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THE ALLIANCE OF HANOVER

J. F. CHANCE





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THE ALLIANCE OF HANOVER

A STUDY OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY IN
THE LAST YEARS OF GEORGE I

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192355-
13.11.24

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

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PREFACE

THE purpose of the present work is to expose in detail British foreign policy during the time of European turmoil begun in the spring of 1725 with the treaties of Vienna and ended by the signature of preliminaries of peace with Austria and Spain in the early summer of 1727, just before the death of the protagonist in the combat, the experienced and strong-willed George I. The period is short, but full of incident, and the author hopes that information gathered mainly from original sources may be of use to students of history.¹

The four years preceding the treaties of Vienna were years of calm in Europe. In the south, in 1721, Great Britain, France and Spain had made alliance under their treaty of Madrid of June, conspiring to force on Austria fulfilment of the conditions of the Quadruple Alliance, while in the north, in September, Peter the Great had concluded his Baltic work at Nystad. True, that during the remainder of his life he continued to keep Denmark and Hanover in affright, but his real attention he turned to new conquests on the Caspian. These were the years of the congress of Cambray, the actual business of which was transacted, until 1724, not there, but by interminable correspondence among the chanceries of the courts concerned.

In the autumn of that year Elizabeth of Spain, weary of the futilities of the congress, determined to try the emperor privately. That singular emissary of hers, the baron de Ripperda, appeared at Vienna in the first days of 1725. At the same time the massacre of protestants at Thorn threatened war in Poland. In February 1725 Peter the Great died and the disordered reign of Catherine I began. In March Spain was violently sundered from France by the repudiation of the little infanta living at Paris as the intended bride of Louis XV. Elizabeth, in her wrath, grasped at terms offered by Charles VI which else had been contemptuously rejected. Treaties

¹ By the kind permission of Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co. use has been made in the earlier chapters of material from the author's articles published in the *English Historical Review* in the years 1911 to 1914.

of peace alliance and commerce between Austria and Spain, the treaties of Vienna, were signed at the end of April, and the period of repose was past.

The sheet anchor of British foreign policy from the year 1717 was alliance with France. Sprung in the first instance from the dynastic needs of George I and of the regent Orleans, it had developed on the basis of national political interests as Austria became the foe of Great Britain also. But it was never an "entente" between the peoples; to them only the old jealousies were cordial. With the death of Orleans in 1723 the dynastic interest lapsed for France, and besides, with Spain as a second ally and Russia in prospect as a third, the French government had not to depend on British support alone. As Dureng writes, in spite of their union the two courts pursued separate paths, oftenest divergent; their collaboration was full of reservations and private aims carefully concealed. Especially was the divergence marked in relations with the northern powers; France was jealous of British action in Sweden and wished to gain Russia by restitution to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp at the expense of Denmark. Only when Spain was lost was France thrown back on England. During the last fifteen months of the duke of Bourbon's rule George I practically dictated her foreign policy. Fleury afterwards, for all his efforts to regain Spain and to relax the tension with Austria, could not pay for reconciliation the price that those powers demanded, separation from Great Britain. At the death of George I the alliance still held firm.

Great Britain's second-ally was the Dutch republic, her partner in the long wars with Louis XIV, her faithful guarantor of the Protestant Succession. Although the brave stand made had brought on the United Provinces financial ruin, their prestige still stood high and other powers courted eagerly their friendship. But to move them to hostilities against Spain or Austria proved difficult. Remaining commercial interests disfavoured the former; the Austrians were posted on their frontier, indefensible with its fortresses in decay and soldiers lacking. The Dutch could never be induced to sign the penal clauses of the Quadruple Alliance; it took nearly a year to bring them to accede to the treaty of Hanover; and then they would not be forced to do violence upon the Ostend Company. What they wanted was peace and quiet. It was important for George I to have their adhesion, but in fact their support could be little more than moral.

Prussia, a third ally in name, was fitful as such and even encumbering. Her first British treaty in the reign of George I, of August 1719, was part of his pacification of the north and from his side designed mainly against Russia. And the same with the second,

that of Charlottenburg, of October 1723. Both, and that of Hanover too, were half-hearted on the part of Frederick William I. His fixed maxim in foreign policy, never to fall out with the dangerous neighbour, Russia, deprived the two former of weight and made him abandon the other, when he saw Russia the ally of Austria. With southern affairs he refused to concern himself at all.

Of the enemies of George I, the breach with Russia dated from 1716, when Peter the Great suddenly abandoned the invasion of Sweden concerted with his allies and quartered his army on the landowners of Mecklenburg, whose interests were those of Hanover. That action of his was a principal incentive with George I to consent to alliance with France.¹ Mutual personal dislike and many an insult on either side aggravated the quarrel. Hanoverian in its origin, Great Britain was drawn into it by fear of Russian domination of the Baltic and because Peter gave asylum to Jacobites with the intention, it was gravely if foolishly asserted, of making some time in their favour a descent upon Scotland from Swedish ports. As a fact, Peter always declared for friendliness with England and confined his animosity to Hanover. Modified towards the end of his life the enmity broke out afresh under Catherine I, when George I refused to find satisfaction for the dispossessed duke of Holstein-Gottorp, her beloved son-in-law and the victim of George's Swedish peace-making. Had he been willing, and able, to meet this her demand, the whole course of history had been changed. Instead of an enduring alliance between Austria and Russia an irresistible confederation of Great Britain, France, Holland, Russia, Prussia and Sweden had controlled the destinies of Europe.

With Austria British dissension became definite when the Tory government of Queen Anne left Charles VI to carry on his struggle with Louis XIV alone. With George I on the throne there was quarrelling, first about the Dutch Barrier, then in connexion with the northern war. The proud court of Vienna felt keenly the ending of that without reference to the imperial congress called at Brunswick for the purpose. In retaliation George I was refused investiture of Bremen and Verden, save on impossible conditions. This dispute was Hanoverian, but a far graver question affected Great Britain, defence of the threatened protestant liberties of Germany. To these subjects of complaint was added, when Spain had acceded to the Quadruple Alliance, the refusal of Charles VI to carry out his contracts thereunder. We find Lord Townshend, formerly so strong for the Austrian alliance, raging in his dispatches of 1721 against the contempt and indifference displayed at Vienna

¹ See Stanhope's dispatches from Hanover, R.O., S.P. Dom. Regencies I.

towards his master. Anger waxed while the Cambray negotiations dragged on and concentrated finally against the company established under imperial charter to trade to the East Indies and China from Ostend. After the treaty of Hanover there was war between Great Britain and Austria in all but declaration.

And the same with Spain. Philip V renewed and maintained his demand for restitution of Gibraltar and Port Mahon. Leaders of the Jacobites were entertained at his court, and the British government could not but believe the evidence (false though most of it was) of his intention to attempt restoration of James III by force of arms. When knowledge of the British action in the Caribbean against the Spanish treasure-fleets was had at Madrid the smouldering embers burst into flame. At the end of 1726 the Spanish ambassador quitted London, and in the following February trenches were opened before Gibraltar. Nor did the state of war terminate with the signature of the preliminaries of peace.

A complete investigation of the alliance of Hanover, its genesis and its results, would oblige research in practically all the archives of Europe, not only in those of the principal powers concerned, but also of the lesser, as Denmark, Bavaria and other German states, Savoy, Poland, Portugal. Even Turkey was involved, on the question of spurring the sultan on to war with Russia. Such a task, carried out in detail, would far exceed the powers of a single worker or the compass of one volume. Our study, therefore, will be confined to the aspect of affairs from the British view point. Fortunately, for elucidation of the aims of other leading states sufficient material, gathered from archives, is to hand in modern works. French policy under the direction of the dukes of Orleans and Bourbon has been exhaustively explained by Wiesener, Bourgeois, Dureng. Of French relations with Spain nothing more can be said than has been said by Baudrillart, nor of Ripperda's meteoric career than by Syveton, to whom Baudrillart acknowledges his debt. The life and times of Elizabeth of Spain have been displayed by Armstrong. The subject of the Ostend Company has been treated exhaustively by Huisman, and that of Juliers and Berg by Rosenlehner. For Prussia we have Ranke, the Seckendorf correspondence published by Förster, and the too patriotic Droysen; for Denmark Edvard Holm; for Sweden Malmström and Stavenow; for Austria Arneth. The dry bones of Russian diplomacy have been collected by Solov'ev, the flesh we have in more familiar languages in the published dispatches of Campredon and Mardefeld. For lively portraiture of Russian social and political conditions we are indebted to Waliszewski and Nisbet Bain.

For the study of British policy we principally want to know

the information on which that policy was based, information supplied by the representatives of George I abroad. That was not always correct, but correct or not, it was what he and his advisers had to go upon. Most valuable are the special dispatches sent by courier, for at a time when the regular postal business included examination of the contents of letters secrets were not confided to that agency. Sometimes, indeed, false information was purposely conveyed in order to mislead the enemy. Moreover ministers abroad differed much in capacity industry and trustworthiness. Horatio Walpole at Paris, Saint-Saphorin at Vienna, William Stanhope at Madrid, Stephen Poyntz at Stockholm, were men of insight and capacity, even if the vision of the second was clouded by religious bigotry, but honest Du Bourgay was unequal to the inconsistencies of Berlin, Lord Glenorchy was oftener away from Copenhagen than at his post, and when there was not greatly valued, Edward Finch at Warsaw was denied admittance to court. Perhaps his brother William, removed from Stockholm to an easier, if more honourable, post at the Hague, was the least useful of them all. Even the able and persistent Poyntz was deceived in supposing that Count Horn told him everything or that he could rely for information from Russia on ambassador Cederhielm or on his own secret agents there. It was on what he transmitted, however, that George I founded his mistaken creed that Catherine I must in the end obey his mandates and depend upon Great Britain and France to maintain her position. When Campredon and Mardefeld, the French and Prussian envoys, related what they saw at Petersburg and sent warning accordingly they were branded as infamous scoundrels sold to the tsaritsa.

Our main material, then, must be the dispatches of the British envoys and our principal documents the replies in which the secretaries of state set forth their government's decisions. Lord Macaulay has cast ridicule on the exhumator of dry archives, but the student of detail may console himself with the words of Baudrillart: "*Les relations . . . des diverses puissances de l'Europe entre elles sont connues dans leurs traits essentiels; on n'en peut renouveler l'histoire que par le détail précis et vivant.*"

J. F. CHANCE.

March, 1923.

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THE ALLIANCE OF HANOVER

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

STORM-CENTRES for Great Britain in European politics in the last years of George I were four : the questions of Gibraltar, of the Ostend Company, of Sleswick (this, for the reason noticed in the preface, of weightiest effect), and of the Polish protestants. The first set her at enmity with Spain, the second with Austria, the third with Russia ; the fourth threatened to relight the fires of religious war. All, and the minor problems attendant on them, were interactive ; as the duke of Newcastle expressed it, "the affairs of the North and South are so interwoven together, that any stand or rub that happens in either place must in consequence affect the other." ¹

Gibraltar, with Minorca, had passed into the possession of Great Britain by the peace of Utrecht. Neither Philip V of Spain, however, nor the French government, nor that of George I, regarded the possession as permanent. Earl Stanhope, when chief minister, was all for restoration to Spain in return for amity and colonial concessions, while of the regent Orleans Dubois wrote : "il consentireroit plutôt à sa perte entière que de renoncer à un engagement si public." ² When, however, Stanhope ventured to broach the question in parliament, such was the storm he raised that he was glad to let it drop.³ A breach with France was averted only by his

¹ To Horatio Walpole at Paris, 4 February (o.s.) 1725, B.M. Add. MS. 32742.

² To Destouches in England, 23 February 1720, Bourgeois, iii. 218. English correspondence on the subject, R.O. France 167 ; the letters exchanged between Orleans and George I, 23 February and 9 March (o.s.), Royal letters 7.

³ "Quant à Gibraltar vous avez répondu très sagement ; il ne peut aucunement en être question présentement. Il est vrai que nous avons fait une démarche au parlement pour pressentir cette assemblée sur la disposition où elle seroit quant à Gibraltar. J'ay moy même esté l'auteur de cette proposition, et l'avois fait faire dans la vue de faire passer un bil qui rendit le Roy maître de disposer de

personal pleading at Paris; British naval preparations for such an event were actually made. The quarrel ended for the time in agreement to refer the question to the congress appointed to meet at Cambray. Yet again in October 1720 Stanhope urged the restitution strongly, distrusting France in case of such reference. He allowed that former offers had been annulled by the war of 1719 and that the king of Spain's demand as a right could not be allowed, but he advanced strong arguments on grounds of expediency for the restitution as a favour, in return for advantages to commerce and confirmation of old treaties.¹

Saving the question of Gibraltar, the British government was all for agreement with Spain in conjunction with France, and in particular for concert of joint action at Cambray beforehand. Sir Robert Sutton, ambassador at Paris, one of the plenipotentiaries first named for the congress,² was instructed not to go thither until such agreement was reached, and further to press in strongest terms for orders to the French minister at Madrid, the marquis de Maulevrier, to act in close concert with Colonel William Stanhope, his British colleague,

and to use his utmost endeavours towards inducing the king of Spain to finish immediately with us upon the terms and in the manner proposed by the King my master. The Regent will himself see the necessity of finishing instantly all disputes between us and Spain, that being the only foundation upon which a union can be formed between the three crowns for supporting their mutual interest in the ensuing negotiations at Cambray.³

Maulevrier succeeded in concluding on 27 March 1721 a treaty between France and Spain, one separate article of which provided for a second treaty to include Great Britain. But another obliged Louis XV to use his most pressing offices to obtain the restoration of Gibraltar and not to desist from his efforts until Philip V had complete satisfaction in the matter, whether by actual surrender of

Gibraltar, comme bon luy sembleroit pour l'avantage de ses royaumes. Vous ne scauriés croire quel mouvement cette tentative a fait dans le public, qui s'est généralement soulevé avec indignation sur le simple soupçon que l'on songeoit, après tant de succès heureux dans une guerre commencée injustement par le Cardinal Alberoni, à nous priver dans la paix à faire de cette place. . . . Il a falu céder ou torrent, et le parti le plus sage que l'on ait pu prendre c'a esté de laisser tomber la proposition au parlement" (Stanhope to Schaub, 28 March 1720, R.O. France 167; a translation, Coxe, *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain*, ii. 260).

¹ Dispatch from Hanover to the Lords Justices in England, 1 October 1720, Mahon II, Appendix p. xevii.

² The others were Earl Stanhope and Lord Carteret: their full powers, of date 7 September (o.s.) 1720, R.O. King's Letters 13. The two who eventually attended the congress were Lords Polwarth and Whitworth.

³ Viscount Townshend, Stanhope's successor, to Sutton, 1 March (o.s.) 1721, R.O. France 170 draft.

the place or by assurance thereof within a given time. Philip standing to this, George I had to give written promise to make the restitution in return for an equivalent, as soon as parliament should allow. That done, a treaty between the three powers and a commercial treaty between Great Britain and Spain, the principal clauses of which confirmed previous commercial treaties and the Asiento contracts, were signed on 13 June. After the signature a second letter was received from George I, of date 1 June (o.s.), from which mention of an equivalent, refused by Philip, was omitted. The essential passage ran: "Je ne balance plus à assurer Votre Majesté de ma promptitude à la satisfaire par rapport à la démarche touchant la restitution de Gibraltar, Luy promettant de me servir des premières occasions favorables pour régler cet article du consentement de mon parlement."¹

Discussion of the question at Cambray was thus averted; it slumbered until in 1725 Spain was again an enemy. How strong was the English objection to its reference to the congress is shown by an instruction of October 1724 to Horatio Walpole at Paris, after he had sent word of a proposal by the marquis de Monteleon to bring it forward. "Whenever this matter is again mention'd between you, you will continue to convince him of the rashness of the Spaniards mentioning it in any manner whatever either at Cambray or elsewhere, and to insist that no further notice be taken of it."²

Consent of parliament to the surrender was a safe condition. Great as was the value of Gibraltar and Port Mahon as military stations, they were yet more precious for protection of British trade. To this we have evidence such as that of General Dormer from Lisbon, in July 1726.

By my being in this court I have opportunities of seeing every day more and more the good effects to our trade from those important places, insomuch that I cannot help looking upon them as the cheife cause that we are now become the great carriers of almost the whole trade up the Streights. I find upon a moderate calculation there are eight British ships to one of all other nations put together employed in that service. Therefore it is not to be wondered at, if Portmahon and Gibraltar are looked upon with an envious eye by other powers.³

¹ R.O. Royal Letters 55, printed in full by Baudrillart, ii. 467. The former letter, Bourgeois, iii. 277. For full particulars of the negotiation see those works.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 29 September (o.s.) 1724, B.M. Add. MS. 32740. Walpole had previously written (2 September, *ibid.*): "What are we to doe, or shall we at last doe, at Cambray? . . . I find by Mr. Stanhope's last dispatches, w^{ch} y^r Grace will now receive, that the affair of Gibraltar is at last to be started. Surely, My Lord, that matter is to be cutt short; . . . the nation I'm afraid will never bear the parting wth Gibraltar."

³ 28 July 1726, R.O. Portugal 33.

While the treaties of Madrid made Spain an ally of France and Great Britain, towards Austria they registered hostility. Nominally George I and Louis XV were to act as mediators at Cambray for final settlement of the differences between Charles VI and Philip V, yet in both treaties a separate article bound the French and British plenipotentiaries not only to act in concert with the Spanish in everything not opposed to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, but even to agree to derogations therefrom desired by the king of Spain. The bitterness of British feeling against Austria is amply shown in Townshend's dispatches to General de Saint-Saphorin, minister at Vienna. At the same time he was forward with assurance that change of Austrian conduct might restore old friendship, and so we find endeavour to minimise at Vienna the importance of the treaties, to have it believed that only outstanding differences with Spain had been adjusted. Saint-Saphorin was enjoined to keep absolutely secret a negotiation, the particulars of which were known only to those who had conducted it. Townshend depreciated the treaty of alliance as

un verbiage à la Française vague, qui paroît promettre beaucoup mais qui pourtant n'engage à presque rien de positif. Vous verrez que nul inconvénient en pourra résulter à l'Empereur, s'il est assez sage pour suivre le conseil que vous luy avez donné dans vos discours. . . . Nous sommes obligés par ce traité seulement à l'interposition de nos bons offices en faveur des demandes de l'Espagne, autant que cela est raisonnable et qu'il ne donne aucune atteinte à la Quadruple Alliance.

He proceeded to lay on the conduct of the Austrian court of late years the whole blame for its present estrangement from his own. Maintenance, he averred, of the ancient league of the sea-powers with the emperor would have been preferred, seeing that chief danger menaced from the immense power of the house of Bourbon and from the predominance of the tsar in the north, but the extravagant conduct, "l'aveuglement et la bizarrerie," of the imperial court made that impossible.¹

Reasons for this estrangement of Great Britain from her old ally have been noticed in the preface and more at large by the present author in the *Cambridge Modern History*, and in his *George I and the Northern War*. To them was now added the intrusion of the Belgian subjects of Charles VI into oceanic trade.

In the course of the seventeenth century Dutch jealousy and Spanish misrule—to Spain her subjects in the Netherlands were

¹ Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 17 July (o.s.) 1721, R.O. Germany, Empire, 42, draft. And similarly about the treaties to William Finch at Stockholm, 17 June (o.s.), Foreign Entry Book 155.

harmful aliens—had brought to extinction a commerce of old time foremost in the world. A final blow was the closing of the waterways to Antwerp, Ghent and Bruges under the treaty made between Spain and Holland at Münster in January 1648. When after the peace of Utrecht the Spanish Netherlands passed into the hands of Austria the Barrier treaty of 1715 confirmed the articles of the other. There remained, however, to the Belgians one port, Ostend, overlooked, perhaps, for its insignificance in 1648, but since made fit for ocean traffic and linked, or about to be linked, with the inland by a wide system of canals. Thence, as soon as the wars with Louis XIV were ended, private merchants of Ostend and Ghent sought and obtained permission to equip armed vessels for that eastern trade, which they saw to be so lucrative to its participants.

The story of the establishment of the "*Compagnie Impériale et Royale établie dans les Pays-Bas Autrichiens*," the "Ostend Company" of common parlance, need be but indicated here; complete particulars will be found in the well-known work of Huisman.¹ Three private ships sailed from Ostend in the spring of 1715, speculators of London and Amsterdam joining in the ventures. Two of them returned next year with cargoes of value nearly doubled. They had had a hard time; English and Dutch antagonism had been pushed to the extreme; at St. Helena one had been mauled and her captain killed by English guns. Their arrival raised a wave of excitement through the country. Among a sheaf of schemes for expansion of Belgian trade was already one for a monopoly to a chartered company.

The Dutch India Companies set themselves in violent opposition and had the support of the States-General, for it was her overseas trade that saved Holland from bankruptcy. An edict of 1717 prohibited Dutch subjects from taking part in the ventures, under penalty even of death. Principal justification was found in allegation that the treaty of Münster forbade the trade to the inhabitants of the Netherlands, were they Spanish subjects or Austrian. It came to open violence. The Dutch made prize of Ostend ships trading to the coast of Guinea; in reprisal a Dutch vessel was brought into the Belgian port and her cargo sold. Nevertheless ships sailed thence for the East Indies or China year by year, and the profits made by the successful adventurers were large.

The British East India Company made common cause with Amsterdam against the "interlopers." Petitions assailed the

¹ In using this work notice must be taken of the criticisms of Goslinga, in the appendix to his book, and of Crokaert. An account in English (also, but perhaps not so justly, criticised by Goslinga) by G. B. Hertz, *English Historical Review*, xxii. 255 f. Documents in Dumont and Rousscau.

government, and at the end of 1718 Sir Matthew Decker, a director, travelled to Holland to concert joint measures. But official help at present could be only underhand. This was the time of the Quadruple Alliance, of Alberoni's war and its Jacobite connexion, and of hostilities with Peter the Great. Maintenance of good relations with the court of Vienna was imperative. Saint-Saphorin in February 1719 was made to present a mildly worded remonstrance, but there could be no thought at present of compulsion.

Charles VI from the beginning of his reign had recognised the necessity of opening his hereditary dominions to trade. For all their vast extent he was perennially in want of cash. "It is well known," says Townshend in one place, "that the Emperor neither has had, nor has he at this time, any money." Charles had inherited bankruptcy, and his court was not one that could economise. Expenditure far exceeded revenue, and the accumulated interest on borrowings was huge. But nothing could be done until his wars with Turkey and with Spain were ended, and relations with Holland finally adjusted by the Barrier treaty of 1718.

Free of these embarrassments he could set to work. In 1719 he set up a privileged company to trade from Trieste and Fiume to the dominions of the Sultan. And now at last ear could be given to the commercial propositions that poured in from the Netherlands. In January 1721 Charles declared to their nominal governor, Prince Eugene, his intention of establishing there a chartered company. Execution was long delayed by factional opposition, supported by Eugene's deputy, the marquis de Prié; not until November 1722 was the charter finally approved, and only after further long debate on details was it promulgated in July 1723. The company started with a capital of six million florins, greedily subscribed, and with exclusive right to trade to the Indies China and the coasts of Africa for the term of thirty years.

Long before this British hands also had been freed. Spain, as has been said, was now an ally, with France, Austria virtually an enemy. At home the government of George I felt itself well established. Referring in 1721 to hopes founded at Vienna on ill reports from London Townshend asserted matters to be righting themselves in parliament and in the country. As to foreign affairs :

Assurément le Roy sera dans une situation à se faire respecter de tous côtés, et à plusieurs égards il aura un plus grand poids que jamais dans les affaires de l'Europe, comme ayant terminé absolument toutes choses qui pouvoient l'embarrasser dans le Sud, et la guerre du Nord allant être assoupie bien-tost par la paix qui va se conclure à Neustadt.¹

¹ To Saint-Saphorin, 4 August (o.s.) 1721, R.O. Germany, Empire, 42.

Knowledge of the Ostend charter was had abroad as soon as it was drafted, and violent was the anger not only in Holland but in England. In June 1723 parliament declared a criminal any British subject who should interest himself or serve in the new enterprise. Saint-Saphorin had orders to echo the minatory protests of the Dutch ministers, Ernest Pestere at Brussels and Hamel Bruyninex at Vienna, and to demand repeal of the charter. For a time words still were deemed sufficient, but in October Pestere, sent to Hanover on special mission, obtained from George I a vowal that the matter formed a *casus fœderis* under existing treaties. In May 1724 the King's Speech at the end of the session congratulated parliament on measures taken to discourage usurpation of trade by certain neighbours and to extend the commerce of Great Britain.

The Dutch sought also backing at Paris, but were successful only in obtaining from Louis XV an edict forbidding his subjects to engage in the trade (16 August 1723). They then tried Spain, party with them to the Münster treaty. It was arranged with Monteleon, now at the Hague, that the king of Spain should enter a strong remonstrance against the Ostend Company in London and demand reference to the congress of Cambray. At Madrid ambassador Francis Van der Meer asserted that the republic would not recoil from war and might even hand over the Barrier fortresses to the French, in order to expel the Austrians from the Netherlands. The marquis de Pozobueno, Spanish ambassador in London, duly presented the remonstrance promised, couched in emphatic terms,¹ and it was repeated by his colleague at Paris. The British government acquiesced; Saint-Saphorin employed strong language at Vienna; at Cambray Lords Polwarth and Whitworth urged that if Spain made formal demand for suppression of the company the emperor must yield. The French, however, both held back themselves and persuaded the Spanish government to refrain.

There was another reason for British opposition to the Ostend Company, apart from trade jealousy, a reason which has endured, the fear of a Belgian port becoming a German naval base. A report to government on the commercial treaty of Vienna after its publication in July 1725 concluded :

The Emperor has long been desirous to have a naval force, and tho his endeavours in Italy have hitherto proved fruitless, because nothing can produce navigation but trade, yet, should the Ostend Company go on with success, by the natural course of things the Emperor will in time have a naval force on the coast of Flanders, which may prove much more inconvenient to us hereafter than a fleet in the Mediteranean or Adriatick Seas, and there are many reasons

¹ Translation, *The Historical Register*, xi. 40.

why wee should be extreemly jealous of the increase of shipping in the hands of a Popish Prince. The command of the seas has frequently past from one nation to another, and thô Great Britain has continued longer in possession of this superiority than perhaps any other nation ever did, yet all human affairs are subject to great vicissitudes. Wee have seen one considerable Maritime Power established in the North in our memory.

And whereas Great Britain had no ground herself for protest under either the treaty of Münster or any other contract or ordinance (such as that of Philip II in favour of his Castilians) forbidding trade from the Netherlands to eastern countries, it was claimed that under the Spanish treaty of 1667 any privileges granted to the Dutch were to be enjoyed equally by the British. Another report of the same time averred :

If the Dutch are intitled to a trade to the East Indies exclusive of the inhabitants of Flanders, the English by the treaty of Madrid in 1667 are likewise intitled to a trade to the East Indies exclusive of the inhabitants of Flanders.¹

For particulars of affairs in the north of Europe in the years 1721 to 1724 the author may be permitted to refer to his articles published in the *English Historical Review*.² The personality there was the Russian autocrat, Peter the Great, his power proved by the victorious conclusion of his twenty years' war with Sweden, the limits of his ambition unknown, and his friendship sought, in the words of the French envoy, Jacques de Campredon, by all princes with a species of abasement. France would engage him against Austria, Austria against France. Prussia had no choice but to be well with so dangerous a neighbour ; in Poland he was stronger than her king : Sweden and Denmark he held in terror by his new Baltic power and by his calculated patronage of the young duke of Holstein-Gottorp, claimant to succession to the throne in the one country and to restitution of his share of Sleswick, the Danish booty in the pacification of 1719-20, from the other. Only George I among the European sovereigns, Peter's personal and political enemy and his equal in obstinacy, combined the will and the power to stand out against him.

Charles Frederick, the dispossessed duke, had in the spring of 1721 found refuge from his wanderings at Petersburg. Peter the Great seems not to have cared much either for him personally or

¹ Reports endorsed as sent to Townshend (at Hanover) on 30 July (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Treaty Papers 107.

² "George I and Peter the Great after the Peace of Nystad," xxvi. 278 ; "The Treaty of Charlottenburg," xxvii. 52 ; "Northern Affairs in 1724," xxvii. 483.

for his cause, only to have found in him a convenient weapon wherewith to harry George I and Frederick IV of Denmark. Every summer he kept them in disquiet by parade of naval forces in the Baltic, and after his death the case was worse. Catherine I had strong personal affection for the duke, married him to her eldest daughter, and would have no understanding with the allies of Hanover without restoration of his duchy of Sleswick or complete compensation to him for its loss.

George's resolution in this matter was neither to force Frederick IV to find the duke an equivalent nor to contribute to compensation himself. The latter point was complicated for him by the Danish claim that under his Hanoverian treaty of 1715 he had engaged to find the half of any such compensation.¹ That claim he steadfastly repudiated, and on the other head the duke of Newcastle declared emphatically, "neither France nor England have any right to impose or even so much as recommend to Denmark their giving an equivalent to Sleswick."²

The French, subject to maintenance of that accord with Great Britain, on which depended success in the solution of the all-important problems of the south, were avid of alliance with Russia, necessary preliminaries for which were composition of the Sleswick quarrel and reconciliation between George and Peter. To work for that they transferred to Petersburg, in 1721, their envoy at Stockholm, Jacques de Campredon. Although George refused to join with him a British envoy, pending satisfaction of his complaints, it was taken for granted that Peter must wish to strengthen his treaty of Nystad by French and British guarantees and would gladly accept the mediation and alliance proffered.³

The sequel showed how wrong was this belief. Peter was willing enough to ally himself with France, but no longer anxious, as he had been in 1717. Aware of the present strength of his position he was resolved to be a law unto himself. Although received with singular consideration and civility, Campredon could make no progress. The Russians asked for positive engagements, which he was not empowered to give. He was left for months without instructions, and when they came their ambiguity was more embarrassing than the lack of them. The only solution that he could see was a separate treaty between France and Russia, to which George I should be admitted subsequently. In August 1723 Dubois, just before his death, sent the sieur de Chavigny to press this solution

¹ See the *English Historical Review*, xxvii. 496.

² To H. Walpole, 21 August (o.s.) 1724, B.M. Add. M.S. 32740.

³ For Carteret's exposition of British views on the subject see his dispatch of 31 October 1721, *English Historical Review*, xxvi. 281.

at Hanover. George refused the proposal absolutely. The French government had to acquiesce; Campredon was left to his endless and miserable task of temporising.

The idea that Peter might turn instead to alliance with the emperor was scouted. Lord Carteret had recently instructed Sir Luke Schaub at Paris that whether in regard to religious strife in Germany, or to other matters, the two could never unite, their interests being absolutely incompatible.¹

A natural ally of Great Britain in the north was Denmark, but George I was not prepared to send the naval and financial help against Peter the Great, for which Frederick IV pressed. In 1722, indeed, ear was given to his appeals, and drafts for treaties with Great Britain and Hanover were sent to Copenhagen, but that was the time of the "Atterbury Plot," and ships and soldiers might be wanted from abroad. The scare past, the cue in the next years was to depreciate the danger, to represent, for instance, that "such a very wary prince" as the tsar would never venture on hazards which Danish naval and military strength must certainly disappoint.

The fact was that the Danes had none in Europe to befriend them but Great Britain. Lord Sunderland, for instance, in 1717, knew of "no other power by which they can expect to be supported."² Swedish hatred of them was mortal, Prussian hardly less; they were at issue on various points with the Dutch and with the imperial authority, and, specially, the French discountenanced arrangements with them. Conclusion of the treaties proposed in 1722, Dubois opined, would prejudice Campredon's work in Russia and not suffice to stay the tsar from any action that he might meditate. Better, he thought, the menace of them as an inducement to him to be tractable, though he allowed that, were Denmark attacked, it would be necessary to defend and protect her. In 1724 the British government made merit at Paris of refusing the Danish solicitations; it was even alleged that the refusal had been made "purely out of regard to the instances of the French court."³ That of Copenhagen was informed that the best security for Denmark was completion of the work in hand in Russia.⁴

Nor, for the present, did help again to Sweden recommend itself. The Hessian king there, Frederick I, the channel of English influence, had lost all credit; his authority was reduced to a mere cipher. It

¹ 18 April (o.s.) 1723, B.M. Add. MS. 22519.

² To Lord Polwarth at Copenhagen, 19 November (o.s.) 1717, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 5.

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 6 April (o.s.) 1724, B.M. Add. MS. 32738.

⁴ Townshend to Lord Glenorchy at Copenhagen, 12 January (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 5.

was ordained by the riksdag of 1723 that if he refused the conclusions of his council they might sign in his name, and that all dispatches from ministers abroad should be sent to the president of the chancery for consideration by a secret committee. In that year, indeed, belief in a Russian project for a descent on British coasts from Swedish ports brought proposals from Hanover for new subsidies, which should enable the Swedes to prevent the attempt. Townshend and Carteret, both there with the king, supported the demand, but Robert Walpole in England opposed it, and it was dropped.¹

Left thus to themselves, the Swedes were forced into a treaty of alliance with Russia. George I was given to understand that both he and Louis XV would be included in it, and good offices for his reconciliation with Peter the Great were proffered again. But when it was found that the Swedish plenipotentiaries had instructions for mediation only, that was once more declined. William Finch was informed privately: "It is impossible the King should think of consenting to entrust any of his affairs in the hands of the Swedes; their government is so weak and divided, and the Czar has so great an influence among them, that they could not but be the worst mediators we could pick out, if we wanted any." And again, the king would not take the "least step that is derogatory to his honour to bring about a reconciliation with the Czar."²

The treaty was signed on 22 February (o.s.) 1724. Inoffensive in its main clauses, it carried a sting in its tail. A secret article, which was not kept secret, obliged the parties to employ their strongest offices at the Danish and other courts to obtain for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp restitution of his share of Sleswick, and if they failed to take counsel with other powers interested, and particularly with the emperor, how this dispute might be ended satisfactorily and the danger to the peace of the north arising from it be removed.

Present relations with Charles VI rendered this prospect of intervention by the imperial authority in the affair of Sleswick sufficiently perturbing. That it might take place appeared from Saint-Saphorin's reports of frequent conferences of the Russian and Swedish residents at Vienna with the arch-enemy of England, vice-chancellor Count Schönborn, and of himself and his French colleague, Du Bourg, treated with contemptuous neglect. It was decided to send to Stockholm a better man than Finch. He was advanced to the more honourable but (in view of Townshend's

¹ Particulars of this, *English Historical Review*, xxvii. 65-67.

² Townshend to Finch, 26 October 1723 and 10 January (o.s.) 1724, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 155.

personal intimacy with the leading Dutch statesmen) less difficult post at the Hague, and in his place was sent one in the especial confidence of Townshend, Stephen Poyntz. Armed with elaborate instructions he reached Stockholm in October 1724. On receipt of his first reports Townshend expressed the concern of George I at the miserable condition of Sweden and her king, but also his conviction that the disorders arose from mischiefs which no intervention could heal. Especially was blamed the weakness of Frederick I, weakness which had forfeited all confidence in him at home and deterred anyone abroad from helping him.¹

With that strange individual Frederick William I of Prussia, his son-in-law, the relations of George I were always difficult. To unite them worked their common zeal for the defence of protestant liberties and the queen of Prussia's devotion to her father, to divide them the inflexibility of the one in contact with the consistent inconstancy of the other. Moreover Hanoverian jealousies obtruded themselves constantly. With southern affairs Frederick William declined to concern himself, on the question of the Ostend Company he would not run counter to his suzerain, and he absolutely refused to be involved in any offensive action against Russia.

In that matter it was his interest, as it was that of France, to see George reconciled with Peter the Great; himself to be a fourth party in the prospective alliance. Mediation, however, that he offered was declined, in doubt of his sincerity. In objection to a separate alliance between France and Russia he joined, deeming such injurious to the common welfare and designed by France to bridle Germany.² Should, however, the tsar turn attack upon Hanover or any other state of Germany, then, he declared explicitly, he would stand with George I to maintain the settlement effected in the north and resist with him any such attack, whatever its pretext might be, in the same manner as though it were directed upon Prussia.³

In this spirit he accepted, impulsively as usual, the treaty of Charlottenburg, 10 October 1723. An effect of it, claimed by Carteret, was that it would divert the court of France from seeking separate conclusion with Russia. For the time Prussia was thought to be definitely engaged on the side of George I.⁴

The Russo-Swedish treaty promoted this good understanding. It was believed at Berlin to aim not only at restitution to the duke

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 12 January (o.s.) 1725, *ibid.*

² Instructions to Baron Mardefeld at Petersburg, 13 January 1722 and 2 January 1723, *Sbornik* xv. 198, 213.

³ Rescript to Wallenrodt in England, 5 January 1723, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

⁴ Pronouncements on the subject, *English Historical Review*, xxvii. 73.

of Holstein-Gottorp but also at the recovery of former Swedish possessions in Germany, including Stettin and its district, the Prussian loot. In a rescript to Wallenrodt Frederick William discussed the dangers of the situation and emphasised their reality. He espied in present developments French and Austrian underhand intrigue, and went so far as to propose immediate assembly of a joint Prussian and Hanoverian force to oppose a Swedish invasion. France, he said, must be prevented from siding with Sweden and Russia.¹

To calm these fears, and to nullify any danger that there might be from the Russo-Swedish alliance, it was determined to invite the accession of France to the treaty of Charlottenburg. To this end, at the same time that the danger was minimised at Berlin, at Paris it was magnified. Not, care was taken to affirm there, that the king of England stood in any fear of the tsar; the prosperous state of his affairs at home and the treaties made with Prussia and solicited by Denmark rendered him easy on that head; but precautions must be taken for the general interest of Europe and particularly for the negotiations at Cambray, "which any diversion by new disturbances in the north at this juncture would certainly give the house of Austria an opportunity of defeating."² Negotiations in the matter went on until in August news received from Campredon justified their suspension. In the autumn they were resumed, but not now for the simple accession of France, in the way of that stood the secret article concerning Juliers and Berg, but for a new treaty, altered from the other suitably. The French draft of this was approved, with exceptions, in London, Horatio Walpole being desired to express at Paris "in the strongest manner the sense his Majesty has of this new mark of their zeal for strengthening and improving the union and harmony of the two crowns, by France's becoming a party to a treaty of such importance to the preservation of the publick tranquillity both in the North and South."³ However, demands by Frederick William, reasonable enough from his point of view, proved inadmissible, and on the upset of affairs in March 1725 negotiations stopped, in spite of Frederick William's consequential importunity to bring them to an issue.⁴

Campredon's news was that, meeting Peter the Great on the day that he received the instrument of his peace with Turkey, obtained for him mainly by the efforts of the French ambassador at

¹ Rescripts to Wallenrodt, April and May 1724, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

² Newcastle's dispatches of April 1724, B.M. Add. MS. 32738.

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 12 November (o.s.) 1724, *ibid.* 32741.

⁴ Particulars, *English Historical Review*, xxvii. 493-5, xxviii. 692-6.

Constantinople, he had seized the opportunity of his good humour to speak of his own negotiation, receiving answer that orders would at once be given which would satisfy him. He received reply in writing a few days later. In view, it was stated, of Peter's friendship and particular esteem for the king of France, and of the fact that without his own reconciliation with George I (though he had no reason to consent thereto unless his complaints were satisfied) the projected alliance could not be concluded, he consented on conditions stated to receive a British ambassador at his court with a view to re-establishing old friendship. Although the conditions—among them reparation to Peter's two client dukes and their inclusion in the treaty, and the accession of France to that with Sweden—could hardly be considered satisfactory, the news was hailed at the western capitals with delight. Heartiest congratulations passed, and to Petersburg was dispatched the draft of a treaty which it was confidently supposed would be accepted.

All pure illusion. Even if Campredon had understood Peter rightly the utterance was unconsidered. Immediately afterwards Prince Kurakin at Paris was informed that reply to his last exposition of French policy must be deferred until some change in it could be discerned, for written obligations with the king of England could not be undertaken. Although in December Campredon still nourished hope, in January 1725 he had to write definitely that while the tsar was still open to alliance with France he would admit the king of England thereto only subsequently and after satisfaction of all complaints. Then, on 8 February, Peter died. On the news of his widow's successful usurpation Campredon, on request from London, was ordered to suspend his work pending further instructions.¹

The importance attached in England to a settlement in the north is shown by a dispatch from Townshend of the end of January. Writing of assurances renewed of French resolve to enter into no separate treaty with the tsar, and further to inform him that the delays and uncertainties experienced could no longer be suffered, he instructed Horatio Walpole at Paris to take occasion from Poyntz's advices to show "how fatal any disturbance in the north must be to our affairs in the south at this juncture, and consequently how much it imports the two crowns to preserve peace and tranquillity in that quarter"; the most effectual means to which end were for the French to continue "to press at Petersburg the conclusion of our alliance and reconciliation" and to send to Stockholm "some prudent discreet man to reside there" to act in concert

¹ Particulars, *ibid.* xxvii. 503 f.

with Poyntz in preventing the Swedes from "running into wild and disastrous measures." These measures Walpole was ordered to press upon the court of France with the utmost earnestness.¹

The Polish question came to a head with the so-called "blood-bath" of Thorn, in December 1724. In Germany there had been of late cessation of attack and reprisal between catholic and protestant, but in Poland the relentless advance of the former threatened complete extinction of the Reformed religion. At Thorn, for instance, only one church and the school remained to satisfy the needs of a population mainly protestant. There, in July 1724, tumults occurred, in the course of which the college of the Jesuits was stormed and sacked. Troops were sent to occupy the town; a commission of inquiry was appointed under the authority of the Polish diet; on its report the magistrates were condemned unheard, and on 7 December nine of the principal burghers were sent to the scaffold.

George I had long seconded the efforts of Frederick William I of Prussia in favour of the Polish protestants. But King Augustus II was obdurate; he dared not, in fact, oppose his catholic clergy. To a letter of expostulation sent by George early in 1724 he had retorted that the protestants were sufficiently protected under the laws and customs of the country, and that it would be well if the catholics in England could enjoy similar security.² In the opinion of James Scott, formerly accredited to him as envoy, there were but two remedies; either to persuade the tsar to interfere, as he had done with effect in the case of the Greek catholics, or to get an article in favour of the "dissidents" inserted in the treaty of peace still to be made between Poland and Sweden, which could be guaranteed by other powers. Otherwise, he thought, the protestants would be exterminated.³

When the sentence against Thorn was known Frederick William of Prussia renewed former remonstrances in a strong letter to Augustus and appealed to the guarantors of the treaty of Oliva; Frederick of Denmark followed suit; George I indited another letter. Before this could be sent came the news of the massacre, and thereon a veritable storm of indignation burst. Frederick William remonstrated afresh and appealed to Louis XV and to the tsar; George I endeavoured to rouse the protestant fervour of the Swedes; at the same time Frederick of Sweden appealed to him, to Louis XV, and to the emperor, as previously to the States-

¹ Townshend to H. Walpole, 18 January (o.s.) 1725, B.M. Add. MS. 38502.

² Letters of 24 January (o.s.) and 22 April 1724, R.O. Royal Letters 41, King's Letters 46, Poland 29.

³ 29 February 1724, R.O. Prussia 17.

General.¹ For his letter written George substituted one in much stronger terms and sent it to Dresden by a special envoy, Edward Finch, ordered in the previous May to Ratisbon to support the cause of the protestants in Germany.² In his covering dispatch Townshend wrote of "the affair of Thorn, which surprized all Europe with its unheard of cruelty," and of the king's resolve

"to exert himself in the most serious and earnest manner in order to procure redress and reparation to that injured town and all its protestant inhabitants. . . . The King would have you let the king and ministers of Poland know, that not only his Majesty is moved, but the whole nation is provoked and ready to break out into the utmost indignation on account of that bloody, unjust and unheard of decree against the town of Thorn."

In view of "this inhuman sacrifice to the Papists" he had determined to make good the guarantee of the treaty of Oliva given by Charles II, and in concert with the king of Prussia and other protestant powers, guarantors of that treaty, to enter upon reprisals, if obliged, upon the catholics in his dominions. "And in these resolutions there is no doubt but the parliament here will heartily and unanimously concur."³

Finch, arrived at Dresden, did not fail to use high words, but unsupported by arms they had no effect. He was met by assertions that Augustus, as elector of Saxony, had nothing to do with the affair, and as king of Poland could not interfere with lawful action by the diet. The emperor, he learnt, had endeavoured to stop the execution, but his envoy had not presented the letter and so was in disgrace; yet the court of Vienna was in pain not for the fact but for its consequences. Although the king of Prussia might act, the Poles feared neither him nor Denmark nor England. All turned on what the tsar might do; if he declared against them they would grant everything, otherwise nothing.⁴

¹ References, *English Historical Review*, xxviii. 697-8.

² Credentials to Ratisbon, and instructions, 2 May (o.s.) 1724, R.O. King's Letters 19.

³ 15 January (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 212, Poland 29; credentials for Finch to the king of Poland, same date, R.O. Royal Letters 41, King's Letters 46.

⁴ Finch, 28 February, R.O. Poland 29. A full account of the Thorn affair, with some of the royal letters (in English), in the *Historical Register*, x. 29 f. and 106 f. Finch's speech, 7 February 1725, p. 115.

CHAPTER II

THE SITUATION IN MARCH AND APRIL 1725. THE TREATIES OF VIENNA

IN the first days of March 1725 three startling advices came to London almost simultaneously. They were, that Peter the Great was dead, that a Dutchman, supposed to be the queen of Spain's confidential agent, Jan Willem Ripperda, had for some time past been working in secret at Vienna, and that the French government had finally determined to find for young Louis XV a bride other than his intended, the little infanta of Spain.

The momentous news of the great tsar's death roused varying emotions at the different courts concerned. The hearts of the Poles and of their king were hardened. At Berlin there was deepest dejection,¹ at Copenhagen manifestations of joy that were indecent.² At Stockholm the Holstein party was cast down and the king's few friends began to raise their heads. The despondency, however, of the former regarded the duke's prospects against Denmark rather than in Sweden; his envoy, "in a deep melancholy," says Poyntz, thought his chance of succession there to be increased but his hopes of recovering Sleswick ruined.³ At Paris and Vienna feelings were mixed; at the latter court there was satisfaction at the unlikelihood now of Russian interference in Poland, but regret on account of Peter's hostility towards England and Denmark and particularly because, while he lived, nothing need be apprehended on the side of Turkey.⁴ Generally a revolution in Russia was expected; power to return to the old boyars and Peter's life-work to be undone.

In London the prominent feeling seems to have been relief at the removal of Peter's powerful personality. The prospect of reaction in Russia and of the destruction of his life-work was not

¹ Du Bourgay depicted the king of Prussia's grief and embarrassment and on 3 March wrote: "The Czar's death has caused great alterations in the schemes and measures of all northern powers, especially in his Prussian Majesty, who now talks of engagements with France and how much he might depend on their alliance" (R.O. Prussia 18).

² See Holm, i. 133, and Glenorchy's dispatches, R.O. Denmark 48.

³ 17 February (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 36, cf. Malmström, i. 445.

⁴ Saint-Saphorin, 17 March etc., R.O. Germany, Empire, 54.

disagreeable to George I and his advisers. Nor did the news from Vienna trouble much. But recently Newcastle had termed "pretty extraordinary" reports of a change of relations between Austria and Spain, of renewal of old overtures for marriages of Spanish infantes to Austrian archduchesses, and had stated that the king gave little attention to them; and Horatio Walpole had replied that at Paris nothing was thought to be on foot, by all accounts from Madrid Philip V was "rather more inveterate than ever against the Emperor."¹ Even at the end of March Townshend doubted whether the man in question was really Ripperda—rather, he thought, an agent sent from Rome with the cognisance of Spain—and argued the impossibility of an alliance between Spain and Austria. Even if so strange a thing did take place, he said, the king, allied with France, felt no alarm. "Il est fort en repos soit que cette intrigue réussisse, ou qu'elle échoue."²

The French news, on the other hand, was disquieting in the extreme; the repudiation of the infanta meant rupture between France and Spain and ruin to the southern policy of George I. The step had long been meditated at Paris, for the infanta would not be of marriageable age for some years and the necessity of providing France with a direct heir as soon as possible was admitted.³ The matter had been debated in the Council in October 1724, when the king's preceptor, Fleury, bishop of Fréjus, had strongly opposed and refused to be a party to it.⁴ The dangerous illness of Louis XV

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 4 February (o.s.), H. Walpole, 24 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32742.

² Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 16 March (o.s.), *l.c.*

Syveton shows (p. 68) that Ripperda came to Vienna at the beginning of January 1725. The date sometimes given, as by Coxe and Armstrong, November 1724, was that of his departure from Madrid. His instructions were dated the 22nd of that month, and the Sicilian canons (of whom later), in the *Breve y sumaria noticia* which they handed to Horatio Walpole in October 1727 (B.M. Add. MS. 32752, f. 208), stated him to have set out on the 24th.

Saint-Saphorin had wind of the matter only after Ripperda had been at work at Vienna for six weeks. His informant, he wrote on 18 February 1725 (*l.c.*), was Hermann Petkum (formerly for many years the duke of Holstein's minister at the Hague and London and now a kind of diplomatic hanger-on at Vienna, touting for employment and supplying Townshend with long screeds of hearsay). Petkum could not identify the Dutchman as Ripperda, not having had sight of him, but the description tallied, he said. Yet the Dutch minister, Hamel Bruyninex, according to an extract from a dispatch of his to his colleague at Madrid, enclosed by Colonel William Stanhope on 12 March (B.M. Add. MS. 32742), knew already on 10 February that the man was Ripperda and believed him to have been at Vienna some ten or twelve days. He gives the baron's assumed name as Pfaffenberg, a spelling probably correct. Arneth, however, says that Ripperda did not preserve his incognito, and Baudrillart (iii. 136) accepts this, while saying that the court of Madrid continued to address him as baron de Phafenbergh till the middle of March. It seems that he pretended a mission to the tsar, and so obtained access to Sinzendorf to submit his proposals.

³ Baudrillart, iii. 144 f., Dureng, pp. 236 f.

⁴ Villars, *Mémoires*, iv. 302.

in February 1725, ascribed by Walpole, describing the young king's gluttonous habits, to a surfeit of chocolates, brought home to the duke of Bourbon his own danger, should Louis die and the crown pass to his hated rival, the duke of Orleans. He was "struck all of a heap," says Walpole, "having made no provision for his own support and security." Against this peril injury to the policy of the Quadruple Alliance could not weigh. Fleury gave Walpole hints of what was toward in February; on 7 March the ambassador reported the decision taken; on the 10th Broglie in London communicated it in form and asked, or rather suggested for his master the hand of George's grand-daughter, the princess Anne.¹

In one way George I gained. Since the Spanish marriage contracts of 1721 interest in the British alliance had waned at Paris. The Hanoverian establishment did not appeal to the present ministry of the duke of Bourbon; neither they nor Fleury, the power in the background, were greatly at pains to conceal their sympathy with the Chevalier de Saint-Georges. There were jealousies, and particularly of the aims of George in the north. The alliances in force with Spain and in prospect with Russia lowered the value of the British, but now, Spain lost and Russia not gained, France was left with only England to depend upon.²

For all the belief entertained that Spain could never ally herself with Austria, it seemed necessary to be prepared for the possibility; and since the emperor might be expected to seek to fortify any treaty concluded by the adhesion of other powers, in that to anticipate him. Premising in a dispatch to Paris of 1 March (o.s.)³ the earnest desire of George I to act in close concert with France, Newcastle recalled that hitherto little credit had been given to

¹ Walpole's dispatches, B.M. Add. MS. 32742, those of 10 and 13 March printed by Dureng in full, pp. 496 foll. On the subject of the princess Anne see Newcastle's dispatches, B.M. *ibid.*, also Coxe, *Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole*, pp. 88-95, Basil Williams in the *English Historical Review*, xv. 492, Baudrillart, iii. 155, 168, Dureng, pp. 246-9. The proposal was at once and decisively declined by George I on grounds of religion both personal and national. Yet that the match was arranged was the universally accepted report; it spread, says Walpole, through Paris like wild-fire, and it raised commotion at Berlin, where Anne was looked upon as promised to Crown-Prince Frederick (Du Bourgay, 27 March [R.O. Prussia 18]. Wallenrodt advised his perturbed master that the marriage was impossible on the ground of religion, "welche des Königes bester Buclier ist." He prayed him not to listen to such idle talk, but to trust his own envoy (20 March and 10 April, Staatsarchiv, Berlin).

² Prince Kurakin's report on Anglo-French relations in March 1724, and Horatio Walpole's expression of opinion in April, *English Historical Review*, xxvi. 308-9. See also Townshend's dispatch of 22 June (o.s.), cited in full by Dureng, pp. 491-5. For the new situation Dureng, pp. 171, 234-6, 273, 298-9. Wallenrodt, the Prussian minister in London, wrote on 27 April 1725 that the "genaue Harmonie" of England and France was now such, that not one letter was drawn up which was not concerted between them (Staatsarchiv, Berlin).

³ B.M. Add. MS. 32742.

reports received of a negotiation for the marriage of the prince of Asturias to one of the imperial archduchesses, considering the apparent absence of motive and the "long and settled enmity" of the two powers; but now, he said, Saint-Saphorin's news appeared to give better foundation for those reports, and probably the scheme was of the queen of Spain's conception, though "how she and her family will find their account in it is pretty hard to conjecture." After suggesting reasons for her supposed conduct the dispatch continued:

Whatever may have been the motives for it, if there should appear to be any truth in this report, or if the step that will soon be taken in France should induce the court of Spain to think of such a measure, it would not be improper that in all events the courts of England and France should be prepared to obviate any ill consequences that may possibly arise from such an union.

The congress of Cambray will indeed be immediately broke up, but the reconciliation between the Emperor and Spain, being the chief thing that was to be transacted there, if those two powers have found means, without the interposition of the mediators, to reconcile themselves, the breaking up of the congress will be no great misfortune.

It is not to be imagined that the Emperor, let him take what measures he will with Spain, will think of attacking the two crowns at present; he will certainly rather at first content himself with the advantage he will have got by having gained Spain from us, and having put that crown in a great degree of subjection to him, from whose interposition and influence with the two crowns at Cambray, as he had reason to fear, a great blow would have been given to his power in Italy. He will make use of the credit this success with Spain will give him to fortify himself and prepare for greater schemes, by endeavouring to gain what interest and alliances he can among the other powers of Europe, and defeating as far as he can our entering into measures with any of them; and in the first place he will thwart and disturb the views and designs of those princes of the Empire, and of the north, who have not run into every measure that he may have thought fit to propose, and in order to chagrin us in particular he may encourage Spain to put difficulties upon our trade. But none of these things will be attended with the least success, if those two powers see that England and France have been so far beforehand with them as to have taken such wise measures as may effectually secure the peace and tranquillity both of the north and south.

The chief powers with which the Emperor will certainly try to avail himself are Muscovy, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, and Poland.

His Majesty is of opinion that the death of the Czar has given a very good opportunity of securing the several powers in the north to the interest of England and France, by offering them that protection from the two crowns, which will not only be very necessary for them but, in great probability, be very much desired by them.

The King was very glad to find by your Ex^{cy}'s letter that orders have been sent to Mo^r Campredon not to renew his instances concerning the reconciliation depending at Petersburg, but to wait to see what turn things took

there, and how far the Czarina would be able to support herself; which was a very wise step, considering the uncertainty things are in there at present.

What your Ex^{cy} says with relation to the concluding of the treaty with the king of Prussia, and the making that serve as a foundation for bringing in the other powers of the north, would indeed be very desirable, if there was any hopes that he would comply in time with what has been proposed to him by the court of France, but considering that prince's constant desire, upon every new bargain, of getting still better terms for himself, and the new objections that he is every day making to the treaty as proposed by France, . . . his Majesty thinks it might be of ill consequence to await the issue of that treaty, which may perhaps be long depending, when if the court of France will be steady to the terms they first proposed to Prussia, and will joyn with his Majesty in taking such measures at the several courts, as may be necessary for securing the tranquillity of the north, it is not to be imagined but the king of Prussia will then comply.

The first and most necessary step to be taken in this affair, in his Majty's opinion, is the sending a minister from France immediately to Stockholm, and this the King would have you represent in the strongest manner to Mo^r le Duc, and Mo^r de Morville. If there was an able and honest minister on the part of France in Sweden, to act in perfect concert with M^r Poyntz there in the present uncertain situation of affairs in that country, it is easy to imagine what effect their joyn't representations might have.

The new spirit that the friends of the present king, and the patriots, as they are called, must have taken from the death of the Czar, as well as the dejected condition that the Muscovite and Holstein party must be in upon that account, would certainly make it very practicable for England and France to enter into measures for the king of Sweden's support, without running into any engagements which might give any just offence to the duke of Holstein, so as to make him think himself desperate with the two crowns.

You will have seen by M^r Poyntz's letters to my Lord Townshend by what means the Czar has been able to gain such an influence over that country, and if they could now see that they may depend upon England and France for support against any attempt that may be made upon them by the Muscovite faction, it is more than probable that that country might yet be retrieved and preserved from ruin, and put into a condition not only of being serviceable to themselves, but to the two crowns. Your Ex^{cy} knows they have a great number of very good troops, which, if that government were not in the weak state it is in at present, would be a great terrour to any power that would attempt to disturb the peace in those parts of the world.

The gaining and supporting of the king of Sweden must be followed by detaching the landgrave of Hesse from that servile submission he has of late paid to the court of Vienna; and nothing would be so great a mortification to the Emperor, and a hindrance to any views he might have in the north, as to see the king of Sweden supported in this manner, there being great reason to think that the duke of Holstein's party has been long favoured by the court of Vienna, of which the inclosed extract of Mo^r de St. Saphorin's letter to my Lord Townshend gives a remarkable instance, and that particularly from the regard and affection that Count Sinzendorf is known to

have for that prince and his interest, from whom he already receives, and does further expect very considerable advantages.¹

If the French had a minister at Stockholm he would also be able to inform them of the views and designs of the duke of Holstein by means of his faction there, and in some measure of what passes at Petersburg, from whence we might have great light to see in what manner it would be adviseable for the two crowns to conduct themselves with relation to the affairs of the north. At present they can have no intelligence but from Mo^r Campredon, whose behaviour has been all along such as has given the greatest dissatisfaction to the King, and in the present critical situation of affairs he cannot be depended upon, even by his own court.

There would be little difficulty to bring the court of Denmark into whatever measures should be proposed by the two crowns; and then there would be but one thing more necessary to compleat the influence of England and France in those parts, which would be to prevent the views that the Emperor may have upon the succession to the crown of Poland, and his Majesty thinks that France has a very good opportunity at present to contribute very much to this end. The affair of Thorn would give a good handle for the French to send a minister to Dresden, who might have orders to act in concert with M^r Finch in pursuance of the treaty of Oliva, of which France is a guarantee.

Such a step as this would hinder the king of Prussia, when he sees that England and France have the conduct of this affair, from entering into any extravagant measures upon this account and would prevent the danger that your Ex^{cy} apprehends there might be of flinging the Poles, who are Roman Catholicks, into the hands of the Emperor. On the contrary, France would have an opportunity of insinuating to them how desirous she is to maintain them in their rights and libertys and support them in the freedom of their election to their crown. The Poles can never suspect that France can have any view against the Roman Catholick religion, and such of them as have been formerly in the interest of the Czar would be glad to have the countenance and support of a French minister; and his Majesty, by the part that he has taken in the affair of Thorn, would gain such a credit among the Protestants in that country as would bring them entirely into the views of the two crowns.

Such a management as this would give the two crowns, even at present, a great influence in Poland, and being rightly improved would put them in a condition hereafter effectually to defeat any views with relation to the succession, which should not be agreeable to them.

Your Ex^{cy} may easily shew Mo^r de Morville that the protestant religion would be by this no further supported than the French are obliged to it by the treaty of Oliva, and that such a measure would give the French a handle to secure that which France has most at heart, which is the preventing the prince of Saxony's succeeding to that crown. The very sending of a minister

¹ Sinzendorf's mother, by her second marriage Countess Rabutin, and lately deceased, was a Holstein princess in receipt of a considerable pension from the duke. Saint-Saphorin in his dispatches of 28 October and 1 November 1724 says that it amounted to 6,000 florins, and that Sinzendorf had a "*prédilection extraordinaire*" for the duke and expected the reversion of the pension (R.O. Germany, Empire, 53).

on the part of France to Dresden, to act in concert with M^r Finch, would be sufficient to engage the king of Prussia to comply with everything that can be desired of him, and if these several powers could be united together, in the manner before mentioned, there would be little reason to apprehend any turn that might be taken in the affairs at Petersburg.

As to the reconciliation at the place last mentioned, his Majesty is willing to go on with it or not, just as the court of France shall desire.

Before Horatio Walpole could transmit the reply of the French government to the plan of action propounded it was known that Peter's widow Catherine was established on the Russian throne. He had died without naming a successor, in spite of his own edict of 1722. In his last moments he succeeded in writing the words *otdaite vse*, "hand over everything," but to whom he could not make intelligible.¹ It is unnecessary to describe here how the men of his creation, Menshikov, Tolstoi, Osterman, the men of brains and action who saw themselves faced by Siberia or the scaffold, opened the treasury to win the Guards and forced the Golitsuins, the Dolgorukys and the rest to acquiesce in placing on the throne the strangest of all candidates. They were strong enough to keep her there. Campredon in his dispatches of February painted her prospects in glowing colours. She had gained all, he said, by her new policy of clemency, "*elle joint à un courage mâle toutes les lumières nécessaires à une souveraine*," and was obeyed as the late tsar was. The nobles were standing by her, fearing for their possessions, there was no one of sufficient weight to head an opposing faction, the clergy were flattered, and in any case she had the army and fleet and held the Baltic provinces.² This was not all true, but it impressed.

Outside Russia those who had mourned for Peter's death were now elated, those who had hoped for the downfall of his stately edifice and for liberation from the Russian menace correspondingly depressed. At Copenhagen, says Glenorchy, the event had "quite dissipated the joy which the news of the Czar's death occasion'd here, and they begin already to be under greater apprehensions than ever," intending, however, "to lye by" and see what would happen, taking consolation from the thought that no expedition could be attempted against them in the coming summer and flattering themselves that Catherine would rather assist her prospective son-in-law in his pretensions to the crown of Sweden, "with the view of having a support from thence or at least a sure retreat in

¹ So Klyuchevsky, iv. 341, Waliszewski, p. 2. Bain in the *Cambridge Modern History* (V. 548) strangely translates the words "forgive everything."

² Campredon, 13 and 17 February, *Sbornik*, vol. lviii. It may be noted that couriers usually took about a month to pass between Petersburg and Paris.

case of necessity.”¹ Like expectation prevailed at Stockholm, and though it was not consoling to the king’s friends there, yet, says Poyntz, they drew hope from the fact that it seemed also to alarm certain of the senators opposed to him.² On the other hand Holsteiners and Prussians were jubilant. Mardefeld wrote from Petersburg in his relief, “Der Höchste hat durch seine wunderthätige Hand auch des Ohnmögliche möglich gemacht.”³ Du Bourgay reported from Berlin :

His Majesty’s daily discourses turn on the future advantages which he shall receive by her friendship and alliance, and is even so sanguine as to affirm that the Czarina will support her self her friends and allys with greater dignity than the late Czar did. The king believes that the present differences about religious affairs offer him a fair opportunity to enter into alliances that may help to redress those grievances and at the same time assist him in his own private views and designs.⁴

Indeed, Frederick William offered his support to Catherine against Austrian and Polish intrigues and expressed his pleasure at her resolve to carry on the negotiation for alliance with England and France, to which he himself was fully inclined to accede.⁵

Against Austria the balance seemed adverse. The excluded heir, Peter son of Alexis, was the empress’s nephew, and Russia under the rule of his adherents might have been expected to seek support from Vienna rather than from Paris or Berlin, and not to stand in the way of Austrian ambitions. Campredon expressed the thought of the moment when he wrote, immediately on Catherine’s usurpation : “Cet évènement va aliéner pour longtemps la cour de Vienne de celle-ci, qui n’a point de parti solide à prendre qu’une alliance étroite avec le roi ; je sais, que c’est le sentiment de la nouvelle souveraine.”⁶

Having communicated to Morville such portions of Newcastle’s dispatch as he deemed proper, Walpole learnt how pleased the whole

¹ Glenorchy, 3 and 10 March, R.O. Denmark 48.

² Poyntz, 24 February (o.s.), private and in cipher, R.O. Sweden 36, and further 3 and 10 March (o.s.). The opportunity was taken to press him afresh for financial aid from Great Britain and France, and he heard “wild notions and extravagant reasonings,” as Townshend termed them, on such subjects as the recovery of Livonia. Impressed himself, he could make no reply, having been again quite recently informed by Townshend that neither king Frederick nor his henchman General Diemar (the Hessian envoy) were to be trusted with money, “having neither credit, firmness, resolution nor any other abilities requisite to conduct or carry on any concert for their own or the kingdom’s safety” (5 February (o.s.), *ibid.*).

³ 10 February, Staatsarchiv, Berlin, *Sbornik*, xv. 251.

⁴ 24 March, R.O. Prussia 18.

⁵ Rescript to Mardefeld, 10 March, Staatsarchiv, Berlin (*Sbornik*, xv. 265–6), cf. Droysen, iv. ii. 365, Ranke, iii. 33.

⁶ 10 February *Sbornik*, lii. 444.

court was "with the solidity of his Majesty's sentiments," and that, in spite of extreme anxiety to conclude the treaty with Prussia, the unwisdom of waiting on that king's dilatory and uncertain disposition was recognised. He noticed belief in the establishment and friendly sentiments of Catherine I, sense of the importance of preventing her from making advances to the emperor, and nothing seen in engagements with her to prejudice measures in regard to other powers of the north. They ought neither, said Morville, to be "too backwards, or cool" towards her, nor so forward as to have their hands tied, and he noticed that, differently from the late tsar, she expressed desire for the friendship of England as well as of France "without any reserve." Although he added that money could be found for the king of Sweden, if the course of affairs required it, Walpole could not but conclude "that their thoughts at present seem more favourable to Muscovy than Sweden." ¹

Newcastle in reply pressed earnestly for immediate and vigorous action on the part of France. Seeing, he said,

that Mo^r le Duc must be sensible that the step he has taken cannot fail of making at present at least some disturbance, and disposing the several powers of Europe to turn it, if possible, to their own advantage, it seems amazing that the court of France should so long delay sending their ministers to those courts, which are so absolutely necessary to be secured to their interests.

The private letter from Poyntz enclosed showed "the weak, uncertain and corrupt condition of Sweden, and how little able they are to direct themselves." To send ministers to help to guide them, so far from prejudicing the good disposition of the tsaritsa reported, on the contrary would make both her and the duke of Holstein more eager for the friendship of the two crowns, nor could anything so much conduce to conclusion with Prussia. As to a minister for Dresden, additional reasons for sending one were the king of Poland's military preparations, his approaches (though probably unsuccessful) to Catherine, the general expectation of a religious war, and the evident design of setting the emperor at the head of the catholic faction in Poland.

¹ H. Walpole, 24 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32742. He was now in close touch with secretary Pecquet, "upon whose opinion," he said (16 March), "the conduct of foreign affairs principally turns, and whom I have always perceived the most difficult and cool" upon the point of sending the ministers. This man had borne an important part in the negotiations for the quadruple alliance in 1718, when Luke Schaub termed him "*bon François, mais au reste homme de beaucoup d'honneur et d'intégrité*" (B.M. Stowe MS. 231, fo. 99; cf. Wiesener, ii. 218. A copy of the dispatch of Craggs there cited is at the Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 29).

Your Ex^{ty} will easily see how entirely master the Emperor must be, both at present and hereafter of that kingdom, if the Roman Catholicks are obliged to think that they owe their protection to him, or the Protestants that they must be always at his mercy.¹

Walpole, however, though able to report "highest approbation" by Bourbon and Morville of the arguments advanced and their promise that envoys should be named in a few days, had yet to state attention to be concentrated on the affair of the infanta and on finding a wife for Louis XV "out of hand." This brought renewed insistence. His Majesty, Newcastle wrote, was very sorry to see the dispatch of the French ministers still postponed. "The present situation of affairs in the north is such, that every day shews more and more the advantage that some powers may take of the indolence and inactivity of France upon this occasion," witness the behaviour of the court of Poland in regard to the affair of Thorn, with the object of securing the succession of the electoral prince of Saxony, the trouble which might be caused by the indiscretion of the king of Prussia in the matter, he seeming to have in it only his own interest in view, "and lastly the divisions in Sweden."²

However, only promises could be obtained at present. The cost of foreign embassies was of consequence, when the indebtedness of the state was so great and was constantly increasing.³ Besides, there was the fear of doing anything which might prejudice the negotiation in Russia. The only appointment made was that of the duke of Richelieu, as ambassador to the emperor. His instructions, of date 28 March, illustrate French views on the general situation, while they reflect in their ambiguity the indecision consequent upon domestic dissension and incapable leadership.⁴ First

¹ Newcastle in reply, 16 March (o.s.), *ibid.*

² H. Walpole, 3 April, and the reply, 1 April (o.s.), *ibid.*, and 32743.

³ Particulars, Dureng, pp. 257 f.

⁴ On French politics and rivalries see H. Walpole's secret dispatch of 3 April, recounting a very long and intimate conversation with Fleury, and further Newcastle at much length, 1, 5, and 29 April (o.s.), and Walpole again, 27 April, B. M. Add. MS. 32743. The incapacity of the duke of Bourbon's government is the subject of frequent scathing comment in Walpole's dispatches. For instance, on 30 July (*ibid.*): they had "no system of their own," and knew not "which way to turn themselves, to prevent any troubles, nor how to put themselves into a condition to resist them, if they come; the weakness of the Administration and the sovereign contempt of it in all parts, not only among strangers, but among their own subjects, is incredible, and were it not that this Government is so entirely absolute, and that there is no body, either bold, or able enough to make the least motion, I should think it impossible to hold two months; but there is not the least danger of a change; his Most Christian Majesty is so ignorant and indolent; so averse to all business; and indeed to all pleasure, excepting that of going out a hunting by day, as it is called to kill some beasts; and of coming home, to play at cards all night; that he thinks of nothing else; leaves all to his ministers; and being now acquainted with their faces, he would not easily be persuaded to change

the policy of the Triple and Quadruple Alliances was reviewed, and opposition to Austria was stated as its motive. One reason for sending Richelieu, though not the principal one, was the possible dissolution of the congress of Cambray ; should that happen, it was said, the treaty of London, “ que Sa Majesté regarde comme la base et le fondement de la tranquillité publique,” would still remain in force, and he must combat contrary arguments by the Austrian ministers and use all possible means to prevent its contravention in any way. His attention was called (1) to Austrian suspicion of supposed endeavours to extend French influence in the empire, particularly by alliance with Prussia, (2) to the emperor’s paramount interest in the Pragmatic Sanction, (3) to the disorganised state of his finances, which forbade a war, and (4) to the increased acerbity of religious strife and the embarrassment at Vienna consequent upon the very important affair of Thorn. In the foreign relations of Austria there was no chance of restoring the old system ; the emperor was effectually separated from the king of England by his refusal to grant the investitures of Bremen and Verden and by the disputes on religion, and from Holland by the affairs of the Ostend Company and the Barrier. The goodwill of Sweden he was doing his best to cultivate ; Denmark he attempted to hold in a kind of servitude ; and with the late tsar three methods had been tried, (1) to make alliance with him, (2) to secure the throne of Poland for the electoral prince of Saxony or some other on whom Austria could depend, (3) to foment war between Russia and Turkey. The greater the alarm that was shown at French alliances with Great Britain, Holland, and Prussia, the more necessary were they to be regarded. Of the first, in being, experience had shown the utility ; it and the treaty of London must be firmly upheld, and Richelieu must act in close concert with Saint-Saphorin. Even were the congress of Cambray dissolved, it might be set on foot again hereafter. In the troubles which a guarantee of the Pragmatic

them. He is indeed a perfect child, and more than should be expected from his years, and the appearance of his person.” And again on 14 August (*ibid.* 32744) : “The ignorance and incapacity in business of Mo^r le Duc and Count Morville, and in consequence thereof the irresolution and timidity of them in counsels and measures to be taken, is unaccountable, and altho’ the Bishop [Fleury] is quick in his apprehension, clear and strong in his opinion, and is for vigorous measures in the execution of what is right, yet after he has once given his sentiments, he will not indeed depart from them, but yet he will not push them in opposition to others with that weight and resolution as to make them prevail, for fear of creating divisions in the ministry. To conclude, My Lord, I must do this court the justice to say, that I am persuaded they have no thoughts of abandoning his Majesty’s friendship, and they would look upon it as the greatest misfortune to have it in the least weakened, and this opinion goes so far, that it is the general voice of all the foreign ministers here, that France acts entirely by the influence and motions of England ; but their weakness and want of courage is unaccountable.”

Sanction might bring neither Great Britain nor France were disposed to involve themselves. On the religious question the king favoured, of course, the catholics, but the emperor's action was really political and the worst possible for the welfare of catholicism in Germany; Richelieu must give hereon only general assurances that France would hold to her guarantees of the treaties of Westphalia. As a guarantor of the treaty of Oliva she must employ her good offices on behalf of the protestants in Poland, but on this subject Richelieu must apply himself principally to obtaining information on which positive orders to him could be founded. Generally, he must limit himself at present "à écouter beaucoup, à s'instruire et à se renfermer dans des discours généraux, tels qu'ils viennent de lui être prescrits." In supplementary instructions Richelieu was informed that the emperor could hardly yield to Spain any considerable advantage, and probably was acting only with a view of detaching that power, and thereafter Great Britain and Holland, from France; even were an agreement arrived at, he might be expected to throw it over so soon as that aim had been attained.¹

In regard to the new situation in Russia English disposition accorded well enough with the French. His Majesty, Horatio Walpole was instructed, was very ready for alliance with Catherine I on the terms offered and would receive advances from her side in the best manner. To Walpole's arguments against undue precipitation² it was replied that "such a return should be made to the present good disposition she expresses towards the two crowns as may prevent her having recourse to the Emperor and entring into views and measures contrary to those of the two crowns." The last accounts from Petersburg were very favourable, and if she held her own alliance with her would be of very great advantage, if only by bringing the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, "who some time or other may be very considerable in those parts," into the views of the two crowns. Otherwise England and France might be the only powers standing out, or worse, the king of England, by the fault being imputed to him, be left alone to bear "the future resentment of Muscovy and Holstein. . . . Whereas on the contrary the inducing the duke of Holstein to enter into the same engagements, that the other northern powers are under with us, would be no bad affair, whatever turn things may afterwards take in Muscovy."³

¹ *Recueil des instructions*, i. 200.

² In gist, that it was "morally impossible" for Catherine's rule to "subsist many months without the utmost confusion and disorder," that the object of the proposed alliance had been to bind Peter the Great's "aspiring and ambitious temper" and to prevent him from "attempting to raise new disturbances," and that it would now only entangle Great Britain and be of no service (private postscript of 4 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32742).

³ Newcastle to him, 18 and 25 March and 1 April (o.s.), *ibid.* and 32743.

Soon, however, reports began to come in from others at Petersburg very different from Campredon's first glowing forecasts. In the worst strain wrote the Saxon minister, Lefort, conscious of the pleasure with which his highly coloured effusions would be read.¹ They, of course, were not available for London or Paris, but Poyntz had accounts from his paid correspondent at Petersburg that agreed and transmitted Count Horn's belief in an impending revolution. He quoted a Swedish officer arrived in Finland thence to say "that all which has been done in favour of the Czarina has been through the dint of money; that not the tenth part of those who have signed the oath are satisfied with what is done or intend to abide by it; but there is a perfect anarchy in the country, . . . the discontent is so universal that a revolution may certainly be expected."²

The reply was that his Majesty's first and principal aim was to preserve the peace established in the north, since any disturbance there must affect the negotiations at Cambray, to the emperor's great advantage. Poyntz, therefore, must apply his particular care to restrain the king of Sweden and his party from any thought of breach with Russia or any of their neighbours, or from building on the reports from Petersburg such hopes as of recovery of the lost provinces. The tsaritsa had begun well, had gained much esteem and affection, and was showing "grands talens, et un génie supérieur." There might be divisions and menace from the party of the tsarevich, but the two powers most dangerous to her, Prussia and Poland, were courting her goodwill. There was nothing that the king of Poland would not do for her, if she would support the succession of his son. The result of any breach of the peace of Nystad on the part of the Swedes might well be loss of their Pomeranian holding to Prussia and establishment of the said succession. At the same time the present establishment in Sweden must be maintained and the Swedes animated against submission to Russia, a thing doubtless more easy, now that their fear of that power must be diminished. In his relations with the Russian and Holstein ministers Poyntz must be polite and straightforward, using every argument to convince them that the duke's sole hope lay in what Great Britain and France would do for him, if he submitted to their measures; if he would not, then he must be taken for a declared enemy. To find out what the said ministers were doing money must not be spared, for it was "of the last consequence that Sweden should not enter into any measures with the Muscovites

¹ Dispatches of February and March, *Sbornik*, iii.

² Poyntz, 17 March (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 36.

unknown to the King, nor till we see the fate of our treaty at Petersbourg." ¹

Another private dispatch of the same date ran :—

I must now return you thanks for your private letter of the same date with your publick one, which has been laid before the King ; by the whole tenor of the advice contained in it there is great reason to think that, tho' the Czarina's government may not be in any immediate danger, yet that her authority is but weak and does not promise any long duration.

However that will be no reason to induce his Ma^{ty} to change his conduct with relation to the country where you are, or to the court of Petersbourg. It will be always well for the King to have made peace with Russia. If the Czarina continues in power it will be of consequence to have her our friend, or at least to have tied her hands by solemn engagements from disturbing the peace of the north. If she miscarries, and the power falls into hands able to carry on the government upon a scheme that may make them considerable to their neighbours, and to this part of the world, and such as are enemies, as most probably they will be, rather than friends to the duke of Holstein, they will have no further regard to his interest but be heartily glad of the guarantee obtained from England for securing their new conquests to them in the manner it is done by the treaty now in agitation. Lastly, if the power should fall amongst people wholly resolved to restore their ancient form of government and way of living, we shall scarce ever hear of them any more, much less shall we be ever troubled with them, and consequently in that case if our treaty does no good it can do us no harm.

At this time was received at Paris from Campredon a memorial signed by the duke's ministers admitting the conclusion of that treaty to be the best thing for his interests, provided that the three powers undertook to compel Denmark to make him just and reasonable satisfaction for his loss of Sleswick and that, pending a final decision, he should receive from France and England an annual subsidy. This was not at all to the taste of the French court. Such claims, Campredon was sharply told, placed an invincible obstacle in the way of obtaining compensation for the duke, for the kings of France and England would not depart from their guarantees to Denmark nor the former king from his union with the latter ; the matter could not be hurried, and it was to be hoped that the tsaritsa would not be misled by the counsels of the Holsteiners. The affairs in Campredon's charge were so pressing that any false demand on the duke's part might be irremediable.²

¹ Townshend to him, 6 April (o.s.), a public dispatch in French and a private one in English, *ibid.* The greater part of the texts, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 184-189. The former, Horatio Walpole tells us, was submitted to and approved by the French government.

² Bourbon to Campredon, 15 and 26 April, *Sbornik*, lviii. 139, 187. The memorial, pp. 40-43.

Yet the need of satisfying the duke in some way was recognised at Paris. One idea was that the Swedes might pass some act in his favour, to be guaranteed by Great Britain and France, in return for which he should acquiesce in nothing being said in the Russian treaty about Sleswick. To this and other expedients of Pecquet's suggestion it was replied from England that news from Petersburg showed that "if the court of France do, without loss of time, give the Czarina and the duke of Holstein to understand that they do insist upon the treaty's being concluded in the manner that it was sent to Petersburg, there can be no doubt of their ready compliance."¹ Poyntz was informed that nothing could be conceded. "We must always look upon the duke with a jealous eye, as long as we find him so sett upon disturbing the peace of the north with relation to Sleswick." Of the methods suggested for reducing him "to cooler thoughts, the first, which is distressing the Czarina's government by fomenting intestine divisions, is the best and surest ;" Poyntz must seize every opportunity for this that offered and endeavour to excite feeling against the duke in Sweden.² Broglie again, once more trying for concession, was answered that it was impossible to allow the duke either the "*indemnité équivalent*," or the annual subsidy, demanded, as Campredon reported, by the Russians. The king, he was told, was surprised at this contradiction to the assurances given from Paris of the tsaritsa's facility ; her demands were greater than those of the late tsar, it was now nearly nine months since the draft treaty had been sent to Petersburg, and the tsar's repugnance and the present delay merited no greater condescension on the part of the two crowns than readiness still to sign the treaty, certainly not acceptance of changes so opposed to their interests and the retractation of resolutions taken with such deliberation. The word "*indemnité*" had been expressly used to exclude the word "*équivalent*," and the proposal of an annual payment was equally extraordinary. It was hoped that the tsaritsa would be informed that the treaty must be concluded as agreed upon by the two crowns, for they could not in honour or in accordance with their engagements go further.³ These

¹ H. Walpole, 24 April, and the reply, 19 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

² Townshend to Poyntz, 27 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 37. To enable him to work with effect Poyntz was now authorised to spend £10,000 among the senators and in "disentangling" General Diemar from his debts, though he must not let the money get into the king's hands or be used for other purposes. Annual pensions, he was told, would be preferable to single sums, and it would be well if by "management and frugality" a smaller amount could be made to serve.

For Major-General Diemar, the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel's envoy to his son, King Frederick, see p. 165.

³ Newcastle to Broglie 6 May (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Ministers 4 ; a very rough draft, France 181.

representations produced renewed orders to Campredon in the sense desired.¹

To the naval preparations which Catherine I was known to be making no great regard was paid at present ; only a training-cruise was thought to be intended. So Campredon advised, confident of her pacific intentions, and so Du Bourgay from Berlin, though he ran up the tale of ships to twenty-five men-of-war and two hundred galleys. From Copenhagen Lord Glenorchy wrote : " We are very easy here and apprehend nothing," while Poyntz and Walpole heard again of quarrels and confusion rampant at Petersburg, naval expenditure reduced by one-half, and officers and men ready to mutiny for want of pay.²

In his own work, that of winning by persuasion or otherwise influential senators, Poyntz had been unremitting. Chief among them was Count Arvid Horn, of whom Townshend : " he has certainly better abilities and more credit in his country than any of those employed by the king " and, according to information, " if he had his master's confidence would serve him with zeal and fidelity." Later, on receipt of Poyntz's report of a favourable disposition on the count's part, Townshend intimated that the king of Sweden was minded to meet it ; news which he deemed of such importance as to require a special messenger.³

Poyntz had already excited Horn against the Holstein party by informing him, on Walpole's authority, of libels against him by loquacious young Cederhielm, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's minister at Paris.⁴ Pushing his advantage he made open confidence of everything and reported, after detailing the conferences in full :

What your Ldp. will judge of his behaviour on this remarkable occasion I cannot tell ; to me it had not the appearance of perfect innocence, nor of much greatness of mind. He is not for the king of Sweden ; he is not for the duke of Holstein ; so that, except he means to sett up for himself, his conduct is merely guided by his passion and has no meaning at all." And yet, " I think I see several marks of his having alter'd his conduct both towards his Majesty and the king of Sweden.

Others whom Poyntz thought to have " converted " were Counts Lagerberg and Cederhielm, senators " of very good sense and parts "

¹ Bourbon to Campredon 10 and 21 May, *Sbornik*, lviii. 294, 317.

² Campredon, 24 and 31 March and 7 April, *ibid.* ; Du Bourgay, 1 May, R.O. Prussia 19 ; Glenorchy, 12 May, R.O. Denmark 48 ; Poyntz, 21 and 27 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 37 ; H. Walpole, 8 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 24 March (o.s.) and 13 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 36. The former advice was from William Finch, the latter from an intercepted letter from Frederick's private secretary, Törne, to Baron Sparre in London. The messenger carried a copy of this to Poyntz.

⁴ Nephew of the Swedish senator mentioned below. H. Walpole's references to him are always of the most abusive character. Cf. Malmström, i. 454.

but looked on as devoted to Russia ; the former a son-in-law of Count Vellingk and both suspected of receiving pensions from the late tsar. Cederhielm he notified to be about to go as ambassador to Petersburg in order, he gathered, to learn for himself how matters stood there, the present envoy, Baron Cedercreutz, being of no use.¹

In May, as the result of further conferences, Poyntz could write :

I find the duke of Holstein's interest declining so fast with Count Horn, and I begin to be so well persuaded of the honesty of Count Cederhielm's intentions, that I believe his Majesty need be in no pain for the future least they should obstruct the reconciliation on the duke's account. . . . The count intimated to me, as plainly as he ever intimates anything, that if he lives and can help it the duke shall neither have the least assistance from hence towards recovering Sleswick by force, nor any farther assurances of the succession than he has already. . . . He said it was repugnant to their form of government, their oath, their libertys and right of election to nominate a successor while their present Majestys lived." ²

Horn, however, by no means told Poyntz everything. Partisan neither of the king nor of the duke, but zealous for the interest of the nation, he was obliged in present circumstances to dissemble. He was to govern in the end, but in the meantime had to work his way cautiously and to play a subtle game with all. Even if really well disposed to England he could not for the present venture to break with Russia. About Cederhielm Poyntz was quite deceived, as the event showed. Malmström relates how his appointment to Russia was carried by the Holstein party in the senate with intention that he should work for a close alliance of Sweden with Russia as against Denmark Prussia and England, for the advantage of the two powers and of the duke. He notes how Bestuzhev, the Russian envoy, favoured the choice, and how Cedercreutz was believed to be of the king's party.³

Other advices came through the Swedish minister at Paris, Baron Gedda, decidedly a royalist. Private letters to him,⁴ communicated to Walpole, advised the good effect of Peter the Great's

¹ Poyntz, 5 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 36. Cederhielm, he said, had had an English pension all the time of Charles XII's absence in Poland and had been very serviceable to the then envoy (Dr. John Robinson, afterwards bishop of London). His father-in-law also was an English pensioner, and his wife's brother, the present secretary at war, had been educated at Oxford at Queen Anne's expense. A small sum now would probably fix him in the king's interest. "I take him to have the best parts and knowledge of any in the senate next to Count Horn." If he should "drop off," Cederhielm might succeed him as president of the chancery.

² The same, 14 May (o.s.), *ibid.* 37.

³ Malmström, i. 445-8.

⁴ From Horn, Törne, and Court-chancellor Düben.

death in removing fears of invasion, the desire for a French minister to come to Stockholm (since now, in Walpole's rendering, "things are so altered that there was a good disposition in Sweden to have recourse to their old friends"), and so on. He was instructed to assert all possible rectitude of intention in sending Cederhielm to Russia, and gave assurance of orders to that ambassador to act in concert with Campredon. On the strength of this Walpole took occasion to urge the replacement of that suspected minister by one "of credit and integrity," entering fully into the reasons for mistrusting him.¹ Bourbon he found, as usual, agreeable, but Pecquet, who, he says again, "has the greatest influence, and almost the sole direction of foreign affairs," hinted that Campredon had received English money when in Sweden and objected that it was not convenient to take the present negotiation out of his hands before the Russian ministers should have explained themselves upon it. He promised, however, later, that a change should be made in some manner which might not disoblige the tsaritsa and the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, as soon as someone were found to replace Campredon, who should at once have orders, as desired, not to favour the duke's aspirations.

Also Walpole took occasion to advise a supply of money for the king of Sweden's use, with the view of bringing the country into subservience to the views of Great Britain and France. Paid in instalments, he said, and not of sufficient amount to enable the Swedes to undertake anything against Russia, the subsidy would yet render them independent and disable the tsaritsa from any enterprise.²

At Dresden, all this while, Edward Finch was making no progress, and the Prussian envoy, Baron von Bülow, who arrived on 1 March to help him, was put off as he had been. The Prussian monarch, however, was in earnest. Bülow, in answer to his first report, was ordered to support Finch with the utmost firmness and informed of inclination on the part of Catherine I to take effective measures.³ To Mardefeld at Petersburg Frederick William expressed his readiness to respond to Catherine's overtures,⁴ and to Wallenrodt in London his pleasure at hearing that George I maintained his good

¹ A mistrust repeatedly expressed in the English dispatches. It arose in great measure from what Poyntz heard and reported against his integrity, see his essay of 2 February (o.s.) on Swedish affairs, R.O. Sweden 36. H. Walpole obtained from Pecquet the admission that Campredon had lately bought an estate in France, which he could not have afforded out of his salary (16 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32742).

² H. Walpole, 24 and 27 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

³ Translation of instructions to Bülow sent by Finch on 17 March, R.O. Poland 29. Cf. Droysen, IV. ii. 364.

⁴ Rescript of 27 March, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

intentions in regard to Thorn and his own readiness to enter into all measures that should be thought suitable or necessary; the tsaritsa, he said, had declared to him that if the protestant powers would enter into a concert in the matter she was prepared to accede to it with all her heart.¹ That intervention was preparing was the public talk. Finch had news of offers by Catherine I to send 40,000 men into Poland to assist the protestant powers, were they forced to proceed to extremities, the half at their expense and half at her own; Campredon reported a large muster of Russian troops about Riga; ² Du Bourgay wrote in April that Catherine had intimated to the court of Berlin her readiness to enter into the most effectual measures for the relief of the Polish dissidents and to stand by the guarantee of the treaty of Warsaw of 1716, which forbade the entry of Saxon troops into Poland. Principal attention, he said, was being given to the affair of Thorn, a great war was anticipated, British financial help was relied on, and it was plain that Prussia and Russia, acting together, could do what they would.³ At Ratisbon it was said that the king of Prussia would send 24,000 men and the king of England 10,000, with further contingents from Hesse-Cassel Sweden and Denmark, and that the duke of Holstein-Gottorp was strongly pressing Catherine I to join. At Berlin was current a list of Prussian regiments appointed to assemble on the Polish frontier. In May it was asserted that 12,000 troops of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel would march as soon as George I came to Germany.⁴

So far as George was concerned such reports were without foundation. He was not prepared for forcible intervention, although, as Wallenrodt reported Townshend to say, allowing the advantage of the tsaritsa interesting herself in the affair of Thorn.⁵ Finch had been informed: "You have done your duty," but seeing "that words will not do the business, and that we are not prepared in any wise to support them by effects," he should not press his case too strongly. What Prussia did, said Townshend, did not much matter; the "main turn" depended on Petersburg.⁶

These sentiments were shared at Paris. It was hoped there, Horatio Walpole had written, that the king of Prussia would not press on his resentment at the Thorn massacre to a war and so "make the Polanders desperate and oblige them to fling themselves

¹ Instructions, not dated, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253.

² 31 March, *Sbornik*, Iviii.

³ 10 and 18 April, R.O. Prussia 18.

⁴ *Lettres historiques*, lxvii. 411-5, 529.

⁵ 20 March, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

⁶ 30 March (o.s.), R.O. Poland 29.

into the hands of the Emperor.”¹ And we find the same thing in the instructions issued to the abbé De Livry, sent to Poland in the following year, though they deal, of course, with a situation then greatly altered. The reasons for sending him were stated to be the feeble state of Augustus II's health, the publicity of his steps to secure his son's succession, Austrian overtures to the Poles, movements in the north, and the affair of Thorn. Four of these reasons held good in 1725. On the last it was pointed out that the protestants had given the provocation, and that, however severe had been the reprisals, the catholics had good arguments to support them and their proceedings were judicially correct. All “*démarches d'éclat*” must be avoided, for to irritate the Poles might drive them to bring in Saxon or even imperial troops for their defence, with the result that the king's authority would be completely established in the country and his son succeed him. While De Livry must do something to meet the engagements of France under the treaty of Oliva, he must on no account act as though he were the minister of a protestant power; must make it understood that there was no desire to interfere in the domestic concerns of the country, only to offer mediation and good offices for the restoration and maintenance of peace.²

On 1 May Mardefeld wrote that the Russians looked upon an expedition against Poland as an easy and inexpensive way of gaining glory.³ And Campredon on the 12th: “*le roi de Prusse continue de faire solliciter vivement.*”⁴ But nothing resulted. For one thing, Catherine's attention was now concentrated on the Sleswick question, for another Prince Gregory Dolgoruky, lately returned from Poland, and his son Prince Sergius, now at Dresden, were advising, so Mardefeld learnt, against resort to force. At an interview with him Osterman refused to say more than that a great error had been committed, repeating the words “*fermeté, fermeté,*” the apparent imputation being that the king of Prussia ought to have interfered in arms at once.⁵ And the consistent reply to

¹ Dispatch of 7 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32742.

² *Recueil des instructions*, iv. 301.

³ Staatsarchiv, Berlin; *Sbornik*, xv. 277.

⁴ *Sbornik*, lviii. 298.

⁵ Mardefeld had reported on 2 January a saying of Peter the Great that had he so strong an army “*à portée*” he would never have allowed such wrong to go unredressed. The imputation galled Frederick William sadly. While reiterating his anxiety for a Russian alliance, and the sooner the better, he complained that neither the late tsar nor the tsaritsa had ever been persuaded even to remonstrate with the king of Poland. The futility of accusing him of want of firmness was shown, he said, by his actual mobilisation of a force of 30,000 to 40,000 men, a thing which few other princes could have done in so short a time (rescript to Mardefeld, 5 May).

Mardefeld's representations was that the tsaritsa was perfectly prepared to send a good force, if only the king of Prussia would concert a plan with other sovereigns interested and communicate it to her.¹

To conclude present reference to affairs in Poland, when there came to Dresden news of the proposal to marry Louis XV to the daughter of ex-king Stanislaus Finch observed "a great damp in all their faces" and wrote, "the ministers here think seriously of adjusting the affair of Thorne, that they may not have to do with the Dissidentes at the same time that the hidden party of Stanislaus." But he doubted whether they could control "the bigoted and head-strong" in Poland. Bülow, he said, was tormenting him to know what resolution parliament would take in the matter before prorogation. He had something to say of a new plan of partition with Prussia, mooted privately by Flemming, of endeavours by him to persuade the Poles that George I would not "support the affair of Thorne," and of his showing Bülow letters from Poland "in that stile in order to foment a dissidence between our court and his." He concluded, if the tsaritsa promised "no more than she will perform, and the court of Berlin does not prefer private interest to the publick cause, and the K. of France's marriage wth Stanislaus's daughter . . . is declared," then there would be little difficulty in bringing the Poles to reason, but "if any of these cards are wanting," failure.²

Meanwhile Elizabeth of Spain, in her first fury at the dismissal of her daughter from Paris, had accepted the meagre terms, which Ripperda had been able to transmit. Treaties between Spain and Austria were signed at Vienna, a public treaty of peace and a private one of defensive alliance on 30 April, and a treaty of commerce on 1 May 1725.³ To meet all the extravagant demands of Ripperda's instructions⁴ Charles VI undertook little more than not to oppose the restitution of Gibraltar and Minorca, "si amicabiliter fieret," and to employ all good offices, where deemed useful, and mediation, if desired. For himself he obtained, besides a guarantee of his Pragmatic Sanction, most extended commercial privileges for his subjects and specifically for the Ostend Company. No wonder that the ministers responsible displayed the "abondante joye" recorded by Saint-Saphorin and Du Bourg.⁵

¹ Mardefeld's dispatches to 26 May, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

² Finch, 3 to 19 May, R.O. Poland 29.

³ Dumont, VIII. ii. 106 f., Rousset, II. 110 f.; in Spanish, Cantillo, pp. 202 f. Full particulars of the final negotiation, Baudrillart, III. 175-189.

⁴ See for these Syveton, ch. vi, Cantillo, pp. 214-6, the *Cambridge Modern History*, vi. 139, 140.

⁵ Boasting, said they, of freedom now from "la tutelle des deux cours médiatrices. Elles traversoient sous main notre paix avec l'Espagne, bien oin de

The public treaty was at once communicated to foreign courts with invitations to accede to it and the statement that it was entirely conformable to the principles of the Quadruple Alliance. Even now there was surprise in London at the successful event, "so much the less expected," Newcastle wrote, "because it was not easy to foresee how their Catholick Majestys could find their advantage by this separate alliance."¹

It was true that the public treaty was in conformity with that of London (the Quadruple Alliance), on which the second article expressly stated it was to be based. The principal addition was the mutual guarantee of successions established, one of them the Pragmatic Sanction. But it could not therefore be accepted as innocuous. In the first place two powers reconciled of their own will might be expected to act together in the future. Secondly, both were catholic, and the Pragmatic Sanction had avowedly catholic objects, and therefore the alliance was a further menace to the hardly pressed protestants of Germany and Poland. Thirdly was evident the strength which must accrue to the Ostend Company, although the Spanish engagements in favour of it were not yet revealed. Fourthly, the meagreness of the benefits to Spain compelled belief in other compacts kept secret. Thus Newcastle: "In case there be no other treaty than this (which is hard to believe) the court of Spain has shewn it's moderation in a very extraordinary manner, in having departed from what was proposed for them by the mediators, and was not then by them thought sufficient."² And Horatio Walpole in reply: "The treaty publish'd is so dishonourable and disadvantageous in every respect to the crown of Spain that this court does, as everybody must, conclude that there is some secret treaty, or articles, to flatter the queen of Spain's vanity and ambition in favour of her son Don Carlos, wherein tis very likely she will be at last disappointed and find she has given up the substance, to catch at the shadow." He reported Morville to say that "the most

l'accélérer; nous avons sçu la faire sans Elles, et c'est maintenant que nous serons respectables" ("Relation Commune" of 11 May, R.O. Germany, Empire, 55; cf. Dureng, pp. 277-9). In his dispatch of 16 June (*ibid.*) Saint-Saphorin gave the chief credit to the Marquis de Rialp: "Rialp a toujours eu en tête de négocier avec l'Espagne, il a obligé le comte de Sinzendorff à adopter ses idées; il leur a été facile d'y faire entrer Savaillac, et ces trois messieurs, qui sont continuellement au tour de l'Empereur, ont trouvé moyen de luy faire envisager cette négociation comme devant le rendre arbitre de toute l'Europe, et sur tout également le directeur de la monarchie d'Espagne, pour laquelle il a tant d'affection, comme le maître absolu de l'Empire."

¹ To H. Walpole, 3 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32743; drafts with much correction and erasure, R.O. France 181. The copy of the treaty delivered to George I R.O. Treaties 150, with a French translation.

² To H. Walpole, same dispatch, and similarly Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, same date, R.O. Germany, Empire, 54.

material thing to do at present " was to employ all means, not sparing money, to find out whether there were secret articles, and if so what.¹

Specially suspected were a marriage-contract between the infante Don Carlos and the archduchess Maria Theresa, and the promise of help to recover Gibraltar and Port Mahon by force. In reality there was nothing of the kind. The stipulation of the private treaty concerning Gibraltar was only as said. The third and fourth articles guaranteed safe entry of imperial ships into Spanish ports on equal terms with those of the most friendly nations, "*uti Galli hucusque fuerunt et Angli adhuc sunt*," and effort in common to procure reparation, should those of either party be attacked on either side of the line. The fifth clause specified the mutual succour in case of attack; on the part of the emperor 20,000 foot and 10,000 horse, on that of the king of Spain at least fifteen men-of-war of the line, 15,000 foot and 5,000 horse, or in place of the ships 10,000 troops, or in place of either cash at rates specified. The emperor, having no funds, escaped this pecuniary alternative.²

George I was not only invited but pressed to accede to the public treaty. Overtures besides were made to Saint-Saphorin for separation from France and return to the old system of alliance with Austria.³ But the invitation and the proposals were declined.⁴ The cue adopted was to show neither interest nor disquietude. Horatio Walpole was instructed to urge the French government to maintain the close alliance with Great Britain, to send ministers to the northern courts at once, whereupon "we shall soon be upon such a foot of power and influence in Europe as not to be under any manner of concern at whatever may be the secret view or design of this new alliance," and to decline entry into a treaty "made in so unhandsome a manner" and containing "new stipulations which might hereafter prove very burthensome" and of ill consequence.⁵ Nor would George listen to the offer by Charles VI of his mediation on points at issue between Great Britain and Spain, an offer accompanied by the strongest assurances of friendship, couched in the most guarded terms, and disclaiming alike knowledge of what the differences might be and belief that any could remain unsettled.⁶

¹ H. Walpole, 15 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

² From a copy of the print of 1727, sent by Saint-Saphorin with his dispatch of 1 March of that year, R.O. Germany, Empire, 60. Dumont's version differs in certain points.

³ Saint-Saphorin in his great secret dispatch of 11 May, R.O. Germany, Empire, 55.

⁴ See Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, i. 140-1.

⁵ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 3 May (o.s.), cited.

⁶ Extract from a rescript to Starhemberg in London, dated 19 May, R.O. Foreign Ministers 11, Spain, 93.

Count Conrad Starhemberg having communicated these his instructions on 2 June (o.s.) was answered that the king "knew of no differences or disputes that were between him and his Cath. Maj^{ty}, they having lived in the most perfect union friendship and intimacy, which his Majesty on his part should continue to cultivate and improve, and that he had no occasion for any mediation, nor would he admit of any."¹

Before the end of May the British plenipotentiaries, Lords Marchmont (formerly Polwarth) and Whitworth, took a hurried departure from Cambray, in order to save appearances by anticipating that of the Austrian and Spanish. The French stayed on awhile, "upon a puncto of civility," says secretary Thomas Robinson, Cambray being on French territory.² On 27 May was proclaimed the betrothal of Louis XV to Maria Leszczynska, a match which increased the difficulties of the French government abroad and was recommended only by the probable submissiveness and fecundity of the bride.

¹ As retailed to Stanhope at Madrid, 20 June, R.O. Spain 93.

² 30 May, R.O. France 181. There had been protracted discussion on this subject. Robinson was in charge of affairs at Paris while Walpole was on a visit to England.

CHAPTER III

UPSET IN THE NORTH. PRUSSIA

DURING the months following the treaties of Vienna attention still turned principally to what was passing in the north. Spanish hostility to England was not displayed till August ; however much Ripperda at Vienna, as reported by Saint-Saphorin,¹ might boast of the will and power of Philip V to recover Gibraltar and Port Mahon and even to set up James III in England, all that was set down to Austrian incitation. Colonel Stanhope would see, he was told, that it was

the aim of the Imperial court by the means of Spain to bring us as much as they can under their influence, and to raise disputes between Great Britain and that kingdom, in order to make themselves the umpires of them. If such a gross artifice should have made any impression at Madrid, and their Cath. Matys should give in to such wild plans with respect to Gibraltar, and our commerce, as seem to be projected between the Imperial ministers and Ripperda, you must, as from yourself, speak very plain upon these points." ²

From the north, on the other hand, in June, burst sudden storms. Continuing his dispatch of 14 May (o.s.) Poyntz told of a letter from Count Bassewitz, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's first minister, shown him, recounting the tsaritsa's transport of rage on receiving her ministers' report of their first conference with Campredon, the violent harangue in which she had declared her intention of making war on Denmark, and her orders to Menshikov and Admiral Apraksin to have her fleet and the troops for embarkation ready by the middle of May, at their peril. When Poyntz remarked that the whole thing read like "a fiction or rhodomontade of Bassewitz, contrived with very little art and probability," Horn had replied

¹ 26 May f. 1725, R.O. Germany, Empire, 55 ; cf. Armstrong, pp. 182-3, Dureng, p. 283, Syveton, pp. 126, 142, Baudrillart, iii. 184, 207.

² Townshend from the Hague, 20 June, R.O. Spain 93, and similarly to Newcastle, 29 June, Regencies 6.

that since had come "certain intelligence that it was all literally true."¹

What had happened, by Campredon's accounts, was that at a conference on 19 April his complaints of the delays of the past six months had been met by the Russian ministers with assurance of the tsaritsa's readiness to conclude the proposed treaty, provided either that France and Great Britain should accede to the Russo-Swedish treaty of February 1724, or that that treaty should be included among those specified for guarantee. They had stated, moreover, that the duke could not be satisfied with a mere indemnity, but must have a "satisfaction suffisante, prompte et effective." Campredon standing firmly by his instructions, the conference was adjourned in order that report might be made to the tsaritsa. Her outburst had followed, and at a second conference with the Russian ministers, on 27 April, the effect of the news of the repudiation of the infanta had shown itself. His opponents now objected that the prospect of war between France and Spain lowered the value and increased the responsibilities of the proposed alliance. It was argued that by force of the third article, which named among the treaties to be guaranteed those of Utrecht, Baden, the Hague (the Triple Alliance), and London (the Quadruple Alliance), Russia might be compelled to take up arms against Spain or Austria or the empire on questions in which she had no interest, while all that she had in return was an unwanted guarantee of the provinces won from Sweden. To set the balance right engagements must be undertaken on her behalf in regard to Persia and Turkey. And further were required omission of the treaty of Stockholm between Sweden and Great Britain and inclusion of that of 1724, made, it was stated, under French advice. Amendments also were proposed on other articles and the whole was embodied in a counter-project, which Campredon forwarded on 3 May, with a great dispatch to Louis XV recapitulating the whole course of his negotiation. From the third article all mention of treaties was struck out and a general guarantee of existing possessions substituted. By the twelfth the crown of Sweden was named as included ("nommément comprise") in the treaty, in consequence of the alliance from which the tsaritsa

¹ Poyntz, 14 May (o.s.), cited. He gives a version of Catherine's harangue in full, characterising it as stage rant and commenting: "It is indeed a most curious piece, and will deserve your Ldp's utmost attention, since it not only relates to the affair of the reconciliation but will let your Ldp. into the Czarinna's real character, and convince you that she has caught the contagion of Bassewitz' madness and is as enraged and desperate in the Holstein cause as that incendiary can wish her."

A portion of the harangue, Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, i. 243. Count Bassewitz' letter was of date 9 April (o.s.), and addressed to Reichel, the duke's minister in Sweden (Malmström, i. 445, note).

could not derogate. In the second secret article "offices efficaces" were stipulated to restore to the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin his possessions as soon as possible and to maintain the rights and privileges accorded him by the treaties of Westphalia and the constitutions of the empire; the Hanoverian troops in occupation to be withdrawn; and the differences between the duke and his subjects to be adjudged by the diet or by impartial arbiters. The third secret article, stated to be the tsaritsa's ultimatum, ran:

S.M.I. de toutes les Russies ayant déclaré en même temps, qu'elle ne pouvait se dispenser d'accorder une protection à S.A.R. le duc de Holstein-Gottorp, son gendre, S.M. a demandé pour cet effet à Leurs Majestés T.C. et Brit. d'entrer dans ses vues, pour contribuer à faire avoir contentement au dit duc par rapport au duché de Sleswick, surtout puisque S.M. le défunt Empereur de glorieuse mémoire a pris à cet égard des engagements très précis avec la couronne de Suède, dont S.M. l'Impératrice régnante aujourd'hui ne saurait se départir. Cependant S.M.I. étant bien aise de contribuer en tout ce qui peut dépendre d'elle, pour qu'on puisse sortir de cette affaire amiablement, elle accepte les offres et promesses, que font en vertu du présent article Leurs Majestés T.C. et Brit. de procurer au plus tôt par des moyens convenables au duc de Holstein une satisfaction entière, qui lui puisse servir pleinement d'un dédommagement équitable par rapport à son duché de Sleswick, S.M. Imp. prenant sur elle de disposer S.A.R. d'y acquiescer aussi de son côté; mais en cas que le roi de Danemark n'y veuille point donner les mains, Leurs Majestés T.C. et Brit. déclarent, qu'elles ne s'opposeront ni directement, ni indirectement, à l'efficace des moyens, que S.M. Imp. trouvera à propos d'employer pour faire avoir justice au duc, son gendre.

Commenting on this, Campredon definitely ascribed the changes in the third article to the altered circumstances in the south of Europe. The Russians, he said, objected to being involved in the quarrel between France and Spain, not only on general grounds but also because the tsaritsa would thereby be prevented from taking up arms on behalf of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Whereas, if free from it, she might attack Denmark safely, for other powers would be too much occupied to interfere; some of them, indeed, would be glad to side with Russia, "qui peut seule donner le poids à toutes les affaires du Nord." And even if the attack on Denmark failed, Russia was unassailable in return. The Swedes, it was further said, would be carried by their unappeasable hatred of the Danes to join in any measures which the tsaritsa might propose; indeed, with the duke on the throne of Sweden, and his bride declared heiress in Russia, things which very soon might come to pass, the two nations would be practically under one direction.¹

¹ Campredon, 21 April to 3 May, *Sbornik*, lviii, the counter-project, with the changes in it proposed by the French government, pp. 265-84. There follows a scheme by Campredon for the distribution of 60,000 ducats among those Russians who had helped to bring his negotiation to an issue. Another copy of the counter-project, with papers in connexion, R.O. Treaty Papers 61.

A first effect of the intelligence was to direct British and French attention once more to Prussia, neglected since the dropped negotiations of the winter. Reply to Poyntz ran :

The account of the Czarina's behaviour in the senate of Petersburg is as curious as it is surprising. We never had before such particulars of her temper and her views ; but the King has long thought by the delay which has been used in the business of the alliance and reconciliation that other projects were on foot, and that what should be done in that negociation would be little more than amusement, in order to cover other designs. But since you have cleared that matter up so strongly, and Count Horn looks upon themselves to be pretty secure on the other side the Baltick, his Majesty judged in this situation that the best he could do was to endeavour to counterwork the Russian plan on this side the Baltick by giving what encouragement he could to Denmark, by putting the king of Prussia to the test either of discountenancing the Czarina's project, or of furnishing the 10^m men promised by the treaty of Charlottenburg, or of openly discovering his views by declining to comply with the terms of that alliance ; and by exciting France to joyn in both those schemes with respect to Denmark and Prussia.¹

Mistrust of Frederick William of Prussia was as marked at Paris as in London, but extended there rather to his relations with Austria than with Russia, and particularly to what might result from the late arrival of an imperial envoy, Count Rabutin, at Berlin.² On this head George I and his ministers were not disturbed. They knew that Frederick William would shape his policy solely from the point of view of his own advantage and that the emperor, at present at all events, had not enough to offer him. Du Bourgay's present advices were that the refusal of George I to accede to the treaty of Vienna had given great pleasure, that the king intended to repair to Hanover as soon as his father-in-law arrived there, that he was much alarmed at supposed secret articles of the said treaty directed against the liberties of the empire and the protestants, and that he would be found ready to join in any measures that his Majesty should think fit to propose. And again : " Count Rabutin and Gen^l Seckendorff with all their friends at this court have endeavour'd to disengage the king of Prussia from his friendship with France, and not without some insinuations tending to disunite the King and his Prussian Majesty. But I am assured their efforts have proved fruitless hitherto." ³

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 1 June (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 37.

² Rabutin had left Vienna in February, but owing to disputes about the liability of his baggage to customs duties and on points of ceremonial (see the Seckendorff correspondence, 24 February f. 1725, in Forster's *Friedrich Wilhelm I*) he reached Berlin only on 26 April, nor did he have his first audience till 21 May (Du Bourgay's dispatches, R.O. Prussia 19).

³ Du Bourgay, 5 to 21 June, *ibid.*

In all that related to the north, on the other hand, Frederick William was thoroughly suspect in England. He was known to be in treaty with Catherine I, as of old with Peter the Great, for the establishment of a Prussian prince in Courland as husband of duchess Anna Ivanovna, Peter's niece, and it was understood that he was ready to take up arms on behalf of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp in return for the duke's promise to cede to Prussia Swedish Pomerania on his obtaining the crown of Sweden. It would be seen, Poyntz was told, from what Du Bourgay wrote about the Courland question how the court of Berlin "loves always to be driving such underhand bargains, and the bait thrown out seems to be very proper for the Czarina's aims in order to draw that prince deeply into her interest." Horatio Walpole had written previously : "I cannot forbear . . . venting my thoughts which I have long entertained with regard to the king of Prussia's conduct, which seems to me in all parts of the northern affairs entirely opposite to his Majesty's interest ;" certainly there had been a concert between him and the late tsar by which he was "to find his account by some new acquisition." Newcastle had replied : "His Majesty approves your reasonings about that prince's conduct, and thinks them very just." ¹

That Frederick William should thus be everywhere distrusted was a natural consequence of his vagaries. At home, where he could play the tyrant, he swerved not from his work of building up his iron military-bureaucratic state ; abroad he had no such resolution. A professed maxim of his in foreign policy was to render no service without fit recompense, and he ever turned his eyes to where advantage seemed to offer for the moment. No sooner a bargain made than dropped, if a better offered from elsewhere. Decisions impulsively taken were as hastily repented. None could depend on him, and yet everyone had to reckon with his military force and his overflowing treasury. ²

His position, indeed, was difficult. Not only was Austria jealous of his rising power but also Saxony and Hanover and other of his neighbours. His natural ally was Russia, and her friendship

¹ H. Walpole, 3 May, Newcastle in reply, 29 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

² A French estimate of Frederick William's character, ten years earlier, ran as follows. "Le roi de Prusse fait aisément des avances, et s'il désire d'un côté de faire des traités avantageux, d'autre part il craint également de s'engager dans des mauvaises affaires. Occupé sans cesse de la passion de s'agrandir, il est toujours incertain sur les voies qu'il doit prendre pour y parvenir. S'il en choisit une, à peine est-il déterminé à la suivre qu'il en reconnoît les dangers, et pour l'ordinaire il aime mieux abandonner le parti qu'il a pris que de travailler à surmonter les obstacles qu'il y rencontre" (instructions to the Comte de Croissy, sent as ambassador to Charles XII at Stralsund, 11 April 1715, *Recueil des instructions*, ii. 259).

he persistently cultivated; yet to join hands with Russia was to break with England, nor would Catherine I respond sincerely to his advances. Against Austria, he had to ask himself, dare he rely on Great Britain and France for protection, when the emperor, his minister at Vienna wrote, would be able, by Spanish subsidies, to put 90,000 infantry and 36,000 horse into the field next year? ¹ We have a picture of his perplexity in a report by his intimate friend the Austrian General Seckendorf, who spent in his company this year the greater part of June. The king agreed, it ran, that good harmony with the imperial court was necessary and was pleased with Count Rabutin personally, but no sooner was he brought into a good humour than there came some fresh decree of the Aulic Council to irritate him. Neither he nor his ministers seemed to have any fixed plan of policy, so that little that was real was to be hoped from him. Though unlikely to ally himself with foreign powers against the emperor and empire, he could not be depended upon to furnish the troops, of which he was so fond, even as auxiliaries, still less to employ his whole army. He seemed to wish so to behave towards all powers as to be thought ready to enter into fixed alliances, without taking real engagements with any. Thus he would doubtless treat the French envoy, Count Rottembourg, when he came to Berlin, very confidentially, in order to rouse jealousy in other quarters and to be made more account of at Vienna. He hung now on Russia, now on England or other powers, without being able to resolve to close with any of them. In spite of appearances, Seckendorf knew that the British and Prussian courts were anything but in harmony, and when the two monarchs met there might be an explosion, because George I would not be hurried about the marriage of Prince Frederick to the crown princess of Prussia. If this did not come off, the king of Prussia would be alienated from Hanover altogether, especially if his father-in-law acted the preceptor and espoused, as threatened, the cause of the Magdeburg nobles. Nor was he content with the slumberous attitude of George I in the Thorn affair. It were well if at their coming meeting an imperial minister could be present, in order to profit by a quarrel and bring Prussia wholly over to the side of the emperor. He (Seckendorf) ventured this advice, knowing so well the king of Prussia's temper and his court. Any one spending some weeks with him could not too greatly wonder at the "vielfältigen Veränderungen, Resolutionen, Projecta, Furcht, Hoffnung und differente Affecten." Prince Eugene, to whom this was written, agreed with the views expressed, but thought that ways would not be

¹ Droysen, IV. ii. 374

wanting at Hanover to bring over the king of Prussia to anything desired.¹

The gravity of the marriage question was appreciated by Du Bourgay. It was "the chief subject," he wrote, on which the king of Prussia would talk at Hanover, and the queen was so uneasy about it that she had renewed her commands to him to desire Townshend to use his best offices "that some distant hopes may be given of the conclusion of this matter," otherwise she could not prevent her husband "from taking resolutions very destructive to the good of her family, and her own quiet and rest for the remainder of her life, whereas that his Prussian Majesty has so much at heart this matter, that if the least favorable expression be dropt, it will calm him entirely."²

On the subject of Pomerania Poyntz had lately written: "The Czarinna is very solicitous to make matters up between this court and Prussia. The reason is because the K. of Prussia has offered to guaranty the succession of the duke, on condition he may have the remainder of Pomerania."³ And that this was an object of Frederick William's ambition is the fact. In January, indeed, when the Holsteiners at Petersburg had renewed the suggestion, he, being then engaged on his projected alliance with Great Britain and France, had seen the unwisdom of angering those powers for so shadowy a prospect; but just now he informed his envoy Mardefeld that he favoured the proposal.⁴

Besides which, he was known to be negotiating with Catherine I a treaty, reported by Du Bourgay to include provision for mutual succour with 10,000 foot and 4000 horse, the Russian troops, perhaps, to be employed in Germany.⁵ On this subject, however, George I, if better informed, need not have alarmed himself. The facts were that Russian proposals for closer alliance had met with warmest welcome at Berlin, that Mardefeld had raised afresh the question of Courland in connexion, and that Frederick William had sent to Petersburg a draft "punctation" for the hire of a Russian corps of

¹ Seckendorf to prince Eugene, 27 June 1725, and the reply, 14 July, Förster, *op. cit.*, Urkundenbuch II. 38-47. In accordance is Saint-Saphorin's statement (11 May, R.O. Germany, Empire, 55) that the court of Vienna was so convinced of the king of Prussia's irresolution that it feared him little, although so jealous of him and although he could do more harm to Austria than any other prince.

² Du Bourgay, 24 May, R.O. Prussia 19.

³ Poyntz, 5 May (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 37.

⁴ "Sind Wir bereit, wenn Wir den Ueber-Rest von Vor-Pommern durch Beförderung der Russischen Kayserin erlangen können, mit derselben in Alles eintreten, was mit solcher acquisition eine proportion hat" (26 May, Staatsarchiv, Berlin).

⁵ 20 and 24 May, R.O. Prussia 19

8,000 infantry and 2,000 dragoons for his own service.¹ Later, on 26 May, when difficulty had been encountered in getting it prepared at Petersburg, a draft for a treaty of alliance was sent from Berlin. This included stipulations about Courland and the dukes of Holstein-Gottorp and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the king of Prussia undertaking to second the tsaritsa's efforts on behalf of the former duke with his good offices, so far as was practicable, on condition that he should show himself favourable to execution of the contract made in former times with the administrator of Holstein, especially in what concerned the acquisition of Wolgast; but its principal contents related to the troops and to the affairs of Poland, prevention of complete Saxon domination there and protection of the protestants.²

Nor on other matters need George have concerned himself. We have seen how Catherine had put off Frederick William's proposals for joint military intervention in favour of the protestants of Poland. On the subject of Sleswick, in reply to Mardefeld's report that Bassewitz was striving to make Russian engagements with Prussia conditional upon an undertaking to recover that duchy for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, he said that, if these were the only services rendered by Bassewitz, the 2,000 ducats sent him were badly employed; such pretensions were impossible, and better counsels on the tsaritsa's part were hoped for; it was no fault of his that the duke had lost Sleswick, that the Swedes would not support his interests more keenly, or that Denmark had received the guarantees of England and France; he had done the duke good service, he thought, in declining to be also a guarantor, and would always employ in his favour all possible good offices.³ Another belief, that Mardefeld was ordered to traverse Campredon's work, was equally unfounded. On 3 February, for instance, Frederick William expressed to his envoy his great regret at hearing that the work was not prospering, it being in present circumstances his true and highest interest that the projected alliance between Great Britain, France, and Russia should be concluded quickly.⁴ For he looked to be included in this "ersehnte Verständigung," as Droysen calls it,⁵ and thereby to render his position against Austria impregnable.

¹ Rescripts to Mardefeld, 23 January to 25 April, Staatsarchiv, Berlin; Mardefeld, 10 and 14 April, *ibid.* and *Sbornik*, xv. 275, f., with documents.

² Staatsarchiv, Berlin, partly printed *Sbornik*, xv. 285; cf. Droysen, p. 376. This was the first form of the treaty concluded between Russia and Prussia in August 1726, of which later.

³ Rescript of 29 May, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

⁴ Rescript of 3 February, *ibid.*

⁵ *Geschichte der preussischen Politik*, iv. ii. 365. And again: "Für Preussen lag Alles daran, dass dieses Werk der Versöhnung nicht scheitere," and further, p. 376. And Ranke, in reference to Frederick William's "politisches Testament" of 1722 (*Zwölf Bücher preussischer Geschichte*, ii. 33): "vornehmlich in der Allianz mit England und Russland sah er damals seine Sicherheit."

The "test" for Frederick William took the form of a craftily worded letter from George I congratulating him on his influence at Petersburg and expressing the hope that he would dissuade Catherine from her dangerous projects, as he could do if he clearly represented the hazards to which they would expose her. It was his own firm intention, said George, to maintain his guarantee of Sleswick to Denmark with his whole force both by sea and land, and for that purpose, if war broke out, he would be obliged to demand the Prussian succour of 10,000 men stipulated under the fourth article of the treaty of Charlottenburg. In conclusion he protested his extreme sympathy with the victims of Thorn and his willingness to concert measures to repair the injuries inflicted. He was glad, he said, to be informed of the declaration made by the tsaritsa on the matter, and flattered himself that she would seek honour and glory by joining with the protestant princes in that cause, rather than in upsetting the peace of the north by ill-conceived attempts in favour of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Forwarding this letter to Du Bourgay Townshend observed that it was quite probable that the tsaritsa desired to amuse the king of Prussia with hopes in regard to Courland, in order "to court and sooth" him while carrying out her dangerous designs. Repeating the substance of the letter he desired Du Bourgay to speak plainly and to press for the diversion of Russian arms into Poland, an enterprise for which the king would very speedily enter into a concert with the tsaritsa and the king of Prussia.¹

At the same time the French government was once more adjured to send properly accredited ministers to Berlin and Stockholm to support the British envoys, a thing, Newcastle wrote, which the king "*ne peut que solliciter avec le dernier empressement.*" He detailed the suspicions of the king of Prussia entertained, and desired that Prince Kurakin should be informed clearly that Great Britain and France would infallibly oppose any such enterprise as the tsaritsa appeared to intend. Any disturbance in the north, it was repeated as an argument specially suitable for French ears, must increase the haughtiness of the court of Vienna and give it opportunity to carry out in the south the measures agreed upon with Spain.²

When Du Bourgay received his orders he sounded the Prussian ministers, who asserted entire ignorance of the tsaritsa's intentions. If, said Ilgen, such enterprise as was apprehended was really in

¹ George I to Frederick William I, 1 June (o.s.), R.O. Royal Letters 46, King's Letters 52, Sweden 37; partly cited by Dureng, p. 324. Townshend's covering dispatch of the same date, Prussia 19.

² Newcastle to Broglie, same date, R.O. Foreign Ministers 4.

hand, the king would readily execute his obligations under the treaty of Charlottenburg.¹ The royal letter had to await for presentation the return of Frederick William. Back at Potsdam from military inspections on 23 June, he at once sent to Hanover Count Truchsess zu Waldburg to compliment and to assert the continuance of his entirely sincere intentions.² Coming to Berlin on the 28th he indited to the letter a reply of equal craft. He would execute his word exactly, he said, if the case for aid arose, in the hope that the king of England would permit him also to enjoy the effect of the treaty of Charlottenburg on occasions which might present themselves. He thought that the tsaritsa might, indeed, send some ships to sea, but without coming to a rupture with Denmark, and that the case apprehended seemed to be neither so sure nor so near as was believed; he would use all necessary offices at Petersburg to prevent it arising. It was to be wished that the affair of Thorn could be brought to a happy issue, as undoubtedly it might be, if more efficacious remedies could be substituted for useless words.³ Whereon, Du Bourgay, forwarding the letter :

It is impossible to express to your Lordship how much trouble it has given them, and what consultations have been held to frame it, which after all is intended to mean nothing, the king of Prussia being highly pleas'd that the Czarina should by her projects be under some sort of necessity of entring into the measures he has proposed, and designs farther to propose. . . .

I am thoroughly convinced that the infatuation which his Prussian Majesty is in at present, with respect to the Muscovites, is not to be conquer'd by any arguments I can use. The only inducements that I foresee can draw him off from the engagements he is running into are, either the prospect of a close alliance with France or the conclusion of the family alliance he has so much at heart with his Majesty. . . . It is certain that while this court did not beleive the expedition on foot at Petersburg was design'd in favour of the duke of Holstein, they thought making a merit with his Majesty in offering chearfully the ten thousand men mention'd in the 4th article of the treaty of Charlottenburg, for nothing could be more positive than the declaration M^r Ilgen made to me upon it; but the advices they have since received from Petersbourg have obliged them to declare for one side, and they are pleas'd to chuse the Muscovites, who, being already well informed of his Prussian Majesties resolution, will not fail to sooth him, till they have struck the blow, for which they shall stand in need either of his assistance, or neutrality.⁴

In similar vein Townshend, writing to Poyntz about the Russian counter-project, now presented, expressed belief that the

¹ Du Bourgay, 21 June, R.O. Prussia 19.

² Creditive letter for the count, 26 June, R.O., Royal Letters 46, original.

³ 2 July, *ibid.*, original; copy, King's Letters 52.

⁴ Du Bourgay, 3 July, *l.c.*

omission to specify Prussia as a party to accede to the proposed alliance had been purposely concerted with the court of Berlin.

The king of Prussia desires to have nothing to do with our treaty till he has finished his own, not doubting but that he may have liberty at any time to accede to it, and that then we should of course become guarantees of his treaty with relation to Courland. Besides, as the leaving him out, from what appears to us, arises solely from the Czarina, tho' done in concert undoubtedly with his Prussian Majesty, had we and France consented to it, he would not have failed to have made great clamours against us.¹

Arrived at Hanover on 26 June Townshend found among other "great packets from all sides" a huge dispatch from Poyntz of 31 May (o.s.). It opened with an account of large offers by Catherine I to Swedish senators, as to Count Dücker, the head of the army, of a starosty in Livonia worth £5,000 a year and to Horn of an estate near Reval. Horn, said Poyntz, had refused the bribe, but certainly Catherine had now "fairly outbid all other foreign powers at the auction."² Going on to discuss at great length past and present views in Sweden he reaffirmed conviction that the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's credit was really falling, "as a number of little accidents have conspired to make it appear."³ He concluded with an account of further interviews with Cederhielm.

In another dispatch Poyntz inquired whether he was still empowered to finance the Swedes in case of a Russian invasion. Townshend replied that it was left to his prudence to use that power only in case of absolute necessity and subject to the terms of the treaty (of 1720) with Great Britain. Should Sweden actually be invaded the case of the treaty would exist, and Poyntz might then draw for £50,000 or even £100,000, assuring the Swedes that the king would "punctually make good all his engagements to the utmost of his power." Likewise, should the duke appear with the Russian fleet and demand the calling of a riksdag to settle the succession upon himself, then, were the demand refused, Poyntz might draw for such a sum as he should judge absolutely necessary to enable the Swedes to defend themselves. Yet, Townshend went on, these instructions were only intended to set Poyntz's mind at ease, for it was not thought now that the tsaritsa would attempt anything

¹ 15 July, R.O. Sweden 37. About Courland, Townshend went on, Poyntz should endeavour to raise feelings of jealousy in Sweden and so spoil the project, for the tsaritsa would not care to flatter the king of Prussia at the expense of angering the Swedes on so important a point. "For my part I can't help wishing the duke of Holstein had it."

² See on this subject Malmström, i. 454-5. In a most private letter Poyntz stated the offer to Horn to have been 100,000 crowns.

³ In a postscript: "The Holstein party is much broken and disconcerted, and many are coming over."

that summer.¹ And he wrote similarly to Du Bourgay² and to Robinson at Paris, with commendation of the firm language held by the French government to the ministers of Sweden Denmark and Russia residing there.³

Such equanimity could not be shared at Copenhagen, immediately threatened. Renewed proposals for accommodation with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp had failed,⁴ and now preparations for defence were hurriedly pushed on and appeals once more went out to Great Britain and France for help. A memorial from Baron Söhlenthal in London of 19 June cited statements made to Westphalen at Petersburg that the peace of the north could not be maintained unless restitution of Sleswick were made, that Great Britain and France would not hold to their guarantees, that the tsaritsa was resolved to employ all her forces in the duke's cause, and that it was intended to land 12,000 Russians at Kiel to be joined by 4,000 Swedes. He demanded efficacious measures in opposition, fulfilment of the guarantees, and a declaration accordingly to the Russian court in the most serious terms.⁵ In reply to this Townshend asserted emphatically that the insinuations referred to had "no manner of foundation," the king being firmly resolved, were the king of Denmark attacked, to "assist him punctually and to the utmost of his power" and to "agree to nothing that shall not be intirely conformable to the engagements he has with Denmark."⁶ These assurances, says secretary Hermann, gave the greatest satisfaction, though the Grand Chancellor intimated that the presence of

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 29 June, R.O. Sweden 37, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 191-2.

² 28 June, R.O. Prussia 19.

³ 3 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

⁴ See for these Holm, i. 139-141 and cf. Campredon, 21 April, *Sbornik*, lviii. 163-7 and Poyntz, 2 June (o.s.). They seem to have been made privately by Frederick IV without the knowledge of his council, and when they leaked out the Danish ministers abroad were ordered to deny all knowledge of them. Other proposals, depending on the supposed willingness of the king of Sweden to abdicate (Poyntz in January had reported him "so distressed and low that he is capable of anything for money and ease" and that if his father died he would certainly retire to Cassel) are contained in an information, unsigned and undated, sent by Townshend to Poyntz on 1 June (o.s.) (R.O. Sweden 37). Cf. Campredon, 12 May l.c. pp. 305-9.

⁵ Copy sent to Poyntz on 29 June from Hanover, R.O. Sweden 37.

⁶ Townshend to secretary Hermann at Copenhagen (Glenorchy was on leave of absence at Aix-la-Chapelle), same date, R.O. Denmark 48. At the same time Poyntz, who had intimated to the Danish minister, Resen, "that his court must think of some satisfaction for the duke, but must not pretend to give it out of what belongs to other princes, or what is not in their own power," was desired to "avoid giving the least jealousy to the Danish court on that article, when they have not the least reason to conceive any, the King being resolved to make good his engagements to that crown" (Poyntz, 2 June (o.s.), Tilson to him, 29 June, R.O. Sweden 37).

eight English men-of-war would give the best security against any enterprise by Russia or Sweden.¹

Further reports from Campredon had nothing consolatory, save on the subject of the Russian armaments. Although he had to tell of ten men-of-war and thirty transports to be added to the fleet and troops for embarkation collecting, for reasons given he believed that nothing would be attempted during the present year, the intention being only to intimidate Denmark. His political news was that Osterman, the man who really mattered, from his inveterate hatred of England had joined the partisans of the young tsarevich and of Austria in representing to the tsaritsa that the alliance with France was not the best that she could make. With Austria, they were advising, it could be had, were young Peter named as her successor; the king of Prussia, "qui négocie de tous côtés," would enter into all her projects, even on behalf of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp; the emperor would support the duke's rights, never having consented to the appropriation of Sleswick; Sweden and Poland would join without difficulty; France and England were too far off to be of service and the former was embroiled with Spain. Secret negotiations, Campredon went on, were being conducted by a Jacobite named Hay,² arrived at Petersburg on a special mission. Reporting much else of like unfavourable import, he emphasised the importance of finding some honourable satisfaction for the duke.³

Could one thing have been allowed, the alliance desired might have been concluded at once. For years it had been the darling ambition of Peter the Great and Catherine to marry their second daughter Elizabeth to a French prince, failing Louis XV himself to the present duke of Orleans or (after he was married) to the duke of Bourbon. When in the previous autumn there had been a rumour that the Spanish infanta was to be repudiated Peter had at once sent orders to Prince Kurakin to renew the proposal for a match with Louis.⁴ Now, immediately that the news of the resolution taken reached Petersburg, Menshikov came to Campredon privately on Catherine's behalf and made the proposal again. Should it be accepted, he said, the tsaritsa would place her whole power and forces at the disposal of France, whether for offensive action, or to control Poland, or to execute anything in Italy or in the Empire. Moved by the prospect, Campredon ventured to extol in his public dispatch the tsarevna's fine qualities and accomplishments, and in a private

¹ Hermann, 4 July, R.O. Denmark 48.

² Formerly, we learn elsewhere, a captain in the Russian naval service.

³ Campredon, 22 and 25 May, *Sbornik*, lviii. 323 foll.

⁴ Rambaud in the *Recueil des instructions*, viii. 254.

letter to Morville advocated the marriage strongly. And when immediately afterwards came the report of Louis being betrothed to Anne of England, he recommended the union of Elizabeth to Bourbon so far as he dared, saying that then Catherine would join in all measures against the house of Austria, "dont elle ne craint rien que le voisinage." But in reply the proposals were declined on the ground of religion, although Menshikov had expressly said that it could be changed.¹ The real reasons, Catherine's low origin, the offence that would be given to England, and the belief that a princess of Elizabeth's spirit would not submit to the domination of Bourbon's mistress, Madame de Prie, of course could not be stated.

At Paris the unexpected rebuff from Petersburg roused almost consternation. In his dispatches last received, sent just before his conferences, Campredon had been sure of concluding the alliance. Catherine, he had written, desired it in good faith; "elle y est fortement excitée par le duc de Holstein." The duke himself had promised to do all that he could for the treaty, expressing, however, the hope that, seeing that the tsaritsa was disposed to support his cause with all her power, the king of France would enable him to come off with honour and in the meantime to support himself.² And so, by secretary Robinson's report, it was the current belief at Paris that "the Czarina's better temper or precarious situation" had induced her to give the duke "entirely up."³ Now, as a first step, orders went to Campredon to suspend negotiation until the counter-project received had been thoroughly considered.⁴ Not till the end of June was it communicated, altered in certain points, to George I at Hanover. At present the British government knew only from a private source that Prince Kurakin had received a copy and was prepared to treat upon it, since Campredon had not the necessary full powers (those for use with Peter the Great purposely not having been renewed).⁵

¹ Campredon, 13 and 14 April, Bourbon and Morville to him, 21 May, *Sbornik*, lviii. 110 foll., 313, 322.

² 14 April ff., *Sbornik*, lviii.

³ 29 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

⁴ 19 and 20 June, *Sbornik*, lviii.

⁵ The information, unsigned and ciphered, marked No. 29 and dated 29 May, and the reply, also unsigned but apparently from Newcastle, R.O. France 181. It emanated to all appearance from Kurakin, to whom H. Walpole (now in London) directed Robinson to show the reply and to send his answer as quickly as possible to Townshend in Holland. The writer prayed "qu'on agisse seulement avec flegme . . . me croire que vous avez un grand avantage de cette alliance." He could say that the reason for admitting Sweden, but not Prussia to the treaty was that Russia was in alliance with the one but not with the other; "cette occasion est favorable pour vous plus que jamais de brouiller la cour de Berlin avec celle de Pétersbourg. Enfin, je vous prie de favoriser et donner de la facilité à cette négociation à la cour de France autant que vous pourrez." It was answered:

The French appear to have thought that with the amendments introduced the counter-project would pass. If so, they were quickly undeceived. Thanking Broglie for this new mark of confidence on the part of the king of France in communicating it, Townshend regretted that the tsaritsa seemed to think herself entitled to dictate the terms of the treaty solely to her own advantage. The onerous obligations in regard to Turkey and Persia could not be undertaken, and Prussia must be admitted to the treaty. The second secret article required the king of England to undertake engagements most contrary to the constitutions and fundamental laws of the empire, which it cited,—the troops in Mecklenburg were troops of the empire and the suit between the duke and his nobles before its tribunals,—while the third exhibited the tsaritsa's designs more clearly than ever. Recalling and discussing the whole history of the Sleswick question Townshend insisted that the article concerning it must be adhered to exactly as drawn up by Great Britain and France, who had declared that they would never sacrifice Denmark.¹

These views had to be accepted at Paris, in spite of the reluctance there to break with Russia. Fleury indeed, by Robinson's report, expressed pleasure at the clear explanation given, declaring that they would "know now what to stand by" and that to treat further with the tsaritsa would only encourage her to make larger demands and abuse the good disposition of the two crowns. And Morville, though seeming not to have much hope of carrying the treaty now, agreed, advising that all means should be taken to separate the king of Prussia from the tsaritsa, expecting much from that king's coming visit to Hanover, and promising that Count Rottembourg should be there at the same time on his way to Berlin.² Afterwards in a dispatch to Broglie Morville regretted that the slight changes proposed were not accepted and stated that, while action was being taken in accordance with the king of England's views, it was not thought well to break off the negotiation, for that would prejudice the work to be carried out in Sweden and might drive Russia to unite with Austria, but nothing should be neglected to ensure its success.³ With Kurakin he had a long discussion, "warm and positive for some time," says Robinson, recounting it, and rising hottest on the Holstein article, but the French minister holding his ground.⁴

"notre ami pourra être très assuré que l'alliance sera très agréable au Roy, et qu'on apportera de ce côté icy toutes les facilités possibles;" only for the duke nothing more could be done than was already concerted with France.

¹ Townshend to Broglie, 2 July, R.O. Foreign Ministers 4, Regencies 6.

² Robinson, 10 and 12 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

³ Morville to Broglie, 15 July, R.O. Regencies 6.

⁴ Robinson, 19 July, *l.c.*

The project was returned to Petersburg practically in the old form. In the third article the phrase about guaranteeing treaties was modified and mention of the Anglo-Swedish treaty of 1720 was suppressed, but not to specify the others, it was said in the accompanying orders to Campredon, would he “retrancher ce qui peut donner le plus de poids à l’alliance,” and no engagements could be undertaken with regard to Persia. In the twelfth article, he was told, Prussia must be named as well as Sweden for special invitation to accede, and in the second and third secret articles no change could be allowed. The anterior engagements of France and England in regard to Sleswick subsisted always ; they were known to the tsaritsa and her ministers ; and persistence by them in their demands could only be taken as proof of insincerity. The duke might be accorded the title of Royal Highness, but only in the last resort.¹

¹ Instructions to Campredon of 19 July, and further in the same sense, 12 August *Sbornik*, lviii.

CHAPTER IV

THE TREATY OF HANOVER

THE recalcitrance of Catherine I upset the scheme of alliance against Austria propounded from London in March 1725. In its place was devised at Paris a new treaty between Great Britain and France, so drawn that any power so minded, whether protestant or catholic, could accede to it. To set the proposal before George I Broglie was ordered to follow him to Hanover with all speed. Accorded special privileges for the journey he arrived there on 29 June, and on 3 July was able to report complete approval.¹

In a treatise of 16 June, the largest of those which, as said, overwhelmed Townshend on his arrival at Hanover, Saint-Saphorin had advised support to the protestant princes of the empire and attachment of catholic powers also, in particular Savoy and Bavaria. Since, he said, he would soon be passing Munich on his way to Switzerland he might attempt to influence that court, if so empowered.² Probably he had already sounded the Bavarian minister at Vienna, Baron Mörmann, for about this time the latter's colleague at the Hague, Gansinot, expressed to Dayrolle there "in a familiar and rambling discourse" the desire of the electors of Bavaria and Cologne (father and son) "to live in strict correspondence" with the kings of England and Prussia, with testimony thereto in extracts from their dispatches to him.³ Also Saint-Saphorin was on terms of intimate friendship with the Sardinian minister at Vienna, the marquis di Breglio (de Breuille).

¹ See Dureng, pp. 313-4. But Broglie did not accompany Townshend all the way; he got to Hanover three days later (Tilson, 29 June, Townshend, 3 July 1725, R.O. Regencies 6).

² R.O. Germany, Empire, 55, 85 pages, partly printed by Dureng, pp. 292-8. Saint-Saphorin had already pointed out (11 May) the hostility of Bavaria to Austria; had credited the electoral prince (the pretensions of whose wife, the Josephine archduchess Maria Amalia, were destroyed by the Pragmatic Sanction), with ambition courage and talent; and had advised that the presence of British and French ministers at Munich would cause mortal inquietude at Vienna.

³ Dayrolle, 3 July, R.O. Holland 285. The elector of Cologne sent Count Plettenberg to compliment George I on his arrival at Hanover.

Townshend answered him that the king hoped so to employ his time at Hanover that the treaty of Vienna should bring no harm to the protestant princes of the empire, that efforts were being made to rouse the Dutch, and that the plan of gaining Savoy and Bavaria was much approved. Saint-Saphorin should sound Mörmann on his master's willingness to oppose imperial despotism in Germany, while he himself would see what could be done with the king of Sardinia's envoy, when he came to Hanover. "Je serois bien aise de voir le plan ou projet d'un tel traité dressé selon vos idées."¹

With the Dutch Townshend had done his utmost when passing the Hague on his way to Hanover. Now, as a further incitement, he sent pensionary Hoornbeek a copy of Saint-Saphorin's dispatch to study.² But they were hard to move, in spite of their hostility to the Ostend Company sedulously fostered. Disquietude about what might be contained in the yet unpublished commercial treaty of Vienna had been allayed by advices from their envoy there that there was nothing new in it.³

Prussia, then, was still left by George I and his ministers in the background. As said, they neither trusted Frederick William nor feared that he would side with Austria against them. In fact, after Rabutin on 2 July had formally invited him to accede to the treaty of Vienna, he instructed his minister there not to declare his intentions yet; he would first see how the game went.⁴ Shortly he wrote to George I desiring to learn his views and receive his counsel before giving a positive reply. Accession, he said, besides the embarrassment of a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, would infallibly drag him into all the quarrels which might ensue not only between the emperor and the king of Spain, but also between those two princes and other powers.⁵ In reply George explained his reasons for sending the former letter—one of them that the constitutions of Great Britain did not permit him to keep on foot a sufficiently large army to maintain his guarantees for the peace of Europe, and he preferred the military aid of Prussia to any other—and in regard to the treaty of Vienna reasserted his resolve not to accede to it; he foresaw most dangerous consequences for the empire and for the whole of Europe and would take no step without consulting the king of Prussia, who, he hoped, would act reciprocally.⁶

¹ Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 3 July, R.O. Germany, Empire, 55, Regencies 6.

² Townshend to Hoornbeek and Finch, 3 July, R.O. Holland 280, 286, the former dispatch also Foreign Entry Book 250.

³ William Finch, just returned to the Hague, 26 June, R.O. Holland 286.

⁴ Droysen, pp. 372-4.

⁵ 7 July, R.O. Royal Letters 46, the original; copies, King's Letters 52, Regencies 6; the substance, as communicated to Broglie on 12 July, Foreign Ministers 4.

⁶ 12 July, copies *ibid.*

The French government, on the other hand, its attention concentrated on affairs of the south and ill informed of what was passing at Berlin, for want of an accredited minister there, could not be tranquil about what Rabutin might be doing. It was decided to send back thither Count Rottembourg, released from Cambray. A Brandenburger by descent, with connections and possessions in that country, and intimately acquainted with the Prussian court from previous experience, he was the fittest man to be found. It was he to whom had been committed in great privacy the negotiations with Prussia of the winter. He received credentials both without a character, in order to avoid delays of ceremonial and save precious time, and as ambassador, for presentation when ordered. His instructions set forth the desirability of an alliance between France Great Britain and Prussia, now that affairs both in north and south were in so critical a state. He was ordered to pass Cassel on his way, that he might consult the landgrave on European affairs in general and cautiously sound his views on the dangers threatening from Austria. After discussion of possible engagements by the king of Prussia with Russia—the king of France, it was said, would not object to the establishment of a Prussian prince in Courland, if nothing against his guarantee of Sleswick to Denmark were entailed—and of his intentions in regard to military intervention in Poland (a thing strongly to be deprecated), it was stated that the principal object of Rottembourg's mission was to dissuade him from acceding to the treaty of Vienna; arguments need not be suggested, but there seemed to be no other means than to bring him into alliance with Great Britain and France, and to effect that nothing must be left undone.¹

Informed of the acceptance of the new plan at Hanover, and with Saint-Saphorin's dispatch for his text, Morville indulged in a long discourse to Robinson on European affairs in general. He passed in review, says the secretary, the powers who might be brought into line against Austria, instancing especially Bavaria and Holland, expressing himself sure of Denmark, and thinking that Sweden would come in from apprehension of the Holstein faction. Too much haste, he said, could not be taken to anticipate Count Freytag, believed to be now "posting from Vienna to Stockholm." Sweden secured, or at least her king, he, if well supported, should draw with him his father the landgrave. The king of Sardinia he termed

the bulwark of France and the terror of the Emperor on the side of Italy, whose fears of the Imperial court, whose own security and the circumstances

¹ Instructions to Rottembourg, 2 July 1725, *Recueil des instructions*, xvi. 332–8. He did not, however, reach Berlin till 15 August (newsletter of 18 August, R.O. Prussia 19).

of the times would throw into our arms, upon a proper opportunity. . . . This he hinted in such a manner as that France is as good as assured of him. After which he passed over into Spain and approved in a more vigorous manner than I expected from him his Majesty's orders to Mr. Stanhope with relation to Gibraltar, Port Mahon, and our commerce.¹

Meanwhile there was most disturbing news from the northern capitals, of which in the next chapter. This led Townshend, in answer to Morville's ecstasies, to indulge in a scathing indictment of French conduct as hitherto pursued. Praising the decision in the matter of the Russian treaty he inveighed against the reliance on the advices of men who, by delaying its conclusion, had

"kept the affairs of the north in such confusion that the powers in those parts, which might have been of the greatest use at this juncture to the two crowns towards keeping the Emperor in awe, and whose natural interest leads them to be so, are not only a load and a burthen upon us at present, but may by the dexterity of the Imperial court, and the advantages they take of our supineness, be turned against us, and make the forming of any scheme in our favour in the Empire absolutely impracticable.

If France would send to Petersburg and Stockholm, as also to Copenhagen,

men of weight and ability who wou'd talk the same language that the King does, . . . declaring at the same time they will joyn their assistance heartily both in money and troops against whosoever shall be the aggressor, . . . the weight of the two crowns would be such in the north as to make the chief northern powers, I mean Denmark Sweden and Muscovy, so farr usefull to us, as to enter into our views upon any occasion. But this is never to be compassed whilst the ministers of France in those courts are perpetually distinguishing the interest of their master from that of ours, and have their friendships and cabals with the most determined of our enemies.

Passing then to Morville's review of European politics, Townshend expressed surprise at so much attention being given to what was passing at Vienna, considering the figure that Great Britain and France had made in Europe, even when opposed to one another.

¹ Robinson, 12 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32743. "I must observe, My Lord, that I never saw, or heard, that M. de Morville ever spoke with so much resolution and vigour, as he seem'd to do with me this morning, passing from country to country, seeking out friends and new alliances, and talking of a system so strenuously, and in so animated a manner, that I flatter myself he is ready to enter into the first grand and well-digested system that offers itself. He seemed to speak with the soul of the Bishop [Fleury], and perhaps they had seen one another since I left Chantilly. He said the great plan must be to hinder if possible Don Carlos's marriage with the eldest archduchess as leading to almost an universal monarchy; and if that once fails the treaty between Spain and the Emperor is at an end and her Catholick Majesty must return to her old friends out of spite, or necessity."

"It is well known that the Emperor never had, nor has he at this time, any money," and people would attribute the present pass to "a defect of conduct" in the government of the two great kingdoms. Whereas, by the vigorous behaviour advocated Sweden, Denmark, and perhaps Russia also, might be engaged in any defensive alliance proposed to the princes of the empire, to Prussia, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Würtemberg, "for securing their civil and religious rights." Such an alliance could not be resented, since its only object would be to maintain the treaties of Westphalia. If Morville would form a plan the princes named would doubtless readily come into it, and the Dutch, in their present apprehensions in regard to trade, certainly; but the late coldness of France towards them necessitated the first advances being made from Paris. "These are the measures, and the only ones, that can effectually secure a reconciliation between the courts of France and Spain; were these put in execution the Emperor would be so far frightened and alarmed that he would not dare for his own sake to sooth the queen of Spain in her wild extravagant notions;" both she and the duke of Parma would be sensible of their folly and rashness in exposing both herself and Don Carlos to the resentment of the two crowns and would try to retrieve their past conduct.¹

Morville had already expressed to Broglie the full concurrence of the French government in these sentiments. The new treaty, he gave as his opinion, could neither be too soon concluded nor, in its beginnings, too simply drawn, whether in regard to its stipulations or to the number of princes who in the first place should have part in it. He expected agreement that the articles should be such that all powers, and particularly Holland and Prussia, should be able to join without any difficulty. For instance, the motives for the alliance might be based on the necessity of giving attention to the apparent effect of the treaty of Vienna in nullifying the purpose of that of London (the Quadruple Alliance), maintenance of peace, which should be declared to be the principal object now in view. Without following scrupulously the models of previous treaties those articles might be selected from them, which interested France and England equally. After specifying such Morville proceeded to suggest a separate article, to be kept secret, obliging the two powers neither to accede to the treaty of Vienna nor to guarantee the emperor's succession. If Townshend approved these views, he

¹ Townshend to Robinson, 21 July, R.O. Regencies 6. The question of a reconciliation between France and Spain bulks largely in dispatches of the time. For the duke of Bourbon's overtures through the Pope, Bermudez, the count de Marcillac (his confidential agent at Madrid), and Monteleon see Baudrillart, III. 194-202.

said, and would furnish a draft, they would be in a position to conclude the negotiation, and Broglie should receive the necessary powers. At the same time might be formed a plan for gradually extending the alliance, before the court of Vienna should be ready for counter-measures. Doubtless the imperial ministers would make every effort to obtain accessions to the treaty of Vienna both in the empire and in the north. They had already made approaches to the king of Prussia, a principal motive for hastening the departure of Count Rottembourg for Berlin. And it was important to be beforehand with Count Freytag at Copenhagen and Stockholm. As to the catholic powers of the empire, although the court of Vienna would naturally flatter itself on gaining them, it might nevertheless be supposed that Bavaria and Münster would join with France and England, and their example would attract a great number of others in Upper Germany, especially if the house of Saxony, realising the uselessness of its alliance with Austria when once the succession of the emperor's daughters had been generally recognised, should resolve to resist the solicitations of the court of Vienna. As a beginning, a French minister was to be sent to Munich at once.

En général, il faut espérer que ce pourroit être le fruit du renouvellement public de nos liaisons avec l'Angleterre, mais s'il y avoit à cet égard de l'indécision dans l'esprit des princes de l'Empire, elle seroit sans doute aisément fixée, lorsqu'ils auroient une certitude de l'engagement de mariage de l'Infant Dom Carlos avec l'aînée des archiduchesses filles de l'Empereur. Tout l'Empire, et même je puis dire toute l'Europe, pourroient envisager dans cet événement le retour de toute la puissance de Charlequint. Le souvenir des maux, qui en ont été la suite funeste, acheveroit de mettre en mouvement tous les princes d'Allemagne qui craindroient avec raison de nouvelles chaînes.

Lastly, referring to the boastings of Ripperda, Morville characterised his ideas as chimerical and his intention to be to try all ways of dividing powers, whose union appeared embarrassing. Should Spain, he said, against all probability, venture on such extremities as he threatened, means could be found to avert the injury.¹

When, however, Broglie submitted a draft for the proposed treaty it met with scant approval. Townshend wrote to Horatio Walpole, back at Paris on 22 July :

The King upon seeing these stragling articles laid together as Mo^r de Morville proposed did by no means approve of patching up a treaty out of several others, which by that method would seem to be weakened, instead of being strengthen'd and confirmed. . . . Besides, the agreeing by a separate or secret article not to guaranty the Imperial Succession appears to the King

¹ Morville to Broglie, 15 July, *ibid.*, copy.

to be a way of doing business, which is never long a secret, and has always an ill grace when it comes to be known. His Majesty has therefore thought it more proper to have a general plan of a defensive alliance drawn in such terms that the princes and states intended to be invited to accede to it may find no difficulty to become partys; as his Ma^{ty} doubts they would to that projected by M^r de Morville. The king of Prussia has an aversion to extensive guarantys, and could never be brought to have the least relish of the Quadruple Alliance.¹ And that article concerning the successions in England and France would particularly prove a stumbling block to those who might otherwise be willing to joyn in a general defensive alliance with us. Upon these considerations the King ordered a plan to be drawn up according to the model here inclosed, w^{ch} his Ma^{ty} hopes is couched in such a manner as effectually to attain the ends proposed.²

On the day that this was sent, 27 July, Frederick William I appeared at Hanover. He had been importunate to come immediately on the arrival there of George I and again on the latter's return from his course of waters at Pyrmont, but had been persuaded to allow his father-in-law a few days' rest.³ He had important matters to discuss; the betrothal of his children to their English cousins, affairs in Poland, the succession to Juliers and Berg. To the last he was distrusted. Newcastle wrote: "his Prussian Majesty will never be brought to do right, till he finds it absolutely for his interest so to do," two very extraordinary letters from Du Bourgay showing that he "is not only trifling with us, but if great care is not taken will absolutely declare against us."⁴ Morville warned Walpole that he must be "closely plyed" to prevent his accession to the treaty of Vienna, that certain communications by his minister Chambrier inspired belief that concessions by the emperor might yet procure it, and that Michel reported from Berlin that his ministers had insinuated to Rabutin that he might guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, in return for that of his succession to Juliers and Berg.⁵

In view of all this the temper in which he appeared must have agreeably surprised. After the first conversations Townshend hoped to have "instilled very good principles into him" and "laid the danger of his being caught by these false baits" from Vienna.⁶ What afterwards occurred he related as follows. His Majesty, convinced of the truth of Morville's intelligence, had ordered him

¹ Erased from the draft: "and you know the States-General have been as positive always in refusing to come into it."

² Townshend to H. Walpole, 27 July, *ibid.*, draft.

³ Wallendrodt from Berlin, 14 July, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, holograph. Cf. Loewe, *Preussens Staatsverträge*, pp. 285-6.

⁴ To H. Walpole, 12 July (o.s.), B.M. Add. M.S. 32743.

⁵ H. Walpole, 26 July, *ibid.*

⁶ To Newcastle, 31 July, R.O. Regencies 6.

(Townshend) to wait on the king the day after his arrival. After a long conference he had been so far impressed "that I did, by the King's order, put into his hands a copy of the project of our alliance with France, which I had endeavour'd to make more palatable to him by inserting Prussia as one of the original contracting parties and not as a power to be invited to accede to this alliance, as it stood in the first draught of our project."¹ Seeming to be "pretty well satisfy'd with my reasonings" he had taken the draft "and kept it two or three days, and afterwards return'd it without any material alteration, and declared to the French ambassador and myself that he agreed to the project here inclosed." However, the king had been desirous that Ilgen should be summoned and informed of what was proposed, lest he might be disposed to make objection and "infuse ill notions into the king of Prussia of this alliance, in case it were transacted entirely without his knowledge," and to that the king of Prussia had consented, "but has declared beforehand to me, that he shall not alter one word."

You may easily imagine that the secret article concerning the succession of Juliers and Berg was the chief bait that drew the king of Prussia into this alliance. You will therefore endeavour to dispose the court of France not to make any objection to the said article, which is in effect no more than a confirmation of the 14th article of the treaty by which the Elector Palatine himself holds these dutchys, and to which, in truth, the K. of Prussia has a right to demand our guaranty.

So that if it were published no one could complain of it. Townshend concluded by pointing out that in gaining the king of Prussia the king had obeyed the desire expressed by the French court, so that it ought to be satisfied. "His Ma^{ty}'s success has been beyond our expectation;" it was never anticipated "to secure him on such reasonable terms." The good effects of the treaty, when finished, would certainly be seen at Vienna and Madrid and even at Petersburg, and it was hoped, therefore, that full powers might be sent to Broglie as soon as possible; those for himself, sent to England to be sealed, were expected by the returning messenger.²

Hardly less attractive to Frederick William than the undertaking about Juliers and Berg were articles upholding the treaties of Westphalia (liberties of the empire) and that of Oliva (the Polish protestants), so drawn, said Townshend, "as that any catholic prince

¹ One copy of the draft at the Record Office has the name of the king of Prussia thus inserted.

² To H. Walpole, 4 August, *ibid.* Frederick William's holograph letter summoning Ilgen to Hanover, 2 August, Staatsarchiv, Berlin. Wallenrodt, sending it, sought favour with Ilgen by saying that the king would conclude nothing without him and insinuated that he himself had suggested the idea to George I.

may agree to them ;” not even the elector of Bavaria could object to “so innocent a stipulation.” These subjects were of keenest interest to the Prussian king. We have seen that he would have interfered in arms in Poland, if adequately supported. George I seems now to have been less opposed to employment of force than formerly ; witness his letter of June to Frederick William. In that of 12 July, also, expressing his readiness to take measures and his serious concern at the infraction of the treaty of Oliva and the prejudice to those of Westphalia, nothing, he said, was more necessary than for the protestant powers to join in a concert and plan to maintain the rights and privileges attacked. The intention may have been to divert Russian arms into Poland, as expressed, or merely to inveigle Frederick William, but an impassioned appeal to the Swedes had a more genuine ring. Beginning, “His Majesty is wounded to the heart to see the disturbed condition to which the protestant religion not only in Poland, but in many parts of the empire, is reduced,” Townshend descanted at great length and in strong language on its threatened subversion first in the former country and afterwards in Germany. He authorised Poyntz to “talk of this affair openly and with less reserve, and take all proper methods of letting the King’s sentiments be known on this head.”¹ Moreover George commended Edward Finch, who had so pestered Augustus II at Dresden, for pursuing that monarch to Warsaw, as told in another chapter, in spite of almost forcible resistance by the Poles, and steadily refused request for his recall.

The fourth article of the treaty, prohibiting any party from entering into any other treaty or alliance or engagement without the knowledge and consent of the others, replaced the secret one proposed by Morville against a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. In this form Townshend pronounced it “much more palatable to any prince that will accede, than if the thing itself was expressed in plain terms, tho’ secretly or separately.”

The main article, however, was the second, guaranteeing reciprocally possessions actually held by the parties both in and out of Europe as also rights immunities and privileges, especially in regard to trade. Such possessions and rights included for Great Britain not only Gibraltar and Port Mahon and her commercial privileges in the Spanish colonies, but also associated her allies in the campaign against the Ostend Company. That this was intended is shown by Townshend’s comment that the article would particularly please the Dutch, who would be very glad to have a French guarantee of their treaty of Münster. He observed that the States-General,

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 15 July, R.O. Sweden 37.

cautious as they were, could hardly find fault with what was "contrived for their benefit without laying any new burthen upon them."¹

The Ostend storm had burst anew on the recent publication of the Vienna commercial treaty. This, the industrious compilation of the imperial historiographer, Jean Dumont, set out in most particular detail in forty-seven articles, after abbreviation, the concessions of the private treaty on the subject. The 36th accorded to the Ostend Company specifically the privileges of trade granted to the United Provinces by the Spanish cédulas of 1663 and the treaty of Münster. The Dutch companies demanded of the States-General measures to stop the trade entirely.² Count Starhemberg was told at Hanover that to attack British commerce was to tear out the eyes of the nation.³ At Vienna Saint-Saphorin declared that George I would never consent to Belgian navigation to the Indies on the terms of the new treaty. In parliament in February 1726 Horatio Walpole averred support to the Ostend Company to be its main design.⁴

Yet the Dutch government could not be roused to action. A committee was appointed to examine the treaty, but after a month's delay Hoornbeek wrote that there was still great doubt about what could be done; while jealousy of the Ostend Company's progress might carry the States-General to embrace all measures to destroy it, there was yet much scruple about undertaking inconvenient engagements, and on the whole he thought such scruple not unjustified.⁵ Nor had other representations effect, communication of private advices from Vienna (not confided, said Townshend, even to Finch) to the effect that the emperor, able to act against England in favour of the Pretender only by way of the Netherlands and Ostend, probably intended some enterprise against the Dutch garrisons of the Barrier.⁶

Frederick William, though not yet visualising the bearing of the second article against the Ostend Company, already had qualms about it. On a draft of the treaty marked by Ilgen "*Premier project du traité . . . délivré à S.M. devant mon arrivée à Hanover*" he noted that its engagements might involve him in any trouble, great or small, that might break out in Europe, and would require explanation. Other notes of his required reduction of his contingent for succour from 8,000 foot and 4,000 horse to 3,000 and 2,000

¹ Cf. Dureng, pp. 317-8; Townshend's comments from his dispatch to H. Walpole of 27 July, cited.

² Rousset, ii. 199, 203.

³ Syveton, p. 120.

⁴ *Parliamentary History*, viii. 504.

⁵ Hoornbeek to Townshend, 25 August, R.O. Holland 286.

⁶ Townshend to Hoornbeek, 7 August, *ibid.*, 280 and Foreign Entry Book 250.

respectively, forage and bread to be found for them (article 3), and one about the Thorn affair ran, "avec la Negociacion cella ira bien mes la Negociacion sans force je vous assure que cella ne feras rieng." He doubted whether the Dutch would readily accede and had changes and additions to propose to the secret article concerning Juliers and Berg. As a general comment he wrote (to regularise his execrable spelling) :

Pourvu qu'on y change ce que j'ai corrigé je le signerai, mais je déclare que si ce traité ait quelque chose de caché dans l'explication, qui était contre les engagements que j'ai depuis 1718 avec la Czarienne, je n'y pourrai point entrer et agir contre elle, mais je me tiendrai neutre, et si elle fait quelque chose contre les états royaumes ou provinces du roy de la Grande Bretagne je promets que je l'empêcherai avec toutes mes forces et par la négociation et par les armes.¹

The reduction of the Prussian succour was allowed and the Berg and Juliers article was strengthened,² as desired, and with these changes the draft treaty was signed by the ministers of the three powers on 7 August.³

In the success obtained Broglie bore his share. "Il n'y a que milord Townshend et moi à qui il aime parler," he wrote of Frederick William, who had shown him "toutes sortes de bontés et de préférences." Representing that the kings of France and England must desire his aggrandisement and that he ought not to listen to powers who thought him already too strong, at length, after having "prêché et patrociné," they had persuaded him. But without England, Broglie confessed, success would have been difficult, not to say impossible, and he was persuaded that, if the king of Prussia had not been led to believe in the advantages set out to him, he would never have consented.⁴

When the news of what had been done was received at Paris the French ministers, Horatio Walpole wrote, seemed extremely well pleased, seeing that the new alliance "could not fail of having a wonderfull effect upon all the affairs of Europe, as well with regard to the north as to the courts of Vienna and Madrid." No alterations, he said, were likely to be proposed; the Juliers and Berg article was looked on as quite reasonable. He had pressed for acceptance without change, lest the king of Prussia should be put off and a

¹ Staatsarchiv, Berlin. More fully, Droysen, pp. 379, 380.

² "Bergues" being substituted for "Cleves," correcting that error in the treaty of Charlottenburg.

³ The French and English documents, Staatsarchiv, Berlin, the Prussian, R.O. Treaty Papers 59.

⁴ Dureng, pp. 325-6, citing Broglie to Morville, 3 August.

handle be given to his ministers to create new difficulties.¹ Of sentiments at Hanover Wallenrodt's report was enthusiastic. He testified to harmony consolidated, "Alles hier gut Preussisch seyn will;" even the German ministers and Bernstorff himself, though he would not vouch for his sincerity, now giving in to the king's views and crying out against imperial despotism.² At Berlin, on the other hand, some were pleased, some not. As a correspondent had it, "tant que Cnyphausen est pénétré de joye du pli qu'ont pris les affaires à Hanovre, et du départ d'Ilgen, autant et plus même Golovkin,³ Lövenhör,⁴ et Rabutin en sont embarrassés."⁵

Frederick William himself seems to have been delighted with his visit to Hanover. He wrote that he found George I better in walking and eating than for five years past, and that he did not know the Hanoverian troops again, they were so improved; he praised them highly.⁶ This may very well have been with him a powerful reason for his compliance.

The wording of the treaty, however, was by no means yet agreed. Townshend Ilgen and Wallenrodt stated in their subscriptions to the draft that it had their masters' assent, Broglie that his signature was subject to the approval of Louis XV.⁷ That was not at once forthcoming; changes considered necessary turned out not all to be, as alleged to Broglie, "si légers qu'ils ne devoient pas suspendre la conclusion."⁸ In the second article it was proposed to substitute for the definition of possessions, "dont chacun des alliez sera actuellement en possession au tems de la signature de cette alliance," the words "ainsi qu'il est dit au précédent article;" this partly, said Morville, in order properly to connect the two articles, but partly, he owned, "for the sake of having some management with the king of Spain with regard to Gibraltar." Walpole observing this to be "a very extraordinary reason at this juncture, he immediately told me they would depart from this amendment if his Majesty insisted upon it." Next, in the fifth article, Walpole goes on, the words

¹ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 11 August, B.M. Add. M.S. 32744.

² 12 August, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

³ The Russian ambassador, Count Alexis Golovkin.

⁴ The Danish envoy, General Paul Lövenörn.

⁵ Newsletter of 7 August, R.O. Prussia 19 (Du Bourgay was at Hanover). The writer proceeded, "Ce seroit un coup de party que Lövenhör fût éloigné. Il mérite la défiance de vostre cour plus qu'aucun ministre étranger dans quel endroit du monde que ce puisse estre, et ce qui est tout dire, plus que Mardefelt." Another letter, of 19 August, stated that Rabutin and Lövenörn were inseparable and were doing all they could to spoil the treaty, harping especially on the marriage-string.

⁶ *Briefe . . . an den Fürsten Leopold zu Anhalt-Dessau*, p. 293, 10 August.

⁷ "Le projet cy dessus du traité et de l'article secret ayant esté dressé entre les ministres des trois Roys et ayant esté envoyé à ma cour, jattens pour le signer l'aprobation du Roy mon maistre."

⁸ Louis XV to Broglie, 12 August, Dureng, p. 319.

“et particulièrement sur les affaires de religion” had met with objection on the grounds that it was not proper for the king of France thus publicly to declare “his taking upon himself the protection of the protestant religion,” and that they were unnecessary, since “the general words of *droits et privilèges* would answer the same end, and it was certain that the French would never in fact depart from that known policy and interest of maintaining a ballance with regard to religion as well as in other respects in the Empire.” Then the sixth article (about Thorn) was altered “in the whole tenor of it,” because, Walpole quoted Morville to say, “it takes for granted and declares peremptorily that there has been a notorious infraction of the treaty of Oliva, which is deciding before hand the matter that the guaranties are to examine into,” the effect, in fact, being “denouncing war to Poland, which he apprehended might tend to unite the Polanders more strongly to King Augustus, and to settle the crown upon his son.” Hence, by “a softer turn” given to the whole article, it was sought to limit interposition to good offices. To this he (Walpole) had objected that the word *offices* had been of late of very little consequence, and that “we ought in the conclusion to speak in the stile of *garanties*, for taking the effectual measures” required. He “wished they would not let a matter of such consequence fall too low,” but had constantly observed a great tendency to caution in the affair of Thorn, for reasons which he would explain some other time.

Other of Morville’s suggestions were requirement of the king of Prussia to find at least 6,000 troops as succour, and insertion of two articles of the treaty with him formerly proposed, relating to the case of war between France and the empire, as, says Walpole,

being liable to no objection in themselves, and as what would have a very odd appearance, if France should conclude an alliance with Prussia without them; for as these articles do not restrain his Majesty and the king of Prussia, as electors, from furnishing their contingent in case of war declar’d by the Empire against France, on proper occasions, so it would seem very extraordinary that in case his Most Christian Majesty should be attack’d and a war declar’d by the Empire against them, even on account of his performing his engagement of this very treaty, the king of Prussia should be left at liberty not only to furnish his contingent but to let out as many troops as he might find for his advantage to serve against France. This, M. de Morville said, would be making an alliance upon such unequal terms, that his reputation as a minister could suffer extreamly by it.

What Broglie would say about the proposed changes, Walpole went on, he could not determine, “but I am persuaded they are desirous to finish this treaty, if possible.” In reference to overtures made to Richelieu for the accession of France to the treaty of Vienna,

as the best means of being reconciled with Spain, he was sure "that France will think of no accommodation with Spain, but by the mediation of England." ¹ Sending the papers to England, Robinson wrote :

You will have the pleasure of finding our interests so linked and interlaced now with those of France, that it is become a common cause. They were brought but heavily into it, and there was occasion for all Mr. Walpole's address to rouse their timidity into this strenuous declaration. But as they have begun in earnest, it is to be hoped they will continue it, which will put us out of all danger. I think I may with pleasure congratulate you upon it, which gives the fairest prospect of keeping things quiet. There needed but half of this six months ago to prevent all the apprehensions we have been under from so many different quarters.²

Such of the French alterations as were accepted at Hanover Townshend did his best to commend to the court of Berlin, characterising them to Ilgen as in no way essential and really only a turning of certain phrases to suit the delicacy of French ears. The fifth article, he argued, was sufficient, although somewhat weakened, while the sixth was so turned as to oblige France anew to fulfil her guarantees of the treaty of Oliva and was rendered more digestible to catholic princes, who might afterwards be led further. To avoid difficulties with them, however, it was thought better to have this article separate and secret. Indeed, "on fera des actes séparés de tous les articles secrets et séparés, a fin qu'on puisse produire l'un ou l'autre comme on trouvera à propos." To press his arguments he sent Ilgen a copy of the *Grande Relation* of the dispositions of the various princes of the empire, just received, which Saint-Saphorin had compiled in accordance with his request.³ He thought that on reading the two separate articles added by France Ilgen would be astonished at their being insisted on, they, or at least one of them, being rather such as themselves might have demanded; and as they meant nothing it might be well to show complaisance by accepting them. Altogether the interests of Great Britain and Prussia seemed to be essentially and solidly provided for. In conclusion, Townshend hoped that full powers would be sent to Wallenrodt at once, Broglie and himself having theirs ready. As Rottembourg was not instructed about these negotiations he thought that Ilgen would agree that it was not necessary to consult him.⁴

¹ H. Walpole, 13 August, B.M. Add. M. S. 32744; cf. Dureng, pp. 322-3.

² 18 August, R.O. France 182.

³ Dated 1 August, 110 pages, R.O. Germany (Empire) 55, partly printed by Dureng, pp. 513-27.

⁴ Townshend to Ilgen, 21 August, Staatsarchiv, Berlin, copies, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253, Regencies 6. After the treaty was signed

Meanwhile Ilgen was writing (to Wallenrodt) about the words "tant dedans que dehors de l'Europe," reminding that envoy of Townshend's explanation that the expression was intended to apply only to an attack upon England or Hanover or to war on that account in the Netherlands; he wanted the point made clear or some expedient found.¹ Also further changes were asked for in the article about Juliers and Berg. At these proposals Townshend expressed surprise. Ilgen, he said, had been so satisfied at Hanover that he had pressed for signature before his departure and before the consent of France was received, and it was rather extraordinary to desire now changes in articles agreed to after such mature consideration. Yet the king, of his desire to please the king of Prussia, assented to a definite declaration on the first point, as now sent. But the same complaisance could not be extended to the article concerning Juliers and Berg. That Ilgen had recast himself, after his own fashion, and the changes proposed would make it obscure and doubtful, to the prejudice of the king of Prussia's interests. Broglie was of the same opinion, and was not authorised to admit the least change. The articles regarding the interests of the kings of England and Prussia might legitimately have been altered by France, but that had not been done, out of consideration for them. Wherefore, "Je me flatte qu'on se contentera des facilités qu'on y a déjà apportées et qu'on enverra des ordres à Mons^r Wallenrodt de signer."²

The declaration stated that the Prussian succour "ne pourra être employé dans aucun pays hors de l'Europe, ni même en Italie, ni en Espagne, mais bien partout ailleurs."³ But in the Juliers and Berg article Wallenrodt failed to obtain the alteration desired, although, he wrote, he had seen the king himself and had argued for hours with Townshend and Broglie.⁴ However, in the meantime Frederick William had accepted the article as it stood,⁵ and Ilgen had written that orders sent to Wallenrodt would show that the king of Prussia only desired to conform to his father-in-law's sentiments in all things and to finish the treaty as soon as possible. Soon he

Townshend wrote to H Walpole that from the two separate articles proposed by France reference to the treaties of Utrecht and Baden had been struck out, as not elsewhere mentioned, preposterous and unnecessary, and certain to be objected to by the king of Prussia (4 September, R.O. Regencies 7).

¹ Ilgen to Wallenrodt, 19 August, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 253.

² Townshend to Ilgen, 29 August, *ibid.* and Foreign Ministers 46, the original, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

³ Printed, *Preussens Staatsverträge*, pp. 293-4; Dumont, VIII. ii. 127-9.

⁴ 29 August, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

⁵ In a copy of the amended treaty received on 23 August (*ibid.*, with Ilgen's report upon it) his note to the article is "tres bong." Dureng (p. 328) says that the acceptance was only obtained by opportune news that the emperor was guaranteeing the Sulzbach succession to Juliers and Berg, in order to have the support of the elector Palatine.

added that the explanations given were quite satisfactory and that instructions sent to Wallenrodt would, he did not doubt, enable the treaty to be signed immediately.¹

Other correspondence had reference to the long contemplated royal marriages. The queen of Prussia having come to Hanover for a long stay, Townshend wrote privately to Ilgen (by special order, says Wallenrodt, of George I) about her tender reception by her father, congratulating himself on being able to work with him to unite the two families "en toute manière de plus en plus, et en même tems fortifier la religion protestante, et les libertés de l'Empire." Ilgen in reply expressed his master's great pleasure on reading the letter; nothing more, he said, was to be desired than further union, and himself would work for it.² Previously, on warning from Wallenrodt of a supposed plan to betroth the princess Anne to the young prince William of Orange-Nassau (her eventual husband), Frederick William had expressed to him the hope that nothing of the kind would be resolved upon before what concerned his own children was settled.³ Whereon Wallenrodt was able to report Townshend's positive declaration that Prince Frederick, at least, was to marry no one else but the princess of Prussia; also, that while the queen would hardly be able to persuade her father to come to Berlin, the season being so far advanced and he not very well, she was trying to get him to sign and deliver to her a written declaration that Prince Frederick should marry her daughter. In return Frederick William sent Townshend his warmest thanks and assurance of sincere obligation.⁴

On 3 September the treaty was signed by the plenipotentiaries, Townshend, Broglie, and Wallenrodt.⁵ Its contents are sufficiently indicated by what has been said above.⁶ For its character, it was in the main directed against the late alliance of Austria and Spain. It was not the reply thereto first projected, nor was it a realisation

¹ Ilgen to Townshend, 27 August and 1 September, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46.

² Townshend to Ilgen and the reply, 21 and 27 August, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46.

³ Rescript of 25 August, Staatsarchiv, Berlin. It referred to the marriages as "die zwischen Unserem und dem Königl. Englischen Hause, nach Gottes Willen, künftigt etwa erfolgende Heyrathen."

⁴ Wallenrodt, 2 and 6 September, and rescript to him, 8 September, *ibid.* Cf. Droysen, p. 381.

⁵ Tilson wrote: "The courier from Potsdam came last Saturday night, and all we writ about was agreed to; so all Sunday, God bless us, were we as busy as bees, without any thought of Church, in hopes of signing this blessed work that day; but it could not be completely finished that night, so it was put off till yesterday, when all was signat. and sigillat. in due form; upon which I congratulate you most heartily, for I think it is a mighty business compleated" (4 September, R.O. Regencies 7).

⁶ It is printed in full in *Preussens Staatsverträge*, pp. 287-93. Originals, R.O. Treaties 95, 412.

of the alliance between the same three powers worked upon during the winter, for that was rather meant for service in the north and difficulties with Spain were not yet thought of. It was the form of combination for protection of their various interests which present circumstances enforced. The marrow of the treaty was the fresh emphatic declaration that France and Great Britain were prepared to stand together against all comers. The inclusion of Prussia was the accident of the visit of Frederick William I to Hanover, when it was found that he could be secured on easy terms. His participation was important, in view of its effect in the empire and in the north, but it was not essential. The treaty would have been concluded without him, and more quickly; his interests, as it turned out, threw serious obstacles in the way of gaining other powers; and his desertion in the following year impaired the strength and stability of the league then formed but little.¹

The signing of the treaty was followed by mutual congratulation. Wallenrodt could not sufficiently express the pleasure given on the French and English sides; the most happy consequences were expected, he said, "et qu'on pourroit envoyer promener et la cour de Vienne et celle de Saxe, et songer aux remèdes efficaces pour mettre à la raison les Polonois."² Neither had Newcastle much difficulty in obtaining the approval of the lords justices in England,³ nor Morville that of the council at Paris. From Berlin Ilgen sent Townshend warmest praise: "Comme le mérite de ce bel et grand ouvrage est deu uniquement à V. Excellence, nous luy rendons icy toute la justice là dessus que luy en est due."⁴ And Frederick William wrote to him after the ratifications had been exchanged (on 10 October) that he himself must wish success to the treaty, seeing that it was "mon propre ouvrage, et que j'ay eu le plaisir d'en négotier moy même en personne avec vous."⁵

Yet, when the treaty was published, a storm of hostile criticism broke from all quarters. In England, when parliament met, it was attacked on the ground that the engagement of British troops for defence of the king's dominions abroad violated the Act of Succession, and for many years it continued to be the target of invective as a signal instance of subordination of British interests to those of

¹ See fully on the aims and nature of the treaty of Hanover, Dureng, pp. 329 f.

² 6 September, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

³ See his dispatch of 10 September (o.s.), printed by Coxé, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ii. 474.

⁴ 9 September, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 253.

⁵ 20 October, R.O. Royal Letters 46. Ratification, however, of the declaration about employment of the Prussian succour was refused, as without precedent, although Frederick William sent to Hanover his own signed ratification of it; see Townshend to Wallenrodt, 12 October, Tilson, 12 and 29 October, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 253, Foreign Ministers 46, Regencies 7.

Hanover. In 1743, to cite but one example, it was stated to be, beyond controversy, "calculated only for the preservation of Lower-Saxony, or rather to support and defend the new possessions and claims of the Electorate of Hanover."¹ On the other hand Frenchmen, Prussians, Hanoverians complained as loudly. The first-named shrank from the unwelcome prospect of a conflict with Spain; in most minds the balance of advantage seemed to weigh heavily for England; old jealousy revived.² At Berlin few were at pains to conceal their disapproval. Ilgen himself had been forced to share in the work against his will. He saw his master departing from his old established policy of caution, undertaking indefinite risks for shadowy prospects of advantage. It was the very thing against which he had ardently appealed in February. Why, it was asked, should the king have declared against Austria thus openly before there was necessity? If the empire came to war with France, must he refuse to fulfil his constitutional obligations, and could England defend him against the emperor? Had he waited for the league to form and show what it could do, he might have joined it later on definite conditions. His accession would certainly have been sought, and if those conditions were not granted he would have been well out of the affair.³ Nor was there less discontent in minds at Hanover. The prime articles in the creed of Bernstorff and his colleagues were loyalty to the emperor and jealousy of Prussia. Now they saw Prussia aggrandised and Hanover, perhaps, constrained to fight on the side of Austria's hereditary foe, exposed to the emperor's vengeance, laid under the ban of the empire; and all to secure to their master's kingdom her foreign acquisitions and her trade. Baron Huldenberg at Vienna took relish, we may believe, in retailing complaints of the Austrian ministers that foreigners (the English ministers and particularly Townshend being meant), who knew nothing of German affairs, should exert themselves to excite misunderstanding between the emperor and the king of England.⁴

Of all these critics the British were the least justified. It was legitimate enough to indict the German obligations undertaken, to object to embroilment in continental politics, but it was but politics of party to ignore the rest. And for the present useless. When the treaty was presented to parliament care was taken to

¹ From the Stanhope-Chesterfield pamphlet, *The Case of the Hanover Forces in the Pay of Great Britain*, demolished by Horatio Walpole in his reply, *The Interest of Great Britain Steadily Pursued*.

² Dureng, p. 342.

³ Droysen, pp. 382-3, Prutz, ii. 380.

⁴ Extracts from Huldenberg's dispatches, 8 and 12 September, R.O. Germany, Empire, 225.

lay stress on the advantages to the two prime British interests, religion and trade. The motives of the treaty stated first in the king's speech were "the distressed condition of some of our Protestant Brethren abroad" and measures taken by foreign powers "which seem to have laid the foundation of new troubles and disturbances in Europe, and to threaten My subjects with the loss of several of the most advantageous branches of their trade." There followed a hint of the intention of those powers to espouse the cause of the Pretender. Elaboration of these arguments by ministers overcame all that could be said in opposition and secured approval of their policy by large majorities in both houses.

On the Austrian side news of the signature roused both indignation and alarm. Strange reports of its contents were circulated; prohibition of a female succession to the Habsburg dominions, settlement of their partition in advance, and agreement for transfer of the imperial dignity to another house, even should Charles VI have male issue. Wich at Hamburg heard talk among the Austrians there of a bloody war in prospect, of declamation by Vice-chancellor Schönborn against Sinzendorf's intimacy with Saint-Saphorin, of English machination to blame for everything.¹

At Hanover, in October, Count Conrad Starhemberg presented on behalf of the emperor a formal protest. He was answered that George I had not at all changed his principles in regard to the affairs of Europe. The new alliance, purely defensive and calculated not to disturb public tranquillity but to preserve it, was proof of his solicitude for the general well-being. No representations whatever, as Starhemberg knew, had been made about the marriages proposed for the archduchesses, so much talked of, and it was hoped that the emperor would not take it ill, if the king of England could not see his way to guarantee the succession to his hereditary dominions; in present circumstances he must keep his hands free. He had not received the emperor's guarantee of his own succession in England until some time after the formation of the Quadruple Alliance, and advantages to the house of Austria he was under no obligation to procure.²

¹ Brandt, 19 September, cited by Droysen, IV. ii. 412 note; Carrard, 10 October, R.O. Germany, Empire, 56; Wich, 27 October, R.O. Hamburg 42. Count Schönborn's declamation against the treaty, Rosenlehner, pp. 73-74.

² Townshend to Starhemberg, 24 October, R.O. Foreign Ministers 11, Germany, Empire, 56, Regencies 7 (draft).

CHAPTER V

ALARMS FROM NORTH AND SOUTH

CONTINUALLY while these negotiations were conducting alarms from the north vexed minds at Hanover. First, early in July 1725, came word from Poyntz of intention on the part of Catherine I to demand the use of a Swedish harbour for her fleet. This, Townshend told him, was confirmed by secret advices from Paris and Berlin, and an attempt on Denmark seemed certain. Ease felt at Paris on the subject he ascribed to misplaced trust in what Campredon wrote and Kurakin and young Cederhielm professed. Poyntz must exert all his energy and skill to prevent the grant, and to oppose the tsaritsa "a little by her own methods" might use what was left of his £10,000, if he thought fit, while repeating the former assurance that £50,000 or even £100,000 would be forthcoming in case of actual hostilities.¹ At the same time promises were renewed at Copenhagen and the French were pressed to help, on the old plea that any disturbance in the north must serve the ends of Austria. Seeing, Townshend pressed on Broglie, that neither would England send a fleet nor France an army, other means must be devised, and best and readiest to find the Danes a good sum of money; £50,000 from each power would enable them to repel the first attack, and the money should be used only if actually required.²

The French, however, were persuaded that little need be apprehended, and very soon calm prevailed again at Hanover. On further advices Poyntz was ordered to be very careful of his money and to pledge none "but upon the express condition of Sweden's being actually attacked."³ Prince Kurakin gave most positive assurances that no Russian expedition would take place, and Campredon and Michel, the French agent at Berlin, sent like consolatory word. Transmitting their advices Robinson opined that those from Michel were "sufficient proofs of the happy effect his Majesty's vigorous resolution had worked at that court, and that

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 7 July 1725, R.O. Sweden 37, Regencies 6.

² Townshend to Broglie, 8 July, R.O. Foreign Ministers 4, Regencies 6.

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 10 July, R.O. Sweden 37.

the present disposition of the king of Prussia was the best answer to his Majesty's letter, which M^r de Morville perfectly agreed in."¹

Hardly was this written when Poyntz cast another bomb. Calmly writing at Pymont, says under-secretary Tilson in his jocose vein, and thinking of nothing but finishing the royal cure and "jolting back to Hanover," they had been disturbed by "such a dispatch from Stockholm as put us in a combustion."² After noticing report of willingness on the part of the emperor to accede to the Russo-Swedish treaty of 1724, when "the little weight that this country has in the general system of affairs may chance to be thrown into the Emperor's scale," and describing how he had gained to oppose the Holstein party at Petersburg the Russian envoy Michael Bestuzhev, returning thither in exasperated state of mind, after a violent quarrel with the Holstein minister, General Reichel,³ Poyntz passed on to recount Horn's settled conviction, expressed "in the greatest distress and perplexity," that the Russian intention was not to attack Denmark but to bring the duke of Holstein Gottorp and his new duchess⁴ to Sweden with a fleet, which would winter at Norrköping. It was easy, the count said, to see what effect such a step might have upon the nation. They could not hinder it themselves, but the king of England would be entitled, on the plea of Denmark being threatened, to send a squadron to join the Danish fleet, "which combin'd force might easily enclose the Russians in the port of Sweden and take them all in a nett," when the Swedes would give them so warm a reception by land that not a man should escape. Horn could hardly believe, indeed, that the Russians would attempt to force a port, what he feared was rather that the tsaritsa "should amuse them with specious proposals, hold them in suspense and alarm them with her fleet, send the duke and her money among them, and soon undermine the present establishment." He himself would absolutely refuse to treat until the riksdag met, eighteen months hence; if an extraordinary session

¹ Robinson, 19 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

² Tilson, 21 July, R.O. Regencies 6.

³ The quarrel, Poyntz tells us, had cost Bestuzhev marriage with Count Lillienstedt's daughter, of whom he was "passionately fond," and an appointment in the duchess of Holstein-Gottorp's household, and he had gone primed with a quantity of information about Holstein aspirations and intrigues, and "with all the assurance of a man possessed of that which would effectually confound his enemys and give a full scope to his revenge." Solov'ev says that Bestuzhev had asked leave to return in order to have a direct part in Cederhielm's negotiation; Malmström (i. 453, note) that he was recalled in consequence of letters that he had written against Reichel and Bassewitz, which the latter saw. Previously Poyntz had written: "M^r Bestuchef leaves this place much regretted; he is a modest civil man, and I fear if he does not return we shall not gett so good a one in his place." The Holsteiners prevented his return, but he regained favour with the Russian court, as Poyntz wrote later, and a pension of 1500 roubles.

⁴ The duke had married the tsarevna Anne on 1 June.

were compelled he hoped to unite the patriots and royalists to overcome the Holsteiners and so protract matters for another winter and give time to summon help. But in the mean time they could not keep out the duke and duchess, whose residence in Sweden must have the worst consequences; the duke's pension of £5,000 was all spent in the country and large bribes were coming in from Russia; the influence of the Holsteiners, he was sorry to say, seemed to be increasing; and he saw no resource but for Great Britain and France to supply a good sum of money for counter-bribing. He knew what had happened before, how the king had squandered large sums for bad purposes, but the king of England could not fulfil his engagements more cheaply, being spared the expense of ships and subsidies. He would not have the money pass into the king's hands but be distributed by Poyntz.

While not giving in to all these utterances of Horn, considering his state of mind, Poyntz testified to his being "at present heartily frightened on his own account, perfectly reconciled to the king and queen of Sweden, and entirely attached to Great Britain." And so he gave him all possible assurances as to the fulfilment of treaty engagements and acquainted him with the measures taken. As, he said, it appeared from a dispatch from Gedda that France was similarly inclined to help, "your Ldp. may depend upon it that Count Horn is disposing all his friends to enter into a close union with his Ma^{ty} and France." Without giving much encouragement about the money he had found it absolutely necessary to draw for the balance of £6,000, and he most earnestly begged Townshend to consider what further could be done. "If our forces do but stand firm, we have at present a clear majority of nine voices against five in the senate, the rest being sick or absent," but he could not answer for the effect of the presence of the duke and duchess "in a nation so liable to corruption, and whose spirits are so far broken with a long series of misfortunes." Secretary Höpken, a most formidable opponent, he hoped to gain through Baron Sparre, "who acts honestly and vigorously in all respects," and Gyllenborg he had succeeded in reconciling with Horn and would make him his present as soon as it could safely be done. Also he was dispensing £200 or £300 among certain influential ladies.¹

Copies of this dispatch, its alarming news confirmed from Copenhagen,² were hurriedly sent off to London and Paris. To Newcastle Townshend wrote that if events developed

¹ Poyntz, 30 June (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 37, an immense dispatch marked for the king's personal perusal only. Sparre was at present on leave of absence at Stockholm. Gyllenborg, expelled from England in 1717, had therefore not received the present to envoys customary on their departure.

² Hermann, 17 July, R.O. Denmark 48.

as these advices give us too much reason to apprehend, your Grace will own with me that all our system of affairs in the north and consequently in the south will be entirely overturned. . . . As to the money affairs I don't doubt but particular care will be taken in England that M^r Poyntz may neither want credit nor the necessary supplies. I fear our too great inclination to frugality hitherto has been the chief cause that matters have come in Sweden to such a height.

The little expended, it seemed, had gained a majority in the senate, and more might have been done with larger sums. Newcastle would please show this letter to Robert Walpole and send word of means in regard to money, and of anything else that might occur to him for his Majesty's service in the present critical turn in northern affairs. But he should keep the information very private, and do nothing to raise alarm.¹

To Poyntz in a private letter Townshend complained that the Swedes had neglected to notify the present danger, though he himself had always thought the plan now feared more probable than a direct attack on Denmark; the only hint had come from Robinson at Paris, to whom Gedda "in the fullness of his heart and with tears in his eyes" had talked even more passionately than Horn. As, he said, payments hitherto had been made from the Civil List and could not be continued from that source, while former subsidies had come from parliament, the only way, as represented in the accompanying public dispatch, was for the Swedes to apply for aid under their treaty, when his Majesty would have "full scope to assist them with money and ships, to the full import of his engagements and their necessity."

This "publick dispatch" stated the design against Sweden and went on:

the Czarina, in consequence of this one stroke, will see herself mistress of that whole kingdom, and by that means of near three parts in four of the coast of the Baltick, with a fair prospect of pushing on her conquests next spring, with ease and success, against the island of Zeland and the rest of the king of Denmark's dominions. I need not explain to you how fatal a blow this would be to the interest of his Ma^{ty}'s dominions in particular, and to the balance of Europe in general; and of what consequence it is to us to defeat this designed attempt.

The Swedes, in their "indolence and supineness," had given no notice of the danger, and it was now too late to send ships or troops to their aid, "neither is there any fund for raising any money." Yet, so resolved was his Majesty to fulfil his engagements, that if

¹ Townshend to Newcastle, 21 July, R.O. Regencies 6.

Poyntz found the advices well founded, and "a spirit in Sweden to oppose the attempt with vigour," he must in spite of all give the strongest assurances of assistance and intimate that he was authorised to furnish a sum of money for defence. He must be as frugal as possible, but if the senate refused admission to the Russian fleet and asked for help he might draw for £50,000 or even £100,000 if he saw absolute occasion for so much. It was hoped that the necessity of the case would justify the grant to parliament and the whole nation.¹

The copy of Poyntz's dispatch sent to Walpole at Paris was accompanied by instructions to show it to Morville and Fleury and to press them urgently to furnish at once £10,000 or £12,000 to help the king of Sweden and the well-intentioned there, informing them of the British money promised. They would plainly see, said Townshend, that Campredon and Anthouard did "nothing else but betray us, and that no manner of confidence can be put in them," but to complain of their being employed was now too late.²

The French government had at last gone so far as to name an ambassador to Sweden, a member of the distinguished family of Brancas-Céreste. He, however, did not reach Stockholm till September.³

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 20 July, R.O. Sweden 38.

² Townshend to H. Walpole, 21 July, R.O. Regencies 6. In a postscript: "I beg Dear Horace you wou'd do y^r utmost to get the French court at all events to put the sum of £12,000 or if you can of £20,000 immediately into Poyntz' hands, for without it we shall all be undone, the King having run his Civil List so far in debt by the supplies he has given Sweden that we can do no more that way."

Anthouard, an adjutant-general in the Swedish service acting for France at Stockholm, was the object of perpetual invective by the British ministers as wholly devoted to the Holstein interest. If they stigmatised him further as a man of low condition and bad character, we may set that down as ordinary language about a political opponent. Count Wrangel in his *Liste des diplomates français en Suède*, 1541-1891 (p. 48 n.), names him Pierre d'Anthouard, Seigneur d'Archambaut, and says that he was in the service of Charles XII for sixteen years, and aide-de-camp to him and a writer of dispatches from Poland to the French government and to the marquis de Bonac since 1704. Also that he left Sweden in November 1725 and was soon made a "mestre-de-camp" in the French army.

³ Not Louis de Brancas, Marquis de Céreste, afterwards a field-marshal, as says Geoffroy in the *Recueil des instructions*, for he was born about 1670, while both Poyntz and Wallenrodt describe the man in question as young. Count Wrangel in his work cited gives his name and titles as Bouphile-Hyacynte-Toussaint de Brancas, Comte de Céreste. Poyntz always calls him Count Brancas. In the *Lettres Historiques* (lxviii. 292), where it is recorded that he came to Hanover on 14 August and left for Stockholm on the 23rd, he is named "Comte de Brancas-Céreste," and a copy of a letter from him at the Record Office (Sweden 38) is so signed. He was a nephew of Marshal Villars (Dureng, p. 309), and is named in the marshal's Memoirs "Comte de Cérest" or "Comte de Cérest-Brancas."

At Hanover he made a good impression. "Tho' he is but young," Townshend wrote to Poyntz, "yet he has a great deal of good sense, with an agreeable air and turn of a gentleman." Poyntz "could not have a prettier gentleman sent from France" to act with him. He was warned not to trust the king of Sweden too far nor Anthouard at all, would follow Poyntz's counsels, and would have £10,000 or £12,000 or even more of which to dispose. Poyntz should copy in his treatment

His instructions, of date 6 June,¹ throw useful light on French sentiments on affairs in the north. After reviewing relations with Sweden since the mission of Count de la Marck in 1717 they stated that another envoy would probably not have been sent, but for the tsar's death. To foil his suspected designs against Sweden had been a chief object of continuing the negotiations with him, it being expected that Sweden would join the projected alliance. Now the Holstein party was counting upon the support of the tsaritsa, credited with the intention of pressing the duke's claim to the crown of Sweden. In view of the condition of affairs there no precise orders could be given; the king of France was certainly favourable to restoration of the royal authority, but must have regard to the will of the nation. Moreover, he was too little instructed of the present situation "dans une conjoncture où il faut ménager des partis qui agissent sur des principes aussi différens et aussi contraires." In particular Brancas must endeavour to dissipate the feeling that the king, in order to recover the sovereignty, would make alliance with powers always regarded by the Swedes as their natural enemies.² While giving the king the best possible assurances of French sympathy he must observe complete impartiality, so as to persuade everyone that his master had only the true interests of Sweden in view. He must give no hope that the king of France would derogate from his guarantee of Sleswick to Denmark; only intimation that he would willingly join in measures, such as should not disturb the public tranquillity, to obtain for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp a reasonable equivalent. The clause concerning him in the proposed treaty with Russia had that end in view, and it was thought that what Sweden had appeared to want in inviting France to accede to her own treaty with Russia would be fulfilled more perfectly in this way. Since the tsaritsa was showing "beaucoup d'empressement" to conclude the said treaty success was hoped for, and Sweden, acceding to it, would find both her own interests and those of the duke better consulted thus than by reliance on engagements divided among different treaties and therefore weaker. But in putting these considerations forward Brancas must observe most cautious reticence, waiting to instruct himself thoroughly on the views and strength of the different parties. With Poyntz he must act in close concert and complete confidence. The document concluded with information about the Swedish constitution and

of him the "unreserved familiarity" existing between himself (Townshend) and Broglie, for the influence of Great Britain and France abroad proceeded "from that union of measures and councils which appears among all their ministers" (23 August, R.O. Sweden 38).

¹ *Recueil des instructions*, ii. 197 foll. His credentials bore date 30 June (Wrangel).

² Denmark, to wit; an old scheme of Frederick I is referred to, as again below.

the supposed views of individual senators, Count Horn being credited with concealing under a simple and modest exterior "*une ambition démesurée*," and, while more inclined to the duke than to the king, with aiming at holding the balance to his own advantage.

Further instructions, secret, show the want of confidence that there was in the aims of George I in the north. The king of England's ministers there, it was said, had seemed to attach themselves publicly to the king and so had rendered themselves suspect to his opponents, and then had come the long negotiation with the late tsar. Progress had been so slow that the king of England, carried perhaps by engagements with Denmark of which the king of France had never more than an imperfect knowledge, had sought to assure himself against the tsar by other means, this being no doubt the reason for the support given by his ministers to the king of Sweden's scheme of alliance with Denmark. Perhaps it was the opposition encountered that made him wish for the help of a French minister to win over the majority of the senators. Brancas must beware of such dangerous action, and must observe complete impartiality. But as the king of France would willingly fall in with the king of England's policy, were it likely to succeed, the real situation of affairs must be discovered at any price, if only, in case of ill success, to convince the king of England of its reasons and to disabuse him of any suspicion of the king of France's sincerity. Nothing could be prescribed precisely about the Russian negotiation, which necessarily concerned Sweden; Brancas must so comport himself that there should be nothing against him; and he must explain to Poyntz that he had only to await the better settlement of affairs to take a part more conformable to the taste and interests of the king of England.

Horatio Walpole, back at Paris on 22 July, showed Poyntz's dispatch to Morville and the next day harangued the duke of Bourbon in terms "that I thought the most capable of inspiring him with a resolution." The money, he said, was wanted not for the benefit of the "*contemptible*" king of Sweden nor his "*insignificant creatures*," but to help the nation, now visibly altering its disposition. Two or three hundred thousand livres now would save millions later. Fleury, whom he then visited, expressed strong approval of the language held, and as the result, in spite of the opposition of Morville and of Marshal Villars,¹ Walpole learnt next day that it had been decided to furnish Brancas with 200,000 livres at once and with instructions conformable to those sent to Poyntz. No more could be obtained, he said; the expenses of sending back the *infanta* and of the king's marriage were pitifully pleaded.²

¹ Dureng, p. 302.

² H. Walpole, 30 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

But already fears again were calmed. Berlin, Copenhagen, Stockholm agreed in reporting the Russian expedition laid aside and the troops put on shore again. Said Poyntz—himself ascribing the event to disappointment of the hopes of Swedish support founded on the “mad expectations” of Bassewitz :

This good news has given great ease to our friends here, who all with one voice attribute it to the vigorous interposition of his Majesty and France in their defence. . . . I have taken care to give Count Horn and all our friends such strong assurances in private, that they are wrap up in his Majesty's goodness and in the best heart and disposition imaginable.

Upon the whole Poyntz thought the affair would pass “without much trouble or expense to his Majesty.”¹

Townshend was of opinion that Catherine had been influenced by warning from Cederhielm “that an attempt upon Sweden would not easily succeed. . . . I believe our friend has done good service, and tho' it has occasioned some expence, yet your Grace will agree that it has been well employed and very seasonably, and may save us much greater charges.”² To Robert Walpole, who had objected to the proposed subsidy to Sweden, he wrote : “I think it needless to dispute about a matter, which is now entirely over.”³

In a further dispatch Poyntz asked for leave to distribute the money remaining in his hands : “as our friends have acted bravely, and as we shall have further occasion for their service, I think it absolutely necessary.” Horn, he said, now that the Russian menace was past, only feared two things, that the king of Sweden, relieved, should burst out again into wild projects, and that the tsaritsa should be driven to join forces with the emperor. Replying, Townshend left it to Poyntz to do what he thought best about the money and urged him to do all he could to prevent admission of the emperor to the Russo-Swedish treaty, pointing out that he could not help Sweden with either money or ships, while the king of England could. Yet an agreement between him and the tsaritsa Townshend still did not think an easy matter, giving his reasons. The king, he went on, was not opposed to the satisfaction to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, which Horn desired, but there were insuperable difficulties against his getting more than was offered in the proposed treaty with Russia. If Cederhielm would press the tsaritsa earnestly there would be little difficulty about concluding that treaty, and if

¹ Du Bourgay, 21 and 28 July, Hermann, 21 July (“Je crois que le Dannemark en sera quitte cette année pour la peur”), Poyntz, 6 July (o.s.), *ll.cc.*

² To Newcastle, 24 July, R.O. Regencies 6.

³ See Walpole to Townshend, and the reply, 20 and 27 July, presumably old style, Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ii. 471-3.

Horn, after it was signed, had anything admissible to suggest, the king would be glad to listen to it.¹

Poyntz's dispatch last cited was brought to Hanover by Captain John Deane, a man who had been sent to Petersburg in June with a nominal commission as consul-general, but really as a spy. He had reached his destination only to find his mission suspected by the British merchants, most of whom were Jacobites, and seeing that some years before he had been dismissed the Russian naval service in disgrace, their representations brought him orders, on that ground, to leave within eight days.² He ridiculed the whole story of the Russian armaments, says Tilson, as "a bugbear only from the beginning;" neither ships nor galleys ready, and the troops for embarkation, only 6,800 effectives, at work on the Cronsnot docks. The late tsar's naval work he thought would perish; the new port at Rogerwyk he had visited and found neglected. Menshikov had "laugh'd from the beginning to think how they terrified Denmark and made 'em work even on Sundays."³

¹ Poyntz, 10 July (o.s.), Townshend to him, 2 August, R.O. Sweden 38, the latter dispatch, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 192-4.

² His commission, of date 11 May (o.s.), R.O. King's Letters 57. Townshend wrote to Poyntz on 7 July: "You know Cap^t Deane as well as I do, I take him to be an honest man. He has indeed a commission of consul from his Majesty to serve only as a colour, but his true business is to transmit hither what intelligence he may be able to get for his Ma^{ty}'s service." A previous nomination of him as consul, in 1721, had been objected to by Sir Nathaniel Gould on behalf of the Russia Company as "very prejudicial to our mercantile affairs," he being reported "very obnoxious to the Russ government" (27 July (o.s.) 1721, R.O. Russia 107; there-with a copy of a memorial of the company of 24 April (o.s.) 1716 praying that no consul might be appointed without its knowledge).

The Jacobite William Hease, of whom in another chapter, wrote on 25 July (o.s.) 1725: "There was one John Dean sent hither, who was formerly a capt. in this service, now sent here as a consul, but as we were well advised that he was rather sent as a spy he was immediately sent back on pretence that he was an improper person, being sent out of the service and country in disgrace for his misdemeanours" (intercepted letter, cited later, p. 140). See fully on the subject Deane's dispatches and those of the chaplain to the English factory, Thomas Consett, R.O. Russia 9, 107; also Campredon 23 and 30 June, *Sbornik*, lviii, and Jackson from Stockholm, 7 to 21 July (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 41. Consett gives much information about what was passing at Petersburg, and not less interesting is Deane's voluminous account of his experiences, written after his departure. In the autumn he was in Holland employed in obtaining information about the Jacobites at Petersburg, and was promised a handsome reward for his services, see his correspondence with Townshend, Holland 579.

Another intended spy was an old friend of Townshend named Thomas, a constant traveller and master of many languages, whom he sent to Poyntz for instruction before going to Russia in the guise of a tourist. Poyntz kept him two months at Stockholm and then, in consequence of Deane's experiences, found it inadvisable to send him further than to Dantzic and Königsberg, to pick up what he could there as "a traveller at large." His place at Petersburg, said Poyntz, would be supplied by a Swedish officer going thither, on whom he could rely (Townshend to Poyntz, 30 April (o.s.), Poyntz to him, 6 July (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 37, 38).

³ Tilson, 31 July, R.O. Regencies 6.

A probable account of the whole matter was contained in a letter written from Narva by a Swede in the Russian service, of which Poyntz managed to obtain a copy. The writer stated the Holsteiners, without the knowledge of the senate, to have carried the tsaritsa to prepare her armaments first on the pretext of a training cruise, as in the late tsar's time, and then, when this plea no longer served, on pretence of an attack on Denmark; their real object being to set the duke on the throne of Sweden and to recover Sleswick subsequently. When, however, nothing was wanting but the order for the fleet to sail the opponents of the scheme had prevailed and prevented its issue. The letter described the great Holstein expectations and concluded with an account of the general discontent in Russia and of the possibility of Catherine being forced to declare the young tsarevich her successor in order to save herself.¹

On 14 August Townshend wrote to Newcastle :

I think I may now congratulate your Grace not only upon the storms being intirely over in the north, but also on affairs being likely to take such a turn there, that we may hope before next spring to put our selves out of danger from any insults in those quarters, and his Ma^{ty} need not doubt in my opinion of bringing matters in the south to such a posture before he sets out for England, as to be free from any troublesome apprehensions, especially if the court of France will show the same spirit and vigour the King has done, and exert the same application in the several courts of Europe towards bringing them into our measures.²

"Matters in the south" had taken a sudden and surprising turn. Not in what concerned Vienna; if Saint-Saphorin continued to write of secret conferences of Ripperda with the Austrian ministers, of his "contentement indicible" and boasts renewed that George I would fail in his pretensions to govern Europe, if he maintained conviction that secret articles and marriage-contracts had been drawn up and sent to Madrid,³ these were old stories discounted, what mattered was the news from Spain. Having begun a dispatch by advising that at an audience the sovereigns had disavowed the language used by Ripperda and expressed their hope that consent of parliament to the restoration of Gibraltar would be arranged, and having expressed conviction of no present desire for a rupture and that this disposition would continue during the breach with France, Stanhope had been roused from bed at two in the morning by an "extraordinary letter" from the marquis de Grimaldo, secretary of state, written on the arrival of a courier from Vienna and declaring

¹ Letter of 11 July (o.s.), enclosed by Poyntz 10 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 38.

² R.O. Regencies 6.

³ Saint-Saphorin, 12 to 21 July, R.O. Germany, Empire, 55.

that what the king had said about maintaining alliance and commercial relations with Great Britain was on the supposition that Gibraltar would be handed over, and that *presto*.¹ Forwarding this dispatch to England Tilson wrote: "The news from Madrid is of the utmost importance, and my Lord begs that his Grace [Newcastle] and M^r Chancellor of the Exchequer [Robert Walpole] would not take any alarm upon it but keep it a secret and suspend all orders and resolutions till they hear from him." Shortly Townshend advised that the king, in view of the effect which the new treaty with France and Prussia might be expected to have at Madrid, thought it unnecessary to show any alarm at Grimaldo's "dry and haughty letter;" only that orders ought to be sent to General Wade to push on the fortifications and barracks in the Highlands and no money be spared to strengthen that weak spot. The South Sea Company must not be alarmed in any way; the king would maintain its rights with force and vigour, if necessary.²

Of giving up Gibraltar there was no thought. To Townshend's dispatch of 9 July cited in the *Cambridge Modern History* (vi. 58) may be added such utterances of his of the same time as the following: "His Ma^{ty} is resolved neither to hear of any mediation nor to think of restoring Gibraltar," and "Soiez persuadé qu'on tiendra ferme sur Gibraltar et sur toute autre chose qu'on voudra entreprendre contre les traittés. . . . Sa Majesté est déterminé absolument à ne pas admettre aucune médiation sur ces prétendues disputes entre Luy et l'Espagne."³ Already, as one of the precautions taken to "convince the City of London, and all England, that it never was the King's intention" to give up Gibraltar, Colonel Kane, in command at Minorca, had been transferred to Gibraltar as lieutenant-governor and ordered to divert thither two regiments that were being sent from Ireland to relieve the garrison at Port Mahon.⁴

¹ Stanhope, 14 July, received 1 August, R.O. Spain 93, with Grimaldo's original letter.

² Tilson, 3 August, Townshend 7 August, R.O. Regencies 6. In a previous dispatch, 10 July, *ibid.*: "My brother Walpole" ought to be thinking what amends could be made to the South Sea Company, on whom the storm, if the court of Vienna succeeded in raising it, would fall first. "I own I have no opinion of their junction with the African Company, but if anything can be done towards India, I should be very glad of it, and some way should be thought of to keep so considerable a body of men, as those concerned in the South Sea, in good humour, in case the king of Spain should be mad enough to make any attempt upon their trade." But this in strict confidence, for "the least air" of it "would be of very ill consequence to that stock in particular." It was hoped that the king of Spain would not be so ill advised as to come to a rupture.

³ To Newcastle and to Saint-Saphorin, 10 and 12 July, R.O. Regencies 6.

⁴ To Newcastle, 17 and 21 July, *ibid.* In the latter dispatch: "All our advices confirm that the K. of Spain grows extremely out of humour with his treaty concluded with the Emperor, and when they see at Madrid that we send a man of weight to Gibraltar, and make other necessary provisions for the defence of that

Behind everything was seen the hand of Austria. Saint-Saphorin was told : "La cour Imp^{le} pousse ses desseins avec tant de fureur contre le Roy, que non seulement on va exciter l'Espagne à venir à une rupture avec nous au sujet de Gibraltar, s'ils peuvent y réussir, mais aussi on embrasse avec zèle le parti du Prétendant et on fera jouer tous les ressorts pour incommoder le Roy de ce côté-là."¹ And Stanhope : the king was not greatly surprised at "the short and peremptory demand of Gibraltar made" in view of "the violent counsels inspired at Madrid from the Imperial court by the means of Ripperda. . . . The King sees very evidently that the court of Vienna pushes their rage against him with the utmost bitterness and malice ; he knows that they will do all in their power to bring things to a rupture with Spain, and has good reason to think they are determined to encourage and assist the Pretender." But after the success of the last session of parliament his affairs were "in such a posture that he is not in the least anxious about any scheme which their wild imagination may suggest to them." If the trade of his subjects were molested he would not sit still but take the most effectual measures.²

For all these brave assertions it was deemed necessary to demand from France specific assurance about Gibraltar. Continuing his discussions with Morville about changes in the Hanover treaty Horatio Walpole inquired whether he had communicated to Bourbon what he (Walpole) had said and written about Grimaldo's declaration, receiving the answer "that I might return his Majesty all possible assurances of the Most Christian King's resolution to support him in this, and all other occasions, pursuant to his engagements." Not content with this, Walpole asked for and was given a written declaration on the subject. But on examining it he found that Gibraltar was not specifically named. Unable to obtain anything further from Bourbon or Morville, he betook himself to Fleury, argued the whole case with him, and took occasion to represent

place, I am persuaded they will be convinced both there and at Vienna that it will be to no purpose to make that demand." Draft of the orders to Col. Kane, 21 July, *ibid.*, copy of a letter from him, reporting his arrival at Gibraltar on 16 August (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32744 f. 244, reports of the time from him and others on the garrisoning and state of Gibraltar and Minorca, sent home by Townshend on 19 October, R.O. Regencies 7. Actually, as the reliefs from Ireland did not touch at Gibraltar, the two regiments which they were to replace at Minorca were landed there.

¹ Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 3 August, R.O. Germany, Empire, 55. In his dispatch to Newcastle of 7 August, cited : "Your Grace sees where the D. of Wharton is got, and what a secret article the Emperor, as we are assured, has made. But I believe we shall counterwork them so effectually, that all the fine schemes Rome Vienna and Madrid have been framing against us will be quite blasted."

² To Stanhope, 4 August, R.O. Spain 93.

what an ill impression the general opinion of their weakness, of their want of vigour and resolution in their counsels and measures, had upon the minds of all sorts of people to the disadvantage of France, that the timidity and concern they shewed for fear of a war would, if care was not taken, plunge them inevitably into a war.

As the result, in spite of evident disinclination to give a specific undertaking, he obtained a written declaration that the king of France, "en quelque cas et sous quelque prétexte que l'on pût de la part de l'Espagne troubler l'Angleterre dans la possession de Gibraltar, ou dans le commerce de la nation angloise au préjudice de ces traitez," would at once join in taking proper steps and measures with the king of England. In return Walpole gave a declaration that if France by this undertaking became embroiled with Spain Great Britain would effectually support her.¹

The summer was not to end without a fourth alarm from Russia. Early in August the tsaritsa's fleet sailed out as far as Gothland, and again report of hostile intention against Denmark or Sweden was rife.² However, the scare was again soon over. "All the noise we had last week about the Muscovite fleet seems to be vanished at once," Jackson wrote, the last news being that it had returned eastwards and was lying off Viborg.³ At the end of September there was definite news that the ships were laying up for the winter and disarming.⁴

That domestic affairs in Russia were passing from bad to worse all accounts agreed. Lefort excelled himself in the description; Campredon now, and the private correspondents of Poyntz and of resident Jackson, supported.⁵ Count Lieven on his return from a business journey to Reval had much to say on the discontents and divisions among the senators and of their opposition to the tsaritsa, rendering a "despicable account" of the Russian forces both by land and sea, in want alike of pay, clothing, stores and discipline.⁶

¹ H. Walpole, 13 to 17 August, B.M. Add. MS. 32744; cf. Dureng, pp. 319-321. Copies of the declarations *ibid.* and R.O. France 182.

² Jackson, 4 August (o.s.), Poyntz, 10 and 11 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 41, 38; Hermann, 28 August, Denmark 48.

³ Jackson, 18 August (o.s.).

⁴ Jackson, 8 September (o.s.), Hermann, 25 September.

⁵ Jackson's informant, he says, was not known to him personally, but had been recommended to him "as a man of spirit who had credit among the Russes and frequently conversed with a great man of distinction, and besides I am assured is the only one of the factory that is not tainted with Jacobitism" (18 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 41).

⁶ Poyntz, 10 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 38. See on this subject Klyuchevsky, v. 346.

CHAPTER VI

FIRST STEPS TO EXTEND THE ALLIANCE

THE very day that the treaty of Hanover was signed the business of obtaining accessions to it was begun. In a dispatch to Paris Townshend named Bavaria as "at this juncture of the greatest importance," then Holland, the pensionary and other friends to be consulted privately on prospects of success, and Sweden third, there similarly a beginning to be made by strictly secret information to Count Horn. This, in spite of the fallen estate of Sweden, if only "to defeat the Emperor's views, who is pressing them perpetually to permit him to accede to the secret article" of their treaty with Russia, and to force the tsaritsa and the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to rely for their future upon Great Britain and France. In the case of Bavaria Townshend saw nothing to hinder but the secret article concerning Juliers and Berg, which need not be communicated. He left it to the court of France to decide whether negotiation should be opened through the electoral prince, expected at Paris shortly, or conducted by Saint-Saphorin; preferring the former course, because then it would be under Walpole's conduct.¹

Next day, despite the stipulation that the parties to the treaty should take no step separately, letters went out to the Hague and Stockholm. Finch had two, with a copy of the treaty. The one instructed him to disclose its contents in confidence to his French and Prussian colleagues, the marquis de Fénelon, newly appointed as ambassador, and Meinertzhagen, but to no one else; the three then separately, so as not to attract attention, to let Hoornbeek know that a treaty had been concluded and would soon be communicated. The other letter, very private, directed him in the strictest confidence to take "some unsuspected opportunity" of letting Hoornbeek see the treaty and its separate articles, reading them to him and enjoining utmost secrecy, from fear of unpardonable offence to Paris and Berlin. And the same, perhaps, with Fagel and Slingelandt, letting them know "that I am undone if they take the least notice to any body of my having made them this communication."

In a third letter, to Hoornbeek himself, Townshend pointed out

¹ Townshend to H. Walpole, 3 September 1725, R.O. Regencies 7.

the particular intent of the words "tant dedans que dehors de l'Europe" to protect Dutch commerce, the engagement of France now to oppose the Ostend Company, and the necessity of the Thorn article. Should war break out, he observed, the States-General could not stand neutral, but the treaty would contribute not a little to make Austria and Spain more reasonable. He hoped shortly to be able to present a copy. "C'est à vous seul, et sous le plus grand secret, que je parle présentement; je vous prie au nom de Dieu ménagés bien la communication."

Poyntz, lastly, seeing, said Townshend, after an eloquent panegyric of the treaty, that immediately on news of it the Holstein party at Stockholm would not fail to take advantage of Swedish hatred of Prussia to insinuate maliciously its disadvantage, was ordered at once to communicate it privately and in the greatest confidence to Horn, with due representation of the reliance thus placed on his discretion. To no one else, not even to the king, must it be shown, unless Horn thought that absolutely necessary. But no desire for accession must be indicated yet, only Horn's private sentiments be discovered on each particular.¹

Poyntz in his dispatches last received had had much to say about fear in Sweden of a separate treaty between Russia and Prussia and irritation against Holstein projects. Should the duke come to Sweden with a Russian fleet he expected him to "meet with such an affront as will probably drive him back again," but if he came without a fleet he would certainly be admitted. From alarm on these matters a good majority seemed disposed to enter into a good concert with Great Britain and France against Russia, and would be glad to begin by uniting with other protestant powers in the affair of Thorn; but certainly no action would be ventured on behalf of the protestants of Germany, nor of those in Poland excepting with great caution. His own progress Poyntz thought to be sure, if slow, "but there is a pride, a sullenness and jealousy in some them, which cannot be workt out all at once." The help of Baron Sparre, returned to England after filling up his time "with as many good works as could possibly be crowded into it," he had lost. He himself was "in fashion again," on very good terms with Horn and not ill with Höpken. On the question of satisfaction to the duke he thought to have convinced Horn that Sleswick could not be restored and that any equivalent must take the form of money, the prejudicial effect of which in Sweden would be judged. He believed Horn to speak on this subject rather "par manière d'acquit" and

¹ Letters, all of 4 September, to Finch, R.O. Holland 286, Regencies 7, to Hoornbeek, Holland 280, Foreign Entry Book 250, to Poyntz, Sweden 38, Regencies 7. The last in full, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 194-6.

with a view to the future, in case the duke should come to the throne of Sweden, than from any desire to see him aggrandised at present. But the Holstein article in the proposed treaty with Russia the count thought too loose and general, though he was "mightily pleased with the turn in your Ldp's letter for putting it on the Czarinna to furnish the equivalent." Both he and Taube had been firmly persuaded that Denmark was obliged by her treaty with Sweden to find it, but this, on consulting the document, had been found not to be the case.

In addition Poyntz had much to say about Cederhielm. Before that ambassador left Sweden he had busied himself to attach and utilise him. Recounting in full detail conversations "at three or four dinners and two long conferences" he had told how he had arranged for a correspondence in cipher and the guerdon for the service, ending a long discussion of the count's character and political intentions: "the suspicions are strong against him, and yet I think the facts are rather for him, which would be a very odd management in any country but this, where, as I mention'd before, their fear of Russia obliges them all, more or less, to act a double part."¹ Sending now a full abstract of Cederhielm's instructions² Poyntz supposed that the result of the liberty accorded him to gain the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's confidence, "which I believe he has done in the full extent," must depend on the honesty of his intentions. When he remarked upon his acting "more like a Holsteiner than a Swede" Horn, although somewhat jealous of him for keeping his fullest information for Gyllenborg and Höpken, had suggested that the Holstein court might easily be deceived by his "fawning complaisance," seeing that he could not "speak a bold or shocking truth to any man living" and had told Gyllenborg that his conduct would show that the Holsteiners were very much mistaken in reckoning upon him. In fine, said Poyntz, "the intelligences he hath hitherto sent, tho' lame and imperfect, seem to show a very honest disposition." For instance, there was his cold answer to the duke's minister Stambke, that the plan of wintering the Russian fleet in a Swedish harbour as a preliminary to an attack on Denmark would

¹ Poyntz, 31 May (o.s.), cited.

² For which see more reliably Malmström, i. 450. Poyntz stated that they had been drawn up chiefly by Cederhielm himself and Höpken and that without doubt "large explications on the general hints scatter'd up and down them" had been given separately. He was assured that, should the tsaritsa desire "the least degree of assistance from Sweden," demand would at once be made for restoration of Viborg and its district. To get the abstract, he said, had cost him £50 to the only person who could have supplied it, and should the transaction come to light that person would lose his head and himself his reputation, so that absolute secrecy was essential. In a later dispatch, of 5 October (o.s.): Cederhielm "neither has had nor ever will have an instruction which I shall not get a sight of."

ruin the duke's cause entirely. He concluded: "Thus far I think Cederhielm has acted very well, and is only attended with his old fatality of having suspicions against him, and facts for him;" perhaps the "enigmatic and oracular style" of his private letters made people think that he was keeping things back.¹

Account of Poyntz's work for gaining the accession of Sweden to the treaty of Hanover must be left for another chapter. Already he was employing the money sent him,² and on 25 August (o.s.) he wrote: "we must expect a scene of corruption and intrigue here during the winter, but with some supply to the king of Sweden from the two crowns we shall gett the better of it."

At the Hague the three leading statesmen, Isaac van Hoornbeek, grand pensionary, Simon van Slingelandt, secretary to the Council and shortly to succeed Jacob Hop, deceased, as treasurer-general, and Francis Fagel, "greffier" to the States-General—were all for union in action with Great Britain. In the English dispatches they are habitually styled the "friends," and with Townshend the friendship was intimate from old times. Hoornbeek derived his influence mainly from the high offices that he held, but the brothers-in-law Slingelandt and Fagel were admittedly the weightiest men for character and learning in the state. Each had held his office for thirty-five years. But while Fagel was universally beloved for his courteous amenity and modest self-effacement, Slingelandt was as greatly feared and disliked as he was respected. It was jealousy of his being strong enough, if given opportunity, to play the tyrant that had prevented him from succeeding Heinsius as grand pensionary in 1720. He was to replace Hoornbeek in 1727. In his foreign politics he was all for the republic playing in European affairs a proper part.

Conclusions in Dutch foreign policy lay with the States-General, and it was Fagel's business to conduct the official correspondence. While shackled in that by official restraint, in the committee on foreign affairs, to which questions were first submitted, his erudition

¹ Poyntz, 27 July and 10 August (o.s.), *ibid.* 38. In agreement about Cederhielm we find Townshend writing: "I am yet of opinion that he is at the bottom a man of principles not contrary to our scheme," with "a pretty nice part to play at Petersburg" (to H. Walpole, 27 August, R.O. Regencies 6). Câmpredon too, expecting an out-and-out Holsteiner, was agreeably surprised to find him a man of prudence and moderation (see his dispatches of 17 July and 18 September, *Sbornik*, lviii.). As Malmström shows (i. 450-1) they were mistaken. From the first, says that author, Cederhielm exerted himself to compose party strife at Petersburg in the tsaritsa's interest and ever more and more made her son-in-law's cause the principal object of his negotiations.

² £2,000 to Diemar, £500 to Gyllenborg, £1,000 kept for Cederhielm, £300 to court chancellor Düben by the hands of the king, which had been paid honestly, the remainder in presents to senators' ladies out of "a large cargoe of rich shoes, stockings and snuff-boxes from England."

and long experience made him, in ambassador Fénelon's phrase, the oracle. Permanent membership of the committee, as grand pensionary, gave Hoornbeek also preponderating influence there, and at the same time he was not the servant of the States-General but free to correspond with the Dutch ministers abroad and with foreign statesmen privately, and he did so. Moreover, as president of the States of Holland he could control in great measure the decisions of that assembly, and what Holland and Zeeland, the wealthy provinces that bore the major part of the financial burden of the republic, approved was usually carried in the States-General.

In practice, measures in foreign policy were concerted by the grand pensionary and such others as he chose to consult and then submitted in succession to the States of Holland and the States-General. It was in the latter assembly that the main difficulties arose. Unanimity, at least approximate, was required for all measures of importance, and those on which there was disagreement had to be referred to the provincial States. They in their turn had to consult their constituents, and so it came about that every town, every noble, it may be said every burgher had power to obstruct. As the result any conclusion on foreign affairs was a matter always of weeks, often of months, and sometimes even of years.¹

Maintenance of close friendship between Great Britain and the Dutch republic was as necessary for the one as for the other. The moral power of the republic in Europe was still great, if not the physical. The States-General were the particular guarantors of the protestant succession, and the value of their military aid had been shown on the occasions of the Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1719. The Dutch were the other great traders of the world, and co-operation with them therein was now more profitable than rivalry. Moreover exports from England to Holland were of value nearly four times that of the corresponding imports.²

Information about affairs in Holland was supplied not only by Finch and the three statesmen named, but also by Cornelius Hop, ambassador at Paris, a man whose sense of his family's and his own importance laid him open to Walpole's flattery,³ and by a

¹ Fully on the above, Goslinga, chapter 1.

² Goslinga, pp. 51 f.

³ Son of treasurer-general Jacob Hop and brother of Henry Hop, envoy to George I. Walpole characterised him as honest and experienced, but "sufficient and jealous of the regard which he thinks due;" likely to be influenced for or against a proposal according to confidence reposed in him and his concern in it. Humouring this weakness Walpole communicated the treaty to him and was able to report, "I am persuaded he will employ all his reasonings influence and credit for the accession of the States to this treaty." Townshend wrote: "I must own to you that as I have long known the father, and never much liked him, so I was acquainted with the son, when he was young, and found him such a genius then

private correspondent of Townshend, Baron van Itterssum, whose zeal to serve was quickened by hope of obtaining payment of his English pension of £600 a year, sadly in arrear.¹ Each had influential friends to recommend for service. The gist of their and Finch's advices was that the chief obstacle to accession would be fear lest the emperor, in case of hostilities, should withhold his subsidies for maintenance of the Barrier garrisons and stop payment of the interest on large sums of money invested in the Austrian Netherlands; that particular attention must be given to protect Dutch trade, especially against the Ostend Company; and, says Finch, "that nothing should be done in favour of the king of Prussia with relation to Berg and Juliers that might give the republick umbrage with respect to so powerfull a neighbour."

On the former heads it was proposed to reassure the Dutch government by a formal declaration. A draft for such sent to Paris was there considered far too strong in its expression both of hostility towards Austria and Spain and of favour to the Dutch. Returned amended, Townshend considered it improved on the former count but on the other now utterly insufficient, the matter of the Ostend Company being "but very slightly and tenderly touched, and no mention made of the two main points upon which all their fears are grounded, I mean the loans and subsidys." It would be "perfectly mad," he said, to lose the Dutch accession for want of something more explicit on this subject. Yet the matter need not be debated yet; "our business is rather to stay and see what the Dutch will ask for themselves." As to the secret article, his Majesty was of opinion that it need not be communicated; if it came out the Dutch would rather be obliged by not being entangled in it. Only, when giving the proposed declaration, it should be intimated that the king of Prussia, as a condition of joining in it, would require in return one which might contain the substance of the article.²

Frederick William allowed the importance of gaining Holland,

that, entre nous, I have little hopes that he can have made any shining improvements now he is older. However his father is a man of figure in the republick, and this gentleman and his friends have credit at Amsterdam, and among the States" (H. Walpole, 29 August and 21 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32744, Townshend to him, 8 September, R.O. Regencies 7).

¹ This was Ernst Hendrik van Itterssum tot Oosterhof, a man who had been in the confidence of William III and of many other leading men of that king's time. Fénelon in his *Mémoire Instructif* of March 1728 set him down as "un émissaire de l'Angleterre, étant entièrement dévoué à Mylord Townshend, qui en fait même un espèce de conseil du ministre Anglois à la Haye; en effet, il est un homme capable de bien conseiller. Il n'est pas même sans influence, attendu ses anciennes habitudes avec les principaux ministres de la République, qui ont conservé de l'estime pour luy." His correspondence with Townshend, R.O. Holland 284.

² H. Walpole, 10 and 15 September, Townshend to him, 26 and 28 September, *ll.cc.*; cf. Dureng, pp. 375-6.

partly, as he stated to Wallenrodt, in view of late reports of efforts to cajole Hamel Bruyninx, the Dutch envoy at Vienna. He ordered Meinertzhagen, after consultation with Fénelon and Finch, to express to Hoornbeek and Fagel the great pleasure which a renewal of his old alliance with the republic would give him.¹

The three ministers separately, as now authorised, communicated the treaty to Hoornbeek on 21 and 22 September. He, after consultation with Slingelandt and Fagel, undertook to present it in the States of Holland, now in session, anticipating a favourable outcome. Yet, said Finch, "as your Lordship knows, affairs go on but slowly here." Intimating the royal approval Townshend instructed him to go on consulting the three "friends," but them only or such as they should name, and in confidence, speaking to others privately in such a manner as to encourage a good disposition and remove erroneous impressions.²

Finch faithfully pursued the line of action prescribed, but a stronger minister than he would have been equally powerless against the slow forms of the Dutch constitution. Nothing could have been better than the assurances that he received, nothing worse than the delays occasioned by the necessity of conciliating every voice. It was confidently expected at Hanover that accession would be obtained at once; the work took nearly a year.

One question in debate was whether to extend the alliance by accessions to the treaty of Hanover or by separate treaties. By Horatio Walpole's report Fleury thought accession very proper in the cases of Bavaria Holland and Sweden, but not for the king of Sardinia, while at Berlin it was held (so Rottembourg advised) "that we should not endeavour to clog the treaty with the accession of many powers, who might be more easily joined by particular treaties."³ This view, from continued mistrust of the king of Prussia, did not commend itself at Hanover. Thus Townshend:

That king may have his reasons for not being desirous of having other princes of Germany associated with him, but his Ma^{ty} thinks that England and France should desire to have several of the most considerable princes of

¹ Rescripts to Wallenrodt and Meinertzhagen, 11 September, Staatsarchiv, Berlin. The reports from Vienna were communicated to the French government on 23 August (Dureng, p. 375).

² Finch, 22 September, Townshend in reply, 2 October, R.O. Holland 286. If ever, he said, he named the pensionary only, Finch must understand that Slingelandt and Fagel were also meant, "whom you will please to advise with in every thing, with the same freedom and openness as you do with the Pensionary." He did not doubt that Fénelon and Meinertzhagen, to whom everything must be communicated, would "concurr in opinion that we cannot have surer guides for the right management of this accession than those ministers of the Republick who are so hearty for it, and who know so well the method of conducting it successfully."

³ H. Walpole, 10 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

the Empire, and of the neighbourhood, joined with us, as being the most likely means for keeping his Prussian Ma^{ty} strictly to his engagements, when he shall see that the alliance is supported by so many other confederates, who will be able to maintain it effectually." Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Sweden, Holland "becoming partys to this treaty will strengthen and enforce it very much, and engage the king of Prussia to be the more stedly, as he sees he is the less wanted or that his conjunction is not absolutely necessary, as he would take it to be, if no others were to accede. As to princes at a distance and out of the Empire . . . they may be engaged by separate treatys, if it be judged proper, as particularly the king of Sardinia. But undoubtedly it will be best for our affairs in the Empire, and for securing more effectually the king of Prussia, to engage those powers I lately named to joyn with us in the same treaty." ¹

There were not many German princes of importance to whom application could be made. Certainly not the powerful elector of Mentz, arch-catholic and devoted to Austria, nor at present the Neuburg brothers, electors Palatine and of Treves, unless he of Bavaria could carry them with him, as he would the elector of Cologne, his son. Charles Philip, elector Palatine, was hateful to Frederick William of Prussia by reason of his persecution of his protestant subjects and his counter-interest in Julièrs and Berg. Augustus of Poland-Saxony could hardly be expected to join, and the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was the declared enemy of Hanover.

Saint-Saphorin's views on the subject were set out in the "Grande Relation," which has been cited. He declared all princes in the circles of Swabia, Franconia, and the Upper and Lower Rhine, both protestant and catholic, to be dominated absolutely by fear of Austria, while the imperial towns, though protected against the neighbouring princes, retained only the shadow of their ancient liberties and were governed even more despotically than were the emperor's hereditary dominions. In fact, excepting in Lower Germany, where the princes were too powerful, "*l'Empereur exerce dans l'Empire presque un pouvoir aussi absolu que s'il agissoit de ses propres Etats.*" Were the eyes of the catholic princes to be opened Bavaria must first be gained. The elector and his heir were both ambitious and both most bitter against the court of Vienna. It was his interest to rouse the catholics against Austria, for without their aid his son's pretensions to the imperial throne could never be realised. But the Corpus Evangelicorum must cease its hostility towards him, in spite of his proceedings in the Upper Palatinate, for he would never do anything odious to Rome. The smaller protestant princes, Saint-Saphorin could say, exposing

¹ Townshend in reply, 16 September, R.O. Regencies 7.

their position at great length, looked solely to his Majesty for help and not at all to the king of Prussia. As for Saxony, the claims of the electoral princess in respect of the Austrian succession were likely to embarrass the old close relations with the emperor.

Notice of first openings with Bavaria has been taken. At the end of June the duke of Richelieu stayed a few days at Munich on his way to Vienna and reported favourably.¹ Soon afterwards advantage was taken of a proposed visit of John Law thither to charge him with private inquiry into the elector's sentiments. Later instructions, however, delayed his arrival at Munich till the first days of 1726.²

Saint-Saphorin made his proposed call there on his way to Switzerland in August 1725. He reported Maximilian Emanuel to think well of a league against Austria and to say "*tant mieux, si la France y entre, mais c'est au Roy seul que je suis disposé de me confier entièrement.*" The electoral prince he found more reserved than his father, but also more bitter against the court of Vienna, discussing the religious divisions with great warmth and saying that they were promoted by the emperor, in order to make himself despot. He spoke most submissively about George I and would be much pleased, as he was intending to visit Paris and afterwards Cologne, to receive an invitation to hunt at the Göhrde. In conclusion Saint-Saphorin descanted with enthusiasm on the ease with which Bavaria might be gained, the most decisive thing that could be done against Austria and in favour of the protestants. It was good, he commented, that the elector was "*dégoûté de la France*" and desired to act through the medium of his Majesty.³ With so much of this dispatch, as could be communicated, Walpole reported the French ministers to be extremely pleased, though Fleury thought that the Juliers and Berg article would necessitate a separate treaty with Bavaria instead of simple accession.⁴

In September the elector's four sons came to Fontainebleau to attend the marriage festivities of Louis XV. This gave opportunity for communication of and conversations on the treaty of Hanover. Walpole says little more of what passed than that Count D'Albert, the elector's envoy, spoke of the excellent disposition not only of

¹ See H. Walpole to Townshend, 30 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32743.

² Law had been allowed to return to England in October 1721 and had since been useful to the British government on more than one occasion. For his present service see Townshend to Newcastle, 17 July 1725, R.O. Regencies 6. His dispatches, 1725-6, Germany, States, 91.

³ Saint-Saphorin from Munich, 14 August, R.O. Germany, Empire, 55.

⁴ H. Walpole, 10 and 16 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

his master but of the elector Palatine, "supposing nothing was done in favour of the king of Prussia relating to Bergue and Juliers."¹ A letter from the electoral prince, Charles Albert, to his father, recounting interviews with Bourbon Morville and Walpole, gives fuller information. Bourbon told him that the king of France would prefer a close alliance with Bavaria to all others, leaving to the elector the choice of acceding to the treaty of Hanover or of making a separate treaty with him; exaltation of the house of Bavaria being in his opinion, as in that of the other crowns for whom he could venture to answer, the only means of maintaining the peace of Europe. The duke claimed to know all that Saint-Saphorin had said at Munich and discoursed on the enormous access of power to accrue to the house of Austria from the Pragmatic Sanction and the Spanish marriages. Morville spoke similarly and handed over copies of the treaty of Hanover with its separate articles. Walpole did the same, saying that he could repeat what the elector had heard from Saint-Saphorin. To these utterances, said Charles Albert, he had returned suitable assurances, pending instructions from his father, and had confided everything to his brother of Cologne. He went on to discuss at some length the subject of the elector Palatine.²

Townshend, on Walpole's report, set out the views of George I, concerning Bavaria, as follows. The most effectual way to meet the emperor's exorbitant power in the empire was to collect as great a force as possible to oppose him in the diet at Ratisbon, "where what his Commissarys now dictate are received as laws with the humblest submission and resignation. Wherefore the more princes of figure in the Empire we can get to join in this treaty the greater strength we shall have at the dyet." The article relating to the empire was so plain and clear that the elector ought to perform its stipulations even without new engagements, nor could the Thorn article offend him; "common humanity and the faith of treatys will always be strong arguments on the side of that article." But to bring in the elector Palatine, as suggested, "I take to be the vainest of all imaginations, and an experiment which by all means

¹ H. Walpole, 21 and 24 September, *ibid.* He talked chiefly with one whom he calls "Grand Ecuyer" Plessingen (perhaps Count Preysing), a man "extremely civil, but close and reserved, avoyding to enter into affairs," and with D'Albert. The latter, he says, seemed to want to conduct the business himself, terming the other "a bigoted Jesuit." Morville told him that D'Albert had come to Fontainebleau "on purpose to get the negotiation into his hands, but that he is by no means to be trusted, not being beloved by the Electoral Prince, who is resolved to have Mr Plessinguen his favourite employed in it." This is confirmed by a passage about D'Albert in the prince's letter now to be cited.

² Charles Albert of Bavaria to his father, 22 September, printed by Heigel, *Quellen und Abhandlungen* (1890), pp. 286-290.

we ought not to suffer to be tried. The very attempting of it will lose the king of Prussia."

Proceeding to terms, it was understood, said Townshend, from a long dispatch from Morville, that Maximilian would expect "either immediate subsidies to enable him to put his troops upon a good foot, or some pretty positive engagements towards supporting his pretensions to the Empire." With either of these requirements his Majesty agreed in thinking it very prejudicial to comply; the elector ought to be satisfied with an undertaking "to support strenuously all his just pretensions in general," while annual subsidies "the nature of our government would by no means admit of in time of peace." Nothing was said by Morville about a separate treaty, and it was hoped that that would not be thought of. The Juliers and Berg article need not stand in the way; since it was not intended to communicate it, it would be to the elector "the same as if it had never been made." Lastly Townshend mentioned an idea approved by the king that morning, a promise of subsidies in case of the elector's act involving him in war, "which will make his accession easy, provided he be reasonable."¹

To Saint-Saphorin in Switzerland, in view of his approaching return to Vienna, Townshend wrote similarly, with great compliments upon his "Grande Relation" and enclosing a creditive letter for his use when passing Munich again and a copy of the treaty of Hanover. Any particular advantages for the elector, he said, could be stated in a separate article, but neither his Majesty nor France could engage themselves either to annual subsidies or about the imperial succession. Only a general guarantee of pretensions that were well founded, and possibly subsidies in case of war. The electoral prince's assertion, that his father and he could dispose of the elector Palatine as they pleased, was doubted, that elector being "si bigot, si soumis aux volontés de l'Empereur" and having already, by advices received, acceded to the treaty of Vienna.²

As regards Savoy, we have seen how eager was Morville to secure the king of Sardinia, that old fox, bitten and shy, and what expectation he nourished of success. Seeing that since the breach with Spain it was only through him that France could act against the emperor in Italy, the French government was prepared to offer him the most inviting bribes. George I, on the other hand, while appreciating the value of his alliance, declined to pay too highly for it.

¹ To H. Walpole, 26 and 28 September, R.O. Regencies 7.

² Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 2 October, R.O. Germany, Empire, 55, Regencies 7. The creditive letter, of the same date, Royal Letters 14, King's Letters 19.

Saint-Saphorin in his "Grande Relation" recounted very promising conversations with his friend, Di Breglio. Later Walpole reported "a very close and serious" conversation held by the Sardinian minister at Paris, Count Maffei, with Morville. Not doubting the engagement of Maria Theresa to Don Carlos, Maffei had affirmed the necessity of concerting measures in view of the probable union of the crowns of the empire and Spain. Admitting that his master would do nothing without advantage and security for himself, he gave warning that, since Count Harrach was expected at Turin soon, no doubt with propositions, he must not be neglected. He (Walpole) on hearing this had advised great caution, while showing all imaginable consideration, for it was difficult to propose anything for the king of Sardinia's immediate advantage which should not bring on a rupture with Austria. Morville's view was that he should be informed of the measures that were being taken with other powers and assured that he would be the first to be asked to join in them, when they were settled; while Fleury, who had talked more fully on the subject, thought that he could be promised troops and subsidies in case of danger and maintenance in any acquisition made in war. Might he not, Walpole asked, himself talk with Maffei, in whom he had great confidence, if Cortanza at Hanover were not trusted? ¹

Townshend agreed that Victor Amadeus ought to be managed and engaged. While Cortanza seemed to be "an honest and sensible man" he had not known him so long as Maffei, nor so well, nor did he seem to have so much influence with his master. Wherefore, and since Paris was nearer to Turin, the king left it to the court of France to conduct the negotiation. But full information must be transmitted to Hanover and nothing done which might give umbrage to either Broglie or Cortanza. ²

Maffei now came to Horatio Walpole at Fontainebleau intimating suspicions of the real intentions of France and England roused in his master's mind by reports of underhand dealings by Richelieu at Vienna. If, said the count, they were arranging to accede to the treaty of Vienna, and the king of Sardinia were left out, he would be placed in great danger. Walpole gave him the most positive assurances to the contrary and so, says he, did Morville, whereon with him Maffei had gone further, "declaring that he is sure his master would not ballance in the least to embrace the party of England and France, preferably to that of the Emperor, . . . and he hinted as if something might be stipulated for his favour,

¹ H. Walpole to Townshend, 29 August, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

² Townshend in reply, 8 September, R.O. Regencies 7.

in case the Emperor should dye without leaving any issue male.”¹ After that Morville proposed to inform Maffei by letter that a treaty had been signed and would have been communicated to him, had he not left Fontainebleau. It was thought, said Walpole, that he deserved this mark of confidence and that it was useful to give it, especially as the king of Sardinia had already some knowledge of the treaty. It was agreed that the negotiation had best be conducted from Paris, especially as Victor Amadeus, not sufficiently interested in various points of the treaty to accede to it, would probably want a separate one.²

Townshend approved, but said that “the King would have all stipulations with this prince carefully avoided that may give us uneasiness, or can not be well justified in the face of the world.” He agreed that the king of Sardinia might have a guarantee of his possessions and promise of support in case of war, as Fleury suggested, but went on: “I must tell you in confidence the King has no inclination to engage in promises of anything that belongs to the Empire, as a fief, or otherwise, or to dispose of any part of the Emperor’s succession in case he should dye without heirs male, or in any kind of stipulation that is not perfectly fair and justifiable.” Maffei and the French ministers must by no means be encouraged in such ideas, but the treaty of Hanover adhered to in “plainness and simplicity.” The king of Sardinia could not have any part of the Milanese secured to him at a peace, “for the Emperor would as soon consent to give up Vienna;” better for him “to look towards Sicily, in case we are obliged to take arms.”³

It was decided to send back to Turin Count Cambis, not long returned from a mission thither to give explanation and discover views on the intended dismissal of the infanta and its probable result in a breach with Spain.⁴ Informed that he would take a copy of the treaty with him Walpole demurred to its immediate communication, and it was agreed that Cambis should have discretionary power in the matter, giving all possible assurances and endeavouring to elicit the king of Sardinia’s ideas and what he expected for his own advantage.⁵ At Hanover the contents of the treaty were made known verbally to Cortanza, and also to the Dutch envoy, Henry Hop, Townshend expressing belief that they

¹ Walpole to him, 9 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

² The same, 15 September.

³ Townshend in reply, 26 September, R.O. Regencies 7. Di Breglio had written on 30 August 1724 that the emperor would rather give up Naples and Sicily than any part of the Milanese (Carutti, iii. 572).

⁴ Instructions, of date 25 February 1725, *Recueil des instructions*, xiv. 313 f.

⁵ Walpole to Townshend, 21 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

had thus been "cured of several wrong notions" and now admitted it to be "a plain honest treaty for the publick good of all Europe."¹

When September was out Townshend set forth the general situation in the following illuminating dispatch to Newcastle, the chief points of which are the reasons for laying so great importance on attaching Sweden, and mistrust of the weak government of the duke of Bourbon. In the first place he advised delay in executing certain measures recommended against Spain :

the King thinks that any thing that look'd like a warlike preparation against Spain would be unseasonable at this time. . . . But I must not conceal from your Grace that his Majesty is of opinion that as soon as we have brought some powers to accede to our new alliance, especially the Dutch (of whose accession we have great hopes), orders should then be given to M^r Stanhope to speak very roundly and explicitly to the king of Spain, to let him know that the King never engaged in the affair of Gibraltar any further than promising to lay it before the parliament, and that his Catholick Ma^{ty}'s late behaviour towards the King had sufficiently absolved his Ma^{ty}, in the eyes of the world, from the performance of what he had engaged to do upon that head. . . .

His Majesty has, in my opinion, no reason to apprehend any danger in the south, provided we can prevent the measures the Emperor has been for some time taking in Poland and in the north, but should they succeed we should soon find the language in Spain and at Vienna would alter, and they will, in spite of all we have done, resume their first scheme and endeavour to push it to the utmost extremity, for we must not flatter our selves with the notion that our union with France, be it never so close, will of itself suffice to keep the Imperialists in order ; the court of France, to speak in confidence to your Grace, being fallen into so great a contempt with all the rest of Europe that you would be amazed to hear in what manner they are spoken of, even by those who really wish them well. Your Grace will see by M^r Poyntz's and Col^l Du Bourgay's dispatches how far the Emperor, by the means of the duke of Holstein, has prevailed upon the Czarina to throw herself into his protection. You will likewise see by M^r Walpole's letters the danger there is of their being able to gain Sweden ; were this once done there would rise in that quarter of the world so formidable a strength against us, which would give us so great a diversion, that the court of Vienna, even tho' the Dutch should accede to our treaty, would think they had it in their power to make us submit to whatever they should think fit to impose upon us. They already talk of sending 40,000 men to the assistance of the Poles, in defence of the catholick religion, and it is from this encouragement that the Poles do venture to treat M^r Finch, the King's minister, with so much indignity. Should the Swedes give way and join with the Emperor and Muscovy the king of Prussia will be of very little or no use to us ; his country is so exposed that he will not dare to do any thing against Sweden Muscovy Poland and the Emperor.

Nothing can possibly defeat this scheme, and blast the views of the Emperor

¹ Townshend to him, 28 September, R.O. Regencies 7.

in those quarters, but Sweden. If that nation can be prevailed upon to be steady to us, all is safe; the duke of Holstein must submit to be quiet and the Czarina must court our friendship for his sake. In the meantime France is making difficulties in relation to the proposal made in favour of the landgrave and the king of Sweden,¹ urging those very reasons for not coming into it, viz^t. the duke of Holstein's power and influence in that country, which, if they be true, are the best and solidest arguments for complying with what Diemar proposed. The affairs of Poland and of the protestant interest in the Empire will be sufficient reasons for our desiring the landgrave to accede to our treaty and enabling him to furnish us with a good body of forces upon occasion, and will give us a good pretence (without entring into further detail, unless Spain shall give fresh reason) for laying our treaty before the parliament, and I fancy they will make no great difficulty in giving twenty five or thirty thousand pounds to an old Protestant House, to enable them to furnish us with a body of troops, in support of the protestant cause, at this juncture.

If the Dutch accede to our treaty there will be a necessity of laying it before the parliament, for they will certainly, in consequence of their accession, not only insist upon his Ma^{ty}'s joining with them in measures for stopping the Ostend trade, but likewise that our Company shall act in concert with theirs for destroying the Ostend ships in the Indies, which I believe will not be ventured upon by our Directors, unless the treaty has the approbation of parliament.

In conclusion Townshend referred to expectation of Portugal concluding a defensive alliance with Austria and Spain.²

¹ On this subject see Chapter XI.

² Townshend to Newcastle, 2 October, R.O. Regencies 7.

CHAPTER VII

HOLLAND AND PRUSSIA

EARLY in October 1725 Cornelius Hop at Paris intimated that the time was ripe for communication of the treaty of Hanover to the States-General. He advised assurance about the revenues from the Austrian Netherlands and recognition of the fact that the Dutch were not guarantors of the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva.¹ On this the necessary instructions were dispatched to the Hague, and Fénelon and his colleagues made the formal communication on 12 October. At the conferences which ensued Fénelon took the lead, both from his rank as ambassador and because Finch and Meinertzhagen disclaimed having definite commands.

The deputies appointed to confer raised the points anticipated. They objected in the first place to an implied guarantee of the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva as a novel obligation calculated to rouse much opposition. Fénelon answered that such guarantee would be desired only in return for one of the Dutch treaties of Münster and the Barrier ; he suggested a mutual guarantee, not of any particular treaties, but of the rights acquired under them. Secondly was asked, would the three contracting powers uphold the right accorded to the republic by the treaty of Münster to forbid inhabitants of the Netherlands to trade to the Indies, and, if trouble on this head arose, and in particular if the Netherlands subsidies and interest on loans were withheld, would a *casus foederis* exist ? Thirdly it was observed that the words of the second article of the treaty, " tant dedans que dehors de l'Europe," seemed to suffice for possessions only, not for trade, and that doubt on this head ought to be dispelled. Fénelon declared that he had orders to give fullest assurance on these points ; specific engagements could be embodied in a particular statement, if the Dutch acceded to the treaty. Finch and Meinertzhagen did not doubt their masters' intentions to be quite in conformity, Finch stating that George I was certainly prepared to guarantee the right to stop Austrian navigation to the Indies. The questions, he wrote later, were " more directly meant

¹ Documents with H. Walpole's of 8 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32744

and address'd to the French minister than to me," and that about the second article brought forward "that France might no longer have any pretext of not meddling with the Ostend-Company and East India trade."¹ Approving what had been done, Townshend nevertheless expressed the wish that Finch had informed himself of Dutch opinion as fully as had (evidently) Fénelon. "I would not have you too pressing nor too inquisitive, for that may raise and encourage objections," but people's "way of talking and thinking" ought to be reported, in order that suitable instructions might be sent. "Be quiet and easy, without appearing in any way solicitous about the matter, for that would create jealousys, and do no good."

Also Townshend referred to word from Paris that the Dutch desired the word "*droits*" in the second article to be strengthened by the adjectives "*clairs et fondés*," and might insist on a declaration that the article about Juliers and Berg was not to be included in the treaty. The former demand, he said, the king regarded as "such a novelty, and such a tacit reflexion upon the honour of the contracting powers," that he had commanded Finch to be warned, while the latter insinuation could be made only from intention to defeat the accession and incense the king of Prussia.²

On the question of disclosing the secret article about Juliers and Berg difference of opinion had arisen at Fontainebleau. On the one side were advanced the difficulties likely to be raised thereby, not only in Holland but with such princes as the Bavarian and Palatine electors, on the other it was argued that the article must be divulged to the Dutch some time, since the king of Prussia would require their adhesion to it in return for undertakings by himself. Informed that both George I and Frederick William I objected to its publication Walpole was able in the end to meet inquiries by Hop with the evasive answer that a guarantee of the duchies had been refused.³

Townshend expected difficulty about the article rather "from the humour of some people in Holland, and from the temper of the king of Prussia," than from what was in it. Discussing fully the governing Brandenburg-Neuburg compact of 1666, he maintained that Great Britain and France had only undertaken "to assist the

¹ Finch, 13 to 27 October, R.O. Holland 286. The discourses, Rousset, ii. 225-9. In accordance with Fénelon's declarations were orders to Broglie at Hanover (9 October, Dureng, p. 337).

² Townshend to Finch, 22 and 26 October, *ibid.* and Regencies 7 (drafts). Slingelandt, now treasurer-general, told Finch that the idea of the words "*clairs et fondés*" could only have come from a "*tête crue*" (Finch, 3 November). A long discussion of these points by Broglie, 15 October, R.O. Foreign Ministers 4.

³ H. Walpole, 2 to 6 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

king of Prussia in having the disputes that may arise . . . determined according to the article of 1666, by way of arbitration, and have not in any respect agreed to determine the right in his favour." So that his Majesty was very clear that he had engaged himself to nothing but what he ought. To avoid jealousy and difficulties he judged it most discreet not to let the article be known, but saw no objection to obtaining from the Dutch a declaration in its words. Only due justice was to be done, and it might even be advantageous to the Dutch to be given a share in determining the claim. The king of Prussia's wish to strengthen the article had been refused, and all he thought to have gained was the support of his allies for having the matter decided by arbitration and not "brought in to the Aulick Court, nor the countries made lyable to a sequestration from the Emperor." To prevent that, in view of the habitual use of that power, it was as much the interest of England and France, and even of Holland, as of the king of Prussia himself, to do all that was possible. He had dealt with the article thus at length, Townshend concluded, believing it to be "not well understood, nor taken right according to its true sense," and yet, however weak and ill founded objections to it might be, the king still thought it best to keep it secret, and especially from catholic princes.¹

Frederick William was of the same mind. Warned now by Wallenrodt that the Dutch, on English prompting, would demand special provision against the Ostend Company, and advised by him that their accession to the article and satisfaction of Prussian money-claims in Holland should be required in return, he had answered that the article must not be communicated, for it would then be public property and the emperor might place the duchies under sequestration.²

Arguments now submitted to Berlin in support of this view were the little expectation that the Dutch would admit the article, the damage to Prussian interests, should it prevent them from acceding, and the profit that its publication would bring to the elector Palatine. In time, Townshend represented, Dutch anxiety for protection of their trade would bring them to show less reserve and coldness and to give in on the article in particular and on all else that was reasonable. Besides which, the word "droits" in the second article would alone compel them, once they had acceded, to support the king of Prussia's claim. Asserting that his Majesty, by whose order he wrote, would determine nothing without knowing that king's sentiments, he asked for an immediate

¹ Townshend to him, 19 October, R.O. Regencies 7.

² Rescript of 13 October, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

reply.¹ To Broglie he expressed the hope that Rottembourg would be ordered to support the arguments advanced, and said that it was not thought well to try to obtain reduction of the article's engagements.²

Favourable reply from Berlin was accompanied, however, by request that, should the Dutch decline to admit that the word "droits" covered the claim to the duchies, nothing should be determined before the reflections, which the king of Prussia might have to make, were heard; stipulations in their favour could not justly be required from him, if they proved contrary on so important a matter. Townshend, expressing the king's pleasure at the answer given, stated that he only wished to avoid the ill consequences of a premature negotiation and that Finch was ordered to admit of no refinements on the word "droits," usual in all treaties.³

Of Frederick William's sincerity a better opinion had obtained of late. A report that immediately on his return to Berlin he had communicated the treaty of Hanover to the Russian ambassador there, with expression of hope that the tsaritsa would join the alliance, was denied both by Walpole and by Du Bourgay. The latter advised that by all that Rottembourg and himself could learn "his Prussian Majesty has been very steady to the promise he made your Lordship at Hanover. All the ministers here are very open in all that concerns the interest of the late alliance."⁴

Nevertheless that was to the fore, which was to bring about Frederick William's defection from the alliance of Hanover. In October Du Bourgay was writing:

This day's letters from Petersburg of the 29th Sept^r bring an account that the duke of Holstein makes no more a secret of his views and designs, now that he thinks himself secure of the Emperor and the king of Poland, who has promised him his assistance in the affair of Sleswick, as elector of Saxony. So that the Holstein interest, like a torrent, bears every thing downe before it at Petersburg. . . . The secret articles of the defensive alliance, concluded in February 1724 between the late Czar and Sweden, are to be the basis of the intended treaty between Vienna Dresden and Petersburg, wherein some matters will be stipulated very disagreeable to his Prussian Majesty." And again: "All these schemes and projects perfectly distract the K. of Prussia, who knows not what may be the consequence with respect to himself, as he lyes open to the first attack on all sides."⁵

¹ Townshend to Ilgen, 19 October, the original, *ibid.*, copies and draft, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253, Regencies 7.

² Townshend to Broglie, 22 October, R.O. Foreign Minister 4.

³ Ilgen to Townshend, 23 October, and the reply, 29 October, *ll.cc.* (Regencies 8).

⁴ 28 September, R.O. Regencies 7. Droysen, however (p. 364), states that the treaty was communicated to Golovkin and explanation given him of all its points. That Frederick William should give the ambassador assurance that there was nothing prejudicial to Russia would be natural.

⁵ The same, 13 and 20 October, R.O. Prussia 19.

Already on orders to Count Rabutin to leave Berlin for Petersburg Frederick William had warned his envoy Mardefeld that the object must be a treaty between Austria and Russia, to the ruin of his own harmony with the tsaritsa,¹ and a month later Ilgen wrote : " quoy qu'il en soit, ce voyage ne sçauroit avoir que des veues fort particulières, et ne s'accommodera guères avec les mesures que nous avons prises ensemble."² Yet Townshend at the same time, on Frederick William's relations with Catherine I : " I cannot but think that his extreme wariness will make him have some complaisance for that princess, but in the main I look upon him to be sure and firm, and to hate her and the Muscovites more, if possible, than we do."³ And on the harmlessness of a possible Russo-Austrian alliance :

The Emperour and the Czarinna cannot attempt any thing upon the continent by land, unless the king and the republick of Poland joyn with them ; and as there are not three powers in the world whose views and interest are more opposite, his Ma^{ty} verily believes it will not be an easy matter to form a scheme in which they can agree. But if they should, they cannot stirr one step on that side in consequence of such a plan, but they must immediately come to a rupture with all the powers engaged in our late alliance. Now can any man of common sense imagine that the Emper^r will for the sake of the duke of Holstein, and in consideration of the assistance he may expect from the Czarinna and Poland, engage in a project which must inevitably end in a quarrel between him and the above-mention'd powers ? He would have no reason to flatter himself with the hopes of any advantage from such a measure in the north, but he would most certainly pay dearly for it in all parts in the south. We have not as yet taken any engagements that can in any light be look'd upon as offensive with regard to him, or any other power ; but if his Imp^l Majesty will drive us to a necessity of doing our utmost against him, there are princes enough to be found, who, having France and England at their head, would under their influence and with their assistance undertake to tear the greatest part of his dominions from him, especially considering the unfortunate state of his Imp^l Majesty's succession. . . . Upon the whole, if our own fears do not destroy us, nothing can hurt us ; it is they alone that can even betray our enemies into the hopes of being able to struggle with us, or to oppose us.⁴

In a dispatch to Ilgen, of like tenour, Townshend pointed out how already Count Starhemberg's protest at Hanover exposed the alarm and disconcertment of his court and the measures taken or projected there.⁵ Ilgen replied that the answer given was

¹ Rescript to Mardefeld, 23 September, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

² To Townshend, 23 October, cited.

³ To Poyntz, 24 October, R.O. Sweden 38, Regencies 7.

⁴ To Du Bourgay, 29 October, R.O. Prussia 19, Regencies 8.

⁵ Townshend to Ilgen, same date, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253, Regencies 8, draft.

thoroughly approved, but wrote of the position in Russia: "La contenance de la cour de Petersbourg étant à cette heure absolument sous la direction de M^r de Bassewitz nous devient de jour en jour plus suspecte et mérite que l'on y aye une sérieuse et continuelle attention." ¹

Nevertheless Du Bourgay still would write: "Besides his Prussian Majesty's daily assurances of sticking close to the late alliance, I hear Monsieur de Mardefelt's letters are full of grievous complaints of the indifferent measures that are kept with regard to the court of Petersbourg;" ² while Tilson heard from Wallenrodt, just back at Hanover from Berlin, that "his master promises to be as firm as a rock, and of all treatys will maintain this, as being partly his own negotiating." ³

In Holland, Finch advised, the "friends" were for absolute silence about Juliers and Berg, until accession was procured, ⁴ and the French government, by Walpole's report, agreed. He reported Cornelius Hop to have intimated that the States-General would prefer the succession falling to the king of Prussia, rather than to any catholic prince, but wanted to have a hand in settling the matter, in order to procure advantages to themselves. Such a negotiation Walpole thought "too intricate and tedious to set on foot at this juncture," apart from the danger of rousing the jealousy of catholic princes, and he declared that, in spite of the emperor's influence in Holland through ill humoured individuals, he had never known any affair advance more quickly there. Soon afterwards, on word from Fénelon of representations by Meinertzhagen that the king of Prussia expected agreement by the Dutch to an article in his favour about Berg and Juliers, in return for undertakings of his own about their trade, Walpole reported orders to that ambassador to keep the article of the treaty entirely secret from the States-General, seeing that the guarantees of Great Britain and France ought to be enough for them; whence he anticipated trouble, to the emperor's advantage, unless the king of Prussia should acquiesce. ⁵

That trouble was quickly in evidence. Already Finch had written of word from Rottembourg that the king of Prussia would not give guarantees to the Dutch without an equivalent, and would disavow what Meinertzhagen had done. ⁶ Then Frederick William

¹ Ilgen in reply, 9 November, *ibid.* Mardefeld in a dispatch of 27 October *Sbornik*, xv. 293) had much to say about Russian intrigues with Poland and sent first notice of the project of setting up Count Maurice of Saxony in Courland. Cf Droysen, pp. 395-7.

² 3 November, R.O. Prussia 19.

³ 5 November, R.O. Regencies 7.

⁴ Finch, 3 November, R.O. Holland 286.

⁵ H. Walpole, 1 and 8 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

⁶ Finch, 3 November, cited.

suggested to Hanover that France and England might give the assurances desired and his own be deferred for a particular convention later. He promised to delay orders to Meinertzhagen until he had reply.¹ Ilgen, for his part, desired Townshend's prudent counsel, whether it was right for Prussia to enter into any quarrel with Austria that might arise on Dutch account, whether in respect of the Ostend Company or of the Netherlands garrisons and payments. He deprecated risk of war with the emperor without any undertaking on the part of the republic in regard to Juliers and Berg, and wished to have settled the form in which Prussian aid might be required, in order that the consequences and the necessary remedies might be judged. Yet, "nous nous donnerons tout le soin possible pour que l'Estat n'aye pas moins de lieu d'estre à l'avenir entièrement content de nous et tout ce que nous ferons." ²

Immediately on receipt of Finch's information Townshend had sent a translation of his dispatch to Berlin, advising Ilgen that the well-intentioned in Holland wished the article about Juliers and Berg to be kept absolutely secret until the accession of the States-General was completed; then, they thought, it would be seen to be the interest of Holland that the duchies should come into the hands of a protestant prince. It was the peace-party, he asserted, always opposed to engagements with foreign powers, who were agitating the question of rights and commerce in order to defeat the accession. Were the desired declaration given, that party would be caught in its own snare and the republic obliged to go all lengths.

Ce sera eux qui se brouilleront les premiers avec l'Empereur, les autres alliés ne sont en droit, et ne pourront rien faire contre lui qu'à leur réquisition, et fondés comme nous sommes dans le second article, qui reste dans son entier, et qui garantit au roy de Prusse les mêmes droits, dont il est question, nous pourrons alors les faire donner toutes les explications nécessaires sur les droits de sa Mté Pruss^e. Votre Ex^{ce} conçoit bien la dépendance dans laquelle le traité de Barrière et les hypothèques sur les Pais-Bas ont mis les Etats Généraux à l'égard de l'Empereur. L'occasion qui se présente à présent est peut-être la seule que nous aurons de notre vie de leur faire naître l'envie de s'en affranchir, au Nom de Dieu ne la perdons pas; l'Emp^r ne se relâchera pas de l'affaire d'Ostende sans guerre, ou même jusqu'à la dernière extrémité. . . . Il me semble que plutôt de les empêcher de se quereller avec S. M. Imp^{le} nous devons les y encourager, et même leur en faciliter les moyens. L'Empereur sera toujours le grand appuy de l'Electeur Palatin, et les Hollandois savent

¹ Rescript to Wallenrodt, 6 November, rough translation, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253.

² Ilgen, 9 November, cited. He advised his master: "die Holländer sollten zufrieden sein, wenn E. M. ihnen Ihre guten Dienste wegen Ostende und sonst anboten; aber den Degen für sie zu ziehen geht wohl nicht" (10 November, Droysen IV. ii. 285).

que la Maison Palatine est dévouée à celle d'Autriche. Si une fois ils se brouillent tout de bon avec la cour Imp^{le}, ils ne permettront jamais que ni elle ni ses amis s'aggrandissent aux Pais Bas, ni dans leur voisinage, et ils ne manqueront pas alors de se tourner vers le roy de Prusse, et de favoriser ses intérêts même de leur propre mouvement.

The affair was of the utmost importance to the king of Prussia both for his general interests and for his particular rights to the duchies. If the Dutch did not accede, everything would be in the greatest confusion ; if and when they did, undoubtedly satisfaction could be forced from the court of Vienna on all points. Should not Meinertzhagen, then, be authorised to act as was desired ? " Peut on faire difficulté de leur frayer un chemin à les mettre mal avec l'Empereur ? Il me semble qu'on ne doit pas." ¹

In subsequent correspondence Townshend reiterated his arguments in similar impassioned style, while Ilgen gave excellent assurances but maintained the point that his master could not risk entry into war on behalf of the Dutch without good recompense. The eastern danger Townshend minimised again, showing how remote was the possibility of a league between Russia Austria and Poland and how little it could stand, even if accomplished, against the allies of Hanover, especially were they reinforced by Holland and Sweden. Nothing, he asserted, could harm but inopportune timidity and distrust, and servility towards ill-disposed powers calculated only to encourage them. " Reposons nous sur nos forces " was the text of an eloquent passage in which he extolled the king of Prussia's power and designated him a cherished ally. The letter ended with a particular reference to English interests : " V. E. sçait que le commerce nous tient au cœur. Nous sommes, à vous dire le vray, a peu près autant intéressés dans le cas dont il s'agit que la Hollande, et ne nous témoignés pas de froideur sur cet article." ²

Du Bourgay continued to report well. On 11 November he sent word of orders going immediately to Meinertzhagen to hear the Dutch demands and report, and on the strength of this Townshend expressed to Finch conviction that Frederick William would give a " full and sufficient " guarantee, when informed.³ A few days

¹ Townshend to Ilgen, 7 November, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253, with translations of his dispatch to Finch of 26 October and of the reply of 3 November.

² Townshend to Ilgen, 15 November, *ibid.* and Regencies 8 (draft). In a private letter he called attention,—by the king's express command, he said,—to the bad effect which would be produced in England, if the Dutch were not brought into the treaty of Hanover. " Cela peut bien nous devenir un coup mortel, et déranger tout à fait le système de notre alliance et de notre union."

³ Du Bourgay, 11 November, R.O. Prussia 19, Townshend to Finch next day, R.O. Holland 286. In a private letter Du Bourgay recounted how plain talk by Rottembourg to the Prussian ministers had resulted in " most bitter complaints "

later, after an interview with the king, Du Bourgay believed it to be "a hundred to one but he will agree to what your Lordship desires," seeming to want war in Brabant with such wealthy allies as the Dutch and putting questions about the English forces which seemed to show him "pretty well disposed to a war, which he looks upon as a certain consequence of the present measures." And again: Ilgen was writing "that notwithstanding the great reasons they have to act with caution in the affair your Lordship presses so warmly, the king his master is so bent upon coming into all his Majesty's measures, which he does not doubt are calculated for the comon good, that he would wade thro the greatest difficulties to oblige his Majesty, but desires onely a little respite, before he sends his final resolutions."¹

Townshend now proposed to visit Berlin personally,² in spite of extreme disinclination in view of his approaching tiring journey to England. Instead thereof, whether to oblige him or for other reasons, Ilgen was suddenly ordered to the Göhrde, where George I now was for his hunting and shooting. Arrived on 20 November he showed Townshend his instructions, written in the king's own hand, and next day handed in a short memorial setting forth their substance. It prayed that, when the States-General declared their requirements, the answer should be concerted with the king of Prussia, and, were it such as might engage him in a war, that a plan should be agreed for the complete protection of his dominions, this appearing the more necessary because a Polish mobilisation on his frontiers, "*pour tirer on ne sçait quelle satisfaction*," already threatened and was likely to be carried out with greater vigour, if the proposed alliance of Austria Poland and Russia came into effect. Further Ilgen took note, for report to his master, of Townshend's intimation that Great Britain, France and Holland would furnish money instead of the stipulated troops.

Discussion resulted in agreement between the two ministers both on a letter which Ilgen should carry to Berlin and on the reply to it which he should write thence. The former stated that nothing could be more just and equitable than to protect the king of Prussia

by Ilgen "of the dilemma in which he had the misfortune to find himself so often in respect to such points, where he must either sacrifice himself to the resentment of his master . . . or disoblige their best allies in acting contrary to their notions." Du Bourgay believed Rottembourg to have so far prevailed that "those ministers will be cautious in giving offence to his Majesty in this affair; so that the onely difficulty lyes with the king of Prussia, whose answer under his Majesty's own hand Count Rottembourg has seen, and is a flat denial of complying with the demands of the Dutch, except he has in return what he calls an equivalent."

¹ The same, 16 and 17 November.

² As humbly suggested by Du Bourgay.

from all danger incurred in entering into what regarded the interests of his allies. It recapitulated the importance of the Dutch accession, only to be obtained by assurances about the Ostend commerce, in which England also was greatly interested, and it appealed to the king of Prussia to give proof of his friendship and zeal for the public good by joining with his allies and sending to his envoy at the Hague orders to act in concert with their ministers. Under conviction that he would do so promise was made that in case of attack upon his territories, whether by Russians Poles or Austrians, the king of England would pay the cash equivalent for his quota of troops under the third article of the treaty of Hanover immediately on requisition, pending ability to send the troops themselves. That king, it was said, with much more in eloquent language to the like effect, was sure that neither his money nor his troops could be better employed than under the orders and disposition of the king of Prussia. All the means that God had given him would always be at Frederick William's service, and he did not doubt that like sentiments prevailed in France.

The reply to be sent averred that the king of Prussia had nothing more at heart than to preserve the truest and most intimate friendship with Great Britain and France and would, Ilgen did not doubt, when he knew what enlightenments the Dutch desired, order his minister at the Hague to act with his British and French colleagues in a way to manifest clearly the union and harmony subsisting between the three crowns.¹

All this subtle diplomacy was frustrated by the blundering issue from Paris of a definite statement of concessions to be allowed the Dutch. The document was sent first to the Hague for the benefit of Fénelon and Finch, to go on thence to Hanover and, if approved there, to Berlin, and to be brought back to the Hague as finally agreed by the three powers. It supplemented the treaty of Hanover by three explanatory acts. The first fixed Dutch succour at 4,000 infantry and 2,000 horse, on the terms of the third article of the treaty. The second declared that although the States-General were not guarantors of the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva, and so could not become parties to the various engagements under them, yet they would send aid to any power attacked on account of maintaining those obligations. The third, a long statement emphasised by repetition, specifically extended the guarantees of the second article to the cases of the Ostend Company and the

¹ All these papers of date 21 November, 1713. The last was headed: "Copie du projet de la lettre que Mon^r d'Ilgen propose de m'écrire en réponse à la cy jointe si S.M. l'approuve." From what Droysen says (p. 386) Ilgen's memorial was a very mild rendering of his instructions.

Netherlands loans and subsidies, and stipulated succour to the Dutch, should they be obliged to take action in consequence of Austrian reprisals. As it was to be apprehended, Horatio Walpole said, that the king of Prussia would hardly assent to this, the act was so framed that it need be signed with Great Britain and France only, "it being to be understood, that it will still be much better if his Prussian Majesty can be persuaded to acquiesce and come into it, without any equivalent or further consideration."¹

Despite little hope entertained of Prussian acquiescence, the document, with some changes in the Ostend act, had to be sent on to Berlin, Townshend expressing the hope that the king of Prussia would appreciate the carefulness and frankness of the court of France, and accept the proposals. He brought in again a reference to English trade interests: "*Je vois par mes lettres d'Angleterre que l'affaire de l'Ostende tient si fort à cœur à tous nos gens de commerce, que je crains que la Ville de Londres ne fasse fort la méchante, si elle trouve qu'on n'a pas eu un soin particulier de cette affaire dans les négociations icy au dehors.*"² The sentiments of George I he set forth in two letters to Finch, the one for his and Fénelon's use only, since there was too much in it about Juliers and Berg, the other for the benefit only of the three Dutch statesmen confided in. In the former he recognised the goodness of French intention but feared a contrary effect, "*tant cet empressement à proposer des projets formés semble faire roidir d'avantage la cour de Berlin.*" He had got so far, he said, with Ilgen on the principal matter as to induce the king of Prussia to wait, as was very reasonable, to see what the Dutch would ask, before concerting with his allies what should be accorded, and to obtain his promise of such orders to Meinertzhagen as would show the harmony of the three crowns. His Majesty foresaw that the king of Prussia would adhere to his resolution, but although appearances were not too good did not despair of obtaining a favourable answer in the end. But the idea of having the Ostend act, "un point capital," guaranteed by Great Britain and France only, a suggestion which Rottembourg had asked leave to put forward in the last resort, was objectionable for several reasons. No doubt the king of Prussia would be ready enough to accept the expedient, but not only would the union of the allies be gravely impaired, there was danger that the ill-intentioned in Holland would take occasion to say that if he would not give the necessary assurance about the Ostend commerce there was no reason for the republic to enter into so extended a guarantee

¹ H. Walpole to Townshend, 19 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32744. Copy of the document with Townshend's letter to Ilgen next cited.

² Townshend to Ilgen, 26 November, *ll.cc.*

of all his rights as under the second article of the treaty, and so the whole business would collapse. "Il faut donc laisser mourir les délibérations à Berlin sur le point principal, et en attendant aller le chemin que la nature des choses nous a tracé à la Haye." Conditions which the States of Holland might make, when they met again, the king thought should be taken *ad referendum*, though there could be no harm in letting the deputies understand that there was every disposition to satisfy their just and reasonable requirements about the Ostend commerce.

In the other letter Finch was ordered to sound the three Dutch statesmen on their willingness to accept the guarantees of Great Britain and France only, explaining the fears which held the king of Prussia back; to promise that those guarantees should be exercised energetically; and to point out how important it was to secure the accession of the States-General before parliament met, if only that the British East India Company might be authorised to act with vigour conjointly with the Dutch.¹

At Berlin followed what was feared. Hardly had Ilgen left for the Göhrde when Frederick William informed Rottembourg and Du Bourgay that his commission was to concert a "treaty of execution" for the war which seemed inevitable; a plan, namely, for stationing armies one in Roussillon against Spain, a second in Alsace, a third in Lower Germany, a fourth in Brabant, and a fifth on the frontiers of Poland; observing that reconciliation between England and Russia would keep the Poles in awe and so save the last.² Afterwards the colonel heard contended first the illegality of and the penalties that would be incurred by a German prince engaging in offensive war against the emperor in a province of the empire, as Brabant by the last treaties with France was declared to be, and secondly the inability of Prussia to resist a combined attack of Poles, Saxons, Austrians and Russians, unless properly protected. When Rottembourg and he appealed to the king himself they were answered that engagements with the Dutch would oblige him to declare war against the emperor and certainly bring on the said attack, that England and France were safe but Prussia unprotected, and that while he would be firm to the treaty of Hanover a plan for his security must be formed.³ That plan he detailed at an audience granted them on 5 December. A somewhat modified French version of it, which Ilgen handed to the envoys next day, is curious enough to quote in full.⁴

¹ Townshend to Finch, 3 December, R.O. Holland 286, Regencies 8.

² Du Bourgay, 20 November, R.O. Prussia 19.

³ The same, 29 November and 4 December.

⁴ Copy sent by Du Bourgay, *ibid.*; another, as returned to Berlin with the remarks of George I, Royal Letters 46; a third, Treaty Papers 107.

1. Premièrement il faut, Messieurs, que vous avouiez que l'alliance faite à Hannovre est défensive, et si une des dites Puissances est attaquée les autres sont obligées de la soutenir avec des troupes, ou avec de l'argent, comme la partie lésée le désire.

2. Second point. Que toutes les Puissances qui veulent accéder dans notre alliance seront les bien venues, et sur tout les Hollandois.

3. L'alliance qu'on propose avec les Hollandois n'est pas comme celle d'Hannovre, elle est offensive, puisque le point d'Ostende est offensif contre l'Empereur, et que les Hollandois ne veulent rien me garantir, à quoy donc dois-je entrer avec eux, par quelle raison ?

4. Par ce dit traité j'entre donc en guerre pour le bien de Messieurs les Hollandois, pour qu'ils puissent vendre le thé, café et fromage, porcelaines, etc., plus cher. Et ces Messieurs ne veulent pas faire la moindre chose pour moy, et moy je dois tout faire pour eux. Messieurs, dites moy, est il équitable, si j'entrois dans cette alliance, ne diriez vous pas que le roy de Prusse a donné dans les panneaux ?

5. Messieurs, vous me direz c'est pour mettre l'Empereur à la raison. Si ce moyen est suffisant, eh bien, que cela fera-t-il à l'Empereur si vous luy prenés ses vaisseaux et vous luy ruinés son commerce d'Ostende, sera-t-il plus petit Empereur qu'il est à cette heure ? Il sera la même chose.

6. Messieurs, si vous voulés donc que j'entre dans la nouvelle alliance offensivement, je vous déclare que je ne veux absolument pas entrer comme un aveugle, et que je veux sçavoir le pot aux roses.

7. Le pot aux roses est qu'on fera la guerre à l'Empereur et on luy ôtera des provinces. Et à qui tomberont-ils pour partage, les provinces prises de l'Empereur, et lesquelles prendra-t-on ?

8. Comment veut-on faire l'exécution du traité, où sont les troupes, où est le réquisit pour soutenir la gageure ?

9. Puisqu'on veut commencer la danse, il la faut bien commencer. Ne veut-on pas chercher de troupes auxiliaires auprès les petits princes de l'Empire pour de subsides ?

10. Messieurs, je vous déclare, si je dois accéder dans cette alliance de Hollande, je n'y veux pas entrer comme gallopin, et que je veux sçavoir tout les secrets, également comme le roy Très-Chrétien et le roy de la Grande Bretagne, et régler avec Eux tout ce qui se passera, et comme Partie, mais pas en subalterne, et inférieur, mais également comme les dits roys.

11. Si j'entre dans cette alliance, elle est purement contre l'Empereur.

12. Que fera l'Empereur ? Il fera des alliances contre nous, comme il le fait déjà avec la Tzarienne et les Polonnois. Et quand vous attaquerez l'Empereur en Brabant, les Russes et Polonois m'attaqueront. Avec la grâce de Dieu je me défenderay de toutes mes forces, aussy bien que je peux.

13. Messieurs, je vous demande, si cela arrive, si vous me couvrirés mon dos avec 50 escadrons et 30 bataillons, qui camperont auprès de Crossen pour observer la contenance des Saxons et les troupes Impériales qui sont en Silésie et Bohême ? Et si l'Empereur m'attaquasse dans mes pays de Clèves ou pais de la Marche, qu'alors ce corps d'armée marchasse droit en Silésie et Bohême, pour faire diversion.

Le général, qui commande ce corps, il faut qu'il soit sous mes ordres.

14. Si je fais des conquêtes, me maintiendra-t-on, ou faudra-t-il que je rende tout ? Et si je rend tout, qui me payera mes dépenses de la guerre ?

15. Après la guerre on fait la paix. M'oubliera-t-on, seray-je le dernier, faudra-t-il que je signe par force ?

16. Si mes affaires en Pologne, et contre la Czarienne, marchassent pas bien pour moy, m'assistera-t-on avec toutes les forces, par mer et par terre, pour me faire r'avoir ce que j'aurois perdu contre l'Empereur, la Czarienne et Polonois ; à sçavoir provinces ?

17. Dans notre alliance d'Hannovre il n'y a rien dedans de la Tzarienne. Je suppose qu'Elle me demande d'être neutre avec moy lorsqu'Elle envoie une armée en Allemagne, pour mettre le duc de Holstein dans ses états de Schleswig ; si je peux accepter cela ou non ?

18. Et si je peux accepter la neutralité, à condition que les états provinces et pays du roy de la Grande Bretagne en Allemagne seront point attaqués ou incommodés de la moindre marche ou théâtre de guerre ?

With this document went to Hanover a detailed account by Rottembourg of his and Du Bourgay's efforts with the king of Prussia and their criticism of its points. Du Bourgay notified strongest assurances on the king's part that if the answer were satisfactory he would come into the Dutch guarantees, as the two crowns thought necessary, and "likewise concur in any measures towards inviting the king of Sardinia and other powers to accede to our treaty. He objects, however, to the king of Denmark's accession, except he be allowed to keep free from any engagements relating to Sleswick." He seemed to be "very hearty" in what he said and not to have separate measures in view.¹

Such report had no value at Hanover as against the "extravagant flights of imagination, to say no more of them," as Townshend termed the demands sent in. "I own to you I never in all my life saw such a paper. . . . If we shall be subject to have more reasonings of the like sort, it will be impossible to do business, or to carry on any negociation." He ordered Du Bourgay to concert with Rottembourg how best to make the Prussian court "sensible of their madness and folly." All had been said that could be said, and a final decision must be taken.² At Paris, too, Morville complained of the "most unaccountable and intractable temper of the Berlin court," saying that the king of Prussia with his demands and objections and his idea "that England and France had actually framed a scheme for the partition of the Netherlands" was "indeed a necessary ally at this juncture, but the most incommodious one that ever was known."³

¹ Du Bourgay, 6 December, R.O. Prussia 19.

² 9 December, *ibid.*

³ H. Walpole, 24 December, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

With Townshend's dispatch went a personal letter from George I to be delivered by Du Bourgay with his own hands. It expressed in vivid terms the hurt inflicted by the mere suggestion that he could conceal plans from his son-in-law or wish to inveigle him into dangerous engagements and then leave him to the mercy of his enemies. There had never been the least thought, it said, of depriving the emperor of the Netherlands. It was hoped, and believed, that justice would be done to British trade without resort to extremities, but should war, contrary to all expectation, be compelled, no plan for it or for subsequent peace should be formed without the king of Prussia's consent and approbation. About accessions to the treaty of Hanover George, with careful and necessary abstention from particulars, asserted that everything had duly been communicated. With further expostulation against the injustice of the suspicions entertained he swore, as before, that his treasure, his troops, his fleets and all other means that God had given him should always be ready for the succour of his Prussian Majesty.¹

Du Bourgay, having delivered the royal letter, reported that no satisfactory answer would be given until the king was thoroughly assured about his 13th article, for the reason, positively and frankly declared by Ilgen, that he feared that Great Britain and France would fail to send him help, were he attacked, on the pretext of having their hands full. That on the other hand he gave the strongest assurances that if his demand were satisfied he would agree to everything else, and even if it were not would still keep strictly to his engagements under the treaty of Hanover, excluding the Ostend affair as foreign to it.² Rottembourg testified the like, expressing affliction that he had not succeeded better in the first commission entrusted to him by Townshend, in spite of efforts to which Du Bourgay would bear witness.³

Frederick William in his answer to George I made strongest protestation of absolute trust in him and of resolve to give real effect to the treaty of Hanover. He alleged great willingness to fall in with the measures proposed for obtaining the accession of the Dutch, save for consideration of his own and George's connexion with the emperor and empire and of the dangers to which war with them, incurred on this account, would expose him. From such embarrassment and ill consequences he prayed to be exempted. He confessed that he had foreseen these possibilities, when the

¹ George I to Frederick William I, 9 December, R.O. Royal Letters 46, with a copy of the paper, annotated.

² Du Bourgay, 13 December, R.O. Prussia 19, Regencies 8.

³ Rottembourg to Townshend, 14 December, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46.

treaty of Hanover had been concluded, but pointed out that that alliance was purely defensive and the Dutch accession intended to be "pure et simple selon la lettre du traité." Now it was a question of other things, and undoubtedly the emperor would regard the proposed obligations about the Ostend Company as aggressive and an infraction of the rights and privileges of the circle of Burgundy, a member of the empire still as when under Charles II of Spain. Calling once more to mind the great extent of his unprotected frontiers and the plots of his enemies to compass his ruin he expressed the hope that, to resolve his doubts once for all, George would allow him to revert to his first demand, to await declaration of Dutch conditions. He would accept them willingly, were that possible without hazarding a war, but in the contrary case must be fortified in advance by his plan submitted. And he hoped that no difficulty would be made about the troops of Hanover joining his own. He ended: "Je prie Votre Majesté par tout ce qu'il y a de plus sacré et de plus inviolable d'y réfléchir selon son bon cœur, et sur lequel je conte et conteray toute ma vie."¹

In the circumstances nothing remained to be done but to dis-pense the king of Prussia from specific engagements against the Ostend Company. To a fresh inquiry by Townshend, whether the Dutch government would be content with a declaration on the part of Great Britain and France only, Finch had replied that Hoornbeek and Slingelandt were indifferent about a Prussian guarantee themselves but feared difficulties being raised by others.² Now Townshend was of opinion that if the Dutch would assent to the expedient "the accession to the treaty as it now stands may be made with the consent of the king of Prussia and of all partys without any difficulty. It is best not to push the king of Prussia any more, but to let him take his own method," the second article binding him sufficiently about the Ostend Company.³

Here may be noted belief expressed by Du Bourgay that certain of the Hanoverian ministers, in their antipathy to the treaty of Hanover, had encouraged Frederick William's scruples either directly or through Wallenrodt. He found that the latter had means of knowing the contents of his dispatches and reported them to the king of Prussia privately.⁴ After the court had left Hanover he

¹ Frederick William I to George I, 16 December, R.O. Royal Letters 46, original, Regencies 8, copy.

² Townshend to Finch, and the reply, 11 and 15 December, R.O. Regencies 8, Holland 286.

³ To Finch, and similarly to Newcastle, 18 December, *ibid.*

⁴ An instance of this, says the colonel, was report from Hanover word for word of a remark of his about "strange insinuations" made to the king of Prussia, with allegation that the prince of Anhalt was referred to. This the king had taken so much to heart that he had had affidavits drawn up certifying that the prince had

wrote: "I have some reason to suspect that the ministers here, who have no mind their master should enter into any engagement, which in their opinion is offensive, have already alarmed the Hanoverian ministers. For I hear they do all they can in your Lordship's absence to prevent the King's entring as elector into his Prussian Ma^{ty}'s proposal about the fifty squadrons and thirty battalions, and I am even assured that Baron Bernstorff has already writ hither upon that foot, desiring at the same time to be informed of the steps that have been taken in this affair."¹ Seckendorf too, on his visit to Hanover elsewhere referred to, heard much invective from his old friends Bernstorff and Alvensleben and from others against the mischievous interference of the English ministers, and of Townshend in particular, in Hanoverian affairs.²

The concession made and assurances given quieted Frederick William for a time. During the first weeks of 1726 Du Bourgay had only favourable reports of his attitude to send, whether towards his allies or towards Russia. For instance: "The king of Prussia and his ministers have expressed a great deal of satisfaction at the prosperous success of our affairs in Holland;" and again, while the Prussian court did not seem to care much about success with Sweden or Bavaria, there appeared to be a growing impression that Dutch assistance would be needed some time.³

In Holland, meanwhile, on 15 November Hoornbeek had moved accession to the treaty of Hanover in the States of Holland. The result in general, he told Finch, was unhesitating assent, though some members desired to consult certain persons of first consequence before deciding. From the other provinces, excepting Friesland, Finch anticipated ready acceptance. Itterssum claimed to have procured the assent of Overijssel, in spite of the imperialist Count Rechteren. In his opinion, "le tout s'achemine jusques à présent bien, quoi que lentement." Of the principal towns of Holland, he

not been near him for a great while. It might be judged, Du Bourgay went on, how disagreeable this was to himself, while Rottembourg took it "more to heart than I care to tell you." Once they forfeited the king's confidence their service would be useless. (To Tilson, 16 December, R.O. Prussia 19. He had previously given warning of Wallenrodt maintaining a correspondence with his master through other than official channels.)

¹ Du Bourgay, 25 December, *ibid.*

² Seckendorf to prince Eugene, 17 December, elsewhere cited.

³ Du Bourgay, 8 and 22 January 1726, R.O. Prussia 20. He noted the cold reception of Colonel Tessin, sent by the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to solicit help, who was answered that the king of Prussia was always ready to serve his master with good offices but would not act contrary to his engagements. To Mardefeld Frederick William was now complaining of Russian neglect to inform him of what was being done with the king of Poland, repeating his fear that there was an end to the "vertrauliche concert" with himself on Polish affairs (rescript of 5 January, *Sbornik*, xv. 299).

said, all had declared positively but Dordrecht, where measures were being taken ; that vote secured, the accession of the republic was, humanly speaking, certain.¹

Vain expectations, when every province and town had private interests to promote and all were more or less in fear of Austrian revenge. The courts of Vienna and Madrid took full advantage of the various intrigues and disagreements. A telling argument was the danger to Dutch trade, in case of hostilities, when the allies of Vienna would probably have Portugal and Russia with them.² Ambassador Van der Meer was assiduously courted at Madrid ; he could report more orders to redress commercial grievances issued in a day than for four years past.³ At the Hague young Count Charles Ferdinand of Königsegg-Erps, arrived as ambassador from the emperor on 28 October, interviewed deputies, presented memorials,⁴ and promised advantages of all kinds, to be specified when the marquis de San Felipe (St Philippe) should appear as ambassador from Spain. In vain, he had to report a limitation of the Ostend trade obligatory, were the Dutch to be conciliated. To new suggestions by him, authorised by his court, the deputies refused to listen ; indeed, they were taken but to signify Austrian disposition to recede. Fagel let him know clearly that the emperor could prove his good intentions only by complete suspension of the company's charter.⁵ Hoornbeek expressed opinion that "there was not one man in all the Seven Provinces" to recommend the accession to the treaty of Vienna solicited, whatever scruples might be entertained about that of Hanover. Finch advised that Königsegg's canvassing was resented ; Itterssum that, while Austrian activity in the republic had never been greater in the memory of man, yet the emperor's influence was declining rather than increasing, "faute de connoître le terrain" ; the promises made no impression and threats indulged in only roused to indignation some hitherto lukewarm.⁶

This was very well, but what was urgent in minds at Hanover was accession of the States-General before parliament met, in order to facilitate approval of the treaty there and to enable joint measures for destruction of the Ostend Company to be taken forthwith. The

¹ Finch, 17 and 20 November, Itterssum, 17 and 24 November, R.O. Holland 286, 284.

² Dayrolle, 6 November, *ibid.* 285, Itterssum, 24 November, cited.

³ Itterssum, 3 November ; Stanhope, 5 December, R.O. Spain 93. Van der Meer was Itterssum's brother-in-law ; "il défère beaucoup à mes sentiments," says the baron (27 October).

⁴ Several, and others by the Spanish secretary, Nicolas de Oliver, with Finch and Dayrolle's dispatches ; also Rousset, ii. 231 ff. Cf. Dureng, p. 378.

⁵ Huisman, pp. 342-4.

⁶ Finch, 13 and 17 November, Itterssum, 17 and 24 November, *ll.cc.*

king, Townshend wrote just before starting on his journey home, was little concerned about Königsegg's memorials but very much about the delays, for if the accession were not obtained before the opening of parliament the treaty could not well be laid before it, nor without parliamentary sanction could the East India Company stir a step against its rival, which in the year's delay that would ensue would grow so strong, and the emperor would take such measures, that it could not be opposed.¹ To his disgust, on arrival at Osnabrück, he received report from Finch ² of resolutions adopted by the States of Holland and West Friesland in joint assembly containing "several nice points" calculated to raise difficulty. These, at the Hague, he was able to discuss with his old friends there and to concert with them resolutions to his taste. And so he set forth for Helvoetsluys in hopes, which even before he sailed were to be disappointed.

¹ Townshend to Finch, and similarly to Newcastle, 18 December, R.O. Holland 286, Regencies 8.

² Of 20 December, R.O. Holland 286.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POSITION IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

COLONEL STANHOPE at Madrid had no better news to follow his startling report of 14 July 1725. He could only declaim on the wickedness of the court and its complete subservience to that of Vienna.¹ In spite of an empty treasury and notorious inability to provide even "the necessary ordinary subsistence for the soldiers in their quarters," he saw military preparations pressed forward and heard talk of war with France as certain. At an audience on 3 August, on the subject of Gibraltar, all possible arguments, gentle and forcible, had had no other effect than "the letting me see, clearly and beyond all manner of doubt, that their Cath. Maj^s are obstinately and immovably fixt upon pushing this affair with the utmost precipitation and vigour." He could suggest but two means to prevent a speedy rupture, equally impracticable; the one for Great Britain to abandon France, which would "infallibly and at once put an end to this affair for ever," the other to promise to restore Gibraltar within a limited time, which, however, would have but a temporary effect.² When he explained that the place could be restored only by consent of parliament, "No, sayd the queen, let the king your master return presently into England and call a parliament expressly for this purpose, it being no more than we might expect from his friendship for us," and then, "let but this short argument be once made use of, either give up Gibraltar or your

¹ "All affairs here are brought into such an unhappy situation, through the rage and resentment of an offended woman, the imbecillities and cowardice of the present ministers, the madness and villany of the Spanish ambassador at Vienna, and the monstrous ingratitude towards his Maty of that court, upon which this submissively and abjectly wholly depends, that nothing good or agreeable can possibly be sent from hence." And again: conduct would entirely depend "upon the influences this court does and shall receive from Vienna, to which they become here every day more and more submissive, in proportion to the hopes given them from thence of a marriage for Dn Carlos, which is what this court now gives out as in a manner adjusted."

² Stanhope's argument on this subject was that the great object of the dominant court of Vienna being "to disunite his Maty from France, that point once obtained the same interests must then make them desirous to keep his Majesty and the K. of Spain well together," whereas the restoration of Gibraltar would not have that effect at Vienna.

trade to the Indies and Spain, and the matter (I will answer for it) won't admitt of a moment's debate." ¹

Townshend declaimed indignantly on this "most extraordinary scene." The king, he said, "looks upon the court of Madrid to be so intoxicated with their new alliance with the Emperor, and so elevated by some vain schemes inspired by the Imperial ministry, that they think they may treat his Ma^{ty} as they please." But he, since a rupture seemed unavoidable, would not fail to take measures "for disappointing the vast projects the Imperial and Spanish courts seemed to have formed together to awe and controul the rest of Europe." ² And when further word from Madrid indicated the queen's temper to be "not in the least cooled," and the likelihood of seizure of the English merchants' goods, Townshend insisted on the necessity of deciding how to act. "Your Grace will agree that it will be looked upon as the highest neglect in the King's ministers, and will be imputed maliciously to his Ma^{ty}'s absence from England, if so severe a stroke should be struck by the Spanish court and nothing done by us; nor any measures taken to retalliate such a heavy blow." Newcastle and Sir Robert Walpole should consult with the Lord Chancellor and others on what ought to be done, showing them Stanhope's dispatches and those of Saint-Saphorin about Ripperda's sayings and doings at Vienna and the Austrian negotiations with Spain. Action might be taken such as when the king of Portugal seized the effects of a merchant of Lisbon, namely a squadron of 15 or 16 men-of-war, with bomb-vessels, be fitted out to demand reparation, or inflict reprisals in case of refusal. This would put the Spaniards in fear for their treasure-fleet and coast towns, a fear which the "great and powerfull confederacy" just formed would magnify. Thus "we shall at the same time certainly secure Gibraltar, and every reasonable man will allow that nothing more can be done in this season, nor even till next spring, than to do that, and put our selves in a posture of demanding satisfaction." Parliament need not be summoned specially, for since the extraordinary expense would be "employed upon our naval force, and be laid out for the honour of the King, the good of the nation, and the security of our trade, I believe there is little doubt to be made but that the parliament would give their consent to have it repaid." But everything in the greatest secrecy, nor any preparation made until Spain should have actually seized the merchants' goods and orders were received from the king. ³

¹ Stanhope to Newcastle and to Townshend, 6 August 1725, B.M. Add. MS. 32744, R.O. Spain 93, the latter dispatch received at Hanover on 22 August.

² To Newcastle, 24 August, R.O. Regencies 6.

³ The same, 11 September, very private, *ibid.* 7.

Now, however, Stanhope was marking a change, desire for maintenance of good relations with Great Britain. The demand for Gibraltar *presto* was explained to him to mean within a reasonable time. At an audience "the queen appeared more dejected than ever I had seen her in my life, never showing any of those vivacities so natural to her."¹ Townshend at once transmitted this intelligence to England to allay suspense, saying that the king proposed to strike while the iron was hot and obtain "more explicit declarations upon several heads that must try the good faith and sincerity of the Spaniards, if they intend to live in that good correspondence they speak of."² At the same time he condemned as "very precarious and unsatisfactory," and as long ago rejected, certain concessions in return for the restoration of Gibraltar, which Stanhope had suggested as from himself in an amicable conversation with the marquis de la Paz; liberty to cut logwood in Campeachy Bay, "the settling the trade of the S. Sea Company upon such a foot as might avoid any disputes or complaints for the future," and prolongation of the term of the Asiento contract. "The King," Stanhope was told,

has always frankly told his Catholick Majesty that he could do nothing as to Gibraltar without concurrence of his parliament, and your Ex^{cy} will easily judge that at this time there is no manner of likelihood of obtaining their consent. The nation is very sensible of what has passed derogatory to the King's honour and disadvantageous to the trade of England. . . . I must tell your Excellency in confidence that the offers my Lord Stanhope made in relation to Gibraltar were done absolutely without the King's orders: it cannot be alienated without the consent of parliament, and the behaviour of the Spanish court, since they enter'd into measures with that of Vienna, has been such that it is impossible they themselves can think his Majesty any longer under the least obligation even of laying this demand before the parliament.

If the king and queen of Spain were sincere in their professions they would give proofs thereof by no longer insisting on the demand for restitution and by observing strictly the treaties of commerce, whereon the king would be very glad to resume the old friendship. But "His Ma^{ty} knows very well what caresses are of late made to the late duke of Ormond, and what encouragement is given to all those enemys of his government," witness the intended mission of Sezanne,³ a known Jacobite, as ambassador to Petersburg, and the outbursts of Ripperda.

Further Stanhope was ordered to inquire into the truth of reports of the remittance of large sums from Spain for the emperor's

¹ 4 September, R.O. Spain 93, Regencies 7, B.M. Add. MS. 32744. "That haughty spirit seems now as abject as it did imperious."

² To Newcastle, 25 September, R.O. Regencies 7.

³ I.e. General Seissan.

use; to hint to the Portuguese minister the disadvantages of further alliance with Spain than by the royal marriages in contemplation; to take particular care that the Dutch minister should lead in complaints about trade, "which he ought to do, his masters being concerned as principals in the affair of Ostend;" and to assert that the treaty of Hanover was "only a defensive alliance made to secure us from the subjection the court of Vienna was preparing for us," the allies desiring to live well with their Catholic Majesties.¹

On the reference to Portugal we may turn to the present relations of Great Britain with that allied power. Danger to them threatened from the personal bias of that masterful and self-willed monarch, John V.² He was brother-in-law to Charles VI, and with Philip of Spain he had in negotiation marriages of his son, the prince of Brazil, to the infanta of Castile, a match proposed for her immediately on her return from France, and of his daughter, Maria Barbara, to the prince of Asturias. It was not this, however, that disturbed British minds—"we have nothing to say to these marriages," Townshend, in his dispatch last cited, had told Stanhope—but report of overtures to Portugal to join the allies of Vienna. While Townshend professed inability to see, "since we don't intend to begin an attack, how their entering only into a defensive alliance with Spain will be of any great advantage to the Spaniards or of any detriment to us," yet he desired Horatio Walpole to try what could be done with the former Portuguese envoy at Paris, Dom Luiz da Cunha, and with Morville in regard to resumption of French diplomatic relations with Portugal.³

¹ Townshend to Stanhope, 26 and 28 September, R.O., Spain 93, Regencies 7. The information about the money came from Di Breglio at Vienna through his colleague, Cortanza, at Hanover. They believed the remittances to be intended to meet the emperor's military needs, and it was observed that a great many remounts for the imperial cavalry had been bought in Savoy.

² For John's character see Schäfer, v. 166 f. Count Tarouca, the Portuguese envoy in Holland, said of his master: "Quand un fois il se met une affaire en tête et qu'il y s'engage il n'y a rien qu'il ne fasse, sans en tirer aucun avantage" (Ittersum, 16 October, cited below). Arthur Street, agent at Lisbon, wrote on 28 July 1726 (R.O. Portugal 33): "The king I find pritty much alter'd, as he now thinks himself wiser than any body and is pritty violent and ungovernable." He cited in instance the late expulsion of some thirty members of the aristocracy from Lisbon because of a nobleman's servant being allowed to escape justice. And envoy Dormer (14 July 1726, *ibid.*): "His Portuguese Majesty has often threatened thô never til now so strongly exerted his power. This has called to mind a saying he has frequently repeated, speaking of his nobility: his grandfather loved them, his father feared them, but he neither loved nor feared them."

³ To H. Walpole, 28 September 1725, R.O. Regencies 7. Rupture of relations between Portugal and France had taken place in January, when the abbé De Livry had found himself obliged to leave Lisbon and Da Cunha consequently Paris. The latter, one of the most distinguished diplomatists of his time, had been accredited to the British court from 1696 to 1718 (save for the interval of his appointment as Portuguese plenipotentiary at Utrecht), and was now at the Hague.

The British representative at Lisbon now was brigadier-general James Dormer,¹ newly arrived (13 September). Principally instructed to keep watch on British commercial interests, particularly in view of the negotiations with Spain and of Austrian attempts to obtain privileges from Portugal for the Ostend Company, he was also to offer mediation on points of the treaty of Utrecht between Portugal and Spain left unsettled, to work for reconciliation with France, and to do everything possible, gently and insinuatingly, to prevent the king of Portugal from acceding to the treaty of Vienna, a "most unfriendly proceeding" towards England and Holland.² On his arrival he received assurances from Dom Diogo de Mendonça, secretary of state, that were quite satisfactory,³ but was at once confronted by a curious affair which, insignificant in itself, came near to having serious consequences.

One Spelman, suspected of concern in a robbery from the Exchequer, was traced and followed to Lisbon by a certain Thomas Butler, who contrived to have him arrested as a deserted sailor and sent home on board a British ship. When the Portuguese authorities discovered the fraud they had Butler flogged and imprisoned, while Galvão, the Portuguese minister in London, handed in a strongly worded protest. Butler claimed to be a king's messenger and therefore privileged. The affair developed into a very pretty quarrel, but political considerations demanded its composition. Newcastle adjured Horatio Walpole to exert himself in this matter also with the friendly Da Cunha, it being most important not to disoblige Portugal at this time and impossible to mention the treaty of Hanover at Lisbon until this "unlucky accident" should be accommodated. Galvão he described as "far from disposed to do right either in this or any other matter, he scarce talks with common decency to us."⁴ Townshend feared that the queen of Portugal, who had "a great ascendant" over her husband, would use the occasion to advocate the cause of her brother the emperor. He advised either the release of Spelman or his surrender to Galvão, and was writing, he said, to Tarouca (of whom below) "to set this matter in a true light" and get it amicably settled.⁵ Newcastle thereon informed Galvão that Spelman would be sent back, in the expectation that Butler would be released

¹ For whom see the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

² Newcastle to Dormer, 30 July to 28 September (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Portugal 32, Foreign Entry Book 115.

³ Dormer, 24 September, R.O. Portugal 31. Newcastle had reckoned Mendonça always "a faithful friend to the English interest."

⁴ 15 October (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32744, with more in a dispatch to Dormer and again to H. Walpole two days later.

⁵ To Newcastle, 26 October and 5 November, R.O. Regencies 7, with a copy of his letter to Tarouca.

on his arrival, at the same time reprehending the minister's expressions, "si fortes et si peu ménagées" that they might have produced bad results, but for the determination against any rupture with Portugal.¹ The exchange was effected in January 1726. Meanwhile Butler had been found to be no king's messenger, but only a thief-catcher employed by the Tellers of the Exchequer and himself a rogue, tried with Jonathan Wild and pardoned on turning king's evidence. Against Spelman nothing could be proved.²

Philip V gave formal consent to the Portuguese marriages on 1 October 1725,³ and there were great rejoicings at Lisbon on the news, thanksgiving services and illuminations for three nights. He had signed the contracts, consul-general Thomas Burnett was informed, immediately on the arrival of a courier from Vienna, and at the same time certain points in dispute between Spain and Portugal had been referred to the emperor's arbitration.⁴ Dormer having offered the usual congratulations Newcastle approved of them as proper and necessary, though fearing fall of English influence in Portugal.⁵ When the envoy asked for a copy of the marriage-treaty, he was informed that it would be made known in due course; at once, Mendonça intimated, were the treaty of Hanover communicated. That accession to that of Vienna had been promised, if not actually effected, Dormer had the greatest reason to suspect, "all my intelligence tends to that effect;," though he was "apt to believe they will enter into this alliance with some restrictions with regard to England."⁶ Communication of, however, and invitation to accede to the treaty of Hanover, had to be delayed, in the present relations of France with Portugal, in spite, Townshend wrote, of the freedom left to Spain and Austria to play "some untoward trick" at Lisbon.⁷ Indeed, in answer to representations of the bad effect in England and Holland and the

¹ Newcastle to Galvão, 7 November (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Ministers 39, Foreign Entry Book 252.

² Fully on the affair in the dispatches, R.O. Portugal 31 to 33. In an appeal to Newcastle from prison (*ibid.* 90, original) Butler alleged that having gained Spelman's confidence, by means which he describes, he could have enticed him back to England without further trouble but that Dormer, newly arrived and hearing of the affair, preferred to have him arrested as a deserter from an English man-of-war, then in the Tagus. Spelman making a great resistance, "some Irish villains of the pretender's party" came to his help, asserting that he was a priest; and the affair making a great noise he (Butler) was seized and thrown into gaol, Dormer denying him protection. So he had suffered for seven weeks, for the last without money or food, all in consequence of the envoy's mismanagement.

³ Newsletter of 18 October, R.O. Spain 93.

⁴ Burnett, 12 October, R.O. Portugal 31. He was the youngest son and biographer of Bishop Burnet, and in later life a judge and knighted, see the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

⁵ Newcastle to Dormer, 26 October (o.s.), R.O. Portugal 32 and Foreign Entry Book 115.

⁶ Dormer, 6 November, *ibid.*

⁷ Townshend to H. Walpole, 19 October, R.O. Regencies 7.

prejudice to French trade, were the emperor to win Portugal, Broglie expressed opinion that, since the marriages were settled, "voilà une accession de moins à demander, et nous avons bien fait de n'en point parler."¹

A man found ready to work on the side of Great Britain was Count Tarouca, the Portuguese envoy in Holland, under orders for Vienna. Itterssum, intimate with him, reported confidences that he had made, namely, that proposals for an offensive alliance with Portugal had come from Spain, and that many communications between Lisbon and Vienna had passed through his hands. The queen of Spain, said the count, was pressing her daughter's marriage, for only so could she find her a crown. He himself saw nothing prejudicial therein, but thought in general that any alliance with Spain must be harmful to Portugal, and an offensive one ruinous. He had so advised his master, he said, without offending but at the same time without success, receiving, on the contrary, reiterated orders to go to Vienna to negotiate. Having exhausted all his arguments he thought to find a fresh one, if he could be told that the States-General would accede to the treaty of Hanover.²

Townshend on this congratulated Tarouca on his appointment to Vienna, saying that his Majesty wished the king of Portugal well about the marriages and could not believe that he would enter into inimical alliances. The count answered with compliments corresponding to those received and with the positive assertion that his master would never undertake engagements at variance with his ancient alliance with England and would observe the existing treaties religiously, confident of like rectitude on the British side.³

Tarouca now received fresh and urgent orders, with the fullest powers and ratifications in blank, he told Itterssum, to go to Vienna at once to get the treaty through. It was against France, he said, that his master was so greatly piqued: "Sa Majesté veut ligue contre la France, et en même temps ne pas se brouiller avec l'Angleterre."⁴ Townshend argued to him at great length the disadvantages of a Portuguese alliance with Spain and Austria, offered to send him a copy of the treaty of Hanover, and assured him that the king ardently desired the king of Portugal's accession to it.⁵ Tarouca supposed that Dormer's omission to give the invitation, when speaking against accession to the treaty of Vienna, was due to

¹ Townshend to Broglie, and the reply, 22 and 25 October, R.O. Foreign Ministers 4.

² Itterssum to Townshend, 28 September, R.O. Holland 284.

³ Townshend to Tarouca, 2 October, and the reply, 8 October, R.O. Regencies 7.

⁴ Itterssum to Townshend, 13 October, R.O. Holland 284.

⁵ Townshend to Tarouca, 26 October, R.O. Regencies 7.

want of orders ; it must be remedied promptly, he advised, and England must risk something, if the king of Portugal were to be dissuaded from taking engagements with the emperor.¹

In November Stanhope at Madrid was assured by the Portuguese minister there that John V had entered into no measures yet with Spain and Austria, jointly or separately, nor had anything been yet proposed to him ; in fact, he was resolved to have no engagements contrary to the king of England's interests, " or disagreeable to him, whose friendship he shall always prefer to that of all others," hoping for reciprocity. Galvão, he said, was ordered to make like representations.² Yet about communication of the treaty of Hanover Dormer was still ordered to await instructions.³ Townshend was sure from Tarouca's letters

that nothing is yet done to our prejudice ; and if we open the parliament with a warm and vigorous approbation of the measures the King has taken I am convinced nothing will be done in Portugal to hurt us, either in our trade or otherwise ; you may however depend upon it that his Portuguese Majesty's affections are entirely with the Empire, and that fear only will keep him from acting against us. The Empire courts him prodigiously, thinking that if he can gain him we must submit, our nation being too much interested in point of trade to dare to break with Spain and Portugal together."⁴

At Madrid, when the news of the signature of the treaty of Hanover was received, Stanhope had noted sullen silence and " a dead stop " put to his negotiations.⁵ He could do nothing whether in conference with Grimaldo and De la Paz or through private channels.⁶ Yet, he went on, although the court was " as much incensed against France as ever, and every day more and more dissatisfied with his Majesty," yet it was difficult to suppose that Austrian instigation could push them into a war, which they were no wise in condition to support. The whole revenue of Spain at present, " the Indies included," he knew from exact figures to amount to little more than three and a half million pistoles, of which some two-thirds were

¹ Itterssum to Townshend, 3 November, retailing his conversation at great length, and again 17 November, R.O. Holland 284.

² Stanhope to Townshend, 19 November, R.O. Spain 93.

³ Newcastle to him, 23 November (o.s.), R.O. Portugal 32, Foreign Entry Book 115.

⁴ Townshend to Newcastle, 11 December, R.O. Regencies 8.

⁵ At an audience, says he, the king refused to say anything on the subject of Gibraltar, " and what was still more extraordinary, the queen during the whole audience spoke not one single word, but showed a dissatisfaction and sullenness in her looks by no means natural to her."

⁶ As by employing Monteleon, " who at present is not ill at this court, to sound the queen's confessor (his great friend)."

required for the army alone on its peace establishment; 56,120 foot, 7,540 horse, and 3,900 dragoons.¹

It seemed proper, in these circumstances, to communicate the treaty of Hanover to Philip V. Townshend desired Horatio Walpole to consult the French ministers on the subject and, if they concurred, to send on to Stanhope the accompanying dispatch and copy of the treaty, but in the contrary case to return them by the first messenger. He founded the proposal on information received from several hands,²

that the court of Vienna have now declared openly and informed the Dutch minister and several others that they never had any thoughts of marrying either of the archdutchesses to Don Carlos. This behaviour must in all probability incense the court of Madrid against the Emperor, who will on his part throw the blame upon us, and will endeavour to excuse his disingenuous way of acting towards them by insinuating that our late alliance was formed in opposition to the match which was supposed to be on foot between Don Carlos and one of the archdutchesses.³

The dispatch for Stanhope asserted the desire of George I to live well with Philip V and rather to convince him of his error than to resent his conduct, attributing what had passed to his queen, "deluded by the court of Vienna" and soon to be undeceived. The imperial ministers, it went on, "now loudly assert that there never was any intention of giving either of the archdutchesses to Don Carlos;" they had declared to several foreign ministers "that the whole was an invention of his Imp^l Ma^{ty}'s enemies, spread abroad in order to engage several princes of Europe to enter into a combination against him;" this with the evident intention of preventing such princes from acceding to the treaty of Hanover and of evading the engagements with Spain, on pretence that Great Britain and France, by that treaty, had rendered them impracticable. To defeat such malicious insinuations, and to convince the king of Spain of his Majesty's sincerity, Stanhope might communicate the

¹ Stanhope to Townshend, 11 October, R.O. Spain 93, B.M. Add. MS. 32744. His secretary, Charles Holzendorf, wrote: "As to the situation of affairs here every thing seems to be at a stop, and their Cat^k Maj^{ty}s are grown mute, and seem to be very much puzzled, since the news of the conclusion of the treaty of Hannover, but it is more than probable they will follow the Emperor's sentiments, w^{ch} is the queen's oracle, and who will do every thing to hinder a reconciliation with France, she being implacable on that head, a new proof of which I was told of the other day, viz^t, the king talking at table of the famine in France, and some body saying that hardly any neighbour could succour them except Spain, the king shewed some tenderness and said *il ne faut pas les laisser mourir de faim*, upon which the queen in wrath reply'd *qu'ils meurent tous*, and the king drop'd immediately the conversation" (to Tilson, same date, *ibid.*).

² Erased from the draft, "and particularly by a letter from M^r Petkum, a copy of which I send you inclosed."

³ Townshend to H. Walpole, 21 October, R.O., Regencies 7.

copy sent, waiting, however, to learn from Walpole that the court of France agreed, and for the manner of the communication advising with Grimaldo. And although to accede would be the wisest thing that Philip could do, Stanhope must "not let anything drop which may look as if we desired the accession," a thing at present both unnecessary and prejudicial.¹

Joseph, marquis de Grimaldo, secretary of state, was always reckoned a friend of England. Paris advices at this time had it that his credit was increasing and that he was allied with Bermudez, the king's confessor,² and with the marquis de Castelar, formerly no friend of his ; also that they were insinuating that Ripperda was sold to the emperor, in prejudice to the true interest of Spain, so that he might soon be recalled in disgrace.³

So far was this from being true, that Ripperda was even now on the point of success in the main object of his work, pressed steadily since the end of May, to obtain the consent of Charles VI to future marriages of his daughters to the queen of Spain's sons.⁴ On 5 November 1725 he signed with the Austrian ministers a "*strictius et amplius fœdus secretissimum etiam connubia complectens.*" This stated intention to strengthen the sincere friendship already established by more sacred ties of blood, namely, by contracting to Don Carlos and Don Felipe in marriage two of the three archduchesses when of proper age. To provide for the case of the emperor dying before that time he was to confirm the contracts by will, naming expressly in that case Maria Theresa for Don Carlos. Should he have a son the provisions of the treaty nevertheless to be strictly observed, or it to be null and void. For the rest the treaty was stated to be based, as were the previous ones of 30 April, upon the Quadruple Alliance, and those treaties it absolutely confirmed. It stipulated the perpetual separation of the crowns of France and Spain and also that the present possessions of the emperor should never fall to either of those crowns, but the order of the Pragmatic Sanction, already guaranteed by Spain, be inviolably preserved ; to confirm this, no archduchess or infanta ever to be given in marriage to a king of France or a prince of his house. Further the parties agreed to embrace each other's interests as their own and to support them by land and sea in all possible contingencies, whether concerning religion or otherwise, the following engagements being laid upon the king of Spain : in an election of a King of the Romans to support the

¹ To Stanhope, same date, *ibid.*, and H. Walpole to him, in similar language, 29 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

² "Arbitre de la politique comme de la conscience du roi" (Baudrillart, iii. 5).

³ H. Walpole, 24 October, *l.c.*

⁴ See for his negotiations Baudrillart, iii. 207 f., Syveton, pp. 128 f.

house of Austria, as his predecessors had done ; to support also any imperial candidate for the throne of Poland, finding towards expenses 500,000 Rhenish florins, or more if required ; to maintain the said house in possession of the duchy of Mantua ; and to support the Sulzbach or eventually the Austrian rights to the succession to Juliers and Berg, this last to be a *casus foederis* under the treaty of alliance of 30 April. The stipulations of the same treaty to be closely observed in case of war within or without the empire or of danger of it, whether from the Turks or French or on account of religion, the last being feared as a consequence of the affair of Thorn. In all these cases the king of Spain to furnish help by land and sea and subsidies as agreed. In case of a successful ending of a war with France he was to help, (1) to recover for the emperor the Belgian and all other territory formerly belonging to him, but now held by France, (2) to procure for Don Felipe the county of Burgundy, unless he were otherwise satisfied, in which case the emperor should have that also, (3) to obtain for the emperor restoration of Alsace and Strasburg and the bishoprics of Metz Toul and Verdun, saving the constitutions of the peace of Westphalia and of the empire, (4) to reinstate the duke of Lorraine in his status of 1633. On his part the emperor undertook to assist the king of Spain to regain the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne and the lower part of Navarre and, if in consequence of the treaty of 30 April he came to war with England, to render the aid stipulated in that treaty towards recovery of Minorca and Gibraltar, continuing exertion of best offices in the meantime. Last came a renewed promise on the part of Spain to support the Ostend Company, a general engagement for mutual help in case of trouble, a pledge to keep the treaty inviolably secret, and a provision for exchange of ratifications within five months.

Such were the conditions which Elizabeth of Spain was willing to accept in return for advantages for her sons of shadowy prospect. Charles VI might yet have a son and disappoint in that way her hope of the Austrian inheritance for her own offspring. Nor, excepting in the case of his own death or of that of one of his three daughters, was he bound to marry Maria Theresa to Don Carlos. As Fleury put the case after Ripperda's revelations of the following year (in Horatio Walpole's words) : "The Emperor has this advantage, that he having given his agreement to the marriages under his hand she cannot put him to any real proof of his intentions these five or six years, because of the minority of the children and for fear of discovering the secret before the time of consummation."¹ His benefits were immediate, hers of uncertain future ; for him the

¹ H. Walpole, 2 July 1726, private, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

marriage promises were but an expedient to escape from present difficulties. It is to be noted that again he was not bound to use force in aid of recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca, excepting in the case of his own engagement in war with England.¹

The text of this treaty has come to light only in modern times.² Its main points were revealed by Ripperda when he took refuge in Stanhope's house in May 1726, but with the addition of three separate articles which had not been agreed. Even less accurate were the disclosures of the "Sicilian abbots" in the autumn of 1727.³ All that the British government knew of the affair at present—though much of what now was stipulated had been read into the conjectured private treaty of 30 April—came (in Saint-Saphorin's absence from Vienna) from secretary Carrard, who signified the reception of engagements by Philip V to provide subsidies and troops and diversions in case of war and to join in action about Poland, with request that Don Carlos should at once have the title of prince of Tuscany as the recognized heir to that duchy. He was certain that Ripperda had concerted arrangements "*pour tous les cas, où l'Empereur et l'Espagne pourroyent se trouver.*"⁴ The treaty signed, Ripperda left Vienna for Madrid, leaving his son in charge of affairs in his absence.

There was also information that Ripperda had obtained, and communicated to the imperial ministers, the original letter of George I promising to restore Gibraltar, and had given a copy to the duke of Wharton, for some time past active at Vienna on behalf of the Chevalier de Saint-Georges.⁵ Townshend commented on this to Newcastle: "Your Grace will see by what is said about the duke of Wharton what a game is designed to be played at instigation of the court of Vienna in England this next session. . . . Their taking so dishonourable a step, as giving a copy of this letter to that wretch, can be done with no other view than to exasperate the nation personally against the King. But if I remember the letter right, they will be disappointed in their wicked design," for after Earl Stanhope's "unwary engagements" about Gibraltar, made without

¹ See fully Syveton, chapter xi; also Arneth, iii. 181-2.

² In Spanish, Cantillo, p. 231, the Latin text, Syveton, Appendix I; cf. Armstrong, p. 187, note. Arneth (iii. 547) was not aware of its publication by Cantillo, and he slips in his dates both here and, in regard to the treaty of Hanover, on pp. 181, 206.

³ See pp. 317, 743.

⁴ Carrard, 3 and 14 November, R.O. Germany, Empire, 56.

⁵ The advice stated that Ripperda had sent for the original from Madrid and shown it to the imperial ministers, who had given Wharton a copy. Secretary Carrard believed that the duke would move in parliament for Saint-Saphorin's recall, on the ground of the impropriety of employing foreigners in the British service, after which "*l'on ira plus loin*" (17 November, R.O. Germany, Empire, 56, Regencies 8).

orders, the king had been obliged to say that he could not perform them without the consent of parliament. Townshend asked for a copy of the letter, if it could be found, or, if not, that application should be made to Lord Carteret for information (he having been in charge of the southern province at the time), for his Majesty wanted to see "what is said now to be so unhandsomely produced and divulged by Mons^r Ripperda, and the court of Vienna."¹

Stanhope was now reporting: "I think it may be taken for granted that they will break with his Ma^{ty} whenever their fears will give them leave to do so." The last about Gibraltar was that the king of Spain would wait for its restitution till January, when George I would be back in England and parliament assembled; further explanation was refused. The Dutch ambassador had made the complaints about trade desired, himself seconding in a separate memorial. About remittances to Ripperda 120,000 pistoles, he learnt, had been sent to Amsterdam in July and 420,000 to Vienna in September, besides 30,000 at various times through Genoa, while now the court was negotiating with the moneyed men of Madrid for an advance of a million and a half on the revenues of the next year, so that great sums, it would seem, were to be sent abroad. Everybody was surprised, those revenues being already engaged for ten million pieces of eight. Yet, although the sullenness of the court was rather increased, discontent with that of Vienna was now no secret; were the queen's hopes of the marriages disappointed her fury against Austria would transcend that against France.²

On 11 November Stanhope, after the prescribed consultation with Grimaldo, communicated the treaty of Hanover to Philip V, who, says he, received the confidence with seeming satisfaction and proper assurances, but asked whether the guarantee of possessions extended to Gibraltar. Answered by admission that the want of specific mention of the place seemed to imply that, after further conversation on the subject he declared that, if such were the case, he must press his demand for restoration. Stanhope countered that his Majesty "never thought he had any occasion for the treaty of Hanover for the strengthening his right to the keeping of Gibraltar, which was incontestable," and that the only point was, whether the present juncture was suitable for him to propose the restoration to parliament, "which I had by express order fully and clearly explained not to be." However, he could get no other answer

¹ To Newcastle, 8 November, R.O. Regencies 7.

² Stanhope, 5 November, R.O. Spain 93, copies of the memorials about trade enclosed. The "piece of eight" was the ordinary silver dollar ("peso duro"), four to the gold pistole ("doblón d'oro") and worth about 4s. 3d. English.

from the king but that he awaited decision on a demand "from which he did not recede." Stanhope concluded :

the king of Spain is not determined to break with his Majesty, but keeps this matter open in order to have some colour of a pretence for declaring warr upon him, whenever he shall find a favourable opportunity for so doing, and I am apt to believe that the schemes he is entered into in favour of the Pretender have chiefly influenced him to act in this manner, in order to have always in hand a pretext for attacking his Mat^y whenever he shall think matters ripe for assisting the Pretender, without discovering too plainly to the world his having entered into such base and treacherous measures directly in opposition to the faith of his most solemn engagements.

Further, said Stanhope, when he repeated the fact that he communicated the treaty on behalf of Louis XV also, Philip's answer had been that he could have nothing to do with France till the satisfaction demanded was fulfilled, and still insisted on the duke of Bourbon coming to Madrid to apologise in person. Yet, Stanhope went on, the court did not seem to be better satisfied with that of Vienna. "Althô they don't yet publicly own the loss of their hopes of a marriage for Dⁿ Carlos" they were evidently highly discontented, and he could not account "for their thus quarrelling with all their old friends, without making any new ones." If they had any system at all, it was founded on the conviction that no one would attack them, so that they could play the bully as they liked.¹

Of the Jacobite scheme, into which Philip V was supposed to have entered, notice will be taken in the next chapter.

Townshend was of opinion that what the king of Spain had said about Gibraltar showed that no dependence could be placed upon or justice expected from him. Stanhope must let him know how the king had hoped that he would concur in the good work done at Hanover, and as a beginning redress the grievances complained of by British and Dutch traders. Declaring emphatically that after the treatment experienced restoration of Gibraltar could not be proposed to parliament, and approving the memorials delivered about trade, he enclosed a memorandum showing how the right to have the Ostend Company suppressed depended in the first place on "a strong and direct stipulation" in the treaty of 1667.²

However decided the Spanish refusal of reconciliation with France, in the latter country desire for it was general. Fleury, the man of real influence, who had carefully dissociated himself from the repudiation of the infanta, was all for it. Prominent among others holding the same view was Marshal Villars, agreeable

¹ The same, 19 November.

² Townshend to him, 14 December, *ibid.*

to strongest measures of force against Austria, but lamenting the breaches with Spain, old and new, and going so far as himself to write to Elizabeth and to Grimaldo in the interests of reconciliation.¹ Such advances were not at all to English taste. Stanhope declared belief that this "appearance of great forwardness" on the part of France "would serve only to render them more haughty and obstinate."² And again, after the abbé de Montgon had arrived at the end of November and entered into close relations with Bermudez ("the king's confessor scarce ever leaves him"): "I can't help observing that in my humble opinion these almost daily marks of the most abject submission of the court of France encourages this court to be thus haughty to all the world." Although there was something in ostensible letters from Bourbon and Morville by every post the king never allowed them to be answered, while from what Grimaldo said the Spaniards were "as farr as ever from any disposition towards a reconciliation with France, and are perswaded that that court has neither the courage nor the means of entring upon a warr upon any provocation whatsoever."³

To return to Portugal. At the end of January 1726 Mendonça asserted that no commercial treaty with Austria was in readiness for conclusion, but intimated that no prince could be expected to refrain from attempts to secure trade benefits for his subjects. He adduced instances of the convenience of trade with Austria in certain commodities, but once more gave assurance that nothing should be done contrary to engagements with Great Britain.⁴ Whereon Newcastle, while admitting such assurances to be satisfactory, said that the king could not but be concerned at negotiations with the imperial court for a treaty of commerce; the Trieste Company's trade had been found to be of no use to either country; Austrian intention must be "to hook in some advantages" for the Ostend Company prejudicial to British interests and treaty rights. He sent Dormer copies of the treaties of Hanover and Vienna (the most obnoxious clauses of the latter printed in prominent type), and of

¹ See his *Memoirs*, *passim*, e.g. August 1725.

² 11 October, cited.

³ Stanhope, 5 December, *ll.cc.* For Montgon, author of the valuable memoirs, see Baudrillart, III. 236-8. Stanhope says that Philip V two years before had wanted him to come to take charge of the prince of Asturias' education, and that now he had declined the queen's offer of an almonership in one of the royal chapels, wishing to retire into a convent. H. Walpole confirms the former statement and adds that Montgon, for religion's sake, had resigned his estate in France to his younger brother (11 December, B.M. Add. MS. 32744). Really, says Baudrillart, he came as a secret agent of France with instructions revised by Bourbon himself and a special cipher.

⁴ Dormer, 27 January 1726, R.O. Portugal 33. On relations with Spain he notified the mutual appointment of ambassadors: the marquis de los Balbases for Lisbon and the marquis de Abrantes for Madrid.

Dutch memorials and replies and other papers, affirming the whole of the commercial treaty to be a manifest violation of the Dutch treaty of Münster of 1648 and the British of Madrid of 1667 ; and he dealt at some length with the aims of Spain in thus treating the Dutch and generally in allying herself with Austria ; all this in order that Dormer might keep the court of Lisbon in the right way. He concluded with an exposition of the promising state of the king's affairs : the resolution of the States of Holland to accede, the proceedings in parliament, the active preparations for war in England and France, and the measures taken with other powers ; the whole undoubtedly sufficient to preserve the peace of Europe and fully to protect the commercial and all other rights of his Majesty's subjects.¹

In March Dormer reported the court of Lisbon "not so far gone into the measures with the Emperour and Spain, but that the spirit and unanimity of parliament will yet make them consider their own real interest." In reply he was instructed to keep a careful watch on the negotiations with Spain and to report every circumstance concerning them. He must be helped in his work, he was told, by the general concurrence of the nation, since "no true Portuguese can be pleased with the late marriages, or think it for the interest of their country to contribute to the making Spain too powerful, or to forego the alliance and support of Great Britain and France." On matters at present in dispute with Portugal (affairs at Bombay, at Kabinda in West Africa and elsewhere, of which these dispatches give full particulars) he must take care "to do nothing at this critical juncture that may give offence."²

¹ Newcastle to Dormer, 8 February (o.s.) 1726, *ibid.* 32 and Foreign Entry Books 114, 115.

² Dormer, 9 March, Newcastle in reply, 29 March (o.s.), *ll.cc*

CHAPTER IX

A JACOBITE SCARE

THE mission of Captain Deane to Russia has been noticed. On his way thither he had passed in the Sound three Russian men-of-war bound, he was told, for Cadiz or beyond and expected to touch at British ports.¹ At the end of July two of these were reported to have sought refuge in the Shannon and a third at Galway.² Poyntz had information that they had visited the north of Scotland and deposited arms there.³ Reaching Cadiz towards the end of August they were reported laden with merchandise and naval stores and a few arms and cannon for the Spanish government, and to be followed in the spring by twenty more with like cargoes, the ships themselves to be sold to Spain, if wanted.⁴

Little heed need have been taken of so much, but for discovery of what seemed to be proof positive that the enterprise was undertaken on behalf of the Pretender; this in letters from well-known Jacobites at Petersburg, William Hease, Sir Harry Stirling, and Thomas Gordon, obtained by Deane in Holland from the man who carried them.⁵ The terms were veiled, but admitted of easy interpretation. That from Hease ran :

¹ Deane from Elsinore, 26 May (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Russia 9.

² Reports from John Medder, coast officer at Kilrush, and from one Beare, collector at Limerick, of 12 and 16 July (o.s.) respectively, R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 18. Medder boarded one ship, the *Petersburg*, of about 600 tons and 36 guns mounted, but was not allowed to examine her cargo. They claimed, he said, to be merchant-vessels, two months from Reval. Beare specified the *Devonshire*, Capt. Mikhailov, of 800 tons and 34 guns, and the *Crownloved* (Kronlev ?), Capt. "Fream," of 300 tons and 20 guns, both of Petersburg and bound from Reval for Cadiz with ship's stores.

³ Poyntz, 6 July and 4 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 38.

⁴ Holzendorf (Stanhope's secretary), 11 September, R.O. Spain 93.

⁵ Copies of the letters, R.O. Russia 9, 107, Regencies 7, S.P. Dom. Naval 18; that from Stirling, of date 25 and 26 July (o.s.), printed by Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ii. 480. They were addressed respectively to Messrs. Hease and William Waters, bankers at Paris, to Messrs. Butler and Kelly, merchants at Madrid, and to Mr. Robert Gordon, merchant at Bordeaux. Stirling had lived at Petersburg since he took refuge there with his uncle, Robert Erskine, Peter the Great's confidential physician, now deceased; Gordon was probably his father-in-law, the Russian admiral. Hease, Townshend wrote, was "the same whom we have often found to be running on such errands to Petersburg and back" and frequently mentioned in the correspondence intercepted at Leyden (to Newcastle, 2 and 4

I have receiv'd yours of the 4th June inclosed to Mr Campredon, the answer of which I enclosed to Mr Archdeacon ¹ the 28th, since which time the factory of this place condescended to let us have five more ; there is one ready to sail and two more drawn out in the haven, which in a little time will be also ready, the rest gradually. We long to hear that the three are arrived safe that went off, it was very satisfactory when we had the account that Sr Harry's bill was answered, let all care be taken that the rest be the same, there are many necessarys granted to us, sent in those vessels. We have had all the assurances that can be had of a secure commerce with this factory, of which you shall know more at large by the middle of October. I am departing immediately for Stockholm to see the goods to be had there, one who is our especial friend is gone thither.²

And then, after the reference to Deane elsewhere cited :

Sr Harry writes to his friends in Madrid of those last five vessels along with this. 'Tis required that a proper person be sent to Stockholm. It is understood that twenty thousand pounds is necessary to be ready for that side ; no endeavours will be wanting in these to establish your trade, and 'tis expected that you make all preparations to begin along with the company next season. Prince Dolgarukee and Prince Curakine have instructions about closing articles with you, or any that are appointed, for the satisfaction and security of all sides. Whoever you send to the north will meet with good friends. We are very timorous of the treachery of our enemies in obstructing the present, but as they have no friend of signification here we are in hopes they are not better

October, R.O. Regencies 7). Stirling's letter, he said, from certain words in it, was supposed to be intended for the duke of Ormonde.

The man who gave the information appears to have been one Edmund O'Connor, engaged by Deane at Petersburg (by the account of Thomas Consett, chaplain to the British factory there) to desert the Pretender's cause and supply information (24 July (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Russia 9). Townshend in his dispatch of 4 October, cited, described the man as having been "sent by the Jacobites with letters of consequence to Petersburg, and recommended by them to be placed in the army there, but not liking the country was sent back with these dispatches to France and Spain." He had sent Deane £100 for him, with the promise of pardon and of further reward for information of how to intercept Jacobite letters. In a letter to Deane (5 October, R.O. Holland 579) Townshend stated the man to be going to Madrid with a token of introduction to Stanhope, to make discoveries. That ambassador was convinced that he must be O'Connor, a relative of Sir Toby Burke, and advised, if that were so, against his coming to Spain, since he had fled that country a year before under suspicion of being a spy of his (6 November, Spain 93). He seems to have gone to Hanover, for Townshend wrote to Deane on 19 October (Holland 579) that he liked his friend better than expected, going on to say that it did not seem advisable to send him to Spain at present ; on his own return to England he could send him without risk of discovery. A warrant for O'Connor's pardon, he said, was signed. And to Stanhope on the same date (Spain 93, Regencies 7) : the man was not to be sent to Spain, but "to skulk up and down in some place where he may be secure."

¹ A merchant of Rotterdam (not a pseudonym for John Deane, as might be conjectured).

² Presumably either Count Golovin, the new Russian envoy, or the captain of his frigate, Sorocold, a rebel of 1715 (cf. Townshend in his dispatch of 4 October, referred to).

acquainted than what the suspicions of a guilty conscience can produce. Our friends here are very plain in expressing their good will and inclinations to you, which with God's blessing and the carefull contribution expected, together with carefull management, will do.

The other letters were of like tenour, and the alarm they roused amounted almost to a panic. Townshend commented :

You will see by them what a game the Czarinna and the D. of Holstein are playing with the Jacobites and the king of Spain, in which the Emp^r in all likelihood will have his share. The reconciliation of the King appears to be all amusement, and another kind of scheme is certainly going forward than that of our alliance with the court of Russia. Our advices of late from Madrid have assur'd us that great caresses were made to the late D. of Ormonde.¹

And in his very private letter to Newcastle, cited : the letters were certainly genuine, and advices from all parts confirmed what might have had dangerous, and even fatal consequences, if not discovered in time. There was great reason to believe that in Sweden not only Reichel, the Holstein minister, but even Höpken, secretary of state, was deeply engaged in the scheme. Austria and Spain were so certainly, and much of the Spanish money sent to Amsterdam must be intended to promote it. Adducing various evidence of Spanish complicity Townshend found "no room to doubt that they intend, in conjunction with the Czarina, to make an attempt upon us next spring," and that the queen of Spain's late modest language about Gibraltar was intended only to deceive. "I have been for some months thoroughly persuaded that Spain and the court of Vienna, when they concluded their late treaty, enter'd into a strong engagement in favour of the Pretender by a secret article," the intelligence coming "from so good hands, that I no more doubt the truth of it, than if I had actually seen the article." There were yet six months in which to defeat the "wicked intentions of our enemies," and if in the meanwhile Sweden Holland and Hesse-Cassel could be secured "we may, in my opinion, laugh at all these designs." As a present measure, without discovering the reasons, General Wade ought to be ordered to search for the arms believed to have been deposited in the isle of Lewis and to put the barracks at Killiernan and Inverness in a posture of defence. Moreover his Majesty was now more inclined to agree with the proposition of some of the Lords of the Council to send three or four ships to strengthen Captain Scott's squadron in the West Indies ; a measure of "no great expense to the public" and "a great check to the Spaniards." They might be used in the

¹ To Poyntz, 2 October, R.O. Sweden 38.

meantime to seize the two Russian ships mentioned as about to sail, supposing that they could be caught in the Sound or elsewhere, though to cruise in search of them would excite too great alarm.¹

Shortly Townshend wrote that the king had changed his mind in regard to the West Indian reinforcement, being confirmed in his belief of a concert between the courts of Petersburg Madrid and Vienna in favour of the Jacobite interests and thinking it, therefore, much more necessary to have a strong naval force nearer home. If the project went on one squadron would be wanted for the Baltic and another for the coast of Spain. On some pretext, such as should give the least possible alarm, the force of eighteen ships always held in readiness should be augmented to between thirty and forty, in such a manner that, if wanted in March or April, they might be equipped for sea in a short time. Such preparations were absolutely necessary. Although it was given out from Petersburg that the tsaritsa, in seeking redress for her son-in-law, would confine herself to "mild and amicable ways" through powers interested to preserve the quiet of the north, such assertions only confirmed the belief, founded on other advices, that the intention was "to lull and amuse us till they were ready to strike their stroke, without our being in the least prepared against it." The news from Petersburg enclosed showed that a strong squadron was being sent to lay up at Reval, so as to be the earlier out at sea in the spring.²

These views were endorsed in England. Previously Sir Robert Walpole had combated the West Indian proposal on the grounds of uselessness and the danger of creating alarm, and had objected to seizure of Russian ships as an act of aggression to be avoided, although, he had admitted, if it unfortunately came to war, such action would be proper on the grounds of invasion threatened and of maintenance of the protestant succession. In the new scheme he concurred. It was arranged, he wrote, to order provision of victuals for 10,000 seamen as in the ordinary course for the year 1726, a force which it would be easy to raise by 2000 or 3000 later. Thirty or forty of the line could easily be got ready by March or April, without new orders before Christmas. He confessed to weighty apprehensions of some design preparing for the spring, which could not be too closely watched, and thought that Spain was obliged to get from Russia, besides ships, naval stores to furnish her own. He surmised a double attack, from Sweden upon Scotland and from Spain upon the west of England; if the emperor joined, his forces must come by way of Ostend. While one fleet sent to the Baltic in good time, and another

¹ Townshend to Newcastle, 4 October, R.O. Regencies 7, printed by Cox, ii. 480.

² The same, 9 October.

stationed in home waters, would probably defeat the scheme, most to be desired were measures in the meantime to foil it.¹

Newcastle advised Walpole at Paris in like vein. He, thereon, obtained from Fleury admissions of belief in Spanish intention to promote on any opportunity the cause of the Pretender, in Russian design merely to amuse by the negotiations pending, and in the consequent necessity of alliance with Sweden. Bourbon and Morville assured him of full support from France against any Jacobite attempts, whereon he took occasion once again to inveigh against Campredon as implicated in their plots and to argue "how necessary it was to strengthen ourselves by other alliances, which might make that with Muscovy as unnecessary as it seemed to be impossible from the conduct of that court."²

To apprise the king of Prussia Townshend sent in strict confidence a French translation of part of his dispatch to Newcastle and the substance of the Russian letters. Suitable reply was made, and a few days later Du Bourgay wrote that ministers had promised "to dive into the bottom of the designs at Petersburg" and render most exact accounts in the utmost secrecy. Best information, he learnt from Cnyphausen, could be obtained from syndie Surland of Hamburg, brother of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's private secretary: Townshend would know how best to deal with him.³

Stanhope at Madrid was warned both by Townshend and by Horatio Walpole. The former desired him to inquire "what particular design they drive at, and whereabouts either in England Scotland or Ireland they intend to make their attack." Enclosed was a private letter from Monteleon agreeing perfectly with the other intelligence and which, Townshend thought, might help to "a further, if not a full discovery" of the whole project. Walpole sent information of the three ships having stayed for some weeks at the isle of Lewis, where the customs officers had observed them to have great quantities of arms and other warlike stores on board; as they had probably landed a good portion there he was "apt to believe that the present submission of the Highland clans is no more than a blind." Since Stanhope had advised that they might, on their return, winter in Ireland, it was probable that they might carry thither more than fruits from Spain.⁴

¹ To Townshend, 2 and 12 October (o.s.), Coxe, ii. 485-8.

² H. Walpole, 17 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

³ Du Bourgay, 13 October, R.O. Regencies 7. The letters to and from Frederick William, Staatsarchiv, Berlin, and R.O. Royal Letters 46.

⁴ To Stanhope, 19 and 29 October respectively, R.O. Spain 93 and Regencies 7, B.M. Add. MS. 32744. As to the clans, General Wade had been commended by Townshend on 2 October for his activity in disarming the Seaforth's (R.O. Regencies 7).

The references to Sweden in the letters pointed to Stockholm as the most likely place at which intelligence about the plot could be obtained. Diligent inquiry by Poyntz had, however, but small result. He found that a certain St. Leger¹ (with Höpken's assistance, he understood) had nearly succeeded in obtaining a ship from the government and "a large quantity of arms out of the arsenal of this place, which are certainly the *goods* referred to in two of the letters. The cases for packing them lye still in the arsenal yard." The pretence was the old Madagascar project. He would watch St. Leger's doings, "but I am well assured that affairs in Russia tend so fast to confusion that his Ma^{ty} may be perfectly easy from that quarter." Could not Townshend, he asked, get Osthoff to write a full account of the Madagascar scheme, specifying all persons in Sweden engaged in it?²

After this Poyntz wrote of another ship to be fitted out to seek "a large treasure of gold sand," a venture in which he had himself been offered a share, "a very coarse net" to spread before him. Yet the person employed to approach him, Höpken's first secretary, was "one of very little fraud or guile," and indeed there were "persons of honesty and good sense, and well affected to his Ma^{ty} engaged in this wild project." He surmised that one or two persons, to whom alone the Pretender's secret was entrusted, designed thus to get ships equipped, which, on disappointment of such schemes, they might buy for his service. He learnt also of a Russian ship seen hovering off Gothenburg, apparently waiting for St. Leger's to come out, but disappointed. Anyhow the arms which St. Leger had sought to get were "miserably old and unfit" for service.

What the Pretender's policy can be, to ransack the Baltic for ships and arms, which he might buy as good and as cheap in other parts less distant, is such a mystery, that if it were not for the experience of the Madagascar ships one would almost suspect the letters from Petersburg to be a fiction; for your Lodp. observes by those letters that the ships and arms are not lent, but are to be paid for. This may possibly be to save the court of Spain from the

¹ Described later as formerly captain of a privateer, "a bold fellow and fitt for any desperate attempt."

² Poyntz, 5 October (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 39. The scheme referred to was a trading venture, in which this John Frederick Osthoff had taken part. Thrown into prison in 1723 for treasonable correspondence he had escaped, only to be re-arrested in June of the present year at Hamburg. His release was obtained because, as Townshend wrote on 29 June, "This man is in his Maj^{ty}'s service and has been of great use to us in discovering several intrigues of the Jacobites in the last conspiracy against the King" (R.O. Hamburg 42).

Now, in answer to Poyntz, he said that he did not know where Osthoff was. "What he told me of the design of the Jacobites in general was convincing enough, and gave good light into that affair," but he had not said anything, so far as could be remembered, about the persons in Sweden (30 October, R.O. Sweden 39, Regencies 7).

direct imputation of assisting him, but considering the expences and hazards of such a long navigation seems very unaccountable.¹

Townshend disagreed, looking on the affair as a plot most dangerous, had it not been discovered. He accused the Holsteiners of taking advantage of the tsaritsa's weakness for the duke to engage her in the Pretender's cause "as a means to recommend her to the courts of Vienna and Madrid," not doubting that when alliance was made with Austria they would be sure of Sweden. "To encourage the Emperor to come into their interest, and to secure all the help he can give them in Sweden, they must be as serviceable as they can to the cause of the Pretender, which he is now carrying on jointly with Spain." And since Swedish ports, and particularly Gothenburg, were very convenient for carrying arms to England, "they are no doubt even now doing all they can by their emissarys to assist and encourage such projects." Hence the revival of old schemes, such as the Madagascar and gold-dust ventures, to blind and provide material for the Jacobites without noise and suspicion. It would, of course, be a great advantage for them to engage an actual British minister in the project.²

Next Poyntz learnt from Admiral Oernfelt, newly come from Gothenburg, that the Russian ship mentioned had entered that port and was commanded by John Sorocold, who had tried at Lübeck and in Denmark, and was now trying in Sweden, to engage pilots for Danish waters for the expedition of the coming spring. The ship was not to go to Spain but to return to Reval, Sorocold himself intending for Stockholm; an infraction of the treaty stipulation against harbouring rebels, which ought to be challenged. Later Poyntz wrote that the Swedish pilots were refused, that Gyllenborg and Höpken did not seem to be implicated, and that Hease had not appeared. The Swedish frigate at Gothenburg he had learnt to be the *Fortune*, one of those employed for the Madagascar venture, and the Russian the *Prince Alexander*; both of 24 guns. Another Swedish ship of which he was informed was the *Gothland Lion*, able to mount 60 to 70 guns and bound for St. Ubes (Setubal) or Lisbon with old and worthless arms and swords bought at 6½*d.* apiece. There was great jealousy between Sorocold and the Swedes, and now he was returning with his ship to Russia.³

Other investigations were by Cyril Wich at Hamburg, whose endeavours to discover correspondence with Petersburg were hampered, he wrote, by the death of his friend Paridom von Nachten,

¹ To Townshend, 14 October (o.s.), *ibid.* (Regencies 8).

² Townshend in reply, 5 November, *ibid.*

³ Poyntz, 20 October to 13 November (o.s.), *ibid.*

post-master for the Dutch mails. The "Anciens de la Bourse," who had taken over the charge themselves, were merchants rich as Croesus and could not be gained. Having obtained secret orders for the post-master Destinon, the Prussian resident, to help him, together they had searched the post office registers for names of persons corresponding with Russia, of whom he sent lists. A man chiefly suspected was the banker Drusina, whom, finding nothing to incriminate, he had decided to attack directly, being met with perfect openness. Confessing that he was in correspondence with John Archdeacon of Rotterdam, Drusina had showed all received from him, which proved only to relate to commercial matters and law-suits. Wich was sure that so far nothing had passed through his hands for Petersburg. One Mariotti he found to be transmitting packets thither, but one which he opened contained only dispatches from Paris for Campredon.¹

Failure whether by Poyntz or Wich to unearth any material evidence of Russian or Swedish implication in the Jacobite designs by no means allayed the tremors of the British government. Townshend saw in what Poyntz wrote strongest confirmation of "all our suspicions in relation to the intrigues of the courts of Vienna and Madrid in favour of the Pretender." The visit of the Cadiz ships to Ireland must, he pressed on Newcastle, be preparatory to a Spanish invasion in the early spring; no time should be lost in sending private orders to Lord Carteret to have them seized and searched, all small arms on board and papers not relating to trade confiscated, and correspondence with people of the country prevented. Since execution might be difficult, the ships being "of force" and the port to be visited not known, and success precarious, Newcastle should consult the Lord Chancellor and others on the best orders to be given, observing absolute secrecy, if no good excuse for them were found.²

Newcastle was equally convinced of "an alliance on foot between Muscovy the Emperor and Spain, to which Sweden will be invited"; and did not doubt something being attempted in the spring, unless thwarted by the warning received. Lord Orrery, he observed, was at Paris; Wharton on his way home from Vienna with his copy of the king's letter promising to restore Gibraltar. It would be of great service if Walpole could get proof of either he or Orrery

¹ Wich, 24 October to 17 November, R.O. Hamburg 42. He was always able to see and cite Campredon's dispatches sent by way of Hamburg for safety, and on 15 January 1726 offered to intercept the Holstein correspondence coming from Russia, whenever Townshend pleased. Some trials he reported to have made on that of certain Scotch merchants, without finding anything incriminatory (*ibid.* 43).

² Townshend to Newcastle, 15 November, R.O. Regencies 8, Coxe, ii. 490.

seeing Atterbury at Paris : "if it could be obtained, it would do our work at once." But he must keep the affair entirely secret, and write to Stanhope for earliest possible news of the ships.¹

In his next dispatch Townshend transmitted the king's approval of measures proposed for strengthening Gibraltar and Minorca, but was sure that Ireland would be the real objective of a Spanish attack. "Your Grace in one of your letters of the 2nd seems to think that the motions of troops and ships and other dispositions about Gibraltar, and in the neighbourhood, may be intended against that place ; but I cannot but be persuaded that the preparations your Grace mentions are rather designed towards supporting the Jacobite scheme concerted between the courts of Madrid and Petersburg." Any attack upon Gibraltar at present, it was thought, must be fruitless ; the intention seemed rather to be "perplexing our affairs at home, in order to prevent our meddling or interfering with them abroad," and the means thereto some attempt "upon some of his Ma^{ty}'s kingdoms in concert with the Jacobites and disaffected there." England was pretty secure, and so many Highlanders would not have submitted and begged pardon were anything designed against Scotland. It was in Ireland that the attack would begin ; the three ships going thither to carry arms and concert an insurrection, to break out when "other ships and troops from Spain should be at hand to support them," was "a pretty evident sign of it." And though the enterprise would certainly be unsuccessful it would raise great alarm and "ruffle our affairs very much at home," so that it was thought that "too great precaution cannot be used in hindering the least spark of rebellion's being kindled in that country." All at Hanover were much concerned at the lack of preparation and of ships in readiness, and wished that on various pretexts (for instance, the king's escort to England might be made pretty strong) twelve or fourteen men-of-war could be fitted out for use at the first call ; the only way to wreck the project, if not to nip it in the bud. Newcastle and Walpole could best judge what should be done. By Stanhope's account the Spanish sovereigns were still sullen and silent, seeming to have the same ill intentions and only waiting for the proper season.

I am of opinion that we should not at present press for a positive explanation, since we are not at all prepared against any rupture ; and it would be much best to have the parliament sitting first and get the sanction of our late treaty, which is to be the basis of the tranquillity of Europe and will, when approved by both Houses, discourage our enemys and let our friends see that we are in earnest. Yet without a strong fleet (according to the notion at present

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 15 November (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

universally entertain'd of us abroad) all the parliament can say will make very little impression in our favour.¹

At the same time Townshend sent a draft for the clauses of the King's Speech at the opening of parliament concerning foreign affairs, in order, he said, that Newcastle and Sir Robert Walpole might consider them well before the king arrived. Specially was recommended equipment of a strong fleet against the spring, both to defeat attempts upon Great Britain and to secure justice in regard to the encroachments on trade, the number of troops already on foot being declared to be sufficient. Sir Robert commented that, were such language to be used and the measures advised put in execution, parliament ought to meet by the middle of January, because the effect on credit might oblige him "a little to vary my schemes of supply, and not venture upon the strength of credit, which I have hitherto depended upon." Rumours of war, he advised, were even now having their effect on stocks, and no steps, such as fitting out squadrons, ought to be taken, which were not immediately necessary; there was plenty of time. He noticed hopes founded by the two Pulteneys on difficulties "from foreign affairs, and especially from the Hanover treaty," and their correspondence with ministers of the emperor. "I had the curiosity to open some of their letters, and find them full of this language."

In answer Townshend expressed conviction of persuading Walpole, when they met, that only vigorous resolutions of parliament could prevent a war and that they could be consequent only on what the king should say. His view was that such resolutions were necessary for extension of the alliance of Hanover, whereby maintenance of British prestige and defeat of the "extensive and dangerous" designs of Austria; otherwise war would be inevitable, and only France to depend upon. "Whereas shewing a spirit now will secure us friends and prevent Portugal and other powers from joining with the emperor and Spain."²

That the intention of wintering the three ships in Ireland or the Orkneys—"those cold, inhospitable parts"—could be innocent, or their voyage merely for the purposes of trade, Townshend still refused to believe. He was sure that the king of Spain had in view "some push in favour of the Pretender" and was sending arms and ammunition thither to prepare. To seize the ships was most important, in order to warn the king of Spain that his design was discovered and to dishearten the Jacobites. The tsaritsa could not complain, seeing that the ships had been declared when passing

¹ Townshend to Newcastle, 27 November, R.O. Regencies 8.

² This correspondence, Coxe, ii. 492-4.

Elsinore to be merely private traders, and it would be lawful to seize them on the bare suspicion of carrying arms for the Jacobites, especially if care were taken to do no violence on the Russians aboard but only to seize suspected subjects of the king. His Majesty, however, thought that the seizure ought to be made only in a British harbour; he would not advise further, but did not doubt that his ministers would do all that was possible for effectual performance of the service. Stanhope's last dispatches confirmed the necessity of getting ready twelve or fourteen ships "with as little noise as possible"; Atterbury's discourse at Paris plainly showed that something was brewing and that knowledge of it had transpired; and it would be inexcusable if the nation were left defenceless for want of a naval force in readiness.¹

Now there was news from Stanhope that was reassuring. At first he had been filled with proper horror at the discoveries made, and had at once set to work to prosecute inquiry. First, with no result, he tried some of Ormonde's people, for only the duke and his chaplain, Hamilton, he could suppose to be in the secret.² Later, informed that Ormonde had been holding long conferences with the Russian ambassador, Prince Sergius Golitsuin, he succeeded in suborning the latter's poverty-stricken French secretary, who thankfully accepted a present of £50. The information, however, that he supplied was of no importance, and Stanhope concluded: "Certainly the minister of Muscovy here knows nothing as yet of any designs being concerted betwixt this court and his in favour of the Pretender." Nor could he himself observe any preparations for the same, nor did the reports of the consuls at the different ports apprise him of any. An account of the three ships obtained stated them to be only partially armed, to have been laden with guns and ammunition, naval stores, and various Russian produce, and to be intended solely as an "essai de commerce." They had put in for repairs first in Norway and then on the coast of Scotland, two having been re-masted at "Dunblain." They had reached Cadiz on 28 August and had delivered their cargoes to one Semenikov to sell, as arranged. Re-loading at once, chiefly with salt, they had sailed with orders to winter in Denmark, if they found the Sound frozen. The writer, said Stanhope, gave good reasons for the impossibility of a Russian enterprise in favour of the Pretender.³

Nevertheless Townshend instructed Stanhope to prosecute his inquiries: "you cannot be too watchfull and attentive on this article, nor too expeditious in communicating your discoveries."

¹ Townshend to Newcastle, 11 December, R.O. Regencies 8.

² Stanhope, 6 and 9 November, R.O. Spain 93.

³ Stanhope, 5 December, *ibid.* and B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

There was strange news from Rome of the Pretender's intention to leave that capital.¹ Later, arrived at the Hague, he was shown advices from Van der Meer, which discounted those of Stanhope, and sending an extract to Newcastle commented :

Your Grace will see by it that the design we have had notice of goes on, and that M^r Stanhope is kept in the dark. Undoubtedly the secretary of the Muscovite minister, whom he bribed, deceives him, for your Grace will have observed in an article of M^r Walpole's of the 1/12 Dec^r that the Muscovite minister at Madrid assures Prince Kurakin that the project in favour of the Pretender would go on as soon as they could bring their matters to bear between the Emperor Spain and the Czarinna.²

Of what the three ships really did we have an account by James Young, a sailor on board, in answer to questions put to him by Deane in 1727. They were laden, he testified, with naval stores ; anchors, cables, cannon, small arms, shot, shells, tallow and tar. Having put in to the island of Lewis to repair damages caused by storms "the Highlanders were jealous of us at first, taking us for English men of war," but afterwards "they came frequently aboard and were very merry," and "several gentlemen of fashion often visited the commodore," though Young did not know them nor what they said. No ammunition or arms were landed. Arrived at Cadiz there was no hurry to discharge nor yet to reload with "salt and some oil," it being intended to winter in Ireland. But the commodore declining to go up Channel in the face of contrary winds they had borne up for Santander and wintered there, refitting at the expense of the Spanish government. On the voyage home they "saw no land from St. Andero to Shotland."³

The refitting at Santander was known in England by the time that parliament met in 1726.⁴ At the end of April the ships were back in the Sound and going on to Reval laden with oil salt and raisins.⁵ Sir Charles Wager, arrived at Copenhagen with his squadron on 4 May, just missed them. Deane, with him presumably as interpreter, was told by the Russian minister, Alexis Bestuzhev, that he had been on board and found that they carried little beyond oil and wine, and what there was mostly perished during their long winter's stay.⁶

¹ Townshend to him, 14 December, R.O. Spain 93.

² Townshend to Newcastle from the Hague, 1 January 1726, R.O. Regencies 8.

³ Answers to Deane's queries signed "London Nov^{br} the 14th 1727 per me Ja : Young," R.O. Foreign Ministers 52.

⁴ By letters from Holzendorf, Stanhope's secretary, of 7 to 21 January 1726, R.O. Spain 93.

⁵ Secretary Hermann from Copenhagen, 27 April, R.O. Denmark 49.

⁶ John Deane to Townshend, "Torbay" in Copenhagen roads, 26 April (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 77.

CHAPTER X

THE CONTEST IN SWEDEN

LATE in August 1725 a new Russian envoy appeared at Stockholm, Count Nicholas Golovin,¹ specially commissioned to oppose Poyntz by all methods. He manifested his hostility from the first by refusing to visit or show the most ordinary civilities to Poyntz or Jackson or the Hanoverian envoy, Colonel Bassewitz. At a certain wedding festivity, for instance, although, says Poyntz, "for several hours in the same room with M^r. Jackson and myself, and tho' he speaks English, he was not pleased to utter the least word of civility towards us . . . His servants have told mine that he has forbid them to sett their foot in my house." On another occasion only the ministers of George I were not invited to a ball given by Golovin on the tsaritsa's name-day.² Moreover, to promote their ends, he and the Holsteiners spread tales about, such as that George I had offered to guarantee the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's succession in Sweden,³ that hated Denmark had acceded to the treaty of Hanover, that it was not yet ratified by Prussia, and that Frederick William, on his return to Berlin, had told the Russian ambassador that England and France regarded Sweden as a cipher, intending to invite her accession merely for form's sake and looking on the result with indifference. They gave hint, besides, of great advantages to be accorded by Catherine I in return for acceptance of her son-in-law's succession, for instance, as reported from Paris and Berlin, restoration of Viborg and other lost Swedish territory.⁴

Of the treaty itself what Poyntz calls a "most monstrous relation" was circulated. Horn, says he, not being at liberty to

¹ Son of Peter the Great's minister, Count Theodore Golovin.

² Poyntz, 1 and 8 September and 1 December (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Sweden 38, 39.

³ "Unparalleled impudence," says Poyntz, seeing that in the same breath it was asserted that George was using all his money and influence in favour of prince William of Hesse, reported to have gone to Hanover expressly to promote his claim

⁴ Prince Kurakin, says H. Walpole (16 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32744), was stating that Cederhielm was busy with a treaty for settling the succession in Sweden on the duke and giving up Viborg and its dependencies to him at once, receiving a Swedish garrison and to revert to Sweden absolutely on his accession. Du Bourgay had a great story to retail of recessions offered; the isle of Oesel and its revenues given to the duke already (6 October, R.O. Regencies 7).

own that he had seen it, could only advance the absurdity of what was imputed and pressed for its formal communication, as also for "dormant orders" to Poyntz and Brancas (now at last arrived) to invite accession at a suitable time. They therefore, Poyntz wrote privately, had gone so far as to desire him "to act as he should think best for the good of the service," not disclosing anything but asserting only that such and such conditions were not in the treaty, and declaring his opinion in general of its justice and inoffensiveness.¹

This brought Poyntz blame for misunderstanding his instructions and orders to give Horn a copy of the treaty with its three separate articles at once; if Brancas found himself unable to join therein, then alone. "As to future steps . . . take Count Horn's opinion as you do, and move as he advises, without expecting any further orders from the King. I shall conclude with telling you that the bringing about the accession of Sweden to this treaty is the most acceptable and most important service you can do the King at this juncture." A little hazard must be run rather than failure result from waiting for precise orders. Brancas would be fully empowered to act in concert, his court having lost all trust in Russia.²

Another obstacle was the jealousy of Prussia—"the grand obstacle of Prussia still remains unremoved," says Poyntz,—but worst was the lukewarmness of Brancas, inspired, we may presume, by the warnings of his private instructions. He was found to take chief counsel with the obnoxious Anthouard, arousing thereby mistrust in the minds of Horn and other friends,³ and to his reports Poyntz attributed the opinion prevalent in France "of the superiority of the Holsteiners."⁴ Horatio Walpole confirmed, stating Brancas to picture "a very melancholy prospect of our affairs in Sweden," Horn, according to him, though strongly for alliance with Great Britain and France, deploring that no satisfaction had been found for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and doubting his own ability to defeat or even to defer the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm, vehemently pushed by the Holstein party.⁵ Yet, Malmström observes, Brancas' presence at Stockholm had good effect with influential men, old friends of France, such

¹ Poyntz, 5 October (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 39.

² Townshend to Poyntz, 25 and 30 October, *ibid.*, the former dispatch, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 197-8.

³ "He seems to be a very good natured agreeable young gentleman, but neither Count Horn nor I have as yet much confidence in him. Anthouard possesses him hitherto, and we suspect his secretary. But not a word of this to France till we see further." And again: "Our friends are certainly well disposed to it [the accession], but the suspicions they have of Count Brancas for caressing Anthouard have thrown all our affairs back" (15 and 29 September (o.s.), *ibid.* 38).

⁴ 14 October (o.s.), *ibid.* 39.

⁵ 1 November, secret, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

as Counts Erik Sparre and De la Gardie, who had served in the armies of Louis XIV.¹

In his next dispatch Poyntz, counting heads, reckoned with the king's double vote just a majority in the senate for accession. In reference to his disbursements of cash he said: "I am letting out some, but my friends stop my hands till a diett meets, which is to be our last resort if the senate should refuse to accede." Brancas he stated to have received no new instructions yet. Townshend answered: "I hope the majority you reckon'd up so clearly will be able to do the business; for it will be but a bad case, if we are left to have recourse to a dyet." He was sorry to hear about Brancas so differently from what Walpole was now writing, but hoped that he would soon be enabled to act with Poyntz in everything.²

Indeed, three days later was presented at Hanover a copy of instructions sent to Brancas, instructions termed by Walpole eminently satisfactory and well calculated "to fortify and strengthen the well-intentioned and the patriots."³ Success, Brancas was told, depended on their getting the upper hand; it was uncertainty on this head that alone had delayed permission to communicate the treaty, it being feared that the hostile party might allege intention rather to prevent Sweden from joining Austria than to renew the old bonds of friendship and alliance with France. Now, since Horn seemed to desire it, the treaty with its separate articles might be communicated formally. After specification of arguments to be used at length Brancas was authorised to say that there had been no repugnance on the part of France to accede to the treaty of Stockholm, only to the secret article of it. That made known the senators, it was thought, might be brought to reflect, the patriots fortified, the Holsteiners reconciled, and especially Count Horn emboldened to speak against the article.⁴

Despite his calculation on a majority in the senate Poyntz was by no means hopeful. "Besides that the opposition is strong, I foresee our friends will clog it with such exceptions additions and demands as will make it impracticable." He had to write of adverse memorials presented by Golovin and Reichel, advices from Vienna of the counter-alliance on foot, which Sweden would be invited to join, and still the want of instructions to Brancas. On the other hand he could report letters of recall sent to Cederhielm, now recognised by him as entirely devoted to the Holstein party. Although, he said, the date was left blank and intimation was given

¹ *Sveriges politiska historia*, i. 463.

² Poyntz 20 October (o.s.), Townshend to him, 14 November, R.O. Sweden 39.

³ H. Walpole, 8 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

⁴ Copy of these instructions, of date 8 November, with a letter from Broglie to Townshend of 17 November, R.O. Foreign Ministers 4.

that if the ambassador saw any certain prospect of advantageous offers he was to report them and stay on, in any case his appointments would not be continued beyond January.¹

The mention of conditions to be made roused Townshend's ire. "Our good friends at Stockholm may deceive themselves, if they think they have an opportunity now in their hands of making us swallow all they think fit to put upon us." Were, as was probable, one of the exceptions a refusal to guarantee possessions, that would be taken as a refusal to accede. "Such an attempt, were it admitted of, would destroy all we have done and drive the powers concerned to sea again"; it would, in fact, be starting a new treaty. He showed how on all sides the prospects of the allies of Vienna were bad. "You will see by the inclosed from Constantinople² that the Russian affairs on that side are in as bad a way as we can wish, and I can assure you neither pains nor any thing else shall be wanting to bring trouble upon them from all parts." The news might put the emperor on his guard at home. Ripperda was said to be recalled from Vienna; Spain to have anticipated her whole revenues for 1726 on military and naval preparations and remittances abroad. It was difficult to see of what use at the present juncture those powers could be to Russia, or the emperor to Sweden, in opposition to the allies of Hanover, whom Denmark would join whenever invited. Let Horn and the king of Sweden reflect seriously on this.³

In his next dispatch Poyntz recounted how Brancas had at last consented to join in communication of the treaty to Horn, with reservation only of the second and third separate articles. Poyntz had objected the ill grace of this, when they had already been printed in Holland and so were public property, and had confessed, besides, to having been obliged by his positive commands to make the whole known to Horn, acquainting him that Brancas only awaited orders to do the like and would anticipate them, if judged necessary. Horn, he wrote, preferred the procedure adopted as less formal, and had made "a very dexterous use" of it in the following manner.

In the first place he had acquainted the senate that he had received from Poyntz an authentic copy of the treaty, but must delay its formal communication pending arrival of orders expected by Brancas. He suggested that it should be read for collation with

¹ Poyntz, 27 October (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 39. Malmström (i. 463) tells us that a proposal by the Holsteiners to recall Baron Cedercreutz, the minister in ordinary, on the ground of the expense of keeping two at Petersburg at the same time, was turned against them by substituting Cederhielm, he to return in two or three months' time, if he could not show reason for staying on.

² Stanyan's dispatch of 3 October, cited elsewhere.

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 21 November, draft for ciphering, R.O. Sweden 39.

the copy received from Preis, the Swedish minister at the Hague, "for preventing all prejudices and mistakes, which was readily agreed to."

As soon as the treaty was read he told them he could with great truth assure them he did not as yet know for certain whether they should be invited to accede to it or not, though he must own by some hints he had had he believed the contracting powers would be *glad* Sweden should accede. This expression was received with a sneer by Count Welling and his party, who called out *to be sure, without doubt*; with more low pleasantry of that kind. This first brunt being over he told them that in all events it was of great importance to them to weigh and consider the treaty carefully, if it were only to furnish themselves with good arguments for rejecting it; that he therefore moved it might (being one of the *Negotia Majora*) be referred first to the Secret Committee and then to the Chancery, in order to the reporting their opinion of it to the Senate; from whose opinion, your Lordship will observe by the way, the Senate here as seldom dissents, as the House of Commons in England does from the resolutions of its grand and most solemn committees. He further moved that, if any doubt or objection upon the matter of the treaty had occurred to any senator in hearing it read, it might be propounded as a help and direction to the other two bodys in examining the treaty.¹

This, Poyntz goes on, embarrassed Vellingk and his friends, who tried to formulate objections and especially to the guarantee of rights and to the second and third separate articles. Part, however, of what Horn said, namely, "that he apprehended, if the accession ever came to be proposed, there would be room for obtaining explanations exceptions and additions, and for adapting the treaty more particularly to the circumstances of this country, in the same manner as he supposed would be practised in Holland, if that state should accede," in conjunction with hints received from elsewhere about subsidies in time of peace, made Poyntz "quite despair of seeing any good issue of this negotiation." He had laboured to convince Horn that no changes would be admitted, that the treaty must be accepted or refused as it stood, and that if it were not accepted before the meeting of parliament "our court will grow very indifferent about it, since in counter-alliances of this kind the first *éclat* and impression is all in all."²

The debate over,³ the "friends" desired formal invitation for

¹ Poyntz was sure of a majority in the chancery, and in the secret committee reckoned at the worst on an equality of votes, three to three. The senate, he said, might dissent but would think twice about doing so, in view of responsibility to a future diet.

² Poyntz, 30 October (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Poyntz gives a detailed account of what passed, but it is to be remembered that he was by no means correctly informed either on this head or of Horn's private managements, for instance his correspondence with Cederhielm in Russia, referred to by Campredon on 27 November (*Sbornik*, lxiv. 112). Cf. Malmström, i. 465-6. But it was by his reports that the British government had to be guided.

Sweden to accede to the treaty of Hanover and Poyntz begged that the necessary letters and full powers might be sent him as soon as possible. Yet, he said, it was plain that the affair would not be hurried, for one reason, that no Prussian minister had yet appeared. In view of the delays entailed by correspondence with England he asked also for full instructions in advance in regard to the objections likely to be made. On other matters he told how, though it had not been possible to refuse Count Tessin at Vienna full powers to conclude the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm, yet Horn had found means to delay their issue and "had again the whole senate on his side"; recounted a long discussion with Gyllenborg on Holstein policy; and retailed reports of growing dislike of the duke at Petersburg, of his desire to get away "out of the scrape," and of confusion and jealousies among his ministers.¹ He could say also now that Anthouard was recalled and that Brancas' reports home corresponded with his own.²

Receipt of this information brought request to Berlin for formal invitation to the Swedes to accede and full powers for the Prussian envoy designated, Baron von Bülow. Those for Poyntz, Ilgen was informed, had gone to England to be sealed, and those for Brancas, so Broglie assured, were on their way. It was hoped, said Townshend, that Bülow, knowledge of whose soon going gave much pleasure, would hasten his departure, and that besides his full powers he would have orders to act with Poyntz and Brancas in a manner to show that one soul and one heart animated the allies.³

Du Bourgay had expected Bülow to be leaving more than a month before "with a firm resolution of acting in perfect concert with M^r Poyntz," and thought that "no fitter person could have been named."⁴ The baron's departure had, however, been delayed

¹ For instance, the disgrace of Stambke and his return to Germany. "It would be worth any money to gain that man."

² Poyntz, 10 and 13 November (o.s.), *ibid.* One thing that he recommended was association of his Hanoverian colleague, Colonel Bassewitz, with himself and Brancas in their work, in view of Hanoverian interests therein and also to please him. It was answered that while the king was well persuaded of Bassewitz's merits it was thought better not to complicate the negotiation by bringing him into it. To Bassewitz himself it was explained that the king feared derogation to his status, were he to take part in the conferences but not sign the acts, a thing to be done only by the envoys of the parties to the treaty of Hanover. Had the king been minded to employ two ministers in the negotiation Bassewitz, of whose fidelity and experience he was entirely convinced, would doubtless have been appointed. Poyntz explained in reply that he had not wished Bassewitz to be empowered to join in the conferences, but only instructed to speak and act in favour of the accession, in order to remove jealousy of Hanover. He wanted like authority to be sent to the Dutch envoy, Rumpf. (Townshend to Poyntz and to Bassewitz, 18 December, Poyntz to Tilson, 15 December (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 39, 131.)

³ Townshend to Ilgen, 30 November, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253; a draft, Regencies 8.

⁴ Du Bourgay, 28 September, R.O. Regencies 7.

pending restoration of diplomatic relations between Prussia and Sweden, so long interrupted. That had at last been effected by Russian mediation, and Golovin had notified that a Prussian minister would be received at Stockholm.¹ Ilgen, therefore, could reply that his master was agreeably surprised by the news from that capital; that he had not hesitated a moment to draw up his letter of invitation, now enclosed and to be sent to Poyntz; that Bülow had already started on his journey; that full powers and instructions should follow him at once by a route arranged with Rottembourg; and that he was empowered to accept accession pure and simple, taking conditions, if any were put forward, *ad referendum*.²

Soon came news from Poyntz that Brancas agreed to join with him in formal communication of the treaty and in request for the appointment of commissioners to discuss the question of accession.³ Townshend returned the king's warm approval of all that had been done, but again resorted to warning of what would happen, were the accession not completed during the coming session of parliament; "it will not only lose extremely in its value, but will come too late for his Ma^{ty} to do any thing for Sweden." To enforce his arguments he dilated on the deceptiveness of Russian promises and the helplessness of the emperor, destitute both of money and ships. He enclosed the British and Prussian letters of invitation and the full powers for Poyntz, with notice that the French invitation would follow in due course. Bülow, he was assured, had full instructions to act in unison; young and well intentioned, he might be so influenced as "by his relations to carry his court further than perhaps they intend at present." Yet Horn must not be allowed to hold Great Britain and France responsible for anything that the court of Berlin might do. "The best way to secure Bulow and his master to the measures we are taking and to the interest of Sweden is to convince them that the Russian and Holstein faction have lost their weight and influence at Stockholm." Once so persuaded, the king of Prussia "would court Sweden as much as he has ever done Muscovy," for of the Swedes' bravery and valour he had a great opinion. As to the Swedish objections expected, if a guarantee of British and Dutch rights out of Europe were really a stumbling-block, then the guarantee might be limited to Europe,

¹ The same, 24 and 27 November, R.O. Prussia 19. Droysen (p. 395) says that Golovkin at Berlin recommended Bülow, and gives the dates of his instructions as 19 September and 4 December.

² Ilgen, 4 December, *ll.cc.* Du Bourgay reported dispatch of the documents by Rottembourg on 8 December.

³ Poyntz, 17 November (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 39. He had the pleasure now of notifying Anthouard's departure.

as always in former treaties with them; certainly they would never be required to send ships.

After which Townshend passed to a private conversation of Count Gyllenborg with Poyntz, about something being promised for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp.¹ He was of opinion that everything ought to be done to gain Gyllenborg, "or at least to break the edge of his opposition," and he gave Poyntz full liberty to talk to Horn and others in like manner. "I have often told you that the King has no animosity against the D. of Holstein any further than that he has fallen into schemes and designs destructive of his Ma^{ty}'s interests;" if he "changed his conduct intirely, his Ma^{ty} would be ready to do him any services consistent with his honour." But such a prospect was distant, for even Campredon now allowed that the duke "has given himself up to the Emperor, and laid aside all thoughts of being well with England or France, or their allies."²

Sending news of the appointment of Swedish commissioners to treat³ Poyntz indulged in a long discussion of "all the difficultys I have ever heard, or can possibly foresee will occur in this negotiation." The greatest stumbling-block he saw in the guarantee of territories outside Europe, but said that for the two separate articles a strong precedent had been found in the treaty of 1672 with France. Chiefly desired was delay, to see what might happen. "The best intentioned of the senate seek delays, and it must be our business to afford them as few handles as possible." There was "a last mine" to spring in a secret and little known instruction by the late diet to rely on England, if danger threatened from Russia.

Also Poyntz reported notification by Golovin of formal orders received by the imperial secretary at Petersburg to propose alliance with Russia and Sweden; proposals which would be communicated

¹ The conversation, Poyntz had said, had been held "under an oath of secrecy, but there was so much occasion for it, that I beg to know from your Lordship at the very first opportunity, whether his Majesty will think it proper to give hopes of the same kind to Count Horn and his friends, in favour of the duke, when the accession is perfected and when they shall be satisfied with the duke's conduct or get him out of the hands of Bassewitz and Muscovy. The court of Denmarke is at this time making private offers by Mr. Westphale, and whatever the duke gets by the interposition of Muscovy will only serve to strengthen the Holstein interest here."

² Townshend to Poyntz, 11 December, *ibid.* and Regencies 8 (draft).

³ Count Erik Sparre, "gained by his attachment to France and vanity at being placed at the head of this affair," Court-Chancellor von Düben, Councillor von Kochen, Secretary Baron Höpken, whom Poyntz had "hopes of softening," and Counts Banér and Ekeblad, these two "plain, honest men, but much the heaviest in the whole body. Banier uses to follow Count Horn blindly, but is as obstinate as a mule, whether in the right or wrong. Ekebladh's house and goods were destroyed by the Russians, and he is piqued against us for not sending our fleet in time to save them. But he has voted right hitherto, and we employed a friend to make him comprehend that he has now an opportunity to repair that loss."

at Stockholm when further advanced, the tsaritsa "being resolved to enter into no alliance without the participation of Sweden." The transparent intention, said Poyntz, had "caused a loud laugh in the senate," and the answer informed Golovin of the communication of the treaty of Hanover and of the sending of a copy of it to Cederhielm for the tsaritsa's benefit. As concerned the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm he notified an unanimous resolution of the chancery to order Cederhielm and Tessin immediately "to drop all further mention" of that affair in default of orders to the contrary; Tessin to conclude nothing in virtue of his full powers without further instructions.¹ To this there had been little opposition in the senate because, Poyntz believed, it was desired to refer the matter to a diet; and certainly, he said, "they will never more enter into engagements with the present government of Muscovy, nor consequently with the Emperor," unless the Russians should come upon their coasts next spring unopposed by England.²

Horatio Walpole, for his part, basing his views on the accounts of "my friend Gedda," held what was passing in the Swedish senate to be "a sufficient caution and cure against all the extravagant inventions and stories of the Holstein faction with regard to their power in Sweden." He thought Horn to be so strong, that there was nothing to fear, and the affair of the accession to promise well.³

First conferences with the Swedish commissioners took place on 7 and 18 December 1725. On their report the senate resolved unanimously on reference to the chancery, "a great point gain'd," Poyntz reckoned. His full account of the "long and warm debates," on 24 and 27 December, came to hand when George I was back in London. He narrated how, after reference to the chancery had been carried, the "friends" had been obliged to consent to representations on behalf of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and how Horn, consequently, had recommended instructions to the Swedish ministers at London and Paris to make cautious advances in the matter. Gyllenborg's opinion that Great Britain and France should be desired to specify satisfaction had been warmly opposed as "impracticable, if not unreasonable." In the end Lagerberg,

¹ Tessin's original instructions, of 22 September (o.s.) directed him to open no negotiation until an answer about the tsaritsa's requisition to invite the emperor's accession was received from Petersburg; if alliance with Sweden were proposed, to await further orders; and if a fresh invitation to accede to the treaty of Vienna were given, to find excuses (Malmström, i. 461).

² Poyntz, 23 November (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 39.

³ H. Walpole, 24 December, B.M. Add. MS. 32744. Gedda he could not sufficiently commend. And so, when soon afterwards complaints by Cederhielm against him were reported, Newcastle wrote that Poyntz would have strongest orders to defend him, whose "only crime is the having stuck to the true interests of his country" (to H. Walpole, 25 January (o.s.) 1726, *ibid.* 32745).

marshal of the last riksdag, had recalled certain secret orders left by it concerning the duke and friendship with the emperor, and it was agreed that search for these should be made. Three days having been so occupied, on the 27th Horn could only report the finding of "a general instruction for cultivating the friendship of the Emperor, but no ways applicable to the present conjuncture, since the same instruction likewise imported that they should cultivate the friendship of their other antient allies, and particularly of Great Britain, as the only power likely to support them against Muscovy." He had argued the altered circumstances, which could not be foreseen, —the massacre of Thorn, the treaties of Vienna and Hanover, and the rest; had pointed out that the riksdag had wisely left to the king and senate discretionary power; and had showed that, while there were strong instructions for employment of best offices in favour of the duke, there was nothing about resort to force or about specification of an equivalent, whether "as a preliminary of the duke's reconciliation or a *conditio sine qua non* of Sweden's entring into closer negotiations with Britain." To meet Gyllenborg's views to some extent he had advised "a last effort towards reconciling his Majesty and the Czarinna (tho' for several reasons he was of opinion it was more impracticable than ever)," and consented to orders to Cederhielm to discover "whether the Czarinna approved of their resuming this negotiation, and on what terms as an *ultimatum* she would enable them to proceed in it." Taube and others well disposed, not being informed of Horn's "secret managements with the other party," had been surprised at this, and had insisted on adherence to the opinion of the chancery, directions only to Sparre and Gedda "to touch this point of the duke's satisfaction in the tenderest manner"; but they had been out-voted, "which our adversaries will not fail to represent as a complete victory." Among the friends, however, all was "sett perfectly right again, and a thorough good understanding restored."¹ It could be said positively that nothing more was intended "than to make the court of Petersburg more slow and intractable with the Emperor" and to gain the moderate Holsteiners. "The point relating to the duke's satisfaction having ended in this manner, the others for refusing absolutely any new engagements with Muscovy or the Emperor, and for ordering Cederhielm to declare expressly that Sweden will never joyn in any violent measures for recovering Sleswick or an

¹ "What is the merriest part in this whole transaction is, that after this great victory was carried, Höpken, who was to prepare the instructions for Cederhielm, either through laziness or dexterity left it to his clerks, who, misled by the confusion of the protocol, drew them up conformably to the opinion. So that the anger of our friends is turn'd to great mirth."

equivalent, was carried without a division, on which I beg to wish your Lordship joy." There appeared to be every hope of the accession, "if the unaccountable conduct of the court of Prussia does not spoil all." Moreover Poyntz was able to report that Cederhielm, for all his importunity, was refused conduct of the negotiation for the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm, confided solely to Count Tessin at Vienna, and that credentials were actually sent to Baron Cedercreutz to replace him.¹

"Unaccountable conduct of the court of Prussia" had reference to the first doings of Bülow, just arrived. "Of a warmth and loquacity not to be governed," says Poyntz, he had already magnified a private quarrel into a public affront, and had written an account of it "which would have fired the K. of Prussia at once," had not Brancas got him to recall it from the post. Moreover, in spite of dissuasion, he had pressed for the immediate sending of a Swedish minister to Berlin, and had been twice to Golovin to solicit his assistance. Poyntz and Brancas had even been led to think of Great Britain and France concluding with Sweden separately.²

During January 1726 Horn stayed in the country. On his return to town Poyntz found him resolute against accepting a Russian subsidy and "warmer than ever for the accession," but praying for continuance of protection to himself, even should his plans miscarry, and saying that a British squadron in the Baltic would carry everything. Poyntz answered that parliament could not distinguish persons, however disposed, but "must consider the resolution of the senate as the voice of Sweden, and act accordingly." As helpful to the accession he cited advices from both Tessin and Preis that an article in the proposed Russo-Austrian treaty concerned the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's succession in Sweden, and as of yet greater service letters from Campredon to Brancas about Cederhielm having accepted great plans of the Holsteiners in a convention.³ To an inquiry by Bülow, whether there were any hope of the duke

¹ Poyntz, 31 December 1725 (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 42. He had also much to say on Cederhielm's investiture with the order of St. Andrew, with a diamond and gold cross, and of Catherine's extraordinary speech on the occasion, as also of Cederhielm's quarrels with Campredon and of the latter's revelations and accusations.

² Same dispatch.

³ The letters were of 3 and 8 January, and contradictory; Poyntz gives their contents at length and condemns dependence on Campredon's advices on Swedish affairs. "It will be very hard if after we have gott M^r Anthouard removed M^r de Campredon should be rely'd on for the present state of Sweden. I believe I am better informed of Cederhielm's instructions than he and know the utmost of his line. But it will be of the utmost importance that in obviating these suggestions care should be taken not to discover that I have seen Mons^r Campredon's letters, which would hurt Count Brancas and stopp the most usefull canal of intelligence I have."

obtaining the crown of Sweden in the life-time of their present Majesties, Horn had sent an answer "such as will make the duke's ears tingle." ¹

A week later there was news from Cederhielm of great Russian naval preparations: twenty ships or more of the line, thirty of the largest galleys, 24,000 men ordered to be ready to embark in April. Poyntz transmitted a moving appeal from Horn for a British squadron to protect Sweden and for the news of its equipment to be published at once. On the suggestion, now renewed, of giving Courland to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp he wrote: "Besides that Poland would hardly consent, I am satisfied that any thing obtained for the duke by interposition of Muscovy would at present destroy all our hopes here and give our enemys the ascendant entirely. If C. Horn should once suspect that his M^{ty} is making private offers to the duke, he will infallibly be beforehand and make his peace first at our expence." Townshend in answer stated positively that "forty stout ships" would be ready in a month's time and that a strong squadron should not only be reported to be fitted out for the Baltic, but should actually sail thither, as soon as the seas were open, to stay the whole summer. ²

By the next post Poyntz could report the senate's confirmation of the opinions of the chancery against acceptance of a Russian subsidy (previously mentioned as of 100,000 roubles for three years) and in favour of continuing the accession conferences. Reasons for the former decision, he said, were that "accepting subsidys in general created too great a dependence and a blind subjection to the powers offering them," that it was uncertain whether Cederhielm's "100,000 r." meant roubles or rixdollars, and that in any case the offer was "too inconsiderable and precarious." ³ The other opinion he described as filling a document of 27 sheets, setting out and answering all objections in full, giving "occasionally some slight hopes of improving this opportunity towards disposing his Ma^{ty} to get something done for the D. of Holstein," and concluding not with direct recommendation of accession " (this Count Horn dared not hasard till we have the addresses of the parl^t and the news of the Dutch accession) " but that the conferences should be continued and intimation given of inclination to enter into "closer measures with our courts, provided Sweden may find its advantage and security in them, which, joined with what goes before, is in effect declaring for the accession." Agreement had been carried

¹ Poyntz, 26 January (o.s.) 1726, very private, *ibid.*

² Poyntz, 2 February (o.s.), Townshend in reply, 22 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ For the debates on this matter and on Cederhielm's recall, Malmström, i.

in the senate by seven votes to four, without counting those of four absentees, two of whom had since declared assent. Although the accession would yet take much time, "our enemys understand very well that this stroke is decisive." Further Poyntz wrote of a formal Russian proposal to admit Prussia to the treaty of Stockholm, which had placed the "friends" in great difficulty but had been opposed by the Holstein party, probably because they feared a bad effect on the emperor's inclination to accede thereto.¹

Satisfaction in England was great. Newcastle was jubilant

upon the greatest turn that could happen, in the affairs of the north, in favour of the two crowns. Mo^r de Morville will now see not only how much M^r Poyntz's accounts of the situation of affairs in Sweden were to be depended upon, but how wisely things have been managed there and how right it was rather to apply ourselves to gain Sweden than to be amused by the negociation with Muscovy.²

Townshend, promising Poyntz a substantial increase of his emoluments,³ directed him to ascertain in what manner the fleet would be desired to act, when it came to the Baltic, in order that instructions to the admiral might be drawn up.

Sweden by their accession to our treaty will and must have the lead in the affairs of the north; the interest as well as the inclination of this country will make us always give them the preference in point of friendship. And the Czarina and her government have so far lost all credit in France, that if they see that Sweden begins to take courage and is resolved to act independently from Muscovy that court will return to their old maxims and replace their confidence in Sweden.

The tsaritsa, in her precarious position at home, would cease to care what became of Russia and devote her whole attention to her son-in-law's prospects, and unless he submitted to Swedish counsels he must lose all expectation of that crown. "So that it will now be in the power of Sweden, with the help of their allies, to influence the Czarina in all her measures, provided they have spirit and conduct." But helping the duke to recover Sleswick, or prematurely to any satisfaction for its loss, would be "putting arms into his hands for the reduction of Sweden and its libertys. It would be setting the north in a flame, weakening the hands of the allies to Sweden, and making the Muscovites once more masters in those parts."

¹ Poyntz, 9 February (o.s.), very private, R.O. Sweden 42. A fuller summary with his dispatch of 24 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

² To Robinson, 28 February (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

³ His Majesty having resolved, when parliament rose, "to free you from your companion in your office here and to give you the enjoyment of the entire place."

Should, however, the Holstein party prove too strong to be mastered, Townshend advocated bringing Sweden and Denmark together for their mutual defence, an alliance which might even lead to recovery of the provinces lost to Russia, "which ought ever to be their first point in view." Poyntz must talk on these matters with Horn in confidence, in order that the instructions mentioned might be prepared.¹

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 1 March (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 42. In his dispatch of 12 January (o.s.) he had written: "I can with great truth say that the Swedes cannot be more eagerly bent on regaining Livonia than his Majesty is to assist them in the doing it"; the means were the difficulty, not the end. The dispatches, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 200-5.

CHAPTER XI

THE PURCHASE OF HESSE-CASSEL

SEVERAL considerations recommended engagement of old landgrave Charles of Hesse-Cassel by the allies of Hanover. He was the neighbour in Germany of George I and Frederick William I, stood with them in the forefront of the protestant cause, and had store of good soldiers, who otherwise might be engaged by Austria. As grandfather of the young head of the house of Orange he had strong influence with that party in Holland, and Frederick I of Sweden was his son.

In September 1725 came to Hanover together his second son, Prince William, and his envoy to Sweden, Major-General Ernst Hartman Diemar. The latter, obnoxious to the Swedes for his fidelity to their king, had been expelled from Sweden long before but that his debts, incurred principally on Frederick's behalf, had assisted the resolution of that monarch and of the landgrave to keep him there. At length, after Poyntz had found him the funds for his journey, he had left Stockholm, with strong recommendations from the envoy, at the end of June.¹

Ostensibly his mission was political, and he carried elaborate instructions,² but the real purpose of his journey to Hanover was to obtain money for the sorely embarrassed king. He carried a

¹ Authorising the payment, £2,000, Townshend had admonished Poyntz not to let any of the money get into the king's hands and to be sure that Diemar was going before he paid anything (27 April (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Sweden 37).

Poyntz (4 November (o.s.) 1724) had stated Diemar's original offence to have been his writing to Campredon to propose a match between the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and a princess of the house of Hesse, a proposal communicated to Peter the Great and by him to the Swedish senate. To Tilson, when Diemar was leaving, he described him as "one of the best natured men I ever mett with, but more of a soldier than a minister. You will read his character in his open jovial countenance, and if L^d T. would make him completely happy, he must treat him with arrack-punch or bishop after dinner. Lett him have the making of it, and submitt to his rules in drinking it, which he has copied from the fundamental *leges bibendi* of the English fleet. He was prejudiced in my favour when I first came by thinking my name was *Punch*." They had emptied two bowls together that morning, while sitting up. (23 June (o.s.) 1725.)

² Of date 19 April (o.s.), copy with Poyntz's dispatch of 30 June (o.s.).

letter from Frederick to Townshend, setting forth the absolute necessity of a prompt aid to enable affairs to be carried on.¹ Arrived, he submitted a list of the "plus pressantes et plus criantes" of the king's debts, amounting to 112,594 crowns "banco," of which 24,356 had to be found at once and the remainder before the end of the year.² His presentment met with cold response. The king, Townshend wrote to the landgrave's chief minister, Baron Dalwigk, was truly touched and greatly inclined to help, but his civil list would not bear the expense and he must see what the landgrave would provide to sustain the honour and dignity of his son.³

Then a brilliant idea occurred. For Hessian troops subsidies might be obtained from parliament, and the king of Sweden's debts paid out of them. On 16 September Townshend sent to Paris proposals for a treaty. First, a guarantee of the landgrave's treaty with Saxony about the succession to the county of Hanau, and the promise of good offices in the affair of Rheinfels. (Noted, that the treaty named must first be seen.) Secondly, by a separate act he to provide a certain force, to be paid for by Great Britain and France on the Dutch scale, and to be employed wherever the case of the treaty might exact. (Noted, 8,000 foot and 2,000 horse.) Thirdly, a subsidy to set this force on foot. (Noted, £50,000.) Fourthly, the half thereof to be applied to meet the king of Sweden's pressing needs. (Noted, that this condition might be embodied in a separate and secret act.)

The scheme, Townshend explained to Horatio Walpole when sending it, was not suggested by the Hessians, "the thought arose from me, and I have made use of the presence of Prince William and of General Diemar to dress it up in this form, and to engage them to undertake to bring in the landgrave." None of the money would go to him; one half would be used for the king of Sweden's debts, the other remain in the hands of Poyntz and Brancas. Great Britain and France must either support that king, or let him sink, and to prevent that the landgrave's money might as well be used. Since his Majesty had already expended £12,000 in Sweden, while the moneys for which Brancas had credit remained untouched, it would be proper for him to find £6,500 towards the first £25,000, which he would do at once, France paying the balance of £18,500 by the end of the year.

¹ 19 June (o.s.), R.O. Royal Letters 56.

² List sent to H. Walpole on 16 September, R.O. Regencies 7. At 4s. 6d. to the "écu banco," as estimated by Carteret in 1720, the sum would equal about £25,000. There were, besides, 12,000 crowns owing to Diemar himself, for which he was content to await repayment.

³ Townshend to Dalwigk, 12 September, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 248.

His Ma^{ty} hopes your Ex^{cy} will not fail of success in bringing France into this important affair. The King will never consent to it unless France comes in to bear a full proportion as well with regard to what he has been obliged to expend this year and as to the fifty thousand pounds now proposed, neither is there any reason he should. The French have already a credit at Stockholm, which may be made use of towards paying eighteen thousand five hundred pounds to be paid by them in the latter end of December, and it will be time enough next spring to remit a credit for their share of the remaining twenty five thousand pounds, part of the fifty thousand, which is to remain in our minister's hand for the support of our interest in Sweden. I beg of you once more to use your utmost endeavours to bring this scheme to bear, and that orders may be sent accordingly to Count Broglie, and let me hear from you as soon as possible. You will easily conceive that this whole transaction ought to be kept very secret, and if the landgrave does accede to our treaty nothing must appear to the publick but his bare accession, with the number of troops and the money we are to give him to make the levies.¹

At Paris, where a copy of the plan had been received from Broglie, it was objected that the treaty with Saxony must first be seen, that the landgrave could not raise the 10,000 men proposed unless he had the money for himself, that it ought to be applied to purposes of greater advantage in Sweden than payment of the king's debts, and that it did not appear whether the proposal would be agreeable to Count Horn, whose sentiments ought to be ascertained. Morville thought, however, that the plan "might do in the main" and observed that of the money to be paid that year more than 200,000 livres were already in Brancas' hands. Fleury also made strong objections, but in the end Walpole reported him to seem "entirely convinced . . . of the necessity to support the king of Sweden and our friends there," and flattered himself on obtaining the sum demanded, if not so soon as could be wished, yet sooner than at first he had expected, "especially if Count Horn should give his opinion for it, without which I apprehend they will be backward in parting with their money." Broglie, he said, would be reprimanded for having gone so far in the matter, and it was suggested that the whole scheme might be only a device of Diemar to get his own advances back; yet if Brancas' reports agreed with those of Poyntz, and if Horn approved the payment of the debts, the affair would probably go through.²

On receipt of this Townshend wrote to Poyntz:

My public dispatch brings you the plan of the landgrave's accession, with the general orders for communicating it to Count Horn; my letter to Mr Walpole, and the other papers that accompany this to you, will explain

¹ Townshend to H. Walpole, 16 September, private, R.O. Regencies 7.

² H. Walpole, 21 and 24 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

the whole matter. A main point to be look'd after in this affair is the settling C. Brancas right in his notions and making him send advices accordingly to his court. . . . I can't but think that C. Horn will have a fine game to play, if he will take courage and joyn heartily with his Ma^{ty} upon this occasion by exhorting the landgrave to accede to our treaty.¹

Meanwhile Diemar had gone on from Hanover to Cassel, to be followed thither shortly by Baron Sparre, envoy to George I from Sweden.² The latter reported the landgrave "fully inclin'd, and even resolv'd," to come into the scheme, but desirous first of ascertaining Swedish views. If anything were known of them, he asked, might it be communicated to himself by express? Townshend replied with expressions of pleasure at the landgrave's inclination to accede and to accept the plan proposed, but said that there was no fresh news from Sweden and he did not see why it should be waited for. Even were the Holstein party strong enough to prevent the accession of Sweden, that of the landgrave must be for his son's advantage. Nay, Holstein superiority should rather be a reason for his accepting the present plan, by which alone the king of Sweden could be helped. In answer Sparre doubted not but that tolerably good news from Sweden would bring success before he left.³

Writing home, however, Townshend, while terming Sparre's first letter "very comfortable," had to observe that the landgrave did not seem so forward as Prince William and Diemar had represented. Shortly he sent word of bills for £6,500 given to Sparre to send to Diemar, and transmitted the baron's good account on his return to Hanover. The landgrave, it appeared, had "honestly opened his reasons" for not acceding to the treaty of Hanover at present, but had "heartily pressed" his son, the king of Sweden, to accede and was only awaiting the reply to do so himself; and the king would by no means risk losing the accession of Sweden for so small a sum. Descanting further on the subject, Townshend desired that Sir Robert Walpole should be asked to make the necessary provisions, not doubting that he would agree.⁴

On 24 October Horatio Walpole reported encouraging talk with Fleury, but found Morville still reluctant about paying the king of Sweden's debts; "I know he is very cautious and backward in pressing M^r le Duc on any thing that is not agreeable to him, especially with regard to money." He decided, therefore, to assail

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 2 and 3 October, R.O. Sweden 38, very private.

² Diemar reached Cassel on 16 September, Sparre left Hanover on the 25th.

³ Sparre, 1 and 4 October, Townshend to him, 2 October, R.O. Foreign Ministers 63.

⁴ Townshend to Newcastle, 4 and 9 October, R.O. Regencies 7. Diemar's acknowledgment of the bills of exchange, 10 October, Foreign Ministers 15.

Bourbon himself with arguments about the landgrave's influence in Sweden and Holland and the absolute necessity of "engaging as many princes of the Empire, as we can, whether little or great," in order to safeguard Hanover and Prussia against the Russo-Austrian combination. He noted the reputation of the court of Berlin "of being more inconstant and liable to fear, on account of the great extent of their frontiers lying open and exposed," and in the end obtained from the duke a statement that in spite of the present extraordinary expenses he would concur in everything that the king of England thought useful and necessary. "This I look upon from his Highness to amount to a promise, for altho' he is very slow in his resolutions, yet he is very steady to his word, when once given." He hoped, therefore, that the proposal would be carried in the Council, Fleury, Morville, and even Villars having promised support.¹

Nevertheless, although Walpole, three weeks later, found Morville and Fleury convinced of the necessity of, and Pecquet zealous for the payment, Fleury even assuring him that the Council had resolved upon it, the French money was not forthcoming.²

At the beginning of December Diemar brought a letter from Dalwigg stating that the general would tell with how much money the landgrave had just lately helped his son; he could not afford more and hoped that the king of England would enable him to be useful to the common cause. Complimenting Townshend on the great work carried through, a stroke worthy of the great minister he was, Dalwigg said that his master could not dissociate himself from the interests of the protestant powers and in particular from those of the king of England, although certain obstacles, which Diemar would report, obliged him to wait a time before acceding to the treaty of Hanover.³

Townshend replied suitably, but stated that the money wanted must come from parliament and would be granted only in return for the landgrave's accession. No subsidies in time of peace, for that the British constitution did not allow. Nor could anything be done in France unless the landgrave gave either written assurance of accession within a fixed time, say six months or sooner, or else a declaration such as drafted and enclosed, namely, that although he was prevented from acceding at present, he was ready to conclude a preliminary convention with Great Britain and France, obliging him to take no step contrary to the treaty of Hanover, to enter into no engagement or measure without their approbation, and to hold ready on demand 50,000 men on the conditions specified;

¹ H. Walpole, 24 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

² The same, 16 November.

³ Dalwigg to Townshend, 1 December, R.O. Foreign Ministers 15.

the two crowns, on their part, engaging so to act that justice should be done him in the matter of Hanau and to employ good offices concerning Rheinfels.¹ The landgrave, however, as it appeared later, demanded in return for his accession guarantees of a much more extended character.

The fact was that he had another string to his bow. General Seckendorf came to Hanover and Cassel about this time ostensibly to solicit the consent of George I and of the landgrave to his appointment as a master of the ordnance of the empire (Reichs-Feldzeugmeister). What he learnt at Hanover about the aims and intentions of the allies and other matters is noticed elsewhere. At Cassel he received a hearty welcome. The landgrave declared complete and long-established confidence in him, but at the same time complained that no regard was paid at Vienna to his fidelity to the empire and his patriotic zeal; in particular, that his late offer in conjunction with his cousin of Darmstadt of 10,000 good troops for the emperor's service had received no answer, not even thanks. Yet he had so far refused the great offers that England and France were making him in return for his accession to the treaty of Hanover, nor would he ever easily be moved to join in anything of danger to the Holy Roman Empire and his fatherland. Dalwigk spoke similarly, stating the offer of troops to have been made because of the proposals from the other side and the landgrave's inability to go on longer without money, whether for his own support or for that of the king of Sweden. He might, said Dalwigk, have accepted the Anglo-French proposals, but for the secret article of the treaty of Hanover which guaranteed to the parties their possessions present and future, and so too nearly affected the interests of the young prince of Orange.² Even should the two powers effect an accommodation between the king of Prussia and the house of Nassau in regard to the Orange inheritance, yet he would not be persuaded to undertake anything prejudicial to the empire.

Having extracted from Diemar full particulars of the offers made by England and France Seckendorf could give assurance that the landgrave showed not the slightest inclination to accede to the treaty of Hanover, and could almost believe that, if other but tolerable conditions were proposed and he could handle the 200,000 thalers so urgently necessary for the king of Sweden, he would not only not accede but perhaps, if desired, enter into much closer

¹ Townshend in reply, 5 December, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 248, Regencies 8 (draft).

² There was no such secret article, only the general guarantee of the second article. Orange jealousy of Prussia on the ground named was, as we shall see, one of the chief impediments to the negotiations going on in Holland.

relations with the imperial court and its allies ; this because he observed particular coldness towards Hanover, whose neighbourhood produced various vexations and disputes. Travelling back to Hanover with Diemar, whom he found very friendly and a good imperialist at heart, Seckendorf learnt further from him that, if an agreement could be effected with Prussia on the Orange succession question, the landgrave at last, and in default of other expedient, would through his want of money be attached by England and then interest himself to bring other protestant princes into the alliance of Hanover, his only scruple being about taking the first step.¹

It was a question, then, of who should buy the landgrave, and George I was able to effect the purchase. Officially, when the court was leaving Hanover for England, Diemar wrote that his master could not undertake to hold ready the troops required without a guarantee of the security of all his dominions in addition to the assistance required in respect of Hanau and Rheinfels. Privately he expressed hope of bringing the landgrave round, could some declaration or assurance about the guarantees be given. He undertook to do all he could to obtain leave to follow Townshend.² The latter answered that the declaration as amended at Cassel was so different from what had been proposed at Hanover that he had no authority to write as Diemar wished ; difficulties also were greatly increased by the demand for inclusion of the guarantees required in the proposed declaration instead of leaving it for the act of accession. He had devised the expedient of the declaration, pending the accession, only because the landgrave wanted time and the affair of the money pressed. But if it, intended to be a simple act, were to be charged with the conditions specified, the old embarrassments would recur and he did not see how to get out of them. It would be useless to consult France on the changes proposed. Engagements about Hanau and Rheinfels could be undertaken only in return for the landgrave's accession.³

In the end, just before George I sailed from Helvoetsluys, Diemar signed there two declarations, without positive orders from his court, he stated, but knowing his master's sentiments and desire

¹ Seckendorf to Prince Eugene, 17 December, Förster, *Friedrich Wilhelm I*, Urkundenbuch ii. 53-56. He found the landgrave much aged and enfeebled in mind and body and no longer able to connect things properly. Insisting still on discussing and deciding important matters himself he employed the services of his secretary Riess exclusively, distrusting his other ministers, so that perhaps, Seckendorf thought, the thing to do was to gain that man. If the landgrave died, his son would certainly join England and France, who would spare no money to engage him.

² Diemar to Townshend, 28 December, R.O. Foreign Ministers 15, the private letter holograph.

³ Townshend from the Hague in reply, 3 January 1726, *ibid.* and Foreign Entry Book 248, Regencies 8 (draft).

for close bonds of amity. The first obliged the landgrave to hold ready for service wherever the allies of Hanover should require 8,000 foot and 4,000 horse. But since to complete this force he must raise 3,000 foot and more than 2,000 horse, as well as find remounts for his existing cavalry, and would have to maintain the whole for two years at his own expense, he promised himself that the king of England would furnish £125,000, £75,000 to be paid on signature of the present declaration and the remainder in February 1727, unless the troops were wanted by him before that time, in which case the balance should be paid at least two months before the troops would have to march. When they entered the king of England's service they were to be under his orders and maintained as regulated by the London convention of February 1702. Undertaking to be given to support the landgrave properly, were he attacked in consequence of these engagements. By the second declaration, in view of the kind undertaking of the kings of England and France to find £50,000 to meet the king of Sweden's private debts, the landgrave consented that out of the £75,000 abovesaid the king of England should retain £25,000 for that purpose, using, it was hoped, his good offices with the king of France to provide the like sum, it being solely on this consideration, and on the willingness of the two kings to assist the king of Sweden, that the landgrave was supplying so considerable a body of troops at so cheap a rate.¹

The declarations signed, to disabuse the minds of George I and his ministers of certain insinuations that the landgrave only desired to amuse and gain time, Prince William of Hesse sent most positive assurances of his father's intention to accede to the treaty of Hanover as soon as Sweden and Holland should have done so. The conditions of the accession, he said, would be those that he had had the honour to propose at Hanover: a guarantee against all insult, for instance in the case of the succession to Hanau, good offices and help towards placing a Hessian garrison in Rheinfels, and exception of the interests of the house of Orange from guarantees given to the king of Prussia. The landgrave sent Diemar a rescript to similar effect.²

¹ Copies, 12 January, and the landgrave's ratifications of 25 January (originals), R.O. Treaties 255.

² Prince William to Townshend, 14 January, R.O. Royal Letters 19 (original), King's Letters 19 (copy); Diemar to Townshend, 22 January, Foreign Ministers 15. The insinuations mentioned came from Count Flodroff (or Flodrop), formerly in the Saxon service but now in that of the landgrave and specially attached to the court of Friesland. He had come to Hanover from Cassel in August (having waited till the king of Prussia should be gone) on business concerning the young prince of Orange being named stadtholder in Holland and married to the English princess Anne (information from Wallenrodt and rescripts to him in answer, August and September 1725, Staatsarchiv, Berlin).

As to the French money, Diemar prayed Townshend to take care for its payment without delay, if not the whole, then to the banker Bruguier at Hamburg at least so much, 40,000 to 50,000 crowns, as would acquit the letter of exchange expired in December, for otherwise the king of Sweden's credit and his own reputation would be gravely imperilled.¹ Soon afterwards the landgrave appealed to George I personally for means to equip his troops at once.² A month later 100,000 livres were paid by Brancas to the king of Sweden for his private use out of £16,000 that he had for employment as required.³

The second declaration was, of course, kept private, and ratification of the other by George I, Townshend explained, was found to be incompatible with customary forms. In the end it was changed into a regular convention for the hire of 12,000 Hessians, signed on 12 March (o.s.) 1726.⁴ Townshend hoped, he said, to lay it before parliament in a fortnight's time; the sooner the landgrave's ratification was received the sooner he could touch the money.⁵ The landgrave ratified under date 8 April.⁶

¹ Diemar to Townshend, 17 January, R.O. Foreign Ministers 15.

² Letter of 26 January, R.O. Royal Letters 19, the German original and a French translation. A rescript to Diemar of the same date (*ibid.*) denied further insinuations by Flodroff that the prince of Orange was to marry a Prussian princess; the landgrave promised to consult his daughter, the prince's mother, how to put a stop to such injurious reports and sent thanks to George I for his warning and for his continued protection of the young prince.

³ Robinson, 1 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32745, Poyntz, 16 February (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 42. Poyntz made the sum 10,000 pistoles and remarked that the French court seemed to be "trying even to get the start of us in supporting Sweden."

⁴ Printed by Rousset, iii. 322.

⁵ Townshend on 15 March (o.s.) to Dalwigk, R.O. Foreign Ministers 15, Foreign Entry Book 248, and to Prince William similarly, Royal Letters 19, King's Letters 19.

⁶ His original ratification, with an English translation of the convention, R.O. Treaties 256.

CHAPTER XII

BAVARIA. THE ELECTOR PALATINE. SAVOY.

MAXIMILIAN EMANUEL of Bavaria was moved by his son's report from Fontainebleau to high elation. He deduced renewal of his lapsed treaty with France with its agreeable subsidies. There was no reticence about terms with him ; cash, for he was over head and ears in debt, and support to Bavarian claims to the imperial crown and the Austrian succession. In a very private reply he descanted on the menace of the Vienna alliance to Germany and to his own house in particular, whose claims on the Habsburg succession ranked prior to any. Adverting to the upset of his lifelong ambitions by the catastrophe of Blenheim, the result only of mistakes, although England and Holland had then fought on the emperor's side, he pointed out the difference now, when those powerful electors, the kings of England and Prussia, had discovered, according to Saint-Saphorin's authorised discourse, that the balance of power in Europe could be maintained only by setting the house of Bavaria in the place of that of Austria, should the latter fail. Such an advantage, sent by God, he said, ought to be pursued. But cautiously to begin with, and first by a separate treaty with France, as offered, drawn on the lines of that of 1714 and according liberty to accede to that of Hanover at a proper time. A principal condition would be subsidies, or at least a round sum to pay off debts. It would be essential to show that, as soon as the court of Spain came to know that he would not fall in with the emperor's wishes, he would forfeit the million crowns and the dowry monies owed him thence.¹ Since

¹ The chief dowry claim was in respect of Maximilian's first wife, Maria Antonia, only daughter of the emperor Leopold I and Margaret Theresa of Spain. She and her only son, Joseph Ferdinand, being long since dead, the claim naturally was disputed. A minor one was in respect of Maximilian's sister, Violante Beatrix, grandduchess of Tuscany. Cf. Riezler, viii. 391-2. The million crowns, Stanhope explains in a dispatch of 28 February 1726 (R.O. Spain 94), were claimed on account of the 100,000 a year granted to the elector in 1713 in compensation for his not getting Flanders. He had seen peremptory orders to the Bavarian resident, Romet, whom he had gained by payment of the half of a sum of 5,000 pistoles engaged to him by a cedula of 1724 on the South Sea Company, to demand the payments, and gives the reasons for refusal. Romet he had persuaded to write "in the plainest and strongest manner" of the insincerity of the Spanish court, himself reading the dispatch and seeing it sealed in his presence.

the money would be used to satisfy creditors in France, it would not leave that country. The subsidies must be paid regularly, for if faith were not kept on that essential point the rest could not be relied upon. A further argument would be that, in spite of remonstrances from his Estates, he had continued to keep on foot the troops stipulated in his treaty with Louis XIV at a cost of a million crowns a year.

The brother electors Palatine and of Treves, his kinsmen, Maximilian deemed it dangerous to approach about the treaty of Hanover, for both they and their ministers were too subservient to Austria to keep the secret. It would, however, be well if the king of France would endeavour to engage them independently. As to the king of Poland, his envoy, Count Wackerbarth, had notified invitation to him to accede to that of Vienna, but he also had a flea in his ear about Don Carlos, and to attach him would gain another powerful elector.

Charles Albert had done right, Maximilian proceeded, to confide in his brother of Cologne, but nothing must be imparted to that elector's ministers, nor must he know anything about the proposed treaty with France; nothing more than that liberty would be reserved to him to accede to that of Hanover jointly with his father. For he did not want subsidies, the chief object of the French treaty, his war-establishment being sufficiently provided for.

As to negotiating the treaty, Count D'Albert knew all about the previous one, had a copy of it, and was accredited as envoy to Louis XV chiefly to renew it. Besides, he was cognisant of the change of attitude towards the elector Palatine and would suspect something from it. So that he could not well be passed over. He should be informed and instructed how to behave in both affairs; of his zeal fidelity and reticence there was no doubt and he seemed to be well with the French court. Conclusion, however, had better be left to Charles Albert himself, and what a consolation, said Maximilian, to have so talented a son and heir to whom to confide the happiness, he might say the destiny of his descendants and his dominions! He could sign with the duke of Bourbon; no other would suit his rank. That nothing might be wanting, in case plenipotentiaries had to be employed, blank full powers were enclosed in which the prince could insert the name of whomsoever he thought fit.¹

Charles Albert recounted the results of his consequent work succinctly in a reply of 21 October.² Bourbon, he said, seemed

¹ Letter of date 6 October, printed in full by Heigel, *Quellen und Abhandlungen* (1884), pp. 262 f.

² Heigel, (1890), pp. 290 f., under date 31 October, not the only misprint in these volumes. Charles Albert left it to D'Albert to send a full account, which, Maximilian complained in his answer, had not been forthcoming.

well content, excepting with what referred to the elector Palatine, with whom he thought the king of Prussia not likely to agree and in whom he himself had not the slightest confidence. Morville, however, had objected to a private separate treaty, in view of the article of the treaty of Hanover which obliged the consent of all the parties. Walpole had discoursed with Preysing on the advantages of accession thereto, and appeared to be informed of Maximilian's two principal aims. He had explained why British subsidies could not be granted in time of peace and had objected to engagements of which the emperor would be entitled to complain. At several other interviews held by the ministers named with himself (Charles Albert) and with D'Albert Preysing and Plettenberg ¹ they had insisted always on accession to the treaty of Hanover, to which he was not empowered to consent. Finally, on the eve of his departure, Bourbon, with best assurances, had stated the prime consideration to be action in union with Great Britain. D'Albert was left to work for separate articles to be taken *ad referendum* and embodying conditions, this largely to gain time. For the affair must be well digested, not hurried.

Horatio Walpole reported decision to await discovery of Maximilian's real intentions, since the discourses of the prince and D'Albert seemed to show him determined "to do nothing but in concert and confidence with the Electors of Palatin and Treves, in order to keep their families united." He had acquainted Morville with the entire agreement of George I about refusing immediate subsidies and positive engagements in regard to Maximilian's imperial and other pretensions, and at the same time had insinuated his Majesty's discountenance of a separate treaty. In later discussions with the Bavarian ministers he heard required a separate treaty, subsidies in time of peace, security about the imperial succession, and renewal of the expired treaty with France, to which his Majesty might accede and it be kept secret; and when assured that the elector Palatine neither had acceded nor would accede to the treaty of Vienna, nor take any step without Bavarian concurrence, was confirmed in his belief that the two electors were closely united. Indeed D'Albert, he says, "owned that there was a strict and inseparable union between the four Electors of Bavaria, Cologne, Palatin and Treves made about eight months since."

Townshend supposed Maximilian to profess attachment to the other electors only in order to avoid angering the court of Vienna,

¹ The elector of Cologne's minister, who, says Charles Albert, "sert en cette affaire avec autant de zèle et peut-être plus de vivacité qu'aucun." He explains how he had been under indispensable necessity of bringing him in on his master's account.

for particular friendship with them could not alone account for his reserve towards Great Britain and France, especially in view of the frankness of his conversations with Saint-Saphorin. Perhaps this was a softer way of putting the negotiation off, when he saw that he could not have the assurances he wanted. "It would have been a great madness to open ourselves further towards him"; the negotiation must be protracted until he should "come to act separately." Subsidies could be allowed only in case of a war.¹

Prussian views were in accord. On communication of much of Walpole's advices to Berlin Ilgen replied that his prudent handling of the affair was much approved, for it would be extremely dangerous to take engagements with the elector of Bavaria, if he would not separate himself from the others.²

Further negotiation was remitted to Saint-Saphorin, soon to pass Munich again on his way back to Vienna. Townshend instructed him that the elector had changed his sentiments and had disclosed views incompatible with those of his Majesty. It all came to a resolution of the other three not to separate themselves from the elector Palatine, a pretext to him of Bavaria for gently declining accession. Saint-Saphorin would be able so to turn him about as to discover his real intentions, and what line he would adopt apart from accession. Even in default of that his support to the treaties of Westphalia, and action at Ratisbon on behalf of German liberties, which it was his interest to maintain religiously, might be secured.³

Maximilian was profoundly disappointed. It seemed, he told his son, as though the object of the French proposals had been merely to discover his intentions and impart them to the British court. Subsidies, it appeared, the two powers were in agreement to refuse. Renewal of his French treaty would have furnished a base for the great aims of his house and obliged him to nothing more than to maintain the troops he had on foot already and to make no engagements with other powers without intimation. There was nothing to do now but to await the result of D'Albert's endeavours in accordance with the thoroughly correct instructions given him. In the remainder of the letter Maximilian descanted on his well-established claims and other matters of his own concern.⁴

Saint-Saphorin, after a slow and painful journey protracted by

¹ H. Walpole, 6 and 17 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32744, Townshend to him, 19 October, R.O. Regencies 7. Presumably the compact of the four electors was their "Hausunionstraktat" of 15 May 1724 (Rosenlehner, p. 53).

² Ilgen to Townshend, 23 October, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253.

³ Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 31 October, R.O. Germany, Empire, 56.

⁴ 29 October, printed by Heigel (1884), pp. 259" f.

continual illness, reached Munich on 28 November, to be told that he had been expected with impatience. In reply to insistence on positive engagements; about the imperial succession he represented that Great Britain and France, after considering all pretenders, could look to none but a prince of Bavaria, provided that they were assured of his attachment to themselves, and on this head claimed to have convinced, and about subsidies argued that the object of the treaty of Hanover being purely to maintain peace, princes would be better secured by acceding to it, without any augmentation of troops, than by a very considerable army otherwise. Great Britain would not grant subsidies in time of peace, nor ever but in case of urgent necessity. On this point he had found Maximilian "*d'une sensibilité extraordinaire*," he said, insisting that he could venture nothing without subsidies, that if he had but a small number of troops he was maintaining officers for 30,000, and that his funds were completely exhausted by the late war, by marrying the electoral prince, and by obtaining benefices for his younger sons. By acceding to the treaty of Hanover he would incur the resentment of the emperor, already hostile, but were he helped would soon place himself in a position to be respected. He maintained his point in spite of all that Saint-Saphorin could say, desiring nevertheless his counsel as a trusted friend and referring him at the last to the electoral prince, who must soon succeed him. He could say that neither the elector Palatine nor the king of Poland had yet acceded to the treaty of Vienna and that the former, so he wrote, would not, without previous concert.

On the return of Charles Albert to Munich Saint-Saphorin had like and equally long discourse with him. He offered at the end, and the prince approved, a separate agreement ("*revers*") with the kings of England and France, in case of accession to the treaty of Hanover pure and simple. Next day Preysing showed him, as a mark of confidence, the emperor's invitation to accede to the treaty of Vienna, which Saint-Saphorin remarked to be "*plus impérieuse qu'obligeante*." At further interviews, alternating with delays on various excuses, the same arguments were advanced and answered and always immediate subsidies, whether from Great Britain or France, insisted on from the Bavarian side. Saint-Saphorin's final conclusion was that the elector would like to ally himself with Great Britain and France, but dared not; that if greatly embarrassed he was thoroughly sincere in friendship towards them and hostile to the court of Vienna; and that he seemed extremely piqued with the elector Palatine on account of a letter from him just received intimating desire to accede to the treaty of Vienna. The point of subsidies appeared to be the only essential

difficulty, and there was danger, since his finances were in so great disorder, of his being bought by Spain. And so Saint-Saphorin wrote as strongly as he dared in favour of subsidies.¹

This dispatch was so framed that it could be shown at Paris.² Morville admitted the importance of anticipating the emperor in winning Bavaria and discussed what the conditions of the proposed "réversalle" (to use his word) were likely to be. He took for granted subsidies in time of peace, exceptions from the treaty of Hanover, and some particular advantage. On the first he suggested delicately that George I might be brought in the end "*sacrifier à toute extrémité quelques légers subsides de paix,*" in order not to lose so happy an opportunity of strengthening the alliance of Hanover; payment of the arrears under the elector's expired treaty with France would hardly meet his views, even were the debt acknowledged, and it would readily be understood that the king of France could not do so much alone as he would if helped a little by his allies in a cause so absolutely common. Exceptions from the treaty of Hanover would probably relate to military succour and the affair of Thorn. As it would certainly be difficult for the elector to raise the troops required at his own cost, as Saint-Saphorin admitted, it might suit to allow him to furnish them "*moyennant ce que l'on conviendrait dans le tems de luy donner pour subsides de guerre.*" About Thorn it should be possible to devise some suitable modification. Although difficulty about the guarantee of dominions and rights under the second article was not expected, it would be well to consider what might be allowed on this point, as also on others which might raise discussion. As to particular advantages, it was evident that the king of England, as a prince of the empire, would object to express engagements about the imperial succession, but perhaps some encouraging "*ménagements convenables*" might be contrived, for instance, an undertaking to oppose in concert any election not agreeable to the contracting parties. That would not only flatter the elector but would suit the policy of the two kings against Austria.

Treating then of the conduct of the negotiation Morville balanced the advantage of Saint-Saphorin's capacity and knowledge of the elector's sentiments against the difficulty of concealing it from the imperial ministers, were it conducted at Vienna. Noting, however, in a postscript, that Count d'Albert at Paris, having asked so much, might be expected to raise difficulties about accepting less, he concluded in favour of employing Richelieu, acting in close concert

¹ Saint-Saphorin from Munich, 17 December, 61 pages, R.O. Germany, Empire, 56.

² A second, for eyes at Hanover, discussed the politics of the empire and gave assurance that the elector's ministers at Ratisbon would act impartially in matters of religion. A third discussed Swiss, and a fourth the writer's private affairs.

with Saint-Saphorin and warned to avoid anything that might excite the least suspicion.¹

Saint-Saphorin, ordered urgently to return to Vienna and continue his negotiation thence, was back at his post on Christmas Day.² On 12 January 1726 he sent another long account of his experiences. The question "an," he said, was settled; the affair would go through if certain "douceurs" were accorded; and the accession would overthrow all the emperor's projects at a blow. He enclosed copies of a letter from Count Törring to Baron von Mörmann, the Bavarian representative at Vienna, and of the elector's answer to the emperor, both entirely conformable to what had been concerted with himself, and recommended conduct of the negotiation by himself and conclusion at Paris. And since Richelieu (whose equivocal converse with the Austrian ministers and Ripperda, to be noticed later, he had previously detailed) seemed "*rentrer de plus en plus dans le bon chemin*," he preferred to affirm him in his altered conduct by associating him in the work.³

Townshend in reply lauded Saint-Saphorin's prudence ability and address and stated that the king would confide the negotiation to none other but him. He had done very well in leading the elector to consent to simple accession to the treaty of Hanover instead of a particular treaty, and there was nothing to add to his reasonings. A separate treaty could not long be kept secret, and what "*bruit et fracas*" would be raised in the empire, what an opportunity be given to the emperor to raise the Germanic Body against his Majesty, were it known that he and the king of France pretended to make dispositions concerning the imperial crown or the Austrian dominions! Accession would guard the elector's rights just as well without exciting umbrage or jealousy. The "*revers*" suggested was an expedient convenient enough to make clear what the elector might wish to have explained at the time that he acceded, but his Majesty could not express opinion on its suitability without knowing what he might want inserted in it. Subsidies in time of peace must absolutely be refused, for the constitutions of Great Britain forbade.⁴ In case of war they might be found in equal ratio with France, yet the name alone of so powerful an alliance ought to be sufficient to guarantee the elector against all assault. The elector of Cologne the king would be pleased to admit to it, having a great

¹ Morville to H. Walpole in London, 6 January 1726, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5.

² His recredentials, with a letter from Maximilian to George I full of assurances on his own and on his son's behalf, both of date 16 December 1725, R.O. Royal Letters 14, King's Letters 19.

³ Saint-Saphorin to Townshend, 12 January 1726, 112 pages, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57.

⁴ Here Townshend sets out the reasons for this in full.

esteem for him. As soon as Richelieu received his instructions Saint-Saphorin must set to work to bring the affair to a conclusion in accordance with the above ideas.¹

Testimony to Maximilian's urgent need of money was given by John Law, who, at last permitted to pursue his journey, reached Munich on 2 January 1726. The elector, though seriously ill, sent for him immediately on his arrival, thanked him for his services in former times in obtaining advances of French money, and pressed for a loan from himself, at heavy interest, out of the millions of francs which he was supposed to have carried with him out of France. Law wrote to Sir Robert Walpole recommending a loan, on the plea of cementing friendship with a prince who could raise an army of 15,000 men, with plenty of good officers, whose country was well populated and his subjects fond of war, and who would carry with him the electors Palatine and of Treves and so secure peace in the empire and throughout Europe.² Needless to say that he was not thanked for his proposal.

Form was now given to the negotiation in three draft documents sent from Paris to London and to Richelieu at Vienna,³ whose orders in the matter, said Morville, agreed absolutely with Saint-Saphorin's, although difficulties were apprehended from the smallness of the offers made.

The first was a "Projet d'Accession" to the treaty of Hanover. The preamble recited the reasons for inviting the elector to accede and for his acceptance, assured that nothing was contained in it contrary to the public peace. His military succour was fixed at 1,000 foot and 3,000 horse and his allies were allowed to substitute for theirs cash. In case of necessity he was to employ all his forces against and even to declare war on the aggressor. The explanations given for the kings of England and Prussia in regard to the third separate article were extended to him as also a prince of the empire. Objection on the part of the king of Prussia, Morville observed, was not expected, but orders were going to Rottembourg to ascertain his views and ask him to instruct his minister at Vienna in the matter, unless, like most German ministers there, he were given over to the interests of Austria. If the king named made difficulty his name might be suppressed, or, in order not to lose so weighty an ally as the elector, provision be made for his inclusion subsequently. He must be consulted, both to avoid exciting his mistrust and

¹ Townshend in reply, 14 January (o.s.), *ibid.*

² John Law, 9 January and 6 February, R.O. Germany, States, 91.

³ "Dressed upon the plan," says Robinson, sent to Saint-Saphorin and conformable to the king's sentiments as transmitted from London by Horatio Walpole (to Newcastle, 6 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32745).

because one of the articles of the treaty obliged it. Rottembourg would inform Du Bourgay, in order that they might act in concert.

The second document was the "Projet de la Réversalle," concerning the kings of England and France only. It obliged them, in case the elector were required to furnish his stipulated succour, to find subsidies to maintain the troops, and since, in case of open war, it might be advantageous to put him in a condition to make diversions, to enable him to put into the field such number of men as should be agreed upon, by subsidies proportional to the exigencies of the case, whether to meet the danger to which he would be exposed or for diversions. He was to be relieved from any obligation under the first separate article of the treaty of Hanover, which might offend the catholic princes of the empire, and bound to fulfil his engagements thereunder only were the two kings troubled in consequence of what they might be obliged to do in virtue of their guarantee of the treaty of Oliva. The whole, said Morville, conformed to British views in containing nothing which could imply any particular interpretation of the second article. Richelieu was ordered to impress upon Mörmann at Vienna that the engagement could neither be a burden to his master nor render him suspect to the catholic princes of the empire.

The third draft was for a separate article between France and Bavaria only, but to be signed by their ministers with Saint-Saphorin's full knowledge and in his presence. Whereas, it stated, the elector desired annual subsidies in time of peace and the king of England, for reasons given, could not furnish such, the king of France promised amounts of 600,000 and 300,000 livres a year by monthly payments, the latter sum being on account of arrears of subsidy and to cease when they were paid off. This Morville stated to be the most that could be accorded ; he doubted not but that the king of England would order Saint-Saphorin to assist in removing objections to this article by making it known that, while these subsidies in time of peace ought to be satisfactory to the elector, in case of war he could count on the two kings carrying their efforts in his favour as far as possible.

Further, for particular advantage to the elector's house Morville suggested an undertaking not to consent to any election of a King of the Romans not conformable to the laws usages and constitutions of the empire. If, he said, it was thought that the king of France, not being a member of the Germanic Body, could not join in this, there would be no objection to the king of England doing it alone. The suggestion arose from extreme apprehension of inability to overcome the elector's resistance without some "adoucissement," but it would not be imparted to Richelieu, who was ordered to join

with Saint-Saphorin in representing the inconvenience of any stipulation which, if it transpired, would arm the imperial court with powerful weapons against both the elector himself and the princes with whom he should have contracted. Morville prayed for an answer, in order that this important accession might not be delayed.¹

On the first two documents the only comment, beyond approval, was inquiry to what sum the proportional subsidies might be expected to amount. On the third Walpole observed that his Majesty would learn with great pleasure that Maximilian was content with the subsidies offered, but in the contrary case hoped that they might be increased, in view of his own more costly charges for the landgrave. As regarded the particular advantage suggested, the king's duties as a prince of the empire already obliged him to oppose an unconstitutional election, and the elector, aware of that, would hardly be attracted by the stipulation, which, moreover, might raise jealousies among other German princes.²

Morville replied that the proportional subsidies might be expected to follow the valuation of the third article, unless events obliged the greatest efforts to furnish extraordinary means, and that the elector would probably be satisfied with the peace subsidy offered, since with the arrears he would have enough to provide what was necessary at first. The number of years for which the subsidy was to run testified that with so good an ally as the king of England it was impossible to be difficult; all other considerations would yield to that of strengthening the alliance.³ With Robinson, however, Morville disputed the fact of the king of England bearing the greater charges in respect of the landgrave, and when the secretary submitted figures showing them to be four times as much as those proposed for France, observed that the Hessian payment was a single one, but the French subsidy an annual charge for the term of the treaty, fifteen years. Whereon Robinson argued the difference between a lump sum down and terminal payments, which might easily cease. On the whole, in view of "the great desire there is here to succeed in this negotiation," he flattered himself that nothing would be wanting to carry it through.⁴

Maximilian's ministers were not persuaded by Saint-Saphorin. Hardly had he left Munich when Baron von Unertl, secretary of state, presented a written opinion against accession either to the treaty of Vienna, on account of the Pragmatic Sanction, or to that

¹ Morville to H. Walpole, 7 February, R.O. France 183.

² H. Walpole in reply, 10 February, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5, rough draft, and similarly Newcastle to Robinson, same date, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

³ Morville to H. Walpole, 5 March, R.O. France 183.

⁴ Robinson, 1 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

of Hanover, as of insufficient advantage. Orders went to Mörmann on 27 December to recall Bavarian services, to complain of ingratitude shown, and to set out the elector's case.¹ A letter from Maximilian to Charles VI stated that neither was he concerned with the treaty of Vienna, in view of previous compacts, nor prepared to accede to that of Hanover.² Before long decision against the latter course was practically taken. On 24 February 1726 Unertl set out against it the protestant character of the treaty of Hanover and loss of the Spanish money. In view of the impossibility of standing neutral without a strong army he advised alliance being made with the emperor as quickly as possible, upon conditions.³ Three days later Maximilian died.

Despite the objections to dealing with the elector Palatine, so closely related to the imperial court—the empress-mother was his sister,—and so hostile to that of Berlin, attempt was made at least to discover his real sentiments. Charles Philip had opened the way by sending to Hanover in September 1725 the baron von Bevern. He, however, though he stayed there nearly three months, could obtain nothing beyond denial of anything in the treaties either of Charlottenburg or of Hanover to his master's prejudice.⁴ In January 1726 a young count of Lippe-Schaumburg was made use of, one who had corresponded previously from Mannheim in 1724⁵ and now was there again. Information was desired of him on two points; whether Charles Philip had yet acceded to the treaty of Vienna, and why he was in so close union with Bavaria. The count's answer to the former question was in the negative, though he gave warning that strong pressure was being exerted from Vienna and that all the elector's ministers, excepting Count Blankenheim, were strongly imperialist. On the second he could only refer to agreements between and particular interests of the two electors as obliging them at least to show accord, and the more so since the imperial court was doing all it could to embroil them. He believed Count Plettenberg, lately arrived from the elector of Cologne, to be sent to dissuade Charles Philip from acceding to the treaty of Vienna and to be advising such demands to be made as should in any case entail delay and in the end be found impossible to concede. He judged Plettenberg to have been completely won over, when in France, to the side of the allies of Hanover, and advised that no time

¹ Riezler, viii. 389–392.

² Copy and French translation, both undated, enclosed by Saint-Saphorin with his dispatch of 12 January 1726, cited.

³ Riezler, pp. 393–4.

⁴ See Rosenlehner, pp. 66–68.

⁵ His dispatches of the time, and Townshend's replies, R.O. Germany, States, 179.

should be lost in using him. And he observed pressing anxiety lest France, dreaded on account of her power and her vicinity, should have made some private treaty with Prussia concerning Juliers and Berg.¹

Another dispatch contained a vast amount more about Plettenberg, about the elector's power, and about the conditions of alliance which he would require, the chief of them concerning Juliers and Berg.² Townshend in reply desired the count to paint in the most vivid colours the disadvantages to the elector of acceding to the treaty of Vienna and the benefits of an opposite course. He had the effrontery to write: "S.A.E. peut être persuadée que Sa Maj^{te} n'a pas pris des engagements qui puissent faire aucun tort à ses prétensions sur Juliers et Bergues"; his principal object was to ensure fulfilment of the compact between the Palatine house and that of Brandenburg of 1666. The most sure way, he said, for the elector to secure his rights was to join the alliance of Hanover and enjoy the guarantees of the treaty.³

On 8 February the count reported Plettenberg to have just left for Munich with a positive promise from the elector to await his return before deciding. But now in reply to his voluminous ciphered reports of conversations with all and sundry Townshend advised him that to press the accession might give great umbrage to the king of Prussia, and so he must only try to persuade the elector to stand neutral, keeping his negotiation secret; for if that king learnt anything of it he would conceive "une jalousie inexprimable, . . . nous courrons risque de le perdre sans ressource."⁴ Before long he was ordered to terminate his work in the best manner he could. When he continued to write to Robinson at Paris about means of keeping the elector neutral by subsidies and intimidation, the order was repeated peremptorily.⁵

Turning now to Savoy, Count Cambis left for Turin late in October 1725. His instructions⁶ made a point of his anticipating

¹ 16 January 1726.

² 24 January.

³ Townshend to him, 28 January (o.s.).

⁴ The same, 11 February (o.s.).

⁵ The same, 13 March and 15 April (o.s.). Morville, says Robinson (9 April, private, B.M. Add. MS. 32745), objected not only the inevitable jealousy of the king of Prussia but also the uselessness of the elector's neutrality, since passage for French troops into Germany was easy through his dominions. He connected the matter with previous Bavarian suggestions for an accommodation between the elector and the king of Prussia on the question of Juliers and Berg, put off by himself on the ground of the impossibility of Great Britain and France interfering in so delicate an affair.

The answers given to Lippe and Plettenberg at Mannheim, Rosenlehner, pp. 108-9, 112-13.

⁶ Of date 12 October 1725, *Recueil des instructions*, xiv. 332 f.

the expected imperial envoy, Count Harrach. Treating at large on the vast ambitions of the emperor and his mastery of Spain, on the subject of accession by the king of Sardinia to the treaty of Hanover they were guarded. "Le Roi recommande à son ambassadeur de ne pas se livrer si absolument à l'objet d'engager ce prince à entrer dans les mesures de sa Majesté, qu'il ne puisse donner une partie de son application à découvrir le fond des intentions du roi de Sardaigne." This might be done by oral information about the treaty ; he must not give a copy of it. If what he said did not seem to impress, the king of France would take it that the king of Sardinia had no desire for alliance, at present at all events. No doubt he would raise the very delicate question of advantages for himself, but that subject must be cautiously handled. The only definite assurance that could be permitted was satisfaction in respect of the contested "Droit de Villefranche."¹

Le comte de Cambis s'étudiera également à éviter les discussions, parce que l'on n'est pas encore en état de s'y prêter d'une manière satisfaisante pour ce prince, et à ne pas paroître avoir dessein de les éluder, parce que certainement c'en seroit assez pour l'aliéner. Il faudra donc que l'ambassadeur du Roi, s'il arrive qu'il ne tienne plus qu'à cela pour s'asseurer du roi de Sardaigne, fasse en sorte que ce soit ce prince qui s'ouvre sur ses vues et sur ses désirs.

Horatio Walpole advised that the French ministers discountenanced an offensive alliance, but were prepared to go all lengths for a defensive one, with a guarantee of conquests which Victor Amadeus might make, should there be war. He himself was inclined to recommend the offer of Sicily, "as what would in the possession of that prince make him more dependant upon England and France, would best preserve the balance of Italy, and keep the Emperor in awe on that side." The French, he said, were extremely desirous of success, Morville enlarging thereon as "of greater service to our affairs than any one thing besides." But it appeared that what Victor Amadeus wanted was war, with its resultant spoils. After a conversation with Maffei at the end of November Walpole concluded the king's chief view to be "some acquisition, to be stipulated immediately, in case of a war, or of the Emperor's dying without heirs male," and expected him to defer decision until he saw what the issues of the present situation might be. He thought that negotiation ought to be kept up and that the emperor had nothing of real and lasting advantage to propose.²

Cambis' report confirmed Walpole's expectation. Victor Amadeus, he understood, had received communication of the treaty

¹ An affair explained in the instructions.

² H. Walpole, October and November, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

of Hanover "very civilly, but in a manner as if nothing at all had been said to him," while at a later audience strongest assurances had failed "to make him open his sentiments at all, or to enter into any discourse of what he was disposed to do or what he expected should be done for him." Morville, when telling Walpole this, had descanted on the importance of attaching the king and asked his opinion about speaking "in more explicit and precise terms." Cambis, he said, had not been instructed to request accession directly, but had intimated desire for it, and now it seemed proper to make the proposal in form, letting the king know that if he had anything particular in view for his own interest he was earnestly desired to explain himself, the two crowns being prepared to go as far as they possibly could to gratify him. Any particular proposition Morville deemed it dangerous to make before they were fully convinced of the king's sincerity, for otherwise he might betray everything to the emperor. Walpole agreed, and Morville then asked him to talk on the matter with Fleury, warning him that some, as particularly Marshal Villars,¹ were "very warm and zealous for engaging on any terms the king of Sardinia to our interest." That Walpole did, successfully, he says. Maffei, he added, was pressing for something more explicit and seemed extremely well disposed.²

After this Morville submitted draft instructions to Cambis: to let the king of Sardinia know informally that his accession was desired, but speaking in such a manner as to allow him the alternative of a separate treaty. Walpole objected, and after arguing the question drew up a document of his own, which, he says, Morville and Fleury were pleased to approve. In this the coldness exhibited at Turin was attributed to perception that the sole aim of the treaty of Hanover was to preserve peace, the king of Sardinia expecting greater advantage from war. Since, however, he had sufficiently given to understand that he did not consider the emperor either disposed or able to venture on an open rupture, there seemed no reason to apprehend that the court of Vienna could tempt him by any considerable offer. In order to keep the negotiation afoot and not to irritate by appearance of neglect a prince of his character, whose friendship was so important, it seemed proper for Cambis to reiterate informally protestations of amity on the part of France and Great Britain and their desire for his accession to the treaty of Hanover, whose object was to maintain and confirm the balance of power in Europe. Arguments suggested were the following. First, the advantage of a treaty which formally required the concert of

¹ Who, says Walpole, "indeed is extremely earnest in the matter, but has no great talents for a negotiation."

² The same, 12 December.

all the contracting powers and so prevented affairs in Italy from being regulated without the king of Sardinia's participation and consent. Secondly, the necessity of the guarantees of the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva to restrain the excessive aggrandisement of a certain power and to engage, or at least keep neutral, the protestant powers and the princes of the empire. Thirdly, expectation of some particular gain by the king of Sardinia, in case the precautions taken to preserve the public peace had to be exchanged for action. Fourthly, that although that peace was the precise and direct aim of the two crowns, they were not so fearful of entering into a war as the king of Sardinia might think, witness the measures taken for action with vigour in case of need. Fifthly, if he apprehended being one of the first to be attacked by the power referred to, and were not satisfied merely to have such strong allies as France and Great Britain, he might be invited to explain what he judged necessary for his greater safety and even convenience, nothing being more usual or reasonable than such mutual explanations, and any practicable proposal assured of all possible attention. Lastly might be pointed out that in explaining his pretensions, and acceding to the treaty of Hanover, the king would only be following the example of the Dutch, who had desired admission of stipulations of particular interest to themselves and whose accession, their desires satisfied, was expected forthwith, although they, more than any, were exposed to the said power's resentment, on account of their Barrier.¹

In his next report Cambis was able to notify at least something said. In answer to his instances obligation had been expressed for the invitation to accede to the treaty of Hanover, though it was pointed out that in accepting it the king of Sardinia would have to bear the first brunt of the emperor's resentment. He wanted to know how his prospective allies would protect him and stipulation of some advantage to himself. Cambis, however, declining to make precise statements, that was all. Retailing this, Robinson reported Morville "eager for concerting out of hand with his Majesty what offers may be proper to be made," and eloquent upon the advantage and necessity of gaining the king of Sardinia, in order to form a powerful league against the emperor, were he disposed to make reprisals on the Dutch for action of theirs against the Ostend Company.²

Other lights were obtained from Cortanza, who on his way home met John Law at Augsburg, and from Di Breglio. Cortanza laid stress on the inferiority of the French army and on French inability

¹ The same, 24 December.

² Robinson, 5 January 1726, *ibid.*

to sustain defeat, and said that he would be troubled if called upon to advise his master, whether to accede to the treaty of Hanover with the offer of the Milanese, or to that of Vienna for a very small portion of it. Nor could Law convince him that Great Britain and France together could be depended upon.¹ Di Breglio assured Saint-Saphorin that his master was always disposed to a firm union with the king of England for the safety of Europe, but with France only under his direction; he insinuated that Cambis was not the man for so delicate an affair and that he himself was kept at Vienna in order to try to adjust it with Saint-Saphorin; with what Richelieu said he was not contented. Saint-Saphorin was of opinion that the accession of Bavaria would greatly influence the king of Sardinia, and vice versa; he thought that it must be gratifying to his Majesty to find a preference on the part of so many powers to treat with his ministers rather than with those of Louis XV.²

Morville now reported Cambis to advise first that assurances now given of willingness to negotiate with the allies of Hanover, though particular explanation of what was wanted was still withheld, were no doubt the consequence of similar approaches from Vienna, and secondly that it was useless to try the court of Turin further unless some sufficient offer were made. On the first point he (Morville) remarked that the king of Sardinia would probably be gained by the side which offered most, and on the second that conversations with Maffei confirmed the belief that explanations must be given; it followed that their nature must be concerted. He thought himself that it would not be difficult to impress upon Victor Amadeus that the treaty of Hanover would amply provide for his security, while for advantage to him the king of France was ready to agree to any proposal from the king of England, whether for a guarantee of all conquests made in war or the specification of some particular one, for which help might be given.³

His Majesty, Walpole answered after an interval, consented to proposals being made, in order not to leave so undependable a prince to engage himself elsewhere, but this provided that neither were they such as the imperialists could make ill use of, if they had wind of them, nor as might inspire the king of Sardinia to excite war for his private profit. Sicily appeared to be the only acquisition to be offered, in case of war, certainly no part of the Milanese, but the king remitted the affair entirely to French judgment. To Fleury Walpole explained the reasons for this in confidence, stating that

¹ Law, 31 December 1725, R.O. Germany, States, 91. "Je n'ay pu disconvenir que les françois ne soutiennent pas bien les disgrâces."

² Saint-Saphorin, 12 January 1726, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57.

³ Morville to H. Walpole in London, 10 January, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5.

it was only out of consideration for French anxiety to secure the king of Sardinia that his Majesty had gone so far as to propose Sicily, for that king's constant conduct obliged caution against being too forward with him, excepting under "bonnes enseignes."¹ At Paris, in answer to Morville's representation of the difficulty of conquering Sicily, Robinson argued that nothing was risked in making the proposal and that it would serve to discover the king's views. He repeated that the negotiation was left to France and that this was the most that the king of England, whether as such or as elector of Hanover, could offer. Two days later he wrote of inquiries from Turin about troops for protection and the question of succession to the emperor's dominions, especially in Italy, "with other like eventual and uncertain speculations."²

As usual the French had to give in, though still considering the offer of Sicily not sufficient. The last letters from Turin, Morville wrote, represented the king of Sardinia as greatly agitated, truly desirous of alliance with France and England, but timorous of the consequences; and so wanting to know at the outset what he might count upon. So far as it was possible to penetrate the heart of so reserved a prince, he seemed to be disquieted about the safety of his present dominions in case of war, and persuaded that more was being offered to other powers than to him. Though Cambis would do his best to calm and reassure him, it seemed "que nous avons à faire à un prince, que l'âge contribue à rendre un peu plus timide, et que les variations, qu'il a éprouvées dans le tems du traité de Londres, ont mis dans quelque sorte de défiance."³

Nevertheless Walpole persisted, and Newcastle informed Robinson that the king of Sardinia's new envoy, the marquis D'Aix, seemed very well disposed to the Sicilian idea and gave the best assurances of his master's disposition.⁴ Robinson, however, could not report in that sense; D'Aix, he remarked, was "a new minister," and Victor Amadeus appeared to confide only in Di Breglio and Maffei, from whom it could be wished that like assurances were had; since, however, Cambis had orders to make the offer of Sicily, a few days should clear up the point. The few days extended to three weeks, and still Robinson reported Morville dissatisfied with the progress made and complaining that the king of Sardinia "keeps entirely off, and that Count Maffei talks of nothing but general plans."⁵

¹ H. Walpole to Morville (copy) and to Fleury (draft), 14 January (o.s.), R.O. France 183.

² Robinson, 4 and 6 February, B.M., Add. MS. 32745.

³ Morville to H. Walpole, 7 February, R.O. France 183.

⁴ H. Walpole to Morville, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5, rough draft, Newcastle to Robinson, B.M. Add. MS. 32745, both of 10 February (o.s.).

⁵ Robinson, 1 and 20 March, *ibid.*

George I was not now represented at Turin, his former envoy, John Molesworth,¹ having returned to England in June 1725, on his father's death, and being himself just dead. It was decided to replace him by John Hedges, member of parliament for the borough of Michael in Cornwall. He did not leave England till the end of August 1726, by which time the situation was greatly altered, but his private instructions, of date 26 February (o.s.),² show what were British views now. He was directed to use all possible arguments to persuade Victor Amadeus to accede to the treaty of Hanover, representing the invitation to be given not only as a mark of regard and a plain indication of the value set on his alliance, both on account of the situation of his dominions and his own personal qualities, but also "to secure him against the attempts of a powerfull neighbour," who might seek, if he could throw the affairs of Europe into confusion, to recover "those territories depending on the Milanese," and other, which his father had lost in the late war. Besides the "satisfaction and glory" of contributing to preserve the peace of Europe, the king would obtain the guarantees of most considerable powers "for his ancient dominions, his new acquisitions, and all the rights he enjoys or ought to enjoy," including the reversion of the crown of Spain in case of failure of the present dynasty. He would be well defended in case of attack and make a great figure in helping to preserve the peace of Europe, and nothing would be transacted whether in Italy or in regard to the Austrian succession without his participation and concurrence. If he desired to know what particular advantages he might hope for, Hedges must say that such did not come within the scope of a defensive treaty, "being properly the fruits of war"; and if he insisted on knowing what he might get in case of war, must find out what he might want; were he found to have views on territories which he could attack with his own troops, as (most likely) the Milanese, views which might incite him to provoke a war, he must be dissuaded therefrom on the ground that the emperor would only cede the Milanese in the very last necessity and recover it as soon as possible. But he might, in case of a breach with the emperor, look to have Sicily back, of much greater value to him and where the maritime powers could

¹ Second Viscount Molesworth, see the *Dictionary of National Biography*, and the *Historical Manuscripts Commission, Various Collections*, viii. Horatio Walpole reported Cambis to write of him as "a person with whom he had lived in great confidence, and one that was very acceptable to his Sardinian Majesty" (24 October 1725, *ibid.* 32744).

² R.O. Savoy and Sardinia 32. His ordinary instructions and credentials of the same date, R.O. King's Letters 38A; the instructions quite short and formal, the only special clause concerning the Vaudois and French protestant refugees in Savoy and Piedmont, against whom the king of Sardinia had lately issued edicts of restriction or expulsion.

readily support him ; nor would the emperor be so jealous about a territory remote from his hereditary dominions, nor the princes of the empire have pretext to interfere, Sicily not being a fief of the empire. If, however, he should be bent upon acquisitions in the Milanese in case of war, and nothing else could induce him to accede, then Hedges, acting with Cambis, might consent to making good Queen Anne's guarantee of 1704 of the equivalent, which the emperor by his treaty of 1703 had promised for the Vigevanasco and the five Novarese towns ; for although by acceding to the Quadruple Alliance the king of Sardinia had given up those pretensions, yet the conditions of that treaty need not be observed, when the emperor had not performed his obligations under it.

If asked about preparations for war Hedges should say that no consultations thereon had taken place as yet, the chief aim of the allies of Hanover being the maintenance of peace ; but he might point to the British squadrons ordered for the Baltic, the West Indies and Spain, to the 12,000 Hessians engaged, and to the great and sufficient forces of France.

Lastly arguments were set out at length for dissuading the king of Sardinia from acceding to the treaty of Vienna and convincing him of the pernicious designs of Austria and Spain.

At the end of April, from what D'Aix said, laying the blame of the delays on French recalcitrance about the "Droit de Ville-franche," Victor Amadeus was deemed in England to be better disposed than formerly.¹ Maffei, however, no doubt let out the truth when he told Robinson "ingenuously, that it would be very impolitick in his master, who could find no advantage but in a war, should he prevent one by fortifying the alliance of Hanover by his own accession."² Little more was done until, in July, Hedges was preparing to set forth on his mission.

¹ Newcastle to Robinson, 18 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

² Robinson, 7 May, secret, *ibid.*

CHAPTER XIII

THE END OF THE RUSSIAN NEGOTIATION

WHILE the treaty of Hanover was yet in parturition the proud Austrian court was stooping at last to recognition of the upstarts of Petersburg.

Overtures to Vienna by Peter the Great had never met with response. They were made as from an equal, and the assumption could not be allowed. Peter cared nothing for ancient dignity and flouted the emperor's authority in Germany. He gave dire offence by contemptuously ignoring the Brunswick congress called by Charles VI to restore peace in the north. When he himself assumed the imperial title, acknowledgment was refused; the court of Vienna continued to treat him with indifference, not to say disdain. The Turkish peril and the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's cause, indeed, were common interests, but the former was not pressing after 1717 and the latter itself a cause of jealousy. When, shortly before Peter's death, his minister, the Pole Lanczynski, sounded Austrian dispositions, he was told that friendship must be full, not partial, and that while it was wished that the duke should have Sleswick back, the negotiations with France and Great Britain showed greater reliance to be placed on them. If Russia wanted help, let it be asked for plainly; if not, let well alone. Again, when Lanczynski announced the accession of Catherine I, assurance of disposition to maintain amity with her was but conventional. To the court of Vienna she was an usurper of the rights of the young tsarevich, nephew of the empress.

This attitude of indifference began to change when to news of Turkish victories in Persia was added observation of the negotiations at Hanover. Lanczynski was then asked three questions: could a treaty with Russia include measures against Turkey, what could be agreed upon concerning Poland and Courland, and what force and means could the tsaritsa employ to re-instate the duke of Holstein-Gottorp? Everything, he was told, proceeded from

English intrigue. Moreover Ripperda openly caressed him, certifying the king of Spain's willingness to accede to the Russo-Swedish treaty of 1724 and to guarantee Sleswick to the duke.¹

To compass the emperor's accession to that treaty had long been an aim of Russian politics, but in the way of direct overtures stood his refusal to recognise the tsaritsa's imperial title. A way out was found in requisition to the Swedes to invite the accession in the tsaritsa's name. They, Poyntz had written, could not refuse, having themselves made the invitation when the treaty was signed, yet they would only consent in order "to save appearances" with her. When the requisition reached Stockholm, at the end of August 1725, it was found to be not in proper form, and Poyntz could report it referred to the secret committee of the senate, who "have as good as promised me to defeat it for this winter." In any case, he said, the recall of Höpken, the Swedish minister at Vienna, and the time required for correspondence, would extend delay until affairs might be changed in Russia or his Majesty's interest be so strengthened at Stockholm that open opposition might be ventured. He had no doubt of his own and Brancas' ability to devise new expedients, the well-intentioned being thoroughly sensible that they could depend only upon Great Britain and France.²

Soon, however, the agency of Sweden could be dispensed with. The ceremonial difficulty was got over when the emperor, as Du Bourgay put it, allowed the tsaritsa "the title of Majesty in all private dispatches, suspending any publick acts, that could derogate from it, till that point was regulated by the authority and consent of the whole empire."³ At the same time secretary Carrard, in charge of affairs at Vienna during Saint-Saphorin's absence, was writing that Lanczynski was believed to have declared Catherine's consent to name the young tsarevich her successor and to marry him to her daughter Elizabeth, his half-aunt, and her resolution to attach herself to Austria in preference to any other power. Ministers, he went on, were greatly pleased, as always when they found themselves courted.⁴ Whatever the truth of this, Lanczynski was

¹ The above mostly from Solov'ev, xix. chap. i. On the relations between Austria and Russia, 1716 f., see also Arneth, iii. 186 f., Chance, *George I and the Northern War* (index).

² Poyntz, 27 July and 25 August (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Sweden 38.

³ Du Bourgay, 28 September, R.O. Regencies 7.

⁴ Carrard, 29 September, R.O. Germany, Empire, 56. A result of this, probably, was the sending of one Loewenwolde to Petersburg, a brother of Catherine's lover, Reinhold Loewenwolde (for whom see Waliszewski, pp. 19, 20). His arrival at Berlin was notified by Du Bourgay on 9 October. He was a Livonian, says Carrard (3 October), and a protestant: would have much influence through his brother, and might, Di Breglio suggested, be profitably bought.

successful in procuring the mission of a qualified minister to Petersburg, not Count Kinsky, as expected, but Count Rabutin, recalled for the purpose from Berlin.

In spite of all this George I still held to his conviction that the emperor could never condescend to make terms with the tsaritsa, and that she must accept his own conditions, if she would maintain her position. Provided that Sweden were on his side, Sweden freed from fear of Russia, he professed not to care much what course she took. To quote but one of Townshend's dispatches: "we take it for granted that the duke of Holstein has thrown himself into the arms of the Emperor, and that he will endeavour to make the court of Petersburg Imperialists," and since Bassewitz, that "strange odd turned genius of a man," governed the tsaritsa, it would not be surprising, should Austrian counsels prevail. "But her power I look upon to be a good deal precarious, and the true interest of England and France is to secure and support Sweden, and make them as little dependant on Muscovy as possible"; that done, little need be feared from Austrian influence in Russia. If France would "come roundly" into the business with Hesse-Cassel, and so "gain the landgrave Sweden and probably Holland all together, we may be very secure as to all the Emperor can do elsewhere."¹ Campredon's insistence, "si l'on manque l'occasion de conclure le traité projeté avec la Czarinne on l'engagera après quelque répugnance à s'allier avec l'Empereur,"² was contemned. He was branded as a traitor, Mardefeld as "wholly devoted to the Muscovite and Holstein interests" and "a creature of the late Czar." Townshend had told the king of Prussia this at Hanover, he said, and would try to get him ordered to change his conduct, or recalled.³

¹ To H. Walpole, 26 September, R.O. Regencies 7.

² 17 July, *Sbornik* lviii. 45.

³ To H. Walpole, 17 August, R.O. Regencies 6. Later, on the text of Mardefeld's dispatches, communicated, Townshend indulged to Wallenrodt in a scathing diatribe, desiring his letter to be forwarded to Berlin. "Il a raison," he wrote, "de cacher au roy son maître ce qui s'est passé à Petersbourg à l'arrivée de notre contre-projet, il s'est fait des choses à cette occasion trop contraires aux intérêts de son maître, aussi bien qu'à ceux de ses amis et alliés, pour qu'il les osast mander, vendu au duc de Holstein comme il est." What he reported the Russian ministers to say was a "galimatias"; it was known from a sure hand that they wanted to conclude the alliance at once and were only prevented by representations to the tsaritsa from the duke and Bassewitz, that she ought to wait to see whether the emperor would accede to her treaty with Sweden. His arguments were not worth discussion, and it was to be lamented that in the present favourable circumstances disturbance should threaten only from a quarter whence there would be nothing to fear, were not the king of Prussia's minister sold to their enemies. Yet he was left there, and had found the secret of flattering his master with the hope of advantages which would never be accorded. "Il l'endort par là, et Dieu sait s'il ne trouvera pas l'occasion de tout gêner, en brouillant tellement les cartes, que toute notre attention sera désormais tournée vers le nord. Avouons, mon cher ami, que si cela arrive à un prince aussi éclairé que S.M. Prussienne, il

Moreover, full credit was given to the reports coming from all quarters of anarchy and disorder at Petersburg. That something approaching chaos existed there was true enough. But they who founded thereon expectation of a speedy end to Catherine's rule were deceived. To those who had set her up her fall meant ruin; that bond of danger rose superior to all their discords; and there was one among them, if only one, equipped for the task of carrying the administration on. Menshikov, Yaguzhinsky, and the rest might quarrel and intrigue, each for himself against the others, Catherine might give herself over to drink and night-long orgies,¹ but the stately ship that Peter the Great had launched sailed on, steered through the rocks by Osterman, the hated and the indispensable.² He now saw best prospects for himself in association with Yaguzhinsky and the others who, making full use of the long absence of reply to the Russian counter-project sent to Paris, were advocating alliance with the emperor.

When answer came at last on 20 August Campredon at once sought a conference with the Russian ministers, advancing all the arguments he could find in support of his instructions. When he came to the Holstein article and declared that there could be no change in it, Osterman, he says, looked on his colleagues "d'un air étonné, mais qui marquait une satisfaction intérieure, que la profonde dissimulation n'a pu me cacher," and at the end declared that, while the tsaritsa still preferred alliance with France to any other, she must hear and consider what had been said. He advised her, Campredon learnt, that the king of England sought only to amuse, that she must take her measures, prepare for an attack on Denmark in concert with Sweden, and negotiate with the emperor; which arguments were supported by Yaguzhinsky and by Michael Bestuzhev. Tolstoi, however, opposing them with others stronger, had for the time prevailed,³ while Cederhielm protested to have left

faut que le Ciel le veuille ainsi pour nous punir de nos péchés" (19 September, the original, Staatsarchiv, Berlin, copies, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253, Regencies 8. In his covering dispatch Wallenrodt described the vehemence of Townshend's indignation, how "nach der Englischen vivacité sich sehr gegen den Frh. von Mardefeldt emportiret").

¹ Cf. Waliszewski, pp. 14-17.

² "Osterman, without whom the Russian court dared take no step, . . . though they honoured neither his spirit nor his knowledge nor his industry, but scorned him as a foreigner, feared him as an intriguer, and hated him as a rival" (Klyuchevsky, iv. 336, translated). Solov'ev names him a master of languages, always wanted and always at hand, indispensable from that power of work which no one else of his time in Russia possessed. Appointed Vice-Chancellor in November 1725 he was included in the Supreme Privy Council established in the following February.

³ In a dispatch of 9 June (*Sbornik* lviii. 360) Campredon wrote of Tolstoi's influence with Catherine I: "tous les avis, qu'on lui donne pendant le jour, sont pesés, examinés et dirigés la nuit entre elle et M. Tolstoi, qui, en très habile politique, fait semblant de s'éloigner des affaires et de ne se mêler que de ce qui se traite dans le

nothing undone to bring the duke to reason and dissuade him from "voies de fait." ¹

When Campredon met the Russian ministers again the same arguments were recriminated. In vain he cited the services so constantly rendered by France to Russia at the Porte; Osterman insisted on guarantees against Turkey and Poland, whether expressed in the third article in the general terms proposed or in a secret one. The modifications also in the Mecklenburg and Holstein articles were pressed, the latter, says Campredon, "de la manière la plus touchante." But he stood firm. The Russian ministers, he reflected in his report, would be glad to be rid of the duke's affairs, which seriously hampered them; they saw very well that they could gain nothing for him by force nor dispense with the concurrence of other powers; that as he would not yield it only remained to see what answer would be received from Stockholm. To inquiry about the treaty of Hanover Campredon answered that he knew nothing of it. Were then, Osterman asked, orders being reserved for his successor? If he were to be recalled, that would be taken to mean that France never had any serious intentions.²

The French government had to conform to the views of George I, palatable or no. The return of the counter-project was followed by renewed orders to Campredon to maintain his ground and to reiterate the declaration that the kings of France and England, while desiring alliance with Russia, adhered to their constant principles. He was informed of the treaty of Hanover, as soon as it was signed, and instructed to say that it contained nothing contrary to Russian interests and to use it as a fresh argument for acceptance of the Holstein clause. In reply to his report of his first conference he was told that the Russian ministers appeared to have been less lively on the Holstein article than was expected, and only to press it as a point of honour. It was to be hoped that Cederhielm would continue to represent the attitude of Sweden aright, but in any case Louis XV would not separate himself from England, even if called upon to join in measures of defence. It was futile and bad for the Russians to think of depending upon Austria. The incertitude

sénat." Lefort has it (7 and 25 August, *Sbornik* iii. 417-9) that Tolstoi, though opposed to Osterman and the Austrian party, had been gained over to the Holsteiners by Shafirov, recalled from exile and of influence daily increasing, and that they, with Menshikov, seemed to be the stronger party. Tolstoi, he went on, was a declared enemy of Prussia, and would probably work for the king of Poland "pour peu qu'il soit flatté." From which, and from much more of the kind, we see how complicated and in constant change were politics at Petersburg.

¹ Fully in Campredon's long dispatch to Louis XV of 28 August, *Sbornik* lviii. 507 f. Information from Menshikov, however, he said, threw doubt on Cederhielm's sincerity.

² The same, 18 September, pp. 550-571.

of the situation gave fresh reasons for France and England to fortify themselves and extend their common measures for the tranquillity of the north, and the treaty of Hanover would be a new rampart against those who wished to disturb it.¹

To similar instructions on receipt of Campredon's second report Morville added that the little return made for French good offices at the Porte rendered it necessary to order the king's ambassador there to suspend them, until it was seen that the tsaritsa could not take advantage of quiet on the side of Turkey to trouble the peace of the north.² On the royal dispatch, which accompanied, Horatio Walpole commented: "nothing can be fuller in every respect, and I believe more agreeable to his Majesty's sentiments."³ Townshend wrote to Poyntz: "With respect to our treaty at Petersburg you will have seen by the advices I lately sent you how little thoughts there are at that place of being friends with us, and we are rather preparing to disappoint their dangerous designs, and think no more of that treacherous negociation." He hoped that Count Horn would now trust them and leave off teasing about an equivalent for Sleswick, "for assuredly the D. of Holstein means nothing by that, but to get a step nearer to the crown of Sweden, which he aims at."⁴ And Du Bourgay, when with his advice of an alliance in prospect between Russia Austria and Poland he transmitted suggestions for satisfying the Holstein party at Petersburg, made to him privately by "the old ministers and true patriots of Russia," was answered:

I never saw his Majesty more surprised at any letter, since I had the honour to be in his service, than he seemed to be at the contents of yours. His Majesty attributes your countenancing such notions to your not having seen what I sent some time since by his order to the king of Prussia, relating to the designs and projects carrying on at Petersburg, and to your not being truly informed of the state of the question as to Slesvic, nor of what has passed in that negociation. The Russes, whether Old or Young, will be very dexterous indeed if they can perswade us, at this juncture, to sacrifice Denmark to them, as the only means to prevent the Czarinna's entering into measures with the court of Vienna. If Lewenohr and Rabutin can, by their secret negotiations, bring Denmark into the views of Vienna and Petersburg, and perswade her to give up Sleswic, in that case our master and France would get rid of a very troublesome engagement. But I fear that all their parts and abilities will not be able to induce the king of Denmark to do us so great a favour. His Ma^{ty}

¹ Dispatches and instructions to Campredon, 30 August to 27 September, *Sbornik* lviii. 529 f.

² 18 and 25 October, *Sbornik* lxiv. 28 f.

³ 17 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

⁴ 24 October, R.O. Sweden 38. Poyntz had last written: "C. Horn presses it beyond measure to C. Brancas, and to me, and teases more than ever for an equivalent, as the only means to defeat the Emperor's scheme and to engage the Czarina in the affair of Thorn."

hopes that for the future you will not give any countenance to schemes so prejudicial to his service, and in truth to his honour, especially at a time when the duke of Holstein and his friends are acting so infamous a part towards him. . . . We shall see next spring who will be master in the Baltick.¹

And again, on advices from Mardefeld of the ease with which the duke of Holstein-Gottorp might be brought over: "It is vain to think of any thing real and fair from the court of Muscovy to our purpose, they never meant honestly in regard to the King and they are now gone entirely into another interest, and are pressing with eagerness quite a different scheme." Of this they were "now perswaded even in France," as the enclosed dispatch from Horatio Walpole, which Du Bourgay would please to communicate to the king and Ilgen and to Rottembourg, would show.²

Justification of this assertion we have seen in the orders to Campredon. Further proof of French sincerity was found by Walpole in Bourbon's talk to ex-king Stanislaus, father of the new queen and now in France, when he pleaded the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's cause, and in answer made to fresh overtures and persuasion by prince Kurakin. With him the French ministers, and Pecquet in particular, had been "plain and peremptory" that no changes in the proposed treaty could be allowed; France was inseparable from Great Britain and the Russian court only intended to amuse.³

If, however, the one side could be firm, so could the other. Mardefeld transmitted affirmation by the Russian ministers that the tsaritsa could not be expected to forego "the interest of her children, because the measures of England and France were opposite to it," and by Bassewitz that the duke would never give up his pretensions to Sleswick, especially now that the majority of the Swedish senators had declared that he ought to insist upon them strenuously.⁴

¹ Townshend to Du Bourgay, 29 October, R.O. Prussia 19, Regencies 7. The reference to private negotiations concerning Sleswick is elucidated by a dispatch from Cyril Wich (31 October, R.O. Hamburg 42). He had it that the king of Denmark, "qui ne scauroit s'empêcher de tâter par tout," was contemplating acceptance of the emperor's mediation in the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's affairs, and that Lövenörn (the Danish minister at Berlin), who had been so intimate with Rabutin (the Austrian), had gone to Copenhagen to persuade his master thereto. The sudden departure of Rabutin for Petersburg gave colour to this, he thought, while Count Starhemberg, now at Hamburg, had said about Count Freytag's going to Copenhagen "avec plusieurs commissions désagréables," that when things appeared most desperate they were sometimes nearest mending.

² The same 31 October; Mardefeld's report, of 16 October, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46.

³ H. Walpole, 17 October and 3 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32744. He related how Stanislaus had been so completely convinced by Gedda of his error that he had sent a written assurance of his thorough devotion to the king of England's interests (copy of the letter, of date 12 October, enclosed).

⁴ Du Bourgay, 27 October, R.O. Prussia 19.

Campredon wrote sheet upon sheet on the daily increasing influence of the Austrian party, the uselessness of representations whether to the duke, to Bassewitz, or to the Russian ministers, the complete belief in Holstein dominance in Sweden, and much else of the kind. The duke, he said, after strong protestations of his good intentions, had finished by saying that the same arguments might be repeated a hundred times, that he had examined them maturely, and that neither the tsaritsa nor himself would ever accept the article concerning him, as it was proposed. He and his adherents had gone over unreservedly to the Austrian side, Yaguzhinsky was promoting the emperor's cause with all the vivacity of his impetuous nature, Osterman closely allied with him, Tolstoi likely to join them as the stronger party. Count Flemming's coming was more positively asserted every day; a house had been taken for Count Rabutin. Hohenholz, the imperial secretary, formerly neglected, was now openly caressed, dined with the duke and had secret audiences of the tsaritsa; just before the first of them an answer had been received from the emperor to that letter of hers, which he had previously refused to receive. This and Rabutin's mission were the first fruits of the convention concluded at Vienna by Lanczynski. Report ran that hostility between France and Spain was growing more bitter every day, that Gibraltar was to be besieged that winter, and that the emperor's side must prevail. Swedish news inspired confident belief that the Holsteiners would carry the day at Stockholm. Brancas was believed to have confessed to his court the difference of facts from what he had been led to expect, Bassewitz claimed to have prevented Cederhielm's recall, no longer talked of, and it was argued that, now that division of Europe into two great camps seemed probable, Russia and Sweden must unite more closely for promotion of their own interests. Yet Cederhielm seemed much put out at being excluded from the Austrian negotiation, although he disclaimed interest in it beyond what concerned the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm, and Mardefeld—who, although not less assiduous with the Holsteiners than before, perhaps only sought to penetrate their designs, having received orders from his master to meddle no more with their affairs,—shared his appreciation of the difficulties that attended the said negotiation.¹

Nothing of all this had weight at Paris. Morville declared that the beliefs entertained at Petersburg about Sweden had no foundation; the duke was deceiving himself; what was offered him was reasonable and sufficient and in accordance with the views of the

¹ Campredon, October to December 1725, *Sbornik* lxiv. Some of his dispatches he sent for secrecy through a firm at Hamburg (*ibid.* p. 135), and Wich there, as has been noted, was able to have sight of them and send extracts to Hanover.

late tsar. The emperor's objects in offering to guarantee the secret article of the treaty of Stockholm, and that made by Peter the Great with Turkey, he pronounced to be in the former case to embroil the tsaritsa in some fatal enterprise, and in the latter to keep in flow a source of perpetual dissension between her and the sultan. By getting the succession settled on the young tsarevich he would always have sure means of disturbing the tsaritsa on her throne, whenever it suited him. It was to be wished that this augury might not be verified by events, but easy to see, from Campredon's private letter, that Yaguzhinsky's arguments would prevail over the most pressing reflections that could be made by the tsaritsa's true servants. In another dispatch, after expression of hope that the duke might be satisfied in some way not contrary to French engagements, and so a breach with Russia be avoided, Campredon was instructed :

Les choses paraissent même au point, que vous n'avez absolument plus rien à faire auprès de la Czarine. L'on a épuisé de notre part tous les condescendances, et elles ne peuvent plus être portées plus loin. . . . Le Roi a rempli tout ce que son amitié pour la Czarine a pu lui suggérer, et S.M. sera en état de faire voir dans tous les temps, qu'il a autant fait pour servir les intérêts de cette princesse, que si elle y avait été obligée par les engagements les plus précis. De nouvelles représentations sur les principes, que l'on suit à présent à Petersbourg, augmenteraient la fausse opinion, où l'on y paraît être déjà, que le Roi craindrait l'union de la Czarine avec l'Empereur, et verrait avec peine que la satisfaction du duc de Holstein s'opérât par ce canal. . . . L'illusion est trop marquée pour qu'elle ne doive pas avoir son cours, vos efforts seraient de trop faibles obstacles, et les ministres moscovites font connaître tous les jours de plus en plus, que le caractère de droiture et de sincérité n'étant pas la vertu dominante dans le pays où vous êtes, il n'est pas possible d'y traiter d'aucune affaire.¹

In his first dispatch of the year 1726 Campredon added to his melancholy forebodings particulars of a plan of campaign for the coming summer drawn up and approved ; a Russian fleet reinforced by twelve Swedish men-of-war to land a great combined force near Lübeck, with a view to the conquest of Bremen ; the Danes expected to assist, in return for concessions about Sleswick ; the emperor to assemble 40,000 men in Silesia on the pretext of Polish affairs ; in sum, an overpowering league of Austria, Spain, Russia, Sweden and Denmark against the allies of Hanover. The full powers desired for Lanczynski he reported to have been sent five weeks since, and Count Tessin (appointed to Vienna in the place of

¹ Morville to Campredon, 19 November and 13 December, *Sbornik* lxiv. 79, 148.

Höpken) to have orders to join in the negotiation on the part of Sweden.¹

He failed to impress. The stories, Robinson advised, met with no credit at Paris, "these measures of the Czarina are regarded as a last effort to intimidate Sweden." What related to Lanczynski's success at Vienna Morville said he knew to be false; only loose and general propositions had been made and the Russian minister's full powers had been found to be deficient.² Campredon was answered that, were the plans he described serious, they would hardly be so openly discussed. What related to Sweden was completely contradicted by the last news thence; against what danger there was the proper precautions would be concerted with Great Britain. At the same time he must continue to press all arguments to bring the tsaritsa and her ministers to other views. While nurturing no ill intentions towards the duke of Holstein-Gottorp the king of France must prefer the general interest of preserving the peace of the north to particular measures in his favour.³ Like statements were made to Kurakin in answer to memorials which he continued to present.⁴ He replied that the endeavours to bring Sweden into the alliance of Hanover were of much more serious import than the Russian negotiations with Austria, but that nevertheless his mistress was working with equanimity to preserve the friendship of France and to keep the door open for future close engagements.⁵

British opinion was in accord. Newcastle asserted:

Notwithstanding what Mo^r de Ripperda and Count Konigseck give out of the treaty between the Emperor Spain and the Czarina being concluded, it is so far from being finished, that we have accounts from all parts that it meets with difficulties which will not easily be got over. . . . Our advices from all parts not only confirm the accounts Mo^r de Morville gave you of the situation of the Czarina's affairs, and the difficultys she is like to meet with in her own government, but also the great apprehensions that court is under of a breach with the Turks, which, in all probability, from the joint instructions to the British and French ministers at Constantinople cannot fail, and must eventually put the Czarina out of a condition to attempt any thing that may be destructive to the peace of the north, or contrary to the views of the two crowns.⁶

¹ Campredon, 3 January 1726, *ibid.* 172-199. Westphalen confirmed in a dispatch of 7 January, communicated by Robinson on 20 February, and in another of 2 February, Holm, i. 152.

² Robinson, 6 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

³ Louis XV and Morville to Campredon, 7 and 14 February, *Sbornik* lxiv. 236-245.

⁴ One of them, of 25 February, reviewing the whole subject of Franco-Russian relations since 1717, emphasising the excellent sentiments of Catherine I towards France, and discussing the latest proposals in detail, R.O. Foreign Ministers 52.

⁵ Solov'ev, xix. chap. i.

⁶ To Stanhope and to Robinson, 10 February (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

The great event of this February in Russia was the creation of the Supreme Privy Council, with the immediate effect of concentrating power in the hands of Menshikov Tolstoi and Osterman.¹ Campredon now notified appointments of the last-named as ambassador to Sweden and of prince Dolgoruky, now at Warsaw, to the emperor, as also orders to assemble at Petersburg 40,000 men and all that was wanted to equip the fleet. He concluded that the projected attack on Denmark would certainly take place, Sweden, as Cederhielm allowed and Menshikov explicitly declared, not opposing but even joining in the enterprise, if necessary. Yet, said Menshikov, while it was determined to bring Denmark to reason in one way or another, the tsaritsa would not employ force without legitimate cause and would willingly contribute 500,000 roubles towards making the king of Denmark give up Sleswick or find some reasonable equivalent for it. Giving the best assurances in that case, he pictured the dangers which would threaten France and England in the contrary, alleging assuredness of the help of Sweden and Prussia and that the Dutch would be bought off by great commercial offers from the emperor and Spain. From which Campredon deduced that it was desired to avoid war, to manage and even unite with France in conjunction with Sweden and Prussia ; but that the treaty offered would never be accepted, a considerable force put to sea, and Osterman go to Sweden "*les mains garnies.*" Thence he might proceed to negotiate at Copenhagen, to be followed, in case of failure, by the fleet and galleys to ravage the Danish coasts as formerly they had ravaged those of Sweden. In March he was still convinced of a Russian Baltic enterprise and that acceptance of the terms he had to offer was hopeless. The Russians, he wrote, "*entrent avec une vivacité progressive dans l'animosité des Holsteinois contre le roi d'Angleterre, à qui ils attribuent toutes les résolutions du roi de Danemark* "; the tsaritsa was constantly being advised that Prussia would do nothing against her, that the emperor and his allies were stronger than all who could oppose them and that she could send her fleet to Sweden without the slightest danger. He had interviews with Osterman and audience of Catherine, alike futile of result. Mardefeld told him that the king of Prussia would fulfil his engagements exactly, provided that the resolutions of France and England concerning the duke of Holstein-Gottorp did not raise such obstacles as would render his goodwill and that of the other allies of the two crowns useless. To all this, however, reply was in the same spirit as before.²

¹ Accounts, with conflicting views, Solov'ev, Book xviii, chapter v, Klyuchevsky, iv. 359-361, Waliszewski, pp. 25-28, Bain, pp. 84-87.

² Dispatches from and to Campredon in February and March 1726, *Sbornik* lxiv.

Now the British court was insisting on Campredon's recall. Newcastle denounced the incongruity of having at Petersburg a minister "avowedly of contrary principles" at the very time when, by concert with France, a British squadron was proceeding to the Baltic to act with the Danish fleet against Russia. He would spoil, he said, all that the admiral could do to prevent the Russian fleet from coming out.¹ Robinson, accordingly, used plainest language. Morville did not pretend to vindicate Campredon, but confessed that the difficulty was to find anyone to replace him. He "imagined that the late behaviour of that minister could give no room to the Swedes to be offended, for besides what he had learn't from Prince Kourakin, he had now received letters from Campredon himself to the same purpose." To Fleury Robinson spoke in the same sense, hearing the same objection, but receiving from him too a promise of consideration.²

It was finally agreed that Campredon should not be recalled as in disgrace—that, it was thought, might be dangerous,—but for the reason that his presence was required in Paris to inform the king of the true state of affairs in Russia by word of mouth. Care would be taken, said Morville, that he should not return.³ On orders to the above effect going to him two days later Newcastle desired warmest thanks to be returned for a decision which, he averred, would have the greatest effect with both friends and enemies.⁴

Pending receipt of his orders Campredon continued to write in the same strain as before. Among suspicious doings of Mardefeld he noted his renewed proposal to hand over Courland to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and accused him of doing all he could to get his master included in the prospective alliance between Russia and Austria. The project of attack on Denmark, however, he observed to be dropping in consequence of the appearance of Sir Charles Wager in the Baltic.⁵ After he left, on 31 May, the charge of affairs was left to his secretary, Magnan, who could do no more than report occurrences. Attempt to find someone to replace him failed, Chavigny, out of employment since his mission to George I at Hanover, declining the appointment. The only other man who could be thought of was one whom, Fleury told Robinson, "he could not tell how to propose, tho' he was well assured of his honour and good intentions."⁶ This was none other than Nathaniel Hooke, the

¹ To Robinson, 4 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

² Robinson, 20 April, *ibid.*

³ The same, 23 April.

⁴ To Robinson, 18 April (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁵ Campredon, April and May, *Sbornik* lxiv.

⁶ Robinson, 20 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

notorious Jacobite of former days, long naturalised in France and risen to high rank in the French army. Robinson naturally discouraged the proposal,¹ but it was renewed when Horatio Walpole came back to Paris. He made a like reply, and Newcastle desired him to represent how unfit Hooke was for "any station of that kind" and more especially for Petersburg.²

Cederhielm had left Petersburg early in April, and on the 27th had at length arrived Count Rabutin. He, says Campredon, was received with great honours, showed, or simulated, sympathy with the Holstein party, but on the whole kept his own counsel; the general opinion being that, when settled, he would work secretly to arrange the Russian and Polish successions in accordance with the emperor's views. In his last dispatch Campredon reported him to be keeping a courier arrived from Vienna in order that he might carry back the treaty negotiated. The work, however, was completed not at Petersburg but in August at Vienna.

¹ "For it could never be imagined, that a gentleman of Mr Hook's supposed principles could be sent, by concert with England, to Muscovy, the very nest of the most desperate Jacobites that are abroad."

² H. Walpole, 25 May, Newcastle to him, 19 May (o.s.), *ibid.* 32746. Walpole described Hooke as originally a Presbyterian minister, taken in the duke of Monmouth's rebellion, pardoned by James II and thereafter his faithful servant, since in the French service, and now a major-general of good character. Cf. the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

CHAPTER XIV

POLAND. TURKEY

EARLY in August 1725 Augustus II of Poland left Dresden for his royal capital. Since there was already a Prussian minister at Warsaw, Hans Bogislav von Schwerin, Bülow was recalled to Berlin. Edward Finch followed the king, as ordered,¹ in spite of plainly expressed objection by the Poles, wrathful at the strong language that he had used at Dresden. At the Polish frontier he was handed recredentials and a letter to carry back to Hanover, but in spite of almost forcible measures to stop him he went on. His action was upheld. When Augustus protested against his coming, expressed the indignation which his utterances had roused among the Poles, so delicate and sensible in points of honour, and requested his recall in order that old friendship might be preserved, George I, with strong expressions against the violation of the treaty of Oliva, declined the request.²

Endeavour to bring either Swedes or Dutch to act in the cause of the Polish protestants had failed. With the latter Townshend had done his best when passing the Hague in June. He procured new letters of expostulation to the emperor and the king of Poland,³ and the promise of a Dutch minister for Warsaw, but that was all, and the man named, Charles Rumpf, was not sent forward from Berlin until September. The Swedes, since they could not send a minister to Warsaw, never having made their peace with Poland, were invited to empower some one to come to concert measures at Hanover. There was no desire, Poyntz was told, to put them to any expense; only their "name and countenance" were wanted.⁴ All, however, that he could obtain was a "Memorial relating to the Grievances of Religion," sent to Hanover for revision.

¹ His credentials as minister plenipotentiary to the republic of Poland, of date 11 July 1725, R.O. Royal Letters 41, King's Letters 46. He was given this character instead of that of ambassador, because, said Townshend when sending them, it would leave him more free.

² Augustus II, 18 and 23 August, George I to him, 30 August (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Copies, of date 23 June 1725, with William Finch's dispatch of 3 July, R.O. Holland 286; the former, *Lettres historiques*, lxviii. 270.

⁴ Townshend to Poyntz, 15 July, R.O. Sweden 37.

From it, he observed, all reference to the German protestants was omitted, from fear of allegation by the Holstein party that the object was to draw Sweden into "a new Grand Alliance against the Emperor." More, he said, could not be obtained at present, and although he had strong assurances in private "that they mean the very same thing as his Majesty," yet Horn was of opinion that threats unsupported by force would but make the condition of the Polish victims worse and lower the reputation of the powers interfering. Possibly, he thought, "a new round of representations pour'd in like a volley" might have some effect, but more was to be expected from the negotiations proceeding at Hanover. He advised strongly against a religious war with all its consequences, pointing out that the Swedes in their present condition, "and with the power of Muscovy hanging like a storm over them," could hardly give help.¹

Arrived at Warsaw, Finch found there Schwerin and the Russian princes Basil and Sergius Dolgoruky. The former, newly arrived as ambassador from Catherine I, assured him of her intention to act in concert with Great Britain and Prussia in favour of the protestants. He found tempers calmer, but his recall still insisted on.² To his report of the Grand Chancellor owning that there were defects in the decree against Thorn, answer was made that "the expedients mentioned for patching up things again are such as we can say nothing to yet, were they proposed even to your self by any good hand." As instructed, he must "lye by, keep quiet, and observe exactly all that passes," until the arrival of a minister from France.³

Communicated to Hanover had been a dispatch from Schwerin of 25 August, with an extract from Dolgoruky's instructions. Schwerin said that the Russian ambassador had promised to act in concert with himself, and that they were impatiently awaiting the arrival of Finch to join them. Dolgoruky's instructions were in like sense, but three conditions were laid down: Prussia and England and other protestant powers to agree on steps to be taken, with an ultimate view to force, if necessary; all to press for satisfaction together; and the emperor to have no part in the affair; that to be pushed to a happy conclusion through the mediation of Russia and Prussia, or else by force.⁴

In accordance was what Golovkin had been reported to say at Berlin, namely, that although the tsaritsa was not concerned with

¹ Poyntz, 10 August (o.s.), *ibid.* 38.

² Finch, 25 and 29 August and 1 September, R.O. Poland 30, "Count Flemming, tho' at the bottom of the clamours against me, still keeps behind the curtain."

³ Townshend to him, 14 September, *ibid.* and Regencies 7.

⁴ Copies with Townshend's dispatch.

the treaty of Oliva and so could not join openly in the negotiations, she could and would offer her mediation and, were that rejected, help to form a new confederation and support it with all her might. When, the information went on, Golovkin had spoken of this, the king of Prussia had strongly recommended him to forward reconciliation between Russia and Great Britain, for were that effected all the rest would follow.¹

In view of all this Finch was ordered to cultivate Dolgoruky's acquaintance and to insinuate the desire of George I to be well with his mistress. "We take him to be an Old Russ, and of that party which is for the true good of his country," and so, said Townshend, Finch might remind him that England and Russia had always been friends, that their real interests ought to unite them more closely, and that reconciliation and alliance with France "sticks solely upon a point that concerns only the interests of strangers." If the ambassador were found to be of the inclination supposed he could be instructed on all that concerned the projected reconciliation and alliance, "which perhaps you may by his means advance more effectually than we can by any one at Petersbourg itself."²

Finch duly consorted with the Dolgorukys, and of course with Schwerin, and "had as much reason to be pleased with my first conversation with the eldest Muscovite minister as I could expect from a minister of so much phlegm, and so few words." Count Wratislaw arrived on the part of the emperor on 16 September, and acknowledged Finch's character by exchanging visits, and on 2 October, at last, the Dutch ambassador, Charles Rumpf. But no sign yet of De Livry, chosen to represent France. Audience of the king was first refused Finch on the ground that he had received his recredentials, and then offered only with departures from the proper ceremonial, which he could not accept.³ Informed of his difficulties Townshend wrote: "I repeat to you again by the King's command that his Ma^{ty} is determined not to recall you. . . . Rest quiet, be civil and obliging to all, but do no business nor enter upon any negotiation before the French minister comes." And about the refusal of an audience: "Show as much easy indifference as possible at so strange and unjustifiable a behaviour on the part of the Poles. . . . Particularly avoid exciting other ministers to make your cause a common one, or forming a kind of party in opposition to the proceedings of the court." By such conduct Flemming and the other ministers would be put more and more in the wrong, "till the

¹ News letters of 7 and 18 August, R.O. Prussia 19.

² Townshend in the same dispatch.

³ Finch, 19 September to 3 October, R.O. Poland 30.

French minister comes and with him, we hope, the time for speaking in another tone altogether.”¹

By this time Finch had found reason to distrust the Dolgorukys, to take the elder of them to be “not the Old Muscovite, he formerly was,” while the younger, when at Dresden, he knew to have “talked very differently from what he does at present.” The former, he learnt, had received 15,000 ducats in specie, which made it appear that “he does not design to continue in the same inaction which he now affects.”² The court at Hanover too, in view of the developments at Petersburg, had changed its mind. Finch was now instructed only to hold civil converse and talk in general terms with the Dolgorukys, and if they had said anything about a reconciliation with Russia to “drop all further discourse of it as handsomely as you can.” And again, not to be too open or intimate with them, for now “we have great reason to distrust the Czarina and her measures.”³

The Russian policy, then, of George I had its effect in Poland. There could be no joint action now in favour of the protestants; indeed, their welfare began to be of less account than the part which the republic might play in the general drama. Yet, if the allies of Hanover had reason to apprehend association of the Poles with Austria and Russia, neither were those courts happy about the outcome. Dolgoruky was advising his mistress to be quiet and await events; to leave the protestant powers to press their demands by word and deed, while aiming herself at bringing matters to a quiet issue by mediation; and in view of the weakness exhibited by them to abstain from strong representations, in order neither to indicate her sentiments prematurely nor to provoke either side.⁴ At Vienna it was feared, so Carrard reported Sinzendorf to have told Di Breglio, que quelque peu d'envie qu'on ait d'en venir aux extrémités, les Polonois, de la manière qu'ils sont faits, ne fassent quelque mauvaise démarche qui attirera la guerre chez eux, et qu'alors ne sachant quel parti prendre ils ne recourent à nous, et ne se jettent entre nos bras pour les tirer d'affaire, et dans ce cas nous ne pourrions nous dispenser de leur tendre la main.⁵

Against employment of force in Poland the allies of Hanover were by this time agreed. Frederick William I instructed Schwerin that he would not support a campaign alone. Finch put off that

¹ Townshend to Finch, 11 October, *ibid.* and Regencies 7.

² Finch, 3 and 10 October, R.O. Poland 30. Sergius Dolgoruky's behaviour he attributed to the recall of his father-in-law, Shafirov, from exile, “but without that there would be nothing to do with this gentleman, since he is a pensionaire of this court, and for his complaisance with it ill with his own, and will be recalled soon.”

³ Townshend to Finch, 11 and 19 October, *ibid.* and Regencies 7.

⁴ Solov'ev, xix. chap. i.

⁵ Carrard, 29 September, R.O. Germany, Empire, 56.

envoy's inquiries about the intentions of George I by saying that they must await the coming of the French minister to make vivid instances, and, should they be ineffectual, further instructions to him from his government.¹ Broglie in England intimated fear of premature steps which might have harmful consequences; increase of bitterness, he gave warning, might frustrate the said minister's task of conciliating the Polish catholics and drive them to cast in their lot with Austria and Saxony.² Later Broglie learnt (from Rottembourg) that the king of Prussia had sent orders to Schwerin to be moderate, remitting the interests of the protestants to the good offices of France.³ Indeed, when the primate of Poland inveighed in a strong memorial against Prussian aims and methods, Frederick William had been at pains to write to him to expose the baselessness of his accusations and to express his own excellent sentiments towards the republic.⁴ At the same time, in reference to Russian pressure for a concert of the protestant powers to intervene in Poland forcibly, should negotiation fail, Ilgen had expressed fear of intention to reveal the plan at Warsaw and so make Polish relations with Prussia yet worse. It seemed, he said, in the present situation and in view of the menace of fresh troubles in the north, that nothing was more necessary than to avoid with all imaginable care a separate war with the Poles.⁵

Townshend, assuring Broglie that Finch's instructions could not be more moderate than they were, took occasion to advert again to the delay in sending a French minister to Warsaw as giving the emperor's partisans a fine game and greatly to be regretted; he ought, he said, to be sent at once not only in virtue of the first separate article of the treaty of Hanover but also to counteract their enemies' designs and to bear witness to the king of England's moderation.⁶ Answering Ilgen he expressed pleasure at learning that the king of Prussia agreed on the inadvisability of overtures to the tsaritsa about Poland, for that would only augment her influence there and perhaps enable her to carry out her plan for engaging the Poles to join with herself and the emperor against the allies of Hanover. Better to act prudently, and let the first flame of bigotry die out; that alone kept the Poles united. By such policy they would be rendered useless to Russia or Austria, and by nourishing

¹ Finch, 13 October, R.O. Poland 30.

² Broglie to Townshend, 15 October, R.O. Foreign Ministers 4.

³ The same, 17 November.

⁴ 6 November, a copy enclosed with Finch's dispatch of 16 January 1726, R.O. Poland 32.

⁵ Ilgen to Townshend, 9 November, R.O. Foreign Ministers 46, Foreign Entry Book 253.

⁶ Townshend to Broglie, 22 October, R.O. Foreign Ministers 4.

their intestine divisions they could be led on to anything desired ; the protestants, at the same time, not being allowed to believe themselves abandoned. From this point of view the delay in sending a French minister to Warsaw was fortunate ; for it gave a fine opportunity to begin the work on the new plan, if the king of Prussia approved it. His minister and Finch could be instructed to abstain from any negotiation until their French colleague appeared. The influence of France, as a catholic power, was great in Poland, and the protestants could not complain, for the treaty of Hanover obliged Great Britain and Prussia to act in concert with France. Truce for the present, and let the party factions of Russia, of Austria, of Stanislaus, of the present king of Poland, and of Count Flemming revive.¹

During the next months Finch, isolated as he was, had little to communicate. To use his own words : " I have been so entirely excluded from all commerce and company, that I have found it impossible to penetrate into any design but by conjectures, which might prove too uncertain to trouble your Lordship with." His special business seemed to him " entirely forgott, and the Poles affect to think it ended, which I believe is owing to their having gained the Muscovites." Of his colleagues he saw only Schwerin. Le Coq, returned from Hanover, avoided him. Intervention by Rumpf, which Schwerin suggested, he disapproved, and Rumpf himself declined. The only report that he could send in December, and that he doubted, was that the imperial court was remonstrating against Polish indifference and refusal to consider expedients and especially the emperor's mediation, with the warning that soon it might be too late for him to interfere. He concluded the outcome " to depend entirely on the success of the treaty between Vienna and Petersburg, and by a letter I saw yesterday from the last place the Czarina's resolutions are very far from being fixt in that affair." ²

On 11 January 1726, to assist Schwerin, little less obnoxious to the Poles than Finch, appeared at Warsaw his brother, Major-General Curt (Conrad) Christopher, who had rendered good service there as envoy extraordinary in 1724. He was instructed to allay Polish jealousies by showing them to be either unfounded or else easily put aside, and in any case not worth war with Prussia, anxious for the republic's freedom.³

Finch supposed him principally entrusted with such private matters as recognition of the Prussian royal title by the republic and release of the Elbing mortgage. He now noted the Saxon ministers

¹ Townshend to Ilgen, 15 November, R.O. Regencies 8.

² Finch, 3 November to 19 December, R.O. Poland 30.

³ Droysen IV. ii. 397, instructions dated 18 December.

to be fomenting discord and talking contemptuously of the Hanover alliance, and Wratislaw and Dolgoruky often in conference, though rather, he thought, to inculcate belief in alliance between Austria and Russia arranged than having anything to negotiate, "without they are concerting measures to bring the Republick into it." On religious matters he presumed intention to wait to see what should be De Livry's instructions and what the resolutions of the British parliament; assembly of the diet to be hastened or retarded accordingly. Meanwhile, he said, several dissidents had been sounded privately about a commission to inquire into their grievances, great advantages being promised them, in fact entire restitution, if they would give up reliance on foreign princes and show themselves submissive; as much as to say, as Finch put it and hinted to them, "that since the most solemn engagements the Republick could enter into in your behalf have availed you nothing, you have all the reason in the world to depend on our bare word." After Schwerin's audience, on 3 February, he wrote: "By what I have been able to judge of the mysterious conduct of the two brother ministers, they are driving at being well with the republic at the expense of the court; and the Saxon ministers are endeavouring to acquire their confidence and embroil them with the Poles," who seemed to have hastened the audience from desire to know something more certain of the king of Prussia's designs before coming to any decisive resolution. Schwerin had expostulated in his speech against the misrepresentation of his master's views, claimed the sinister accusations to have been dispelled by his letter, referred to the close friendship of more than a century, and desired to know, since he could not express himself in more friendly terms, what he had to expect both in reference to the above and to the affair of Thorn. The Council had resolved not to treat on religious affairs with him and to insist on satisfaction of their claims against Prussia.¹

One matter discussed was the ambition of Augustus II to obtain from the electors of the empire recognition of the title of Royal Highness for his son as prince royal of Poland. It seemed, Frederick William wrote to George I, that the ecclesiastical electors would consent; what would he advise? George expressed pleasure at this new mark of confidence and at hearing that the king of Poland was making advances, as counselled by himself, through his envoy,

¹ Finch, 12 January to 13 February 1726, R.O. Poland 32. Schwerin's discourse at his audience, *Lettres historiques*, lxi. 279. Droysen (*l.c.*) says that he had much success in persuading the Polish magnates of their king's intrigues and obtaining from them professions that they had no wish for war and would endeavour to carry in the approaching diet such measures as should establish a good understanding with Prussia for ever, provided that real service were done to the republic, in return; that the court marked this with chagrin, and its bitter feeling towards Schwerin was shown by the manner in which his audience was so long postponed.

Le Coq. He advised pleading want of knowledge whether custom was in favour of the step proposed, and suspected particular reasons to prompt the request, seeing that the king of Poland had been so long on the throne without making it. Expressing strong inclination to give him pleasure, George would first know those reasons, in order to concert measures for preserving peace in Polish quarters.¹

On 22 February Count Rabutin appeared at Warsaw on his way to Petersburg and joined, according to Finch, with Wratislaw in endeavouring to procure the accession of Poland to the treaty of Vienna by harping on Prussian war-preparations and Anglo-French intrigues at the Porte.² Further Finch reported the primate to have delivered to the two Schwerins the demands of the republic in writing, but promises only by word of mouth, telling them that since their master had given good assurances he might depend on the Poles, who would "seriously think of giving some satisfaction on the affair of Thorn," whereas if he preferred to "drive them into extremitys they would be obliged to listen more willingly to alliances proposed to them with great advantages, meaning the Emperor." When Rumpf approached the primate on the subject he was answered that the affair could be accommodated through Le Coq in England, if the like grievances of English and Prussian catholics were met.³ Shortly an edict issued to the town of Thorn to choose a catholic president at the coming elections. Whereon the Prussian ministers desired Rumpf to join with them in a protest, but he declined to do more than remonstrate by word of mouth, being, in Finch's phrase, "extreamly tied up by his instructions."⁴

At Constantinople the aim of British policy for many years past had been to keep the Turks at enmity with Russia. In present circumstances that desire was intensified. Referring in a dispatch of November 1725 to the reported Turkish victories in Persia and the prospect of the Russians being driven from the Caspian Townshend instructed ambassador Abraham Stanyan as follows :

I am ordered to let your Ex^{cy} know in the greatest confidence, and with the utmost secrecy, that the Czarina, being carried away and wholly alienated from the King by the rash and wild councils of the duke of Holstein and Mons^r Bassewitz, has, according to very sure and authentick advices, entred into close friendship with his Ma^{ty}'s enemies and formed projects for assisting and supporting the Pretender against his Ma^{ty} and his government.

¹ The letters, 11 and 18 December 1725, R.O. Royal Letters 46.

² On Rabutin's negotiation and the views of the Polish magnates in connexion, Droysen, IV. ii. 397-8. He set forward on his journey on 18 March.

³ Detailing "a quire of griefs in England, Ireland, Holland and Prussia, the two first are a summary of all the penal laws enacted against the Papists since the Reformation, the several oaths of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration, the test, and the treaty of Limerick."

⁴ Finch, 23 February to 27 March, R.O. Poland 32. The Schwerins presented a memorial of their own on 21 April (*Lettres historiques*, lxi. 512-4).

So that with all the dexterity and caution possible Stanyan must work against any new treaty of the Turks with the tsaritsa and animate them against her.

The Turks can never expect a fairer or better opportunity than at this juncture, whilst the Russian government is in the hands of a woman and weakened and distressed by intestine factions and divisions, and that the late transactions and alliances between the Emperor and the court of Spain have put the affairs of Europe into such a ferment, raised so universal a jealousy, and set all powers in this part of the world so much upon their guard, that none of them, not even his Imp^t Mat^y himself, can think of giving the Czarina the least assistance. You will see the thoughts of the court of France upon this subject by the inclosed extract of a letter to me from our ambassador at Paris. Your Ex^{cy} will sound in a proper manner the French minister with you, and find whether he has as yet received instructions from his court agreeable to those mentioned by his Ex^{cy} M^r. Walpole.

The tsaritsa must be kept engaged on the side of Asia, so that she might be "less attentive and less enterprizing to create trouble and uneasiness to the King on this side." Yet Stanyan must be careful to observe absolute secrecy, and "whenever you animate the Turks against the Muscovites not to say or do anything that may look like incensing them against the Emperor," so that, if anything leaked out, no offence could be taken at Vienna.¹

Hitherto Stanyan's French colleague at the Porte, the marquis de Bonac, had worked as steadily for peace between Turkey and Russia as Stanyan for the opposite. Now this policy was changed. The advice from Walpole was of orders going to Andrezel, in charge of French affairs at Constantinople since Bonac's recent departure, to support Stanyan in his inflammatory work. Two months later Robinson confirmed, reporting that when Prince Kurakin had called attention to the Turkish victories in Persia, and had asked that Andrezel might have orders to renew the good offices formerly exercised by France, Morville had retorted in refusal the "long and ineffectual negociation" with his court and its "unhear'd of propositions, broached only to render the whole negociation ineffectual and impracticable."²

By Stanyan's report, however, Andrezel was by no means obeying the orders said to have been sent him. On this Horatio Walpole expostulated with Fleury by letter, and Newcastle set out to Robinson in strong language the serious consequences of the French breach of faith, desiring him to press for immediate orders to Andrezel to change his conduct. While the tsaritsa was engaged in Persia, he said, she could not trouble the peace of the north, on the contrary, she must seek the friendship of Great Britain and France in order to

¹ Townshend to Stanyan, 19 November 1725, R.O. Turkey 25, S.P. Dom. Entry Book 272, Regencies 8.

² Robinson, 19 January 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

maintain herself. A breach between Russia and Turkey would have gained the Swedish accession at once, while a guarantee of the Persian provinces appeared to be the great obstacle to her treaty with the emperor. Previously, in a dispatch to be communicated to the French government, Stanyan had been informed of the satisfaction given by the news from Persia and ordered to continue to urge the Turks to diversion against Russia in that quarter.¹

Robinson, obeying his instructions, received from Morville "most solemn assurances of his having above two months since sent the properest and most ample directions to M^r d'Andrezell" in triplicate by different routes. Yet, the secretary observed, he seemed to evade stating whether the directions had been carried out, while Fleury doubted whether they were really what was stated, giving his reasons. New ones were now sent in a sealed dispatch handed to Robinson to be carried to Constantinople by the English courier, and on these Fleury remarked of Morville, "il a écrit plus fortement ces jours-cy."² Yet Saint-Saphorin in March, claiming to have seen all Andrezel's letters to Richelieu, averred that he was not ordered to stir up trouble for the tsaritsa in conjunction with Stanyan, but only to keep her negotiation with Turkey in suspense, so that he might act as a peace-maker, or contrariwise, according to events. He even believed that, but for Richelieu's admonitions, Andrezel would have continued to pursue the former course.³

In April Stanyan was able to report arrival of orders to the French minister to drop all efforts at mediation between Turkey and Russia and to concern himself no more with those affairs. Although Andrezel, he said, disclaimed authority to join in inciting the Porte to active measures, he had undertaken to acquaint the grand vizier that his court was dissatisfied with the tsaritsa's conduct and did not desire favour to be shown her, and had promised to act in concert with Stanyan, so far as he could.⁴

Meanwhile an incident of these negotiations had come near to bring about a definite breach with Austria. The story as embodied in complaints by Barons Palm in London and Fonseca at Paris,⁵ retailed from Vienna and Hamburg,⁶ or published in the Dutch

¹ H. Walpole to Fleury, 25 January (o.s.), R.O. France 183; Newcastle to Robinson, same date, B.M. Add. MS. 32745, and to Stanyan, 15 January (o.s.), R.O. Turkey 25.

² Robinson at great length on 11 and 14 February, Fleury to H. Walpole, 12 and 19 February, *ll.cc.*

³ 17 March, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57. Menshikov informed Campredon similarly (*Sbornik* lxiv. 258, 23 February).

⁴ Stanyan, 2 April (o.s.), R.O. Turkey 25.

⁵ Those of Fonseca in Fleury's letter to H. Walpole, 19 February, R.O. France 183.

⁶ Saint-Saphorin, 30 January and 4 February, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57; Wich, 26 February, Hamburg 43. Wich took from a letter from Constantinople of date 28 December 1725.

gazettes,¹ varied. Its essence was that a courier carrying dispatches to Stanyan, in order to get through, had obtained at Vienna a passport as an English merchant, using the name of Edward, and that immediately on his arrival at Constantinople Stanyan had conferred with Andrezel, and then at a conference with the grand vizier had communicated the treaty of Hanover and pressed for a rupture with Austria, showing how the Turks could never have a better opportunity for recovering their possessions in Hungary, how the allies were determined to reduce the exorbitant power of the emperor, and so on ; to which the grand vizier had replied that an attack upon him might be made next year, after the Persian conquests had been consolidated and the army re-organised.

The courier was Matthew Avison, and the dispatch which he carried that to Stanyan of 19 November 1725, noticed. He confessed to adoption of disguise, but denied using the false name. Suspicion was aroused when he was found neither to have business with nor even to know any of the merchants at Constantinople, and confirmed when he was recognised for a king's messenger.² The rest was the invention of the imperial resident, Dierlin. Stanyan, as we have seen, was instructed to do nothing which might have the appearance of hostility towards Austria. By his account, after finding that Andrezel had not received the orders expected, he had audience of the grand vizier and rendered him an account of what had happened in Christendom during the past year. The vizier remarked that Turkey could but remain a spectator of such distant doings ; what news, he asked, from Muscovy ? Stanyan sketched the divisions of the Russian court and its intention to attack the northern powers through the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's influence, observing that such projects rendered the tsaritsa's attention to affairs in Persia impossible. It was not his business, he said, to urge the Turks to war, but it was incumbent on him as a friend to let them know that they could never find so favourable an opportunity as the present. He was answered that the sultan was resolved not to be the first to break the peace ; ways could be found to reduce the Muscovites without resort to extremities. The vizier then asking about the truth of an alliance between the tsaritsa and the emperor, Stanyan assured him to the contrary, saying that the succession in Russia rendered any such thing impracticable and that, even if it could be brought to pass, the allies of Hanover would keep the emperor so busy that he could in no wise assist the tsaritsa. He perceived all this to give pleasure, and next day sharp action was taken against the Russian minister, action which Stanyan regretted, since it might

¹ As in the *Gazette d'Utrecht* and the *Delfsche Vrydagsche Courant*, copies of which Finch and Dayrolle forwarded on 22 February (R.O. Holland 289, 287).

² Avison's affidavit, sworn on 3 May (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Turkey 25.

be laid at his door. He had taken particular care to say nothing which might inflame feeling against the emperor, but Dierlin had been very jealous to know what had passed ; to prevent his finding out he had himself handed in no memorial but had kept to word of mouth, assuring Dierlin that nothing had passed affecting the emperor's interests directly or indirectly.¹

Resentment at Vienna rose to such a pitch that Saint-Saphorin saw himself menaced with expulsion. Townshend denied the accusations absolutely and threatened reprisal on Palm or other Austrian minister, in case of so insufferable an outrage. He asked Palm whether the complaint he made were serious, and told him that the king was in no way bound to render account of his couriers, that Avison had left the Göhrde with the ordinary recognition-mark and orders to make all speed on his journey, and that if, to get on more quickly, he had adopted a disguise, it was the king's business to complain thereof. The supposed orders to Stanyan he indignantly repudiated, while asserting that the support given to the Pretender would have amply justified them.²

To Fonseca Fleury similarly scouted the whole story as imaginary, telling him that if the emperor would keep quiet France and England would not trouble him.³ Morville disclaimed to Robinson any knowledge of the affair, but let Walpole know that he had told Fonseca that the French preparations for war were purely precautionary, and natural when the king of Spain was doing the like and was supported by the emperor.⁴

Returning, Avison was detained at Belgrade for four weeks, pending receipt of orders about him from Vienna.⁵ Whereon Townshend, to show how little foundation there was for the "*bruits odieux et envenimés*" spread abroad,—although, he said, the irregular and offensive conduct of the court of Vienna merited no endeavour to clear up the matter—sent Saint-Saphorin a translation of the actual orders to Stanyan, not, however, for communication to any living soul, but to be kept very secret. Avison's arrest, he said, was an open and unheard of violation of the rights of nations, and the reasons given made the act the more injurious. Saint-Saphorin must demand satisfaction, threatening, in case of refusal, reprisals on Austrian couriers.⁶

¹ Stanyan, 4 January (o.s.) 1726, *ibid.*

² Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 8 and 22 February (o.s.), R.O. Germany, Empire, 57.

³ Fleury to H. Walpole, 19 February, cited.

⁴ Robinson, 22 February, secret, B.M. Add. MS. 32745, Morville to H. Walpole, 28 February, R.O. France, 183.

⁵ Details in his affidavit cited ; cf. Saint-Saphorin, 16 and 22 February, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57.

⁶ Townshend to him, 1 March (o.s.), *ibid.* Robinson had a great deal to say on

Fleury declared that Richelieu and Saint-Saphorin would know best what reparation to demand for the arrest, that the language used by Prince Eugene was intolerable and must be resented, and that he himself had spoken so strongly to Fonseca on the subject that he appeared to be convinced.¹ Newcastle, on receipt of Stanyan's reports, attributed the stories to "no other intention than to create a difference between his Ma^{ty} and the Porte." He desired Stanyan for the future to send his dispatches by way of Marseilles, addressed to Fenner, the Turkey Company's agent there.² Sinzendorf, when Saint-Saphorin and Richelieu interviewed him together, endeavoured to justify Avison's arrest on the grounds of his false passport and the reliable advices received. Saint-Saphorin claimed to have greatly embarrassed him, and even reported him not displeased to have a pretext of complaint against Prince Eugene. The threat of arresting Austrian couriers, he said, he had not launched, because they need not traverse Hanoverian territory, whereas there was an infinity of places where those of the king might be stopped. So that he was glad to have to make it only if satisfaction were refused. Were that delayed, it might be good to have a pretext for justifying measures which might become necessary in affairs more capital.³

Before Saint-Saphorin met Sinzendorf again a curious thing happened. One of the count's lacqueys left at his house a portfolio of papers, which he was asked to look through. He found a heap of writings, including an answer to his letter of 15 April, drafted by Dumont, "remplie des expressions les plus aigres" and much corrected, and reports from Dierlin and others at Constantinople. By the time that his secretary had copied only Dumont's paper, Sinzendorf's came to say that the portfolio was intended for his master. Saint-Saphorin gave it up, but had seen enough to say that a new insult to himself was meditated, rather than satisfaction. At a further interview with Sinzendorf he indulged in a violent tirade, which he recounts with gusto.⁴ After which, it seems, the affair was allowed to drop.

the matter, and on how to send couriers safely to Constantinople by other routes, in his dispatch of 5 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

¹ To H. Walpole, 17 March, R.O. France 183.

² Newcastle to Stanyan, 24 March (o.s.), R.O. Turkey 25.

³ Saint-Saphorin, 15 April, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57.

⁴ The same, 4 May, *ibid.* 58. His letter to Sinzendorf of 15 April, and the reply, *Lettres historiques*, lxi. 637-645.

CHAPTER XV

AUSTRIA AND SPAIN

A FIRST measure of the court of Vienna to counter the propaganda of the allies of Hanover was to dispatch special ministers to the principal capitals of Europe ; as noticed, Counts Rabutin to Petersburg, Freytag to Copenhagen and Stockholm, Wratislaw to Warsaw, Harrach to Turin. At the Hague we have seen young Count Königsegg-Erps already active, and to Madrid was sent his uncle, Field-Marshal Count Lothar von Königsegg-Rothenfels.¹ Various German princes also were approached, and at the end of the year 1725 a constitutional campaign was set on foot at Ratisbon. Mandates issued to the imperial commissary there, Baron Kirchner, inveighing against the rebel conduct of the electors of Hanover and Brandenburg and requiring him earnestly to dissuade other princes from acceding to their pernicious treaty and to press for their accession to that of Vienna.² A paper supplied set out ten points in which the laws of the empire had been contravened.³ Pamphlets were circulated, chief among them two from Dumont's official pen ; the *Analyse du Traité conclu à Hanovre* and *La Vérité du Fait, du Droit, et de l'Intérêt de tout ce qui concerne le Commerce des Indes*.⁴

Other natural endeavour was to separate Great Britain and France by private overtures to each. On the one side attempt was made at Vienna, in Saint-Saphorin's absence, on the youthful

¹ On his eminent qualifications for the post see Armstrong, pp. 201-2. He had the entire confidence of Prince Eugene, who in his dispatches to him insisted on maintenance of the alliance with Spain and exact fulfilment of the pledges given, especially in regard to subsidies (Arneth, iii. 216-9).

² French translations of one, dated 22 December 1725 and as presented to the diet on 19 January 1726, R.O. Prussia 105, Foreign Ministers 15, of another of 10 March 1726, Treaty Papers 107 and with H. Walpole's of 18 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32746 ; extracts from the latter, Droysen, IV. ii. 112, Dureng, p. 396.

³ R.O. Treaty Papers 107, Germany, States, 179, in the latter case with a dispatch of 3 February.

⁴ The *Analyse* and others in Rousset, vols. ii., iii., see Droysen, pp. 392 note, 412-3, Dureng, pp. 396-8. Saint-Saphorin sent copies of the two mentioned on 9 and 22 February (R.O. Germany, Empire, 57), stating them to have been compiled by Dumont under Sinzendorf's inspection. Another copy of the *Analyse*, sent by Dayrolle from the Hague on 26 February, R.O. Holland 287.

ardour of the duke of Richelieu, on the other General Seckendorf used his duty of paying respects to George I as a pretext for a visit to Hanover. He heard there no uncertain language. Great Britain and France would never tolerate the Ostend Company, Holland would soon join their alliance, Sweden Denmark and other powers would help them to hinder Austria and Spain from cutting the throat of their trade. People in England were as zealous for their sovereign's rights in Germany as for their own at home, and measures would be taken in parliament on his return which would have far-reaching consequences. When Seckendorf proposed consideration of means to avert the evils threatened Townshend recriminated the services rendered to the emperor during so many years and the great sums of money spent on his account, services and expense so ill requited. No proposals, he declared, could be submitted at Vienna, they must issue thence. All that Seckendorf could learn for his solace was that if an expedient could be found to remove the umbrage of the Ostend Company, and if the king had satisfaction of his demands in respect of Bremen and Verden, then the Barrier treaty, if not entirely thrown over, might be amended to Austrian advantage.¹

Richelieu's conduct at Vienna was giving serious disquietude. This, Townshend confided to Saint-Saphorin, was the reason for requiring him to expedite his journey on from Munich.² When Horatio Walpole mentioned the subject at Paris Morville admitted "very ingenuously" how Richelieu had been informed of the emperor's great desire to enter into negotiations and how Petkum³ had played the busy intermediary. He assured Walpole of renewed instructions to the duke "not to give the least attention to propositions of that nature," seeing that the court of Vienna could only want to ensnare him and to create jealousies between France and her best friends. Walpole was sure of the sincerity of the French court and of its desire to avoid anything that might give a handle for jealousy or mistrust.⁴

Saint-Saphorin on his return to Vienna had a vast amount of curious information about Richelieu to retail.⁵ His report received, confidential recourse was had, as usual, to Fleury. His own government, Horatio Walpole wrote to the bishop, was persuaded that Richelieu had acted from ambition to negotiate and to cut a figure,

¹ Seckendorf to Prince Eugene, 17 December 1725, Förster, *Friedrich Wilhelm I*, Urkundenbuch, ii, 57.

² Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 1 December, R.O. Germany, Empire, 56.

³ Called here "an indigent broker for news and negociations on all sides."

⁴ H. Walpole, 30 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

⁵ Filling 35 pages of one of his great dispatches of 12 January 1726, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57, cf. Dureng, pp. 424-6.

not from instructions sent him. It was known, in fact, that he had been rebuked, and better conduct was expected from him for the future ; yet, to avoid risks, it was hoped that Fleury, who had had the chief hand in sending him to Vienna, and so must be more interested than anyone in the success of his embassy, would caution him. In any case it was desired that the thoroughly trustworthy Du Bourg should stay on at Vienna, with power to influence Richelieu, at present too much governed by the abbé de Saint-Rémy, a man more likely to work for the interests of his order than for any other. Surmising that Richelieu might have been tempted on by desire to serve Bourbon as against his rival Orleans, Walpole adverted to the unfortunate consequences of that rivalry and to the latter giving away secrets to the court of Vienna through the duke of Lorraine, as noticed by Saint-Saphorin.¹

Fleury, in a reply copied, he said, in his own hand to ensure privacy, undertook to write to Richelieu again in spite of assurances received from him in response to strong remonstrances already sent, and of his promise to hide nothing, not even his thoughts, from Saint-Saphorin. The bishop professed his own wish to keep Du Bourg at Vienna, as a man who had always given satisfaction, was well acquainted with the ways of the court, and was in close harmony with Saint-Saphorin ; in fact, he had asked Richelieu to request that he might stay. But as Du Bourg had desired to be recalled, and as Walpole's letter must be kept secret, it would be hard to find reasons with Bourbon for retaining him. The fact of Orleans' indiscretion Fleury confessed and undertook to get some one, the duke of Berwick, perhaps, to speak to him. He laid the fault of his quarrel with Bourbon on him, entirely governed by his mother and wanting to share authority, though incapable of exercising it. Fleury did not fear ill consequences to France from their dissension, though admitting that it might easily raise a bad impression abroad ; here again he found it difficult to hit upon a remedy.²

Soon Saint-Saphorin was able to write of Richelieu differently : "on ne peut être plus uni avec lui que je ne le suis, . . . il est dans un très bon chemin."³ And Fleury : "il pense présentement comme on peut le désirer. Il a perdu toute idée de négociation, et il convient qu'il faut s'expliquer avec hauteur avec des gens qui savent la prendre sur ceux qui paroissent les craindre." Walpole gave Fleury the credit for the change, assuring him that "toutes nos craintes à cet égard sont absolument calmées." In reply Fleury sent

¹ H. Walpole to Fleury, 25 January (o.s.), R.O. France 183, rough draft.

² Fleury in reply, 12 February, *ibid.* This correspondence of his with Walpole was extra-private ; he told Robinson that he burnt Walpole's letters as soon as read.

³ 4 February, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57.

a further good report and expressed great pleasure at Richelieu's intimacy with Saint-Saphorin.¹ However the improvement was but temporary; the duke's conduct was to cause most serious annoyance to the British ministers in the future.

Ripperda was back at Madrid on 12 December 1725. At once created secretary of state, duke, grandee of Spain, and knight of the order of the Golden Fleece, after a fortnight Stanhope reported him to have "visibly taken the entire government into his hands, and particularly what relates to foreign affairs. . . . He is to the full as absolute here in all respects as the Card^l Alberoni ever was."² Another fortnight, and he had "got to himself the affairs of the army, as also the inspection of the inland business," and was expected in a few days to replace Sopena as secretary of marine and the Indies.³

Stanhope claimed the right to talk with Ripperda "with more freedom and plainness than any body else, for reasons y^r Lord^p is acquainted withall" and because he had known him intimately for eight years. Doing so, he received protestations which astounded him. On Ripperda's first coming he had reported him to talk "with as much impertinence and insolence as he could have done at Vienna"; had noted "infinitely greater inveteracy" against England and France and attachment to Austria and "all sorts of preparations making with great diligence" for war; and had learnt of request made for the recall of Anglophile Van der Meer and of great commercial concessions promised to the Dutch, should they decline to accede to the treaty of Hanover. Now Ripperda claimed him for his only friend in Spain (a statement says Stanhope, "most certainly true"), asserted that against faction at home and the ruin which war would bring upon him "his only security must be to live in peace, in hopes thereby to merit the favour and protection of the foreign powers," positively and solemnly denied any secret engagements with Austria whatever, whether for marriages or other object, and indignantly disclaimed dealings with the Jacobites, with promise to reveal any designs of theirs, of which he might have knowledge.⁴ He gave "strongest assurances of his accommodating

¹ Further private correspondence of Fleury with H. Walpole, *l.c.*

² Stanhope, 27 December, R.O. Spain 93.

³ Secretary Holzendorf, 7 January 1726, *ibid.* Ripperda, says he, pretended to manage "all the affairs of the monarchy with the assistance of ten commis only" and "acts the Prime Minister in all its colours." Every one was "perplexed and attentive of what would be the event of this strange mutation"; generally it was thought that his temper and "the badness of some rash measures will precipitate him."

⁴ This in spite of letters from James Edward himself, the one of date 7 December, congratulating Ripperda on his recall to Spain, "où je me flatte que vous ne serez par moins attentif à avancer mes intérêts que vous l'avez déjà esté," the other of 9 January, felicitating him on his honours and advancement (B.M. Add. MS. 32685, Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ii. 572, 585).

speedily the affair of Gibraltar to his Majesty's satisfaction," and while avowing "inveterate and irreconcilable hatred of France" asserted earnest desire for close friendship with Great Britain and Holland, without any engagements inconsistent with the treaty of Hanover.¹

Ripperda's passionate declamation might impress at a personal interview, but could have no effect at second hand. "Idle discourse" was the verdict in England, intended, perhaps, to divert the king and parliament from taking necessary precautions. Seeing, Stanhope was told, that there was "no accounting for the conduct of so extraordinary a man," he should respond in a manner to test Ripperda's professions; were he sincere, he might reckon on his Majesty's favour and protection. Particularly Stanhope might express surprise that he should "level all his resentment against France, as the only formidable power with whom Spain would never come to an agreement, and slightly pass over the court of Vienna as one little to be apprehended, when their late behaviour does so plainly shew that their main end and view is to make every other power subservient to them, and in the greatest degree to give laws to all Europe." Would Ripperda prove his sincerity, let him dispose their Catholic Majesties to renew their former amity with France, England and Holland, redress trade grievances old and new, and "desist from any further demand from Gibraltar."

At the same time Robinson at Paris was instructed that Ripperda's object in what he said was to create jealousy between England and France, so that when he showed the extracts from Stanhope's dispatch sent him he must expatiate on the answer made, namely, that the public peace could be preserved only by reconciliation between France and Spain and that the king could enter into no measures but in concert with France.²

About Gibraltar Stanhope had already told Ripperda clearly that demand for its restoration was useless in view of the clear right and title of George I to keep the place.³ Previously he had written of Spanish desire to submit the question to the mediation of the States-General.⁴ At this proposal Newcastle expressed the king's surprise, so soon after Ripperda's professions,⁵ and Finch at the Hague found that pensionary Hoornbeek knew nothing of it and scouted the idea. An answer, he said, prepared, showed that the Dutch would not be the dupes of Spain.⁶ Nor had Ripperda

¹ Stanhope, 17 and 27 December 1725, *l.c.*, the former dispatch Coxe, p. 573.

² Newcastle to Stanhope and to Robinson, 13 January (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Spain 97, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

³ 7 January, R.O. Spain 94.

⁴ 31 December 1725, *ibid.* 93.

⁵ Postscript to his dispatch of 13 January (o.s.) 1726, cited, and again more at length on 3 February (o.s.).

⁶ William Finch, 22 and 25 January, R.O. Holland 289.

better success in proposing to Van der Meer Spanish mediation in the affair of the Ostend Company, that ambassador intimating that the negotiations already instituted at the Hague sufficed.¹

In his great dispatches of 12 January and 4 February Saint-Saphorin dwelt at large on Austrian intentions and armaments, on the outlook in regard to Bavaria, Savoy, Russia and the rest, on sympathy with the Pretender unconcealed and the duke of Wharton's boastings and intimacy with Ripperda, and on the animosity displayed towards the British ministers and himself.² He pictured certain expectation of military help from Mentz Treves and the Palatinate, France to be attacked through Luxemburg, two million piastres from Spain actually in the imperial coffers in good gold, and the reality of danger, when a prince so powerful and of so obstinate character as Charles VI was enabled by the Spanish subsidies to place on the Rhine 50,000 of his own troops alone. Yet, he concluded, what was all this worth, unless France was in an "anéantissement entier"? The court of Vienna must be abashed and made to change its policy by force. Richelieu, similarly, wrote of levies and of demands for troops from Germany foreshadowing an invasion of France by way of Mézières. "Vous pouvez être sur que c'est un projet formé. . . . Cette cour veut absolument la guerre."³

In England the danger was taken to be real, and preparations to meet it were energetically pushed. Already in January a great fleet was ordered to be put in commission. At the opening of parliament, on 20 January (O.S.), the king was made to say :

the distressed condition of some of our Protestant brethren abroad, and the negociations and engagements entered into by some foreign powers, which seem to have laid the foundation of new troubles and disturbances in Europe and to threaten My subjects with the loss of several of the most advantageous

¹ Stanhope, 14 January, R.O. Spain 94. He enclosed copies of letters which had passed between Van der Meer and Ripperda, the latter stating that the emperor desired negotiation at Madrid because the marquis de San Felipe, ordered to the Hague, would through his ill health take so long to get there.

² The Austrian ministers, he said, were abstaining from all civilities towards him, nor was he speaking to them but on matters of no importance, to their great chagrin. "Ils ne m'ont aimé en Suisse, ni à Munich, mais ils sont encore plus fâchés que je suis revenu icy," a main reason being his establishment of the fact that the basis of the alliance with Spain was Don Carlos' marriage. He had word of intention to cause a protest to be made in parliament against his employment, as a foreigner. Of their feeling towards Townshend: "Si ce duc (Wharton) en veut plus à Mons^r le Chevalier Walpole qu' à votre Excellence, en échange cette cour icy suppose qu'elle auroit tout gagné si elle pouvoit vous éloigner, my Lord, des affaires. Elle attend avec beaucoup d'impatience ce qui se passera à l'ouverture du parlement; si les affaires y prennent, comme je l'espère, un bon pli, ils seront fort dérangés."

³ Richelieu, 1 January and 4 February, cited by Dureng, pp. 414-6.

branches of their trade, obliged Me without any loss of time to concert with other Powers such measures as might give a check to the ambitious view of those, who are endeavouring to render themselves formidable, and put a stop to the further progress of such dangerous designs.

There followed reference to undoubted Jacobite hopes "from the prospect of new troubles and commotions; they are already very busy by their instruments and emissaries in those courts, whose measures seem most to favour their purposes, in soliciting and promoting the cause of the Pretender." There was no ambiguity in the answer; loyal addresses were carried unanimously; in the Commons the supplies of men and money asked were granted and the treaty of Hanover was approved by 285 votes to 107. On 24 March (o.s.), in answer to a royal message setting forth the necessity not only of augmenting the fleet but also of taking "such other measures as may most effectually conduce to the desirable ends" recited, it was resolved by 270 votes to 89

That an Humble Address be presented to His Majesty, that He will be pleased to make such an addition to the number of seamen already voted, and to concert such other measures, as His Majesty shall, in His great wisdom, think will best conduce to the security of the trade and navigation of this Kingdom and to the preservation of the peace of Europe. And to assure His Majesty that this House will effectually provide for and make good all such expences and engagements as shall be made for obtaining these great and desirable ends.

The assertions of the British ministers, that the king's policy had the support of the nation, were justified.¹

In France the attitude was different. Protestant interests, the Ostend Company, Jacobite plots, were not matters of first importance there, and venture on war by Austria and Spain was scouted. Morville counted up 220,000 men in course of assembly on the French frontiers and 60,000 militia to be called up, if wanted. When Robinson complained that these great preparations were not advertised, as were the British naval armaments, in order to strike terror into the foe beforehand, he cited the inquietude evinced by the Austrian minister, Baron Fonseca, to prove that they were well known.² Fleury, answering advertence in one of Horatio Walpole's confidential letters to the general conviction of French weakness

¹ Particulars, with many of the speeches in full, B.M. Add. MS. 33033 and in the publications of the time and elsewhere. Horatio Walpole's important speech on 16 February (o.s.), *Historical Register*, xi. 58, Coxe, *Memoirs of Horatio Lord Walpole*, p. 110.

² Robinson, 25 January, B.M. Add. MS. 32745. Particulars of the reconstitution of the French militia, Dureng, pp. 416-8; the printed "Ordonnance" and a further "Arrêt" with Robinson's of 12 and 20 March.

and incapacity to speak out boldly, likened Prince Eugene's "fanfaron" and the noise of Austrian war-preparations to the bombast of Catherine I against Denmark; "quand on veut effectivement faire du mal, on ne l'annoncera pas si fort à l'avance." Bringing to notice the solid measures that were being taken in France both for defence and for attack he did not doubt but that the emperor and the king of Spain would think twice before declaring war. The ardour of parliament he termed most pleasing and likely to have full effect both in Holland and with the king of Sardinia, whose claims were truly insupportable. The British naval armaments must make the king of Spain reflect; he was, it was true, so unstable that heed must be taken lest he should be persuaded into war against his inclination, but all news from that country showed that he would not be the aggressor and did not wish for war with France.¹

Again, when Count Maffei, whom Robinson supposed to have had it from his colleague Di Breglio at Vienna, detailed to Morville the plan above noticed,—invasion of France by way of Thionville and Mézières, supported by magazines established at Coblenz Luxemburg and Treves and covered in the rear by the forces of the electors Palatine and of Mentz and Treves; the joint imperial and Spanish forces being reckoned at 240,000 men² and against those of Hanover and Prussia "the Czarina, Poland, Saxony, and perhaps even Sweden to be engaged"—Morville, says Robinson, put down the scheme as "of a piece with Riperda's other extravagances" and in the present happy circumstances even more chimerical than they.³

It was replied from England that Morville's becoming language to Fonseca would show his court that its dependence on French "timidity and inactivity" was ill founded. The vigorous measures that were being taken in conjunction with England would prevent execution of any of the "vast and ambitious designs" exposed. Robinson was directed to urge the speedy attachment of Bavaria and the posting of a sufficient force on the Alsace frontier, both to protect the German princes well disposed and to hinder others from joining Austria, with advertisement of what was intended. "The very rumour of a very considerable body of men being to be quartered near Germany will and must have a very good effect." Also was

¹ Fleury to H. Walpole, 12 February, R.O. France 183.

² Namely, 70,000 Spanish (30,000 for an army of observation, 20,000 for garrisons, 20,000 in Italy), 150,000 Austrian (40,000 in Italy, 30,000 in Hungary, Transylvania, etc., 10,000 in the home provinces, 70,000 in Flanders), and 20,000 from the three electors. Wich sent from Hamburg on 5 March a trustworthy estimate of the emperor's existing forces at 92,000 foot and 29,000 horse, showing their distribution (R.O. Hamburg 43).

³ Robinson, 22 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

prescribed consultation with the French government on the propriety of making formal inquiry and protest at Vienna about Ripperda's recent revelation of a secret treaty.¹

This was the latest of Ripperda's vagaries. All of a sudden he had avowed to Stanhope secret engagements with Austria; on the one side for support and maintenance of the Ostend Company, on the other for help to recover Gibraltar by force, if good offices did not suffice. Sending the news Stanhope expressed impatience to know what had passed in parliament and in Holland, for that would "decide the fate of Europe as to peace or warr," and intimated that Ripperda was making utmost efforts to get a fleet to sea that summer.² Soon he had the satisfaction of knowing that his previous dispatch, "luckily received two days ago," had been cited in parliament and had greatly contributed to the government's success.³

At Paris Ripperda's divulcation, Robinson reported, was set down as merely "a new sally" of his, and what he declared about Austrian armaments to be impossible.⁴ Not so in England. No more certain proof of a secret treaty, Newcastle wrote, could be had than the statement of the man who had signed it. The terms, considering his character, were not the less likely to be true because absurd. They were what had been suspected all along and were certified by the king of Spain's behaviour. The undertaking to send troops into Spain was odd, but might be only a device for getting subsidies thence. In view of a possible attack upon Gibraltar he desired Stanhope to warn Colonel Kane at once to put the fortress in a proper state of defence and to say whether he had troops enough.⁵

Ripperda was now assuring Stanhope that Philip V, while never giving up his claim to Gibraltar, would not break with England on that account. He still pressed strongly for negotiation and offered a complete equivalent. He accused the Austrian ministers, and particularly Prince Eugene, of urging their master on to war, boasting, however, that Eugene's influence was falling and his own with Charles VI greater than that of all his ministers put together. The only question, he asserted, likely to cause disturbance was that of the Ostend Company, "for that the Emperor out of a punctilio of honour would never be induced to revoke his patent," but if the king of England and the States-General would consent to treat of

¹ Newcastle to him, 10 and 22 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Stanhope, 4 and 11 February, R.O. Spain 94, Cox, pp. 584-6.

³ Newcastle to him, 17 January (o.s.), *ibid.* 97.

⁴ Robinson, 22 February, cited.

⁵ Newcastle to Robinson, 22 February (o.s.), cited, and to Stanhope, same date, R.O. Spain 97.

this matter at Madrid he had authority enough so to limit the trade that it should be harmless.

As a further resort Ripperda sought to convict the French court of treachery towards Great Britain. After hearty congratulation on the success of the late proceedings in parliament and locking all doors to ensure privacy, he confided to Stanhope that the duke of Orleans and others, including Fleury, had offered to persuade Louis XV to join with Austria and Spain in favour of the Pretender, if Philip V would help to bring about the fall of Bourbon. Philip, he said, had as yet declined the proposals, from jealousy of Orleans as the next heir to the French throne and from abatement of zeal for the Pretender's cause since that prince's quarrel with his wife, and he himself opposed, because he saw his own authority and safety threatened by the influence which France would thus acquire in Spain. Stanhope might not have given ear to this, he says, in spite of cognisance of Fleury's efforts for reconciliation, but for convincing and infallible proofs confirmed by Montgon,¹ who, though unacquainted with the particular proposals, had shown letters that he had written to warn Bourbon and incite him to immediate action on the ground that, as Stanhope put it, "the mildness and indecent submissions he has hitherto practised towards this court" had been taken for "effects of weakness and consciousness of his declining credit."²

Reports of intrigue to separate France from Great Britain were nothing new. It was on this account, as said, that Richelieu's conduct at Vienna gave such great concern. There had been previous warning from Montgon of Ripperda sending on a secret mission to Paris the Count de Marcillac, Bourbon's private agent at Madrid, while later Ripperda himself had boasted to Stanhope of ability to reconcile France and Spain in half an hour.³ Sounded, the French ministers had positively denied proposals of any kind made to Spain.⁴ But then had come reports of military preparations slackening both in Spain and France, while Fénelon at the Hague was observed to show attention to the Spanish ministers there. Robinson had been ordered to investigate⁵ and Horatio Walpole in another of his confidential letters reminded Fleury that mutual communication of all advices received, all steps taken, was essential to maintenance of the intimacy of union of the two crowns. This

¹ "Whom I think perfectly sincere in Mon^r le Duc's interest and who lives with me in the greatest confidence."

² Stanhope, 28 February, *ibid.* 94.

³ The same, 27 December 1725 and 27 January 1726. For Marcillac and the complete failure of his mission see Baudrillart, iii. 194-5, 234-5, Syveton, p. 174.

⁴ Newcastle to Stanhope, 27 January (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

⁵ Newcastle to Robinson, 10 February (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

brought from Fleury emphatic denial of any interruption of war-preparations and the statement that neither would his court be lulled to sleep by Ripperda's false hints of reconciliation nor intimidated by his threats. He asserted "que ni directement ni indirectement cet extravagant ministre ne nous a fait faire aucune proposition ni même insinuation de raccomodement"; were any made, it should be communicated, and nothing whatever done but in perfect concert.¹

When Stanhope's dispatch reached Robinson the latter took it straight to Fleury, in order, he wrote, to show the king's confidence in him, presuming his innocence, or, were he guilty, to discover the fact by his disconcertment. Guilty or no, Fleury was not a man to be disconcerted. He received Robinson's disclosure smilingly, said that both Bourbon and himself knew everything already, and ridiculed the whole affair as a device of Ripperda. Next day Morville met Robinson with unusual openness, repudiated attempt at reconciliation with Spain by Bourbon, and showed Montgon's letter.² Afterwards Bourbon showed equal frankness, denied the possibility of reconciliation with Spain save by British mediation, and bore strongest witness to Fleury's fidelity.³

It was replied that his Majesty was alike and equally convinced of Fleury's integrity and of Ripperda's mendacity. Robinson was ordered to express to Bourbon in the strongest manner "the sense that his Ma^{ty} has had of the behaviour of the French court towards him during the whole course of his Highness's administration"; Ripperda's "malicious and ill-grounded assertions," intended only to create jealousy between England and France, made him the more desirous to improve existing good relations. As to Fleury: "You will not fail to acquaint 672 very particularly that his Majesty was not capable of giving the least credit to the malicious and false reports of the duke of Ripperda."⁴

¹ H. Walpole to Fleury, same date, rough draft, Fleury to him, 1 March, copy, R.O. France 183.

² "Very long and ill enough put together," says Robinson, "couched in ambiguous words and cant terms, describing persons and things by odd qualities of time place and habitation, but neither was the duke of Orleans nor M^r de Frejus so much as once pointed at, as well as I could observe," nor anything precise or positive against Bourbon, only "that in general there is such a powerfull cabal." The principal persons indicated, by description only, were Torcy, Le Blanc, Madame de St. Pierre, the dukes of Lévis and Saint-Simon, and Sir Toby Burke (the last-named a noted Jacobite, who after spending several years in Spain had returned to France with the young widow of Luis I, daughter of the regent Orleans, and was now attached to her household. Robinson denounced him to Morville as "a dangerous person, and the more so as being a visionary ideal man, and mad with politicks," who ought to be expelled).

³ Robinson, 13 March, very private and very long, B.M. Add. MS. 32745, partly printed by Cox, *Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole*, pp. 114-5.

⁴ Newcastle in reply, 7 March (o.s.), *ibid*.

To Stanhope Newcastle used yet stronger terms.

I cannot conceal from you that the King has had such experience of the integrity and good intentions of the Bishop Frejus, both for his Maj^{ty}'s interest and the success of the common cause, that his Maj^{ty} cannot give the least credit to a scheme, whereby he must be supposed to act so perfidious and wicked a part. The King, ever since the death of the late duke of Orleans, has had all the reason imaginable to be satisfied with the behaviour of this minister, and I may in confidence observe to your Ex^{cy} that the King has always had such a dependance upon the Bishop, that whenever any thing of consequence was to be transacted with the court of France, that met with any difficulty from the other ministers, application was always made to him, and it has generally been carried thro' by his personal credit and influence with his Most Christian Maj^{ty}. And tho' Mo^r de Frejus has always had the reputation of being bigotted to his own religion, yet he has constantly given the most publick and convincing proofs of his desire to cultivate the good understanding between England and France, and has forwarded, as much as in him lay, the union with Prussia Sweden Holland and those other protestant powers, which it is thought necessary to bring into our alliance. . . . Nothing but the most plain evidence could bring his Majesty to distrust the Bishop.

Probably, Newcastle went on, Ripperda had seen in Fleury's known zeal for his religion and want of accord with Bourbon material for sowing jealousies. Otherwise he would hardly have made to Stanhope a disclosure calculated to defeat the plans of Austria and Spain. That the king and queen would be deterred by "distant apprehension of the duke of Orleans' too great power in France" from accepting proposals, "by which their resentment against Mo^r le Duc would have been gratified, and all the measures of his administration defeated and disappointed," was not probable. Of Montgon and his advices all the French ministers spoke slightly. The fact that similar reports had been industriously spread of late in Vienna Brussels and elsewhere showed that they originated from the imperialists. Yet, Newcastle concluded, the affair was of such consequence that Stanhope should spare no pains to sift it to the bottom.¹

Although again, on 15 March, Stanhope confirmed the truth of what he had written from sources independent of the repeated solemn affirmations of Ripperda, on receipt of Newcastle's dispatch he had to apologise and to confess that a letter to Morville from the merchant Stalpart, which he had seen, was proof enough that Fleury was not intriguing against Bourbon. He still believed, however, that the bishop's name had been used, if without his sanction, because the queen's confessor (Guerra), from whom the information came

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 10 March (o.s.), very private, R.O. Spain 97.

through three credible persons, was now declaiming passionately against him as having turned his coat.¹

This second dispatch received Robinson communicated its contents to Morville and Fleury and endeavoured to get mention of Stalpart's letter, "but I never heard one word about it." Fleury expressed belief that authorisation sent to Stanhope to speak also in the name of Louis XV would "cure the court of Spain of all their false hopes of succeeding here." The calumnies against himself he was inclined to lay at the door of Sir Toby Burke, whose letters to Madrid, he said, examined regularly, were very full in expression. "He finds himself often represented as the Chevalier's intimate acquaintance, tho' he says he never saw the man but twice."²

Confirmatory of belief in French sincerity had been Robinson's late report of utterances by Morville on the subject of private overtures to Saint-Saphorin by the two counts Starhemberg. Strongly approving that minister's refusal to dissociate himself from Richelieu, Morville had stated Louis XV to be entirely opposed to any negotiation with the Austrian ministers, "directly or indirectly, jointly or separately," on the grounds both of mistrust and of unseasonableness. It would be proper, he had said, "to hear the Emperor's offers when all our accessions are finished, when our force shall be great enough to oblige the Emperor, by it's own weight, to perform our conditions; then the particular pretensions of all our allies may be taken care of, and a lasting and universal peace be settled."³

¹ Stanhope, 11 April, R.O. Spain 94. For Stalpart's letter (of 6 April), of which a copy was enclosed, and his relations with Ripperda, see Baudrillart, iii. 238-240, Syveton, pp. 197-8. He was a French merchant, who had made a great fortune and name in Spain but had afterwards been almost ruined by undertaking at the king's persuasion the reform of the trade to the Indies (Baudrillart, iii. 29). Stanhope stated the letter, concerning alliance of France with Spain and Austria, to have been written under Ripperda's supervision. He described Stalpart as an agent of France at Madrid for many years, in close confidence with the French ministers there and corresponding with them and with Morville, also as having an Irish wife of Jacobite sympathies. He had suborned him, he said, some months since by a loan of 400 pistoles, when he was in great want, and so had him entirely at his disposition.

² Robinson, 20 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32745. Later Morville pretended to have forgotten to notice Stalpart's letter from its unimportance, terming it "but an idle attempt of M^r Ripperda . . . to draw this court into a reconciliation with Spain, upon the same extravagant and wild notions as had been so much talked of these three months past" (the same, 30 April).

³ Robinson, 20 March, and similarly on the same date to Saint-Saphorin, B.M. Add. MS. 32745. Particulars of the overtures in that minister's dispatch of 22 February, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57. He wrote at a later date to Robinson: "En général, Monsieur, j'aurai l'honneur de vous dire que l'on m'a essayé, et que l'on auroit voulu m'engager dans une négociation séparée de la France, mais mes négatives ont été d'une sécheresse à leur ôter toute espérance de parvenir à leur but; quoique l'on soit même venu jusques à m'offrir, en cas que sa Majesté voudût garantir leur succession, de se séparer entièrement de l'Espagne" (12 March, copy enclosed by Robinson on 6 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32745).

Ripperda by this time was in difficulties ; the burden that he had shouldered light-heartedly was crushing him. Every one hated him ; the favour of the queen, his sole support, he could retain only by finding money to meet the insistent demands of Königsegg, at Madrid since the middle of January. That ambassador, says Stanhope, declared his court to have been deceived about the king of Spain's wealth—"he finds him more distressed upon that article than the Emperor himself"—while for his part Ripperda complained "that the Germans were unsatiable and would not be contented 'till they had drained the king of his last pistole."¹ In another dispatch he set out the situation as follows :

I am entirely of opinion with y^r Grace as to the little credit to be given to the promises and propositions of the duke de Ripperda, and of his offers of security for the [South Sea] Company's annual ship and for the effects of our merchants in the Spanish ports, not but that I am perswaded of his sincere desire of accommodating matters, from the inability he at present apprehends of being able to support the engagements he has rashly entered into with the court of Vienna, and imminent danger of being disgraced here upon the first misfortune in a warr he shall have engaged his master into, without the least probability of being in a condition to support it, from the disappointments he has met withall from the vigorous resolutions of the parliament, the accession of Holland, and the difficulty arisen to the effectuating the treaty betwixt the Emp^r and the Czarina, &c, for whatsoever his own sentiments and desires may be, he looks upon all other danger as still more remote than of what he must fall into upon his quarrelling with the court of Vienna, as loosing thereby his only support, viz^t that of the queen, whose attachment to and entire dependance upon that court, from her hopes of an arch-dutchess for her son, and whose hatred and rage to that of France continues in as high a degree as ever ; from whence I conclude, My Lord, that peace or warr depends entirely upon the designs and views of the Imperial court and that this is and will be solely and absolutely governed by the inspirations it shall receive from thence. And as the duke de Ripperda several times declared in the most positive manner to the Dutch ambas^r and me in our late conversation with him . . . that the Emperor was absolutely and immovably determined to enter into a warr, rather than revoke his patent to the Ostend Company, and that in such a case the king of Spain would be obliged and was resolved to assist him in it, a warr seems to me unavoidable any otherwise than through the Emperor's finding himself under an absolute impossibility of supporting one, which in my humble opinion would be the case, should any accident happen to the Spanish flota and galeons.

In conclusion Stanhope failed to see how funds for a war could be supplied by Spain otherwise than by seizing the private property of foreigners on board the treasure-fleets. That, he was persuaded,

¹ Stanhope, 28 February 1726, cited.

was Ripperda's intention, and his plea, in justification, that the proprietors were enemies of Spain. No remittances had been made to Vienna of late ; Königsegg was complaining loudly of Ripperda not keeping his word.¹

At the same time that Stanhope was writing as above Newcastle was instructing him that, since the time of year for taking measures for the security of trade was coming on, the King could not, in justice to the merchants, delay orders to him any longer. At an audience to be requested for the purpose he must acquaint the king of Spain with his Majesty's astonishment on hearing of a secret offensive alliance, prejudicial to his subjects and contrary to treaties, and that if measures were taken for protection of trade and prevention of hostile designs he must not be surprised. No more to him, but Ripperda and the other ministers must be reminded of their repeated statements that the two treaties published² were purely defensive and had for their object maintenance of peace, while the secret one, now divulged, proved intention to enter into all measures with the emperor subversive thereof. Reflecting on the two main questions, the Ostend Company and Gibraltar, Newcastle emphasised the liveliness of British determination to resist attack. He recalled to notice the prosperous outlook ; the fidelity of and great military preparations by France, the promising state of the negotiations with Bavaria and Savoy, the attachment of Hesse-Cassel, and, " what we think of greater consequence than all other considerations," the proximate readiness of the fleet for sea. All foreign ministers, he said, saw that the king's measures had " not only the approbation of his parliament but the universal applause of all his people." So that there was little to apprehend ; the only difficulty was to know how far their opponents would venture, and that Stanhope ought soon to be able to clear up.³

Next, Stanhope's dispatch received, Newcastle was sure that " a steady and resolute behaviour on the part of the King and his allys will soon reduce the court of Spain to a necessity of abandoning their wild projects, and making up with those powers, which they have lately so manifestly injured." The dispositions going forward with such " great success and expedition " would suffice ; they were the " best and only answer " to Ripperda's revelation of the secret treaty. Mediation in the matter of the Ostend Company was offered simply to amuse and gain time ; the like had been rejected in Holland some time since. His Majesty approved what Stanhope had said on the subject and was " exceedingly pleased " with Van der Meer's

¹ The same, 15 March.

² The treaty of peace and that of commerce.

³ Newcastle to Stanhope, 7 March (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Spain 97.

report on the subject to the States-General.¹ "Indeed, the nature of the trade to the East Indies, as well as the particular circumstance of its being carried on from the Austrian Netherlands, is such, that nothing but the putting an entire end to the exercising that trade can be sufficient security to the English and Dutch"; the expedients proposed by Ripperda were impossible "and shew plainly with what view they were prepared." Saint-Saphorin's last advices agreed perfectly with Stanhope's notion that not open hostilities were in view but greater hurt by encroachments upon trade. The Spaniards appeared to hope, by their underhand proceedings, "to lull us to sleep, in such a manner as that their galeons may be in no danger"; they arrived, all projects could be put in execution. Stanhope should discover, through his long intimacy with Grimaldo, what truth there was in information that "great and powerfull partys" were forming against Ripperda in Spain; were it confirmed, he must not fail to contribute what he could "to lessen the power and influence of one, who has been the author of all the measures that Spain has of late entered into against us." Yet, if Ripperda seemed likely to maintain his position and really disposed to change his conduct, Stanhope might deal with him as he should think proper, being on the spot and the best judge.²

Townshend, sending copies of these dispatches for confidential perusal by the Dutch ministers, deduced desire on the part of Ripperda to get out of his engagements about the Ostend Company, given a good handle, though he dared not press the imperial court to yield. Königsegg was evidently dissatisfied, "and if the queen of Spain had not her ambition flatter'd with the expectation of her son Don Carlos's marrying an archdutchess, and did not still breathe revenge against the court of France, there might be a prospect of Spain's coming back soon to their ancient friends and allys and of quitting the dangerous schemes their intrigues with the house of Austria have thrown them into."³

Soon after this Broglie presented a report of French war preparations. It showed the regular army raised to 165,000 men completely equipped, 60,000 militia called out for service by the end of May, 12,000 "invalides," with a double complement of officers, for garrison duty, provisions on the frontiers for six months, all field and siege artillery necessary in readiness, powder in the arsenals sufficient for more than twenty years, a portable bridge of boats under construction for passage of the Rhine at any point and an

¹ Van der Meer's dispatch, of 15 March, of which Stanhope sent a translation, Syveton, pp. 184-7.

² Newcastle to Stanhope, 17 March (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

³ Townshend to W. Finch, 18 March (o.s.), R.O. Holland 289.

infinity of pontoons for smaller rivers, funds for payment of the troops fully assigned. By the end of April, it was stated, 55,000 men would be ready on the Upper Rhine to march wherever wanted, 18,000 on the Moselle, 40,000 in Roussillon, 20,000 towards Flanders. Were more required, one of the new militia battalions would be incorporated in each old regiment and replaced within two months by a new levy of equal strength. Ample funds would be forthcoming from the "joyeux avènement" and the "cinquantième" imposed. From all of which it would be clear to the enemies of the allies of Hanover that all possible diligence was being used to put them in a position not only to fear nothing but also to undertake anything required, and that nothing could dissolve their union.¹

At Vienna Saint-Saphorin continued to hold high language. After Sinzendorf had explained to him what really were the emperor's undertakings about Gibraltar and Port Mahon, denying engagements with Spain contrary to those of the Quadruple Alliance, he brought forward Ripperda's confession, suggesting his object to have been to alarm Great Britain and the States-General and prevent the latter from acceding to the treaty of Hanover. Sinzendorf denying the existence of an offensive alliance, Saint-Saphorin countered that specific engagements for mutual succour were really offensive, besides which, were the treaty merely defensive, so was that of Hanover, and there was as much right to complain of the one as of the other; in effect a distinct undertaking had been given to support Spanish pretensions to Gibraltar by force. He claimed again to have left Sinzendorf greatly embarrassed and glad that another appointment obliged him to terminate the interview. He thought also that the evidence of a third treaty coming out was creating sensation at Vienna, since Eugene and Sinzendorf had always positively denied its existence, and he diagnosed a fourth, touching the marriages, and even a fifth, concerting measures for war.

Also Saint-Saphorin attacked Sinzendorf on the subject of Ripperda having said positively that Spain could not go on with Austria much longer, when the latter was so insatiable of money. What money, cried the count, have we received? That Saint-Saphorin did not profess to know. Königsegg, he commented, was certainly discontented with the state of affairs in Spain, and opinion at Vienna was divided between hope and fear. If money came, the emperor could put large forces in the field and would

¹ Broglie to Newcastle, 14 April, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5, original, with copy and translation. If, as Dureng says (p. 418), the report was prepared at Newcastle's request for use in parliament, its statements must be discounted. For reports from French commandants of eastern fortresses see Dureng, p. 415.

hesitate at nothing. But not otherwise ; the orders issued for putting the troops in Italy Germany and the Netherlands on a war footing were probably intended to impress on Ripperda the necessity of sending a supply. Even were such received, although some regiments might be ready towards the end of June others would not be available before August, so that nothing much was likely to be done in the present year. The business was so to arrange matters in the empire that the emperor should be disabled from creating disturbance there, and so from fulfilling his engagements with Spain ; whereon that power could easily be separated from him.¹

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 3 and 15 April, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57.

CHAPTER XVI

APPROACH TO WAR

SINCE, then, George I and his ministers were persuaded that the emperor intended war, but could not wage it without his Spanish subsidies, the obvious expedient was to prevent the money for payment of those subsidies from reaching Spain.

Two fleets, the "flota" and the "galeones," brought to Spain each year the treasure of her American colonies. The flota collected at Vera Cruz the produce of Mexico and the adjacent countries, trafficked to the islands, and assembled for the return voyage at Havana; the galleons took on board at Puerto Bello the wealth of Chile and Peru, brought across from Panama. Besides what was for royal account both fleets exported goods of private ownership for sale or exchange. In this year 1726 the cargoes expected by the galleons were valued at 25 million dollars, the half belonging to the king of Spain or his subjects, three or four million dollars apiece to French and English, the remainder to Dutch, Genoese, Venetians and Hanseatics.¹ On the flota were registered for Cadiz gold and silver, in coin bars or plate, to the value of 12,687,883 dollars, cochineal worth nearly two million, and other commodities raising the total to over fifteen million.²

It was decided to use force; to dispatch a squadron to the West Indies to stop the treasure-fleets' return. The preamble to the instructions for Vice-Admiral Francis Hosier, appointed to command, cited Ripperda's disclosures as confirming "in the most authentick manner" the intention of the emperor and the king of Spain to disturb the peace, and particularly to deprive Great Britain of her

¹ As in a French memorial of June 1726, Dureng, p. 447.

² "Particulars of effects by the Flota arrived at the Havana from La Vera Cruz assigned for Cadiz. Registered Anno 1726," with Stanhope's dispatch of 30 October 1726, R.O. Spain 95. The list of commodities comprised, besides the cochineal, indigo worth 288,875 dollars, and in lesser amounts vanilla, wild cochineal, jalap, contrayerva, chocolate, guatiaca, copal, achiote, cocoa, sugar, liquid amber, balsam, sarsaparilla, oil of Maria, carmine, cevadilla, logwood, hides, china and fine earthenware, precious stones (20,000 dollars), wrought copper, and 142 boxes of presents.

conquests in the last war and of trade rights granted under solemn treaties. Warning was given of two Spanish ships ordered to the West Indies on the pretence of carrying quicksilver for the mines there, but secretly intended to bring back the gold and silver of the flota and galleons, the privately owned portion of which, credibly said to amount to more than three-fourths, it was plainly intended to confiscate to the uses of the king of Spain, for not otherwise could he fulfil his undertaking to find the emperor his annual subsidy of four million dollars. Of the particular directions which followed, and of Hosier's doings, notice will be taken later. A very private letter to Stanhope covering a copy of the instructions desired him to do the deciphering himself and not to divulge or even hint at the affair to any other person.¹

Meanwhile Ripperda was getting into waters deeper and deeper. Every possible expedient employed, cutting down salaries and pensions, tampering with the coinage, and the rest, failed to provide the money wanted for expenses. To prove the impossibility of meeting the demands of Königsegg he had stopped, says Stanhope, "all payments whatsoever (the same thing as shutting up the Exchequer with us)," whence "the greatest consternation and despair imaginable," especially among the moneyed men, large creditors. And yet a camp was preparing for 12,000 men, with magazines and a large train of artillery, thirty pieces having been ordered in haste from Barcelona. How far execution of designs would be pressed Stanhope could not forecast, when affairs were directed by a minister "upon whose veracity no sort of dependance can be had, and what is still worse, who acts upon no fix'd scheme." He recalled Ripperda's "insupportable insolence" on his return from Vienna, his boasting of the power of the emperor with his "irresistable force," and of the king of Spain with his "inexhaustible riches," to face all Europe and "chastise those who should have the boldness to dispute receiving the law from them," to set up the Pretender in England, and to drive the kings of England and Prussia out of their German dominions in one campaign. This he believed to have been Ripperda's real conviction, intoxicated as he was with his new honours and absolute authority; he had expected the accessions of the king of Poland and the tsaritsa to the treaty of Vienna and had supposed that France was too divided to take vigorous action, that parliament would never sanction war with Spain nor the Dutch venture to accede to the treaty of Hanover, and that he himself could command whatever sums of money he wanted. Now everything had turned out contrary; most mortifying was the total inability

¹ The original instructions, of date 28 March (o.s.) 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 19332, copies and drafts R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 69, 80, Entry Books, Domestic, 223.

to raise money without the assistance of the treasure-fleets, "which in case of a warr run the risk of falling into other hands"; Ripperda had entirely changed his way of talking and thinking "and is become as abjectly fearfull, as he was before imperiously intrepid." He had made himself "odious beyond imagination" to the whole Spanish nation, was "by no means agreeable to the king himself," and could only retain the favour of the queen by keeping her assured of an archduchess for her son. "Any handle given to the Emperor for being dissatisfy'd with this court" must bring about his ruin. And so he dared not oppose the Austrian plans openly, but would "engage his master in a warr (in case the Emp^r requires it) however ruinous to Spain and contrary to his own sentiments and inclinations." Summing up, Stanhope believed the Spanish court to be "extreamely averse to the entring upon a warr at present, but that in case the Emperor begins one, or draws one upon him, their Cat^k Maj's *feront cause commune avec luy*. . . . Nothing but a total improbability of succeeding in a warr in the present circumstances will induce this court and that of Vienna to come even to a feigned peace with his Majesty for the gaining of time, and as soon as ever a more favourable conjuncture offers they will not balance to put in execution their projects and engagements in favour of the Pretender &^a." To his declaration made, as ordered, the king's reply had only been that his engagements with the emperor did not preclude desire for the king of England's friendship, while repeated reference to Ripperda's revelation of an offensive alliance had elicited no more than general assurances. At a private conference with Ripperda all that himself and Van der Meer had been able to say thereon had only been answered, patiently and mildly, that the peaceful intentions of the emperor and the king of Spain were proved by their efforts to accommodate the only two questions of importance, those of Gibraltar and the Ostend Company. When to his proposal of a general congress to settle disputes the ambassadors objected that their courts had already taken up their stand on these two matters, he had suggested others requiring settlement. Lastly, as proof that "all sorts of treachery and mischievous designs" were to be expected from him, Stanhope cited Stalpart's letter of 6 April, the excellent reception accorded to Wharton, lately come from Rome with proposals from the Pretender, and information from consul Black at Cadiz of orders to fit out privateers there, as in 1718. From all of which he concluded that no time should be lost in bringing matters to an issue, for when the flota and galleons, expected at the end of June, arrived war would be inevitable.¹

¹ Stanhope, 25 March and 11 April, R.O. Spain 94, Coxe, pp. 588-597; cf. Armstrong, pp. 195-6, Syveton, pp. 188-195.

For the doings of Philip duke of Wharton at Madrid see Benjamin Keene's

Newcastle now, adverting to the Austrian efforts to disunite Great Britain and France by persuading them to separate negotiation, expected the authorisation sent to Stanhope to speak for the king of France in the same style as for his own master to have convinced the court of Madrid of the strict harmony and friendship subsisting between the two crowns, and shown Ripperda how little impression his "malicious suggestions" had made and how useless were "any stratagems he; or any body else, can make use of." He did not doubt that the British and French preparations would soon persuade the Spanish court of the danger of its present policy.¹

The authorisation mentioned was sent in a letter from Morville of 3 April, containing expressions similar to those of Newcastle.² When Stanhope presented it at a special audience Philip V, says he, ("the most diffident and suspicious prince upon earth"), insisted on his earnest desire of accommodating the affair of the Ostend Company and in the end said that he had sent to Vienna a proposal to transfer the seat of the company to Trieste and would say no more until he received an answer, "excepting only that he was not desirous of entering upon a war and most certainly would not begin one." Afterwards Ripperda reiterated his sincere wish for peace, pressed for a congress as the only effectual means to avoid war, and insinuated the king of Spain's disposition to abandon the emperor, if he refused to entertain the said proposal. "To all of which," says Stanhope, "no sort of credit can possibly be given, it being most certain that he (Ripperda) is now actually concerting measures with the Jacobites in favour of the Pretender (as y^r Grace will clearly see by the sequel of this letter) and that this court is at present as much attached to that of Vienna as ever."³

The "sequel" related the discovery of two plans for reinstating James Edward in England, the one proposed by Marshal Berwick's son, the duke of Liria, two months before and now actually under consideration, the other newly submitted by Wharton and supported

account of 5 April, *Hardwicke State Papers*, ii. 636, Mahon, ii. 93. A copy of this, headed "Copy of Mr C. Keen's letter to Mr Robinson, Madrid, 5 April 1726," will be found with Robinson's dispatch of 13 May, cited below; "my friend Keene," he calls the writer. Ripperda would have Stanhope believe that Wharton's coming was a complete surprise and his errand only to request permission for James Edward to visit Madrid; the request refused and Wharton told that no proposition could be received and that he had better return to Rome at once. James Edward's letter of recommendation of Wharton, 4 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32685, Coxe, p. 586.

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 4 April (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

² Copies of it and of Stanhope's reply with his dispatch following.

³ Stanhope, 22 April, R.O. Spain 94. With it a French copy (or translation) of Van der Meer's report of Stanhope's and his own interviews with Ripperda, joint or separate. For the proposal to transfer the Ostend Company to Trieste see the note appended to this chapter.

by Ormonde. Liria's plan was discovered to Stanhope by the Bavarian minister Romet, whom he termed the duke's "most intimate friend" and held, as has been noted, under pecuniary obligation.¹ There is no copy of the information with Stanhope's dispatches, but the plan is set forth in a paper sent by William Finch from the Hague on 7 May, without warrant for its authenticity.² First the author condemned a former plan for burning the ships at Chatham and stated belief that what was now propounded must infallibly succeed, if only the emperor would support the king of Spain sincerely. Assembly of Spanish troops was recommended not in Galicia, where it would arouse suspicion, but in Navarre, on the pretext of protecting the frontier and whence they could be embarked in ports of Guipuzcoa. Liria undertook himself to arm six men-of-war in Brittany and stated Ormonde's willingness to command the whole expedition. Further he engaged to arrange for the embarkation of 6,000 imperial troops at Ostend and to supply arms for two war-ships to be sent to Cadiz with "my Lord Marchal"³ on board; this for a descent on Scotland. James Edward, he recommended, should proceed from Rome by way of Vienna to Ostend and there embark on one of the ships armed in Brittany.

Stanhope noted the disclosure of the previous plans, and connected the reference to Brittany with the doings of the Breton Pomphilly, of whom he had previously written.⁴ He could not doubt adoption of some project of the kind, Wharton and "one Connock (who is and has been the Pretender's secret minister at this court many years) being scarcely ever out of Ripperda's house."⁵ From Cadiz, besides, he had advice of six men-of-war ready for sea, victualled for 100 days and said to be intended for the Indies.

Wharton's scheme, from the revelations made by Ripperda to Stanhope after his fall, appears to have been even wilder than that

¹ Romet said that he had not dared to ask for a copy but had written down the contents from memory and corrected his abstract after thrice again seeing the original; he swore it to be correct save for "some expressions of no consequence." He hoped, he said, soon to get Wharton's project also. Stanhope asked for absolute secrecy to be observed, "the poor man being under the greatest apprehensions even for his life in case he happen to be detected."

² Headed: "Substance d'un projet qui fut donné au ministre le mois de Janvier dernier par Monsr L.D.L. contenant ce qui suit" (R.O. Holland 290). Newcastle advised Stanhope on 7 May (o.s.) that the paper was supposed to have been communicated to the Dutch government by Van der Meer.

³ George Keith, tenth Earl Marischal. Stanhope had advice that he and his brother Colonel Keith, afterwards the famous Marshal Keith, had just left Valencia to embark at Denia. They came to Madrid about 15 June.

⁴ 28 February, saying that Pomphilly, lately from England, had been offering money to "several broken officers" to follow him from Madrid to Brittany, where he had two ships ready. Robinson, on word of this, had presented a memorial desiring inquiry into Pomphilly's proceedings (12 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32745).

⁵ Connock was Sir Toby Burke's correspondent at Madrid.

of Liria. An essential feature was the co-operation of Russia, Alberoni's old idea. The tsaritsa was to dispatch a surprise force of 10,000 men to Scotland, where the Earl Marischal would be ready to receive them with the Highlanders. A Spanish contingent of 8,000 men was to sail from Galician ports under command of Ormonde or some other, while the emperor was to have ready 6,000 at Ostend, besides assembling a considerable force to intimidate the Dutch. The Jacobites in England and France were stated to have ready two millions sterling to promote the enterprise, besides 20,000 arms in France. The Chevalier, when restored to his throne, was to return Gibraltar and Port Mahon to Spain, to guarantee the Ostend Company, and to grant equal commercial privileges in England and the plantations. He was immediately to leave Rome for Vienna to conclude the articles in form, and thence to proceed to embark at Archangel. Ripperda said that Wharton's object in coming to Madrid was to communicate the scheme.¹

Apparent proof of Ripperda's complicity in these plots was shortly furnished by the doings of the count de Lambilly, a leader of the Breton rebellion of 1719,² since resident in Spain and an intimate of his. He suddenly expressed his intention of going to Cadiz on private business. Knowing him to be unacquainted with things maritime or commercial, to have been frequently in conference with the Russian ambassador, Prince Golitsuin, and on the night before his departure, five days since, to have had a private audience of the king and queen; and suspecting that his real commission was to carry to Petersburg 80,000 pistoles in gold lately sent from the treasury to Ripperda's house; Stanhope had him followed and found that he had taken the road not for Cadiz but for France; he suggested as his objective Bilbao, or Santoña, where a man-of-war of 60 guns lay ready for sea.³

Already on Stanhope's advices of 11 April Robinson had been ordered to move at Paris for all possible help in discovering the plans of the Jacobites, as by opening their letters, and to argue from the revelations the necessity of the measures taken in the north, at Constantinople, and against the treasure-fleets. To concert measures for nipping the conspiracies in the bud Horatio Walpole, said Newcastle, was returning to Paris at once. The chief thing was to forward accessions to the treaty of Hanover.⁴

¹ From the report brought to England by Benjamin Keene on Stanhope's behalf at the end of June, of which in Chapter XXI.

² See Bourgeois, pp. 68-70. Stanhope says that at Madrid Lambilly had been made a gentleman of the bedchamber and given the golden key with a considerable pension, had formed a friendship with Ripperda and since the latter's return from Vienna had enjoyed his closest confidence.

³ Stanhope, 6 May, R.O. Spain 94.

⁴ To Robinson, 18 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

Robinson, having read Stanhope's dispatch of 22 April on its way to London, had already sounded the French ministers, hinting at Liria's plan "without mentioning either the author of it, or by what means M^r Stanhope came by it. I endeavoured however to describe it as a very serious affair, to animate M^r de Morville to send fresh orders to Bretagne for securing Pomphilly and his ships, which he promised to do." Fleury he found "more concerned for the king of Spain's behaviour, and what he called a fatal infatuation," fearing for France as well as England. He knew about Lambilly and also told of "12,000 compleat arms" conveyed into Brittany from Liège and there bought up at a low price, "almost given for nothing to the people of the country." On receipt of his present instructions Robinson sent Fleury, by night and "by the usual conveyance," a copy of Stanhope's dispatch, obtaining in reply a promise to make diligent inquiry into the Jacobites' behaviour and correspondence, with special mention of Atterbury and the banker Waters. Robinson reminded him of Burke and suggested placing a strong body of troops, of regiments not suspected, to watch the Flanders frontier.¹

The duke of Berwick, later, dissociated himself completely from his son's conduct. On a hint from Fleury he took Horatio Walpole aside and explained that Liria "was entirely settled in Spain, independant of him, and that he was a perfect stranger" to his conduct, supposing him to act "as he thought was agreeable to the court where he was established." For himself Berwick expressed great respect for George I and entire devotion to French interests.²

So much for these Jacobite lucubrations. On other heads Stanhope undertook to produce twenty people at Madrid to whom Ripperda had boasted of alliance with Austria offensive as well as defensive. Further, in spite of his former declaration, which he could not deny, "Ripperda some days ago in great (pretended) confidence shewed me the secret treaty of the 30th of April 1725, not imagining that I had received a copy of it from y^r Grace, with w^{ch} it agrees, and two days afterwards did the same thing to the Dutch ambassador," pretending that there really was no other treaty. Van der Meer was writing home that he was "not only absolutely convinced of there being other secret articles, but that he is fully perswaded of his having seen thô not read them, for that when Ripperda produced to him the said treaty he observed enclosed in it other large papers fouled up." These he was not allowed to

¹ Robinson, 30 April and 7 May, *ibid.* With his dispatch of 3 May he sent copies of his note to Morville and memorial about Pomphilly and of the satisfactory reply.

² H. Walpole, 21 June, *ibid.* 32746.

see, in spite of his expression of conviction that they contained separate articles. About intrigues with France Stanhope had private information now from Sartine and Montgon, in spite of their being bound to secrecy, that the former had been urged by the two royal confessors to undertake a mission to Paris with instructions from the sovereigns, and that on his declining, unless he were informed of the terms of reconciliation proposed, "they both plainly declared to him that the fundamental one and the *sine qua non* was the court of France's separating itself from that of England, which once agreed to, every thing else would be made easy."¹

Robinson, on reading this, advised against the French government being informed either of a copy of the secret treaty having been sent to Stanhope (it not having been communicated at Paris, probably because of the means by which it had been obtained), or of his confidential relations with Montgon and the others, whose "lights" were useful, but if disclosed "might make those canals useless."²

Newcastle instructed Stanhope to ignore Ripperda's suggestions, whether in regard to the Ostend Company, Gibraltar, or a general congress, as calculated only to gain time pending arrival of the flota and galleons. "Matters which can admit of no modification, or be accommodated in any other way than by the Emperor's desisting from the incroachments upon our trade and Spain's receding from the demand of a part of his Majesty's just possessions, which they have respectively made contrary to the most solemn treaties and engagements," could not be submitted to a congress. On neither head had Stanhope's just representations prevailed with the king of Spain; Ripperda had only endeavoured to disunite the two crowns by separate proposals, and to amuse by negotiation until he could possess himself of the treasure from the West Indies, "without any regard to the lawfull owners." His advocacy of a general congress "left no room to doubt of the intended marriage between Don Carlos and one of the arch dutchesses. Upon the whole it is very evident that the disposition of their Cath^k Maj^{ties} continues as bad, if not worse than ever." The Spanish court was absolutely under the influence of that of Vienna, and its ill intentions were clear enough from the encouragement given to the Jacobites. There was nothing more for Stanhope to do "than to penetrate into their councils and measures, and to give the earliest intelligence of them; and this you have done with wonderfull industry and exactness, and extremely to the King's satisfaction." The Cadiz armaments must probably be intended for Havana and the West Indies, for otherwise they would be prepared at Santander and the

¹ Stanhope, 6 May, cited.

² Robinson, 13 May, R.O. France 183.

three Russian ships have been detained there. "But however should they, contrary to expectation, come hither, we shall be in a very good condition to receive them." Also Newcastle notified the dispatch of letters of recall to Wharton by a special messenger, who must be enabled both to deliver them and to gather evidence against him, for others must have heard his utterances.¹

Shortly before this news had come to Paris that James Edward had left Rome for an unknown destination.² Walpole requested orders to ask for his expulsion or arrest, should he enter France, and such were sent him. From Lambilly's supposed purpose of carrying his 80,000 pistoles to Petersburg, and from intelligence gathered by his spies among the Jacobites, he assumed their hopes chiefly to depend on execution of some project in the north, and he argued this as a fresh reason for engaging Danish troops, under the scheme which he was now propounding. He reported strongest orders sent to Brittany to watch Pomphilly narrowly and to render account of the use and destination of all ships in those ports; he himself, he said, would soon have a person on guard at St. Malo and Brest. Atterbury was talking of the Pretender's departure from Rome with great satisfaction and hinting at some "blow in the north," but yet there appeared nothing ripe for execution, which could have rendered the sudden journey necessary.

Soon another letter from Polignac, of date 9 May, brought news of James Edward's return to Rome after absence of a week. The cardinal's promise, Walpole commented, to give the British agent at Rome the best intelligence he could must be the result of orders from Paris; he was further desired to discover the true reasons of the Pretender's journey. No immediate action seemed to impend, but Jacobite hopes all to hang on expected trouble in the north.³

Meanwhile the Austrian and Spanish ministers in London, Palm and Pozobueno, were encouraging their governments with stories of divisions in England, of discontent with the treaty of Hanover and fears of its consequences inspired to George I by his Hanoverians, of his unwilling subjection to his English ministry, of increasing discord between Townshend and Sir Robert Walpole, and of the violence

¹ To Stanhope, 7 May (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

² First information of this came from Colman and the marquis de la Bastie, the British and French ministers at Florence, from Brindley Skinner, consul at Leghorn, and from Cardinal de Polignac at Rome. A letter from the last-named, of 2 May, confirming previous advice, with Walpole's dispatch. Newcastle wrote on 9 May (o.s.): "Where he is gone, tho' I think it must be towards Spain, there is no doubt but it is with a view to make some attempt here, and in consequence of the measures entered into last year by the Emperor and Spain." He desired Walpole to remark that the design must have been arranged long before Hosiér's expedition could be known at Madrid (B.M. Add. MS. 32746).

³ H. Walpole, 15 to 31 May, *ibid.*

and intrigues of the opposition led by Pulteney. Their letters¹ were intercepted and drew from Newcastle, when sending copies of the more material to Horatio Walpole, scathing denunciation of "this piece of malice," this "vilest and poorest calumny that ever was invented," these "absurd and monstrous accounts," this "impudent and groundless a piece of slander." He sent them, he said, because Pozobueno's letters might be "look'd into" when passing through France, or they might "write the same stuff to their friends at Paris," and so the French government receive false impressions. Walpole must say something to the contrary, advertising, for instance, to the known fondness of the courts of Vienna and Madrid for "spreading any manner of scandal." Save for the manner in which the information had been obtained justice upon the two ministers would have been demanded.²

Before this, Ripperda's rule in Spain was at an end. Dismissed from his offices on 15 May, to escape the fury of the populace he had taken sanctuary in Stanhope's house.

NOTE

PROPOSAL TO TRANSFER THE OSTEND COMPANY TO TRIESTE

This expedient, as has been noticed, was the subject of conversation at Madrid in April 1726. The original author of the suggestion appears to have been Count Tarouca, when yet in Holland. In a letter to Townshend of 7 April, from Vienna, he claimed to have broached it to him and to certain of the Dutch ministers before he left the Hague, and that they had deemed it reasonable. Consequently, he said, although forbidden to make any definite proposition, he had opened the subject with Sinzendorf, suggesting that unanimous consent should be given for the company to trade to the East Indies from Trieste and compensation be made to the Netherlands exchequer for the loss by an equivalent reduction of the subsidies for maintaining the garrisons of the Barrier.

Of Sinzendorf's written answer he enclosed a copy. It recalled Tarouca's statement that the principal object of his mission to Vienna was to conclude an alliance between the emperor and the king of Portugal, and his proposal that a form of treaty should be drafted for discussion at once. On the strength of that the emperor had assured him that he was welcome and had accepted his professions as sincere. So that when he told of his discourse in Holland about removing that stone of offence, the Ostend commerce, he had been heard with pleasure. The emperor, however, believed his right to be incontestable; in establishing the Ostend Company he had yielded to the instances of the people

¹ Translations, Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ii. 498 f. Yet Pozobueno confessed of George I: "if his inclination first leads him to preserve his hereditary dominions, yet his interest obliges him to endeavour to maintain the commerce of England, which is his chief wish, the loss of which he is convinced would effectually prove the ruin of all."

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 23 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

of the Netherlands ; he had been moved to take his final resolution by his natural love towards them, by sense of the infinite calamities which they had suffered, and by the indispensable necessity of maintaining the Barrier, the resources for which must be found in the country itself and could only be derived from commerce. Tarouca would understand that the expedients he proposed could not be discussed in detail until the negotiation, for which the emperor had long declared his readiness and the king of Spain had begun to interpose good offices, was set on foot. The emperor would not depart from this line of conduct, but would hear with pleasure what Tarouca had to say, always reserving consultation with Spain on the means to be proposed.¹

Saint-Saphorin understood, from letters of Van der Meer to Hamel Bruyninx, that Stanhope had broached the idea to Ripperda, who had approved and promised to submit it at Vienna. Richelieu, said Saint-Saphorin, was alarmed, believing the proposal to have been made without consultation with his government and fearing that the emperor would accept it. Saint-Saphorin knew that on Tarouca's overtures letters had been written to the Netherlands and that the directors of the company had been at pains to show that the measure would mean nothing less than revocation of their charter. They were right, he said, for the only difference was that the emperor's honour would outwardly be somewhat covered. He thought the time for such a proposal not yet come and doubted whether its acceptance would be suitable before the States-General had acceded to the treaty of Hanover.² It was replied that Bruyninx was misinformed ; Stanhope had made no formal proposal. Only in discourse, when Ripperda had complained that the English wanted to exclude the whole world from trading to the Indies, he had said that that applied only to countries formerly Spanish ; there would be nothing to say against the emperor establishing a company in his home territories.³

In Holland the plan was condemned. Itterssum, to whom Tarouca confided what had passed, thought it so dangerous that he had carried the count's letter at once, he said, to Hoornbeek, who agreed with him in objecting strongly to the unanimous consent. Other contrary reasons he set forth at length. Townshend replied that Itterssum knew what had been stated to Tarouca about mediation, namely, that while his Majesty would be glad to employ the offices of so friendly a prince as the king of Portugal he could say nothing thereon without the consent of France and the States-General, while in the matter of the Ostend Company mediation was inadmissible. What he had himself endeavoured to impress upon Tarouca, since he was going to Vienna, was the wrong done by the company's establishment, and if he had mentioned Trieste he had never had idea of proposing such a thing formally or of entering into such engagements. And the suggestion about the Barrier subsidies was so unjust, that he had never given it a thought. Compensation for damage done would be demanded rather than concession be made. In answer to which Itterssum reported Hoornbeek to be charmed with the sentiments expressed and to have sent Tarouca a copy of Townshend's letter,

¹ Tarouca to Townshend, 7 April 1726, R.O. Germany, Empire, 225, with Sinzendorf's reply, dated 30 March.

² Saint-Saphorin, 12 May, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

³ Townshend's son, writing for his father, 17 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

so that he must be convinced that the conditions of his proposal were impracticable.¹

Lastly, in a reply to Tarouca delayed till the end of June, Townshend took the coldness of Sinzendorf's answer to show that it was not yet time to speak about the Ostend Company with success. He recalled what he had said in Holland, asserting again that the king could act only in common with the States-General and with France. The Ostend commerce was an affair of treaties and could not be a matter for mediation. "Le fait est trop clair pour être mis en compromis. Mais si l'Empereur, pour ôter cette pierre d'achoppement, s'avisera de transporter ce commerce à Trieste, nous n'aurons rien à y redire." That was all that could be said. For the rest the king was very sensible of Tarouca's good intentions and care for the public peace.²

¹ Correspondence of Itterssum and Townshend, 26 April, 19 April (o.s.), 21 May, R.O. Holland 284.

² Townshend to Tarouca 21 June (o.s.), *ibid.* 225.

CHAPTER XVII

SWEDEN, FURTHER

WE left Poyntz awaiting the result of the next meeting of the senate. Thereat, on 25 February 1726, the decision to continue the negotiation for accession to the treaty of Hanover was confirmed, the minority striving in vain for specification of satisfaction for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Poyntz again thought the accession certain, unless what he termed the king of Prussia's "monstrous conduct" should overturn everything.

What had happened was that after Bülow had attended the third conference, on 19 January, Golovin had given out publicly that he had promised not to interfere in the affair of the accession, and to a letter from him traversing this statement had sent the curtest of replies.¹ Bülow's report received at Berlin, Frederick William had noted on it that Ilgen must go at once to ambassador Golovkin there to apologise; he absolutely refused to fall out with Russia on this account, the whole thing was a Hanoverian machination, and Ilgen must write to Mardefeld that Bülow had received an honest reprimand, honest.² Says Poyntz:

Baron Bulow hath received such orders for offering his master's service to the Holsteiners and Russians here, that our cause had already been desperate, if his own disposition concurring with our solicitations had not withheld him from executing them. The K. of Prussia was on the point of recalling him and treats him with the utmost indignity. It might even cost him his head, if it be known that I am apprised of his secret orders, but the baron has spirit, is resolved to adhere to his master's true interest, and in case of extremity to demand his dismissal and retire to Hamburg." ³

¹ Both letters printed by Rousset, iii. 200-3; copies with Poyntz's dispatch of 19 January (o.s.) 1726. Says he: "Secretary Nolke declares that, whilst he was at Petersburg, Mardefeld declared that if the treaty of Hanover gave any umbrage to the Czarina his master was ready to abandon it. This I suppose might be the reason of Count Golowin's interpreting the general compliments, made him by Baron Bulow, in that sense. I send your Lordship enclosed the letters which have passed between those two ministers on this occasion, which I think shew Golowin to be a liar" (R.O. Sweden 42).

² Droysen, IV. ii. 195.

³ Poyntz, 16 February (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Sweden 42. In a note to Tilson he suggested again a treaty with Sweden without the inclusion of the king of Prussia, "whom they look upon as a millstone about the neck of this alliance."

Three days later Frederick William's outburst of rage, to be noticed in the next chapter, brought Bülow letters of recall. Poyntz now saw his work

murdered by that perfidious blow. The infamous defection of the court of Prussia has driven the accession to a full stand, brought irreparable discredit on our alliance, and ruined all we had been doing here with so much care and pains for six months past. . . . It was not Bulow's conduct, but a deliberate change of measures in his court, that occasion'd his revocation. . . . Bulow's crime consists singly in this, that while his court was prevaricating with us in the most infamous manner, he took them to be in good earnest, and was dull enough to act honestly."¹

As a counter-measure Poyntz got King Frederick to go off into the country to hunt,² so as to postpone Bülow's audience of leave. Then he obtained another conference with the commissioners and persuaded Bülow to attend it before he was disqualified, on the ground that otherwise the whole blame for failure of the negotiation would be laid at his door. "But no expedient," he said, "can possibly be thought of which will ever restore the K^g of Prussia's credit, or remove the disadvantageous impressions, which this visible mark of disunion among the allys has occasiond." In "a very melancholy conversation" with Horn he had proposed admission of the Dutch minister to the conferences, with the view of substituting Holland for Prussia in a new treaty. To that Horn had objected that the fate of Sweden would infallibly be decided before such new negotiation could be perfected; had appealed for help "to save him this one summer"; and had promised, if so maintained, at the riksdag which would meet in January to take such measures as should crush his opponents and force traitors to flee the country. There was no hope, he had said, of persuading the nation to rely for its safety on old treaties or to arm itself, but he had insisted that, if the king of England would undertake its defence, sentiment would be but one and all Russian and Holstein schemes be nullified.

After which Poyntz recounted a private conference with Horn and court-chancellor Düben about procedure. Horn, he said, had wanted separate conferences to deal with each objection made, but himself and Brancas had argued the endless delays involved in advising with their courts on each in turn and insisted on having them all set out to begin with. "He took extremely ill my seeming to suspect the sincerity of his intentions, and told me with some passion that, if I desired it, he would propose the question of the accession tomorrow, but he hoped he should not be looked on as

¹ The same, 24 February (o.s.).

² "This he readily consented to, and travelling all that night in a sledge got eighty miles off the morning after."

any longer answerable for the success." He had expatiated on the organised campaign carried on by his opponents, by speech pamphlet and bribery, to alarm the nation against a treaty which might expose it again to Russian ravages, and had observed that "they had a capricious diet to manage and must make it evident to understandings of all sizes that Sweden might find a solid security in this alliance." He wanted only "to gain time for bringing the senate to accede article by article till some more good news should come in, as for instance the accession of the States-General and the compleat equipment of our squadron, and then to finish all at one stroke." Poyntz answered that he did not mean that everything should be settled in a day, but "that we should not be three months more in holding these conferences"; a courier's journey and return took five weeks at least, and their courts would not be hurried in deciding on matters of such importance. "Count Brancas all this while moderated between us, and helped to keep him in temper."

Then Horn let out that the great difficulty was a reported secret article, of which a copy had come by the last post, exempting the king of Prussia from concern with the affair of the Ostend Company. The Swedes also wanted this, he said, having no interest in the matter nor any possessions out of Europe. The envoys could only reply that they knew nothing of such an article and would answer the objection at the conferences. In the end they carried their point; the treaty to be examined at the conferences article by article and all difficulties to be stated at once.

Further, said Poyntz, although information from Cederhielm that the duke assented to the conferences, hoping that his interests would be made a principal point, had rendered his supporters (as in a memorial presented to the senate by Vellingk) willing to postpone the question of his satisfaction "till the difficulties of the treaty itself should be fully adjusted," yet "the K^s of Prussia's withdrawing his minister putts it out of our power to improve this pacific disposition of the Holsteiners towards getting the accession perfected." Moreover, the additional news of Rabutin going to Petersburg had "intimidated our friends very much, and I know Count Horn has said that if England and France did not support them this year, he would never more have to do with those courts." As to a declaration by Mardefeld, reported by Cederhielm, that the king of Prussia intended to desert the alliance of Hanover: "your L^{dp} will judge whether after this it will be possible for us to go on with the accession upon the present foot." ¹

Although on the king's return Bülow's audience of leave was still put off on the ground of his indisposition, and although, on 19 March,

¹ Same dispatch, 24 February (o.s.).

came orders to the envoy to stay till 20 April,¹ that gave Poyntz little consolation.

This expedient will soon sett our conferences going again, but the K. of Prussia's inconstancy, and his declared resolution of recalling Bulow as soon as the accession is perfected, or rather as soon as the Russian fleet is ready to stir out, has made such deep impression here that I now despair of their acceding soon enough to be of any sort of use to the credit of our alliance. A descent from Muscovy, or a strong squadron from England to prevent it, seem at present the only motives powerful enough to put new life into them, and without one or the other I fear this negociation will after all be left to split on the article of the duke's satisfaction. Perhaps if Count Brancas and I were enabled to declare in the conferences that we had a credit ready for a certain summ in case Sweden should be attacked, and if at the same time a squadron were named for the Baltick, our friends would recover their courage, but they think at present from the choice of the admirals all our ships are destined for the Mediterranean or for guarding our coasts." ²

In England there was disposition to make light of the Bülow affair. The Prussian court, Townshend told Poyntz, was but behaving according to habit and the Swedes must bear with it. "Let us all together make use of the Prussian court as far as they will go with us ; but let us never depend upon them, nor expect a stedly behaviour from them ; for they never had any, either as friends or as foes." If the Swedes would complete their accession before another storm arose they might be sure that the king of Prussia would fear them and their friends at least as much as he now feared the tsaritsa. The secret article spoken of, exempting Prussia from action in respect of the Ostend Company, could only be the separate agreement on the subject between England and France and the States-General. A new negotiation, bringing in Holland, the king thought would take too much time ; the only thing to be done now was to finish the present one, without regard to Prussian action. That king had invited the accession of Sweden by letter and his minister had joined in the conferences ; nothing, not even that minister's recall, could properly be called renouncing or revoking the steps taken. If he did recant, France and Great Britain, having entered on the negotiation with his consent, would have the right to go on with it, unless the Swedes raised points to which he could object.

Adverting then to the interview with Horn and Düben Townshend urged the necessity of finishing the accession as soon as possible, to obviate the dangers threatening.

¹ "And not a day longer, with a permission rather than direction to assist at our conferences, but on pain of his life not to offend the court of Muscovy or Holstein."

² Poyntz, 2 and 9 March (o.s.), *ibid.*

The King has taken care on his part to put it in the power of Sweden to conclude this necessary work by providing a sufficient security for them against all the designs or attempts of the Muscovites. A squadron of twenty stout men-of-war, compleatly manned and provided in all respects, will be ready to sail to the Baltick in a fortnight, or three weeks at farthest, so that they will be in the Sound before it is possible that the ice should permit any thing to stirr out of Petersburg. After making so great an expense for the protection of Sweden surely the King might in return expect to have the accession finished all at one stroke, for since the Swedes themselves don't dare to own publicly their fears and apprehensions of the Muscovites, and consequently cannot pretend to demand our assistance by virtue of the defensive allyance, I do not well see how we can in strictness justify our being at the charge of sending such a squadron, unasked for by the crown to which it is sent, were it not in the view of their accession to our treaty. However, as the King knows and is perswaded of Count Horn's good intentions, and as you have mentioned the right use he designs to make of this squadron's being sent for the benefit and security of Sweden, his Majesty, notwithstanding the many difficulties that lye in his way, and which hereafter may arise upon account of having put the nation to so great an expence before the accession was concluded, would not omit doing all he could to put it into the count's power to serve his country in that manner, and with that effect, he hopes to do by the coming of the King's fleet into those seas.

In conclusion Townshend reaffirmed the necessity of completing the accession quickly, in order that naval action against Russia in defence of Sweden might be justified; hoped that Horn would prevent the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm, a thing which "at this juncture would turn all we are doing for Sweden into ridicule"; and reported the Hessian convention ratified and the accession of the States-General to the treaty of Hanover looked on as certain. Shortly he enclosed copies of the royal message of 24 March (o.s.) and of the Commons' resolution upon it, observing that the vigour shown must give fresh courage to the friends in Sweden.¹

Poyntz had already let Horn know, through Düben, "a man of few words but great veracity," that he believed that, to dispel any doubt on the subject, he might sign a secret undertaking that a British squadron should appear as soon as the seas were open, if Horn

would give me his word of honour that immediately on its arrival the accession should be perfected. That if he dared not undertake for thus much, it would be more adviseable for him to tell us what we had to trust to, and to let us into his real difficulties, than by staying in the country and staving off our conferences to raise a suspicion in our court that he was making a merit towards Muscovy by delaying, or else found himself not strong enough to carry it, and consequently had made Count Brancas and me either his dupes or his lyars.

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 22 and 25 March (o.s.), *ibid.*; the former dispatch partly printed, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 205-6.

Yet, with reference to Düben's arguments, Poyntz was disposed to agree that accession should not be forced upon the Swedes "before the patriot party in the country are clearly convinced of their danger and the necessity of courting our assistance, which a month or two will bring about, the panick beginning to spread already." On the other hand he thought it, perhaps, too dangerous

to leave them to the slow progress of their own understanding, and all will depend on sending the squadron early, and making it so strong that they may not be left to trust to the Danes, of whose courage and honour they have a mean opinion. . . . The Czarina requires to know what Sweden will do towards executing the secret article, and offers them more money if they will join, so that they are hard pressed, but will certainly stand and keep their ground if our squadron comes in time. . . . While France is thought to lean towards Muscovy and the duke, and Prussia declares openly for them, it is no wonder if our friends lose ground and courage.¹

That French sentiment on northern affairs was not wholly consonant with British policy was known in Sweden from the reports of Gedda. In January Robinson had stated Brancas' advices to confirm belief at Paris that the only way to gain the Swedes was by finding some satisfaction for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and that Gedda, requested by Morville to "try the pulse of England" in the matter, had noticed besides in what was said French jealousy of the aims of George I in the north.² Descanting on the subject now, while thinking French partiality for the duke to have been partly cured by late advices of his ignorance and dissipated habits and "the rashness of his councillors," Robinson reported Gedda still to notice uneasiness at the slow progress made in Sweden "shewing itself sometimes very remarkably," while "apprehension of his Majesty's gaining too superiour a credit in the north and becoming by no means dependant upon them" was evident to himself.³

¹ The same, 17 March (o.s.), very private. Of his own arrangements: "I have settled a correspondence with a Swedish officer at Petersburg, who is related to the clergyman's wife with whom the Czarina served in Livonia, whose daughters are now her maids of honour." He enclosed a list of the Russian fleet "gott by Count Brancas's priest from the French shipbuilder in prison" and promised another shortly, obtained from a Swedish officer on the spot.

² Robinson, 12 and 23 January, at much length, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

³ The same, 3 April. As late as 7 May he reported the younger Pecquet to have frankly replied to a remark of his about some fortunate accident occurring that the only one that he knew of, to settle the quiet of the north, was by the two crowns forming a plan to be presented to the duke of Holstein for finishing the affair of Sleswick upon a moderate and reasonable equivalent, which, if accepted, would put an end to the dispute, if not, would justify any future conduct in the garantys.

The next news from Poyntz was encouraging. Assurances from Baron Sparre of British ships and money coming had heartened the "friends"; "the country begins to declare in our favour." Were Bülow allowed to stay and work with himself and Brancas in good earnest the accession of Sweden would soon follow that of Holland. Demand by Reichel for soldiers to serve the duke his master would certainly not be listened to, nor would Swedish ports be open to the Russian fleet, "so that I hope we have all but the accession already." Great effect had been produced in the senate by a letter from Cedercreutz recounting further rhodomontades of Bassewitz; it had brought request to the chancery "to advise what can be done for the safety of the kingdom," an express had been sent to bring Horn back to town, and people talked of equipping ships and galleys.

I look on this letter as a sure step towards the accession, which only waits for the approbation of the patriot party in the country, and will be carried on seriously within a week or a fortnight if Baron Bulow stays. . . . Our greatest danger here is from some revolt or conspiracy, but I believe the bulk of the army and fleet will stand firm, though several officers in both, and some even in the guards, are certainly corrupted. . . . The grand argument against the accession, at present, is this; either Britain was sincere in the assistance designed Sweden during the last war, or not; if not, there is no new reason to expect it will be so now; if sincere, experience has shewn their assistance is not sufficient to protect us against Muscovy. We have their friendship and that of France already, and are not likely to gain that of Prussia by acceding; therefore it is safer not to give the Czarinna this useless provocation. But the majority of the senate are of another sentiment, and I believe would accede tomorrow, if it were not for the reasons already mentioned in the former part of this letter.¹

Robinson also now had better report to send from Paris. Gedda, he wrote, had assurance from Morville that Brancas should have orders to expend the 200,000 livres, which he had in hand, a sum to be even augmented so far as the state of French finances would allow, and moreover, "to raise the greater spirit at Stockholm," to give fullest assurances of effectual support by France.

Monsieur le Duc consented afterwards to the same thing, but with more reluctancy and not without a caution to let the Swedes understand that this court expects that they should finish out of hand upon these promises, which to him, he said, were the same as performances. Tis further agreed between Mo^r de Morville and the Swedish minister that the last shall write

¹ Poyntz, 23 and 30 March and 2 April (o.s.), the last very private, R.O. Sweden 42. In regard, however, to what Sparre had said about money Newcastle wrote (in Townshend's absence): "I cant say a word about money, 'tis most unreasonable to expect it, and neither Sparre nor Diemar had the least encouragement to give such hopes" (12 April (o.s.), *ibid.*).

in the name of the former in the strongest terms to the king and senate to show the necessity of dispatching this affair, at the same time that M. de Morville should give proper directions to M. Brancas for that purpose.¹

Townshend now expressed (by Tilson's hand) his sorrow that Poyntz's hopes "ever could run so low as to think of a dyet for a pis aller to obtain the accession." It could not meet before January, and in the meantime there would be nothing to compensate for the expense of sending a fleet to protect Sweden during the summer. If the accession were not finished before parliament met again

judge you what figure the state of our affairs will then make in either House. . . . His Lo^p says he hopes that you will in pursuance of his letter of 1st March settle some scheme that may put Sweden in a condition of helping her self, and being no more in dread of such plays, for 'tis absolutely necessary some such thing should be done; since we cannot be at their call every year with a squadron.²

At their fifth conference, on 23 April, Count Sparre being absent through illness, the Swedish commissioners specified the restrictions that would be required. In the first place exemption from guarantee of possessions out of Europe, Sweden having none, and, as said to be allowed to Prussia, from obligation to take part in troubles which might arise in Spain or Italy. Secondly, in view of the wide undertakings in regard to *droits*, and especially those of commerce, exemption also from support to treaties in which Sweden had no part, and particularly from engagement in the affair of the Ostend Company further than by the exertion of good offices. Thirdly, limitation of their quota of troops to equality with the Prussian. Fourthly they observed that the praiseworthy intentions of the fourth article, for maintaining the balance of Europe, must be nullified so long as the affair of Sleswick lacked amicable and satisfactory settlement. They did not doubt that the allied powers would be inclined to move the king of Denmark to be equitable towards the duke, this being the most efficacious means to preserve the peace of the north and the Swedes having a special interest in his welfare. "Les offices efficaces, que les Ser^{mes} Roys vos maistres voudroient bien employer en cette rencontre, leur attireront non seulement une gloire immortelle mais feront encore naistre auprez de sa Majesté et le royaume de Suède une reconnoissance très vive et très sincère."

¹ Robinson, 16 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32745. Fleury confirmed what Gedda said, telling Robinson that Bourbon's insistence on the Swedes hastening their accession arose from fear that their "poverty and greediness" might make them delay it "purposely to make fresh demands." Shortly Robinson was able to report the orders to Brancas actually sent, Morville telling him this with great pleasure and Fleury confirming (20 and 23 April).

² Tilson to Poyntz, 5 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 42.

The envoys answered that the seven weeks elapsed since the promise to continue the conferences would, they had hoped, have given ample time to draw up all objections to so simple a defensive treaty. Those now advanced could not be disposed of, when others might follow in contradiction. When all were stated they would be answered suitably to right and equity and to the friendly sentiments of the allies towards Sweden. But there was one point not, it seemed, directly connected with the negotiation, which ought to be cleared up, so as not to form matter for a separate conference and more delay. Was the recommendation in favour of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp made as at his instance, or without his knowledge and solely from the king of Sweden's solicitude for the peace of the north and constant care for his true interests ? ¹

Contesting with suitable arguments the first three points raised, Townshend undertook to meet the fourth, after the accession was completed, by means of a separate article similar to that proposed to Russia ; "on this express condition, that the duke previously change his conduct both towards the two crowns and towards Sweden and act entirely conformable to their interests," and subject to the engagements with Denmark. Yet, in view of "the difficulties and unreasonableness of this condescension," Poyntz must say nothing on this head unless he saw absolute necessity and was sure of effect in inducing the senators to vote for accession immediately. ²

Shortly before this had come to London the startling news of the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm. Informing Poyntz, Townshend supposed the action to have been taken not out of regard to Sweden but from desire to gratify and secure Russia, the tsaritsa in return acceding to the treaty of Vienna and obtaining the emperor's support to her "ambitious views" in favour of her son-in-law. He desired Poyntz to press most strenuously for a Swedish declaration at Vienna that the secret article of the treaty did not oblige the use of force in favour of the duke. The Holsteiners, he observed, having thus thrown themselves into the arms of the emperor must forfeit any sympathy with their cause in France, while in Holland the news had made a great impression in favour of accession to the treaty of Hanover. ³

Tessin and Lanczynski had indeed signed the act of accession at Vienna on 16 and 17 April. It was of simple character, the former wrote to Baron Sparre in London, bringing in the emperor as a party

¹ Poyntz, 13 April (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Townshend to him, 3 May (o.s.), *ibid.* ; the text, in part, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 216-7.

³ The same, 26 April (o.s.), *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 215-6, and more to like effect in his dispatch of 3 May (o.s.), cited.

to the treaty from the beginning.¹ No one was more surprised than Poyntz, who a week after the signature believed that he had "put an effectual stop to the Emperor's accession for the present," seeing that he and Brancas, by expostulation and representation of the danger to Sweden, had obtained positive orders to Tessin not to sign without further instructions. When he received the news he comforted himself with the hope that alterations in the text of the treaty, such as specification of the emperor's possessions to be guaranteed, would prevent completion. Although, he said, "it must be owned that C. Horn's temporising and thoughtlessness has put it in this young man's power by a single dash of his pen to ruin our affairs," yet the king "and some more of our friends are resolved to call a dyett and quit their seats in the senate intirely, rather than ratify, and I am in hopes that this incident will bring on the question for our accession immediately." He reported Golovin to have been informed that Sweden was not obliged to go, nor would go, a step towards exerting force in favour of the duke.²

How Tessin came to sign Poyntz explained as follows. He could not be absolutely forbidden, because of irrevocable orders left by the last riksdag "for cultivating the Emperor's friendship and for continuing to solicit him to support the duke of Holstein," to disobey which would have amounted to high treason. All, therefore, that the "friends" could do had been to raise a succession of pretexts for delay; the last of them, when the Russian demand for full powers to Tessin had to be complied with, care to style the tsaritsa in them empress, which had necessitated their return for substitution of others acceptable at Vienna. After that false security had been inspired by declarations, one by Freytag that the emperor's accession would be conditional on that of Sweden to the treaty of Vienna, another by the Austrian ministers to Tessin that extension of the secret article concerning the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, which he had positive orders to refuse, would be required. "And I may add that C. Horn's mistaken opinion of Tessin's honesty mislead them more than all the rest." When the danger was realised the restrictions decided on were sent to Tessin, but too

¹ A copy of this letter, of date 24 April, with Townshend's dispatch. Saint-Saphorin gives a full account of the circumstances in his long relation of 4 May (R.O. Germany, Empire, 58). The two ministers, he says, signed on different days because of their dispute about precedence; also that it was represented to Lanczynski that the accession was a special mark of friendship towards the tsaritsa and ought to decide the restoration of Sleswick to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Copies of the act of accession, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5, Holland 290, and with Robinson's of 7 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32745; also Martens, i. 29, Dumont, VIII. ii. 130, Rousset, iii. 151. On Jacobite exultation at the news the Swede Klinckowström ("Mr. Kl-m," see pp. 541, 578) gave information (8 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32746, f. 3).

² Poyntz, 13 to 27 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 42.

late ; a copy of the full powers sent to Petersburg having gone to him direct he had opened negotiations and so, when the original reached him a few days later, he was ready to sign, and did. So that, really, "there has not been that falseness and duplicity in their conduct, which from appearances might justly be suspected." And although to refuse ratification absolutely appeared now to be impracticable, yet restrictions were to be first demanded. If the emperor accepted them, he would have "no great reason to bragg of his new alliance," if he did not, then the accession to the treaty of Hanover might be finished first and the other be left either unratified or without significance. "This is at least the only after-game we have to play."¹

At Paris the news was received with something like dismay. Horatio Walpole, on his return, reported minds greatly excited and Horn's sincerity doubted. He pointed out that the count had always said that he could not oppose the imperial accession directly but would do his best to delay and thwart it, and that he might well suppose from Austrian declarations that it would be accorded only in return for the Swedish accession to the treaty of Vienna. He laid the blame on Tessin, as having seized his opportunity to serve the Holstein party. He obtained orders to Brancas to suit those sent to Poyntz, and lauded Gedda's services in the matter. French suspicions, however, were not quieted. Walpole next wrote that if Horn did not expedite affairs, now that the British fleet was at hand, he would lose "all his credit here, even of an honest man," and the sending of full powers to Tessin be looked on as a trick. To clog the ratification with restrictions, or to postpone it, Walpole deemed both impracticable and useless, for the treaty was signed and even if the emperor admitted new articles he would have gained his point. "There seems to be no other step, that can be of use, to be taken by Sweden, besides acceding to the treaty of Hanover, than that of entirely defeating the Emperor's ratification on the account of Tessin having exceeded his orders and powers."²

To conclude this chapter may be cited an interesting exposition by Poyntz of Horn's character situation and aims. Premising that about accession to the treaty of Hanover he was "most hearty and sincere, and resolved to carry it through at any rate, or to fall in the attempt," and that conviction as to his own fate, should the duke ever make himself master in Sweden, made him a "constant and irreconcilable" opponent of the tsaritsa's measures, Poyntz proceeded :

¹ The same, 4 May (o.s.), *ibid.* 43.

² H. Walpole, 18 and 25 May and 5 June, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

After having said thus much, your Ld^p will be surprised to hear me add that I am as firmly perswaded he and he alone has kept the accession back for two months past. This would appear incredible to any one who has not some personal knowledge of Count Horn and of those senators who act under him, and some near, however imperfect view of the weaknesses which attend the infancy of their new establish'd government.

All who know C. Horn will own that his many great and shining vertues are allayed with a strong tincture of fear jealousy and passion. By fear I do not mean cowardice, but that excess of caution which is partly the effect of old age and experience, partly of constitution. If he were possess'd of but one fear at a time, this might spurr him on to action ; but the misfortune is that while he is distracted with contrary ones, balancing one another, he remains irresolute till some one has gott the ascendant over the rest, or till his quick sense of anger is too strong for them all together. But the last carries him only by starts and a little way at a time, of which we have had two or three instances in the course of this negotiation.

His first and predominant fear is certainly that of losing their national liberties and those just perquisites of credit and power which arise to him from his having the guardianship of those libertys. These he thought in danger from the royalists during the last diet, and like an honest patriot made use of the duke and the Holsteiners for defeating so pernicious an enterprise. He now thinks them in greater danger from the mad counsels of the duke's ministers and of their traiterous abettors in this country, and will certainly join with the court as far as is necessary to stop this mischief. But as he has still some remains of jealousy that the king of Sweden has the Hesse succession at heart, and that the K. of G. Britain may one time or other resume the design of favouring it, he will certainly endeavour in a future diet to strengthen the patriots against both those partys and not put the game out of his own hands by raising either of them on the ruins of the other. This is one reason, tho' a more remote one, of his acting slowly and cautiously in bringing the accession before the senate.

Another fear which torments him is, least their liberties remaining untouched, the prime administration should nevertheless be wrested out of his hands. He knows that as several in the senate are jealous of his authority, so the diet are jealous of the authority of the senate, and that it will be of little service to him to carry his point in the senate, except it can be supported in a diet. This I take to be the immediate reason why he will not propose the accession in the senate, unless he can find means to bring each individual senator, or all except one or two, to vote for it, and consequently to support it as their one act. Those who follow him in the senate are men of honest minds, but mostly mutes and of little weight in a diet. The best tongues and pens next to his own are against us ; and being generally of the new nobility, whom he has always depress'd, will have numerous followers. He has consulted some of the patriots in the country and found them more disposed to insist on some immediate satisfaction for the duke, than that prince's conduct deserves. This is owing partly to their fear of Muscovy, which our squadron will remedy, partly to their want of proof of the dangerous designs carrying on at Petersburg, which he will not set in a full light till a diet. If in the mean

time any ill accident should happen to them, not having acceded; this he thinks would drive the diet into the accession, but that if the same should happen between their accession and meeting of the States he should be to answer for it himself, and all his great designs of reformatations might be frustrated. . . . I verily believe the result of all these complicated fears will be this: that he will soon putt the senate to a tryal whether they will all vote for it or not; that if they refuse he will, as soon as our squadron appears, call a diet by surprise and gett himself chosen Marshall, whilst the opposite party are unprovided both as to measures and money, and the Czarina in no condition to supply them, having drain'd her treasury by so expensive an armament. This is more than bare conjecture, and I mention it to your Ld^p under the greatest secrecy as the worst that may happen, with this consolation, that he thinks himself sure of carrying all before him, and putting Sweden on a new foot by this expedient.¹

¹ Poyntz, 16 April (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Sweden 42.

CHAPTER XVIII

MORE TROUBLE WITH PRUSSIA

THE mine which lay ready to explode at Berlin was fired in February 1726 by the very news that was expected to reassure. It was well enough to hear of the success of George I in parliament and of the naval armaments allowed and ordered, but of what lay nearest to Frederick William's heart there was no word. Wallenrodt had led his master to believe that Prince Frederick would accompany his grandfather to England and that at the opening of parliament an appanage would be proposed for him as a preliminary to announcement of his betrothal to Crown-princess Wilhemine. The prince had been left behind at Hanover, and now in the King's Speech there was no mention of him. Confined to his room at Potsdam by a prolonged attack of gout, brooding gloomily on the danger threatening from Russia and on the secretiveness of his allies about their dealings with other powers, Frederick William was in no mood to be disappointed.

The immediate mark of his temper we have seen ; the recall of Bülow from Stockholm. When Rottembourg and Du Bourgay, says the latter, asked for revocation of the order, or the mission of an agreeable substitute, or that Poyntz and Brancas should be empowered to act in the king of Prussia's name, Ilgen and Cnyphausen owned "that their master is in such an ill humour at present, they dare not lay these proposals before him" ; to which Rottembourg had answered that he must look on the king's conduct as "a plain indication of his design to depart from the measures he had enter'd into with the two crowns" and would write to his court accordingly. The Prussian ministers themselves Du Bourgay absolved from part in the affair, stating them to be greatly concerned ; but he expected the king's temper to move him to recall Meinertzhagen also from the Hague and "to oppose in all places, as much as he can, the progress of the accessions to our treaty, especially that of the Dutch." In a private ciphered letter he termed it

too tedious and too disagreeable to relate . . . all the extravagant flights he hath abandoned himself to of late against the King and his ministers, both English and Hannoverian. . . . There appears a concerted design to force

his Majesty to conclude the family alliance which the K. of Prussia has so much at heart, let the price be what it will, . . . for the K. of Prussia infers from Prince Frederick's not going to England with his Majesty (of which his minister at our court had given him great hopes) that the thoughts of this alliance are laid aside.

In the opinion that the assurances of it given were intended only to inveigle him into the treaty of Hanover there were plenty at Berlin to confirm him. "If some expedient be not found to prevent the ill effects of this disposition of mind, God onely knows what will happen." ¹

Townshend's reply ran : "I never found his Maj^{ty} more surprised and concerned in my life than at the contents of your letter," not, indeed, on his own account, after the resolutions of parliament and the naval vote, but for the king of Prussia's own reputation and ultimate interest. Bülow's recall would only give "matter of triumph to the Muscovites and Holsteiners," and the Russians would think that they might "securely insult any one from Berlin who dares speak otherwise than they would have him"; but neither would the Swedes, after his Majesty's strong measures, be less desirous to free themselves from Russian bondage, nor, were Meinertzhagen recalled, the Dutch be "less solicitous about their trade and liberty" or less ready to join with England and France in defence of them. The consequences would fall upon the king of Prussia only. Orders to Du Bourgay how to act must wait till French views were known; in the meantime he must "appear easy and unconcerned and take no notice of what passed to anyone." The marriage-project, his Majesty thought, could hardly be the cause of the king of Prussia's ill humour, but in any case he would not be forced in the matter; any indication of such intention, Townshend could say from knowledge of his temper, would put an end to the match. The result might be to "quicken him to make application to Denmark" but would in no wise hinder his plans, secure as he was of the nation's support. ²

Next Du Bourgay had to tell of anxious inquiries by the queen and others about Prince Frederick's going to England, answered by himself that it was improbable, "as it would oblige his Ma^{ty} to blend the private concerns of his house with those of the nation," which must come first. The king's anger he described as risen to such a pitch that "he seeks with eagerness for all opportunitys of revenge," ³ had assured the Russian ambassador "that he will prevent and

¹ Du Bourgay, 19 February 1726, R.O. Prussia 20, and further on the 21st.

² Townshend in reply, 22 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ "As a proof of which I shall give your Lordship a few instances out of a very great number," viz., a resolution to carry on the works at Gartow on the Elbe at any cost, if only to spite Bernstorff, orders to the Chapter of Magdeburg to suspend Canon

oppose all accessions to the treaty of Hanover," would have Bülow "laid in irons the moment he arrives at Berlin,"¹ and had endorsed Meinertzhagen's dispatches, "this rascal must be recalled, he is in my ennemys interest," and those of Wallenrodt, still writing that conclusion of the marriage was near at hand, "this fellow is bubled by England." Expostulation with ministers had been in vain, "all the answer thay made me was a shrug, with bitter complaints of their melancholy situation with such a prince." Rottembourg had told them plainly that France, if called upon to stand with England or Prussia, would certainly choose the former, and had hinted at withdrawal from Berlin on the pretext of drinking waters; on which the king had used strong expressions of regard for France and for the count personally, so that his resentment was clearly directed against England. His conduct being a "manifest breach" of the seventh article of the treaty of Hanover, Rottembourg agreed that it should be resented spiritedly and a declaration demanded, whether he would stand to his engagements, or no. "We are under no apprehension of his joining our enemys, for thô he pays great court to the Muscovites, yet they are afraid to trust one another." To which Townshend replied that the king of Prussia seemed to be "going the high road to destroy all his honour credit and reputation in the world." He would say no more, pending consultation with the court of France.²

Soon there was improvement. Frederick William marked a letter written to him by Rottembourg with orders to Ilgen to visit the count immediately and give him the strongest assurances of constant attachment to his court and esteem for his person. "I love France and Muscovy," he said, "they have never deceived me." Thereon Rottembourg wished to try personal expostulation, but Ilgen told him that the king would see nobody. In the meantime, Du Bourgay goes on, "a very happy conjuncture" had occurred, advice from Mardefeld that the Russian court would come to no terms with Prussia until it was seen what offers the emperor would make through Rabutin; that had put the king "into as great a passion and anger against the Muscovites as he was before with us." Another minister was to be sent to Sweden in Bülow's place, and a second letter from Rottembourg had produced orders to Bülow to stay on at Stockholm, continuing the conferences, till 20 April, besides most solemn assurances of fidelity to the treaty of

Alvensleben's revenue, purely because of his attachment to the king of England, and a refusal to consider the case of Hattorf's relative of the same name (about which in previous dispatches).

¹ The German words, marginally noted on Bülow's dispatch of 30 January, Droysen, IV. ii. 395, note.

² Du Bourgay 21 February, and the reply, 25 February (o.s.), R.O. Prussia 20.

Hanover and friendship towards France. On the other hand Mardefeld was advising that Austrian and Russian proposals would be infinitely more advantageous to Prussia than anything to be hoped for from England and France, while the imperial secretary at Berlin had thanked the king for refusing to join in action against the Ostend Company and assured him that in spite of his illegal entry into the treaty of Hanover the emperor was ready to forget and forgive. Yet the king seemed sensible that he could join in alliance with Russia and Austria only as an inferior, and while ready to bring them into his measures was not so prepared to enter into theirs. Privately Du Bourgay wrote that Rottembourg, who had twelve years' experience of the king of Prussia's character, believed that he had postponed Bülow's return because by the date named he expected to see what effect the good offices of France would have about the marriage, Ilgen hinting that if satisfaction were given on that head all would go well, Mardefeld be recalled, and so on; he himself venturing to write this only because Rottembourg pressed him, saying that the king of Prussia's conduct depended entirely on the outcome of this matter.¹

On 3 March Frederick William, recovered from his illness, came to Berlin for a few days. Rottembourg obtained from him the promise of positive orders to Bülow and Meinertzhagen to act with as great vigour as their British and French colleagues, provided that nothing were required of the latter envoy against the Ostend Company, and to Brandt at Vienna, about Bavaria, such as could be desired. After his own audience, later, Du Bourgay could report the orders sent. And then, on 16 March: "The K. of Prussia has taken the resolution to quiet himself till he sees what will be done for Prince Frederick at the latter end of the session, but if nothing be proposed concerning the marriage before the parliament be prorogued, he says he shall need no other proof of our court's having no design of concluding that alliance." Finally Du Bourgay recommended exhibition of indifference, and treatment of the Prussian ministers at London and Paris with coldness, as the best means to bring the king of Prussia to a right temper, for he would then himself make advances.²

In all that he did Du Bourgay had the advice and help of the queen of Prussia, whose confidant he was of her private letters to her father and who promised him now to do her best to keep her

¹ Du Bourgay, 26 February and 2 March, *ibid.*, with a copy of Rottembourg's letter to the king, of date 21 February.

² The same, 5 to 19 March. Observance of his last advice brought trouble to him later, when Wallenrodt attributed the coldness shown to himself to his false reports. Du Bourgay had to pray for protection from the king of Prussia's anger during the short time that he expected to remain at Berlin (7 May).

husband in his better humour. She named to him two persons, whom it was especially necessary to gain, Gundling, the favourite of the royal table, who had licence to say what he pleased and was used by others to insinuate what they dared not, and Holzendorf, surgeon to the giant grenadiers and brother to Stanhope's secretary at Madrid. "This man, I am assured, has the greatest share in his Prussian Majesty's confidence."¹

At Paris Robinson found Morville "terribly alarmed" at what had happened, troubled with "frightfull ideas of the king of Prussia's defection," and expecting it to be "an absolute bar to the accession of any prince of the Empire whatever," in view of the awe that his military force inspired. As to the marriage-question, while Fleury allowed it to be "a business of much delicacy," in which "no body should presume to intrude upon his Majesty's prudence and pleasure," Morville "seemed to hint as if he thought some satisfaction or at least some hopes being given to his Prussian Majesty, with respect to that affair, might be the properest and readiest means to recover that prince."²

On the manner of treating Frederick William Fleury, in one of his private letters to Horatio Walpole, advocated a mean between too forcible language and too humble compliance with his "bizarres fantaisies." He believed the complaints of want of consideration shown him to be but a pretext, the real fancies of his "chagrins mélancoliques" being that he had nothing solid to gain from the Hanover alliance and might do better with the tsaritsa, getting Courland or extending his hold on Pomerania. "Mais si on luy mettoit le marché à la main, n'y auroit-il pas le danger qu'il nous prit au mot, et que par vanité ou autrement il ne rejetât ensuite

¹ Du Bourgay, 9 March, private, *ibid.* On the subject of the grenadiers he attributed much of the favour shown to Rottembourg to the late arrival of some tall men from France and recommended a similar supply of Englishmen: "this fancy encreases daily beyond any thing your Lo^p can possibly imagine." On 26 March he wrote that General Rank, come to Berlin to obtain payment of certain 47,000 thalers due to him, would probably be successful if he could obtain some giants from Hesse; also that twenty were actually on their way from Russia.

Jakob Paul Gundling, immortalised by Carlyle and set down by Du Bourgay as "a sort of buffoon or madman," was really a man of education and learning degraded by drink; this of itself in the eyes of the philistine Frederick William something of a recommendation. Grumbkow found him employed in the royal cellars and saw in him a man for his own purposes. Introduced to the *Tabakscollegium* Gundling kept the company amused both by witty and knowledgeable talk and by playing the fool and getting tipsy. Seckendorf rated the influence of this "Orakel in publicis" with the king so high as to recommend gaining him by the present of a gold chain and medal, on the pretext that he was writing a history of the emperor Frederick III and would dedicate it to Charles VI. He was allowed an imperial medal set in diamonds, since chains, Prince Eugene wrote, were presents given to ordinary persons, such as couriers. See Förster, *Friedrich Wilhelm I*, i. 254 f. (with a list of Gundling's works), *Urkundenbuch*, ii. 172, *Nachträge*, p. 325.

² Robinson, 12 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

sur nous la cause de cette rupture ? ” The better way, in view of his poor character, seemed to be to make him feel how greatly his glory and reputation were involved ; how, if he deserted the alliance, he would dishonour himself and become to the emperor a slave, whom no prince in Europe would exert himself to free. And this the more, because the inconstancy shown in the changed orders to Bülow might very well appear again.¹

British opinion, on the other hand, was all for strong and plain language. Morville’s “soft methods,” Newcastle wrote, would not serve ; the king was so well acquainted with his son-in-law’s character that he knew the right way to deal with him, and it was hoped that Rottembourg would soon have orders to speak out. There really was no reason for the king of Prussia’s temper ; the family concerns (discussion of which, as purely private and domestic, must be avoided) could only be a pretext ; in reality he was moved by “his hopes and fears from the Czarina and the Emperor.” His conduct was not likely to have much effect in Sweden, in view of the late favourable division in the senate, and not much was to be feared from the tsaritsa, “hated by the Old Russians, weaken’d and distressed by her own senate, and on so bad a foot with the Turks, that we hear her minister has left Constantinople.”²

At subsequent interviews the French statesmen held to their views, emphasising the success of the methods employed by Rottembourg in quieting Frederick William and deprecating direct demand for declaration of his intentions. Morville, to quote one of Robinson’s dispatches, thought

that they might sooth his fear by lessening to him any danger he might apprehend from either the Emperor or the Czarina, and even go so far as to flatter his ambition by hopes of conquests. . . . However justly his Majesty may be supposed to be acquainted with that prince’s temper, yet their latest advices from Berlin gave them reason to think here, that his Prussian Majesty is grown more unreasonable, and less to be understood than ever ; that he is guided by sudden starts, and might in the excess of one of them answer *yes* hastily upon the demand whether he intended to break through his engagements.

However, Robinson obtained a promise that Rottembourg should have orders, such as had Du Bourgay, to procure some positive declaration from the king of Prussia, and he wrote to the latter envoy retailing Morville’s views and suggesting arguments.³ Yet in a letter of his own Morville stated Rottembourg’s advices to confirm his objection to employment of any “*voye de rigueur*,” that envoy’s representations, “*ménagées et affectueuses*,” seeming

¹ Fleury to H. Walpole, 17 March, copy, R.O. France 183.

² Newcastle to Robinson, 28 February and 10 March (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

³ Robinson, 20 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

to have re-established calm in the king of Prussia's mind. Continuance of such management, he opined, whether to flatter the king's personal tastes or to quiet his fears, should carry him to work in concert for everything deemed necessary to strengthen the alliance.¹ On which Robinson :

Surely there is reason enough, even after this, to draw a proper declaration from his Prussian Majesty of his intentions to adhere to his engagements. Acting is always better than talking, but methinks, in the present juncture, one positive word from that prince would make some amends. M^r de Morville is still of opinion that he should be treated like a patient, I answered that in some instances the strongest remedies were the properest. But the truth of the matter is they think C^t R—b sends more exact anecdotes and accounts of the *interiour* of that court than either M^r Du Bourgay knows or, if he did know, would send, out of decency.”²

Answer was that his Majesty maintained his opinion, but nevertheless was “perfectly easy with what the court of France has done.” While much pleased at the change on the king of Prussia's part, he could not alter his views on the course to be taken, namely, “when he flies out into such unaccountable behaviour as he has lately done . . . to treat his capricious humours with great coldness and indifference.” With this, from what Du Bourgay said, it seemed that the experienced Rottembourg agreed, but Robinson must not let Morville think that alterations in that envoy's orders were desired, “the King, whatever his private sentiments are, being very well satisfied that they should go on in their own way.”³

From Petersburg, meanwhile, Mardefeld still harped on Russian desire for the friendship of so powerful a prince as the king of Prussia, asserting that no ear would be lent to Austrian overtures if only he could obtain justice for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and in cautious language making his own opinion clear, that if the choice were forced it would be better for his master to stand with Russia than with France or England. Yet the assurances given him remained assurances, and nothing more ; the proposed treaty stayed ; and he had to admit that Catherine I was inflexible on the subject of Sleswick and was making the greatest preparations for action in the spring.⁴

Frederick William had the idea of satisfying the duke by setting him up in Courland, throwing over his purpose, now clearly unattainable, of securing that duchy for a prince of his own house. He

¹ Morville to Robinson, 21 March, R.O. France 183.

² Robinson to Delafaye, 23 March *ibid.*

³ Newcastle to Robinson, 17 and 24 March (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ Droysen IV. ii. 399, citing Mardefeld's dispatches of 16 February and 2 March.

opened the project to Lövenörn and to Colonel Tessin, the duke's minister at Berlin, saying to the former :

Your king has guarantees enough for the duchy of Sleswick without me, I have my grounds for showing the court of Petersburg respect. The kings of France and England recognized, when they concluded with me the treaty of Hanover, that my situation forbade me from stirring up trouble with the tsaritsa ; but on the other hand I will undertake nothing either against the Hanover alliance or against your king, I desire with my whole heart that this business with the duke of Holstein may be ended. Pray your king to write to the king of England to bring him to work for the duchy of Courland as compensation for the duke.¹

And instructions went to Mardefeld and Wallenrodt to like effect.

Townshend, as we have seen, had ventilated the idea in a fugitive utterance some months before.² And Rottembourg was all for it at first,³ the French court being always anxious to satisfy the duke in some way. But in England there was now but one opinion on the subject. As the principal objection Newcastle advanced the bad effect reported by Poyntz from publication of the scheme in Sweden. "Mr Wallenrodt's commission having got some air," he said, Baron Sparre was already declaring "that should we begin any negociation with the court of Petersburg Sweden would be beforehand with us . . . and make up with Muscovy at our expence." He sent a copy of the answer given to Wallenrodt, and an extract from Poyntz's dispatch, to help to convince Morville of the uselessness and danger of any transaction with Russia, or of anything but the accession of Sweden to the treaty of Hanover to secure the north from Russian encroachments.⁴

The French government gave in, as usual ; before long, says Du Bourgay, Rottembourg "received positive orders from his court not to meddle in any affairs, which shall be transacted between this court and Muscovy, without the previous consent of England."⁵ And though Mardefeld met with some encouragement at first, at least from Bassewitz, he had also to listen to various objections.⁶ On his report Frederick William observed that he himself had most to lose by the Courland scheme, but saw so great advantage from a settlement of the Sleswick question that he was resolved strongly

¹ Translated from Lövenörn's dispatch of 10 March, as cited by Holm, i. 165.

² Some, as Poyntz (2 February (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 42), believed that Townshend had opened it to Ilgen at the Göhrde, but Townshend denied that emphatically (23 February (o.s.), *ibid.*).

³ Droysen, p. 400.

⁴ Newcastle to Robinson, 4 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

⁵ Du Bourgay, 7 May, R.O. Prussia 20.

⁶ Mardefeld, 13 April, *Sbornik* xv. 309. One obstacle, he remarked, was Men-shikov's pretension to the duchy for his own family.

to support and bring it into effect.¹ When, however, Mardefeld found the proposal unacceptable to the duke, as well as to the Russian ministers,² it had to be laid aside.

Meanwhile, towards the end of March, Frederick William had sent his resident Chambrier on a special errand to Versailles to express his great surprise and concern that he should ever have been suspected of so mean a thought as of abandoning his allies, and to say that all his ministers abroad were ordered to act in concert with those of France and England; all that he wanted was to be kept informed of what was being done to extend the alliance.³ Besides which a most complimentary letter to Fleury extolled, says Robinson, who saw it and the reply, "the Bishop's reputation that is spread all over Europe, his influence and credit in the French Councils, the share he has had in contributing to the present engagements that France is under, and particularly in cultivating the friendship between their M.C. and Prussian Majesties"; the answer being couched (at Morville's desire, Fleury said) "in such terms, as might insinuate the strongest representations of the necessity of adhering to those engagements, and indeed, my Lord, in my poor judgement nothing can be better calculated for that purpose."⁴ About the same time Du Bourgay was reporting Frederick William to be deeply impressed by the coldness shown to Wallenrodt and by Rottembourg's arguments, Wallenrodt being ordered to make strongest declarations, and Bülow to stay at Stockholm till the accession of Sweden to the treaty of Hanover was procured.⁵

When, shortly afterwards, came report from Poyntz that the Swedish government had consented, at the tsaritsa's request, to invite Prussia to accede to the treaty of Stockholm, Morville promised strong orders to Brancas and to Rottembourg to oppose "so perillous and unconceivable" a resolution, and took opportunity to reflect on Frederick William's unreliability. He foreboded ill both to him and to the common cause from his "extravagant conduct in his home-affairs, particularly with regard to his late ordonnances for inlisting soldiers etc.," and Robinson thought that the French would sooner or later be obliged to concur in his Majesty's opinion of the proper way to treat him. Indeed, at their next interview Morville again expressed the fear that Frederick William's domestic policy might

¹ Rescript of 4 May, *ibid.* 311.

² Mardefeld, 11 May, *ibid.* 312; Droysen, p. 401.

³ Robinson, 26 March, recounting Chambrier's own story, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

⁴ The same, 3 April, private. To Fleury's apology for such "extraordinary civility" to himself and to the French court, civility which "might seem to proceed too much from that prince's affected discontent with England," Robinson replied that the compliments made must inspire his master with pleasure, not with jealousy. Newcastle, in his reply of 4 April (o.s.), endorsed the sentiment.

⁵ Du Bourgay, 6 April, R.O. Prussia 20.

make him "a useless as well as a dangerous ally," although he seemed to be "well fixed at present in his resolutions as to publick affairs, and the alliance in general," and he admitted that "there are occasions, when it is proper to intimidate him upon our side, which, he told me, he had already put in execution."¹

Soon Du Bourgay was again writing in alarmist vein. One Happe,² at the request of the Russian ambassador, it was said, was to replace Bülow at Stockholm, and the imperial secretary had been summoned to Potsdam. "I know from an unquestionable hand that his Prussian Ma^{ty} is in the mind to enter into closest measures with the Emperor, but how long the resolution will hold I cannot tell." Other extraordinary things were transacting, which he could not commit to paper; better for him to come to London at once, with the view of his successor's instructions being prepared.³ There was "no manner of doubt" of the king of Prussia "being resolved to desert us." Rottembourg had rendered full account of the attempts being made to separate France from England. To remonstrances against Mardefeld's conduct the king had answered angrily that the baron's "greatest merit and recommendation with him was his being unacceptable to the two crowns," and that he meant to make his position easier by according the title of Royal Highness to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Although he would be "of twenty different minds before a scheme could be formed," both envoys thought that timely measures should be taken. They were "under daily apprehensions of some sudden devastation of his Majesty's dominions of Hanover" and even of violence against Du Bourgay's person, for which reason he had removed all his papers to a safe place. The best that could be hoped was retention of the king of Prussia as "a useless and unserviceable friend. For it is certain he will never be otherwise than a chargeable ally, and one, against whose fickle humour human prudence can hardly guard." Bülow's recall had been the price of twenty-five tall men from Russia. Rottembourg learnt from Campredon that 20,000 men were cantoned near Petersburg and that already a million roubles had been spent. Mardefeld "had given positive assurances of his master's acceding to the defensive treaty between Sweden and Muscovy and pressed the execution of the Russes wild projects with greater heat than any of the duke of Holstein's ministers, or most devoted friends." From

¹ Robinson, 9 and 12 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

² Sent in 1717 to represent the king of Prussia at Copenhagen. Of his present appointment Wich wrote from Hamburg: "Les réquisitions de la Czarine ont enfin produit l'effet qu'elle a désiré" (3 May, R.O. Hamburg 43).

³ Du Bourgay had lately received notice that on account of his ill health Brigadier-General Sutton (presumably Richard Sutton, sent in 1727 to Cassel) was coming to replace him.

all these things the Holsteiners looked upon their game as safe. A counter-project to the Prussian proposals of last year contained, Rottembourg had discovered, articles obliging the king of Prussia to withdraw from the treaty of Hanover and to join Russia in forcible methods for the duke's satisfaction. His "conduct with respect to the queen and his family is a little alter'd for the better of late ; but as to us, it is still the same, to say no worse." ¹

Rottembourg confirmed these tales, and the French court again was seriously alarmed. Says Robinson : " if to alienate this prince is the great object of other powers, this court is no less solicitous in preserving him." ² Urgent orders went to Rottembourg to prevent any such rash step on his part as acceding to the treaty of Stockholm, and Broglie was instructed to give warning in London that the least further irritation would precipitate him into the arms of Austria. The marriage-question was raised again ; could not, it was asked, Prince Frederick be sent to Berlin on some such pretext as attending a review ? " Cette seule complaisance suffiroit à calmer le roi de Prusse." Moments were precious, for his desertion of the alliance of Hanover, before Holland and Sweden had acceded to it, would do irreparable harm. ³

On the question of the marriage the reply of George I was sharp.

On doit dire de ma part au comte de Broglie, que je n'ay jusqu'icy songé à une autre princesse pour mon petit-fils qu'à la princesse royale de Prusse, mais que mon petit-fils étant jeune, je ne trouve pas encore à propos de le marier et que je m'étonne que le roi de Prusse puisse exiger à tout moment une déclaration de ma part sur cet article, dans le tems même où je ne sçais ce que je dois me promettre de son amitié, qui me paroît souvent bien chance-lante ; que j'espère qu'il y pensera et qu'il me fera voir que la mienne ne lui est pas indifférente et que les bruits que l'on fait courir n'ont pas de fondement, et qu'il ne voudra pas mettre les affaires sur un pied qui empêchera qu'aucune confiance ne puisse jamais être rétablie." ⁴

Later again, when Morville returned to the subject of prince Frederick visiting Berlin, instructing Broglie how keen was Frederick William's desire for it ; ⁵ and when Broglie, in spite of Newcastle's dissuasion (" you may imagine what a surprise such a proposition must be ; I did all I could to be excused from mentioning it to his Maj^{ty} ") insisted on it being broached ; the king, says Newcastle,

out of his great regard for the Most Christian King, commanded me to return only for answer to the count de Broglie that he had already, in mere comply-

¹ Du Bourgay, 20 to 30 April, R.O. Prussia 20.

² Robinson, 30 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

³ Morville to Broglie, 1 May, cited by Dureng, p. 372.

⁴ Answer transmitted by Broglie on 8 May, *ibid.*

⁵ 22 May, Dureng, p. 373.

ance to their court, gone much further in this matter than could have been expected from him, and that any thing more would only serve to make the king of Prussia still more unreasonable ; and his Majesty was sure they would not desire any thing of him that was not consistent with his honour.

Walpole should speak in this sense to the French ministers, expressing himself "in an easy manner to prevent any further application from them upon this subject." ¹

Hardly had Du Bourgay written as last said when the situation, for a time, was changed again. A counter-project received from Petersburg, which Ilgen read to him, among other things required Frederick William to accede to the treaty of Stockholm and to permit the free passage of a Russian force through his dominions for an attack on Sleswick.² With these demands, says Du Bourgay, the king had "flatly refused to comply." Besides which the colonel reported "scornfull answers" returned from Vienna and reassuring advices from Wallenrodt about the marriages. He notified a royal letter and instructions going to London which dealt fully with the situation, Ilgen insisting strongly on what was contained therein about protection against Russian resentment. He concluded :

let the causes be what they will, if some means could be found in this lucid interval to perswade the K. of Prussia to recall M^r Mardefeld and to continue true to his allyance of Hanover only four or five months, there is no manner of doubt but the reconciliation with Muscovy would be perfected, and the peace of the north secured upon his Majesty's owne terms in that time.³

The letter to George I expressed sincere intention of adhering to the treaty of Hanover, adverted to the Russian demands, and asked for consideration of the proposals submitted to meet the case of a Russian attack brought on by the refusal to enter into the views of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. In this, said Frederick William, and in all other cases of offence given by the treaty of Hanover, he counted securely on his Majesty's assistance.⁴ The requirements expressed through Wallenrodt, from what Du Bourgay says of them, were much the same as of old. Townshend assured that the letter had given particular satisfaction and that orders were going to Horatio Walpole to press the French government to form a concert as desired. And again, that no fear was entertained of a league between Austria Russia and Poland (of which Du Bourgay had

¹ To H. Walpole, now back at Paris, 17 May (o.s.), very private, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

² Droysen, pp. 402-5.

³ Du Bourgay, 4 May, R.O. Prussia 20.

⁴ 4 May, R.O. Royal Letters 46, original, King's Letters 52, copy.

sent supposed conditions), "even were they in earnest and their scheme of union practicable." ¹

The orders to Walpole attributed the present turn to the firm conduct of the court of France and desired him to render hearty thanks for Broglie's communication of the instructions to Rottembourg, "in which the little artifices that the court of Prussia had used to disunite the two crowns are treated with due contempt." In fact, said Newcastle, did Walpole know how pleased the king was, "you would not think you could be too lavish of your compliments on this occasion. His Ma^{ty} observes with some pleasure that the method he originally advised has had so good an effect." Since the king of Prussia seemed to be so well disposed, he thought "it would not be amiss to please him so far as to be thinking of a project" for a disposition of troops, such as once mentioned by Morville, and Walpole might say that he was ready to discuss the subject, as Broglie was informed already. Writing again in similar strain a week later Newcastle expressed the hope about the king of Prussia "that we shall not soon hear of any more such flights as he has had of late." ²

Against this Walpole reported, on reaching Paris: "The count Rottenberg himself observes that this sudden calm in the king of Prussia's temper is so extraordinary, that he rather apprehends some new storm than any lasting good weather from it." ³ And as a fact the new storm had already burst. On 11 May Frederick William sent word to London that 10,000 Poles would take part in the threatened attack on Sleswick, that Count Sinzendorf was going to Ratisbon and Munich, doubting little of success, and that he himself could not decline the proposals made by Catherine I unless real help, not paper promises, were given him. ⁴ Three days later he personally desired Du Bourgay

to acquaint his Majesty, that if some effectual methods were not immediately taken to secure him against the dangerous consequences of the measures which were carrying on by the powers in his neighbourhood he would certainly accept of the offers made him by the Emperor and Muscovy, rather than see his country laid wast and ruined by an obstinate adherence to his ally's of Hanover, who, upon mature consideration, could not exclaim against this resolution, since he had called so long for their assistance, to no purpose.

He demanded immediate acceptance of his demands for the establishment of a camp at Crossen, on pain of his defection. "Your people in England," said he, in Du Bourgay's words, "imagine that

¹ Townshend to Du Bourgay, 3 and 10 May (o.s.), R.O. Prussia 20.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 4 and 12 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

³ H. Walpole, 18 May, *ibid.*

⁴ Droysen, p. 405.

they can bring about what they please with their pen, but the only way to prevent the ill designs of our ennemys is to be ready with your swords ; as to your fleet, it is no manner of service here."

To procure delay, pending the king's return from an intended tour of inspection in Prussia, Du Bourgay set forth in a short memorial that the money requisite to set the engaged troops in motion was ordered to be paid out immediately, and that in view of late advices from Russia the most efficacious measures would be taken ; and he advised impression being made by the equipment of an English force. His own arguments, he went on, had produced upon the king

no other effect, than to induce him to believe that the accession of Danemark might be a further security to him, in case the two crowns thought proper to comply with his demand about the camp at Crossen ; upon which I told him what your Lordship had writ to me about the assistance of the Danes. . . . Tho' these dangers are very remote, yet they appear so imminent to his Prussian Majesty that nothing but a quick provision against them can quiet him. The two crowns must therefore resolve either to apply proper remedies, or go on in their views and designs without him.¹

To consult with his ministers on the policy to be pursued in the present threatening conjuncture Frederick William now summoned to Berlin Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau and General von Borcke.² Their deliberations resulted in delivery of the following extraordinary document to the French and British envoys on 27 May.³

If France and Great Britain desired to oppose the march of a Russian army through Prussia and Mecklenburg to recover Sleswick for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, they and Denmark must join their forces with those of Prussia to prevent it. It was not fair to expect the king of Prussia to act alone ; the treaty of Hanover only engaged him to furnish 5,000 men. To show his sincerity he was ready to join in endeavour to find a reasonable equivalent for

¹ Du Bourgay, 17 May, R.O. Prussia 20. With the dispatch a copy of his memorial, of date 12 May.

² "Remarkably attached to the courts of Vienna and Petersburg," says Du Bourgay.

³ For the deliberations, see Droysen, p. 406. Horatio Walpole understood from Rottenbourg's reports that the prince and Borcke were called in on purpose to oppose Ilgen and Cnyphausen ; that the latter were for adherence to the alliance of Hanover, unless terms equally advantageous could be obtained from the emperor, and for opposition in the meanwhile to the passage of Russian troops ; that the prince advocated agreement with Austria first, Borcke with Russia ; that both were at pains to show that the emperor was disposed to do more about Juliers and Berg than could Great Britain and France ; and that Ilgen and Cnyphausen believed that the only course for those powers was to make it evident that they had taken effectual measures to maintain their guarantees of Sleswick by force, the king of Prussia being persuaded that they would never do anything effective in the north (12 June, B.M. Add. MS. 32746).

the duke ; were it refused, he must be insured against the consequent risks. That was to say : France must find twenty-one battalions of 700 men each and forty squadrons of 150, with artillery and munitions complete, the king of England ten Hanoverian battalions and twelve squadrons of like strength, and the king of Denmark, as the prince most nearly interested, (say) ten battalions and 1,800 horse. The whole force, 28,000 foot and 9,800 horse, to be posted as near as possible to the probable scene of action ; the French at Charlemont, the Danes in Holstein on the Mecklenburg frontier. Prussian officers to review the troops, to test their efficiency, and to take lists of them signed by their generals. All to be ready to march six weeks at latest after demand and to be under the king of Prussia's orders. Everything for them to be provided at their masters' costs, the king of Prussia finding only bare cover, should part of them be obliged to lodge in his dominions. Should he happen to lose one of his provinces in a war engaged in only to please his allies he promised himself, pending its recovery, a monthly payment of 300,000 crowns by England and France, through Mess^{rs} Pels of Amsterdam, "*sur une caution bourgeoise, qu'ils donneroient pour cela.*" If, on the other hand, he made conquests, he expected his allies to do all that was possible to secure them to him, or at least till he had reimbursed his expenses. If no conquests, then the said payments to be continued until he was indemnified. The three crowns to make no peace convention or other pact with the enemy excluding him, and especially no peace until he had complete restitution of his losses, this being so just and ordinary a stipulation that it could cause no difficulty. Further, the king of England at once to allow him the title of duke of Mecklenburg and guarantee him the succession there and in Friesland ; this under the clause of the treaty of Hanover guaranteeing rights possessed. Lastly, in view of so marked a proof of his affection for the service and interests of the kings his allies, without regard to the great risks he ran with no hope of the least advantage, they to declare without reserve in favour of his succession to Juliers and Berg, and were it disputed, to employ not only the 12,000 men promised by each under the treaty of Hanover but all their forces to maintain him in so evident and just a right. "*Ce sera par un engagement aussi raisonnable et aussi solide . . . que l'on peut se promettre de sa Majesté une amitié sincère et qui sera à l'épreuve de tout.*"¹

When this document reached London the reply of George I to Frederick William's letter of 4 May lay ready to send. In it much fine language was expended on assurances ; in evidence of determination to help was adduced the hire of the Hessian and the

¹ Copy sent by Du Bourgay on 28 May, R.O. Prussia 20.

readiness of George's own troops ; and reference was made to the constant pressure upon France to place an army on the Rhine and to concert an efficacious plan. Engagements of the king of Poland with the emperor and the tsaritsa, and the success of Austrian solicitations at Munich, were denied. Austria and Russia, it was stated, could do nothing unless sure of Poland and of the most considerable princes of the empire, and in any case the proposed concert would place Prussia in complete security. Now was added to the letter a postscript expressing astonishment at the demands made and obligation to consult the court of France before answer to them could be given.¹ Forwarding it Townshend ridiculed the basis of the demands, the idea that a Russian army could march into Holstein in face of the force that would be gathered to oppose it, not to mention the Baltic fleet and the armies of France. A plan, he said, was expected every day from Paris which would secure the king of Prussia completely.² Rottembourg, however, Horatio Walpole was advising, opined that "general reasonings of the united strength and power of England and France" would never have effect, "unless we proceeded to facts to make that evident." He wanted the necessary preparations against a Russian invasion put in hand without loss of time, and effectual care taken to make the king of Prussia "of as little use and service to the Emperor and his allies, as he has been to us, which, considering the timorous and uncertain temper of his Prussian Majesty, was no difficult matter to do." Thus informed by Morville, Walpole took occasion to observe how agreeable these sentiments were to George I.³

¹ George I to Frederick William I, 30 May (o.s.), R.O. Royal Letters 46, King's Letters 52.

² Townshend to Du Bourgay, 31 May (o.s.), R.O. Prussia 20.

³ H. Walpole, 12 June, cited.

CHAPTER XIX

MILITARY PROPOSALS. DENMARK

THE assurances given to Frederick William of Prussia that his allies would oppose the expected Russian invasion of Germany in arms were genuine enough. The assembly of an army in northern Germany, to act in conjunction with the Prussian and to be supported by French forces stationed on the Rhine, had come into consideration towards the end of March 1726. The basis of the plan, seeing that the Hanoverian and Hessian troops at the command of George I were not sufficient for the purpose, was enlistment of the military strength of Denmark.

On the face of things protestant Denmark, at enmity with Russia and in continual contention with Austria, should have been invited to join the alliance of Hanover. Frederick IV both desired and expected the invitation; he only wanted money to equip a respectable fleet and put some 30,000 men into the field; and there were disquieting reports abroad of Austrian offers to be carried to Copenhagen by Count Freytag and of activity on the part of the Russian envoy there, Alexis Bestuzhev. Circumstances, however, forbade. The Danes were in ill odour both with France and Prussia, and Swedish hatred of them was mortal. It was well understood that if Denmark were admitted Sweden would stay out. At Paris recognition of Frederick's royal title was still refused, and the guarantee of Sleswick, given under compulsion in 1720, was grudged as the principal hindrance to success of the negotiation at Petersburg. The French objected altogether to overtures at Copenhagen, unless in case of failure of the Swedish negotiation or the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm.¹ In vain Frederick, as soon as he knew that the treaty of Hanover was signed, promised through his envoy Baron Söhlenthal in London to join in measures necessary to secure the peace of the north; in vain he undertook never to oppose suitable endeavours to detach Sweden from the power that thought only of disturbing her, to fall in with any plan that George I, as mediator and guarantor of the said peace, might propose,

¹ H. Walpole, 1 November 1725, B.M. Add. MS. 32744.

and to send the necessary orders to his secretary at Stockholm, or dispatch a minister thither to act in concert with Poyntz, as soon as he was informed of the resolution which the Swedes would take in the matter and of the plan to be arranged; to his appeals and assurances no heed was given. When Söhlenthal, in a second memorial, cited a promise given to his colleague Wedderkop at Paris that their master should be invited to accede, he received in answer only reminder of the constant proofs of British friendship shown and a promise that the treaty should be communicated when affairs were riper and the time more suitable.¹ At the end of the year assurances were renewed; secretary Hermann was instructed "upon all occasions to make them sensible how his Ma^{ty} has their master's affairs at heart," although the time to talk about the treaty was still not come.² Hermann reported Grand Chancellor Holsteinborg to reply that the good intentions asserted were never doubted, for which reason private proposals from the duke of Holstein-Gottorp had never had ear,³ and to express complete reliance on George I.⁴ But Wich at Hamburg took note of Danish irritation that Sweden was invited to join the alliance of Hanover and Denmark not.⁵

At Paris in February 1726 repeated and urgent appeals by Wedderkop, consequent upon the alarming advices from Westphalen, were met by assertion of the impracticability of the Russian plan of attack foreshadowed and by renewed discountenance of any advances at Copenhagen, while the negotiation at Stockholm was depending. Morville classed Westphalen with Mardefeld and Campredon (whom, however, he still declined to recall) as the greatest rogues in the world, "all three engaged to the Czarina, and all three in the plot to alarm the world."⁶ Nor had Lövenörn better success at Berlin. Report thence and from Hamburg had it that Frederick William would

¹ Söhlenthal to Townshend, 17 September and 30 October, and the reply, 14 November, R.O. Denmark 48, Foreign Entry Book 245.

² Townshend to Hermann, 20 December, R.O. Denmark 48.

³ Which, as we have seen, was untrue. But the Danish ministers abroad were now ordered to deny the imputation absolutely. This brought publication by the Holsteiners of the overtures made by Westphalen at Petersburg, as by Bassewitz in a paper of reflections to Reichel at Stockholm, a French translation of which Robinson sent home on 19 April 1726, observing that it seemed to have made impression on Fleury. In answer Westphalen put in writing an emphatic asseveration that he had always declared that the king of Denmark would never enter into negotiation about Sleswick, being resolved to stand by the settlement effected, nor had he ever made any proposition or let out a single word in conversation which might give expectation of his master's receding from his resolution (Westphalen to secretary of state Von Hagen, 2 June, copy, or translation, sent by Poyntz on 24 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 44. Poyntz remarked that the letter gave Bassewitz the direct lie).

⁴ Hermann, 1 January 1726, R.O. Denmark 49.

⁵ Wich, 15 January, R.O. Hamburg 43.

⁶ Robinson, 14 and 20 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

not have Denmark admitted to the alliance of Hanover, out of regard for the tsaritsa.¹

Nevertheless the Danes declined to listen to the blandishments of Freytag, arrived at Copenhagen towards the end of January. He inquired, Holsteinborg let Hermann know, whether an invitation to accede to the treaty of Hanover had been received and then made very favourable proposals, to be extended, he said, on receipt of further instructions expected. He himself, said the chancellor, was disinclined to listen and intended to procrastinate, pending knowledge of the king of England's sentiments. At another interview Hermann was informed that Freytag had pressed for the accession of Denmark to the treaty of Vienna but had again been put off. On 16 February he could report the count going on for Stockholm "fort chagrin," after being told that an affair of such consequence must be ripely considered. But he observed Holsteinborg to be very uneasy, fearing the influence of ministers more inclined than himself to terms with Austria.²

First proposal for the assembly of an army in North Germany, to quiet the king of Prussia's fears, came from Fleury. In one of his private letters to Horatio Walpole he observed that although the late storm at Berlin had passed another was likely to arise, and the idea had occurred to him of concerting some plan for that king's protection, if matters came to a rupture. Such a plan, he suggested, might be for Frederick William, instead of attempting defence of his extensive and unfortified frontiers, to join his army with forces which George I would provide in Germany, and to strengthen which safe communication for French troops would be arranged. Such a display of force, Fleury thought, would intimidate the emperor and quiet the king of Prussia's panic terrors; indeed the latter, whose particular foible was his own aggrandisement, would see that he must find profit from a war entered on with so great a superiority. The only danger apparent was that he might desire to provoke a conflict likely to be so advantageous to himself.³

This gave opportunity to remind the French government of Denmark. Adverting to a late last appeal of Wedderkop to himself,

¹ Du Bourgay, 5 and 9 March, R.O. Prussia 20; Wich, 12 March, Hamburg 43.

² Hermann, 29 January to 16 February, R.O. Denmark 49. Robinson understood from Wedderkop that Freytag's proposals included immediate settlement of all matters in dispute, payment of arrears from the last war (some 140,000 dollars), and the hiring of 10,000 troops for use when wanted. And on the other hand that Freytag's high language had brought upon him the threat of complaint of his conduct and of expulsion, were it avowed. If the king of Denmark, he was told, must join one side or the other, he would choose his old allies and guarantors (to Newcastle, 26 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32745). Frederick IV dared not, indeed, break with England and France, if he would keep Sleswick.

³ Fleury to H. Walpole, 25 March, private, R.O. France 183, copy.

to persuade the court of France at least to send a minister to Copenhagen,¹ Walpole asked in his reply to Fleury whether Danish patience and constancy maintained in spite of the little encouragement given and of the emperor's offers did not merit some recognition, now that affairs in Sweden were so well advanced? In Fleury's proposal he saw not only the danger noticed by him, but also the certainty that Frederick William would not content himself with general terms, but would ask for details of the particular dispositions to be made to obtain him his advantages; whence new discussions and disputes, perhaps a return of his ill temper, and alarm to neighbouring powers from whom assistance might be wanted in the future. He reminded Fleury that the greatest difficulties encountered in Holland had been on the king of Prussia's account.²

The letter found the French ministers already envisaging overtures to Denmark. "Without giving any palliating answer, as formerly, upon this subject" Morville, says Robinson, admitted the advisability of sending a minister to Copenhagen, while Fleury, "entirely persuaded of the necessity," stated the matter to be settled. To overcome the difficulty about the king of Denmark's royal title, it could be conceded, he said, in the renewal of the commercial treaty of 1662, now under consideration.³

Returned to Paris Horatio Walpole submitted definite proposals for countering the Austro-Russian menace and keeping the king of Prussia "from taking any extravagant step to our disadvantage." Premising the reality of intention to attack Denmark and then Hanover, he put first the necessity of securing the king of Denmark, already very well disposed and easily able, having plenty of good militia and his coasts protected by the British fleet, to spare 18,000 good troops after providing for necessary garrisons. With them would be joined 14,000 or 15,000 Hanoverians and the 12,000 Hessians in British pay, while France should find 30,000 men in compensation for not sharing that nor any naval expense. Military dispositions to be determined by generals conversant with the localities. The plan, when formed, to be communicated to the king of Prussia, with representation of the danger to which he would be exposed, if he would not join, and ministers to be sent to Ratisbon to influence other princes of the empire. These proposals, Walpole reported, Morville had promised to submit to the Council next day, Fleury seemed to approve of them, and D'Huxelles Berwick and Chavigny had also been consulted. All that he had said at present

¹ Wedderkop to H. Walpole, 16 March, *ibid.*

² H. Walpole to Fleury, 24 March (o.s.), *ibid.*, rough draft.

³ Robinson, 2 and 3 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32745, the latter dispatch, recounting Fleury's views, as usual private.

was that "the foundation of our plan should be to take care to have a body of troops sufficient to oppose the enemies' designs in the north, in case the king of Prussia should not be brought to act in concert with us."¹

Newcastle deemed the proposed arrangements fully adequate to withstand the hostile plans of Austria and Russia, even should Poland and Prussia combine with them, "notwithstanding the almost unsurmountable difficulties that there is to unite these different interests together." He argued from the "vigorous disposition" of the king of Denmark, exhibited in his declaration through Lövenörn at Berlin that should the Russian attack be prosecuted he would seize ducal Holstein,² the propriety of declaring to him, "as the justice of the thing and the necessity of our affairs require," in the first place his duty to reciprocate the costly efforts of Great Britain and France for his security and in the second that otherwise the two crowns could not in reason be expected longer to support the burden of their guarantees, nor the British admiral in the Baltic continue to concern himself with Danish interests. The demand should be for a force of 15,000 to 20,000 men held ready for the defence of Sleswick, for prevention of disturbance in the north, and for "the security of such powers as may have rendered themselves objects of the resentment of others by their adherence to his interest." To soften the application France might allow the Danes money to enable them to put the proposed force on foot, "and Denmark on their part should insist upon it." Further, to support the army in North Germany a French force should be posted on the Rhine, ready to enter the empire, if required, but not to initiate hostilities.

As the actual marching of the troops of the two crowns and their allies, or the encamping of any part of them, before the motions of the Imperialists makes that necessary, would, as your Ex^{ty} observes, give the Emperor a handle to infuse fears and jealousies into the princes of the Empire, as well as to reproach us with being the aggressors, and as it is not in the least necessary, since if we can be so happy as to agree upon this disposition we shall be able to get these forces together in a much less time than the other powers can assemble theirs, even after they have begun to march with that view, the King is therefore of opinion that nothing further should be done at present

¹ H. Walpole, 21 and 22 May, *ibid.*, 32746.

² As reported by Du Bourgay, 17 May, R.O. Prussia 20. Lövenörn, he said, was much changed since his return from Denmark and now "acted with spirit and vigour in the common cause," so actively, in fact, that Rottembourg and himself were as much concerned for his present conduct as they could have wished for it formerly. A like declaration by Berckentin, the Danish envoy at Vienna, appeared in the public prints, e.g., *Lettres historiques*, lxix. 627. Saint-Saphorin could not say whether the seizure was threatened immediately or upon attack, but expected the utterance to embarrass the court of Vienna sadly (22 May, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58).

than for this scheme to be put in execution, and upon the first notice of the Imperialists Russians or Poles actually drawing together, or of the Emperor forming a camp in Silesia and making any motions that should plainly shew their design of exciting new troubles in the north, in that case his Maj^{ty} proposes that the French troops before mentioned should pass the Rhine in concert with the landgrave, who may upon notice of their march possess himself of Rhinefeld, which Gen^l Diemar assures us he can do whenever he pleases without any difficulty. This done, France will have a secure communication with the landgrave's country and thro them with those of the King and the king of Prussia, and this step will likewise give the greatest satisfaction to the landgrave and engage him thoroughly in our interest, and would be a good inducement to other princes of the Empire to follow his example by showing them what regard is paid to him for coming so early into the measures of the two crowns.

Such measures, Newcastle proceeded, the king thought "of greater service than any diversion that could be made on the side of the Netherlands," which in any case must await the accession of the Dutch and "would by no means be equal to the disappointing the great designs that are carrying on in the north, especially since there is reason to think that the Emperor, in order to pursue his other views, may be less solicitous at parting with a town or two in Flanders, which afterwards he may think some of the other powers would judge for their interest to restore to him." To destroy the port of Ostend and so the Ostend Company, as hinted by Walpole privately, might be advisable in case of open rupture, but nothing should be said of it at present. One event, however, would oblige action in the Austrian Netherlands, namely, the appearance there of the Pretender. In that case the king hoped that the French would come to his aid by such a strong diversion on that side "as may soon make the Imperialists weary of their undertaking."

Lastly Newcastle advised that communication of the plan, when completed, to the king of Prussia should be accompanied by the intimation that it was not doubted that he would have a sufficient force ready to join in preserving the peace of the north, seeing that the design was for his protection and assistance. Were he not satisfied, or should he refuse, "he should in such case be plainly told that these are the measures thought proper to be taken by the two crowns pursuant to their engagements lately entered into by the treaty of Hanover, to which his Prussian Maj^{ty} is also a party, and in justice to which they cannot depart from these measures."¹

The French government, Walpole wrote, "extremely approved" binding the king of Denmark by a formal convention, "by which he might have the effect of the treaty of Hanover without his immediate

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 17 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

accession to that treaty, if that, on account of a management for Sweden, was not proper to be done at present." But instead of French troops for the northern force it was preferred to hire German, as those of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Saxe-Gotha, or Würtemberg, since then the whole body "would be more at hand and in readiness," and the king of Prussia convinced that he would be secure against attack from Silesia, when that must leave other dominions of the emperor, and especially Bohemia, exposed. Moreover the march of French troops across the Rhine would enable the emperor to alarm the princes of the empire, while hiring their troops would in some measure engage them and keep those troops out of his hands. Walpole thereon drafted "a sketch of a convention" between Great Britain, France, Prussia, Hanover and Denmark for the formation of the northern army; Denmark to find 18,000 men, Great Britain her 12,000 Hessians, Prussia 20,000, to act conjointly or separately as judged suitable, and France to take into her service 12,000 Danes Hanoverians and other Germans, besides having on the Rhine 30,000 or 40,000 men ready to make diversions. By other clauses the contracting powers were to oppose with all their forces the passage of hostile troops through their territories, and the armies were to be so disposed as to secure the complete safety of that one who should be most exposed to attack.¹

Townshend now opened to Söhlenthal the question of his master supplying 20,000 men,² while Newcastle pressed the scheme at Paris on the ground of the reports of an intended Russian invasion daily increasing in frequency and credibility. He notified George I to be "mightily pleased" that French views so accorded with his own and "most exceedingly glad" that German troops ("and none can be so proper on all accounts as those you mention") should replace French for the northern army. But "the main affair of all is the 20,000 Danes." Were they required to serve out of their own country a small subsidy would undoubtedly be asked for. The grant would give France command of them for service anywhere, and the cost would be trifling in comparison with his Majesty's great expense in fitting out so strong a fleet, "which was done upon the same principle, and without which everything else would have been ineffectual." The plan carried out, an invasion of North Germany need no longer be feared and "the king of Prussia, when he sees us so strong, will make no difficulty of taking part with us."³

Of the three German princes named Augustus William, duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, had already been approached for a supply

¹ H. Walpole, 28 and 31 May, *ibid.*, with the draft.

² 22 May (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Entry Book 245.

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 23 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

of troops. Although on the one hand closely connected with the court of Vienna, as uncle of the empress, on the other, like the rest, he was grievously in want of cash. Appeals from him for payment of arrears due for hire of his troops by William III had been frequent.¹ In January 1726, with the impudent assertion that recourse was had to him first as the near kinsman of George I and the object of his particular esteem, Townshend had inquired of his first minister, Baron Dehn, what troops could be furnished and offered payment in advance and maintenance of them in the field at the rates of the last war. Dehn had returned expression of the duke's sense of the compliment paid him, named the force available as three regiments of infantry and one of dragoons, but intimated that a considerable sum would be required to get them ready and asked for further light.² Before answer was made the request had to be repeated,³ and by that time the Hessian troops had been engaged. Then, excusing the delay on the ground of continual occupation, Townshend notified that subsidies could not be obtained from parliament in time of peace, so that the king could only return thanks for the offer and assure the duke of his constant friendship; should affairs so develop that he must find more troops than he already had at his disposal, he would not fail to address the duke first.⁴

Now, the supposed case having arisen, Townshend proposed a close conjunction for mutual advantage, pointed out the value of the king of England's protection and the strengthening of the duke's position, if he lent troops to a prince so powerful and so well able to support his allies, asked for reflection on the difficulty of finding subsidies in time of peace, and gave assurance that the king would try to furnish a reasonable sum of money in proportion to the number of troops employed.⁵ But even now Dehn was journeying to Vienna in pursuance of overtures thence. The duke's soldiers were to be engaged not by George I but by the emperor. Würtemberg and Saxe-Gotha were approached later in the year.

Hardly were Newcastle's last dispatches penned when there came the new peremptory demands of Frederick William I. Thereon a draft for the proposed convention was sent to Paris, lacking his inclusion. His requisition was termed "in itself so monstrous and extravagant, that it shews the necessity we are under to hasten the execution of our scheme"; that would master him by cutting off

¹ As in letters to George I and Townshend of 20 February 1720 and 12 January and 5 December 1723, R.O. Royal Letters 15.

² Townshend to Dehn, 12 January 1726, Dehn in reply 22 January, R.O. Foreign Ministers 15; the former also Foreign Entry Book 248.

³ Dehn, 5 March, *ibid.*

⁴ Townshend to him, 18 March (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁵ The same, 13 May (o.s.).

his communications with Westphalia. Among the other changes specification of Hessian troops as part of 15,000 to be found by George I, and of Hanoverian to be paid by France, was cut out. Again Newcastle dwelt on the necessity of Danish services and of French subsidies to obtain them.¹

The French plan now was to have 36,000 men for the army of the north; 6,000 Hessians and 6,000 Hanoverians provided by the king of England, and of Danes 12,000 at the king of Denmark's own cost and 12,000 at that of France. The other 6,000 Hessians and 9,000 Hanoverians, and as many men as the king of Denmark could furnish further by means of the French payment for the 12,000, to be held in reserve; these Hessians to stay in Hesse to support the landgrave, or join the main army, or be stationed on the Rhine or Main to cover the entry of the French. The main army to take post in Mecklenburg, with the line of the Elbe for its support, and to act accordingly to what should be known of Russian and Prussian engagements, its main positions being about Dönitz, occupation of which would render passage of the Elbe easy, and towards Rostock, to block to the Russians the route by Landsberg and Prentzlow. To intimidate the king of Prussia, or to support him, as the case might require, it was proposed to declare to him the arrangements of the convention as soon as it was signed. If he joined, it was said, the force would be more than sufficient; if, on the contrary, he allowed the Russians to pass, the Hanoverian and Danish reserves should advance into Brandenburg to fight them there. Of this scheme, said Walpole, when sending it, Wedderkop "spoke very handsomely," but doubted his master's ability to find all the troops asked for; he suggested 6,000 only, besides the 12,000 to be paid by France.²

One point in dispute was whether negotiation should be conducted through Wedderkop at Paris, or at Copenhagen. An objection to the latter was the scarcity of capable French envoys, a difficulty apparent in the proposal of Nathaniel Hooke for Petersburg. Chavigny had been restored to favour, but was named for Ratisbon. It was agreed to adopt that alternative, which should promise the greater expedition.

The crux, however, of contention was how the French army of the Rhine should act. George I would have it enter Germany as soon as movements of Russian and Austrian troops were observed, contending that a Russian invasion of the empire would afford

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 30 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746, with the new draft.

² H. Walpole, 12 June, *ibid.* enclosing a copy of the French plan and a rough draft of "what might be proper to be said and given to Mr. Wedderkop" in case he were empowered to negotiate.

ample justification ; the French stood out for constitutional procedure, invitation from the empire to execute guarantees of the treaties of Westphalia. A secondary point was the place of entry, whether at Rheinfels or, as the French would have it, from Alsace.

British views were for putting the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel in possession of Rheinfels forcibly. It was pointed out that he had lately been "pretty hardly dispossessed," of the place, and was making a guarantee of its restitution a condition of his accession to the treaty of Hanover. There was no point, Newcastle wrote, where the French could pass the Rhine more easily nor whence they could better intimidate the catholic princes near and even the electors of Bavaria and Cologne. Against a diversion in Flanders the king had already expressed his opinion, and an advance from Alsace would have to be made through neutral territories and, if opposed by Bavaria, would be very difficult. An additional advantage of the northern entry would be the threat to the king of Prussia in respect of his possessions in Westphalia.¹

The French ministers could not be persuaded. One objection, supposed by Walpole, was to handing over Rheinfels to a protestant prince. But those put forward were military. Morville showed on the map how from Alsace a French force could equally well threaten Silesia, the north, or other locality, and at the same time impress the princes of the empire more strongly. Fleury thought that to cross at Rheinfels would leave places in the rear too much exposed, and such, Walpole feared, would be the opinion of the generals.²

The mention of Silesia had reference to Saint-Saphorin's late advice that the Austrian camp there, so long talked of, was actually being formed for the reception of 17,000 men. He believed intention to be not to use these troops for any act of hostility, but only on the one hand to intimidate the king of Prussia and on the other to encourage the Russian attack on Denmark. For then appeal for aid from the powers assailed would make the emperor their master. That he would incur the blame of bringing the Russians into Germany Saint-Saphorin did not expect, the consequences would be too dangerous ; but every help would be rendered secretly and, no doubt, the tsaritsa would be given to understand that the Silesian force would be ready to attack Hanover, in case the king of England supported Denmark. He held peace in North Germany to depend entirely on the behaviour of the king of Prussia ; if he could be

¹ Newcastle, 30 May (o.s.), cited. He noted that Rheinfels was not mentioned in the draft sent, because what he said about it were the king's private thoughts and should be kept secret until the time came for executing the convention.

² H. Walpole, 17 June, *ibid.*

held to the alliance of Hanover all the projects of the Austrian court would be "radicalement renversés." But he must be assured of his safety ; and if the camp in Silesia were formed troops must be sent to the Rhine. Beyond the force named the emperor could not possibly set on foot more than three or four regiments in the present year ; while the three that he had on the Rhine barely sufficed for the garrisons of Freiburg and Breisach.

Also Saint-Saphorin had the pleasure of reporting language as strong as his own used by Richelieu on the subjects of the movement of French troops, the Silesian camp, and Russian intentions. He held it extremely necessary for both himself and Richelieu, if they saw troops actually marched into Silesia, to declare that if anything were undertaken against Prussia or other of the allies of Hanover they would be attacked at once, the king of Prussia being informed of this in advance. He adverted to the great alarm roused by the report of a British fleet going to the Mediterranean to bombard the chief towns of Naples and Sicily, and ended his long dispatch with a tirade against Austrian conduct towards his Majesty.¹

Townshend in answer desired Saint-Saphorin to speak firmly, though without bitterness, about the camp in Silesia, and Richelieu's conduct was approved at Paris. He was ordered, Walpole wrote, "in a more express and particular manner to declare the resolution of France to take their measures to support the king of Prussia upon every motion that the Imperial troops shall make on the side of Silesia to alarm or intimidate his Prussian majesty." Of like orders desired for Saint-Saphorin Walpole undertook to inform that minister by the next post.²

In reports that came to Hamburg the Silesian army gathered strength. Wich heard of 24,000 imperial troops to be joined by 8,000 Saxons and later by 12,000 or 15,000 Bavarians in addition ; also that General Mercy had arrived at Breslau to take command. But he scouted talk that the force would join 30,000 Russians in a march through Prussian territory into Holstein and Hanover : "tout cela sort de la boutique de M^r Bassewitz, et paroît fort chimérique."³

Saint-Saphorin next reported the return of Loewenwold⁴ from Petersburg with dispatches from Rabutin which seemed to give content, ministers expressing their persuasion that the king of Prussia would allow the passage of Russian troops through his dominions. They boasted also that France had declined to join

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 4 June, R.O. Germany, Empire 58.

² H. Walpole, 21 June, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

³ Wich, 11 and 21 June, R.O. Hamburg 43.

⁴ See p. 194.

in several measures proposed from England and that the troops from Ireland, supposed to be destined for the Mediterranean, were really brought over to England for home defence. The accounts of what had passed in regard to Ripperda made them hope for Stanhope's recall—"ils craignent son séjour." In fact, whereas of late they had seemed greatly depressed, now they were resuming their former haughtiness.¹

Actual Austrian views appear in a letter from Prince Eugene to Seckendorf in answer to his minute of 30 May, elsewhere cited. The emperor, he said, had no thought but to maintain peace everywhere. But it was necessary to put himself in a state of defence and find alliances, because England and France were going to all extremes, even to stirring up the Turks against him and projecting schemes in the empire, which could have no other object but to overthrow his authority. Wherefore he was obliged not only to complete his army on a peace footing but also to recruit fresh forces. He had found the necessary friends both in and out of Germany; the Spanish court had given greater assurances than ever, since Ripperda's fall; the Turks would not be misled. The camp in Silesia was necessary, because of the great hostile armaments reported. In fact, the emperor was in a position to await quietly the results of the French camp forming on the Rhine and the English activity by sea and land; yet, for love of peace generally and especially in Germany he would be glad to be rid of all these excitements and unnecessary expenses, desiring nothing beyond quiet in the empire and the peaceful enjoyment of his hereditary kingdoms and dominions.²

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 19 June, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

² Eugene to Seckendorf, 15 June, Förster, *Friedrich Wilhelm I*, Urkundenbuch ii. 68.

CHAPTER XX

DIFFICULTIES WITH THE DUTCH

ALREADY while in the first days of 1726 George I and his court awaited at Helvoetsluys a fair wind for England, Townshend's belief that he had settled at the Hague all points of difficulty about the Dutch accession to the treaty of Hanover was falsified. Two new requirements were put forward: the one that Great Britain and France should take part with the Dutch in their war with the pirates of Algiers and Morocco, the other for exception of the so-called "possessions litigieuses" from the guarantees of the treaty.

Great Britain had treaties with the African states, Algiers, Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli, far too valuable to be broken for the benefit of another power, however friendly. The naval power of the corsairs was formidable, and only the treaties protected the English traders from the depredations suffered by those of other nations. As it was we read of Algerian cruisers stopping an English merchantman in the Channel and taking another into port for want of papers in form.¹ To bring the demand before parliament, Townshend stated, would infallibly entail defeat. He instructed Finch: "I never understood this to be a point to be included in the defensive alliance, but rather a request of the States for the security of the trade, concerning which we and France were to concert measures separately and not as a part or condition of the accession, and endeavour to find out means to preserve them from the depredations of the corsairs." Finch, on representing this to the three ministers confided in, received, as usual, the best assurances: the matter was not to be part of the treaty, even as a separate article; there was "no other title or meaning in it, than an engagement to come to negotiation upon those points" at a proper time and separately. They did not doubt that the States of Holland would come to a resolution about the accession the next Thursday.²

The "possessions litigieuses" were in particular the Orange heritages in suit at law since the death of William III between the

¹ Newcastle, 2 June (o.s.) 1724 and 18 February (o.s.) 1725, R.O., S.P. Dom. Entry Book 221.

² Townshend from Helvoetsluys, 6 January 1726, Finch in reply, 8 January, R.O. Holland 289.

kings of Prussia and the Nassau princes established in Friesland.¹ Chiefly in view were provinces on the Dutch frontier, some part of them already occupied by Frederick William I, in spite of a provisory agreement with William III's executors, the States-General. The court of Friesland apprehended that unless these disputed territories were excepted from the guarantees of the treaty of Hanover they would pass thereunder definitely to Prussia. Informed of this, Townshend had recourse to the prominent Frisian statesman, Sicco van Goslinga, who, professing himself convinced by the arguments put forward, asked him, as the only expedient that he saw, to obtain permission to write a letter which could be read to the princess of Nassau-Friesland privately, to calm her fears. He gave assurance of the devotion of the house of Orange to George I as the sole person who could protect "ces malheureux orphelins" from utter ruin. Townshend wrote accordingly that the question of the Orange inheritance could not rank among the Prussian claims guaranteed, being purely a matter of justice determinable by formal process or arbitration. The only reasons, he said, for his Majesty objecting to explanations in the matter were that they were useless and because the king of Prussia, not being precisely of the same sentiments now as he was when the treaty of Hanover was signed, might make them a pretext for not acquiescing in the accession of the republic. Rather than incur the least suspicion of intention detrimental to the interests of the house of Nassau he would give that accession up. Townshend desired closest secrecy to be observed about his letter, for if the Hessians at the princess's court were informed of its contents they would certainly be known at Cassel and Berlin, and other great difficulties would ensue if they transpired in Holland.²

Itterssum some months later attributed the initiation of both difficulties to Slingelandt, desirous of propitiating the two parties in the state in order to succeed Hoornbeek as Grand Pensionary; the republicans, that was to say, by the Algerian demand, the

¹ In June 1711 Prince John William Friso was on his way to meet Frederick I of Prussia about the matter at the Hague, when he was accidentally drowned. In after years George I and the States-General were more than once asked to mediate from the side of the widowed princess and her father, the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. There is much on the subject in Whitworth's dispatches of 1722 (R.O. Prussia 16, B.M. Add. MSS. 37386 f.), and amongst other documents are supplications by the princess to George I of 28 January 1721 and 16 September 1722 (R.O. Royal Letters 34), a letter from him to Frederick William I of 3 June (o.s.) 1721 (*ibid.* 46), and Saint-Saphorin's dispatches of 18 and 22 November 1723 (R.O. Germany, Empire, 50).

² Goslinga to Townshend, 5 January 1726, and the reply next day, R.O. Holland 280. Berlin was mentioned because the only daughter and heiress of Count Flodroff, one of the persons named, was married to the eldest son of the Prussian field-marshal Alexander Hermann von Wartensleben.

Orange party by apparent devotion to its interests. Neither party, says the baron, favoured Slingelandt, fearing that he would prove a tyrant; the one that, if thwarted, he would restore the stadtholderate in order to be absolute, the other that by the superiority of his genius he would make himself the master as things stood.¹ As the accusation was confessedly inferential, and as Itterssum had his own friends to cry up in opposition, not much credit need be attached to it.

The day named by Finch passed and yet the wearisome business dragged on in spite of Hoornbeek's declarations, for instance, that "the best and wisest part of the Republick were resolved to come to a resolution, cost what it would." Dordrecht, jealous of Amsterdam, obtained a declaration about the Ostend Company displeasing to the northern city, and after that Gorinchem and Hoorn had amendments to bring forward. In general, the smaller towns had little interest in the eastern trade, and it was they, not Amsterdam, who would suffer from Austrian reprisal. Hoorn wanted enlightenment on the affair of Thorn, Medemblik objected to accession altogether, Dordrecht and Purmerend would bring their scruples forward at the next meeting.² Even when on 25 January the States of Holland pronounced for accession it was but provisional, certain deputies reserving reference to the towns they represented. Townshend inveighed against the delays as "of infinite prejudice to his Majesty's service here. . . . Unless we have the accession of the States before the opening of the session, so many odd interpretations will arise upon it here, that it would have been better for us never to have proposed to the Dutch their coming into the treaty than to be met with such unseasonable demurrs upon it."³ We may take it to have been for the king of Prussia's benefit that he wrote a week later to Du Bourgay: "the accession of the States . . . I look upon as good as done."⁴

¹ Itterssum, 21 May, cf. 5 April, *ibid.* 284.

² Finch and Dayrolle, 5 January to 5 February 1726, with particulars, *ibid.* 287, 289.

One principal opponent was Franciskus Terestyn van Halewyn, pensionary of Dordrecht, a friend of Itterssum and lauded by him as of great influence disinterestedness and capacity. The baron claimed to have gained him over, and prayed again piteously for payment of his pension in reward. In answer to his long account of a conversation with Halewyn and of the latter's explanation and present assurances Townshend agreed that he was "assés philosophe," but went on, "pour son talent de politique, par ce que j'en ay vu, je ne l'admire guères. Je crains même que si un homme de son génie borné, et des idées politiques que je luy ai trouvées, gagne du crédit en Hollande, l'état pourra bien souvent en pâtir." He authorised Itterssum to draw for £500 out of the £1,800 due to him (Itterssum, 11 and 25 September 1725, 8 and 12 February 1726, Townshend in reply to the last, 11 February (o.s.), R.O. Holland 284).

³ To Finch from Whitehall, 14 January (o.s.), *ibid.* 289.

⁴ 21 January (o.s.), R.O. Prussia 20.

Parliament met, and though nothing more could be said in the King's Speech than that the States-General had been particularly invited to accede, the trouble expected did not ensue. Soon the news that resolutions to accede had passed the States of Holland on 8 February brought Finch hearty congratulation.¹ When, however, their text was seen it was found that, among other changes, to the draft agreed on was added a separate article embodying the Algerian demand. The Dutch ministers excused themselves on the ground that otherwise the scruples of several towns could never have been overcome. Finch might still aver that "the ministers and every one here look upon the accession as made, not imagining that there will come the least difficulty from the provinces," but Townshend could only reply that the king was anything but pleased and took comfort only in the hope that the necessary amendments would be made by the States-General. "The turn as it stands now is almost as bad as that you sent me at Osnaburg," and some of the conditions, should they transpire, would do more harm in England than the accession could do good. The Algerian clause, although separate, was to be agreed to simultaneously with the rest, "so that in effect it is to be one and the same business." In refusing to accept it ministers were unanimous. War with the Algerians would be disastrous; the king "cannot go such lengths as to make them our immediate enemies" for the sake of the Dutch. Finch must do all he could to get the instrument restored to the form agreed on.²

At Paris, similarly, although the first news produced, says Robinson, "the highest joy and extasy," objection, when the text of the resolutions was received, was made to the "extreme precaution" of requiring immediate succour in case of attack, to restrictions introduced about the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva, and to the clause about the corsairs. Robinson could only plead want of information on the subject and advance in reply general observations on Ripperda's late outbursts and the evident hostility of Austria and Spain.³

The three Dutch ministers admitted to Finch that it was a mistake "to embarrass this affair with so many restrictions," but pleaded necessity. They promised best endeavours to find an expedient, and Finch thought them convinced of the sincere intention of George I to endeavour to procure them peace with the Algerians and that the present demand must infallibly nullify his

¹ 1 February (o.s.), R.O. Holland 289.

² Finch, 15 February, enclosing a copy of the resolutions, Townshend to him, 11 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Robinson, 14 and 22 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

good purposes. Deputies in all the provinces had been written to, he was told, "to recommend to them a speedy resolution, and at the same time to desire that they will procure to themselves full powers to act in case there should be any discrepancy, either with the province of Holland or with the ministers of the contracting powers." He was able on 5 March to announce acceptance of the resolutions by Zeeland and in the course of the month by Friesland and Overijssel. Moreover he observed no greater effect from the conciliatory memorials presented by the Spanish ambassador, the marquis de San Felipe (St Philippe), arrived on 11 February, than from the threats of Königsegg.¹

In fact a declaration by Königsegg, in a note of 20 December 1725, that his master and the king of Spain were resolved on joint action in defence of their commercial rights and would regard as a manifest infraction of treaties the least hindrance which the Dutch might offer to the undertakings of the Ostend Company,² and a letter from Philip V to the States-General, of date 23 January 1726, in which language to like effect accompanied offers of mediation in the matter and a commercial treaty,³ were held actually to have forwarded the resolution of the States of Holland to accede.⁴

Endeavour now, time pressing, was made to engage the Dutch in hostilities against the allies of Vienna without waiting for the accession. The convention with Hesse-Cassel and the disclosures of Ripperda were communicated privately to the three ministers, their attention was drawn to the preparations being made in England, and it was asked that eight or ten Dutch ships might join the squadron appointed for home defence and to keep open communication with the Mediterranean; a thing which, it was said, could be done without difficulty under existing treaties. But though Finch was told "that nothing could be righter," though Fagel expressed complete agreement and promised to move in the matter with the admiralty as soon as the accession was completed, yet it

¹ Finch's dispatches of March, R.O. Holland 289. Copies of San Felipe's first memorial, of 7 March, and of the equally long and polite reply of the States-General, therewith. Also, with other memorials and Dutch replies, *The Historical Register*, xi. 72 f., 152-3, *Political State of Great Britain*, xxxi. 266 f., 347-9, Rousset, iii. 2 f., *Lettres historiques*, lxi. 437 f., 584 f.

² Rousset, ii. 244.

³ Copy and translation with Stanhope's dispatch of 27 January, R.O. Spain 94; Rousset, ii. 271, *Historical Register*, xi. 39.

⁴ Dayrolle, 8 February, R.O. Holland 287. San Felipe himself confirmed. In a dispatch of 15 February he stated three points in the letter to have given offence: the use of the Spanish instead of the Latin language, the signature "Yo el Rey," and the threat of war. But this only in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland, the most English; others—Utrecht, Overijssel, Friesland, Gelderland—being disposed to accept the offers made (transcript, B.M. Add. MS. 36332, f. 184).

was held that nothing could be done till then, for "the least step at present might be hurtful to the affair in general."¹

A month later was propounded a scheme for open attack upon the Ostend Company, a scheme to be put before the Dutch ministers for consideration merely and for execution after the accession. Premising Stanhope's report of apparent desire on the part of Ripperda to bring Spain back to her old alliance with Great Britain and France, and the probability that "a little vigour and firmness shown now" might "wholly disconcert the ill designs formed between the courts of Vienna and Madrid and set all matters upon a right basis, without coming to extremitys," Townshend argued that "undoubted advices from Vienna, by a sure canal which that court does not suspect," made it certain that the emperor, whatever might be his alarm at the negotiations going forward,

continued resolute and determined not to give way to our complaints, nor redress our grievances, but to maintain the Ostend Company and the privileges in commerce he has acquired from Spain. . . . At the same time, as matters stand, the Emp^r has no intention of beginning a rupture with us, and persuades himself that we dare not, in conjunction with France, attack him, and that in the meantime the Ostend trade will take more root and flourish, and he carry his point by standing on the defensive, while we linger and live, and lose all hopes of doing any thing. He believes we are too distrustfull of the steddi-ness of France to venture to join with them in a war upon him and Spain.

Left thus in quiet, he looked to see parliament and the States-General grow tired of finding money "and let an affair drop, that costs so much without any prospect of success." Meanwhile he might tamper with their allies, sow jealousies, and break the union, and so in the end "again become master of imposing those laws on Europe, which he intended, before our counter-alliance was formed."

To prevent all this, Townshend went on, his Majesty thought it necessary to concert measures to dispose of "that essential affair" of the Ostend Company in pursuance of the undoubted rights acknowledged and guaranteed by France under the treaty of Hanover; and as the best means thereto would appoint a few men-of-war to cruise in the Channel and intercept all ships trading from Ostend to the East Indies. Probably none need actually be seized, as they would be afraid to come out. As one consequence Ripperda would be furnished with strong arguments to persuade the emperor to drop a concern which he could not maintain by sea.

¹ Townshend to Finch, 22 February (o.s.), and the reply, 15 March, R.O. Holland 289. It was suggested that the six ships under command of Admiral Sommelsdyk in the Mediterranean might be employed, with one from Zeeland added. But Dayrolle had previously notified complaints by that admiral that his ships were good for nothing and his desire to be recalled; he had had to send a Zeeland ship home as entirely rotten (22 February, *ibid.* 287).

Should he attempt to do so by land, then the defensive alliance would operate; the king could join with the landgrave's 12,000 men 18,000 of his own, and France had undertaken to satisfy the Bavarian demand for subsidies and would have besides 60,000 men quartered towards Alsace. It was proposed, therefore, as soon as the States-General had acceded to the treaty of Hanover, to make to the emperor a joint vigorous declaration against the Ostend Company and to issue orders to seize its ships as "interlopers and smugglers" carrying on an unlawful trade. "Such a stroke would put the Emperor out of his present play, and animate our people to defend their just privileges." He seemed to support the company rather "out of a punctilio than from the great benefits he draws from it himself." In a postscript Townshend asked again for the eight or ten ships to join the British home squadron.¹

The accession, however, that was to precede this plan, was still remote. New obstacles were the detention of a Dutch ship at Gibraltar² and demand for payment of arrears still outstanding from the wars with France. Were satisfaction on these points refused, was the gist of Slingslandt's discourse to Finch, people could hardly give way about the Algerian pirates. And on that head Hoornbeek asked, would Great Britain guarantee treaties of peace with Algiers and other corsair states, if made? Finch could only recall the plan of accession concerted with Townshend and express conviction that "the nearer matters were brought to that plan the more his Majesty would approve of them."³

His complacent report brought a stinging answer.

I expected to know fully and particularly the sentiments of our three friends upon the main point so much press'd in mine of the 18th, concerning a plan for destroying the Ostend trade. . . . I must own that I never saw his Ma^{ty} in my life more disappointed and concerned. Instead of their thoughts upon a scheme of acting with spirit in this most critical conjuncture, for securing the chief end of our alliance with respect to England and Holland by an attempt to put an end to the Ostend trade, his Ma^{ty} received a cold approbation

¹ Townshend to Finch, 18 March (o.s.), very private, *ibid.* 289.

² This, Colonel Hargrave reported from Gibraltar on 9 September 1725, was a dogger taken by the Algerians and driven from Salee by a storm, when half the crew were on shore, and which, after drifting helplessly about the bay, had finally run ashore under the mole. On learning this, the Dey of Algiers had ordered the ship and its cargo of timber to be sold, and they were bought for 5,000 Algerian piastres (=4,000 Spanish) by an Englishman named Logie, whom Hargrave had allowed to take possession. The Spaniards also claimed the ship on the ground, said Newcastle, when submitting the case for legal opinion (29 April (o.s.) 1726), that but for help by an English boat the ship would have stranded on the Spanish shore.

³ Finch, 2 and 5 April, *ibid.* and 290.

of his thoughts in general terms to be further consider'd when the three provinces which are still wanting shall have consented to the accession, when the points in the resolutions of the States of Holland shall be regulated, when we shall have done what they will have us do about the Algerines; and what is most surprising, when we shall have given them satisfaction about the ship brought into Gibraltar and the arrears of the thirteen Dutch regiments.

Surely, Sir, you cannot think that this is a suitable answer to the great confidence his Ma^{ty} made by you to those three gentlemen in opening to them his thoughts with freedom and fullness, and setting before them all the pressing motives which led his Ma^{ty} to those thoughts; with the great and most expensive efforts he is making to execute his part of the measures which shall be judged necessary.

The season of the year is now advancing apace; our squadrons are equipp'd, and our measures taken by land, as well as by sea, to support our engagements; and not one single thing done in Holland towards it. We see the province of Utrecht has putt off their deliberations as farr as the 17th Apr.; and then a M^r Quin¹ may be out of humour, and gett them putt off again further. We hear of private squabbles at Groningen, and we must stay, I suppose, till they can come to temper, and then the battles will come to be fought over about the points contained in the resolutions of Holland; and what time these, and all other incidents, which may be thrown in our way, will take up, who can tell? For my part, by this way of acting, I foresee little else than an uneasy wearing away this year in fruitless debates, without doing any thing essential to the grand purpose.

If they shall want our answers upon all the articles in the resolutions of the States of Holland, there will be no doing it. 'Tis a heap of confusion, as it now stands; and if it is not brought back to the draught of M^r Fagel, which was plain and intelligible, I know not what will become of it. The parliament would certainly impeach any minister of the King's who should offer to advise his Ma^{ty} to consent to what is there proposed about the Algerines; and they may depend upon it in Holland, let what will come of the accession, we shall never buy it with such bargains.

The King looks upon Holland to be as much concern'd as England in the grand article of our allyance, that is commerce. He has considered the slow forms of their government, and therefore has on all sides exerted himself with extreme vigour to encourage and support them, that their subsidys and loans in Flanders might not be lost, that they might be enabled to work thro' the accession with spirit, disconcert the projects of Spain and the house of Austria, and destroy the Ostend trade.

As to the ship at Gibraltar, loaded, I think, with rafters and such like timber, the Spaniards lay as much claim to it as the Dutch, and his Ma^{ty} knows not how to decide the matter.

What they mention at this time of the 13 Dutch regiments is astonishing after what I told 'em in Holland of the impossibility of mixing this with the accession. They know it has been an old demand ever since K. William's time,

¹ Cornelius Quint, a burgomaster of Utrecht, whose contrary doings Finch had related. "Un homme d'intrigue et d'une activité extrême" (Fénelon's *Mémoire instructif*).

toss'd about in parliament often, and as often laid aside. And I am sure, were we to mention this in the House, as one means to purchase the Dutch, they would fly into strange extremes. Such a proposal would comfort M^r Daniel Pultney much, who, when the accession of Holland was urged among the motives for what the parliament was doing, said he had little reason to rely on their engagements; for that he had taken notice, that twice we had been obliged to call for their succours by virtue of the Barrier treaty, and both times we had been forced to pay those troops ourselves, which they were bound by that treaty to furnish at their expence. I mightily apprehend, if our opponents in parliament could lay hold of such propositions as these and have the canvassing the resolution of Holland, with the complaints of the Dutch ship and the 13 Dutch regiments, we should soon see another set of resolutions in the House, and his Ma^{ty} would be desired to hold his hand and go on gently, and see first what the Dutch would do, who are at least as much interested as this nation in the business of commerce and ought to bear a proportionable charge for the defence of it, and go hand in hand with us in all the measures necessary for that purpose.

After which Townshend reverted to the assertion that action against the Ostend Company could be taken under the terms of the Triple Alliance without waiting for the accession. If the company's ships, he said, expected home in May, were to meet with no more hindrance than those that had sailed lately,

we may look upon that affair as given up. Nothing more can be done there this year and, as matters will have been managed, they may depend upon it that next year the parliament will change their language. These are the thoughts that occur to the King upon seeing the flat, lifeless proceedings in Holland. The King will grow uneasy, the par^l will be disgusted, and the whole nation become discontented to see so many hundred thousand pounds spent to no purpose, while the Dutch delay, debate, wrangle, and show no signs of life and vigour in conjunction with us.

Finch must make the strongest representations and press for immediate action of the kind desired and let the King "be no more putt off with general words and civil compliments upon the justice of his thoughts." The Algerian affair could not be made a part of the accession, but if the Dutch would go "handsomely and roundly" on he would not be wanting in befriending them in that affair. He hoped soon to hear of orders for eight or ten Dutch men-of-war, or at least six, to join the home fleet "that we may cruise together in the Channel to obstruct the Ostend trade, and go jointly on the coast of Spain to let the Cath^k King see that we will protect our commerce." ¹

¹ Townshend to Finch, 29 March (o.s.), R.O. Holland 289, and similarly to Itterssum (*ibid.* 284) in answer to his discourse of 5 April on Slingelandt's responsibility for the Algerian clause, on the Orange inheritance question, and on the views of Halewyn and other topics. The long delays, he said, "nous tuent icy. . . .

Finch could only make new instances and report fresh positive assurances. He was promised definitely eight or ten men-of-war by the end of May. Could matters be carried by a majority, he was told, everything would be easy, but as unanimity was required it was impossible to be sure what would be accepted or rejected. Newcastle, in Townshend's absence, answered to much the same effect as he had done, emphasising the necessity of destroying the Ostend Company that summer and desiring Finch to press to get the accession "finish'd out of hand, and such a summary made of the several resolutions for the accession as may be practicable to the other contracting powers to come into it." He notified the Baltic squadron to be on the point of sailing, but sufficient force to be retained at home to act with the Dutch in a matter "as much their business as ours."¹ To Broglie, on a new restriction proposed, "qu'on n'entreprendra rien contre la compagnie d'Ostende qu'après un concert préalable entre toutes les parties contractantes," Newcastle stated that although the king could not but think it better away, in order to avoid the embarrassment of always having to obtain the consent of the States-General, yet he agreed with the court of France that this was not a matter of sufficient importance to retard the general accession of the republic. He called to notice its Dordrecht origin, observing that the deputies of Amsterdam could not be wanting in efforts to suppress the stipulation.²

There were general reasons also for Dutch recalcitrance, expressed by Slingelandt to Townshend as follows.

Les ministres travailleraient avec plus de succès auprès de bien de gens, si chez vous on avait un peu plus d'égard aux sollicitations des ministres sur plusieurs articles touchant lesquels tout le monde ici est persuadé que la Grande

Assurément le commerce des Indes n'est pas tant chéri chez nous, qu'il est en Hollande. . . . Pensés y, je vous prie, et animés vos amis, afin que tous nos soins, toutes nos peines, et toutes nos dépenses n'aillent pas en fumée, à la perte irréparable au bout du compte, même de la République." As to the Algerian demands: "toutes nos affaires seront gâtées, si on insiste chez vous sur cet article."

¹ Finch, 16 April, and the reply, 12 April (o.s.), *ibid.* 290.

² Newcastle to Broglie, 26 April (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Ministers 5. Finch also states that both this and the Algerian clause were brought in by Halewyn of Dordrecht against the opinion of Amsterdam (and so also Fénelon in his *Mémoire instructif*), while Itterssum reported other Dordrecht objections, to which, he said, Halewyn was a stranger. He expected to overcome them through a burgomaster of the town, acting on the advice of another friend of his, Adolf Visscher, Halewyn's predecessor as pensionary of Dordrecht and recently elected to that office at Haarlem. Him he described as "d'un génie trop élevé pour s'amuser à la chicane" and owing his election at Haarlem purely to merit, having previously refused the same dignity at Rotterdam (20 and 30 April, R.O. Holland 284). In other letters of great length of 4 and 14 June (*ibid.*) Itterssum set forth his endeavours with Visscher and Halewyn and a third person unnamed, noting Visscher to have been the man whose illness had prevented a decision on one occasion by the States of Holland, as related by Finch.

Bretagne nous traitent, je ne dis pas contre l'amitié, dont on fait de temps en temps des protestations si fortes, mais contre la justice et contre le retour que méritent les signales services que la République a rendus à la Grande Bretagne dans le temps qu'elle était mieux en état de servir ses alliés." ¹

On 10 April the consent of the province of Gelderland to accede was notified and, although Utrecht and Groningen still held back,² on the 27th the States-General were carried so far as to appoint deputies to confer. The resolutions thanked the envoys for communicating the treaty of Hanover so promptly, ascribed to the forms of government and the necessity for mature consideration in so important an affair the delay in answering the invitation to accede, and stated that although even now, in the absence of replies from the two provinces named, a positive answer could not be given, it was thought well to put forward necessary remarks. "None of the difficult points" were left out, says Finch, reporting conferences held on 1 and 4 May, but he thought that the principal demand would be limited to exclusion of Algerian ships from British ports. He could say that pressing letters had been sent to the two recalcitrant provinces and that probably the consent of Utrecht would not be awaited. He observed a good effect from the news of the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm and disregard of Königsegg's threats of reprisal, if the squadron sent to the West Indies should do harm to the king of Spain, of his assertion that a treaty between Russia Austria and Spain was concluded, and of his boasts of the great forces at his master's disposal.³

At the third conference, on 16 May, the proposal specifically to except "possessions litigieuses" from the general guarantee roused much dispute, says Finch, and was left in abeyance. Other points, as the condition that accession to the treaty of Hanover should not impugn the validity of previous treaties, and what concerned those of Westphalia and Oliva, were agreed to. "The point of the Algeriens gave some trouble and took up a great deal of time. The deputies address'd themselves particularly to me, and talked much of the ships belonging to that people being admitted into his

¹ 18 April, R.O. Holland 280.

² A burgomaster of Utrecht, Meinertzhagen by name and a cousin of the Prussian envoy, asked of Finch for the consent of the province 10,000 florins down and security for 40,000 more as soon as the resolution passed. When Finch rejected the proposal with disdain, Meinertzhagen justified his request on the ground that he had it on good authority that much money had been distributed in Holland. Townshend desired Finch to expose "so barefaced an offer" to all the friends (Finch, 10 May, and the reply, 3 May (o.s.), R.O. Holland 290).

³ Finch, 3 May, *ibid.* On 7 May he sent the resolutions of the States-General, with the observations made to the deputies by himself and his colleagues. Meinertzhagen salved his conscience by absenting himself while the Algerian and Ostend questions were being discussed.

Majesty's ports, and of the mortification it was to find that Gibraltar and Port Mahon were retraits for the Algeriens." They referred particularly to cases of the previous year, the Dutch ship taken into Gibraltar as a prize and the admittance of an Algerian to Portsmouth.¹ Finch reminded them that the latter had been ordered to depart and that ownership of the Dutch prize was in dispute with Spain. He consoled himself by reflecting that the difficulties did not arise from anything in the treaty of Hanover "but from an affair tack'd to it and entirely foreign from it." As to Fénelon's suggestion of an article for exertion of good offices with the Algerians, he thought that even the promoters in the matter would prefer that nothing should be done, rather than so little. As a further grievance he enclosed a resolution of the States-General about a duty laid on goods consigned to Dutch merchants at Aleppo, an imposition laid at the door of the British ambassador at Constantinople and causing much resentment.²

Townshend replied: "We certainly will prevent the Algerines coming into our ports, or bringing their prizes thither," and stated the Aleppo affair to be referred to the Board of Trade for inquiry, his Majesty being surprised to hear that his minister could be thought to be implicated. He said also that the news of the Pretender leaving Rome for an unknown destination ought to rouse the Dutch to realise the pernicious designs of Vienna and Madrid, which their delays about the accession encouraged; if those schemes were prosecuted it would be necessary to call upon them to execute their guarantees. "The surest and the shortest way to put a stop to such designs is to come roundly and handsomely into the Hanover treaty and joyn heartily with the King and with France in opposing the schemes that are laid for destroying the protestant religion and overturning the ballance of Europe."³

When the envoys met the deputies again, on 21 May, Fénelon, in accordance with orders received, handed in a draft act of accession, with two separate articles concerning the Ostend Company and the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva, these practically agreed. He expected thus, says Finch, to leave the difficult points on one side and confine discussion to what was easy. But the deputies had again brought up the "possessions litigieuses" and the Algerian

¹ From papers on these subjects it appears that Algerian ships had entered British harbours in January 1724 and October 1725, on both occasions on the plea of stress of weather and want of provisions. Orders had issued for them to leave as soon as possible, in the second case after protest by L'Hermitage on behalf of the Dutch government. It was laid down by the Lords of the Admiralty to be contrary to treaties for an Algerian ship even to show herself in the Channel, and much more so to enter a British port.

² Finch, 17 May, R.O. Holland 290.

³ Townshend in reply, 10 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

question, though without saying much upon them and promising to examine the draft for the next conference. Finch expected then a document which would not differ much from that concerted with Townshend in December.¹

This only brought further passionate invective against the ruinous delays.

The business of the accession moves with you in a most heavy, lifeless manner ; conference after conference, and promises upon promises, without any real effect, still considering and still bringing nothing to an absolute conclusion. . . . His Ma^{ty} fears that the affair concerning the Algerines will be again thrown in the way ; which will spoil all and make the speedy accession, which has been so frequently promised by all our friends, wholly impracticable. . . It is plain that the concerts made between the Emperor and Spain go on, and whatever delays we may meet with in our affairs, they will lose no time in executing their dangerous schemes, and in all probability we shall soon hear of the Pretender's coming towards this neighbourhood ; wherefore the King would have you wait upon our three friends and represent to them in the most earnest manner the fatal consequences of their dilatoriness in Holland.

In a private letter Townshend set forth further the vast mischief being done at home, even among the king's friends. Some of them, he said, entertained private suspicion that the Dutch must be in concert with the emperor, "for they look upon Holland to be in as much danger as we are." Finch must paint the situation "in the liveliest colours" ; it were better never to have talked of the accession than to meet with such delays and disappointments ; "this suspense hurts us infinitely, since we can satisfy no body, nor give any tolerable reason for such unaccountable chicanes as those insisted upon by the deputys of the States."² After a fortnight again, in answer to Finch's report of ministers being "extremely mortified" at the news of the Pretender leaving Rome and at seeing "how much inconvenience was caused by the delaying of their accession," he expressed himself "tired with repeating so often all our arguments and exhortations to so little purpose." And when thanking Itterssum for two long letters and for his exertions, he used threats. The case against the Ostend Company, he said, had been pressed for two years without effect and a point was now reached at which only Dutch co-operation was required to destroy it.

Ce commerce à la vérité nous incommode, nous pouvons cependant tourner nos affaires tellement que nous n'en ressentirons que très peu de mal. Si les Etats tardent à se joindre à nous on s'appliquera à mettre en oeuvre le plan, qui a été formé il y a quelque temps icy, d'ôter les droits d'entrée des denrées

¹ Finch, 21 May, *ibid.*

² Townshend to him, 17 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

des Indes, et de les charger seulement des accises intérieures. Par là, quand notre compagnie pourra vendre leurs marchandises au même prix que ceux d'Ostende, ils ne pourront pas les fourrer icy clandestinement, et je dois ajouter qu'on est plus porté icy à faire passer ce plan, puisque par le même coup on empêchera l'importation illicite des contrebandes de Hollande, qui ne nous ont fait pas moins de mal, que ce qui nous vient d'Ostende.

If it was believed that anxiety would compel Great Britain to make concessions, that belief was wrong. It was vexing to see the emperor strengthening himself from day to day and pushing on a project which would make the trade of the Austrian Netherlands as flourishing as in former days, "mais on se consolera comme on peut, quand on y trouve la Hollande si indifférente, et on espère avoir icy autant de ressources que chez vous pour prévenir les suites de ce mal, qu'on ne veut pas coopérer à déraciner." As to Algiers, he (Townshend) had gone as far as he could when he was in Holland. But now that the trade had taken alarm from the noise made about the matter he dared not even give a formal promise of good offices, much less speak of a rupture within a certain time. Everybody in England, even those best disposed towards the republic, said that they would rather lose the accession than undertake such an engagement. He himself was uncomfortable about having gone so far as he had. Itterssem knew how badly he had been treated in England about the Barrier treaty; now in his negotiation of the accession he was met with conditions which could not but expose him to his enemies' resentment. Better for the Dutch to leave the Algerian question to his Majesty than do themselves wrong with the nation. "Les bonnes intentions de sa Majesté envers la République sont le meilleur ultimatum que vous pourrès souhaiter." All this, Townshend concluded, was written in the strictest confidence for the enlightenment of Itterssem's intimate friends, badly informed of sentiments in England.¹ The baron in reply made known the excellent effect produced upon them.²

Now came a new complaint of an Algerian ship afforded refuge from Sommeldyck's pursuit at Gibraltar, a most unlucky incident, says Finch, seeing that he was assured that all difficulties were now reduced to the single point of the corsairs. "For these four or five days they have talked of nothing but the loss and damage they receive in their trade from the Algeriens" and of the hardship that these ships should be admitted to ports which they could not enter when Spanish. Copies were handed him of an assurance by Sunderland, of date 3 June 1720, that Algerian ships were ordered not to be admitted to Gibraltar, and of a dispatch of Carteret's

¹ To Finch and to Itterssem, 31 May (o.s.), *ibid.* and 284.

² 21 June, *ibid.*

to Colonel Hargrave, of 14 May 1722, of like tenour.¹ The gravity of the affair was recognised in England. Already on the news of it Newcastle had informed Colonel Kane that not only the treaty with Algiers forbade its ships to come even within sight of Gibraltar or Port Mahon, but that of Utrecht also prohibited Barbary ships of force from entering those ports. After the complaints from Holland he expressed to Kane the hope that the Algerian ship had been made to leave and expressly forbade him and Lord Carpenter at Port Mahon to admit or assist Algerian men-of-war.²

At last, on 11 June, the consent of Groningen was notified. Prospects seemed brighter; at further conferences Finch observed great inclination to arrive at a speedy conclusion; Townshend expressed the king's pleasure and finished: "I am very glad to find that they are like to desist from the point of the *possessions litigieuses*. As to the *garantie générale*, I think it may as well be turned in the way they propose as in any other."³

Futile beliefs, for the act of accession drafted by the deputies for report to the States-General was found to include in separate articles all the restrictions objected to. The first of these recited the depredations of the Barbary corsairs and the repeated endeavours made to persuade Great Britain and France to undertake just measures to repress them and to enforce peace with the republic. It required those powers, as a new proof of their goodwill, to employ all good offices, and if peace were not made with Algiers and Morocco within a year to join in war upon them. Also, for the future to admit no corsair ship to their ports, including Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and to restore to the owners any prizes taken into them. The same conditions, it was said, applied to Tunis and Tripoli, although those states at present were at peace with the republic. This article, says Finch, was not discussed and would not have been brought forward, the deputies allowing it to be "a point which they knew gave us uneasiness," but that Fénelon had insisted on reading a dispatch received from his government as the only answer that he was permitted to give on an affair entirely strange to the principal negotiation.⁴

The second article recorded that the general expression, "possession des états, pais, villes, droits et privilèges," did not

¹ Finch, 7 and 11 June, *ibid.* 290, enclosing the copies.

² Copies of these dispatches with Townshend's of 31 May and 7 June (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Finch, 11 and 14 June, Townshend to him, 7 June (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ He did this, says Finch, although "the article relating to that affair had not been read nor was read." The deputies desiring the letter to communicate, Fénelon would only promise its substance in the form of an answer to the article. "I got him to make it as short and negative as possible," in order not to bring up a fresh debate on the subject.

extend to anything at present in dispute before competent judges and therefore of uncertain right. The envoys objected that it had been shown repeatedly that the exception was useless and unusual, that the whole drift of the treaty was against interference with judges in just exercise of their duties, and that it was time to stop insistence on the condition.

Thirdly it was declared that, if the three powers found it necessary to concert measures for maintaining the balance of Europe, the States-General reserved their liberty to decline to join in them. This, it was answered, was superfluous, because the spirit of the treaty could not impose the obligation feared, and a written clause might suggest want of mutual confidence ; yet if insisted upon in spite of this reflection, made solely in view of the greater dignity of the alliance, the restriction would be accepted.

Fourthly, in case the republic were attacked or menaced in consequence of its accession and found it necessary to arm immediately, demand was made that the promised succours in troops ships and money should be sent promptly on requisition, without waiting for the result of good offices or of amicable intervention. With this the envoys promised satisfactory accordance when the rest was agreed to.

The fifth separate article was that about the Ostend Company agreed between Great Britain and France separately from Prussia.¹

We must now turn to the late startling oversets in Spain and France.

¹ Copy of the document with Finch's dispatch of 18 June, *ibid.*

CHAPTER XXI

THE CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT IN SPAIN AND FRANCE

THE first blow that fell on Ripperda in Spain was his dismissal from control of the finances, on 12 May 1726. Three days later he had been deprived of all his offices and was a fugitive in Stanhope's house. Authority reverted for the most part to the men whom he had ousted. Orendayn (marquis de la Paz) and Grimaldo took direction of foreign affairs, Don Francisco Ariaga of finance, the marquis de Castelar of war, his brother, Don José de Patiño, of the Indies and marine. What had happened was that, on new orders received by Königsegg to press for payment of the subsidies and to expose Ripperda's indiscretions, he and the Spanish sovereigns had exchanged lights, smouldering suspicions had burst into flame, and they had realised that Spain was on the verge of bankruptcy.¹

Stanhope in his first dispatch, of 13 May, notified only what had taken place the previous day. In England his news was not unexpected. Forecasts of a change of affairs, received at Paris from Montgon and others at Madrid, had been imparted to Horatio Walpole, with particular suggestion of support to Grimaldo. That accorded with views in London, Grimaldo, in Newcastle's words, being one "whom his Ma^{ty} has always thought to deserve the greatest encouragement for his steadiness and zeal in his good disposition towards the two crowns, as well as in the pursuit of what is really the interest of his own country"; that, "and even the discourse of Orendayn himself," giving hope that Spain would return to her "old and truest friends."² Stanhope now was told, with satisfaction, that if Ripperda could not raise supplies for Vienna, neither could his successor. Ripperda Newcastle desired to be assured of protection, should his conduct merit it. Report of what had happened subsequently he did not credit, expecting to have heard from Stanhope directly, had it been true.³

¹ See fully Syveton, pp. 214-8, from orders to Königsegg of 14 March and his dispatch of 30 April; also Armstrong, pp. 196-7.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 17 May (o.s.) 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

³ Newcastle to Stanhope, 23 May (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97, Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ii. 605. Three days later he was disposed to ascribe Ripperda's disgrace not to Austrian influence, but to the work of his Spanish enemies, "they

But true it was, as said. Stanhope had delayed to write further till the drama was complete, and then his servant, who carried his account, was detained in custody for a whole week at Vittoria; nominally for want of proper orders for horses, really that his papers might be searched and Pozobueno have the news in London first. He arrived only on 10 June.¹ The story ran as follows.

Stanhope having gone to Aranjuez on 14 May for change of air, news of Ripperda's further discharge from all his offices had brought him back to Madrid next day. Arriving late, he had found the fallen minister in sanctuary at his house. Ripperda told him that he had no reason to suppose himself under the king's displeasure, in fact, he had been given a pension of 3,000 pistoles; he had but sought refuge from his enemies and the fury of the populace, who had attacked his servants and threatened to sack his house. Granted an audience of Philip V next day Stanhope explained that he had in no way prompted Ripperda's action and received assurance that the king's displeasure extended only to the man "who having been so lately his minister and trusted with the secret of all his affairs gave but too just grounds to suspect his fidelity in thus retiring himself into the house of a foreign minister"; he must not be allowed to escape until certain papers of consequence, which he had carried off, were recovered. This Stanhope promised, but the same evening guards were set to watch his house. At a further audience on 19 May, having observed a disposition to remove Ripperda by force, he had pressed for permission to him to retire, as he wished, into a convent, protesting at the same time against violence being done upon a man actually under the king of England's protection and stating his own intention, if such violence were exercised, to retire from court pending further orders. Nevertheless, early on the 25th, an alcalde had appeared with a general officer and sixty horse-guards and had taken Ripperda away.

In a separate letter Stanhope set down "some other circumstances worth observation," purposely omitted from his narrative in order not to break its thread. He attributed Ripperda's fall entirely to the "daily complaints" of Königsegg, unable to get

being all restored to their offices, particularly the marquis de Grimaldo, of whose principles the Imperialists cannot be so ignorant as to have consented to have him employed, if this matter had been at all under their direction." Immediate change of policy Newcastle did not expect, but "whatever may have been the occasion of this great event, and by whatever hand it may have been conducted, I think there may be a great deal of good follow from it, or at least that it cannot be attended with any ill consequence" (to H. Walpole, 26 May (o.s.), *l.c.* Similar expectation of advantage was expressed to Glenorchy and to Poyntz, R.O. Denmark 49, Sweden 43).

¹ Sworn account by the messenger, William Gwyn, 24 June (o.s.), R.O. Spain 94. De la Paz to Pozobueno on the matter, 1 July, and Newcastle's reply, 15 July (o.s.), Foreign Ministers 57.

his money and believing it to be kept back to prevent the emperor from opening a war before the treasure-fleets got safely home. "Conigseck transported with his victory over Ripperda neglected to pursue it by getting him secured immediately, which error he no sooner found by Ripperda's retiring into my house than his rage exceeded even his joy of the day before." The charges were, first that Ripperda had disclosed secrets during his ministry, secondly that he had issued orders without consulting the king, and thirdly that he had rendered no accounts.¹

I have given Duke Ripperda the strongest encouragement to hope for his Maty's utmost protection for the getting him from hence by persuasion or otherwise, w^{ch} your Grace may be absolutely assured he has well deserved, as M^r Keene, who sets out from hence to-morrow expresly for that purpose, and whom I have fully instructed, will inform your Grace by word of mouth, I not daring to trust to writing matters of such dangerous consequence in the present circumstances of affairs.

In the new ministry, Stanhope went on, De la Paz had "the greatest share of business and credit" and relations with Vienna would not be altered, but rather fortified, for Ripperda was plainly disgraced for not being sufficiently imperialist. Königsegg had audience of their Majesties almost daily "and seems to aim at entering into the ministry, as the French ambas^r formerly used to do." For himself Stanhope prayed either approval of his conduct in this trying business, or his recall, for were he disavowed his further stay would not be for the good of the king's service.²

For the British government the first question was, what action should be taken in vindication of the insult to Stanhope. Horatio Walpole intimated the necessity of consulting French and Dutch opinion before any demand for reparation were made, since Van der Meer also was concerned and was freely blamed

¹ Cf. Königsegg's reports, Syveton pp. 207-9.

² The above from Stanhope's dispatches of 25 May, R.O. Spain 94, both printed by Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ii. 598-605. With them are copies of the letters which passed between him and De la Paz, 14 to 25 May, translations of which R.O. Foreign Ministers 57; see also *Lettres historiques*, lxi. 684-698. There is also in R.O. Spain 94 a copy of the long memorandum of De la Paz to the Bavarian minister, Romet, justifying the arrest to the diplomatic body. His letter to Prince Eugene of 17 May, announcing the change of ministry, and the reply of 10 June, Arneth, iii. 549, 550. Fully on the circumstances Syveton, pp. 214-224. An intercepted Jacobite letter of later date (Palma, 17 July, sent by H. Walpole on 17 July, R.O. France 184) asserted Ripperda to have been arrested not for malversation, for nothing on that head could be proved against him, but for revealing secrets of the crown to Stanhope. The writer had seen the very strong indictment of the Council of Castile, arraigning him of "the greatest crimes of high treason, and such as very few have ever committed." What surprised him was the king's irresolution, which had given Ripperda time to escape to Stanhope's house. The letter was directed to "Monsieur Plunkett," under cover to Nieulon, French consul in Majorca but now at Perpignan.

by Spanish partisans at Paris. While ministers, he wrote, held Stanhope's account fully to vindicate his conduct, and were surprised that his "unexceptionable expedient" of allowing Ripperda to retire into a convent should have been refused, yet they showed extreme desire that his Majesty's resentment "may not be so quick, and strong, as to make an accommodation of the matter quite impracticable," for they would not have a rupture with Spain on this account.¹ This was understood in London. Already, on Pozobueno's report, assurance had been sent to Paris that nothing should be done without the full consent of the French court and the incident in no way be allowed to disturb the relations of the two crowns. It was noted that no personal complaint was made against Stanhope, only the action taken justified. He, no doubt, had acted with his usual prudence and discretion and had made good use of his sight of Ripperda's papers.² Stanhope himself, his conduct commended strongly,³ was desired for the present only to abstain from going to court and to apply himself to "gleaning lights" on what was going on, since "several persons seem to be restored to their employments, who are known to have disapproved everything that has lately been transacting with the court of Vienna." To gain time, he was told, for ascertaining French and Dutch opinion, and pending arrival of his secret messenger (Keene), nothing more was said to Pozobueno than that his full report was awaited.⁴

This, it so happened, was the moment that Fleury was displacing Bourbon as head of the French government. His great aim being for reconciliation with Spain without sacrificing the alliance with England, Walpole was able to report extreme pleasure on his part at the line of moderation adopted. His expression of this, and a remark let fall by D'Huxelles that on the whole he did not see that Philip V had acted wrongly, Walpole took to show "how tender they are at present with regard to Spain, flattering themselves that the removal of M^r le Duc must have an influence upon the king of Spain." He recommended humouring this "fond imagination" and nothing being said that might enable the queen of Spain and Königsegg to alienate Philip further.⁵ And so, while Newcastle informed Stanhope that the answer to Pozobueno drafted contained

¹ H. Walpole, 9 and 11 June, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 30 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746, enclosing extracts of letters from De la Paz to Pozobueno. Translations of these, R.O. Foreign Ministers 57.

³ His Majesty "thinks you have shewn uncommon presence of mind, coolness and attention to his service, and at the same time that you have, in a becoming manner, supported the honour and dignity of your Master and have taken care to do it so as to be irreproachable before the whole world."

⁴ Newcastle to Stanhope, 2 June (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

⁵ H. Walpole, 17 June, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

the "amplest justification" of his conduct, he bade Walpole observe that but for deference to French views the king might "have taken the matter higher" and that the answer was, in fact, "even lower than the Bishop himself suggested." And on receiving Walpole's report of a long conversation with Fleury and Morville on the matter he informed him that "as an instance of his Majesty's willingness to comply with what the Bishop shall desire" Stanhope was now to be ordered to attend court again, partly for the reasons advanced and partly that he might be in as good a position as before for obtaining information.¹

The change at Paris had been no less sudden than that at Madrid. At work on his dispatches in the early hours of 12 June Walpole was surprised by a note from Fleury announcing abolition of the post of first minister and orders to Bourbon to retire to Chantilly. The bishop gave assurance that this would entail no change whatever in relations with England.²

Walpole sent off the news immediately by express. He had suspected what was brewing, he said, from hints received through Gedda from the queen's confidant, Count Tarlo, from Fleury's free expression of dissatisfaction with Bourbon's administration, especially in matters of finance, and from other foreshadowings. He expected Fleury to be first minister in fact, none other having "the least confidence and credit with the king," and to consult principally with D'Huxelles and Berwick.³

Sudden as was the stroke it had impended, as Walpole intimated, for some time. The situation as between Bourbon and Fleury, long in opposition on matters political and religious, had become intolerable.⁴ Fleury had worked quietly in the background, implanting his ideas in the mind of the young king, until the opportunity came to act. That he could strike so suddenly was made possible by the habit of impenetrable reserve, which Louis XV had formed from early years.⁵ Fleury wrote in the note cited:

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 9 June (o.s.), and to H. Walpole, 12 and 15 June (o.s.), *ll.cc.*

² Fleury to H. Walpole, 5.0 p.m. on 11 June, B.M. Add. MS. 32746; Coxe, *Memoirs of Horatio Lord Walpole*, p. 120.

³ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 3.0 a.m. on 12 June, private, *ibid.*; Coxe, pp. 121-4. To the dispatch on which he had been engaged he added a postscript, dated 5.0 a.m., advising that caution and moderation in Ripperda's affair were now more necessary than ever, until he could fully clear up with Fleury that and other matters.

⁴ See Dureng's luminous exposition of the whole matter, pp. 454-482.

⁵ Robinson wrote to Delafaye on 14 June (R.O. France 184): "The grand secrecy, and even dissimulation, with which this intrigue was concerted manag'd and carried on on the part of the king, gives the truest character of that young prince's genius, who, according to the good, or bad hands he shall fall into appears from his taciturnity in this to be capable of making the best, or worse sort of king. He is supposed to have come and kept to his resolution during 15 days, without discovering it to anybody whatsoever."

“J’ai été tenté souvent de révéler à V.E. ce qui vient de passer, mais je n’étois pas maître du secret du Roy et mes ordres étoient trop exprès pour les violer.”

After a dinner with Fleury on 13 June, when Marshal Berwick, the only other guest, had gone, Walpole inquired of the bishop who would be the new ministers, observing that the first effect of the change would be bad for his Majesty’s affairs, because the Jacobites, counting on Fleury’s well-known zeal for his religion, seemed to have wrong notions on the matter. Fleury told him that there would be no prime minister, nor any council besides that of state now constituted. Berwick and D’Huxelles, he said, had declined to enter that, and on supposition that their refusal might be due to difficulties about precedence Walpole suggested that Fleury should obtain a cardinalate. He urged that Morville should be continued in his office,¹ but hoped that Fleury would keep the conduct of affairs entirely in his own hands “without any partner or competitor whatsoever.” He spoke particularly against Torcy, pointing out among other objections that he was a Jansenist, and inquired also about Le Blanc and Le Peletier Des Forts, designated respectively for the ministries of war and finance. Fleury reassured him on these matters positively and gave him permission to congratulate Morville on his continuance, for “he, the Bishop, had a particular friendship and regard for him.” With Le Blanc he said that he could not dispense, “especially in case of a war, he being the only person in France by the voice of the whole nation in general that was capable of that post.” Walpole holding him to be no friend of England and certainly in correspondence with the Jacobites, Fleury replied that he “should be no minister, but only secretary in the room of M^r Breteuil, and he would take effectual care that he should do nothing that should give the least jealousy and umbrage to his Majesty.” Should Le Blanc, Walpole commented, act a right part, as he must while Fleury ruled, “his boldness and abilities will certainly alarm the Imperial court more than any other step

In a private letter of 2 July (B.M. Add. MS. 32746) Walpole interpreted Fleury to say about his tuition of the young king; “I hope you think that I can depend upon him for keeping a secret, and the truth is that, considering my age, I am resolved to do what I can to form and fashion the king’s mind for business as much and as early as possible; and therefore I communicate to him alone all matters of moment, taking that opportunity of inspiring him with proper sentiments according to the nature of the thing; and I can assure you that what I said to him on this occasion of the strong and extraordinary engagements between the Emperor and Spain made a great impression upon him.”

¹ For that he “was of a capacity proper to be a subaltern, had no great nor extensive genius, nor had any other ambition but that of being subservient to the person in chief power, was supple and diligent,” and so on.

that could be taken here.”¹ Le Peletier he described as “a great friend of Marshal Berwick’s and uncle to M^r de Broglio, . . . he is looked upon as a very capable and honest man, but of a warm and hasty temper.” In fine he set down his opinion that the new administration would “center in Bishop Fréjus, who without the title of Prime Minister will have the power in a more absolute manner than it was ever enjoyed by Cardinal Richelieu or Mazarin.” He noted general pleasure at the removal of Bourbon and Madame de Prie. When he saw Morville he was shown orders to him from the king to obey the directions of Fleury as though given by himself.² An autograph letter from Louis XV to George I notified, with strongest assurances, admission of the bishop of Fréjus, whose zeal and attachment were long known to him, to his most intimate confidence.³

There was some public disquietude in London on the first news; Fleury’s religious fervour was mistrusted and the funds fell. But nothing of the kind in government quarters. The king, Newcastle wrote, had suspected nothing, but could not anticipate any change of relations. He desired to know whether there might be any connexion with the fall of Ripperda, “whether the disgrace of the two prime ministers might not have been by the common consent of both courts, in order to facilitate their reconciliation.” Even were that so, he said, if Fleury continued to prefer the friendship of England to that of any other power he would make the reconciliation conditional upon separation of Spain from Austria. Although his Majesty had had every reason to be convinced of Bourbon’s sincerity, yet his administration had always been dilatory and weak, “a thing often of very fatal consequence to affairs both in north and south.” A little firmness and resolution would by this time have procured the accessions of Holland and Sweden to the treaty of Hanover, have secured Bavaria and Cologne, apparently now quite lost, and, above all, have kept the king of

¹ Robinson wrote on 18 June: “M^r Le Blanc returns in the greatest triumph, and as most of France depends one way or other upon their pretensions for themselves and friends in the army, he is more *crowded* than ever first minister was.” Barbier wrote in his *Journal* (13 June): “M. le Blanc est actuellement dans son ancienne place avec l’applaudissement général.”

Delafaye, writing to General Dormer at Lisbon (14 June (o.s.) R.O. Portugal 32), termed Le Blanc “another very able man, . . . he has not been reckoned our friend, but we have the strongest assurances he shall never be admitted into politicks. No Torcys, none of the old court are to come into play.”

² H. Walpole, 13 June, very private, B.M. Add. MS. 32746, printed with his dispatch of the 12th by Coxe, *l.c.* Sir Robert Walpole’s letter of congratulation to Fleury in Coxe’s other work, p. 497. Fleury’s replies to like letters from Newcastle and Townshend, 25 June, R.O. France 184, originals. His letters to Bourbon of 13 June and 17 July, Dureng, pp. 527 f.

³ 13 June, R.O. Royal Letters 7.

Prussia from venturing to play the part he had. Now all this might be expected to be remedied. Walpole must press on Fleury the increased necessity of acting with vigour and spirit, and particularly conclusion of the convention with Denmark without loss of time, to disappoint Austrian expectations from the change in France. Lastly Newcastle desired all assurances to Fleury from the king and hoped that Broglie, whom he strongly commended, would not suffer.¹

Of pronouncements to other envoys one example will suffice.

This change will make no alteration with respect to our affairs with France, for thô the King had a great esteem for Mons^r le Duc, and wished him extremely well, yet I must tell you that the B^p of Fréjus by his sentiments and by his way of acting for these several years past has convinced the King that his union with that crown is extremely safe in his hands. The Bishop has given M^r Walpole, with whom he has always acted in an entire confidence, the strongest assurances of maintaining and strengthening that perfect harmony which is between the two crowns, and we have all the reason in the world to rely on those assurances, having had the experience already of his doing every thing in his power towards that end.”²

When the news of Bourbon's dismissal reached Madrid, on 21 June, the “excessive joy,” says Stanhope, surpassed anything since the treaties with Austria of the previous year. “Nothing was talked of for some days as more certain than the immediate accession of France to the treaty of Vienna, the settling of the Pretender in England, and the destruction of all the Protestants in general.” The nuncio Aldobrandini, informed, at Fleury's request, by his colleague at Paris, Massei, had at once acquainted the king and queen, assuring them that the bishop had nothing so much at heart as to effect a reconciliation. Another letter, supposed to be from Louis XV or from Fleury, had been delivered by the courier who brought it to the king's private secretary, the marquis de la Roche, in accordance with positive orders to allow it to pass no other hands.³

At Vienna it was the same. Says Saint-Saphorin : “Les excès de joie où ils sont icy ne sont pas concevables, et ils se regardent par la chute du duc de Bourbon et par les démarches de l'ancien évêque

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 4 June (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746. On the head of connexion between the fall of Bourbon and that of Ripperda Walpole was assured that none existed, that the former was a sudden work “occasioned by Madame de Prie's unexpected return out of Normandy, after she by consent retired from business, and taking upon her a greater ascendant and authority than ever over Mo^r le Duc. in the management of affairs” (19 June, *ibid.*).

² Townshend to William Finch, 7 June (o.s.), R.O. Holland 290.

³ Stanhope, 2 July, R.O. Spain 94. The letter was that from Fleury to Philip V, of 13 June, to be noticed in the next chapter.

de Fréjus comme entièrement au-dessus du vent." For communication to the French court he set forth the whole situation in a dispatch described as containing nothing that was not very true, but turned so as to make the best impression. At first, he said, the news of Ripperda's fall had not given entire satisfaction; it was apprehended that the new ministry would not be able to find the money on which all plans were based. When at interviews privately sought Count Conrad Starhemberg had talked of accommodation, questions about armaments, about the negotiations with Russia, and about intentions in general had greatly embarrassed him. And Tarouca had heard changed language from Prince Eugene and Pentenriedter. But now the news from France had roused the vastest hopes. Starhemberg had told Richelieu that a change in French policy was looked for very soon. Sinzendorf had spoken in like vein to Di Breglio, boasting that if England wanted war she would have to wage it alone. Then the bishop of Namur¹ had been commissioned to insinuate that the new ministry in France would make agreement with Spain and Austria all its care, but that there was still plenty of opportunity for England to be reconciled. All of which he (Saint-Saphorin) had asserted to be pure illusion, pointing out, amongst much else, that it could never be to the interest of France to extend the emperor's power.

In a ciphered postscript Saint-Saphorin stated general belief that France was reconciled with Spain already, though on what footing was not known, whence still much disquietude. If this were at all true, it might yet be possible to accommodate. "Dure extrémité! mais à laquelle il semble que nous serions réduits par le peu de fidélité de nos amis." If France continued in her former principles clear manifestation thereof was very necessary; otherwise the court of Vienna would use its opportunity to engage all

¹ Abbé Thomas Strickland (for whom see the *Dictionary of National Biography*) had been raised to this dignity at last in the previous December, in spite of opposition by the Jacobites. He had been sent to Vienna in January 1719, with the connivance of leading English catholics, to endeavour to conciliate those abroad and to deprive the Pretender of the support of Rome. A cardinalate was sought for him, and the emperor was persuaded to give him a pension. See the dispatches of Saint-Saphorin (who thought him quite sincere) of 1719 (with them a copy of Strickland's "*Mémoire sur l'état présent de la Religion Catholique en Angleterre, et sur les moyens d'en prévenir l'extirpation*") and of 27 December 1721, R.O. Germany, Empire, 38, 44; Craggs to Lord Stanhope, 30 June and 7 and 24 July (o.s.) 1719, Regencies 57; Townshend to Scott at Dresden, 16 February (o.s.) 1722, Foreign Entry Book 7, and to Saint-Saphorin, 15 and 19 August (o.s.) 1723, Germany, Empire, 48; Scott, 7 April 1722, Poland 28. An autograph letter from him to Townshend about the English catholics, Vienna, 15 April 1726, Germany, Empire, 57. In this year (4 May, *ibid.* 58) Saint-Saphorin reported belief at Rome that he had been implicated with Lord Stair in a plot to murder the Pretender, having been with the squadron sent in that ambassador's time to intercept James Edward on his passage to Scotland; also that it was certain that all that was done against him was inspired by the Jacobites.

the smaller princes of Germany, and then no remedy. "Dans une circonstance pareille à celle où nous sommes la réputation fait tout."¹

When Walpole presented the answer of George I to the letter of Louis XV he received the singular favour of a reply. It was only "Assurez le Roy votre Maître de mon amitié," but this, says Walpole, was "the only time that he ever gave an answer to a foreign minister in a private audience, and never did in a publick, but lately to Count Maffei, when he made his entry." To the compliments made to himself Fleury returned the most earnest professions in a better manner than Walpole could express, saying that he had spoken "very roundly" to the Austrian minister, Fonseca, and showing a letter written to Fénelon in Holland "conceived in terms the most proper to make the States easy." Declarations, Walpole went on, made to all ministers of foreign powers, and especially of those in sympathy with Austria, would soon satisfy all Europe that the change of administration would make no other difference in the measures undertaken in concert with Great Britain than that of "pursuing them with greater vigour and resolution." Again he had presumed to insinuate his opinion on ministerial appointments, this time in view of reports of intention to remove certain persons from the Council of State, and particularly the duke of Orleans. Having exposed to Fleury the ill consequences which might attend such a step against the heir-presumptive to the crown, Bourbon's enemy, Walpole claimed to have convinced him and to be more and more persuaded every day of the truth and sincerity of his assurances.²

When the reply to be made to Pozobueno had been concerted with the French government orders went to Stanhope to present a memorial in its terms. He was assured again of thorough approval of his conduct and of undoubtedness that reparation would be made both for the violation of his domicile and for the arrest of his courier. He was warned in a private letter that the French, who had given convincing proofs that they would do nothing about reconciliation with Spain without his Majesty's concurrence, must not be given "the least pretence of differing with us." They so greatly appreciated the value of Stanhope's discoveries, that "they mightily

¹ Saint-Saphorin to Townshend, 22 June, and to H. Walpole, 30 June, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

² H. Walpole, 21 and 25 June B.M. Add. MS. 32746, in the former letter at much length about Orleans. In reply thereto Newcastle desired him to repeat what he had said in the king's name, with cautious apologies for the liberty taken and intimation that the king had no correspondence with the family of Orleans. On receiving Walpole's second letter he expressed the king's pleasure that the duke was not to be removed (16 and 18 June (o.s.), private, *ibid.*).

wished you might have leave to attend at court as formerly." Yet, His Majesty is far from intending that the thing should drop, but that it should be kept up in such a manner as may, in all events, be turned most to his advantage. This incident has already been of very great service, and, if rightly made use of, may hereafter be of infinitely more. Should your Excellency upon your return to court find, as it is most probable, that things will go on in as bad, or worse way than ever, and should our allies come to be alarmed in the manner that they ought, we have it always in our power to say that satisfaction has never been made for this late affront, which will be an aggravation to other injuries that we may have just reason to complain of.¹

The other and more serious ground for quarrel with Spain was the support reported to be given to the Jacobites. The part which Ripperda had been understood to take in their schemes has been recounted. After his fall Stanhope had continued to write of the impudent behaviour of their leaders at Madrid, as of Wharton's contemptuous treatment of the summons to him to come home and of Liria presenting a memorial on his behalf in which James III was styled the lawful king of England; language on the part of a grandee of Spain which Stanhope thought of sufficient gravity to necessitate a protest.²

Towards the end of June came Benjamin Keene to London with his oral report of what Ripperda had revealed when in refuge in Stanhope's house.³ The principal disclosure was an inaccurate version of some clauses of the most secret treaty of 5 November 1725. "All the while," Keene deposed, "the duke of Ripperda was dictating this treaty to Mr Stanhope he appeared to be in the greatest agonies, and frequently burst into tears." He asserted it to be known only to the parties and to the ministers who had signed it. Also he had shown the plans of Liria and Wharton in their own handwriting, these being the papers which the court of Spain was so anxious to recover. He confessed his policy to have been

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 18 June (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97. The answer to Pozobueno, Rousset, iv. 69; copy and English translation, dated 20 June (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Ministers 57. The accompanying drafts show the trouble which its composition had given. In his private letter Newcastle wrote: "The alteration made in the body of the draught was suggested by our friends in Holland, and you may easily imagine why the last paragraph is left out."

² Stanhope, 3 and 11 June, *ibid.* 94. Wharton had left Madrid for Rome on 13 May, sent, according to Königsegg (Syveton, pp. 403-4), by Ripperda to incite James at once to head an insurrection in the Highlands with support of Spanish men and money. Meeting, however, at Valencia the two Keiths he had returned to Madrid with them. The Earl Marischal, says Stanhope, wore the green riband of St. Andrew publicly, as did Wharton that of the Garter.

³ Which, says Newcastle, he was made to put in writing "clearly and distinctly" for communication to Fleury only, as a mark of the king's confidence in him (to H. Walpole, 15 June (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746). For Keene see Armstrong, pp. xi-xiii, and the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

only to gain time for the arrival of the treasure-fleets, his boasts about reconciling France and Spain entirely groundless, and Fleury innocent of the aspersions of treachery cast upon him. On this point Stanhope had made particular inquiry.¹

To what was really in the treaty mentioned Ripperda added other conditions ; for the succession of Don Felipe in France, should Louis XV die without issue, for establishment of the Pretender in England, and for complete extirpation of the protestant religion everywhere. These, Stanhope explained at a later time, were not part of any treaty executed but only projected and agreed on after Ripperda's return to Spain.² But at present the whole was taken for gospel. Sending the information to Horatio Walpole Newcastle desired him to make "the natural observations upon this extraordinary advice, which confirms the suspicions we have long had and justifies, in the highest degree, the proceedings of the two crowns." He adduced evidence of the genuineness of the revelations and observed that France was concerned at least as much as any other power.³

Walpole, having heard the story from Keene on his passage, had already taken the opportunity of new assurances by Fleury,

¹ From Keene's information of 15 June (o.s.), Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ii. 606. Another account by Stanhope, 30 July, sent with a packet of papers entrusted to his care by Ripperda, B.M. Add. MSS. 32747, f. 35, Coxe, p. 610. A copy of the supposed secret treaty, included, B.M. Add. MS. 33005, f. 425. What the two Sicilian priests, before noticed, told Horatio Walpole in September 1727 is obviously untrustworthy. Disclosing articles of a secret treaty between Spain and Austria, they referred them to that of 30 April 1725, while making them a consequence of the treaty of Hanover. Walpole noticed the contradiction, but accepted their lame explanation (B.M. Add. MS. 32752, f. 38, with a copy of the Spanish document certified by him). Equally untrustworthy is their "Breve y sumaria Noticia" of Ripperda's career and fall given to Walpole on 10 October 1727 (*ibid.* f. 206). They attributed an important part in the affair to Monteleon, successful with the aid of the queen's confessor in restoring to her favour his cousins, the two Patiños. Monteleon may have had special influence at court, his son being a son-in-law of Laura Pescatori, the all-powerful nurse, and Stanhope testifies to his intimacy with Guerra and De la Paz. But in May 1726 he appears in Stanhope's dispatches as in disfavour for his leanings towards Great Britain and France and as a suppliant for the ambassador's money and protection. Coxe (*Memoirs of the Kings of Spain*, pp. 330 note, 334-5) follows the priests' account from a translation, but admits that the final influence, which overthrew Ripperda, was not theirs, as they claimed, but Königsegg's. Cf. on the subject Armstrong, pp. 205-6, noting, however, that disclosures made in the autumn of 1727 could have had nothing to do with the King's Speech in January.

² "I can most safely affirm that Ripperda most positively assured me that the secret treaty between the Emperor and Spain, on which I took down from his own mouth and sent a copy of its articles to your Grace, was both signed and ratified before he left Vienna, but that the other treaty mentioned by me between the Emperor and Spain and the Pretender was only projected and agreed to since his return to Spain, but had not been actually signed" (4 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32747).

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 15 June (o.s.), cited.

"that however desirous he might be of a reconciliation with Spain, yet he would take no one step without my participation and concurrence," to acquaint him with it as a particular mark of confidence. Whereon, says he, Fleury expressed the "utmost astonishment at the extravagance and weakness of the king of Spain."¹ When he received his instructions on the matter he found that Fleury had imparted the information to Louis XV and professed himself convinced of its truth, appreciating the motives of the secret treaty and the dangers which it threatened. Walpole hoped, therefore, that no surprise or alarm would be created by what he had to report of continued negotiations with Spain, namely, that when the overtures made had elicited from Philip V only expressions of regard for Fleury, the latter had opened a private correspondence with Bermudez.² He was sure, a week later, that Fleury would "still keep closely to his point of an inseparable union with his Majesty."³

It was still thought in England that the new Spanish ministry might not favour Austria. Newcastle desired Stanhope to advise whether Castelar and Patiño,

who are intire enemies to what has of late been doing by the court of Spain, . . . will not be able to clogg the wheels of that government in such manner, as to prevent their putting in execution whatever designs they may have been carrying on with the court of Vienna. We hear the king's confessor⁴ and the marquis D'Harc^t have gained ground upon the disgrace of Ripperda, much to the dissatisfaction of the court of Vienna. If there should be any truth in this, you will be pleased to acquaint us with it.⁵

Townshend, similarly, set down that although the court of Vienna might believe De la Paz to be in its interest, yet the change was so great, and so many other Spaniards, friends of France, had been restored to their offices, that the French were persuaded that they would soon regain their credit at Madrid and Spain return to its old maxims.⁶

Which pleasurable expectations were at fault. The two Patiños, if enemies of Ripperda, were counted well-disposed by Königsegg.⁷ Grimaldo and Bermudez might be dissatisfied, but could not venture to oppose him openly. Stanhope advised that he was "in effect

¹ H. Walpole, 25 June, private, *ibid.*

² A man "certainly in his heart against the Imperial court and for an union between his Majesty France and Spain." Fleury's first letter to him, of 2 (or 5) July, Baudrillart, iii. 260.

³ H. Walpole, 2 and 9 July, *l.c.*

⁴ Bermudez.

⁵ Newcastle to Stanhope, 18 June (o.s.), cited.

⁶ To Saint-Saphorin, 21 June (o.s.), R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

⁷ Cf. Syveton, p. 236.

first minister," De la Paz, who appeared to have the principal management of affairs, acting in everything under his "inspiration and direction" and being locked up with him for two or three hours every day. He had already received 300,000 pieces of eight (Monteleon had seen the bills of exchange) with the promise of much more. Only war was talked of; Königsegg made no scruple of saying that hostilities would begin before the summer was ended; about reconciliation with France nothing more was heard; only open force could separate the court from Austria. A ship, the *San José*, had brought to Cadiz some 900,000 pieces of eight; the flota was reported due at Havana with twelve million; "the galleons will naturally be there also with near twenty by the beginning of August, to which will be joined the two *azogues* or quicksilver ships, computed at near four more." Troops were on the march for the French frontier; armaments pushing on at Cadiz and Santander. The Jacobites were "more uppish and elated than ever," their leaders dining at Königsegg's country house and almost daily in conference with him when in town.¹

A fortnight later Stanhope repeated all this, declaring the court to be "more Imperialist than ever" and instancing continual remittances of money to Vienna.² No minister, he said, had courage to oppose the queen after the example made of Ripperda.

As to all foreign affairs, it may truly be said that Königseck is not only first minister but regent. Grimaldo Castelar and Patiño are well disposed, but are meer cypher, unless as to the mechanical parts of their employments, being never consulted in any thing, and Orendayn, who alone has some appearance of trust and confidence, receives his directions from Count Königseck, to whose house, when in town, he regularly goes every day. . . . The marquis de Monteleon keeps up his former intimacy with the queen's confessor and the marquis de la Paz, by which means I am exactly informed of every thing that comes to their knowledge. . . . The Jacobites here appear more elated than ever and seem to look upon Mons^r le Duc's disgrace as a sure presage of their speedy return to England, tho' I cant learn that they have any sudden enterprise in view.

¹ Stanhope, 11 and 17 June, R.O. Spain 94. Enclosed was a copy of a letter to De la Paz from Van der Meer, of 29 May, which showed, says Stanhope, how zealously the Dutch ambassador joined in anything that affected his Majesty's honour, he also having absented himself from court since the late affront.

² Van der Meer reported 75,000 pistoles sent to Alicante at the beginning of June in specie and transmitted by letters of exchange to Leghorn; 75,000 more negotiated towards the end of the month on the tobacco-duty and sent by letters of exchange to Hamburg; 50,000 similarly at the beginning of July to the banker Andrioli at Amsterdam, these for payment of troops in Brabant and Flanders; and again 80,000 to Amsterdam on 7 July through two leading merchants, one of them named Musq. Further he was assured that after a fortnight's recalcitrance Philip V had signed an order on 16 July for remittance of 400,000 pistoles more, again negotiated on the tobacco-duty (Itterssum, 6 August, R.O. Holland 284).

Wharton was visiting Königsegg at his country house regularly three days a week.¹

Really, the Jacobite schemes were discouraged from Vienna. Königsegg claimed to have surprised the Spanish sovereigns by revelation of Ripperda's intrigues in that direction, and threw cold water on the idea of a descent on England from Ostend.² Orders went out hurriedly to stop Ripperda's agents. On news of Lambilly's appearance at Amsterdam with his 80,000 pistoles San Felipe and Königsegg-Erps journeyed thither from the Hague and impounded the money and his papers.³ The Spanish minister at Hamburg, Don Antonio Casado, Monteleon's son, had orders to look out for and stop one Paolo La Belli, on his way to Sweden with a like mission.⁴

On the other heads Königsegg's conduct in Spain was prescribed to him as follows. Nothing was of greater service to the emperor than the confidence reposed in him by the king and queen, and he could not apply too great care and moderation in order to preserve it. For so long as it lasted the emperor's affairs in Spain would prosper. Undoubtedly there were many who would look upon that confidence askance and exert themselves to destroy it by representing his least doings in a crooked light. He must interfere as little as possible in the domestic affairs of the kingdom, for that would give the Spaniards ground for mistrust and discontent and undermine his present favourable position. He must confide in none but the marquis de la Paz, but that without exciting suspicion of it in others; he must take care, indeed, in view of the efforts of England and France to gain adherents, that none should have cause of complaint. Even the ambitions of those, who had served the emperor in former times, he must support only so far as their claims were just. To go further might not please the king, who naturally could not be expected to favour former adversaries at the expense of those who had supported him.⁵

One use which it was proposed to make of Ripperda's revelations was in obtaining accessions to the treaty of Hanover. Nothing, Stanhope was told, seemed more effective to this end than privately to acquaint such princes, as might be influenced, with what had been discovered. But in so delicate a matter as letting out things

¹ Stanhope, 2 July, *l.c.*

² Syveton, pp. 203-4, 224-5.

³ Finch and Dayrolle, 11 to 21 June, R.O. Holland 290, 287; Wich, 24 May and 11 June, Hamburg 43. San Felipe on the day after his return (11 June) was seized with convulsions and died.

⁴ Wich, 11 June. The man was an Italian and had been one of Alberoni's secretaries.

⁵ Eugene to Königsegg, 3 September, Arneth, ii. 219. Cf. Armstrong, pp. 201-2.

imparted in confidence the king would in the first place have his advice and suggestions in regard to carrying out so great a public service. On second thoughts, in view of an intercepted letter from Vienna asserting that Ripperda could not reveal anything disadvantageous to the emperor, which assertion, if declared, might prevent the princes named from believing what was told them, Newcastle proposed publication of the secret treaty, as a measure which would engage those princes to strenuous co-operation and hold others back from the opposite course. He instanced the excellent effect produced by revelation of the treaty at Paris and expected like effect elsewhere. The timid Dutch, he said, would see their danger, and the king of Prussia be convinced that firm union with Great Britain and France alone could "save him and his dominions from utter destruction." The elector of Bavaria would run any risk rather than submit to accomplishment of the marriages arranged, and all princes concerned for German liberties would be influenced in like manner. Important above all would be the effect in England. It would be difficult to keep up the sea and land forces next year unless there were something stronger to go upon than the two treaties of Vienna published; it might even be difficult to justify what had been done this year. Whereas, if the secret engagements entered into, before the treaty of Hanover was made or any provocation given,¹ could be laid before parliament everything would be justified and parliament and the nation be thoroughly aroused. "His Majesty would be advised and enabled to take such vigorous steps, as would at once disappoint the execution of this scheme and defeat the malice and inveteracy of his enemies. Jacobitism would be for ever rooted out of this country, and all difficultys flung in the way of his Maj^{ty} and his government at once be totally removed." In conclusion Newcastle desired to know whether Ripperda had said anything about such use of his disclosures. "Should his fate be determined, as is but too possible, the difficulty would then be over." But were he only kept confined, it might go on for years. So that his Majesty was anxious that Stanhope might be able to propose some expedient. Every regard would be had to his opinion.²

In August Stanhope was directed to endeavour to obtain, and to accept as full satisfaction for the insult to himself, permission for Ripperda to return to his own house, and afterwards, in view of the necessity of making use of his discoveries, to contrive his escape thence, using as much money for the purpose as might be needed.

¹ It would appear from this that the treaty revealed was taken to be the private treaty of 30 April 1725.

² Newcastle to Stanhope, 29 June (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

Later he was given full authority to act as he should think proper in the matter, saving the king's honour and anything prejudicial to his service or likely to entail ill consequences, his Majesty "being daily more convinced of the necessity of having this service performed" and thinking "some thousands of pounds very well laid out to accomplish it."¹ Stanhope went so far as to meet "in private and in disguise with the governour of the castle of Segovia, with whom I always used to lodge and who is my particular friend." But partly Ripperda's indisposition, partly the close watch kept by the alcalde who had arrested him, thwarted all attempt to compass his escape.²

We may conclude this chapter with Horatio Walpole's characterisation of personages now of importance in French politics, sent at the end of September in reply to Newcastle's inquiry concerning the recently appointed member of the Council, Marshal Tallard.³ Fleury, it is to be noticed, was now a cardinal.

On Bourbon's fall, says Walpole, there were left in the Council, besides Fleury, only the duke of Orleans, Marshal Villars, and Morville.

The duke of Orleans, tho' a prince of the strictest virtue and morality in all respects, is yet by no means formed for business; his capacity is but short and slow, which joyned with a narrow education, and his not having made that progress in the knowledge of affairs, as might have been expected from his age and experience, makes him of no great service in Council; and were not his integrity too great to be suspected he might be of disservice there, by letting the Emperor, through the canal of the Lorrain family, come to the knowledge of what passes, which perhaps he innocently does sometimes. (Hence the thought to removing him from the Council, which Walpole had successfully discountenanced.)

As to M^r Mars^l de Villars, no person in his figure in the world was ever more illiterate, or ignorant in publick affairs, which besides that his vanity makes him think that he knows better than any body, he is certainly too old to begin to learn; and as to his military capacity, which has given him the greatest reputation, his chief encomium is from his own mouth. . . . Considering all his infirmities, he is indeed no more than a cypher, which it is believed he himself is sensible of, and it may hasten the end of his days, for he is, and has been for some time in a very languishing condition.

M^r de Morville's knowledge in foreign affairs was very scanty, upon his entring into business, and his genius is naturally so narrow, that there is no great prospect that time and experience will ever make him a considerable man, or any thing more than a clerck to receive and execute orders, even

¹ Dispatches to Stanhope, 11 August and 16 September (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Stanhope, 30 October, *ibid.* 95. Ripperda's escape at last and his strange subsequent history are well enough known, see e.g. Mahon ii. 98.

³ H. Walpole, 28 September, private, B.M. Add. MS. 32747, partly printed by Coxe, *Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole*, pp. 133-6.

in which he is not so expeditious as could be wished, and although he loves the appearance and credit of doing every thing himself, yet he will readily submit to the opinion of him, who has the chief power and authority in the government.

This was the state of the ministry when his Most Christian Majesty declared that he reposed his Most intimate confidence in the Cardinal, and that minister became sensible that, at the same time that his authority and power in the management of affairs would be equal to that of a prime minister, he should likewise be accountable for the event of them, and that the good or bad success of the administration would entirely redound upon him; and as he certainly has the best intentions, as well as a perseverance to do that which is right, so he is likewise desirous that the voice of the nation should accompany his good actions; and this love of popularity, joyned with the natural mildness of his temper, is sometimes a restraint upon him and subjects him to a management that in some cases proves inconvenient, but as it never makes him swerve or deviate in the least from pursuing the point he has in view, he has steadiness and with it dexterity enough to compass what he designs, without the displeasure or resentment of any body; and I must do him the justice on this occasion to declare, that I believe the preserving a strict union between his Majesty and France, pursuant to the engagements now in force between the two crowns, is the foundation of his present thoughts and system relating to the affairs of Europe.

This being the situation and the temper of the Cardinal upon the removal of M^r le Duc, he thought it necessary, considering the mean opinion the world had of the Council in the time of his Highness, as well as consistent with the dignity of the government, to increase the number of ministers of state, and his immediate thoughts were to take in the marshals D'Huxelles and Berwick, the first on account of his popularity, being generally esteemed as a good patriot, of plain downright sense and integrity, and well affected to his king and his country. As to the marsh^l Berwick, the Cardinal has for a great while had a good opinion of his modesty uprightness and abilities, having thoughts worthy of his quality and above the little intrigues of women and sycophants at court, which to do him justice he always despised, which is so agreeable to the Cardinal's disposition that it was no wonder that he put so much confidence in him, besides the marshal being the only person fit to command the French army, in case of a rupture.

On sounding opinions, however, Walpole goes on, Fleury had found that Berwick's appointment would not be popular, as he was not a Frenchman born, though no doubt he would command the army, were there occasion. He continued to live in the country and appeared, in general, heartily to wish for "the continuation of a good understanding between England and France in opposition to the Emperor." Certainly he would have no cabals with the Jacobites, thinking "such mean and despicable work" below him.

D'Huxelles Fleury had at once taken into consultation on foreign affairs, until the difficulty of admitting him to the Council, raised by the question of precedence, should have been removed by his

own elevation to the cardinalate. Wanting another, but not Berwick for the reasons stated, he had pitched on Marshal Tallard as likely to act under his direction and less objectionable than any other. He had also thought of the duc d'Antin, "who, he said, had certainly the best and most solid understanding of them all," but on investigation had found that he "had too bad and profligate a character in the world to be employed in so high a station." Cardinal de Rohan had been rejected on account of his well-known anti-English sentiments. But in case of Villars' death, Fleury had divulged in strictest confidence, he had his eye on the marquis de Brancas, brother of the minister in Sweden, "indeed in every respect a very honest man, with whom I have had for some time a particular acquaintance, and by his own seeking, which your Grace may be sure I shall take care for the future to improve." He had been ambassador in Spain, was about fifty years of age, and likely, if made a minister, to enjoy Fleury's closest intimacy and, if found capable, to be so forwarded by him in the king's esteem as in due course to succeed him.

Walpole was sure that his Majesty's interests would not suffer by the appointments of Marshals D'Huxelles and Tallard, while Fleury's credit subsisted. They were "both of the old court, which had indeed a most inveterate aversion to England and the present happy establishment there," but the long peace between the two nations, the low condition of French affairs, apprehension of the Emperor's power, and the friendly disposition shown by George I and sense of the growing regard of his subjects for him had brought a charge even among the old courtiers,

tho' there still remains a pride which makes some of them think that England makes too great a figure, and that France should take the lead more than they do in the concert between the two nations. . . .

Marsh^l D'Huxelles will, in order to keep up that dignity, which he thinks becomes his person and character, of speaking his word plainly and without reserve, sometimes growle, but to give him his due, as he becomes every day more and more instructed in the points of moment, that are in dispute with the Emperor, he is more and more convinced of the justice and necessity of the measures taken by his Majesty and France before he came into the administration. . . . He does extremely well in the main, and has a thorough aversion to the ministers of Vienna and especially Count Sinzendorf, who has no better liking for him, as the marshal has told me himself.

The marsh^l Tallard loves business extremely, to talk much, and to give his own opinion, but by his behaviour yesterday, and by his character of having been always a most servile courtier, I believe he will never differ from the Cardinal in any material point.

This account . . . will, I presume, make his Majesty extremely easy as to the present situation and disposition of this court.

CHAPTER XXII

MOVES FOR CONCILIATION

ON the fall of Ripperda Morville had rendered to Horatio Walpole "a full account of what had passed at Madrid with Stalpart Abbot Mongon and Sartines with regard to the insinuations made to those persons for a reconciliation between France and Spain." He had shown Stalpart's letter of 6 April, unanswered and so, Walpole inferred, little regarded, and affirmed that the reply to it, now ready, would convince the king of Spain, if he saw it, that France was firmly resolved to stand by the treaty of Hanover. He had retailed what Montgon had written about the intrigues to overthrow Bourbon, the "miserable condition of Spain in all respects," and utterances by Grimaldo, for instance, that "the only way to open King Philip's eyes and to bring him to act a reasonable part was for France and England to continue firm," when the complaints of his people must oblige him to give in, and had concluded by saying that Montgon would be thanked "for his usefull and instructive correspondence" and ordered "to enter into no manner of negotiation, but cultivate and improve his confidence with Grimaldo," repeating to that minister the assurances already given. "But as to Sartines, he said he was a person of intrigue" with pecuniary interests in Spain, and no confidence was placed in him.¹

A few days later Morville entrusted to Walpole, for delivery by Stanhope, a letter to Montgon prescribing as principles to guide him, should he absolutely be obliged to speak on affairs, that before all things constant and intimate union with England must be preserved, that neither departure from the alliance of Hanover nor accession to the treaty of Vienna could be considered, and that reconciliation with Spain, although desired, could not be preferred to union with England, so that restoration of perfect intelligence between England and Spain must be its necessary condition. The only two persons to be dealt with, it was stated, were Bermudez

¹ H. Walpole, 21 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32746. On the other hand he reported Fleury to have a good opinion of Sartine and a very indifferent one of Montgon. A copy of Morville's reply to Stalpart, of even date, polite but very cold, with Stanhope's of 11 June, R.O. Spain 94.

and Grimaldo, and the latter especially must be convinced of confidence placed in him and of desire for his advancement in affairs. So that Marshal Tessé's conduct towards them must be condemned without reserve.¹

Fleury in power, these secret handlings were at once replaced by direct approaches, as we have seen. His letter to Philip V of 13 June, noticed, he showed at the dinner with Berwick and Walpole on that date. It alleged as a principal motive for Bourbon's dismissal the hope of putting an end thereby to Philip's malcontent.² Walpole thought proper highly to applaud

being sensible that there is nothing which the Bishop, and indeed the whole nation here has more at heart, than a reconciliation with Spain, and I know the great men here think that the dismissal of M^r le Duc, to whom the sending back of the Infanta at the time and in the manner it was done is entirely owing, is the best opportunity for compassing it. For B. Frejus had the prudence of being then against it, and took care to have the king of Spain convinced of it.

Requested to be very frank, Walpole entered fully, "in such strong but at the same time in such cordial and friendly terms" that he touched without offending, into the accusations levelled against Fleury of intriguing with the Spanish court to overthrow Bourbon. Descanting then on "the unhappy situation that his Majesty was like to be in with respect to the friendship of Spain," particularly by the affair of Ripperda, he adverted to the possibility of the Spanish court seeking reconciliation with France separately from England. On which Fleury

solemnly protested to me, that if this letter should have any influence upon the king of Spain, so as to bring him to a better temper with France, no other use should be made of it than to bring him at the same time to a better understanding with England, and that in all events France should make no alliance, receive nor enter into any measures with Spain, but in conjunction with his Majesty, and that they would stand firm and unalterable to their engagements.³

¹ Instructions to Montgon, 25 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32746, f. 100, and Baudrillart, iii. 248. Sending the paper to Walpole Morville desired the greatest circumspection in its delivery by Stanhope, so that no suspicion of Montgon whatever should arise. "Il éprouveroit une disgrâce au premier indice que l'on auroit, qu'il écrit icy! Cela seroit très fâcheux, car c'est un homme très capable de recueillir et de donner de bons avis." The dispatch, Walpole remarked (28 May, *ibid.*), carried in its whole tenour "the strongest and most convincing proofs" of the "steadfast resolution" of the court of France to act in all things in perfect confidence with his Majesty and never to be reconciled with that of Spain without him.

² The letter, Baudrillart, iii. 256.

³ H. Walpole, 13 June, very private, previously cited. Baudrillart, in illustration of French desire for reconciliation with Spain, quotes Saint-Simon to Cardinal Gualterio on 16 June: "Bon Dieu! quelle heureuse conjoncture à qui la saurait manier pour rétablir l'union intime entre les deux couronnes, les rendre médiatrices de l'Europe, et tirer à Vienne de grands et d'utiles partis. C'est un grand malheur pour l'état que M. de Torcy ne rentre en place." On Fleury's opposition in October 1724 to the repudiation of the infanta see Villars' Memoirs, ed. De Vogüé, iv. 302.

On receipt of this report Newcastle expressed the king's sense of the great advantages resulting from Walpole's confidential intimacy with Fleury, harped on the necessity of reconciliation between France and Spain being conditional on the separation of Spain from Austria, and adjured Walpole to take all imaginable care to be informed of all steps taken and to send earliest notice of them to London and to Stanhope at Madrid.¹ Although, he said, Fleury's letter to Philip V was "grounded upon principles more agreeable possibly to the passions and views of the king of Spain than to the general interest of Europe," yet Walpole had done wisely in commending it. Disposing Philip to reconciliation, of which the king would be "heartily glad," if "made upon a right foot," might lessen the queen's power over him and so the Austrian. But Fleury must be made thoroughly to understand that "the main point, which concerns France more than all the other powers in Europe, and without which nothing can be done," was destruction of the union between the emperor and Spain. The rest would follow very easily; the "pretended differences and disputes" between Spain and Great Britain, "artfully worked up by the court of Vienna," would disappear. The dispatch concluded with a depreciation of Spanish complaints about trade, about Gibraltar, and the rest, and with an exhortation to Walpole to have every confidence in Stanhope.²

Further testimony to Fleury's sincerity was given by Walpole in his private dispatch of 2 July.

The Bishop's plan seems at present to be to make it appear that nothing shall be wanting on the part of France, that is just and reasonable, to renew a good understanding with Spain, as what is extremely desired by this nation; but at the same time he thinks the interest honour and security of France is so inseparable from their strict union and engagements with his Majesty, especially as long as the intimacy between the Emperor and Spain subsists, that he shall be able to make a strong and justifiable stand against any proposals from Spain, that may have the least tendency to divide his Majesty and France, and that he shall have an opportunity of representing the inconveniences and prejudice to the crown of Spain from their being under the influence of the Imperial court; and he concluded this conference with repeating to me, that I might be assured that their reconciliation with Spain should not be made without their taking ours along with it.

Newcastle, replying to this, reckoned the only danger to be that Fleury's great desire for reconciliation with Spain might make him less inclined for active measures. He observed that Spanish

¹ "It highly imports his Majesty that nothing of this kind should be carrying on without his participation and consent."

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 8 June (o.s.), *ibid.*

policy must depend on the Austrian, which France would certainly oppose. Enclosing intercepted correspondence showing how the court of Vienna pretended to be assured of the catholic princes of the empire, the king of Poland and the tsaritsa, and even to be closely united with Sweden, he discoursed of measures which might yet be taken with the first-named.¹

In his next dispatch Walpole recounted a conference at Versailles with Fleury D'Huxelles and Morville, when he had been assured that no step should be taken without his privity and had been shown a letter to Rottembourg just drafted, emphatically contradicting insinuations made at Berlin that French policy would suffer change.² Whereon Walpole had entered on a long discourse "upon the present conduct of those who were known to have entred into engagements opposite to his Majesty and France," recapitulating the secret offensive alliance of Austria and Spain, the Jacobite plots, the understanding between Vienna and Petersburg, engagement of the catholic electors at 600,000 florins a year of Spanish money,³ a projected Russian expedition against Scotland from Archangel, and so on. He insisted that a position of defence must be taken up and, in particular, the Danish convention be pressed on. He was heard, he says, with great patience and without dissent; the ministers were "even fully persuaded" that the king of Spain meant war, though they discredited some of the reports, as about the expeditions from Ostend and Archangel. They promised that no time should be lost about the convention and that the French army should stand ready on the Rhine.⁴

Simultaneously with his overtures to Madrid Fleury initiated tentatives at Vienna. Richelieu was ordered to report any conciliatory propositions that the Austrian ministers might make, whether from themselves or conjointly with Spain, making them understand that such proposals, to attain success, should be communicated to Saint-Saphorin. If, however, they showed invincible repugnance to this, he might concede the point, declaring that he gave way only because he was sure that the king of France would impart everything to the king of England. Further he was desired cautiously to enter on the question of imperial support to Fleury's candidature for a cardinalate.⁵

¹ H. Walpole, 2 July, Newcastle to him, 24 June (o.s.), private, *ibid.*

² A copy of the letter with Walpole's dispatch of the next day, *ibid.* "Long and extremely well wrote," was his opinion of it, and its arguments "detailed in the clearest, strongest, and most conclusive manner, to show that France would on this occasion stand by their engagements."

³ As reported by Saint-Saphorin on 19 June.

⁴ H. Walpole, 8 July, *ibid.*

⁵ Morville to Richelieu, 13 June, Dureng, p. 466.

Saint-Saphorin reported on this head orders to Richelieu either to endeavour to obtain the emperor's promise not to oppose an immediate grant of the hat, anticipating the "promotion de la couronne," or, failing that, to demand action by him, jointly with the king of France, to oblige the Pope to make that promotion at once. Townshend, he said, would appreciate the consequences of such a step.¹ At the same time was intercepted a letter from Vice-chancellor Schönborn, informing Palm (according to the English translation) that Richelieu had acted on his instructions, *more Gallico*, at once, giving assurance of his master's "sincerity confidence and disposition to peace," and expressing the hope that the emperor would be "pleased, *pro conservanda pace Europaea*, to help France to the former confidence and alliance with Spain." Palm's usual good sense, the letter went on, would enable him easily to comprehend the importance of this secret notice, "and you will in course admire how God Almighty seems to design to check the ambition of such as have hitherto affected to rule the *habenas et clavum Orbis*," and "this happy turn of fate from which, by the favour of the Most High, we may expect *tempora pacifica in diebus nostris*."

These advices were sufficiently disturbing. The statements, Newcastle wrote, were "so positively affirmed, and, if true, of such fatal consequence to the present system of affairs in Europe," that in spite of Walpole's repeated assurances the king could not be easy until the matter was cleared up. He desired the letters to be communicated; Schönborn's as though obtained "by some management of Mo^r Palm's family," the substance of Saint-Saphorin's in such a manner that it might be believed to have come from someone of less authority. It was difficult, he said, to see what advantage Fleury could gain from his advances at Vienna, for although his "bigottry for his religion" might possibly be flattered, yet in reconciliation with Spain through the emperor France must play so subservient a part to him as to lose all credit in Europe. There could not be much doubt about the approaches for the cardinalate, but "any application for a favour from the court of Vienna at this time is surely unseasonable, especially made without your knowledge and upon a point in which the Bishop is personally concerned, and which, when you touched to him, he seemed so reserved upon." Walpole must try to find out what were his motives and make representations, for instance, that all measures taken since the death of the regent Orleans were with his advice and concurrence; "the King has always had the satisfaction to have the Bishop on his side." Were he changing his opinions now it was hoped that

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 22 June, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

at least he would communicate his thoughts freely and let the plan of action, which he now thought most advisable, be known. Accounts such as that sent to Palm must undoubtedly be going to other courts and must have a very bad effect, unless immediately contradicted by the conduct of France. Vigorous measures should be taken at once, and such orders sent to the French ministers abroad as should convince the public of the resolution of France to support her engagements. And that the king thought could not be better done than by immediately concluding the convention with Denmark and setting to work to gain those princes of Germany, who had not yet engaged themselves on the other side.¹

To increase the uneasiness came advice from Stanhope of correspondence of Sir Toby Burke and one Colabar at Paris with the duchess of St Pierre and Sartine at Madrid, concerning reconciliation between France and Spain at the expense of Great Britain. Sartine, he said, had shown Montgon in great confidence a letter from Colabar, saying that full powers to conduct a negotiation were being made out for him, and one from Burke conveying warning that Morville was not and must not be in the secret. Sartine communicated all letters to and received instructions from the queen's confessor (Guerra), who had always aimed at separating France from England and only lately had wanted Montgon to write to Fleury in that sense, the object being to restore the Pretender and to advance the Roman Catholic religion throughout Europe.²

Walpole knew already from Saint-Saphorin how Richelieu, despising the caution prescribed, had given the Austrian ministers opportunity to suggest reciprocal favours,³ and had gone straight to Fleury with his information. Says he, after the interview: "M^r de Frejus heartily despised the little mean arts as well as false insinuations made use of in every event by the Imperial court to sow jealousies between his Majesty and France," and particularly in this instance of the cardinalate. He said (in Walpole's words): "I told you some time since that Pentenriedter had himself assured me that whenever an opportunity should offer, or I should desire it, there would be no difficulty in having the Emperor's consent, and as to Spain, M^r de Morville had already hinted, or would soon do it, to the abbot Montgon to mention it to his Catholick Majesty, for his consent too." He repudiated the expectation insinuated

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 29 June (o.s.), very private, B.M. Add. MS. 32746, with a translation of the intercepted letter.

² Stanhope, 2 July, R.O. Spain 94.

³ At a later date Saint-Saphorin (25 July, *l.c.*) reported Richelieu to have broached the matter with undue precipitation, thereby inspiring the Austrian ministers to make conditions instead of giving the ready consent which otherwise would have been accorded (25 July, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58).

that in return "France would drop their pretensions against the Emperor at Rome"; to that, he said, "the duke of Richelieu did not, nor will this court by any means consent." No doubt, Walpole commented, the thing would be done, even if not with a good grace, while the king of Spain's personal esteem for Fleury, "who has never offended him," would make him facile in the matter. "And the sooner it is done the better, because his authority as Prime Minister, and the respects due to him on that account, will by this means be compleat."¹

At the same interview Fleury told of letters from Sinzendorf and from Königsegg, presented by Fonseca that morning, complimenting him on so completely possessing his master's confidence and assuring him of their satisfaction thereat. His good understanding with England being known, said Königsegg, it was to be hoped that he would employ himself "to moderate the haughty and unreasonable carriage of the English nation." They intimated that now was an opportunity for reconciliation with Spain, which no one desired more ardently than the emperor, ready to employ his good offices and mediation. Fonseca was answered, says Walpole, that both France and England were thoroughly desirous of maintaining peace, but at the same time were resolved to put themselves in a position of defence; that reconciliation with Spain was earnestly desired by Fleury himself and by the whole French nation; but that the misunderstanding did not require the good offices or mediation of any power, and certainly not the emperor's; English mediation had been offered from the first and would not be departed from, and that of the Pope had been rejected for the same reason. The emperor might make what insinuations to the king of Spain he pleased, and Fleury would be glad if they had effect, but would know nothing of them. And so Walpole concluded with another panegyric of the bishop's integrity and intention to adhere strictly and inviolably to the union with Great Britain.

Yet prince Kurakin was well enough justified in advising his court that Fleury would place the interests of France in the first rank and be less docile about obeying the behests of George I than the late ministry had been.²

Newcastle's dispatch sent Walpole to Versailles again to alarm the French ministers and animate them to action as desired. He found them intent, so they asserted strongly, on carrying the Danish convention through and on all other measures to thwart the court of Vienna, whether by armies in the field or by work at Ratisbon; sceptical of the ability of Philip V to carry out the schemes

¹ H. Walpole, 9 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

² Solov'ev, XIX. chapter i.

attributed to him, in view of his want of transports and the watch kept on the ports of Brittany ; but very apprehensive of the conduct of the king of Prussia, entirely governed now, they said, by Grumbkow to the exclusion of Ilgen and Cnyphausen. With D'Huxelles, "now admitted into all the private consultations upon foreign affairs," and afterwards with Berwick, Walpole had full discussion on the political and financial outlook and on plans of campaign, Berwick advising in particular an attack on Ostend. Morville, in reference to Montgon's report of approaches to him by the queen's confessor, undertook to send him such an answer as should effectually cure the Spanish court of expectation of reconciliation on the basis of union with Austria. Walpole deprecated concern, asserted again entire confidence in Fleury, and set down Schönborn's letter as meant, perhaps, to be intercepted and the whole affair an Austrian artifice. About the Spanish intrigue Fleury told him he knew of the correspondence and that Connock was concerned in it but not Torcy (brother of the duchess), as supposed, he having absolutely refused to be involved in it.¹

When, however, knowledge was had of a letter from Morville to Broglie ² notifying the conciliatory disposition which utterances by Fonseca showed the court of Vienna to entertain, distrust in England surged afresh. "The pretence taken," Walpole was told, was the declaration which Saint-Saphorin had been ordered to make at Vienna some time since, and which now, in view of Fonseca's language, was at Paris thought too strong. But that declaration had been approved by Fleury beforehand, and went no further than what Richelieu had said and had been ordered to repeat. "The King concludes that this is only to introduce the most material part of the letter, thô brought in by them only by the bye"; he supposed the French court to have "a prospect of an accommodation with the court of Vienna" and "some better foundation for their opinion than what has been flung out in this manner by Mo^r de Fonseca." But however that might be, "since they do not think fit to own it, it is by no means right that his Majesty should seem to suspect it." Newcastle proceeded to descant on the fatal results of any engagement with or reception of proposals from the imperial

¹ H. Walpole, 13 July, private, B.M. Add. MS. 32746. Colabar, said Fleury, was a despicable wretch, the son of a broken banker. With Burke, who was to see him next day, he promised to be very plain and short. Berwick said of Burke that "he had known him a great while to be a man of rambling entertaining wit, full of imaginary projects, valuing himself to be considerable with all considerable persons," but had always thought him honest, until of late compromising facts had come to light of his relations with the Orleans family. On this subject Walpole dilates at some length.

² Procured, says Newcastle, by means which Walpole would easily guess.

court at the present juncture, and repeated the arguments advanced in an emphatic letter^a to Broglie.¹

Horatio Walpole was still satisfied with the French ministers' professions. The two Pecquets, says he, when he brought to their notice, jocularly, an Amsterdam print of advices received by the imperial ministers at Hamburg similar to those transmitted by Schönborn to Palm, "had not patience to read it with the same calmness and indifference, as I had opened it to them," and denied the truth of the statements with great warmth. Then Morville showed a letter from Montgon describing the satisfaction at Madrid at Bourbon's fall as incomplete, pending his own removal also and replacement by Torcy. The letter, said Walpole, was very honest and showed no desire to bring Morville to change his opinions; and, indeed, there could be no better man in his place, for it was "plain on all occasions that M^r de Morville acts and is lookt upon as a good Englishman." Fleury also told him of fresh overtures and fulsome compliments by Fonseca, made by order, to which he had given the proper firm replies. The cardinalate, he had said, was not a personal affair of his at all but the business of his master, who had sent in his nomination some three years since.

As to the matters contained in Newcastle's dispatch, Walpole refused to share the fear expressed but undertook not to slacken his zeal to discover whether the reports had any foundation. The answer to Broglie, he said, would enable him to deal with the matter without raising suspicion of "our harbouring unaccountable jealousies of them" after "their frankness and sincerity in imparting to us every step that they take with regard to the Imperial and Spanish courts." Indeed, he had already done much. D'Huxelles had owned freely that he looked on Fonseca's utterances as "no more than insinuations in the air" intended to amuse and to sow jealousies, and had explained the orders to Richelieu as merely to declare civilly and in general terms the peaceable disposition of France and readiness to hearken to sincere and satisfactory sentiments towards England and France jointly. Morville said that his last dispatch to Richelieu embraced two points, to express the readiness of the French court to listen to reasonable propositions made to England France and Holland, or to the two first jointly, to be communicated to the Dutch, and secondly "the impossibility of the Imperial court being able to succeed in their endeavours to separate France from his Majesty, or to make them hearken to any negociation without him." Moreover Morville had warned Richelieu

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 5 July (o.s.), very private, *ibid.*; the letter to Broglie, same date, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5 (unsigned draft, 17 pages).

against listening to any proposals for mediation, and had spoken similarly to Fonseca.¹

Equanimity was now restored in England. Newcastle transmitted the king's pleasure at and belief in the truth of what Fleury had said about the Spanish negotiation and Fonseca's overtures, and at the attitude of the French court in regard to the reported preparations at Santander, the Danish convention, and the rest.² Soon a letter from Palm, intercepted, enabled him to write that "plainly they despair of detaching France from his Majesty," setting this down as the effect of Fleury's language to Fonseca, and desiring thanks to be returned to him, and also to Morville for imparting the letter from Montgon, a fresh mark of his attachment to his Majesty and to the alliance. He did not doubt that the foundation of Morville's letter to Broglie was what Fleury had said about England and France not being averse from hearkening to reasonable propositions.³

Having repaired to Versailles to discuss the Danish convention Walpole called first on the two Pecquets, who at once adverted to the late alarms in England and expressed concern that their court should be thought to believe that of Vienna sincerely disposed to an amicable accommodation "and thereupon running inadvertently into their snare." Walpole, without resorting to "earnest and aggravating terms," descanted on the necessity of a close concert and on evident Spanish intention to resort to arms, opining in conclusion that the question of war or peace would not be decided "untill Spain had struck some extravagant blow some where or other." All the ministers, he said, seemed really to be of this opinion, Fleury confessing that "from the mad and inflexible temper of the king of Spain they must prepare for war."⁴

Next, at a conference on 29 July, Fleury showed Walpole a reply received from Bermudez and the answer that he was sending. The former, says Walpole, "extremely cool and dry," complimented

¹ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 16 and 19 July, *ibid.* To Delafaye he wrote (20 July, R.O. France 184): "I should be most concerned personally by my station of all his Ma^{ty}'s servants for any weakness infidelity and trick in this court wth regard to his Ma^{ty}; and I must own, notwithstanding the constant alarms w^{ch} you have, and I think in a great measure create to your selves, I am perfectly easy and in no pains about it. I think I know my men, or rather my man, in whom I entirely depend."

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 7 July (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746; two dispatches, the one private. From Sir Toby Burke he believed that nothing was to be apprehended, though the Orleans family must be blind to confide in such a man. Walpole must see what he could do with the duchess of Orleans and remind her of services rendered; "if ever the King had meddled in the affairs of France, it had always been for the service of her family."

³ The same, 12 July (o.s.).

⁴ H. Walpole, 24 July, *ibid.*

Fleury, especially on his zeal for his religion, but said not a word of how his letter had been received by Philip V, while the bishop's answer stated the king of France to be much hurt at the indifference and inflexibility displayed and to contemplate no more advances, hoping that Philip might not have occasion in the future to reproach himself.¹ And so Walpole believed "the correspondence and application from hence to Spain" to be ended, unless the king of Spain should change, for Fleury, having purged his conscience and being able to satisfy the nation that he had done his best, and being convinced, besides, that Philip was entirely under his queen's domination and she under that of the imperial court, would surely attempt no more. As to Austrian advances, apparently Fonseca's object was to draw from Fleury some compromising utterance. "Poor artifice! They have little knowledge of the Bishop's character, if they think that such pitifull tricks will have any influence upon him." He would not trouble about the cardinalate, he had said, but wait for the ordinary promotion at the nomination of the crowned heads, which could not long be deferred, nine places being vacant. About the conduct of the court of Vienna and the march of the Spanish army towards France he had spoken to Fonseca in very plain and strong terms, showing the insincerity evinced and the difference of secret doings from professions.²

Meanwhile Broglie had received an explanation in plain terms of French relations with Austria and of Fonseca's utterances, with strong assertion of the intention of Louis XV to maintain the union with Great Britain and a sketch of the policy to be pursued.³ To his communication of this Newcastle returned the king's hearty thanks and satisfaction. Could, he said, the Austrian advances ever have made any impression on his Majesty, this declaration had removed all inquietude.⁴ And Townshend told Saint-Saphorin: "Je dois vous répéter qu'on ne sçauroit agir avec plus de franchise et de cordialité que l'évêque de Fréjus le fait avec nous; et nous sommes plus amis que jamais, s'il est possible, avec la France."⁵

Saint-Saphorin corroborated. At the end of his long relation

¹ There was also recrimination about alliance with protestant powers, see Baudrillart, iii. 261. The respective dates of the letters were 15 and 26 July.

² H. Walpole, 30 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32747. One thing, says he, that especially provoked Fleury was information that when Monteleon had sounded Philip V about the cardinalate the latter had appeared readily to agree, but later, after he had seen the queen, and when the nuncio had introduced the subject, had been found to be otherwise disposed.

³ Louis XV to Broglie, 22 July, copy sent to H. Walpole on 26 July (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ Newcastle to Broglie, 23 July (o.s.), *ibid.* and R.O. Foreign Ministers 5, drafts.

⁵ Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 22 July (o.s.), R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

on the position of affairs, elsewhere cited, he had the satisfaction of reporting instructions just received by Richelieu to repeat in form what he had said about Austrian war-preparations as from himself, to listen to no private overtures, especially from the nuncio, to insist on openness with himself and Saint-Saphorin in common, and to declare that the court of France would listen to no proposals separately.¹

When Horatio Walpole confided this report to Fleury the latter gave a full apologetic explanation of Richelieu's character and ambitions. He expressed also the hope that his letter to Bermudez would entirely dispel the belief, which Stanhope reported to be still nurtured at Madrid, that France could be separated from England, adding that he thought of writing again to Philip V in "very strong terms." Yet, said Walpole, "it is certain that this point of a reconciliation with Spain sticks so close to their hearts here, that they do not well know how to shake it off," and especially the aged and infirm D'Huxelles, who pressed for all possible representations at Madrid.² Townshend, however, could assure Saint-Saphorin again that France "*nous est plus assurée que jamais. On y agit envers nous même avec plus d'overture qu'auparavant et avec plus de vigueur.*"³ And he was for humouring D'Huxelles by sending orders to Stanhope to forward reconciliation, the king, he said, being thoroughly for it, if "on a right foot," though doubting that any insinuation could overcome the power of the queen of Spain and "the hopes with which she is buoyed up of mighty advantages to her family from her close union with the Imp^l court"; rather she would "impute these repeated applications to our dread of the united power of the Emperor and Spain."⁴

Stanhope now, having seen Morville's answer to Montgon's authorised letter, to the effect that Louis XV would be delighted to be reconciled but could not depart from his engagements, related that Montgon had sent it to Bermudez at San Ildefonso together with Fleury's letter about his cardinalate, but that the reply had put that matter off and said nothing definite about the former. He hoped, therefore, that the French approaches would now cease. A week later he advised that nothing more was done about the cardinalate or anything else, that a letter from Bermudez to Morville

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 25 July, *ibid.* In cipher he uttered suspicion that Richelieu, after Bourbon's fall, had believed his court to have changed its principles and so entangled himself in meshes from which he could not escape. And since he was over head and ears in debt he might be purchaseable. He would be glad to get France to accept the emperor's mediation, if he knew how to open the matter.

² H. Walpole, 6 August, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

³ 29 July (o.s.), R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

⁴ Townshend to H. Walpole, 4 August (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

was couched in general and vague terms, and that reconciliation was further off than ever.¹

Fleury's own account of these transactions, set out in a letter of 2 August to the king of Sardinia, agrees with those of Walpole. As soon, he said, as Louis XV had declared his intention to govern in person he had written to Philip V by a courier, nominally sent by the nuncio Massei, to intimate that Bourbon, the chief author of the repudiation of the infanta, having been dismissed, the king hoped for restoration of friendship with his uncle. At this Philip had exhibited great joy and had praised him (Fleury) greatly, but had sent no answer. Then the nuncio in Spain, Aldobrandini, had proposed negotiation, the Pope having offered his mediation from the beginning, and Philip had said that he would listen to proposals. But Königsegg and the queen had soon changed this disposition, and after the courier's return Fonseca had offered the emperor's mediation, with many compliments to Fleury and the offer of help to procure him the cardinal's hat. To this he (Fleury) had answered that he could owe the cardinalate only to his master, that the emperor's mediation was not required between uncle and nephew, that the king of France only wanted a simple "réunion de bienséance" without prejudice to treaties made by either side, and that neither would he separate from his allies nor require the king of Spain to part from his; that if, however, the emperor really desired peace, reconciliation between the two crowns would greatly contribute to that object, for Spain could work on his behalf, and France on that of England, to remove mutual suspicions tending to a rupture; than which nothing would be more easy, if all would contribute. Having then written in like sense to Madrid, all that he had obtained was expression of confidence that he would carry the king of France to abandon alliance with protestants and to unite with the king of Spain and the emperor to sustain the catholic religion. To which he had just answered that faith must be kept with all, even with Mahommedans and infidels. He much regretted the situation, but the king of Spain was governed by the queen, "plus furieuse que jamais." He had declared that this letter would be the last that he would write, and he would keep his word. He went on to say that all the resources of the emperor and the king of Spain were in the galleons, that it was certain that they intended to seize the money on them, but that there was strong appearance that the English would not allow them to pass, at least this year.²

¹ Stanhope, 5 and 12 August, R.O. Spain 94.

² Fleury to Victor Amadeus II, 2 August, by the hands of his secret agent, Anfosy (see p. 557), *Recueil des instructions*, xiv. 354-5.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE BALTIC EXPEDITION OF 1726

OPERATIONS by land against the allies of Vienna required concert with France; by sea the liberal support of parliament enabled George I to take his independent measures. The squadron promised for the defence of Sweden against Russia duly sailed from the Nore on 28 April 1726. It included the *Torbay* and *Cumberland*, the flagships of Vice-admiral Sir Charles Wager and of Rear-admiral Sir George Walton, second in command, each of 80 guns, nine of 70, one of 60, six of 50, and two fire-ships. Two others of the line, of 70 guns, were to follow with the *Port Mahon* frigate and the *Portsmouth* hospital-ship. A speedy passage brought the squadron to Copenhagen on 4 May.

The service to Sweden enabled attention to be given to the appeals of Denmark also, appeals renewed by Baron Söhlenthal in a memorial of 24 March (o.s.).¹ Answering it, Townshend announced the decision to send the squadron, adding request for eight or ten Danish ships to help to blockade the gulf of Finland and using the threat, "I shall be very much afraid that, if after this extraordinary effort which his Ma^{ty} has made the Danes do not do what is proper on their part, we shall have a hard task to get anything done towards protecting them at another time."²

Now also Lord Glenorchy, absent from Copenhagen on the excuse of ill health for a whole year, was ordered to return instantly to his post, instructed, should the king of Denmark consent to supply ships, to assure him "of our utmost assistance in case of danger, which We believe will not reach him this summer, if he has a competent number of ships joyn'd with Our fleet and the admirals act in perfect concert to frustrate the pernicious designs of the Muscovites." As to accession to the treaty of Hanover, it was for the king of Denmark's own good that invitation to him was deferred, it being necessary to procure that of Sweden first. That work perfected it was hoped, Glenorchy should say, so or by other engagements to

¹ R.O. Denmark 49, holograph, Foreign Entry Book 245, copy.

² Townshend to Hermann at Copenhagen, 25 March (o.s.), *ibid.*

provide for the security of Denmark. But for that purpose it was highly necessary for the Danes to establish "perfect friendship and strict union" with Sweden, and they should send to Stockholm to that end a special envoy, who might expect to be well received, because Poyntz reported inclination there "not only to live well with Denmark, but to join in measures for their mutual security and defence."¹

Hermann was able to report orders already issued for ten of the line and smaller vessels to be ready by the end of April, and more if wanted.² And the advice about reconciliation with Sweden had also been anticipated, Resen, the Danish secretary at Stockholm, having set forth a month before the necessity of guarding against the Russian menace as the sole reason for the Danish preparations, and expressed his master's desire for strict amity and confidence with the king of Sweden before all others. Assurances and sincere thanks were returned him, with the promise that treaties should be steadfastly observed, in the hope of corresponding behaviour on the part of Denmark.³

Wager's instructions premised as reasons for sending the squadron the great Russian naval and military preparations, portending an occupation of Swedish ports and exaction of Swedish military aid in an attack on Denmark; the pressing instances of that king for timely assistance and protection; the good disposition appearing in Sweden to accede to the treaty of Hanover, which, it was thought, might incite the Russians to terrify that people afresh by threat of invasion and so discourage them from a step which it was so important to procure; anxiety to prevent a new war in the north, "which might easily spread to other countries and set the rest of Christendome in a flame in the present critical situation of affairs"; and "above all" prevention of the "fatal consequence" of any increase of Russian power in the Baltic not only to British trade but even to the peace and security of Great Britain, in view of "undoubted intelligence of the court of Petersburg having entered into measures in favour of the Pretender and his adherents."

Arrived in the Sound, Wager should inform Glenorchy of his coming and of his instructions to proceed without loss of time "to

¹ Instructions to Glenorchy, 30 March (o.s.), *ibid.* and King's Letters 8. Similarly, when copies of the instructions and other papers given to Wager, and of so much of Glenorchy's instructions as related to Sweden, were sent to Poyntz, he was desired to "preach up the same doctrine" of union between Sweden and Denmark (8 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 42).

² Hermann, 6 and 13 April, R.O. Denmark 49.

³ The substance of Resen's memorial, of 28 February (o.s.), and a translation of the Swedish reply, of 28 March (o.s.), with Jackson's dispatch of 27 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 41.

the heighth of Stockholm " and thence to some station off the Gulf of Finland most proper to prevent the Russian fleet and galleys from coming out, and should request orders for the Danish squadron promised to follow immediately and act in conjunction. If on arriving in Stockholm waters he found that the Russians had not sailed, and that he could spare the time, he should go up to see Poyntz, communicate his instructions, concert measures, and jointly with him desire an audience of the king of Sweden, when he should present the letter with which he was entrusted, setting forth the reasons for sending the squadron. Then, having settled with Poyntz and Count Horn all measures that seemed necessary, he should proceed with all expedition to take up station off the Russian coast. If, on the other hand, he learnt that the Russian fleet was under sail he must not make any stay at Stockholm but go on with his whole force at once " and endeavour to come up with them and if possible to destroy them." If on arrival at his station he found that the Russian fleet and galleys still lay in port, he was to send up to Petersburg by a proper person one of two letters setting forth the reasons for the coming of the squadron, either, accordingly as Poyntz advised, one from himself (as drafted for him) to Admiral Apraksin or some other of the chief ministers, or that from his Majesty to the tsaritsa, which he carried. After that, if the Russians lay quiet, he was in no way to molest them, but if they should attempt to put to sea must attack them and use his utmost endeavours to destroy them. Should they do any hurt to his Majesty's trading subjects he must stop all ships whatsoever bound for Russian ports and seize those that were Russian. Should the tsaritsa offer to negotiate, he was to say that he himself had no orders and that his Majesty would, as hitherto, only treat with her through France. Despite his full powers to negotiate in Sweden jointly with Poyntz, he was not to interfere in the matter of the accession, which, being so far advanced, would be impeded rather than forwarded by the formalities of admitting a new plenipotentiary. Added as an afterthought were orders to go in person to Copenhagen, desire an audience of the king of Denmark, deliver a letter to him from George I, and request that the Danish squadron might be kept ready to sail on first notice.

Private and additional instructions of the same date again directed Wager to be guided in what he should do and say at Stockholm entirely by Poyntz. Since the letter to the king was couched only in general terms, another private one was given him setting forth the reasons for the expedition more particularly ; he must consult with Poyntz which would be the more proper to present. And he should say among other things, if Poyntz approved, that since a principal motive of sending the fleet was to protect Sweden,

“in order to the bringing the accession to a speedy end, We do expect that that necessary work be concluded out of hand, which will enable Us to go greater lengths in the defence of Our new ally.” And further, “that unless the accession be perfected, you shall find yourself under a great incapacity to act with that vigour you might otherwise do.” How far Brancas should be admitted to the consultations Poyntz must decide; it was necessary to exhibit perfect union with and confidence in ministers of France. As regarded the Prussian minister, the uncertainty of that king’s disposition rendered it proper to deal with him accordingly as Poyntz advised.¹

Of the letters which Wager carried that to Catherine I assumed that she would not be surprised at the fleet coming to the Baltic, when her warlike preparations by sea and land in time of peace gave such “great and just grounds of alarm to Us and to Our allies in those parts.” At the same time was professed constant desire to maintain the peace and for a thoroughly good understanding. Reference was made to the proposals for alliance, their excellent intention and their failure owing to demands “foreign to the true interests of the Russian empire” and contrary to the obligations of the kings of England and France to other powers, demands which must inevitably have “involved the northern crowns in new troubles and confusion.” Extreme surprise was expressed that concurrently with those negotiations measures should have been taken by the tsaritsa in favour of the Pretender and his adherents; no wonder that the king of England should act as he was doing. Nevertheless it was most earnestly desired to live in peace and amity. All this at great length and in fine language.²

Wager’s instructions and the accompanying letters having been communicated at Paris, with suitable explanations and assurances and expression of desire that both Brancas and Campredon might be instructed to make it known that all was done in close concert with France, equally interested to preserve the peace of the north and to protect the powers threatened, Robinson was able to report high approval and promise of full support by declarations to like purpose. “This is, My Lord, a second time that M^r de Morville has spoken in this manner, and shewed an inclination to see Sweden upon its ancient bottom.”³

¹ Instructions to Wager, 11 April (o.s.), with copies of the letters intrusted to him, R.O., S.P. Dom. Naval 77, 81, and F.O. King’s Letters 65. The full texts, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 206–215.

² George I to Catherine I, same date, R.O. Royal Letters 50. She was addressed as “the Great Lady Czarina and Great Dutchess Catharina of all the Great Little and White Russia,” etc., but styled throughout the document “Your Imperial Majesty.” Printed in the *Historical Register*, xi. 198, the *Political State of Great Britain*, xxxii. 55, and elsewhere.

³ Newcastle to Robinson, same date, and the reply, 30 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

At Stockholm, contrary to expectation, the news that a British fleet was coming raised commotion. In the view and talk of the Holstein party the intention was to enforce accession to the treaty of Hanover, if not to make the king absolute and establish the Hessian succession. It was proposed in the senate to demand Russian help, and Golovin offered it. Jackson reported the garrisons reinforced at Carlskrona, at Waxholm castle, commanding the river approach to Stockholm, and at Dalarö. Although Poyntz averred that "the bulk are pleased and I believe it will produce all the good effect his Ma^{ty} can desire," he had to take steps to counter the agitation. He sent to Wager for his letters to the king of Sweden, or copies of them, in order that he might know their exact contents before giving explanations. And finding himself pressed, he delivered a memorial couched in general terms, urged Horn to come to town, and advised Wager to bring the fleet on but not to show himself at Stockholm without previous consultation.¹

The letters to Frederick I, public and private and a third of credence for Wager, were of the purport of the instructions.² When Horn saw them he advised that the private one should not be presented, because the king would certainly divulge its contents to some who would betray him. From the other he wanted the reference to concerting measures omitted, on the ground that this might seem to have been suggested by some one in Sweden, himself, Poyntz interpreted. And he would have the fleet go straight on to Petersburg, or at least "stretch over immediately to the commodious port of Hangö," there to remain till contrary winds might furnish a pretext for coming to Stockholm. Poyntz, therefore, sent messengers to stop the fleet at Dalarö or Elsnabben.³

At Copenhagen, in the absence of Glenorchy, Wager declined introduction to the king by the Hanoverian minister, General Bothmer, on the ground that his position as commander of the squadron, although he was but a vice-admiral, entitled him to dispense therewith. The claim was allowed; he had his audience, presented the royal letter, which he carried,⁴ and dined with Frederick IV on 6 May. Promise was given that the Danish ships should join him at Bornholm, but he did not expect them to be ready for at least a fortnight and undertook not to depend on them. Ministers, he said, expressed anxiety to know how affairs were

¹ Poyntz and Jackson, 20 and 27 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 42, 41.

² Dated 11 April (o.s.), R.O. Royal Letters 56; with them the suitable reply of Frederick I, of 16 June (o.s.).

³ Poyntz, 4 May (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 43. Townshend could not conceive why Horn should object to a concert of measures; "he must be cautious and timorous to the last degree" (20 May (o.s.), *ibid.*).

⁴ Copies, R.O. Royal Letters 5, King's Letters 8.

going at Stockholm, and he promised to keep Glenorchy well posted.¹ That envoy arrived at last on 7 May.²

Townshend answered Wager: "His Majesty has commanded me to lett you know from him that he was before perswaded you was a very good admiral, but he now sees that you are likewise an able minister"; everything done was "extremely right" and nothing could be better than the arrangements made. He notified that the manning of other ships was being pushed forward and that on the news of the Pretender leaving Rome (although there was no apprehension of anything that he could do) all restrictions on pressing men for service had been removed. The *Nassau* had sailed and the *Northumberland* should follow in a few days; "we could not in decency send so large a ship from the coast just at such a juncture."³

Sailing from Copenhagen on 13th May Wager cast anchor at Elsnabben four days later. Poyntz came to meet him there and it was agreed that, since nothing was heard of the Russians being at sea, he should come up to show himself at Stockholm in spite of the agitation, having his letters to deliver and rather than "for such a squadron to come up to the mouth of this river and sneak away again." Already at the gates there was difficulty with the custom-house officers and something approaching a riot.⁴ And though he was extremely well received and entertained to dinner by the king and queen, while afterwards many persons of distinction went to Elsnabben to see the fleet, it was obvious that his visit was generally viewed askance. There was relief, therefore, when on 5 June, reinforced by the arrival of the *Nassau* and *Port Mahon*, he sailed for Reval, intending, he wrote, to go higher up the Gulf of Finland if found practicable and necessary, though not liking to carry his squadron "amongst rocks and shoals unknown and without pilots to depend on." On the 8th he cast anchor at Nargö, an island three leagues from Reval.⁵

¹ Wager, 26 to 30 April (o.s.), R.O. S. Dom. Naval 77, 81. Solov'ev relates from the reports of Bestuzhev how pleased were the Danes at his coming, since it relieved them of the fear of a Russian attack, and how Bothmer observed to him what a splendid fleet it was. To the latter's remarks on the Russian naval preparations Bestuzhev replied that Peter the Great had ordered a cruise of exercise every year. While the British ships were at Copenhagen, he said, he was shunned like a leper.

² He had taken ten days, says Dayrolle, to cross the Channel, once being driven from the coast of Holland all the way back to Sheerness (26 April, R.O. Holland 287).

³ Townshend to Wager, 10 May (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 77.

⁴ Similarly Brancas was stopped when returning from a visit to the fleet a few days later, being obliged to leave his coach behind for the night. The excuse given by the farmers of the customs was that they had word anonymously of large quantities of contraband aboard the fleet.

⁵ Dispatches of Wager, Poyntz and Jackson, 11 to 29 May (o.s.), *U.cc.* Says Poyntz in one of his familiar letters to Tilson: "St. Cha. Wager is a pure good man such as you described him. His look struck terror, but his smiles reconciled all they

When the fleet was gone Poyntz wrote that the "extravagant rage" of the Russians and Holsteiners at its coming had extended to threats to call the king to account and to impeach Horn at a riksdag for having, as they supposed, solicited it, for which reason the "friends," both in the answer to his memorial and in the "Swedish Gazette," had taken care to disclaim apprehension of danger from Russia. This threatened trouble in England, for obviously it would be asked in parliament, why was the expense of sending the squadron incurred, when it was not wanted? In Poyntz's words:

"this unseasonable declaration, joined to the awkward reception which, it must be ownd, our fleet has mett with here may perhaps dispose some turbulent spirits in England in concert with others here to enquire more narrowly into the real motives of sending this squadron hither. To expose the private solicitations of the K. of Sweden and our friends in the senate to a parliament would be to betray and ruin them entirely, as having acted contrary to the form of government, which allows of no such clandestine transaction.

The only remedy that he could see was to get such inquiry put off until a riksdag should meet;

then the just alarms of Sweden and the proofs of their danger will be sett in so full a light, as must convince the most incredulous that it was not only necessary but good husbandry in us to make this timely provision for their safety, without hazarding extremitys by putting them under the difficultys and delays of making the requisition in form.

In the meantime "the two grand ends" of sending the squadron, to hasten the accession by removing fear of Russia and to give the Swedes "time and encouragement" to prepare for their own defence would, Poyntz thought, be effectually attained.¹

Townshend answered:

As to our not producing in parliament, when it meets again, the motives for sending our fleet into the Baltick, I hope the effects of its going will prove so visibly good before the end of the summer that no one will think of calling for all our reasons for being at that great charge. But if our success should not answer expectation it will be impossible to withhold papers from the clamorous and inquisitives. You will tell Count Horn and our friends, there-

were bestowd on. His reception here was but awkward, except from the K. of Sweden and C. Horn, but he putts up with all for the good of the service. We are on a perfect good foot, tho' he certainly c^d not help suspecting *at first* that I had no mind he sh^d be plen^{ty} here, when God knows I wish him, or any one else but my self, envoy." And of Wager's speech at his audience: both his own words and the "pretty strong terms" added by Poyntz on the subject of the accession, preliminary to the "still stronger memorials" which he and Brancas, by Horn's advice, were shortly to present, were answered by the king "in the handsomest, the most grateful and obliging terms toward the King our master," with yet stronger expressions privately.

¹ Poyntz, 27 May (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 43.

fore, that the best way to prevent such an enquiry is for them to accede as soon and as handsomely as possible to our treaty, which will undoubtedly put the nation in such good humour, that we shall have no further questions asked ; or if any such motion should be made we could in that case very easily stop any enquiry of that nature.¹

From ships spoken with on his passage to Reval Wager learnt that twelve Russian men-of-war lay ready at Cronslot with all the galleys and 26,000 soldiers, so that an enterprise, he thought, seemed to have been resolved upon. Two officers sent on board by General Volkov, commanding the forces in Esthonia, to learn the reason of his coming seemed frightened, he says. He asked leave to take in water and sent Lieutenant Barnett in the *Port Mahon* to Cronslot with a packet for Apraksin enclosing the letter for the tsaritsa, with orders to approach as nearly as he could without coming under fire from the guns. Moving up then into Reval Bay he found there only two or three warships, the rest, he supposed, having left for Cronslot before his arrival. He was allowed to send boats ashore for visits to the town and to take in water, and supposed orders from Petersburg to keep on friendly terms. On 16 June Barnett returned from Cronslot with a letter from Apraksin, saying that the tsaritsa's answer would be sent in due course by a frigate. He reported dining with Apraksin and afterwards with Admiral Gordon on his ship. On the former occasion Wager's health was drunk and then that of "Our Sovereigns," Wager's letter being translated in the room at the time paragraph by paragraph and discussed. On Gordon's ship he met three Russian and five English captains ; many healths were drunk and inquisitiveness shown about the reasons for the coming of the squadron. He described the great strength of the Cronslot and Cronstadt defences and reported as ready for sea in the roads, provisioned for six weeks and expecting two months' supplies very soon, three men-of-war of 70 guns, five of 64, six of 56, two of 50, four frigates and two bomb-vessels, besides at Cronslot, unrigged but in good order, two of 90, three of 80, two of 70 and twelve galleys. He had learnt that the soldiers were on shore, employed on works, and that there were 100 galleys at Petersburg. Wager, transmitting this information, said that he was not stopping ships from entering or leaving Reval, only questioning them. In regard to one, a large ship bound for Cadiz, formerly a man-of-war of 44 guns, he gave warning that in case of hostilities with Spain she might be seized as carrying contraband.

With Wager on his flagship was Captain Deane, presumably carried as so well acquainted with Russia and the Baltic regions.

¹ Townshend to him, 17 June (o.s.), *ibid.*, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 220-1.

He was sent, for instance, on the *Port Mahon* to Helsingfors, to learn the state of affairs in Finland and what else he could. Previously he had reported confidential interviews with Bestuzhev at Copenhagen and with Cederhielm at Stockholm.¹

On 24 June the Danish rear-admiral Michael Bille joined with six of the line, a frigate and a fire-ship. This squadron had sailed from Kjöge Bay on 30 May, and Wager had sent from Elsnabben a request that it might join him at Reval.² Later he had thought that inadvisable, for the Swedes did not wish it and the Russians might have cause to complain that the Danes had insulted their coasts. Subsequently he explained that, on better knowledge of the Russian strength, as reported by Barnett, he had written to Bille that he would send him notice, were he wanted at Reval, but too late to stop him.³

On 6 July was at last received the answer of Catherine I to the letter from George I with a German translation, which Wager, conceiving it to be badly done and noting in it insulting expressions, sent on to Poyntz for his decision as to its acceptance. Expressing surprise that George's "friendly and brotherly letter" should have been received only when his fleet was posted before Reval, Catherine observed that previous communication would have saved him the trouble and expense of sending it, for he would have been assured that so far from wishing to disturb the peace of the north her principal care had been its preservation, being yet more interested therein than he. His full knowledge of all that had passed in the negotiation with the late tsar must convince him of the sincerity of her intentions, while his present extraordinary action would make it clear to the whole world that he himself wanted to raise fresh troubles in the north. Recalling the friendship exhibited and the services done to him by Peter the Great, the ill way in which those services had been requited, Peter's magnanimity in consenting nevertheless to consign all to oblivion and in accepting the good offices of the king of France for reconciliation, and the flat rejection of conditions deemed reasonable by that king and even by George himself, Catherine asserted that she could only believe him never to have been in earnest. The present sending of his fleet was nothing less than a violation of friendship which showed the hostility of certain of his ministers, who now, as the only difference which concerned Great Britain, trumped up again the "old, stale and false accusa-

¹ John Deane to Townshend, 26 April to 14 June (o.s.), *ibid.* Of his interview with Cederhielm: "please to consider our friendship and intimacy formerly contracted in adversity as the introduction of this discours, in which I used the greatest caution."

² Glenorchy, 1 and 8 June, R.O. Denmark 49.

³ The above from Wager's dispatches, 29 May to 19 June (o.s.), *ll. cc.*

tion" of engagements with the Pretender. In spite whereof she once more gave emphatic assurance that she would never disturb either him or the British nation by any such engagements. What orders he thought fit to give to his admiral was his own affair; she herself, also a sovereign, would not be hindered from sending her fleet to sea, if she thought proper. In other respects she was willing to preserve a constant good understanding and hoped for a return. Like her late husband she was devoting all her energies to the maintenance of peace and thought the best means thereto to be to place herself in a position to assist her allies when occasion required, to satisfy her engagements, and to protect her faithful subjects.¹

Moreover Catherine, in order, no doubt, as Poyntz remarked, to point a distinction between George I and his British subjects, promulgated a manifesto declaring that she would in no way interfere with the trade of the British merchants.²

Poyntz, forwarding the German translation of Catherine's letter, observed as very remarkable the absence of any direct reference to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's affairs and reported Horn's opinion that in spite of "some harsh and malicious insinuations" the whole was more "tame-spirited" than might have been expected. The "fine reasoning," he said, about the objects of her naval preparations "will be entirely overthrown when she receives the admiral's next letter, and I imagine she will never forgive the K. of Prussia for revealing the secret of her having demanded a passage for her troops."³

The *Northumberland* joined the squadron on 4 July,⁴ but Wager had to send the *Elizabeth*, of equal strength, to Copenhagen for repairs, she having struck a rock in Swedish waters. He wrote: "I find my being here has had a much better effect than if I had gone higher up; for if I had gone near Cronslot they would have seen, in two or three days, that we could do them no hurt, whereas now they are still in fear that we have some design upon them."

¹ Catherine I to George I, 15 June (o.s.); the German text and an English translation with Poyntz's dispatch of 6 July (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 43; the former also R.O. Foreign Ministers 52, the latter, Royal Letters 50. French versions, *Lettres historiques*, lxx. Rousset, iii. 206-210, and in English, *Historical Register and Political State of Great Britain*, ll.cc.

² Dated 21 June (o.s.), also with Poyntz's dispatch, in German. An English "translation from the Russ," as published by Golovkin at Berlin, with Du Bourgay's of 23 July, R.O. Prussia 21. In French, under date 2 July, *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 161. Also Rousset, iv. 223.

³ Poyntz in the same dispatch.

⁴ Her stoppage at Copenhagen to await dispatches for Wager had brought upon Glenorchy a strong rebuke, Townshend informing him that 70-gun ships were not intended for that purpose and that Wager was impatient to have all his ships, and especially of that force, with him (Townshend to Glenorchy, 24 June (o.s.), R.O. Denmark 49).

He reported his rear-admiral and several captains to be "drinking hard on board the Russian man-of-warr, and I suppose drink friends"; he had himself been invited, but neither cared to be so confiding nor to drink. He saw no probability now of the Russian fleet coming out and would like to avoid the risks of storms by moving southwards. What Poyntz reported of Russian threats he deemed but gasconade; so far from thinking of sailing they were fortifying Cronslot and Reval for defence, and their force was much inferior to his own. Nor need Poyntz be uneasy about Swedish ships being held up, none came. It was useless to stop merchantmen coming out; most had discharged their cargoes and were in ballast; while some seventy British ships might be seized in reprisal.¹

Townshend approved Wager's decision to send on the tsaritsa's letter. "The King observed with you that the Czarina disowned any engagements with the Pretender. We know not in what sense they understand engagements, but we are certain that his agents are countenanced and caressed at Petersburg, that there have been plans projects and intrigues in his favour jointly with other princes, and that his adherents have placed great hopes in the assistance of the Muscovites, tho' perhaps there may be no treaty or articles signed yet in form." In reference to Wager's instructions to stop trade to Russian ports in case of hostilities Townshend desired him nevertheless not to molest Swedish ships in any way, on account of the outcry which would ensue at Stockholm, as already evidenced on report of a Swede being stopped. He did not now expect a Russian land invasion of North Germany, so hoped that there would be no occasion for Wager to send the letter prescribed in that case. As regarded the orders for him to sail for home with the first fair wind after 1 September, if he left just when the Swedish riksdag was meeting and "took off all restraint from the Muscovites" they would certainly send out their galleys to intimidate the Swedes, and so the accession, to get which completed was a chief object of Wager's expedition, would be defeated. So that he must stay as long as was compatible with the safety of the fleet, perhaps till the beginning of October, when the winter setting in would prevent the Russians from coming out. He might choose his station, but not go near Stockholm for fear of exciting adverse clamour.²

Menshikov coming to Reval at the end of July Wager sent

¹ Wager, 25 June to 11 July (o.s.), *ll.cc.* With the last a paper, perhaps by Deane, intitled: "The present State of the Danes Sweedes and Russians in respect to one another and to the English Fleet in the Baltick in the year 1726."

² Townshend to Wager, 26 July (o.s.), *ibid.* A postscript communicated Horn's advice to the last effect, as also to keep the departure of the fleet absolutely secret and to return by way of Bornholm; advice with which Townshend desired Wager to comply, since it was very necessary to satisfy the count.

Captain Haddock, of his flagship, to compliment him and reported great civility shown by the prince, who had entertained a number of English and Danish lieutenants on shore to dinner. To his intimation of having sent to Menshikov his letter about the Russian invasion of Germany Townshend replied : " We don't know whether the Czarinna will approve your letter, neither are we much concerned in what manner she takes it." ¹

Poyntz also wrote to Wager pressing him to stay in the Baltic at least during September, if only in Copenhagen roads, for encouragement to the riksdag. ² Wager advised that the Danish admiral could not stay beyond August,—though he was very willing to let him go, if he wished,—that he had over 700 men sick, and that if he stayed too long westerly winds setting in might prevent his leaving. And this was nearly the case. Sailing from Reval at the end of September he reached Copenhagen only on 20 October in consequence of storms which obliged him to shelter under Hanö. The Danish squadron was separated and left behind. Detained another ten days at Copenhagen by contrary winds, he was back in English waters on 10 November. ³

¹ Wager, 20 July (o.s.), with copy of the letter to Menshikov, Townshend in reply, 12 August (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Poyntz, 3 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 43.

³ Wager, 31 July to 30 October (o.s.) *ll.cc.* Both Poyntz and Wich reported the storm to have been of exceptional violence, though Wager escaped the worst of it. Poyntz termed it "as violent as I ever remember" and was in much anxiety. He learnt that the slow-sailing Danes and five or six English ships had been separated off Dagö. Wich recommended Eckenförde in Sleswick as the best place for Wager to winter in the Baltic, were that required of him, and reported another storm, than which he had never known a worse, on 22 October (Poyntz, 28 September (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 44, Wich 4 and 22 October, Hamburg 43). Captain Deane, sent on in advance by way of Sweden, was detained at Carlshamn fifteen hours by the violence of the wind and then crossed to Denmark at great hazard. He explained at Copenhagen that it had not been intended to part with the Danish squadron in the dangerous northern waters and that it had been last seen on 7 October, east of Gothland (Deane, 7 October (o.s.) R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 77). However, the ships came in gradually.

CHAPTER XXIV

NAVAL ACTION AGAINST SPAIN

THE particular instructions for Vice-admiral Hosier, sailing for the West Indies in April 1726, directed him to take under his command on arrival at Jamaica such ships as he should find on that station, and having obtained what intelligence he could about the flota and the galleons to proceed to take in wood and water at Tiburon Bay in Hispaniola (Haiti) and thence directly to Cartagena. If he found the Spanish treasure-ships there he was to acquaint the governor that although Ripperda's declaration might very well warrant any steps to ensure security of commerce, yet he was commanded to refrain from all hostilities unless compelled thereto, for instance, by the seizure of the private effects on board the flota and galleons; were they or their treasure or any part of it not permitted to leave port they would not be molested in any way, but in the contrary case all possible means would be employed to secure the effects, "to the end that justice may be done to all concerned therein." Should the ships have left Cartagena he was to follow and blockade them in Puerto Bello or Havana or other port, where they might be found, and should they attempt to escape must attempt, whether "by persuasion or force," to seize them, assuring their admiral that they were to be taken to a safe port for distribution of the cargoes. If he captured any, he was to bring them to England. Also he must look out for the Spanish war-ships sent out, and if discovered with treasure on board deal with them as with the others. Very particular orders, to be obeyed punctually "under pain of Our highest displeasure," were detailed for guarding against embezzlement or fraud. If he found the flota and galleons to have escaped him he was to leave two of his ships on the Jamaica station with orders to protect trade and make reprisals, if required, and with his main squadron to pursue the Spaniards, making, if he could not come up with them, for Cape St. Vincent, thereabouts to cruise and try to intercept them and to await reinforcement and further orders. Lastly, if when in the West Indies he should obtain certain advice that the Spaniards had seized effects of the South Sea Company or other of the king's subjects he was to endeavour to recover the same or to make

reprisals, or assist the officials of that company to escape such damage, provided always that this must be subordinate to his main service. These orders were to be kept as secret as possible, and full accounts of his proceedings and of everything that he could learn sent home.¹

Communication of these instructions to Paris, with full exposition of the reasons for sending the squadron, was accompanied, seeing that French merchants, and among others the duke of Bourbon himself, were largely interested in the cargoes of the treasure-ships, by orders to Robinson to emphasise the precautions taken for their safety and the desire to avoid any act of hostility. He was to discourse, besides, on the greatness of his Majesty's confidence in making the disclosure and on the necessity of keeping the orders absolutely secret; for one reason, lest publication of them should spoil the plan, for another, that nothing might be known of it in case of its miscarriage.²

Minds at Paris were grievously perturbed. Morville anticipated the worst consequences,

this nation, he said, having a greater concern in the return of the galleons than the Spaniards or any other people whatever; the very news of this step, when spread among the trading part of this kingdom, would be followed by the immediate ruin of all commerce and credit here, . . . besides the difficulty, if not the impossibility, for the persons concerned to make out their several pretensions to their shares, which being entered under borrowed names, or consigned to Spanish correspondents in Cadiz, would make this work, as he thought, both endless and impracticable, and the very stoppage alone for one year of the usual income to France from the Spanish fleet would occasion an infinite number of bankruptcies in this kingdom, and what was still no less to be apprehended, the uneasiness and umbrage of the Dutch, who are themselves so highly concerned.

The duke of Bourbon might be calmed about his share, but the common people never. Moreover, this show of hostility belied the professions of the defensive character of the treaty of Hanover, and would offend those who might join and hinder others from coming in.

Fleury, on the other hand, whom Robinson sought out next day in his temporary retreat at Issy, approved, he says, and "ran over with me the many happy consequences that might attend this enterprise." Morville's objections he laid aside, expressing only fear that the galleons might be kept in harbour so late in the season as to run "the double danger of the badness of the weather or of falling into Ripperda's hands." Two days later Robinson, having

¹ Instructions of date 28 March (o.s.) 1726, previously cited (pp. 237-8).

² Newcastle to Robinson, 11 April (o.s.) 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 32745. Broglie apprised his court next day (Dureng, pp. 445-6).

had word of what had passed on the subject at the Council, pre-
faced another long private dispatch :

As the Bishop went the 27th in the afternoon to Versailles extremely pre-
vented in favour of his Majesty's sentiments and of the nobleness of the project,
but not without a reserved management for the king of Spain, so your Grace
will find his thoughts prevailing and his opinion moderating in the French
councils throughout the course of this dispatch, and as the whole turns upon
matters of a very secret nature, I shall give your Grace but the trouble of one
letter, inserting the Bishop's discourses to me promiscuously with those of M^r
Morville, without giving a separate account of my visits this morning at
Versailles to both those ministers.

The account ran, in brief, as follows. The Council had decided,
Morville had said, to propose suspension of Hosier's orders, pending
reply from the king of Spain to a demand for a solemn undertaking
not to appropriate any private effects on board the galleons.¹ Asked whether it was intended that Stanhope should present this
demand in the names of the kings of England and France jointly,
and whether the king of Spain's promise ought not to be in writing,
Morville answered the former question affirmatively and would
leave the latter point to Stanhope's judgment. Fleury explained
that the expedient proposed had been his own, when he found how
disturbed was Morville and that both he and Bourbon wanted
Hosier's orders to be revoked. For the rest, he said, he had upheld
his Majesty's action "and satisfied all their doubts and little appre-
hensions." He suggested that, if the galleons were brought into a
British port, commissioners to deal with their effects should be
appointed by all nations concerned, including Spain.²

Instructions to Broglie, which followed, set out the French
objections and desired him to request that Hosier's orders might
be cancelled as soon as possible and at the same time Stanhope be
ordered to speak out about the suspicions of Ripperda entertained,
to demand an answer "prompte, précise, et solennelle," and to
declare that any act done on the return of the galleons against
British French or Dutch subjects would be regarded as a mark of
hostility and a declaration of war.³

This frank expression of opinion brought prompt and exculpatory
response. It expressed the deep solicitude of George I at being

¹ "To demand in the most solemn manner of his Catholick Majesty to give
his royal word, that he will not seize or appropriate to his own use any foreign
effects on board the galions, in which case they will be suffered to arrive, as usual,
at Cadiz, unmolested, and which otherwise his Catholick Majesty is not to expect,
but upon giving the most precise promise imaginable, without the least equivocation
or ambiguity."

² Robinson, 27 to 30 April, *ibid.*

³ Morville to Broglie, 1 May, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5. Fleury told Robinson
that he had corrected and added to the dispatch himself.

suspected of bad faith on this single occasion of neglect to consult with the French court in advance. The reasons, it was said, for inability to communicate the orders to Hosier earlier had been explained, and it had been hoped that the king of France, when informed of the objects of sending the squadron, would not only approve but be convinced that the action was taken in French interest equally with British and in a manner that could not be disagreeable to him. It was now some time since his Majesty had doubled his fleet with the object of sending a squadron to the West Indies to protect his subjects' trade there from the violence of the Spanish "guardacostas," of which there had been continually fresh complaints,¹ and when it had appeared not only justifiable but necessary to stop the treasure-fleets the lateness of the season had demanded immediate action. Delay for consultation must have frustrated execution. If in pursuance of the objects of the treaty of Hanover it was right to send a squadron to the Baltic to secure the peace of the north (as admitted in the instructions to Broglie), so it must be right also to render powerless those who would trouble that of Europe generally. So far from Hosier's orders,—which might never be executed, for the galleons might escape him,—being founded on mere suspicion, the conduct of the courts of Vienna and Madrid would have justified actual attack, had not the king been unwilling to push matters so far. The secret engagements of those courts were not conjectural but had been openly declared by the man who had negotiated them, Ripperda. Neither had the king of Spain disavowed them, nor the court of Vienna, which had communicated the article about Gibraltar only and in a different form. Moreover Ripperda's proposal of a general congress for taking measures to prevent the junction of the imperial and Spanish crowns proved that the project of Don Carlos's marriage was a fact. The sending of two Spanish men-of-war to fetch the treasure showed intention to appropriate it all; what belonged to Spain was not sufficient to satisfy her engagements with the emperor. Ripperda had avowed the intention and was quite capable of putting it into execution. Further there were the proofs (cited) of Spanish support to the Pretender. How then, it was asked, could his Majesty help

¹ In May 1725 we find orders sent to captains on the Jamaica station to seize and proceed against, according to law, any ships which under pretence of being guardacostas or other should molest or plunder British merchant-vessels. But such action was only to be taken with extreme caution because, from what was learnt from Stanhope, the Spanish court seemed "well disposed to do us justice and to disallow the unjustifiable proceedings of their guarda costas." The reference was to Stanhope's advice of 24 April 1725 that the *Blackwood* galley, worth £7000, taken by a guardacosta, was ordered to be restored to its owners, with costs (Newcastle to the Lords of the Admiralty, 26 April (o.s.) 1725, R.O. Admiralty 1, In-Letters 4105, S.P. Dom., Entry Book, Naval 221).

fortifying himself against a hostile alliance, which had begun to weaken and had been revived only by the near prospect of the arrival of the treasure-ships? The objection of ill effect on accessions to the treaty of Hanover was not well founded; only the Dutch would be affected and they were too much interested in the success of the precaution taken to object. It was the too pacific disposition of the two crowns that from the beginning had disgusted the king of Prussia and put off the king of Sardinia, the elector of Bavaria and other princes. As to reprisals upon merchants, former experience showed that Spain had nothing to learn about that.¹

These arguments had effect. Horatio Walpole on his return to Paris found them to have made so great an impression that ministers "appeared entirely convinced of the justice as well as of the necessity" of Hosier's instructions. Bourbon himself "only said with a smile, that we had given occasion *pour un petit reproche* in the great dispatch and orders given without his knowledge to our West India squadron, but seemed perfectly satisfied and easy in the main with what had been done by his Majesty." Indeed, "no remains of jealousy distrust or dislike" appeared.² Again, after his conversations on the private negotiations with Spain, Walpole had "no room to doubt, that they are not only satisfied, but extremely pleased with the instructions given to Hosier."³

Yet the affair rankled. A memorandum by Descaux of 23 June indicted the English as essentially the greatest enemies of French commerce, as likely to take pleasure in seeing France take false steps, and as used to dictate to Spain by virtue of their sea-power.⁴

Arrived at Tiburon Bay at the end of May Hosier had under his command his flagship the *Bredah*, 70 guns, the *Superbe*, *Nottingham*, *Ripon* and *Dunkirk*, of 60, the *Leopard*, *Winchelsea* and *Dragon*, of 50, the *Diamond* and *Greyhound* frigates, and the *Spence* sloop. His news was that the flota had left Vera Cruz for Havana with little treasure on board, mostly goods, it was said, and that the South Sea Company's annual ship, the *Royal George*, had disposed of but little of her cargo. He did not doubt being able to stop the galleons, or do even better.⁵ So much was heard from him by the middle of July; of his subsequent doings nothing until late in September.

The third naval expedition of the year was sent to watch, or as

¹ Rough draft of a letter to Broglie, 26 April (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Ministers 5, embodying in its thirty pages much more to like effect. It is presumably the dispatch of 7 May cited by Dureng, p. 448.

² Marshal Villars remarks (*Mémoires*, v. 17): "comme on n'avoit pas résolu de se fâcher bien fort, ses excuses furent reçues."

³ H. Walpole, 18 and 21 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32746

⁴ Dureng, p. 449.

⁵ Hosier, 20 May (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 80, received 4 July (o.s.).

the Spaniards said insult, the coasts of Spain. Its dispatch had been determined in April, but in view of the trouble experienced with the French in the case of Hosier it was deemed necessary to agree with that court in advance on the instructions to be given to the admiral and on the service that he was to perform.¹ Then the change of government in France brought request from Paris for a fortnight's delay, in order that the consequences thereof and of that in Spain might be better understood. This was accorded, the king, Newcastle wrote, being "so desirous to agree with the court of France in everything"; but he bade Horatio Walpole observe to Fleury that it was now a month since his government had been consulted and that the Austrian camp forming in Silesia necessitated immediate measures to show the imperialists "that if they pursue those designs, they may bring themselves into great difficultys."² That was to say, as appears from the instructions now issued to Admiral Sir John Jennings, in command of the squadron, that retaliation would be made by a bombardment of the coasts of Naples and Sicily, as suggested by Saint-Saphorin.

These instructions directed Jennings to take on board three regiments waiting at Portsmouth and to sail as soon as possible; to cruise with his main squadron between Cadiz and Cape St. Vincent; and to detach Rear-admiral Hopson with three ships to pick up those at Gibraltar and Port Mahon and proceed to patrol the Italian coast from Sicily to Leghorn; two bomb-vessels to follow him on their arrival from England. Were inquiry made of the reasons of his coming, Jennings was to allege protection of British trade. Additional private instructions directed him to gain all the intelligence he could about the flota and galleons, to post his ships as might be most convenient to intercept them, and if he met with them to act in accordance with the orders to Hosier, of which he was provided with a copy.³ Of these private orders, on account of the former difficulty, Walpole was desired to say nothing, the more so as Jennings was not likely to meet with the galleons "and if he should, it is very likely that when the stroke is struck the court of

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 7 and 23 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. M.S. 32746. It appeared, he said, "that the Spaniards themselves are of opinion that nothing can more effectually contribute to the bringing matters upon a right foot at their court than the continuance of vigorous measures on the part of Great Britain and France, and the King being desirous that nothing should be undertaken otherwise than in perfect concert between them, and that no difference of opinion may ever happen again, as there did about Admiral Hosier's instructions, which was an affair purely accidental and unavoidable," Walpole should give information that "our squadron designed for the home station, consisting of 12 stout men-of-war, is fitted out and will very speedily be ready to put to sea."

² The same, 13 June (o.s.).

³ Instructions of 11 June (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 78.

France will be better pleased with it than if they had known of it beforehand." Walpole was further informed that the fleet would sail in a fortnight, and was intrusted with a dispatch informing Stanhope of what was intended.¹ Of the main instructions he had already reported approval.²

Some days later plans were changed. Newcastle now wrote that the idea of sending a squadron to the Mediterranean was abandoned and that the ships appointed for that service would remain to watch the coast of Biscay near Santander, with the view of intercepting the galleons, should they endeavour to reach Spain that way. But of this, again, he desired no word to be said to Fleury nor to any of the French ministers.³ Letters of the same date instructed Jennings, advices having been received that the flota and galleons might make for Santander or a neighbouring port, to leave Hopson, apprised of Hosier's instructions in strictest secrecy, with four ships on the Biscay coast, while he himself proceeded with his main force to his station off Cadiz, sending for the ships at Gibraltar and Port Mahon to join him. Three days later, on reports of armaments at Santander which seemed to foreshadow an attempt on England, he was authorised to increase the force with Hopson, if he thought necessary, and then again, on further more serious reports, to take his whole fleet to Santander, there to gain intelligence of what was toward. He was to commit no hostilities and, as before, to declare protection of trade and navigation to be the reason of his coming. But should ships come out with apparent intention of an attack on England, "you are then to fall upon them and do your utmost to prevent the execution of their designs." On

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 18 June (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746, private. Similarly General Dormer at Lisbon, instructed to maintain constant correspondence with Jennings and to obtain for him all possible intelligence, especially about the flota and galleons or other ships sent to fetch their treasure, was desired to "take great care that nobody may suspect you have received any orders upon this head" (Newcastle to him, 21 June (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Entry Book 115).

² 25 June, *ibid.* Walpole did not himself think much of the Naples project and believed that the assembly of Austrian troops in Silesia was intended only to intimidate the king of Prussia and that the declarations ordered to be made by Saint-Saphorin and Richelieu at Vienna, and the Danish convention, would suffice. "St. Saphorin is a good judge of the court of Vienna, but not of the House of Commons, and I am not for making them uneasy of what we do, before we really do any thing." He did not extend this objection to seizing the galleons, or ships of the Ostend Company, and saw no harm in sending the fleet to the coasts of Spain, if it had to be kept in pay (holograph private letter of 26 June, *ibid.*).

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 29 June (o.s.), very private, *ibid.* Walpole commented: "It is very prudent to have a squadron to cruise off the Spanish coast; but it seems very imprudent to leave our own entirely naked; surely that ridiculous project of a Mediterranean alarm is quite laid aside; I never could see the least foundation for it; for Gods sake desire our governours not to send away all our navy, and no part of it in a wild goose chase" (to Delafaye, 17 July, R.O. France 184).

the other hand, if he thought it sufficient to leave five ships on that coast with Hopson, he should arrange for communication with him through Corunna and himself proceed to his southern station. He was informed of Hosier's assurance of ability to prevent the galleons from returning at all events that summer, and so was now told not to take notice of ships coming singly from the West Indies, although they might have treasure on board, but only to act as instructed against the flota or galleons, or a great part of them.¹

The reports that occasioned these changed instructions were of four Spanish men-of-war, one of them of 80 guns, one of 70, and two of 36, fitting out at Santander, of two others ready to sail from Cadiz² to join them with a supply of sailors and marines, and of a concentration of 10,000 or 12,000 troops. The news was confirmed a day or two later by Colonel Dunbar, consul at San Sebastian, who also heard of thousands of troops assembled at Santander and neighbouring places, of others ordered to Corunna and Vigo, and all discourse of preparations for a descent on England. What he wrote further about eleven Russian ships (among them the three that had visited Spain in the previous year but now were known to have returned to Russia) was discredited, and it was noticed that he mentioned no transports; but nevertheless it was thought that the Spaniards might "be weak enough to have some ill-digested design in hand" against the king's dominions. The orders, therefore, to Jennings were repeated, but he was specially warned to keep the intelligence absolutely secret, from fear of "a groundless alarm that may be of prejudice to the publick service."³

Horatio Walpole found the Parmesan minister at Paris, Count Landi,⁴ also to anticipate some "mad enterprize." He advised sending ten or twelve ships to winter at Port Mahon, as the place most likely to be attacked and reported to be indifferently fortified.⁵

Really the Spanish armaments were but intended for defence. Stanhope testified to alarm roused by news that Jennings had eight battalions of troops on board and reported pressing orders to fortify the coasts and raise militia and the hurried dispatch of troops to all the chief Spanish ports; but on the other hand, on the news of Bourbon's fall, revocation of orders for a camp for 30,000 men to be formed at Camprodon in Catalonia (near the French frontier).⁶

¹ Newcastle to Jennings, 29 June and 2 and 7 July (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 78.

² By Dunbar's report the *San Luis* and *San Fernando*.

³ Townshend to Jennings (in Newcastle's absence), 9 July (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ "With whom I have constantly kept up a good understanding without entering into a confidence with him."

⁵ H. Walpole, 25 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

⁶ Stanhope, 2 July, R.O. Spain 94.

Storms and contrary winds prevented Jennings from sailing till 31 July, and it took him ten days to make the Spanish coast. He flew his flag on the *Union*, 90 guns, Hopson his on the *Stirling Castle*, 70, and with them were seven other of the line,¹ with sloops, two transports and two bomb-vessels. Arrived off Santander on 12 August, he sent in a letter to Don José de Cordoba y Alagon, commanding the troops there, but was himself forced by bad weather to go on to anchor in "St. Antonio Bay" (Santoña). The letter stated that he was sent to protect British trade and was forced upon that coast by contrary winds. The answer was civil, but at Santoña different treatment was experienced; shots were fired at the leading ships. Jennings sent in one Don José de Mellis,² under a flag of truce, to intimate to the governor, Don José de Cantillo, that only permission to take in water would enable him to impute what had passed to accident and not to design. The leave was accorded, under restrictions, at a place in the neighbourhood, while Jennings gave assurance that nothing should be done on his part to give offence.³ Proceeding to Corunna he learnt that the two frigates reported at Santander had sailed for Cadiz, whither the two great ships were expected to follow, though previously intended for Havana, "whither I rather incline to think they are drawing their force, than that they have any design on foot against Great Britain." Nor could he hear that there were more than 3,000 troops on all the coast from San Sebastian to Corunna, and they in a starving condition and with eight months' pay in arrear. "These people have watched us so narrowly," he said, "and been so much upon their guard that I am persuaded they were at little ease till I sailed." He was glad to get away, as it was a dangerous coast for heavy ships; no safe harbour for them between Los Pasages and Corunna. He proposed, if he found no contrary orders with the consul at Corunna, to leave Hopson with four ships off that port and himself to proceed with the other five for Cape St. Vincent. He advised that it was next to impossible for the flota or galleons to attempt to reach a northern port of Spain and dangerous to divide his force, were that of Admiral Castañeta as strong as was represented, "especially as Spain seems intent on providing as much as possible for their security."⁴

These views about the Havana force were probably due to a report of 18 July from Cadiz Bay by Lord Vere Beauclerk, of H.M.S.

¹ The *Burford*, *Kent*, *Lennox*, *Berwick* and *Royal Oak*, 70 guns, and the *Canterbury* and *York*, 60.

² A Spanish protestant, who had served with the English in the Vigo expedition in 1719. He got intelligence and did all service, he says in a petition, at the hazard of his life (R.O. Calendar of Treasury Papers 1720-8, p. 419).

³ The various letters, of dates 12 and 13 August (Spanish or French, with translations), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 69, 79.

⁴ Jennings, 8 August (o.s.), *ibid.*

Lyme, from the Gibraltar station. He told how Castañeta had sailed for Havana in May in the old *Ruby*, with two frigates, and had been followed on 20 June by two of the line, of 70 and 60 guns, with 400 soldiers on board and war-stores of all kinds. He found at Cadiz only the old *Gloucester*, now the *Conquistador*, of 54 guns, the *San José* frigate, and a merchantship of 450 tons supposed to be chartered to take iron and cordage for the ships building at Havana. But he learnt that the marquis de Mari had gone to Genoa to buy two ships of 60 guns and a new one of 50. Of troops in the neighbourhood of Cadiz he reported but about 5,000.¹

Jennings's appearance off Santander brought a peremptory demand from De la Paz to know, without equivocation, the reasons for his coming. He threatened that in default of categorical explanation the king of Spain would take his measures. Disclaiming any orders or information on the subject Stanhope offered to send a courier with the letter to London at once. He took the threats to be but the effect of impotent rage and alarm, the latter not so much at a descent of the troops with Jennings as on supposition of concert for a French invasion. At the same time he could report renewed intimation by De la Paz of desire to talk over matters privately in the interests of peace; Königsegg's favour and power increasing visibly every day, but general jealousy of it and outcry against the intended payment of 400,000 pistoles; and a promise by Montgon, just gone to San Ildefonso, to impart everything that he did or learnt there.²

At Corunna the squadron was refused admittance to the port, though an officer sent in was civilly received and the answer given him, Jennings wrote, obliging, "considering the alarm my appearance on the coast has given." Leaving Hopson with four men-of-war³ to cruise in the vicinity he proceeded to Lisbon, where he arranged for transmission of intelligence⁴ and was very graciously received by the king of Portugal, who promised every accommodation for his ships. At the end of August he sailed for Cadiz, to learn from consul Cayley that he would not be permitted to enter the bay, in spite of treaty rights. When he sent in Lord Forbes on the *Canterbury* that officer was closely watched and guarded.⁵

¹ R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 18 (extract).

² Stanhope, 19 and 21 August, R.O. Spain 94. Enclosed were a translation of De la Paz's letter and a copy of his own, both in French and dated 17 August. The former, also in French, Baudrillart iii. 266-7.

³ The *Stirling Castle*, *Royal Oak*, *Kent* and *York*.

⁴ The persons employed to transmit letters were a leading and trusted merchant of the English factory at Lisbon, Edward Mayne, and vice-consul Thomas Lempriere at Faro in Algarve.

⁵ Jennings, 10 August to 4 September (o.s.), R.O., S.P. Dom. Naval 179. Cayley's account of his interviews with the governor, 3 September, *ibid*. He

The refusal of permission to enter Cadiz Bay extended also to the Dutch squadron under Sommelsdyk on the ground of the Dutch accession to the treaty of Hanover.¹ Another reason given by the governor of Cadiz, Don Antonio Alvarez de Bahorques, was that permission to Dutch ships to enter extended only to the duration of the war with Algiers.²

Peace with the Dey had indeed been signed by Sommelsdyk on 8 September. Encouraged by some Jews of Algiers living at Gibraltar and by the governor of that place he had taken his squadron over to see what could be done and had succeeded. When news of the peace reached England Townshend congratulated, but warned Finch not to encourage any proposal for a guarantee by the allies.³ The terms were published in Holland on 15 October.⁴

Hopson, although on special orders from Madrid refused all intercourse at Corunna whether with the Spanish officials or the British consul, stayed off that port until shortage of stores and water obliged him to proceed to Lisbon with the *Royal Oak* and *Kent* badly damaged. He reported thence on 20 September. Next day came in the 50-gun ships *Winchester* and *Swallow* with orders to Jennings to bring part of his force home, on the ground of absence of apprehension now of a Spanish attempt from Santander. The charge of watching for the treasure-ships was remitted to Hopson, with orders to continue at sea so long as he could with safety and afterwards to winter at Gibraltar. Jennings was back at Portsmouth with the *Union*, *Berwick*, *Royal Oak*, *Kent* and *Lennox* at the end of October.⁵ On the same day that he left Lisbon, 10 October, Hopson sailed southward to take up his command off Cape St. Vincent.⁶

reported again that four Spanish men-of-war at Cadiz and the two at Santander, the *San Felipe* and *San Carlos*, were intended for Havana. Forbes found ten battalions of foot in the town and twenty troops of horse in the neighbourhood, and the whole place put into a state of defence. Accounts of Jennings's reception at Lisbon, by consul Burnett and General Dormer, 30 and 31 August, R.O. Portugal 33.

¹ Stanhope, 18 September, R.O. Spain 95, enclosing Van der Meer's original letters to him and a copy of the notification of the prohibition by De la Paz.

² *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 580-1.

³ Stanhope, 18 September, R.O. Spain 95; Dayrolle, 24 September, Townshend to Finch, 23 September (o.s.), Holland 288, 291.

⁴ As in the *Gazette d'Utrecht* of that date. Also Dumont, VIII. ii. 126, Rousset, iv. 260, *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 524.

⁵ The various dispatches, R.O. Admiralty i. 378, S.P. Dom. Naval 78, 79.

⁶ Burnett and Dormer, 14 October, R.O. Portugal 33. The latter advised that the readiness to supply the fleet at Lisbon had given umbrage at Madrid, whence, he surmised, anxiety exhibited for its departure.

CHAPTER XXV

SWEDEN, AGAIN

At a sixth conference, on 28 April (o.s.) 1726, the Swedish commissioners declared themselves charged to meet the envoys' desire to be enabled to give all enlightenments required at the same time. They wanted the king of Sweden's guarantee of the treaties of Westphalia to be qualified by the words "autant que ces dits actes aurent été universellement approuvez et reçus." They affirmed resolve to maintain the treaty of Oliva, to which Sweden was both a principal party and a guarantor, but regretted that the rupture of relations with Poland forbade their sending a minister to Warsaw to join with those of the allies in representing the infractions of it.¹ The second and third separate articles they deemed superfluous for Sweden. And to make it clear that former treaties of alliance with Great Britain or with other powers, notably Russia, were in no wise impugned they required statement that those treaties continued in full vigour. Regarding the duke of Holstein-Gottorp they evaded the question, from what source the references to him were inspired, by referring to what had already been stated in connexion with the fourth article ; but they gave assurance that he wanted nothing more than an amicable settlement and would accept satisfaction from any quarter.²

Transmitting this, Poyntz expected accession to the treaty of Hanover to be proposed in the senate within ten days at latest. He dared not answer for the result, but anticipated a majority of two or three. He stated his aim to be to obtain accession to the treaty as it stood, and to settle points in dispute afterwards. He wanted the three contracting powers to draw up "an ultimatum to each objection, w^{ch} may enable us to finish at once this tedious work. I say the *three* Powers, because your L^{dy} will find that Baron Bulow has no orders of any kind but to declare right or wrong in favour of the duke of Holstein." Nor was Happe likely to be better

¹ Peace between Sweden and Poland after the late war had never been formally concluded.

² Protocol of the conference sent by Poyntz. He gives his own and Brancas' discourses at great length and Bülow's speech briefly.

instructed, in view of the "most perfidious part" which the king of Prussia appeared to be playing.¹

It was replied that Poyntz was so well instructed on the matters in question that the king had only to hope that he would hasten his business with all possible diligence "and not suspend your proceedings one minute in expectation of instructions by way of ultimatum jointly concerted between the three powers." Provided that nothing were inserted to which the king of Prussia could take exception, it would be much easier to obtain his consent to the whole when finished, whereas, if consulted on details, he would raise a thousand difficulties. As to Swedish objections, the points in dispute were brought into so narrow a compass that they could easily be adjusted, were the Swedes in earnest.² Newcastle, for his part, had "every imaginable reason" to expect completion of the accession by the time named; he had seen a letter from Höpken averring that "it would certainly be so, and that he should be found as honest on that side of the question as those who had appeared most zealous for it."³

Cederhielm, however, was now back from Russia to reinforce and lead the opposition, while one of Horn's principal supporters, Count Erik Sparre, lay dying. And this was the time of the offending visit of the British squadron. Cederhielm, Poyntz had learnt, had written that he was bringing proposals which "he dared not commit to paper, but that the senate will be inexcusable to a future diet, if they reject them."⁴ After him, on 20 May, came Happe, to replace Bülow, discoursing to Jackson on the reasons for his master having all possible regard for the tsaritsa. Says Poyntz of him: "Mons^r Happe has certainly the same instructions as his predecessor, that is, to lett the accession take its fate, but to assist at our conferences and save appearances. I can as yet see neither good nor harm in him."⁵

Now Poyntz was seriously envisaging reference of the accession

¹ Poyntz, 4 May (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 43. Besides the protocol mentioned, he sent "two very extraordinary papers" slipped into his and Brancas' hands at parting, the one proposing settlement of the dispute between Sweden and Prussia by the mediation of Great Britain and France, the other demanding of Great Britain arrears of subsidy, a treaty of commerce, "and the opening of the commission for finishing some points relating to his Ma^{ty}'s treaty as Elector" (the treaty of 1719, that is, by which George I obtained Bremen and Verden). Poyntz did not take these for conditions of accession, but as points to be settled amicably afterwards.

² Townshend to Poyntz, 20 May (o.s.), *ibid.*, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 217-8.

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 23 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32746. Such also was the public belief, as in the *Lettres Historiques*, lxx. 31.

⁴ Poyntz, 4 May (o.s.), cited. On the effect of Cederhielm's return, see Malmström, i. 475.

⁵ Jackson, 18 May (o.s.), Poyntz, 27 May (o.s.), *ll.cc.*

question to a riksdag. Were it carried in the senate, he said, with only the bare majority that could be hoped, it must be so referred ; while were it rejected, or "clogged with insuperable difficultys in relation to the duke of Holstein," then he could say in greatest secrecy that Horn and other friends, and perhaps the king himself, would withdraw from the senate, when either a riksdag must be called at once or the government dissolved. Measures by the Swedes themselves for their protection he did not doubt would "follow by degrees," but any concert with Denmark was at present "altogether impracticable, not so much on account of the standing animosity between the two nations, as the affair of Sleswick." Horn promised to do all he could in the matter, so soon as conjunctures allowed, but dared not open his lips yet, lest the Holsteiners should cry out that "the whole view of the accession" was to ensnare Sweden into giving a guarantee of Sleswick. But "when the pernicious designs of Muscovy and Holstein shall have been all open to a diet, and that cause become thoroughly unpopular, he hopes some way may then be found to unite the two nations, in conjunction with the allies of Hanover, for their mutual safety and defense." Even should the senate resolve to accede, delays must follow from insistence on exceptions. Poyntz hoped, therefore, to receive "the ultimatum of the three courts and as many concessions as can possibly be admitted of towards reconciling the bulk of the nation to the alliance, who are certainly much poisoned against it." He feared, besides, resuscitation of the old claim for arrears of subsidies under the treaty of 1700, some £336,000, as under the express words of that of 1719, as well as of the other old demands for compensation for merchantships captured during the wars with Louis XIV.¹

The next reverse was the defection of old Rudolph Horn,² and now Poyntz could reckon but eight votes to eight in the senate, "if the

¹ Poyntz in the same dispatch. He ended by recounting a long conversation with Cederhielm, who asserted the sincerity of his intentions, said that Horn had kept back letters and memorials of his which would have proved this, claimed to have dissuaded the duke of Holstein-Gottorp from measures of force, swore that the tsaritsa had only intended to intimidate Denmark and had never demanded passage for her troops through Germany, or, if she had, only by way of sounding the king of Prussia, and "wished he never might enter Heaven" if she had any engagements with the Pretender. Poyntz believed that he would not "easily forgett nor perhaps forgive" his replies to this and to "a great deal more of remarkable discourse, tho' we parted in appearance very good friends." To Brancas, he learnt, Cederhielm had spoken of "the vast advantages they was just upon the point of obtaining from the Czarinna, of which the accession would deprive them. . . . In short, he is as yet too much intoxicated with the Czarinna's favours and presents, to reason ; but I believe I have a little cooled and frighted him."

² "I fear the Holsteiners have got old C. Horn (almost a dotard)." He was upwards of 94, says Poyntz later, and seemed to be oblivious of his flogging by Peter the Great and of all things else but recovery of a large estate in Livonia.

memorials we are to present do not frighten some back again." Freytag, he said, had presented a counter-memorial in great secrecy, and Golovin had offered again the tsaritsa's support against the British fleet, while one by Happe, delivered after a thousand difficulties and Golovin's leave asked, was so cautious and weak in tone that it had done more harm than good.¹ In view of these difficulties Poyntz referred again to the advisability of other measures.

If they come into the accession with a good grace, all may be well. But if they should insist on subsidys and other unreasonable demands with such a pitiful majority, I beg your Lordship would not be surprised nor offended if I should take the liberty by the next messenger humbly to offer some reasons for declining their accession till a diet and for closing with Denmark immediately. . . . If we meet with insuperable difficulties here, some new plan must be thought of in time."²

Townshend replied :

If they resolve to accede, though it be only with the majority you mention and that their resolution be clogged with some demands, yet his Majesty would not have the accession rejected, nor any mark of indignation shewn on this occasion. It is better to continue to solicit and to endeavour with temper and calmness to show the unreasonableness of the conditions they would impose, than to fling up the game now and to throw ourselves in anger upon the future disposition of a dyett. . . . The negotiation must be kept on foot, and we must try to get off any hard terms, that may be offered, as well as we can ; and you must let our friends know that if we do not succeed in the accession, after we have sent our fleet and have been at such extraordinary charges, we shall be obliged to produce to the parliament the true reasons of our sending it and own the solicitations we received from thence, which necessity we wish heartily they would help us to avoid."³

The fateful debates in the senate opened at last on 13 June (o.s.), and occupied four days. Although, Poyntz tells us, Erik Sparre had himself carried to Stockholm in a dying condition and sent in a written opinion of assent,⁴ and though Banér was won over

¹ After a "warm expostulation" with Happe on "the wretched assistance he affords us," says Poyntz on 22 June (o.s.), he had owned that "his orders reach no further than to be a well wisher to the accession." Poyntz wished he were even that, "but he never comes near Count Horn, is constantly with the rankest of the other party, and has lately been with Mons^r Reichel at Count Wellink's and Count Freytag's in the country"; which pointed to a plot "once more to defeat the accession by means of the court of Prussia."

² Poyntz 1 and 8 June (o.s.), *ibid.* He hoped that the warmth of expression of his own and Brancas' memorials, of date 4 June (o.s.), would be excused, Gedda, writing on Morville's behalf, having used much stronger terms. Poyntz's memorial, *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 269, and, with Freytag's, Rousset, iii. 217.

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 24 June (o.s.), *ibid.*, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 221-2.

⁴ "He has drawn up his opinion in writing and left it sealed in case of mortality ; in which with all the seriousness of a dying man he gives his vote for the accession, and with his parting breath bequeaths this last salutary advice to his country, resolving, as he says, not to carry with him to the grave the reproach of

at the last moment,¹ the result showed a bare majority of nine, including the king's double vote, against eight. Says Poyntz: "The question carry'd is to draw up full powers for the commissioners for finishing the accession immediately, under restrictions. Subsidys will be asked, but I believe not as a necessary condition. . . . I dare not answer positively that all will go well, but have good hopes." Golovin had presented a demand from the tsaritsa for assistance against the British fleet, which certainly would not be granted, and of that and of the division amongst the senators the king had taken advantage to call a riksdag at the end of August.² Shortly he could report Golovin's demand refused, even Cederhielm and Gyllenborg having declared against the help being sent, unless expressly ordered by a riksdag. That, he went on, "to my great joy was voted this morning for the first of September next in spite of the utmost opposition of the Holstein faction, and will not hinder our accession from going on." He understood an opinion of the chancery delivered to be in favour of immediate accession, with restrictions, which Cederhielm and others had striven to extend, including a specific declaration of what would be done by Great Britain and France for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. He viewed the outcome, considering the strength of the opposition in the senate, with "great satisfaction," arguing that if a Russian attack on Sweden or Finland took place in the autumn the accession, had it been carried, would be blamed, whereas now "his Ma^{ty} stands upon the fairest terms imaginable with them, clear of a very burthen-some engagement and of all ill consequences that may happen"; while sooner or later the Swedes would awake to a sense of their danger.

But then on the other hand the proceedings of the diet may be slow, our parliament may grow impatient, and the senate's acceding may be a necessary leading step towards bringing the diet into the same measures. So that your L^d need not doubt of my using my utmost endeavours to gett the accession finishd out of hand, if it can be had on the terms prescribed by my instructions; but if new and unreasonable condescendances should be insisted on, which must of course protract this affair to the meeting of the diet, I believe your L^d will be of opinion that it is better his Ma^{ty} by a becoming firmness should make this his own choice than suffer it to be imposed on him; and that in such case, if the diet should not immediately take a right turn, measures should be concerted with Denmark, who, though the weaker power, having been wanting to its true interests, while he has strength enough left to sign his name."

¹ "He is a worthy honest gentleman, but his brother is marryed to Wellink's daughter."

² Poyntz, 15 and 18 June (o.s.), *ibid.* He desired absolute secrecy about his information, "frequent complaints having been made of our knowing what passes in the senate."

yet being united within itself may at the same expence be enabled to do more against Muscovy than Sweden can, with such a strong Russian party in its bosom. The first conference will enable us to guess what can be done ; but the sending one courier, or the least difficulty on the part of Prussia, will bring us within a few weeks of the diet.

Then about the means that it was necessary to employ : "A Swedish diet is always corruptible, and the king of Sweden has not received one farthing of what has been paid to the landgrave." Although there was like want on the other side, if they were to be sure of the diet some of the said money must be handed over. Poyntz himself had still some £3,000 in hand, but more than that would be wanted for presents to the commissioners and others when the accession was completed. "I do not think it impossible but the diet may be brought to propose an offensive alliance with us and Denmark against Muscovy." As to supplies from France : "Count Brancas writes to his court to dispose them to do something, which is certainly just with respect to us and absolutely necessary for Sweden. If this be granted, the accession will be signed next day ; otherwise the Czarina's offer may be accepted and all our plans here overthrown. If at the same time a supply for the dyet be sent us immediately all will certainly go well."

At the same time against other moneys from England Poyntz stood out. When Horn reopened the question of subsidies there was a violent scene. Poyntz let him know "how irregular and dishonest it is, when we expected an abatement of former unreasonable demands, to add a new insuperable one ; that our fleet had cost so much that we could do nothing of the kind ; that if we could, Sweden, by declaring itself in no danger, and by taking no step towards its own preservation, had made it unpracticable." Whereon Horn "flew into a violent passion, called himself abandon'd, sacrificed, betray'd and threaten'd to lay down ; but I knew the calling of the diet held him fast. He has since bethought himself."¹

The debates over, Horn sent to Vienna the Swedish ratifications of the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm and of the restrictive clauses imposed,² with strict orders to Tessin not to accept counter-ratification of the one without the other. Poyntz had obtained addition of a clause exempting Sweden from obligation to send succour in cases of rupture on religious questions.³ He had previously reported orders sent to all Swedish ministers at foreign courts to declare that the emperor's accession had been invited

¹ The same, 25 and 29 June (o.s.).

² On 25 June (o.s.), says Poyntz. The document printed by Rousset, iii. 154.

³ The clause, says Malmström (i. 480), was carried on 13 June (o.s.). A copy with Poyntz's dispatch of 13 July (o.s.).

three years since, but was not yet completed and would not affect accession to the treaty of Hanover.¹ Should the emperor accept the restrictions and return his ratifications before the latter was finished, Poyntz desired to know how to behave. A firm stand, he thought, might induce the riksdag "to retract all that has been done with the Emp^r, or at least frighten Count Horn into steddier measures." ²

Townshend's lengthy replies to these dispatches are accessible in print.³ He directed Poyntz, were no restrictions insisted on that he thought unreasonable, to get the Swedish commissioners to sign with him and Brancas at once, without waiting for Happe, in view of the king of Prussia's obstruction. He congratulated on the question of a riksdag being determined so much to Poyntz's satisfaction, but insisted that no money could be sent for use thereat, unless the accession were completed first; that done, Horn might be sure of all possible support there. For to debate the question at a riksdag would bring endless confusion, whereas were it settled by the senate beforehand the question to be submitted would be simply yes or no.

And indeed, as you rightly observe, the confirmation of the dyet will be very useful and necessary to give the finishing stroke to that work. . . . So that the King's thoughts are that no stone should be left unturned to get the accession entirely finished before the meeting of the dyet, that it may come before them in it's perfect shape, and that then all application possible should be used to get it approved immediately by that assembly.

As to money, effort would be made to concert with France provision of a good sum and Poyntz be authorised to draw for £10,000 himself. Also, in deference to French opinion, the necessity of granting subsidies was now conceded, in spite of the fact that such had never been granted by parliament to anyone in time of peace and that "this resolution in Sweden to demand, and this proposal from France to give, putts his Majesty under almost insuperable difficultys." Discussing the reasons at length, Townshend authorised Poyntz in conjunction with Brancas to promise subsidies upon the Swedes finishing the accession "forthwith and without delay." But not all in a lump sum, as the French proposed,⁴ for

¹ This on 1 June (o.s.).

² Poyntz, 25 June (o.s.), cited. One device for delaying dispatch of the ratification had been, he says, "taking care that the silver boxes should not be bespoke for want of money, but Count Horn advanced it out of his own pocket, which little circumstance shows how he temporises."

³ *British Diplomatic Instructions* i. 222-9; 8, 12 and 13 July (o.s.), from R.O. Sweden 43.

⁴ Instructions to Broglie, of which Newcastle sent H. Walpole a copy (clandestinely obtained in the usual way), proposed a single payment and also a condition

then the money might be misapplied. And there must be conditions. The king must not be called upon to incur the expense of another Baltic expedition, unless the tsaritsa should actually declare war on Sweden, and a concert for mutual defence must be arranged with Denmark. Moreover, it would be proper for the Swedes to follow the example of the landgrave in finding 12,000 men for the service of the allies of Hanover, during the time that the subsidies were being paid. Pressing these conditions as only reasonable and necessary for the Swedes' own safety and advantage, Poyntz should use his utmost endeavours to get promise of the 12,000 men inserted in the treaty. For that would have a very good effect in parliament and could bring no inconvenience to Sweden, the troops being "likely either never to be wanted or to be well paid when they are." The amount of the British subsidy would be £50,000 a year for three years, the money remaining under the control of Poyntz and Brancas. In view of the great expenditure incurred already on the British side "his Majesty makes no question but Count Brancas will be empowered to give as great a subsidy at least, if not more; and therefore you will take care not to sign such an article, unless France be at least upon an equal foot with us."

Concerning the quarrel with Horn, from whom complaints had been received through Colonel Bassewitz, Townshend intreated Poyntz, in the "ticklish" situation, to make up with him and regain his confidence. Denmark was weaker than Sweden, unable to render any service of moment, and likely to prove captious; to gain Sweden was undoubtedly the better policy, and for that end to be well with Horn was essential.

Newcastle had already written to Paris: "The decision of the fate of Sweden will depend upon the resolutions of this diet," and so no pains nor expense ought to be spared to secure a majority; a supply of £20,000 from each crown "would probably secure Sweden for ever." Now he sent copies of letters received by Diemar from Sweden appealing in strongest terms for the money as absolutely necessary to achieve success.¹ Walpole the same day was communicating Fleury's promise to find £20,000 for the purpose. But the question of subsidies presented to him "one of the greatest dilemma's that ever occurred in my politicks." On the one hand, amongst other objections, powers such as Bavaria and Savoy, to whom they had been refused, would have cause for complaint, on the other the consequences would be fatal, if the Swedes accepted

that the ratification of the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm should in no way prejudice that of Hanover.

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 7 and 14 July (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747, with copies of letters to Diemar from Törne and another.

the Russian offer of a million roubles for three years.¹ He suggested that if two-thirds of the subsidy could be obtained from France, in consideration of the British naval expenses, then the other third might be found without application to parliament, or "some other turn of assurances to Sweden" be given "without calling it subsidies."

Afterwards he reported the French ministers to agree on the necessity of finding the money for the riksdag, Morville saying that Brancas had £15,000 (300,000 livres) already, and Fleury promising that the remaining £5,000 should be sent. As to subsidies, they thought £50,000 a year for three years too much. Walpole replied that his master would not be sorry, if the Swedes would accept less, and that the 12,000 troops would be an indispensable part of the bargain. "They said that condition was both reasonable and necessary, and I am persuaded that they will come this week to some resolution about sending orders to Count Brancas relating to the subsidies, and in the manner desired by his Majesty." And in fact he was able to enclose a letter from Morville confirming the promises made, with the recommendation that Poyntz should do all he could to get a lesser sum accepted, in view of the height of exchange and the fact that France would not, like England, save the expense of a fleet.

Also were discussed the advantage of a defensive alliance between Sweden and Denmark, and the prejudicial effect of the Swedish ratification of the emperor's accession to the treaty of Stockholm. On the former subject the French ministers returned to their insistence that nothing would more promote success and cripple the Holstein party in Sweden than a good disposition shown by the kings of England and Denmark to indemnify the duke. On the latter Walpole did his best to convince them that the restrictions imposed would annul all advantage to the emperor, and upheld Horn's sincerity by showing how his apparently equivocal conduct was necessitated by the difficulties of his position. Since, he observed, the count had decided to conclude the affair one way or the other by reference to a riksdag, the main point was to make sure of a majority therein. But to Gedda he set forth "in strong and plain terms the jealousy which Count Horn's doubtful conduct during the late negotiations has often occasioned here, by making both sides believe that he was working for them and by taking care that the treaties of Stockholm and Hanover should keep pace with one another." Unless, he warned Gedda, the riksdag came "to a clear decision in our favour, after the great expense we had already made

¹ "Which is about 250,000 p^d sterlin between the two crowns, and about 40,000^l per an. for each crown."

and were still to make," Horn would lose all his credit, and even his reputation for honesty, and France, disgusted, might again make advances to Russia and abandon Sweden entirely.¹

The seventh conference with the Swedish commissioners had taken place on 7 July (o.s.), when they formulated the following restrictions. (1) The accession not to derogate from existing alliances of the parties. (2) The Swedish guarantees not to extend out of Europe nor to the Ostend Company, nothing in regard to that but good offices. (3) Sweden not to be embroiled in troubles in Italy, in view of the great distance. (4) In case of a Spanish attack on France, liberty to furnish money in lieu of troops. (5) The guarantees not to apply to possessions in litigation. (6) The Swedish succour not to exceed 6,000 infantry. (7) The fifth article of the treaty to be read as only concerning treaties regarding the empire accepted by it in proper form. (8) The previous restrictions in regard to the second and third separate articles. Further it was declared, as before, that Sweden could not send a minister to Poland to treat about infractions of the treaty of Oliva, because peace with the republic had not yet been made. Satisfaction was expressed at the assurances given of amicable instances in favour of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and proposals concerning him were stated to be brought forward only by way of recommendation, not for inclusion in the treaty.

Happe attended the conference but was evidently, says Poyntz, not in the least informed of what had passed before and explained that, having no instructions, he could only take note for report to the king of Prussia. Poyntz and Brancas agreed to the third restriction but refused the fifth and seventh (the latter as superfluous), and the second in so far as it related to the Ostend Company. To the first they attached the condition that the alliances referred to were not contrary to the treaty of Hanover. The fourth Brancas said was a new proposition, about which he had no orders. On the sixth the commissaries agreed to restore the former numbers, 3,000 foot and 2,000 horse, though Poyntz and Brancas wanted more. The two separate articles the commissaries accepted with reservation of the king of Sweden's obligations as a prince of the empire.

Poyntz would not promise that such of the difficulties as were surmounted would not crop up again. "But if France grants subsidys, all will go well, and we shall sign in three weeks." He thought that the accession would be effected without waiting for the king of Prussia.²

¹ H. Walpole, 25 to 31 July, *ibid.* 32746-7.

² Poyntz, 13 July (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 43, with a copy of the protocol of the conference.

In his next dispatches Poyntz had to transmit "the disagreeable news of Count Horn's having resolved, for want of courage or honesty, to deferr our accession to the diet." About the terms, in a draft prepared by the commissaries he reported no change but in the article concerning Italy ; nothing done since the last conference but translation of the objections into Latin. He held Horn to blame : " It is too plain from their affected delays, as well as from the pertinaciousness with which they are directed to insist upon trifles, that the only design of him who conducts them is (contrary to the most express promises) to protract this affair to the diet. This was only my conjecture formerly, but it is now putt past a doubt by a conversation I have had with Chancellor Düben," who had come directly from Horn with arguments for the postponement ; the gist of them, that in view of Happe's abstention the friends did not find themselves strong enough to dispense with the restrictions objected to. Besides which, Poyntz thought, Horn feared " some aftergame from Muscovy " when the British fleet was gone, and also, being intent on getting himself or one of his immediate adherents elected marshal of the riksdag, dared not render himself in any way obnoxious. " In the mean time his shyness to own to us the weakness of his party in the senate, or to confess his own pusillanimity with respect to a diet, has reduced him to such shifts and doublings and inconsistencies in this affair of the accession, as would have discouraged us or any mortal from taking the least confidence in him, if we had known where else to turn ourselves."

In these circumstances Poyntz could only put forward again the advantage of an act of the whole nation over the resolution of a precarious majority in the senate. However, he said, he and Brancas had rejected Düben's proposal with the greatest warmth, receiving only the reply " that if we resolved to finish before the diet we must be content to submit to most of the restrictions and to promise subsidys, upon which conditions it might *possibly* be compassd, notwithstanding the difficultys the court of Prussia designed to bring us under." He earnestly desired an answer to his former inquiry on the subject : " nothing could happen more seasonably than if I should receive his Ma^{ty}'s orders in answer to that letter for making the diet our own choice, which we shall otherwise be forced to submit to." ¹ In the meantime every effort should be made to get the conferences continued, the obnoxious restrictions dropped, and the accession obtained before the riksdag met, as still might be done if

¹ In a letter to Tilson : " I long for an answer to my letter of 25 June. We are all to pieces here. C^t H. is unaccountable."

France would grant subsidies "in any tolerable proportion towards the expense of our squadron."

Proceeding then to discuss prospects of success in the riksdag Poyntz balanced Horn's expectation of it against the force of Russian money and a sheaf of calumnies.¹ He laid stress on more money for converting opponents of the court, "without which the Czarina will certainly outbid us, and I may add to my certain knowledge a very small reverse will determine the K. of Sweden to abdicate and Count Horn to retire." ²

In a most private letter of the same date Poyntz notified the stoppage of his advices from the Swedish officer at Petersburg, from whom he had arranged to receive intelligence (anything extraordinary "in a chymical ink, not legible to interceptors"), owing to a merchant, who acted as intermediary, happening to open his packet in the presence of a Russian emissary, the affair being thus discovered and the officer thrown into prison. Poyntz had intended to complain, he said, but fortune had given a better revenge, Golovin's under-secretary having offered to sell copies of all papers passing through his hands and having already made a good beginning. And what was of greater consequence, Golovin's principal secretary, a man named Vogt, strongly recommended by Hanoverians who knew his father, a minister of Bremen cathedral, was willing to resign his post, if assured of "a place or pension in Bremen of three hundred crowns a year," and promised copies of Golovin's instructions and other important papers. Townshend in reply transmitted promise of the place asked for. However, three months later Poyntz found himself completely deceived in the young man.

To Poyntz's main dispatches Townshend answered briefly that it was hoped that his last instructions and the promise of French subsidies would enable him to prosecute his work with vigour and achieve success before the riksdag met. "But if that point can't be carried we must carry on the negociation and not think of throwing up the game." All money wanted to secure the riksdag should be found.³ Horatio Walpole, however, was "struck of a heap" by the news. Was the reference to the riksdag a formal resolution of the senate, he asked Poyntz, or only Horn's private resolve? Either was bad enough, but in the latter case the

¹ The old story of the Hessian succession, and assertions that the king had lately received £50,000 of English money, that the fleet had come to enforce the accession, that it had spoilt measures against Denmark which "would have laid that rival kingdom on its back for ages to come and have open'd a door for Sweden's repairing all its losses on that side," that George I intended to seize Wismar for a naval station like Gibraltar or Port Mahon, and that "by his encouragement and assistance the K^r of Prussia is to form a naval force at Stettin."

² Poyntz, 20 and 21 July (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 5 August (o.s.), *ibid.*

count, when he knew of the money to be sent, might change his mind. Townshend he warned of the disquietude of the French ministers, who had spoken to Gedda in the strongest terms. He, Walpole did not doubt, would write home all that was proper, for of his zeal and capacity on all occasions too much could not be said.¹

In his next dispatch Poyntz described the "squabbling and contradiction" that had taken place at another conference, held on 22 July (o.s.), though the parting had been in very good humour. Düben, he said, had advised as strong language as was possible without giving offence, and Horn seemed much pleased at the substance of Townshend's (to Poyntz "most welcome") dispatches, though still "of opinion to defer the accession to the diet, giving hopes, however, that it should be finished sooner, if Count Brancas received the same orders in time." But the number of troops desired could not possibly be furnished, Poyntz was told.²

On this head Townshend had already written that the accession must not be lost by making the supply of 12,000 men a *conditio sine qua non*.³ He confirmed this a week later on the arrival of letters for Diemar "in a most lamenting strain upon the demand of the 12^m men as a condition for granting the subsidys, which would

¹ H. Walpole to Townshend, 20 August, enclosing a copy of his letter to Poyntz of the 16th, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² Poyntz, 27 July (o.s.), very private, R.O. Sweden 43, enclosing the protocol of the conference and translations of instructions to Golovin of 26 and 27 June (o.s.); one very secret, about managing the approaching diet and getting a suitable marshal elected, the other instructing him to arrange matters pending the arrival of Count Bassewitz as ambassador and to consult with the well-intentioned, and particularly with Cederhielm. Of Horn Poyntz wrote: "I shall never venture so far as to lose Count Horn's confidence, of which, and his good humour, I have as strong proofs as ever, tho' he was for some days inexpressibly angry at my having discover'd his tricking, and thinking I intended to complain of him may for ought I know complain of me first; but this is now all over." But in another dispatch, "very private and for your Ld^p alone" (same date): "I do assure your Ld^p most seriously and solemnly that in my expostulations with Count Horn I never used any harsh or unmannerly expression, but the sense of his own tricking and inconsistency, which is now putt past all dispute, made him apprehend I was going to break with him, and consequently disposed him to complain first. Your Ld^p is my witness how often and how long I have palliated his failings in my dispatches; neither can I ever bring myself to open them fully till I have the honour and happiness of seeing your Ld^p. . . . I shall only say one word, that if your Ld^p were to talk with him but one quarter of an hour, you would be so disgusted with his insincerity and obstinacy as never to speak to him more. All this and much more I can bear with cheerfulness, while our affairs do but jogg on the way his Ma^{ty} would have them, but when I saw them drove to a full stand by Count Horn's demanding what I had then no power to grant, I had no remedy left but expostulation, which I am sure upon the whole has done no harm. But about the same time the K. of Sweden rebell'd ag^t his arbitrary government, which I suppose was laid to my charge, tho' most wrongfully. . . . C. Horn would make the same complaint against C. Brancas, but that he thinks he has our court in a string, and France not."

³ 5 August (o.s.), cited.

be attended with such difficulties as could not but disappoint the finishing of their accession before the dyet, which was their design." He had told Diemar and Sparre that "they were very unreasonable to expect subsidys without giving us the name of having such a small body of forces at our command, however, they might be sure that if in other respects they agreed to the accession in a right and reasonable manner" the demand for the troops would not be insisted on. As said before, the king would rather let it fall than allow it to hinder the accession.¹

Against increase in the amount of the subsidies, however, which Baron Sparre was found to have suggested to Horn as a demand which would be granted rather than the accession be lost, Townshend stood out absolutely. The insinuation, he said, was entirely unfounded; the French had with great difficulty been brought up to the sum proposed, more than they had ever given Sweden before; and there had been great opposition in England, including by "two-thirds of his Ma^{ty}'s servants," to the grants made to Poyntz. Horn must be convinced that "we shall rather throw up the whole business than advance one farthing higher in our offers."²

Poyntz's next advices, of 3 August (o.s.), anticipated defeat in the senate on the return of Count Lillienstedt and three others,³ and intimated Horn's uneasiness at the dispatch of the chevalier de Camilly as French ambassador to Copenhagen. Townshend's answer was stinging. "We have exhausted ourselves here both as to instructions for your conduct and as to the offers of subsidies and other money matters to enable you to carry your point; and if all those means will not prove effectual we must bear our miscarriage as well as we can, and labour to redress matters as conjunctures may give us opportunity." The measures with Denmark were "not only very innocent, but such as every true and honest Swede should desire"; the conduct of Sweden showed their necessity. Wager was ordered to stay as long as was desired to encourage the riksdag and thwart the Russian plans. Yet, while his Majesty was thus doing all in his power to strengthen the hands of Horn and his friends, nothing was met with but delays and discouragements, and even "publick rebukes for sending our fleet, which was so earnestly desired and pressed for." But the nation would not suffer

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 12 August (o.s.), *ibid.*, the full text, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 229-30.

² The same, 16 August (o.s.).

³ Counts Meyerfelt (from Stralsund) and Creutz and Admiral Sparre. Later Poyntz wrote that Lillienstedt would be kept away by illness and Creutz detained in Finland. "Adm^l Sparre will soon be here, he loves England and should be for us, pretending great friendship for me." Of Meyerfelt, now on his way; "how he stands affected I can't tell" (to Tilson, 10 August (o.s.), *ibid.*).

that expense for nothing, and if the accession were not obtained before parliament met it would be necessary "to discover the true motives and shew the earnest and repeated solicitations we had from Sweden to succour them in their distress." Intercepted letters enclosed showed the encouragement given to the enemy.¹

Soon Poyntz was more hopeful. "For a week or ten days past I find our friends in great spirits," he wrote, both in regard to Horn's candidature for the marshalship and to the prospect in general. "The count makes me very large promises and shews me more confidence than ever." The senate had rejected a written opinion by Cederhielm, that the king of Prussia's refusal to sign the Dutch accession denoted "some secret views inconsistent with our treaty," and that it was highly imprudent for Sweden to join an alliance which one of the parties seemed to be on the point of deserting; better to make new and separate alliance with Great Britain and France. Horn had answered with spirit talk by Reichel of the tsaritsa so despairing of success that she was preparing to send an ambassador to Denmark with the view to war on Sweden. "Welling and Höpken publish the same menaces. Count Horn has desired us on this occasion to manage Denmark, which happens luckily for the arrival of the French ambassador at that court. If our other affairs succeed well at the diet I make no doubt but we shall be able by degrees to compass a union between Sweden and Denmark, but we dare not mention it as yet to any one, except Count Horn."²

When, on the other hand, the riksdag was about to open Poyntz had several set-backs to report; reception of the emperor's ratification of his accession to the treaty of Stockholm, including the restrictions, news of the Prussian treaty with Russia³ and of the elector Palatine being about to accede to that of Vienna, and talk about Prince Dolgoruky, the coming Russian ambassador, being empowered to offer a subsidy of a million roubles "and the reversion of the Swedish provinces for the duke, on condition of his being declared successor."⁴ He expected to get "all the duke's actual

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 19 August (o.s.), *ibid.*; *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 231-3. The letters, either from Freytag himself or retailing his advices, might be used, said Townshend, to show Horn how freely his conduct and character were treated in them, and the methods employed by Freytag and his associates to carry on their intrigues.

² Poyntz, 24 August (o.s.), *ibid.* 44.

³ "But the king of Prussia's treaty draws after it such strong suspicions of his having an eye to Swedish Pomerania, that it will rather help than hurt us among all true patriots."

⁴ It had been intended, as noticed, to send Count Bassewitz, who was actually preparing for the journey when notification came that he would not be received. Says Poyntz: "I was very much surprised at this heroism, till I found out that Cederhielm had offered and was employ'd to write the letter on the foot of private

servants and pensioners excluded " from the marshalship, but doubted the election of Horn. Their second candidate, he said, was Count Gustaf Bonde, "an honest man, but his brother is marry'd to Bassewitz's niece, and in the duke's service. However the count has never forgiven Bassewitz for making that match. He has a great estate and is popular." ¹

advice." Later he says that Höpken had had orders to notify Golovin and Reichel "that it was inconsistent with the dignity of the crown of Sweden to admitt a minister who has taken such libertys in discourse against the king personally as well as against the Swedish nation"; that like orders had been sent to Cedercreutz at Petersburg and, "what is most remarkable," had been signed by all senators of either party in the absence of the king; and that from a declaration of innocence received from Bassewitz reference to the king was omitted, which had given great offence and made his cause worse (3, 10 and 24 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 43, 44).

¹ Bonde, Jackson had previously written, president of the College of Mines, had returned a month before from a prolonged inquiry into abuses in Finland. Were a senator to be chosen, he expected Horn to be opposed by Cederhielm, "the Holstein idol," and in the contrary case the candidates to be Count Gyllenstierna, an uncle of Countess Horn, and Baron Strömfelt, president of the Chamber of Finance, the latter assured already of 250 votes (6 and 27 July (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 41).

CHAPTER XXVI

THE ACCESSION OF HOLLAND. PROPOSALS FOR ACTION AGAINST THE OSTEND COMPANY

IN the last days of June 1726 William Finch saw the end of his tedious negotiation at last approaching. Despite postponement of positive resolution by the States of Holland until those of Utrecht had met again, he could report "now hardly any one that is not for bringing matters to a conclusion," and Fénelon authorised to sign without waiting for Meinertzhagen, who was not likely to receive full powers until the king of Prussia was informed that the proviso about the "possessions litigieuses" was dropped. Moreover increase of the army was approved, the States of Holland and Gelderland wanting to raise its strength to 50,000. Whereon Townshend, expressing his pleasure, since it was "high time that this tedious business should be ended," observed that the recent changes in Spain and France made it necessary for the two protestant powers to be closely united and called to notice the safe return of three Ostend ships, very richly laden, as a thing which ought to show the Dutch "what inconveniencys attend their slow proceedings" and how the company's trade would grow unless it were destroyed before established.¹

That Meinertzhagen would not be allowed to sign was soon confirmed. When Rottembourg requested full powers for him to do so he was answered that the king of Prussia would wait to know, whether the Dutch would give a guarantee of all that he possessed. In vain he undertook that the powers should be used only conditionally and relatively to that stipulation, Frederick William stood

¹ Finch, 21 to 28 June 1726, Townshend to him, 14 June (o.s.), R.O. Holland 290. To be noted at this time was an alarm of British ships coming to bombard Ostend. Troops were sent there hurriedly from Brussels, property was removed to Bruges, and the governor went so far as to break down important dykes. It turned out that the ships, some ten in number, were on their way to join Sir John Jennings's squadron at Portsmouth (*Lettres historiques*, lxx. 91, 94; Dayrolle, 5 July, R.O. Holland 287).

The Dutch army Dayrolle stated (12 July) to be "very defectuous," only 34,000 men; he reported as above and further a resolution to spend a million florins on repair of the fortifications of Bergen-op-Zoom and other frontier towns.

firm ; his true reason being, says Du Bourgay, what Boreke had said in council, "that if his Prussian Ma^{ty} did intend to enter into any engagement with the Emperor, it was not his interest to strengthen the alliance of Hanover." ¹

Another week, and the act of accession passed the States of Holland, with the restriction only that were it necessary to take action all measures must be concerted with the contracting powers as well as with the other provinces, a provision originally present but expunged. Its restoration, says Finch, had been insisted on by Dordrecht and Haarlem, in their jealousy of Amsterdam. What was done that day was to be revised the next, "and on Monday our friends have promised me to take their measures to bring this affair to an immediate conclusion." The consent of Utrecht would not be waited for ; Zeeland, Friesland, Overyssel, Groningen, would conclude at once ; and if there were any opposition from Gelderland "it must proceed from M^r de Linden's politicks" ; it might have a good effect if Townshend would speak to Diemar about him. ²

Townshend replied that the king did not think the insertion of sufficient importance for objection and heartily congratulated.

The morrow came, and with it the definite resolution of the States of Holland to accede, and at the next conference with the deputies of the States-General all was agreed, excepting the restriction mentioned. ³ Fénelon, said Finch, had wished to sign at once, which had the doubly good effect of showing the steadiness of the court of France and of making the deputies, although they declined the proposal, one and all to declare that they were absolutely in favour of immediate accession. Townshend again took no objection to the insertion and a second time authorised Finch to sign without Meinertzhagen. He noted as "a very good sign" in regard to the king of Prussia his summons to Wallenrodt to meet him at Cleves, and thought that separate conclusion by Fénelon and Finch would bring him in at once. "Whereas if he perceives that his withholding his orders puts a stop to the whole business, it can't be foreseen what way of thinking he may fall into, and what fancies he may cherish of getting something more, if he believes that his holding off will suspend the finishing that great work."

On points of form on which Finch desired instructions he was told that the precedent of former treaties must be followed ; he

¹ Du Bourgay, 6 July, R.O. Prussia 21.

² Finch, 5 July, R.O. Holland 290. Adriaan van Lynden, burgrave of Nimeguen, had been tutor to the prince of Orange and wielded great influence at the Friesland court, says Itterssum (9 July, *ibid.* 284).

³ As Finch now gave it : "sans pourtant qu'on puisse procéder aux voyes de fait contre la Compagnie d'Ostende dans les Indes ou ailleurs avant que les Puissances Contractantes de cet article se soient concertées là-dessus."

to sign first the instrument in which the king of England's name stood first, and Fénelon in the other, his rank as ambassador making no difference. Also that it must be formally declared that the use of the French language did not prejudice the right to employ the Latin.¹

Nevertheless some deputies of Gelderland still insisted on reference to the province, in spite of strong representations made at the Friesland court, and there was new complaint of a Dutch ship taken by the Algerians at Gibraltar.² And when at last, at the end of July, the consent of Gelderland was received, Zeeland made difficulties.³ On this Townshend broke out again. "This dilatory way of proceeding . . . does us incredible mischief." Other powers were waiting to see the result in Holland; the Swedish accession, for instance, so Poyntz wrote, would certainly be completed very soon, unless the friends there were discouraged by the Dutch delays. Finch must inspire ministers to abandon their "spiritless way of acting" and finish the business "out of hand." It was hoped that they were satisfied about the ship taken under the cannon of Gibraltar, and amazing that there should be new difficulties and delays in a matter in which the republic was more concerned than Great Britain or any other power.⁴

At length, on 9 August, the end was reached. Fénelon and Finch and all the Dutch commissaries but one signed the act of accession, Meinertzhagen being present and not objecting. The lacking Dutch signature was that of Gerard van Amerongen, of Utrecht. Finch kept the original documents for some time in the hope of getting the blanks filled, but that was not done. On French insistence a formal declaration was obtained that the want of the Prussian signature should not invalidate the act.⁵

After the preamble and recitation of the treaty of Hanover with its three separate articles the document stated that no previous treaties were impugned in any way, it being intended rather to maintain them and to guarantee possessions both in and out of Europe and all rights immunities and advantages regarding commerce; that the States-General did not charge themselves with a general guarantee of the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva but only of rights and possessions acquired under them; that in the affair of Thorn they could go no further than to employ friendly offices; and that the parties were expected to communicate mutually in all confidence

¹ Finch, 9 July, Townshend in reply, 5 July (o.s.), *ibid.* 291.

² Finch, 12 and 19 July, *ibid.*

³ The same, 30 July. "This last delay, as it was not at all necessary, is very mortifying."

⁴ Townshend to him, 26 July and 2 August (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁵ Finch, 9 to 20 August, *ibid.*

their thoughts on ways and means most efficacious to maintain the guarantees of trade and the rest undertaken. Then came the names of the Dutch commissaries and the statement that they had agreed to accede, obliging the States-General to everything contained; Fénelon Finch and Meinertzhagen engaging their governments reciprocally. The Dutch succour was fixed at 4,000 foot and 1,000 horse; it was declared that after the expiry of the treaty in fifteen years relations should fall back on previous treaties, and especially on that of the Triple Alliance of 1717; and ratification was required within two months.

The declaration respecting the want of Meinertzhagen's signature followed, and then two separate articles, the first that about the Ostend trade agreed with Great Britain and France only. It recited the undoubted exclusion of inhabitants of the Netherlands from trading to the Indies by the treaty of Münster of 1648, and specially emphasised the guarantees of the second article of the present treaty; if the emperor kept back his subsidies for maintenance of the Dutch garrisons of the Barrier or confiscated the interest or capital of the funds assigned by him for their payment, or if he made other reprisals or resorted to force, then their Majesties undertook to protect the States-General in conformity with the present alliance and to concert the most efficacious means to that end, without, however, proceeding to forcible measures against the Ostend Company in the Indies or elsewhere without previous concert by the contracting parties.

The second separate article (secret) provided that in case the republic were attacked, and there were not time to wait for the result of the good offices stipulated, then the other parties should send their specified succours at once. Lastly the various full powers were set out, with a declaration reserving to the States-General the same liberty to consider proposals for preserving the balance of Europe as they had hitherto enjoyed.¹

Satisfaction in England was great; Townshend indited hearty congratulations to the Dutch ministers.² Hoornbeek in his reply could not but express his extreme sensibility at the accounts received of sentiments at London and Paris and congratulated Townshend personally.³ Among others who wrote was Itterssum. He claimed to have persuaded the Friesland deputy Schurman,⁴ president of the week, to finish without waiting for new orders from his province.

¹ Copy with Finch's dispatch of 20 August. The original counter-part, R.O. Treaties 354. The Dutch ratification, of 8 October, still lacking the two signatures, *ibid.* 355. Printed by Rousset, iii. 166, Dumont, VIII. ii. 133.

² His letters to Hoornbeek and Slingelandt, 5 August (o.s.), R.O. Holland 280.

³ Hoornbeek to Townshend, 20 August, *ibid.* 284.

⁴ Johan Abraham van Schurman, one of the deputies who signed the treaty.

Knowing what arguments would prevail, he had succeeded when Hoornbeek and other friends had failed. And this was most important, for Hoornbeek had declared that he must communicate to the States of Holland, at their meeting next day, the king of Prussia's refusal to let Meinertzhagen sign, the fact being known to all the world; and then postponement to the Greek kalends had been probable. In conclusion, Itterssum pleaded again for the payment of £1,300 still owing to him.¹

No sooner was the treaty signed than proposals for suppressing the Ostend Company, now in the height of its prosperity,² were renewed. The plan was set forth to Horatio Walpole as follows.

Upon the quaeres Y^r Ex^{cy} put to me in your last letter, my Lord Townshend has ordered me to acquaint you with his thoughts, how we are to proceed now we have got the accession of Holland; which are that our E. Ind^a Comp^y should make a representation to the King that when they advanced so considerable a summ for the publick service, they hoped that besides their exclusive trade with regard to his Ma^{ty}'s subjects they should have enjoyd that which by solemn treatys, particularly that with Spain in 1667, his Ma^{ty}'s dominions were intitled to in respect to foreigners; then setting forth their hardships on account of the Ostend East Ind^a Company, and concluding with a prayer for relief and that they may obtain a compensation for their losses upon this account, and proposing that his Ma^{ty} would empower them to prevent such ineroachments on their commerce by the Ostenders and to make reprisals. Thus will the load be taken off of the King himself, who can not but hearken to an application from so considerable a body of his trading subjects. Then it is proposed that this should be communicated to Holland, to feel the pulses there, and afterwards to France. His Lo^p has talked with some of the Directors about it, and in a fortnight's time this scheme will probably be put in execution; of which this information is given you in the greatest confidence."³

Walpole answered that his approval of this plan, when Townshend had opened it to him in England, had been conditional upon the States-General declining to proceed more vigorously or to accede to the treaty of Hanover; now he would have the Dutch move first

¹ Itterssum, 23 August, *ibid.*, endorsed 20 April and so misplaced. Two months later, after further piteous appeals from him, Townshend was able to announce himself authorised to pay £600 to some friend of Itterssum's in London, in order to avoid publicity. He expressed great obligation for the baron's relations and did not doubt that his zeal and pains had contributed much to the successful result (14 October (o.s.), *ibid.*).

² It is stated in the *Lettres historiques* (lxx. 343-5) that the cargoes of two vessels from China had sold for three million florins and of one from Bengal for two million. So that the shareholders would be relieved of their liability for a call of a million and a half to complete the capital of six million. The agio for the poor had been raised to one florin per thousand, and a fund established for ransoming slaves. The tea had brought a quarter and the porcelain a fifth more than in the previous year. Two ships similar to the two bought at Hamburg, but with 40 guns only to give more room for cargo, were being built at Ostend.

³ Delafaye to H. Walpole, 11 August (o.s.) 1726, R.O. France 184, copy.

in the affair, as principally concerned. "For altho' we are by the article you mention intituled to the same privileges of trade as were granted to the Dutch, yet, between you and I, I think that but a weak foundation for our right to exclude the people of Flanders from trading to the E. Indies." The Dutch right was plain and was confirmed in strongest terms by the Barrier Treaty and by the conditions of cession of the Netherlands to the emperor, but "we are strictly speaking but friends, tho' the thing in itself is extremely plausible and popular." Moreover, Daniel Pulteney had cited in parliament a clause in the treaty of Utrecht between Spain and the States-General, which destroyed the force of the article of the treaty of 1667 in the respect mentioned.

I am sorry to see that now the States have acceded they are to stop there, untill we have spoke. Will they raise 20,000 men more, and maintain them at great expence, and suffer the Ostend East India Company to goe on, except the English East India Company begin to complain first; and are we to continue our fleets, encrease expenses yearly, expecting that the States will say nothing of this great poynt, except our merchants open first; have we not already felt their pulse; and is there not a clause at the end of their act of accession relating to the Ostend trade, by w^{ch} it is declared that the contracting powers shall immediately concert measures? I must own I thought these measures were to be taken for the destruction of the Ostend ships. . . . My opinion is that if the States and we should in concert take the Ostend East India ships, upon a proper declaration made upon that head, it would be justifiable, and it would not occasion a war neither."¹

The East India Company's memorial was duly drafted, and a copy sent for consideration of the "friends" in Holland. His Majesty, Finch was instructed, would do nothing without consulting them, while thinking the proposed procedure right and proper and being always of opinion "that this affair of the East India trade ought to take its rise from the complaints of the subjects of each state aggrieved." The proceeding, said Townshend, would be constitutional in both countries, and foreign princes paid more regard to complaints from subjects than from sovereigns. If the friends approved, they might get the Dutch company to present a similar memorial to the States-General; in the contrary case, the model could be changed or the matter delayed or dropped, for the English company would take no action but under Townshend's own direction. When settled with the States-General, the plan could be opened at Paris. It would be of singular service if everything could be arranged before the Ostend ships sailed, but while haste was necessary, absolute secrecy must be observed.²

¹ H. Walpole, in reply, 27 August, *ibid.*, holograph.

² Townshend to Finch, 16 August (o.s.), R.O. Holland 291, with a draft of the proposed memorial.

The Dutch ministers, when Finch opened the subject, behaved as usual. They admitted the method proposed to obtain redress to be the "rightest and properest," but doubted minds being yet prepared for the step. They pointed out that funds for payment of troops and other expenses were not yet settled, that there was great discontent at the unwillingness of Amsterdam to contribute its proper quota, and that for the East India Company to present a memorial now would certainly be taken as an Amsterdam manœuvre and rouse great opposition. However, they promised to sound opinions and to do what they could, and Finch did not doubt the genuineness of their assurances. Of the memorial itself, he said, they approved entirely, excepting that they would have request for relief in such manner as his Majesty should think fit in place of authority to make reprisals.¹

Townshend observed in answer that it was already September and that the preparation of joint representations to the court of Vienna, communication of them to France, and settling a concert would give the Ostenders time to sail again without a blow being struck, whereby another year would be lost and the company become the more difficult to suppress. The king, he said, thought also that it was time to concert measures in accordance with the Ostend article of the treaty, in case the emperor should act as therein mentioned on the Dutch asserting their rights. The request for powers of reprisal was preferred as giving more the air of a private right. And as time still went on he urged again that nothing but the speedy adoption of vigorous measures would avail; delays and lack of resolution would render it impossible after Christmas to keep parliament

in any temper with respect to our great sea armaments, which they will find have not had that effect which was expected in that essential point of the Ostend trade. It is certain they have this year contributed effectually to prevent any rupture either in the north or south according to the scheme formed between the Emperor and Spain; but if we don't receive more immediate advantages with relation to commerce by a vigorous concert in regard to the Ostend Comp^a the parliament will grow tired with the expence.

Something must be done before the opening of the session in January, or "all thoughts of putting an end to that trade, which is and will be so injurious to England and Holland," be given up.²

Finch did his best; was able to report the draft of a memorial to the States-General submitted by the directors of the Dutch East India Company and much approved; and received assurance from

¹ Finch, 3 September, *ibid.*

² Townshend to Finch, 30 August and 16 September (o.s.), *ibid.*

Hoornbeek of his having missed no opportunity of urging vigorous measures and "a good and speedy resolution with respect to the affair of Ostend." Yet October came to an end and nothing was done. Whereon a new outburst from Townshend on advice that three ships would shortly sail for Bengal and two or three at least for China, the silver already on board and only guns stores and provisions waited for.

You will see by this account how diligent they are at Ostend while so much time is lost at the Hague. I lament to think what a poor figure we shall make when the other ships shall proceed on their voyage, without any resolution being taken upon that important subject. . . . It is astonishing to find in this critical conjuncture (than which I never saw a greater) the States of Holland at the head of a wealthy and powerful people wrangling about trifles, when the safety and libertys of Europe are at stake. . . . For God's sake warn them in Holland to exert themselves with some spirit, or else they will be the scorn of all the world." ¹

When in November there was word that two ships for Bengal would be sailing in a fortnight, Townshend protested anew that something must be done; "we shall become the jest of the whole world if we let these ships go away without any hindrance." He urged that the emperor's plan of making Spain open a war in which he could join at pleasure, drawing large subsidies as her auxiliary, would be defeated if he were "put to defend his Ostend Company by our making use of our right to ruin it." He asked now for some Dutch men-of-war to join four or five of his Majesty's in blockading the port, or at least, if they could not be equipped in time, for a promise that they should join as soon as ready, the States-General declaring in the meantime that the British action was taken in concert with them. A like proposal, he said, had been made to France and the concurrence of that court was hoped for, it being absolutely necessary "to assert our right strenuously and put the Emperor out of that play, which would distress us extremely." The proposed action would ruin the company entirely, for no one would venture money in the trade when it was seen that the sovereign could not protect it, whereas, if nothing were done, the emperor would grow more bold and the company thrive. He directed Finch to talk "very earnestly and seriously" with the three friends and to communicate the result by express and a "boat extraordinary," maintaining, however, the utmost secrecy, whether they approved or no, lest the design should "take vent and miscarry" and it then "be matter of the greatest triumph to the court of Vienna to hear that such an offer was made and rejected by the States." ²

¹ Finch, 24 September and 1 October, Townshend to him, 14 and 18 October (o.s.), *ibid.*, the last paragraphs having reference to what was passing with Spain.

² Townshend to Finch, 28 October (o.s.), *ibid.* 292.

At Paris destruction of the Ostend Company was now represented openly as "one of the chief views of the treaty of Hanover." Horatio Walpole was desired to suggest "whether it might not be proper, at a time that we are putting it out of the power of Spain to assist the Emperor, to show Spain on the other hand that we will not suffer the court of Vienna to continue to violate their treaties with us." Speaking always as from his own thoughts he might observe that as Jennings was back from Spain and Wager daily expected from the Baltic, four or five men-of-war could easily be sent to lie off Ostend and keep the ships from sailing. Were this opportunity lost it was uncertain when there would be another, and the emperor would have "at least eight or nine months to work up Spain against us, without having anything to apprehend for himself"; whereas a stop put to the trade at once would show him that he could not prosecute his designs. As soon as the French court concurred the necessary orders would be given, and in the meantime the agreement of the friends in Holland would be sought privately "in the manner we desire of France, without which the King will not think of undertaking it." Request for Dutch ships to join would not be made on account of the delay entailed, besides which it was the less necessary to ask for them, now that the accession of the States-General to the treaty of Hanover had bound them to his Majesty's interests. "Your Ex^{cy} cannot conceive how popular this would be here." The only complaint made was that so little was done after all the stress laid on the necessity of destroying the Ostend Company.¹

Walpole, however, thought the measure proposed "too vigorous and quick, and the time for the execution of it too short, for obtaining a proper concurrence from hence and from Holland for the undertaking it." This, moreover, was the time of the Austrian proposals in regard to the Ostend Company, elsewhere recounted, and Walpole found Fleury of opinion that in the circumstances the sudden blow was inadvisable, and particularly by England alone, because it was a principal object of the Austrians to represent that it was England that wanted a rupture, England that was prosecuting violent measures in all parts when the emperor was disposed to come to an accommodation. He thought that if anything were done against the Ostend ships it should be in the Indies, because the emperor could not so easily bring in his friends and allies then as in the case of attack upon him in Europe. Walpole, therefore, did not press the matter but only suggested that if the States-General

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 27 October (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

wanted anything of the kind done it would be difficult for their allies to refuse.¹

From the Hague now Finch reported three men-of-war ready but doubted consent to employ them in the way desired. After communicating the Spanish papers sent he could say that the friends agreed with Townshend's arguments, much regretted the time lost, and were resolved, "now the wheel is going," to push things on with vigour. Soon, however, he was told that the ships could not be ready in time, nor was there any man in the government of sufficient weight to ensure a decision by the States-General beforehand. Even Heinsius, said Slingelandt, could not have undertaken to carry the matter through, and certainly not in so short a time. Whereon Townshend expressed belief in the sincerity of the friends but supposed that the king must be contented for the present, hoping that they would take steps to animate the States to strike a blow against the Ostend Company on the first opportunity, before it should be grown too strong.² Newcastle, in his province, commended Walpole for not pressing on Fleury a proposal evidently distasteful to him, when he showed such vigour in other matters. He recapitulated the reasons for making it; that it might be a long time before another such opportunity offered; that any attempt on the ships in the East Indies would be "very uncertain, if at all practicable"; that the action would give great satisfaction at home, and particularly in parliament; and that "little inconvenience" would attend it, because the Ostend ships would be simply intimidated from coming out and so no actual hostilities be committed. And were it resented by the emperor there would be five or six months in which to make preparations, while in the meantime the trade would be effectually stopped and the court of Vienna so alarmed as to be more ready to annul the company's charter. But the king would not have the matter urged further, since it seemed that the three friends in Holland, while approving the project, had little hope of bringing the States to agree to it.³

In the debate on the King's Speech on 24 January (o.s.) 1727 Townshend stated the position in regard to the Ostend Company as follows. By the Dutch accession to the treaty of Hanover Great Britain and France had become guarantors of the articles of the treaty of Münster, which allowed the Dutch exclusive rights and privileges of trade in the East Indies. But this guarantee was reciprocal

¹ Walpole in reply, 11 and 12 November, *ibid.*

² Finch, 7 and 13 November, Townshend to him, 7 November (o.s.), R.O. Holland 292. Previously, on 1 November (o.s.), Townshend had written that if the Dutch ships were not allowed to join the king would not send his own to Ostend, "for reasons too obvious to need being specified."

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 10 November (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

between Great Britain and the States-General, since by the treaty of 1667 Spain had granted to England the same rights and privileges which the Dutch enjoyed. So that suppression of the Ostend Company, which so manifestly invaded those rights and privileges, was become a common cause with them. And British concern in the trade was almost equal to theirs, since it brought into the customs about £300,000 a year, which sum, if lost, would fall upon the sinking fund.¹

¹ Tindal, iv. 702-3.

CHAPTER XXVII

COUNTER-GAINS BY AUSTRIA. BAVARIA

SIMULTANEOUS with the accession of Holland to the treaty of Hanover was the contrary alliance of Austria with Russia. On 6 August 1726 Catherine I acceded to the treaty of Vienna, with all its guarantees, undertaking, in return for like obligations upon Charles VI, not only to uphold them by the succour stipulated—20,000 foot and 10,000 horse—but also to declare war on aggressors and not to make peace until complete satisfaction was obtained. The parties agreed to instruct their ministers at foreign courts to work together for the common benefit. Rebel subjects of the one were not to be protected by the other. Russian men-of-war were accorded safe entry into imperial and Spanish ports. Poland was to be invited to accede, or in case of refusal by the republic then the king of Poland in his capacity of elector of Saxony. To any power desirous of joining a year's term was allowed. Other articles related to peace between Poland and Sweden and to satisfaction to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Another, most secret, provided that if the Turks broke their treaty with Russia on Persian affairs, with a war in the tsaritsa's dominions as a consequence, the emperor should furnish the succour named and himself declare war on the Porte.¹

Particular conditions regarding the duke of Holstein-Gottorp were set out in a separate convention, to be considered part of the treaty. This obliged the emperor to fulfil his engagements as the principal guarantor of the duke's rights, and in view of the obligations imposed by the treaty of Stockholm to take all measures in conjunction with the tsaritsa and with Sweden, which should seem most fit to terminate the affair amicably. If after a year those efforts should have proved fruitless, arms to be taken up and not laid down until the duke had received complete satisfaction; the mode of such execution in arms to be agreed in the course of the term

¹ A copy of the treaty in Latin, without the secret article, sent to Poyntz at Stockholm on 1 November (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 44. Also F. Martens, i. 34, Dumont, VIII. ii. 131, Rousset, iii. 158, *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 513–523, Förster, ii. 69, note, Arneth, iii. 187–8.

allowed and everything possible done to bring in the king and kingdom of Sweden.¹

Saint-Saphorin was able to obtain a very fair knowledge of the terms, chiefly from Lanczynski when in liquor. He advised that the emperor had undertaken all that Catherine I could wish in regard to Sleswick and Turkey ; that the terror with which the treaty might be expected to inspire the king of Prussia was a powerful incentive to its conclusion ; that the tsaritsa undertook to make every effort to persuade Sweden to accede to the treaty of Vienna ; and that, while formal engagements about Sleswick could not be denied, it was not known whether the Austrian undertakings extended to an attack on Denmark.²

The real contents of the treaty were known when Prince Kurakin presented a copy at Paris, affirming by order that there was nothing in it of prejudice to France, with whom his mistress had always desired alliance. He spoke of British hostility to Russia and intention in conjunction with Sweden and Denmark to deprive the tsaritsa of all the conquests made by Peter the Great, excepting what might be allowed in compensation to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. To his own court he reported thanks rendered by the French ministers for the openness displayed, with intimation that the designs imputed to England were not to the mind of the French government. The advice he gave was to make all preparations for an attack on Sweden in the spring.³

Soon afterwards the Vienna alliance received the accessions of the elector Palatine and his brother of Treves, on 16 and 26 August respectively. The principal condition for the former was to maintain 7,500 men for the emperor's service, in return for a subsidy of 600,000 florins for two years of peace.⁴ Previously, on 19 July, treaties had been concluded with the duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, the tentatives of George I with whom have been noticed,⁵ and his brother of Blankenburg, father of the empress ; nominally renewal of the old defensive treaty of 5 January 1719,⁶ with these accessions to it. In return for a subsidy of 200,000 florins for ten years duke Augustus William undertook to hold a force at the emperor's disposal and to admit, at need, imperial garrisons to Brunswick and Wolfenbüttel.⁷

¹ Printed with the text of the treaty by Martens.

² Saint-Saphorin, 14 August, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

³ Solov'ev, xix. chap. i.

⁴ Fullest particulars, Rosenlehner, chap. ii.

⁵ Chap. xix.

⁶ See Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 291-3. The parties to the treaty, which did not mature, were Austria, Hanover, and Poland-Saxony.

⁷ Droysen IV. ii. 421. Saint-Saphorin (19 June, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58) states that the duke's minister, Baron Dehn, on his arrival at Vienna some days

This defection, when known, was regarded at Paris as of the most serious import. While the French government, Horatio Walpole reported, still desired management of the elector of Bavaria, believing him to have made the treaty, to be noticed below, as it were by force and with the greatest regret imaginable, "and will be glad of a favourable opportunity to extricate himself from it," about the loss of the duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, considering the situation of his dominions, his religion, and his near kinship to George I, Morville expressed extreme solicitude. He thought that sufficient care had not been taken to prevent the loss and that it would have a very bad effect on negotiations elsewhere, especially in Sweden. "The tenderness and reluctance with which M^r de Morville express himself on this occasion was but too great a proof of his extraordinary concern for it."¹

There was trouble also now with that great protestant prince, engaged by the allies of Hanover, the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. John Law in April had learnt from a Major-General Dammy, at Munich in the landgrave's service, that his master was disposed to enter into the emperor's measures.² Throughout the summer the French were pressed from England to pay the moneys promised to the landgrave and to General Diemar, to the latter as "the only thing that could save from ruin a very honest man, for whom we all have the greatest value and esteem," but nothing had been forthcoming, in spite of a statement by Morville in April that the order to pay the Hamburg banker had been signed and that its dispatch should be pressed.³ In August, according to Newcastle, not a farthing had been paid for all that had been promised.⁴ The landgrave's dis- before had asserted that he came only to obtain prompt payment of the expenses of the execution in Mecklenburg, and about an electorate for his master. On 25 July he reported Dehn disappointed in these affairs and indoctrinated by himself and the Danish envoy (Berckentin) with true views on the principles of the court. And then, on 14 August, that Dehn asserted liberty to seek financial aid from the emperor, his Majesty having refused it, and complained of the conduct of ministers at Hanover. He was surprised to have found the prince of Brunswick-Bevern helping to forward the negotiation, he having always professed himself greatly attached to his Majesty and a most zealous protestant. (This prince was a son-in-law of Louis Rudolf of Blankenburg, and so a brother-in-law of the empress. It may be noted that Dehn left Vienna with the rank of count.)

¹ H. Walpole, 10 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747. He shared Morville's disquietude, writing to Tilson; "The loss of the D. of Wolfembuttle is in my opinion the greatest blow our treaty can receive, and irreparable, this we owe to the H—n ministers, who would not lett the drum beat for him last year" (same date, *ibid.*, holograph).

² Law, 17 April, R.O. Germany, States, 91.

³ Robinson, 2 and 3 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32745. The banker in question was Alexander Bruguier. Wich regretted his employment, as "un homme vain et indiscret, qui fait parade des sommes qu'on lui remet" (17 May, R.O. Hamburg 43).

⁴ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 26 July (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747. Diemar's British money, Townshend informed Poyntz on 12 August (o.s.), had been paid (R.O. Sweden 43).

content was fostered by the court of Vienna. Count Metsch visited his court in his tour of June, and there was public talk of an electorate for him. In September a minister of his was seen at Vienna, accorded audiences of the emperor and having frequent interviews with Prince Eugene.¹ In this case, however, the Austrian endeavours proved abortive; the landgrave asked more than could be accorded.

After the other princes named, Charles Albert of Bavaria. His succession as elector, on 27 February 1726, had been viewed by Saint-Saphorin with satisfaction. That minister saw every hope of success, should Count Törring retain direction of affairs, stated that nothing could be stronger than the new elector's assurances, and set him down as a worse enemy of Austria than even his father, than whom he had more ambition and natural genius though not so "liant."² Newcastle, on these advices, did not doubt equal desire on the part of Charles Albert to accede to the treaty of Hanover as on that of Maximilian.³ At Paris, on the other hand, there was no such contentment. When nothing was heard of orders to Mörmann at Vienna to resume negotiation, it was decided to send to Munich some person of distinction, nominally to condole and compliment, really to find out how things stood.⁴

And soon Saint-Saphorin had to change his note. He saw Törring outweighed by other ministers; Count Türrheim, grand chamberlain, "un des plus petits génies que je connoisse," Preysing, the elector's favourite, young, inexperienced and presumptuous, Baron Unertl, supple, assiduous and active. Türrheim's brother, he said, was governor of Upper Austria and all his family established in those parts, while none at Munich doubted the purchase of Unertl. And besides them Plettenberg, as though the others were not enough to spoil everything. "Je ne désespère pas encore tout à fait, qu'en prenant ce jeune Electeur par ses passions on ne le ramène; mais on y échouera toujours, tandis qu'il pourra se flater qu'on voudra entrer dans quelque détail avec lui sur ses demandes." The French court must absolutely refuse to discuss particulars, must stand firm to the negotiations with the old elector, and would do most by establishing a large army in Alsace. Secret doings were being instituted at Vienna without Mörmann's knowledge. Yet the elector's adhesion, if of great importance to the allies of Hanover, would be of no great value to the emperor; he could only furnish

¹ *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 30, 36, 395-8.

² Saint-Saphorin, 9 March 1726, R.O. Germany, Empire, 57.

³ To Robinson, 17 March (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32745.

⁴ Robinson, 2 April, *ibid.*

troops, which would have to be paid for dearly, and the emperor would prefer to keep the money in his own hands.¹

These forebodings were consequent on Mörmann's presentation of conditions, stated to be indispensable. They were certainly impossible. In the first place Charles Albert required the treaties of Nimeguen Ryswick and Baden to be cited, as well as those of Westphalia. He declined ever to engage himself to anything prejudicial to catholic interests in the empire, reserved all his duties as a German prince, and declared that he would never be compelled to war with the emperor, unless he publicly violated the Golden Bull and the constitutions of the empire. For his own security, to repair his fortresses and put his artillery and troops in condition, he demanded two million German florins within two months from signing of the treaty, and further, to maintain them, a monthly subsidy of 50,000 in time of peace ; in return for which he would keep on foot 10,000 infantry and 4,000 horse.² For mutual succour in case of war he undertook to find the same force as the king of Prussia, 3,000 foot and 2,000 horse, but wanted them to be paid for at the rate of 10,000 and 30,000 florins per thousand men respectively. Were he expelled from his dominions, he required assurance of a refuge for himself and his family, and revenues equal to those which he would lose ; the said refuge to be sovereign and independent and named at once and the revenues specified and guaranteed by the three kings jointly and separately ; the same to continue until his dominions should be completely restored to him, and no propositions of peace made till that were done and full indemnity guaranteed. Further he stipulated that troops sent to his succour should be entirely at his own disposal, and protestants among them exercise their religion only in the field and not in churches ; nor must they commit any disorders against his churches his subjects or their goods. He demanded, besides, the guarantee of the three kings for payment of the million "*partagons en espèces*" owed him by Spain as well as of the half-million gold crowns which were the dowry of the electress Maria Antonia, a debt acknowledged and interest on it paid. Lastly he required them, as a mark of their friendship, to engage to support his rights by good offices, and even by action, to the fullest extent, he engaging reciprocally to guarantee their pretensions, provided that such were not already before the councils of the empire and not dependent on them. From these articles, it was said, founded on equity and necessity,

¹ To Newcastle, 15 April. Enclosed were copies of correspondence of his with Törring, including two letters to that minister of date 10 April, one for communication to the council, the other for the elector's private eye.

² "*Il déclare que sans ces deux sommes il luy est impossible d'accéder.*"

he would not recede, and hoped that it would not be taken ill that he held them essential.¹ Similar terms were demanded for the elector of Cologne.

At the end of April Count Sinzendorf repaired to Munich on a mission ostensibly complimentary.² Saint-Saphorin thought well to write to Törring again on the occasion, giving his letter an easy "tour de badinage" and artfully adverting to matters calculated to arouse Bavarian jealousy of Austria. He supposed the proposals committed to Sinzendorf to include payment of the Spanish debt of a million crowns, subsidies to engage the troops of Bavaria and Cologne in case of need, and a league between the five western electors and other catholic princes. He again insisted that the best way to control these was to place a French army on the Rhine. "*Je supplie Votre Excellence d'employer tous ses soins pour que la France forme cette année quelque camp un peu considérable en Alsace, et qu'on parle ensuite ferme aux princes catholiques suspects.*"³

On receipt of Saint-Saphorin's first ill news Newcastle represented it to be all the more necessary for the court of France to use all means requisite to secure Bavaria.⁴ His next dispatch to Robinson shows that he referred particularly to subsidies.

The point that you mention, that that prince will insist to have subsidys from England as well as France in time of peace, can make no difficulty, that matter being already settled between the two crowns, and it being equal to him, provided he has the supplies he desires, from what hand he receives them. The King therefore hopes that the court of France will not let this negociation drop on account of any demand he may make of that nature, which his Majesty, from the assurances Count Broglio has given him, does not doubt but that they will take care to satisfy.

The elector's desire that his accession should be kept secret it was hoped would not be insisted on, "the reputation of it being almost of equal service with the thing itself." The fear that Törring would not have the same influence as formerly, and reports from Holland that both the elector and his brother of Cologne were to accede to the treaty of Vienna, made it necessary to lose no time in securing them for that of Hanover. It was repeated a week

¹ Copy enclosed with Saint-Saphorin's dispatch.

² John Law's report of a long conversation with Sinzendorf, 15 May, R.O. Germany, States, 91. Saint-Saphorin tells us that it was usual to send a minister of first rank on the death of an elector and that Sinzendorf coveted the mission, obtained by an intrigue described, because of the usual leaving present of 50,000 florins. However, he says later, the count had to be satisfied with 20,000.

³ The same, 4 May, with much again about the cabals at Munich. A copy of his letter to Törring of 26 April enclosed.

⁴ To Robinson, 4 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32745. "As *Monseigneur de Broglio* has answered for the success of this negociation, his Majesty is the more easy about it."

later that the accession of Bavaria was "the most material" of any and recalled that the negotiation was entirely in the hands of France ; its importance must be pressed.¹

Robinson, however, was reporting despair about gaining either Savoy or Bavaria ; "as to the last, they imagine nothing is to be done till indifference and neglect shall bring his Electoral Highness to more reasonable terms." From the complimentary mission to Munich, for which the marquis de Maillebois was named, little was hoped beyond diverting the elector from joining the emperor, and of that Morville had no great apprehension ; he promised that everything possible should be done.² Newcastle suggested on this that Chavigny had better "take a step" to Munich on his way to Ratisbon, "if the negotiation with the elector of Bavaria be not in so desperate a way as we imagine."³

The instructions to François Desmarests, marquis de Maillebois, of date 6 May, stated that ostensibly he was sent to condole on the death of Maximilian, that he was not to negotiate, only to give strong assurances and endeavour to elicit views, and that his stay was to be short, in order not to raise suspicions. Charles Albert's demands were stigmatised as purposely calculated to render his accession to the treaty of Hanover impossible. The previous negotiations were recapitulated, with special reference to the expired treaty of 1714 and to the experience of Saint-Saphorin at the electoral court, and renewal of that treaty was set forth as possible, on condition of it being kept absolutely secret, even from the British court, and of the elector's acceding to the treaty of Hanover. Reasons were given for the unlikelihood of his joining the allies of Vienna ; against that Maillebois was ordered to make forcible representation. Törring was depicted as well-intentioned, but of no great influence, Unertl and Türrheim as devoted to the emperor ; Preysing, the elector's particular confidant, as of uncertain disposition.⁴

Returned to Paris, Horatio Walpole found Morville despairing of doing more with Charles Albert than to prevent his joining the emperor, an expedient proposed by D'Huxelles being to bind him

¹ The same, 11 and 18 April (o.s.).

² Robinson to Newcastle, 30 April, *ibid.* In a secret dispatch of 7 May he advised that Maillebois had gone "but little instructed upon the state of that transaction" ; if he spoke of it at all it was to be only indirectly, to the effect "that his Electoral Highness had been very ill advised," though on the other hand he was to talk "amply and home" about the ill consequences to the elector's house, "should they blindly deliver themselves up to the Emperor." But how, Robinson asked, could Maillebois withstand Sinzendorf ?

³ To H. Walpole, 9 May (o.s.), *ibid.* 32746.

⁴ *Recueil des instructions*, vii. 161-172. Maillebois' letter of credence from Louis XV, same date, Heigel, *Quellen und Abhandlungen* (1890), p. 293.

and his brother of Cologne to neutrality by a formal convention. Walpole deprecated this as likely to lead to further unreasonable demands; did not see how the elector could ever accede to the treaty of Vienna; and thought it better to say nothing, at least until the result of Sinzendorf's mission was known. To this he procured agreement. He went on to describe how D'Albert had been very solicitous with him, saying that Sinzendorf had left Munich with nothing done, although his offers included money to maintain 15,000 troops and to pay off the late elector's debts.¹

Newcastle replied that the king was very well pleased with Walpole's reasonings against a neutrality convention, but still left the matter to the French court to carry through, whether by that means or by the elector's accession. And since late advices did not make the case of that so desperate as Morville seemed to think, Saint-Saphorin also reporting Sinzendorf to have met with no success, endeavours by France might have effect. His Majesty was not at all averse from concluding a separate treaty with the elector, if nothing better could be had and it were agreeable to the terms of the treaty of Hanover; "as anything is better than letting this prince fall into the Emperor's hands, we must be contented with whatever he can be brought to."² And when Morville suggested, through Broglie, a separate defensive alliance containing general assurances "consistent with the laws and constitution of the Empire," Newcastle repeated that the king left everything to France and was willing, as before, to enter into such a separate treaty.³

Saint-Saphorin's late news had been that the electors of Cologne and Bavaria were about to come to terms with the emperor, but whether for accession to the treaty of Vienna, or only for military service in return for subsidies, he could not tell. "*Le nouvel électeur de Bavière veut à quelque prix que ce soit avoir de l'argent, et pour tirer une partie de ce que luy doit l'Espagne il agit contre ses intérêts les plus clairs.*" But he was not a better friend of the emperor for that: Törring had insinuated that when the Spanish money had put him in a better position he would be disposed to take measures against Austria. Townshend would be surprised to hear of the "*divers manèges*" at the Bavarian court. If only France would post her army as desired and use bold language, "*nous verrons tous ces cliens de l'Empereur humiliés.*" Next he wrote that close questioning of Mörmann had elicited the information that Sinzendorf had not had full powers to treat, that a principal

¹ H. Walpole, 25 and 28 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

² Newcastle in reply, 19 and 23 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ The same, 13 June (o.s.).

creditor of the elector, the Jew Wertheimer, was willing to wait, that only efficacious offices had been promised in the matter of the Spanish debts, and that the chief inducements offered were church benefices, in particular the coadjutorship of Liège for the elector of Cologne and that of Augsburg for Prince Theodore. Nor had Sinzendorf made any propositions to the ministers of Bavaria or Cologne since his return. What appeared to be in contemplation at Vienna were alliances with all the four electors of the Palatine house ; each in return for a subsidy of 600,000 florins to maintain for the emperor's service 8,000 men and all to accede to the treaty of Vienna.¹

In subsequent dispatches Saint-Saphorin reiterated the impossibility of securing the catholic electors except by money ; "ils en ont besoin, et ils en veulent, à quel prix que ce soit." If they could not be bought off the emperor would dispose of them and of their soldiers. Ministers were in transports of joy on news from Madrid ; certainly considerable sums of Spanish money had already been received, though nothing in comparison with the profusion hoped for, when the treasure-fleets should come home. Were the peace of Europe to be maintained none must go to sleep ; other princes must act with the same vigour as his Majesty. There was positive assurance that mobilisation of the whole of the emperor's forces awaited only the conclusion of his German treaties. Employment of Palatine and Bavarian troops in Italy and the Netherlands would free 70,000 of his own men for service nearer home. So that, if Bavaria could not be gained, every effort must be made with other princes of the empire. Yet even the protestants were so greedy of subsidies that the emperor could be sure of part of their forces, and he would be prodigal of promises which he knew need not be fulfilled. Certainly Bavaria and Cologne were acting against his Majesty with the most vivid ardour ; the two electors would be sure to support in the diet a declaration that the treaty of Hanover was contrary to the laws and constitutions of the empire, they being ready to sacrifice their own prerogatives if they could but injure his Majesty, in their view the only prince in Europe capable of supporting the protestants. Of combination of the latter against the catholics there could be no hope ; Saxony was uncertain, Prussia was being

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 25 May, 4 and 19 June, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58, giving full account of court intrigues at Munich and of the attitude of Bavaria Cologne and other states, and enclosing copies of his correspondence with Törring.

That Charles Albert's monetary claims on Spain were not likely to be met appeared later from correspondence of De la Paz with Louis Romet, the Bavarian minister at Madrid, sent to England by Stanhope on 16 September (R.O. Spain 95). Stanhope remarked "with what haughtiness and disregard this court treats the pretensions of that elector."

cajoled, other of them were not prepared to oppose the court of Vienna from fear or because their ministers were corrupted. France had ill-treated the protestant states and now neglected them ; Great Britain and Holland, after 1688, had influenced them by subsidies rather than by awakening a sense of common interest. Now it was the emperor who promised subsidies, and in regard to them difficulties had vanished since advantage had been taken of differences between the king of Sardinia and the Genoese to dispose the latter to accede to the treaty of Vienna and to deliver themselves over to the emperor entirely. Doria, the Genoese envoy, was said to have found people in his country ready to advance on security all the money that Spain could furnish. Some of them had already more than five million florins in the town bank of Vienna, and as their other effects were located in Spain, in the Milanese, and in Naples and Sicily they were not in a position to escape the influence of the Austrian and Spanish courts.¹

At the end of August Horatio Walpole, setting before the French ministers the last advices from Saint-Saphorin, asked that Maillebois might be instructed by express to represent to the elector that the object of the treaty of Hanover was purely to maintain peace in Europe and the privileges and constitutions of the empire, wherein no-one was more essentially concerned than himself ; that his accession was desired, or, if he had reasons against that, that Great Britain and France were willing to enter into a separate treaty with him, including French subsidies in time of peace ; or thirdly, if his engagements with the emperor forbade that also, that he could still have the said subsidies as the price of neutrality. That if, however, he should refuse all these advantages it was plain that he intended to enter into alliance with the emperor, who could have no other object than to draw him into war with the two crowns, and he would only have himself to thank, if the consequences fell upon him and his country.

Morville was able to reply that orders had actually been sent to Maillebois two days since to make an offer for the elector's neutrality such as Walpole suggested, though not so specifically, and further to advise him, before entering into alliance with the emperor, to desire a declaration that no engagement for the marriage of an archduchess to Don Carlos existed. Either refusal of that, he pointed out, would acknowledge the fact, or compliance make it possible to undeceive the queen of Spain. Further orders, he said, should be sent, but for the fact that Maillebois was recalled,² and he agreed to

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 25 July and 14 August, *ibid.*

² Because, said Fleury, "his long stay at Munich had only served to advance the negociation with the Emperor."

talk that afternoon more fully with D'Albert. Next day Walpole found the latter so impressed by what Morville had said as to be writing at once to Munich to impart and argue in favour of the proposals. He had always been against alliance with the emperor, he said, and lately, the matter being so forward, had urged insistence on proper security for the subsidies stipulated and demand for positive assurance against the marriage. This advice he promised to repeat and emphasise, and Walpole fortified him with arguments and commendation.¹

Walpole, however, was not told the whole truth. Maillebois had found the elector specially to want renewal of his father's treaty of 1714 with France, with its subsidies, and the French were meeting his wish behind the back of George I. Maillebois had some time since been instructed :

Vous pouvez assurer l'électeur de Bavière qu'il peut compter que nous garderons ici le secret le plus exact sur la proposition, que vous lui avez faite, et même que le roy juge ce secret d'une telle conséquence, que sa Majesté demande à ce prince d'avoir la même attention qu'il ne puisse être pénétré ; qu'ainsi cette négociation se conduirait entièrement à l'insu du roi de la Grande-Bretagne et de ses ministres et qu'elle ne passerait pas par les mains du duc de Richelieu, mais qu'elle serait traitée en tel lieu et par telles personnes que l'électeur jugerait à propos.²

Now orders indeed were sent to make the propositions that Walpole desired, either a secret defensive alliance with Great Britain and France or a treaty of neutrality, with 600,000 livres of French subsidy in either case, but also to offer renewal, without the knowledge of England, of the treaty of 1714 according to the draft already sent, excepting from it the article about acceding to the treaty of Hanover, then made a *conditio sine qua non* but now entirely desisted from. It was noted that the amount of 600,000 livres was that which would have been accorded, had the treaty of 1714 been renewed on its lapse. If it were now renewed, it would always subsist independently of the other and must never be known to anyone, especially to England.³

Having acceded to the treaty of Vienna (with his brother of Cologne) on 1 September, Charles Albert expressed his deep regret that the above proposals had not been received earlier. They had

¹ H. Walpole, 26 and 27 August, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² Heigel, *op. cit.* p. 295, under date 8 July. A précis of Maillebois' arguments in conversation with Törring on 15 August, among them that France alone could support the elector's eventual claim to the imperial crown and alone secure to him subsidies, p. 296.

³ Printed by Heigel, p. 297, as communicated to D'Albert on 29 August and sent to Maillebois three days previously.

arrived, he said, at a stage of a negotiation into which his situation had obliged him to enter, and when he could not accept them, advantageous as they were, without impugning that good faith which would always mark his conduct. He had attempted to procrastinate, but had been obliged to conclude a treaty which gave him considerable advantages in return for the small number of troops accorded for two years. He hoped that those troops would never be employed against a monarch whose views tended solely to the maintenance of that peace in Europe, in which the emperor was more interested than any one. His treaty was based on the constitutions and liberties of the empire, and the emperor had assured him that the reports of secret articles between himself and the king of Spain were entirely devoid of foundation. He had entered into no engagements which could lose him the king of France's confidence or raise doubt of his constant readiness to concur in upholding peace in the empire and its rights and liberties. He besought, therefore, continuance of the precious friendship of Louis XV.¹

Saint-Saphorin, despite renewed descant on French mishandling of the Bavarian negotiation and on Austrian hatred of France and intrigues to embarrass the French government, had some comforting reflections to bring forward. He judged the court of Vienna to be much less satisfied with its treaties than was pretended; the engagements with Russia were heavy and news from that quarter not agreeable, the risks of adventure in Lower Saxony were appreciated, and almost the whole of the money extorted from Spain was wanted for the subsidies stipulated. Should that source dry up, all the treaties would vanish at the same time. Even should "leur Sekendorff" prevail at Berlin, the court well knew that it could not be sure of keeping the king of Prussia, in fact, all that it wanted was to detach him from the alliance of Hanover, and that could only be done by allowing him conditions most repugnant to the catholic princes, already dissatisfied with the Spanish marriages and on other points. Nor did Saint-Saphorin expect success to other Austrian machinations in the empire. He could not conceive the German princes venturing on war with France, supported as she was, or in Italy, with the king of Sardinia on the look-out, or in the Netherlands. He diagnosed design only to trouble his Majesty in his German dominions, citing as evidence the issue of orders to the ministers of Bavaria and Cologne, as soon as their treaties were signed, to support in the diet a declaration condemning the treaty of Hanover. For the rest he observed much doubt about

¹ Charles Albert to Louis XV, 3 September, Heigel, pp. 297-9.

Russian support to war in the empire, great disquiet at the prospect of a British fleet in the Mediterranean, and alarm for the fate of the Ostend Company, now that the Dutch had joined the Hanover alliance. He believed the chief object of the intrigues with Richelieu, recounted in a separate dispatch, to be to appease British and Dutch hostility to the company by the mediation of France, sought on the ground of common interest in preserving peace and with the purpose of gradually separating France from England.¹

When Fleury informed Horatio Walpole of the purport of Charles Albert's letter, the latter thought to perceive the reason of Morville's repeated insinuations on the advisability of still managing him, and advised orders to Saint-Saphorin "to carry it civilly" towards his Bavarian colleague.² Newcastle concurred, and Townshend wrote to Poyntz that this was not really an accession to the treaty of Vienna and that "defensive alliances, upon the terms these are made, will neither do us much mischief, nor greatly strengthen the cause of the Emperor." Hosier's success, he said, would cripple Spain, and if Wager's stay in the Baltic had the effect of procuring the Swedish accession all would be well and "we shall open the parliament here with a spirit."³

In another dispatch Newcastle wrote :

Your Ex^{cy} will be pleased to return the Cardinal his Maj^{ty's} thanks for communicating by Count Broglio here the overtures that have lately been made by the elector of Bavaria to the Most Christian King, whereby his electoral Highness seems willing to enter into a separate treaty with England and France, and desires that a minister may be forthwith sent to him for that purpose. The Cardinal may depend upon this being kept an intire secret.⁴

Walpole, however, advised by Fleury "that care must be taken of not overdoing this part at first, least it should commit his electoral Highness too soon with the Emperor," recommended caution. Ignorant of the negotiation for a separate and private treaty with France, he recommended without suspicion that Charles Albert should be left to take the lead. Seeing, he said, that a confidential agent was shortly to be sent to Munich, at the elector's own suggestion and only as *chargé d'affaires*, he might easily arrange matters. Afterwards he spoke to Morville about the danger lest the Bavarian

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 11 September, R.O. Germany, Empire, 59. Besides other matters, the essay included a recapitulation of all that had led to and resulted from the treaties of Vienna, a review of Austrian policy with special reference to the overtures to himself, and an exposition of the sentiments of the court in regard to France.

² H. Walpole, 17 and 18 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 16 September (o.s.) R.O. Sweden 44.

⁴ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 22 September (o.s.) B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

minister at Ratisbon should "violently give into the dangerous views of the court of Vienna with regard to the treaty of Hanover," in which case it was doubtful whether any advantage was to be reaped from civility to the elector and his ministers. Morville agreed on the importance of this and promised to speak to D'Albert about it at once. He hoped that the person designated for Munich would be ready to leave in the course of a month.¹

Yet Walpole had himself in mind a separate treaty with France as advantageous. He was daily urging Morville, he wrote later, to hasten the departure of the man for Munich.

I heartily wish the elector of Bavaria may be disposed to enter into a particular treaty with France. I must own the Cardinal has never yet made that confidence to me, altho' he has told me some things with regard to the elector of equal moment and secrecy. I have already hinted to the M^r d'Huxelles that in case the elector should be willing to make a particular treaty, or even give any act for his being neuter, and at the same time send such orders to his minister at Ratisbon as may disappoint the Emperor's views there, France should make no difficulty of granting the subsidies they have offered before; and the marshal entirely concurs in that opinion.²

Maillebois had left Munich in September, and the new minister, the sieur De Rezay, set out to pursue the work there only when the year was out. His instructions met the desires expressed by Walpole. Informed, in the customary French manner, of all that had passed, he was ordered to feel his way with the utmost caution, confiding only in Törring and Preysing. The elector, he was told, expressed the greatest devotion to the king of France in a letter written in his own hand and gave most earnest assurances of his desire to throw over his treaty with the emperor on the first pretext. If De Rezay found him really disposed to conclude a treaty with France, as was believed, were it only a treaty of neutrality, he was to suggest as the first step orders to the Bavarian minister at Ratisbon to support the French and English in preventing any resolution of the diet against the treaty of Hanover. In conclusion was set out the situation in regard to Spain; De Rezay to discover whether the elector would support the emperor in arms on the side of Spain, in case of war.³ The result was the private treaty concluded between France and Bavaria in November, 1727.

¹ H. Walpole, 1 October, *ibid.* Of the agent: "He has never been in business, is a relation of M^r de Morville, who speaks extremely well of him."

² The same, 15 October, *ibid.* 32748.

³ "Mémoire instructif" for the Sieur de Rezay, 30 December 1726, *Recueil des instructions*, vii. 176.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE DEFECTION OF PRUSSIA

WE left relations with Prussia at the point of Frederick William's outburst towards the end of May 1726. In the councils which preceded the storm General Seckendorf had his part. Invited by the king to Berlin to attend a review,¹ the opportunity was taken to entrust him with a diplomatic mission. Instructions from Prince Eugene expressed belief that his well-known tact and his familiarity with the king of Prussia's ways might have effect. They stated the emperor's unchangeable inclination and intention to bring about a lasting friendship and union, leaving it mainly to the king to say whether and how far he would contribute thereto.²

The councils over, Seckendorf was taken off by Frederick William on a visit of inspection of troops in Prussia. In a hurried minute before he left he recounted how he had been able to dispel the belief inspired by France and England that the emperor intended to carry war into North Germany, and what was the answer given to Rottembourg; namely, that the king knew not by what means, why, or with what object he should throw the emperor over, that he would not concern himself with the affairs of Sleswick or of the Ostend Company, and that his intention in joining the alliance of Hanover had been solely to guarantee to George I his throne in England and his German dominions, including Bremen and Verden. He had declared that although his treatment by the Aulic Council had been harsh he would not on that account abandon his duty towards his suzerain, nor on any other account unless attacked by him; only he claimed to be treated in all ways as were other kings³ and addressed in civil fashion; if he had disregarded imperial mandates, it was because his counsellors advised him that he was in the right. Without praising his army he could promise, if attacked by his allies in consequence of his deserting them, to bring

¹ Förster, *Friedrich Wilhelm I*, iii. 245. Carlyle has a story of Frederick William accidentally espying Seckendorf from a window, asking who he was, was calling him in.

² Eugene to Seckendorf, 20 April and 5 May, *ibid.*, Urkundenbuch, ii. 58, 59.

³ In the letter of 12 June (below) George I is specified.

their wretched forces¹ to reason without outside aid. He would not have the king of England hold Bremen otherwise than Sweden held it, for his own interests were involved. He would guarantee the emperor's succession and vote for his eldest daughter's husband to be King of the Romans. He had a right to the Juliers and Berg successions, but would not eschew an equivalent. Freedom from appeal to the imperial courts must be extended from his electoral² to the whole of his dominions.

Having parted from Frederick William at the Polish frontier Seckendorf, home at Meuselwitz, near Leipzig, sent report of further talk to similar effect. Additional points were that the king of Prussia would never bring foreign soldiery into Germany, that the empire must have a head and it was better to hold to the emperor than to experiment with a stranger, that he wanted no subsidies from his allies but could pay his army himself. Once for all, if the emperor did not attack him, if he left the Pretender alone and the king of England's German dominions in peace, then he himself would never allow a Frenchman across the Rhine nor any violence in the empire. And so, in spite of his variable temper, Seckendorf had more hope than ever of his intentions being upright.

Interesting also is Seckendorf's account of the dispositions of the Prussian statesmen. The prince of Anhalt boasted of being his principal supporter and would have his services known at Vienna.³ Ilgen also had shown himself a good imperialist, but Cnyphausen was of the French party. The former apologised for his share in the treaty of Hanover, concluded against his advice, saying that a servant must always be the sacrifice if the master were over-hasty. He claimed for himself the credit of leaving the Ostend and Sleswick affairs alone, and was sure that a greater service could not be done his master than to reconcile him with the emperor. Grumbkow claimed to have revealed to the imperial court all the intrigues schemes and sentiments of the king and his ministers for two years past. He also and all other officers, from the highest to the lowest, advised alliance with the emperor rather than with any other.⁴

¹ "Schlechteste Macht." Seckendorf recounted Frederick William's discourse on the government and condition of France and England, how officers sent to inspect the French troops reported of them pitiaibly, how Morville was hardly fit for the post of a muster-roll clerk (Musterschreiber), and how England could only bring into the field a few militia, while the state of Bülow's 15,000 Hanoverians was known. And what, he asked, was to be hoped from Townshend, a mere merchant, who yet now governed all England?

² As privileged by the "Golden Bull" of 1356.

³ Seckendorf prayed that, in view of the prince's increasing influence, something might be said in praise of him to his minister at Vienna, if he had one, although for his own part he knew well how far to trust and how to use him, and the king could easily be jealous of him.

⁴ The above from Seckendorf's minute of 30 May and letter to Prince Eugene of 12 June, *ibid.* 59-67.

These reports gave high satisfaction at Vienna. Eugene commended Seckendorf's conduct strongly, set forth for his guidance on his return to Berlin the views of the imperial court, and desired him to get everything, if possible, into the form of a draft treaty. Full powers for him were suggested, in order both to show serious intention of concluding and to justify him, should his endeavours fail.¹

Seckendorf was back at Berlin on 23 June, Frederick William two days earlier. Du Bourgay suspected the object of the general's return, but was sure that he would be defeated by the extraordinary demands that were certain from the Prussian side. Himself and Rottembourg had seen the king frequently during his short stay and had once dined with him, but he said not a word to enlighten them. Seckendorf they observed every day in conference with the imperial Russian and Holstein ministers, but could not learn particulars, since any one in the least in favour of the Hanover alliance was rigorously excluded. When at a private audience on 1 July Du Bourgay communicated Townshend's last dispatch and the orders to Saint-Saphorin concerning the reported Austrian preparations in Silesia the king, he tells us, heard him "with calmness and attention, and even with marks of satisfaction," but turned the conversation on the reasonableness of satisfaction for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Evading that subject, Du Bourgay brought up the prospect of reconciliation between France and Spain.

On the other hand he could report Ilgen to express the wish "that the concert which is forming for his master's security might be perfected," the last news from Russia being that a treaty with Austria was on the point of conclusion. And notwithstanding the privacy of Seckendorf's consultations with Grumbkow, "who is the only person appointed to treat with the said general," he was "very well assured that nothing of moment has yet been agreed upon," nor did he think that any conclusion would be come to for a fortnight or three weeks.²

Townshend was writing at this time of Frederick William :

Ce prince, vous le connoissés bien, il ne sçauroit assurément au fonds avoir tant de peur qu'il en fait paroître, mais il exagère les périls pour nous alarmer et quand on tâche de le calmer, il veut profiter de nos appréhensions pour faire des nouvelles demandes. Il en agira de même avec l'Empereur et avec tout autre allié. . . . Je me persuade que comme il est fait, et situé, tout ce

¹ Letters dated 15 June, *ibid.* pp. 68-74. For the former, however, this date would seem to be wrong, and that in its first line must be 30 May. Seckendorf had previously opined that he could work better without credentials, advising that the king of Prussia would willingly concur in secretary Demeradt being made minister resident.

² Du Bourgay, 22 June to 2 July, R.O. Prussia 20, 21.

que nous pourrions luy promettre ne le fera pas agir cordialement et vigoureusement pour nous, et que les manœuvres, qu'il entamera avec votre cour et avec les Russes, n'aboutiront qu'à des purs amusements, pour tâcher d'attrapper quelque chose de côté ou d'autre. Car vous scavez qu'il a une envie démesurée de mettre à profit tout événement que ces conjonctures délicates pourront fournir. Et ses peurs, qui luy sont, je l'avoue, trop naturelles, ne s'augmentent à cette heure avec des alliés si puissans que pour faire meilleur marché dans quelques veues écartées.¹

Leaving Berlin on 5 July Seckendorf was able to take with him a draft treaty embodying terms in accordance with the assurances he had received.² He recounted to Prince Eugene how the French English and Danish ministers, supported by the fairly strong party of the queen, had done all that was possible to thwart his efforts, and how he had been obliged to be with the king from ten in the morning to midnight in order to lose no opportunity of persuading him. Everything, he said, came back to the point of Juliers and Berg; for other matters expedients could probably be found. The Russian ambassador he found to be entirely in the imperial interest. He noted the necessity of recompensing the Prussian ministers well, if the affair came to a conclusion, and especially Ilgen, who had had £2,000 from Hanover. And again he desired not to be shackled with a character.³

Du Bourgay stayed in the dark about what was transacting. A letter from Prince Eugene to the king he understood to contain only general assurances of satisfying his grievances, if he would make them known to Seckendorf. "Great importunitys have been used, but with no success hitherto, to persuade his Prussian Ma^{ty} to send General Burck⁴ to Vienna." On the whole, "I cannot help believing that this court hath rather a design to alarm than to desert us. This at least is certain, that they appear to be not much disappointed at the great tranquillity which Count Rottembourg and I have shown during all this fine piece of management." A paper, unsigned and undated, purporting to be the document given to Seckendorf, contained only a statement that the king of Prussia's engagements under the treaty of Hanover were, and should remain, solely defensive, with a list of his grievances. The partisans of Austria had "begun their old game" of sowing mistrust about Prince Frederick's marriage, and the object of the king's summons

¹ Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 21 June (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

² Printed by Förster, together with the journal in which Seckendorf recorded his experiences in detail, *l.c.* 77-100; cf. Droysen, pp. 415-7.

³ Seckendorf to Eugene, 5 July, *ibid.* pp. 75-77.

⁴ Borcke.

to Wallenrodt to meet him at Cleves was no doubt to elicit that envoy's true opinion on the subject. In fine :

If your Lordship has had a communication of Count Rottembourg's latter dispatches to his court, you will have observed he is of opinion that the king of Prussia will instantly fall into some extreme measures against us. I must agree with him that the humour and violent resentments of this court may in time produce some very strange and very odd effects, but notwithstanding the great deference and respect which I have for that able minister's sense and reasoning I can not think that the general advances which the court have made towards a reconciliation with the Emperor is a sufficient handle for such an assertion. It is certain that the expostulations contained in the above mention'd paper would formerly have been received with very high and scornful airs at Vienna. Whether the opinion of those who think that the present situation of their affairs will make them more pliant and complaisant be true, I know not.¹

In his next dispatch, however, Du Bourgay had to confess Grumbkow's influence grown to such a height, "that the other ministers are made to understand that their good, or bad situation will chiefly depend on their behaviour" towards him. In fact, "though there have been great piques and differences between them of many years standing," Ilgen and Cnyphausen were now courting him.²

At Paris, naturally, Rottembourg was believed. Says Walpole : "It is impossible to express the uneasiness and alarm this court is under on account of the king of Prussia, who, they are fully persuaded, will not only abandon his engagements of the treaty of Hanover but, if care be not taken, will certainly enter into a treaty with the Emperor." Again attempt was made to procure from George I the concession by which, it was recognised, the danger might be averted. At a private conference D'Huxelles gave Walpole strongest assurance of French readiness to act, but pointed out the powerlessness of the proposed army of the north against a combination of Prussian and Russian forces, and the want of excuse for a French crossing of the Rhine, if the emperor and empire kept quiet. And so with utmost caution and in deprecatory language he expressed desire to enter on a matter confessedly delicate, and with which France could not pretend the right to be concerned. Walpole stopped him by saying that if the reference was to Prince Frederick's marriage to a Prussian princess he "could not dare to hear any thing of it, or undertake to write a syllable about it." D'Huxelles expressed great sorrow, intimating his own and all the French ministers' conviction that "it was the only point that could prevent the king

¹ Du Bourgay, 6 and 10 July, R.O. Prussia 21.

² The same, 16 July.

of Prussia, by his madness, from ruining all our affairs." As a possible expedient he suggested letting it be understood at Berlin that no other bride was in view for the prince and that if the king of Prussia would "endeavour to deserve it first by his complaisant and worthy conduct towards his Majesty" the matter should be decided within eighteen months or two years. Walpole replied that George I had already gone as far as he possibly could in enabling the court of France to say what might convince the king of Prussia that the matter entirely depended on his conduct; he suggested further representation that his present behaviour "would not only alienate his Majesty's affections from him, but also make him odious to the whole English nation." D'Huxelles could not admit this to be sufficient, the king of Prussia having been so worked upon as to believe that the marriage was abandoned. "Taking me by the hand he said with a great sigh, I beg your Excellency's pardon for this trouble, . . . I have discharged my conscience, but I dread the consequence of this thing's continuing in the state it is."¹

Newcastle was just repeating the fixed opinion of George I on the proper way to treat Frederick William, namely, "that at the same time that we were shewing him his security by adhering to the two crowns, he might see his danger by abandoning them," and that most clearly by the posting of a French army near Rheinfels in a position to cut him off from Cleves. Now he deprecated the alarm depicted by Walpole and similarly confided to Broglie in a dispatch just communicated. The king of Prussia's inconstancy, he affirmed, his motives and principles of action, were so well known that his friendship or opposition might alike be disregarded. He was not likely to enter into engagements of duration with any power; should he side with Austria and Russia he would soon, if right measures were pursued, be equally agitated about the intentions of England and France. Walpole must make all compliments to D'Huxelles, but talk to him and Fleury in the above sense. On the marriage-question the king's sentiments were well known; the king of Prussia's conduct gave him no encouragement to do more than he had done out of complaisance to France. Further concession would but bring fresh demands and renewed unreason. The only way was to exhibit indifference and implant conviction that security would result from proper conduct. Du Bourgay's report, and the document that he had sent, hardly supported French impressions. Only generalities appeared to have passed with the court of Vienna so far; and anything more would best be prevented by the two

¹ H. Walpole, 16 July, particular, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

crowns so fortifying themselves that the king of Prussia would see that all that he could do to their prejudice would fail.¹

In like vein Broglie was answered that Frederick William's "variations continuelles" could only be met by firmness, that the approaches to him suggested were the means least likely to control him, and that what was most necessary was speedily to conclude the convention with Denmark in order to reassure him. If, besides, Sweden could be engaged, and so another 12,000 men obtained for the service of the allies, as now proposed, undoubtedly he would heartily shape his conduct as desired. The convention ought to be communicated to him as soon as finished and strongest assurances of protection be given him.²

Soon after Seckendorf's departure Frederick William left Berlin for military inspections in Westphalia. At Wesel he was joined by and discussed affairs with the elector of Cologne. On 17 July he left for a short visit to Amsterdam, the prince royal following him as far as Utrecht. They were back at Potsdam on 1 August and with them Wallenrodt, who had joined the king at Cleves, as ordered.³ Five days later Seckendorf reappeared, with modified proposals and full powers.⁴ Practically all Frederick William's demands were met, excepting in what regarded exemption from appeal to the imperial courts for the whole of his dominions, and Juliers and Berg. To allow the former, Charles VI declared, would be contrary to his election contract and other laws of the empire and would lead to general disorganisation. He consented only to raise the limit of exemption value from 400 to 1,000 gulden. On the latter question, saving his constitutional rights, he expressed himself willing to exert his best offices to effect an agreement between the various claimants and to give it, when made, his sanction and confirmation; alternatively, should other territory, not of his own nor in violation of the rights of a third person, be found for the electoral house of Brandenburg by war or other circumstances instead, he undertook to be helpful in the matter in every possible way. These instructions Seckendorf criticised, so far as he dared, in a long paper of humble "Remonstrationen" and inquiry. He would have liked, he explained to Prince Eugene, to come to Vienna to clear up points of difficulty with him personally, but having word from Grumbkow that much of prejudice had been instilled into the king of Prussia's mind in Holland, and that the elector of Cologne's visit to him at

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 7 and 12 July (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Newcastle to Broglie, 23 July (o.s.), *ibid.* and R.O. Foreign Ministers 5.

³ Finch and Dayrolle, 19 to 26 July, R.O. Holland 291, 288; *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 106, 173.

⁴ These with his instructions, all of date 24 July, Förster, *Friedrich Wilhelm I*, Urkundenbuch, ii. 101 f.

Wesel had borne no fruit, he felt himself obliged to repair to Berlin immediately.¹

What followed Seckendorf related in full to Charles VI after his return to Meuschwitz.² Arrived at Berlin he had been at once aware of a change in Frederick William's disposition. At a private gathering on the first evening,—present, the queen, Wallenrodt and several generals and officers,—nothing had been talked of but the splendour and wealth of the English nation, the king of England's authority and credit with parliament, the approaching accession of the States-General to the treaty of Hanover and increase of the Dutch army. Next day he had learnt from prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau of the deep impression made upon the king in Holland, of Wallenrodt's reassuring representations,³ and of the queen's prayers earnestly supported by the French and Danish ministers. Ilgen had then informed him of the secret Juliers and Berg article of the treaty of Hanover, of the great forces promised to support that treaty, and of the probability of the article being guaranteed by the Dutch, ending with asseveration that he, as an old and honourable patriot, would never fail to second the views of his Imperial Majesty, if only he were placed in a position to avoid violating his duty and his conscience. However, in ensuing conversations Frederick William had given assurance that in spite of everything he would not draw back from the terms to which he had committed himself, had recounted what the elector of Cologne had said at Wesel about his own loyalty and that of his brother of Bavaria to the emperor, and had declared that he would be a good

¹ Seckendorf to Eugene, 1 August, *ibid.* pp. 113 ff. He asked for directions on formalities entailed by his status of plenipotentiary, and for a cipher, and proposed private cover for his correspondence through a merchant of Berlin. He advised again appointment of Demeradt as minister resident, in order to divert suspicion of his own official employment arising from his frequent visits. In a letter of the same date to Sinzendorf (*ibid.* pp. 121–2) he developed his ideas about rewarding the Prussian ministers, were he successful, naming Ilgen as the most to be considered, Cnyphausen as the more dangerous, and Grumbkow, though not actually a minister, as having freest access to the king and most able to contribute to the result. To gratify other military men, of more influence than any ministers, and especially the king himself he proposed presentation of useless giants ("Raizen und dergleichen Waare"), the means whereby other powers had so greatly pleased him. In a later note (p. 138) he specified one tall fellow apiece for Generals Gersdorf and Dönhoff and Colonels Sydow and Derschau.

² 20 August, *ibid.* 127 f. He had left Berlin on the 18th.

³ Namely, according to the prince, that when Wallenrodt was leaving London George I had voluntarily declared to him that he thought of no other matrimonial alliance for his grandson than the Prussian, only such things must be well considered and resolved upon by parliament; that the young prince was created duke of Edinburgh and when he came to England next year would be provided with a household; and that George with tears in his eyes had besought that Frederick William should hold to his treaty engagements, assuring him of protection against the common enemies and a town in compensation for every village he might lose.

imperialist once for all, if he could be certain that he was not being amused with empty promises. Next day Seckendorf had discussed with him the counter-project clause by clause, the king declaring in the result that he only required satisfaction on those concerning freedom from appeal and Juliers and Berg. France and England, he said, had bound themselves in that matter to more than the emperor offered. In the end he had been persuaded to abandon the appeal clause and his claim to Juliers, consenting to negotiate on the basis of the agreements with the electors Palatine of 1624 and 1670, whereby on the death of the present elector without male issue he would inherit the duchy of Berg and the lordship of Ravenstein, leaving the duchy of Juliers to the house of Sulzbach. This he had insisted on as a *conditio sine qua non*, to be set out so clearly that the imperial court could not evade it. Then strong representations from Rottembourg¹ had made him refuse further discussion and suddenly to leave for his hunting seat at Wusterhausen, forbidding any one to follow him without special permission. Subsequently in a discussion on 15 August Ilgen had raised objection to the clauses guaranteeing mutual successions and providing for the case of a British attack on the emperor and Spain. On the former point he had observed that the particulars of the Pragmatic Sanction were not too well known at Berlin and had desired communication of an authentic copy of the ordinance as soon as the present treaty was signed. The latter he had wished to be more clearly expressed, for instance, in regard to the fact that attack on the king of England's dominions in reprisal for his seizure of Spanish ships would enable him under the treaty of Hanover to call on the king of Prussia for succour. It was agreed that, as George I would be the aggressor, the obligation referred to need not be observed.

After which Seckendorf ventured on remarks on the reply of Charles VI to his "Remonstrationen," received the same evening. That had opened with assertion that the Dutch must have entirely forgotten the welfare and interest of their republic, if they had flattered the king of Prussia with hopes of his obtaining Juliers and Berg. It notified the signature of the treaty with Russia on

¹ By Seckendorf's account Rottembourg, after Du Bourgay had found himself unable, for want of orders, to join in a memorial recalling the king's obligations and desiring to know what was transacting with the emperor, had demanded the same in a private letter, threatening in case of refusal other measures on his master's part and his own probable recall. Whereby the king had been made to fear losing the friendship of France and England while yet uncertain of the emperor.

Du Bourgay, on the other hand, had it that Rottembourg disapproved presentation of a formal memorial until it was certain that the Prussian court had serious intention of concluding with the emperor, he holding that such action would help to forward Seckendorf's negotiation, "whereas the less we appear to thwart it the less the Imperialists will press the conclusion of it" (13 August and 7 September, R.O. Prussia 21).

6 August and the imminence of completion of others with Cologne, Bavaria, Mentz, Treves, the elector Palatine and other German princes. Imputation of intrigues to the prejudice of the emperor on the part of the electors of Bavaria and Cologne, when they were openly treating with him through specially empowered ministers, was termed an incredible marvel. After which came a discussion of the proposed treaty clause by clause.¹ Seckendorf observed thereon that he did not find himself in a position, in the present changed and wrong disposition of the king of Prussia, to raise further difficulties, particularly about Juliers and Berg, for fear of a complete rupture of his negotiation contrary to the emperor's intention. Wherefore, he said, he had concealed the courier's arrival and had thought fit to take leave of the king of Prussia by letter, explaining that he must report at Vienna and expressing the hope that the king would declare himself more favourably about the duchies and hold to his resolution to enter into close alliance with the emperor. To this the only response had been the return of his letter marked with a direction to Ilgen to make him many compliments and to say that his Imperial Majesty's resolution was awaited; a sharp declaration which Ilgen had thought fit to soften by explanatory remarks of his own. To Eugene Seckendorf reported similarly, and to Sinzendorf remarked on Frederick William's precipitation; anything that he projected must be executed within twenty-four hours and none could turn him. His own difficulties, he said, would be understood from the fact that the queen and all the royal family were strongly against him, no money persuasion or anything conceivable being spared to maintain the alliance of Hanover.²

One matter which gave great concern was endeavour by the partisans of Austria to get the princess Wilhelmine married to some other than prince Frederick. They knew, says Du Bourgay, that while she remained unmarried the least word from England about her union with the prince might bring the king over. He mentioned several candidates as in the field, as the princes of Baden-Durlach or of Schwedt or the prince of Anhalt-Dessau's eldest son. "Those who apprehend the conclusion of this marriage are under the greatest pain and anxiety about it." Although no fixed measures, he supposed, were likely to be agreed on for at least three months, "amongst all the flights of this court, which I have been witness to during my residence here, I have not seen any that have been pursued like this, all the steps which are taken in this affair appearing to be the effect of serious and premeditated resolutions." Seckendorf was leaving behind him many agents and friends

¹ Instructions to Seckendorf of 10 August, Förster, *l.c.*, pp. 122-6.

² Seckendorf to Eugene and to Sinzendorf. 20 August, *ibid.* pp. 136, 138.

as warm as he for the schemes on foot, and Borcke, Ilgen being seriously ill,¹ was to be a minister for foreign affairs. On the other hand Rottembourg and himself were "not one bit cooler in doing what we can to defeat them." The king's present state was "really unhappy, he being teased and distracted every day with the like and other solicitations directly contrary to his interest and plainly tending to the ruin of his family, but what is the most deplorable of all is the pain and anguish the queen feels upon this occasion, which I can truly say are greater than can be expressed." The question appeared to be the chief cause of the king's disturbance of mind and flight to solitude. The imperialists might be expected to fail in everything, if in this.²

Other worries for Frederick William were the portent of a catholic league forming in the empire, through the treaties made or making by the emperor, and suspicion of intrigue to reconcile Charles VI with George I. A visit of General Schulenburg to his sister in England (the duchess of Kendal) was taken to have a political purpose, and Count Bothmer was said to be in private correspondence with the court of Vienna with a view to re-establishment of the "old system."³ No wonder that Frederick William should wish to reflect on matters quietly by himself.

If, however, he had doubts about the wisdom of allying himself with Austria, he had none in regard to an understanding with Russia. In answer to the proposals sent from Berlin in May Mardefeld had been told that there was no intention of forcing his master to abandon his neutral attitude in regard to Sleswick or to accede to the treaty of Stockholm. Osterman, said the Prussian envoy, had claimed to have opposed demand for the passage of Russian troops through Brandenburg, had denied complicity on the part of the tsaritsa in the Courland ambitions of Maurice of Saxony, and had promised concert in everything regarding Poland, asserting that the omission to exclude the electoral prince of Saxony from the succession to that crown meant nothing, that Rabutin had been told that in any alliance made by Russia steadfast friendship with Prussia must be a *conditio sine qua non*, and that Rabutin's demand for prior conclusion

¹ Said to be "about writing a letter to the king his master in the nature of a political will and testament."

² Du Bourgay, 13 to 31 August, R.O. Prussia 21.

³ Droysen, IV. ii. 421. Field-Marshal Count Schulemburg left the Hague for England on 15 July and was back on 27 August (Dayrolle, 16 July and 27 August, R.O. Holland 288). Du Bourgay hoped that he might pass Berlin on his way home, as he would certainly be invited to Wusterhausen and might have much that was useful to say to the king of Prussia (31 August, cited). The count came to Berlin on 4 November and went on in December to Vienna, desiring, according to Saint-Saphorin (18 December, R.O. Germany, Empire, 59) to have it believed that he brought propositions from George I.

of his own negotiation had been roundly refused.¹ And Golovkin had given similar assurances at Berlin.²

When the Russian counter-proposals reached Berlin Frederick William was away in his royal province. Golovkin had hurried after him to Königsberg without saying anything on the matter to the Prussian ministers.³ It was significant that on Frederick William's return to Berlin he at once took up the question of compensation to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, transmitting proposals to England and urging the necessity of it on Lövenörn "with great warmth." In both quarters he met with unequivocal rebuff. Wallenrodt was answered sharply that an equivalent for Sleswick could not even be discussed, at the most the duke might be paid a sum of money.⁴ Lövenörn, by what he told Du Bourgay, answered "very plainly" that his master so trusted the powers, who had guaranteed him Sleswick, "that no endeavours could induce him to make one step" towards satisfaction to the duke. He claimed to have said all that he could to extinguish hope of success of any engagement that the king of Prussia might be disposed to take with the tsaritsa in the matter.⁵

To the last moment the issue was in doubt. Seckendorf learnt from Ilgen that although agreement on all points had been reached, and Mardefeld instructed to conclude, yet on the king's return from Cleves orders had been sent him not to hurry.⁶ Du Bourgay advised that although the Russians had

receded from the two articles in the counter-project that this court had objected to, yet Mo^r Mardefelt took a pretence to be out of town on the very day w^{ch} was fixed for the signing that treaty. By which it plainly appears that the measures of this court are entirely to be determined by the success of the present negociation with Vienna.⁷

They were wrong; a treaty between Prussia and Russia was signed at Petersburg on 21 August. Its defensive character was clearly stated. Half of its clauses were concerned with the supply, maintenance, command and other particulars of the auxiliary troops to be furnished for mutual succour in case of attack. There was an emphatic engagement to uphold the Russo-Swedish treaty of Stockholm of 1724, but nothing about the king of Prussia acceding thereto or about the passage of Russian troops through his dominions,

¹ Droysen, p. 409, citing Mardefeld's dispatches of 1 and 11 June.

² Solov'ev, xix, chap. i.

³ Du Bourgay, 8 June, R.O. Prussia 20.

⁴ Droysen, p. 408.

⁵ Du Bourgay, 25 June, *l.c.*

⁶ Seckendorf to Charles VI, 20 August, cited. The conversation took place on the 10th.

⁷ Du Bourgay, 17 August, R.O. Prussia 21.

the two articles objected to at Berlin. Two of the three secret articles dealt with the affairs of Courland and Poland, the other with those of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. By this Frederick William bound himself only to employ good offices for the duke's satisfaction and, if they failed, to observe an exact neutrality in regard to the measures that he might take. In return the duke was engaged to abandon his suit with the emperor for investiture of the district of Stettin. The treaty was ratified by Frederick William and Catherine respectively on 3 and 14 October.¹

In possession at the end of August of a very fairly correct account of the Austrian concessions, which he set out at length, Du Bourgay boasted that his own and Rottembourg's "easy and careless behaviour" had made the Prussian court "very irresolute in the counsels and measures they are to take. . . . All which confirms us in the opinion that their first design was to alarm us, being persuaded that the two crowns would have consented to all they desire rather than let them enter into any engagements with the Emperor." And again, "The appearances of the Emperor's intentions being only to amuse this court grow stronger every day," creating great uneasiness among his supporters. Rottembourg and himself, therefore, were convinced that their conduct was right; "it will not be long before you see this court apply to their confederates of Hanover in order to renew the former confidence and good understanding."²

Meanwhile at Paris Horatio Walpole had been attacked on the subject of Prussia again. It was represented to him that Seckendorf was returning to Vienna with abated demands on Frederick William's part, which seemed to show that king's intention of changing sides; that affairs in Sweden looked very ill and Horn's sincerity seemed doubtful; that Catherine I had marched 14,000 men towards Riga and was said to intend to raise their number to 40,000; and that the emperor, now allied with her, would furnish 16,000 more as soon as he had concluded his treaties with the electors of Bavaria and Cologne. If the king of Prussia sent troops to join them the forces to be set on foot under the Danish convention would be utterly overpowered, while even if he remained neutral the Russians, on the departure of the British fleet, might so intimidate the Swedish diet

¹ The full text, with notes showing the differences from the Prussian draft, *Preussens Staatsverträge*, pp. 302-311, also Martens, vol. v. The Holstein secret article, Rousset, *Recueil historique*, iii. 198, Dumont VIII. ii. 135. Droysen (IV. ii. 411) says that afterwards, on the king of Prussia's requirement, reference to the treaty of Stockholm and to engagements with other powers was struck out and a declaration made that Russia would not attack Hanover; a treaty so altered being signed on 3 October and its ratifications exchanged on 31 December. But this second treaty is not recognised by Loewe.

² Du Bourgay, 31 August to 10 September, R.O. Prussia 21.

that accession would be refused. "Whereas nothing was plainer than that if that prince could be kept in good humour for some time all our dangers, which they lookt upon as great and not far off, would vanish at once and the Emperor be entirely disapointed in the hopes he really entertains of embarrassing us in the north."

All this, says Walpole, was put forward with an earnestness and cordiality impossible to describe, ministers assuring him of their desire to preserve peace in all quarters, "the tranquillity and interest of the north and south being by the respective alliances made by the different parties inseperable from one another's." To calm their fears he failed. At last they said that Wallenrodt was to be sent back to London with the offer not to require consummation of prince Frederick's marriage for six years, if the king of England would give his promise of it in writing. They admitted the matter to be his affair alone and touched on it, says Walpole, with all possible delicacy and apologies, setting forth the effectual consequences. He again declined to commit himself in any way. But in a private letter in his own hand he wrote, noting the good effect of the appearance of Sir John Jennings's squadron on the Spanish coast, "all things I think will goe well if Count Horn be honest and his Maj^{ty} condescend to be better to the king of Prussia than he deserves."¹

The reply was courteous but firm. The king, Newcastle wrote, thought the concern for common interests and his own welfare perfectly sincere, desired Morville and Fleury to be thanked for their zeal and frankness, but believed that the king of Prussia's conduct might proceed from other causes than that supposed, "that prince being frequently influenced by motives very different from those he professes." He had explained his views some months since more fully than the king of Prussia could reasonably demand, and the latter's subsequent behaviour gave little claim to further condescension. Nevertheless, out of deference to French apprehensions and wishes, he was prepared to go as far as he possibly could, being sure that the court of France would never advise him to sacrifice his honour by appearing to yield to force or omit any possible precaution for ensuring a suitable alteration of the king of Prussia's conduct.

If therefore the king of Prussia will send his minister back with a letter to his Majesty, drawn in such terms as may shew that he does not pretend to extort from his Maj^{ty} what he seems so passionately to desire in relation to the marriage, assuring his Ma^{ty} at the same time that he will immediately break

¹ H. Walpole, 3 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747. Poyntz at the same time was writing privately: Bülow "endeavours to convince me that there is no other method to dispose his court to act more steddily, but by double marriages" (24 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 44).

off the secret negotiations which he is now carrying on with the Emperor and the Czarina ; that he will never treat with these powers but in concert with the allies of the treaty of Hanover ; that he will instantly give orders to his minister at the Hague to sign the accession of the States-General ; that he will send instructions to his minister at Stockholm to concur heartily and effectually with the English and French ministers towards compassing the accession of Sweden to our treaty ; and lastly, that he will upon all occasions act a firm and uniform part in support of the engagements he has entered into, jointly with his Majesty and France, by the alliance of Hanover, as well as observe punctually all the obligations he is entered into with his Mat^{ty} ; I say, if the king of Prussia will send Mo^r Wallenrodt back with a letter drawn in these terms, his Maj^{ty} will, in answer, write to the king of Prussia and engage, upon condition his Prussian Majesty does behave towards the two crowns in the manner above mentioned, to conclude the marriage between the duke of Edinburgh and the princess royal of Prussia within the space of six or seven years.

This stated, Newcastle proceeded to discourse grandiloquently on the king's greatness of mind, loyalty to France, and so on, in thus meeting the desires of his errant son-in-law.¹

Walpole in reply reported Morville to appear sensibly affected by the royal magnanimity and to flatter himself that the offer would have the desired effect.² A fortnight later he was in daily expectation of good news from Berlin, all the late French accounts reporting the Austrian negotiation to be "very cold" and the king of Prussia to have his daughter's marriage "extremely at heart."³ Newcastle on the same day believed the delay in ratifying the Russian treaty reported by Du Bourgay to be one good result of his Majesty's condescension.⁴

The falsity of such conclusions was soon seen. Horatio Walpole's next advices were of Seckendorf's return to Berlin, of an audience refused to Rottembourg, and of the "extremely embarrassed and confused" character of that envoy's reports.⁵ The Austrian plenipotentiary was about to achieve success at last.

Frederick William had expressed the pleasure that he would have in seeing Seckendorf at Berlin again and in another letter stated his satisfaction at the emperor's consent to adopt the recess

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 2 September (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² H. Walpole, 17 September, *ibid.*

³ The same, 2 October.

⁴ Newcastle to him, 22 September (o.s.), *ibid.* Du Bourgay had written on 21 September that Golovkin was not yet allowed to go to Wusterhausen to get the treaty ratified ; he believed that Dr. Stahl's report on the tsaritsa's health would be awaited. She, he had previously advised (13 August), was said not only to have a cancer in the breast but also "a complication of other distempers originally occasioned by the French disease" (R.O. Prussia 21).

⁵ H. Walpole, 4 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

of 1624 as the basis of arrangement about Juliers and Berg.¹ On receiving the invitation Seckendorf set off for Vienna to discuss matters and receive instructions personally. These stated the question of the duchies to be the point of principal importance. Seckendorf would be able, he was told, by observing the king of Prussia's behaviour, to see how far he could go and must exercise his natural cleverness accordingly. In any case he must open actual negotiation, using all means that his prudence and his experience of the Prussian court might suggest in order, with Ilgen's help, to bring the king to a definite resolution. He must endeavour to get a treaty signed, even though postponement of its ratification should be stipulated until the agreement about Juliers and Berg was carried into complete effect.²

On his way to Berlin, Du Bourgay tells us, Golovkin met Seckendorf and carried him to a royal hunting-seat near the Saxon frontier,³ where Frederick William joined them the same evening (25 September). Coming to Berlin on the 30th he had a long conference with Borce, who carried the protocol of it to Wusterhausen the next morning.⁴ To offset this Rottembourg and Du Bourgay were able to make use of Lövenörn, recalled to Copenhagen⁵ and going to Wusterhausen to take leave. He undertook to speak freely to the king, and doing so obtained his consent to receive Rottembourg the next Sunday and his promise to conclude nothing with Seckendorf previously.⁶

¹ Letters of 9 and 21 September, Förster, iii. 245-6.

² His discussions with Prince Eugene, and his instructions of 20 September, Förster, Urkundenbuch ii. 139-149. Saint-Saphorin, reporting his visit, gave a full exposition of the question of the duchies. He could not think that the emperor would ever accord the dangerous concessions demanded (18 September, R.O. Germany, Empire, 59).

³ The name is not deciphered legibly.

⁴ Du Bourgay, 28 September and 1 October, R.O. Prussia 21. "It is inconceivable," says he, "in what an abject manner every body in this place courts Seckendorff's favour and friendship, even persons that one thought proof against any temptations by their known attachment to the queen cannot forbear falling in with the crowd."

⁵ To Du Bourgay's great regret (14 September), as one of the few in whom the queen could confide. When Glenorchy at Copenhagen expostulated upon the recall, pointing out that Lövenörn's presence at Berlin was more necessary than ever to hinder ratification of the Austrian treaty now concluded, the grand chancellor told him that he had not been consulted in the matter and would endeavour to find pretexts to delay his departure from day to day (Glenorchy, 9 November, R.O. Denmark 49). Rottembourg also appealed in the matter to his colleague Camilly at Copenhagen. "Personne n'est si capable de servir ici utilement, y ayant beaucoup d'accès et de connoissances, et même de l'ascendant sur le roy de Prusse" (21 September, B.M. Add. MS. 15092).

⁶ Du Bourgay, 1 and 5 October. One reason for the complaisance he believed to be a report, which gained ground every day and "operates wonderfully well," that Great Britain and France were negotiating with the king of Poland for a guarantee of the Juliers and Berg succession to him.

Rottembourg, accordingly, repaired to Wusterhausen on Sunday, 6 October. There he found the king walking with Seckendorf. In reply to his first discourses Frederick William on the one hand protested with "*mille caresses personnelles*" his regard for France, but on the other "*se mit à vomir des injures aussi excessives*" against the king of England and his ministers and the British nation, all with irrepressible volubility. However, after Rottembourg had shown how France and Great Britain were exerting themselves for his safety and intimated that Louis XV saw his way to obtain from George I a written promise of the marriage so greatly desired, provided that he, Frederick William, would punctually perform his engagements under the treaty of Hanover and would have regard to the king of England's dignity and sentiments in the family affair, "*il changea tout à coup de visage, me pria de répéter ce que je lui disois, et leva sa perruque pour mieux m'entendre.*" It was then time for church, after which the king was found laughing and in high good humour. At his request Rottembourg enumerated the complaints against him; his refusal to join in the accession of Holland, his traversing that of Sweden, and his negotiations with enemies of the Hanover alliance. The king replied that he was arranging nothing with the emperor contrary to his engagements and would communicate what was settled. Rottembourg replied that that was not enough; the fourth article of the treaty of Hanover forbade him to make treaties without the consent of his allies; it was only on observation of that condition that the marriage could take place; and that his own positive orders were to discuss matters fully only with him alone.¹ Frederick William promised several times to conclude nothing with Seckendorf yet and referred Rottembourg to talk with Ilgen, expected in the afternoon. The count then entered into details of the letter, which Wallenrodt should carry to England, and other points about the marriage; this, he says, to prevent signature of the treaty, for which purpose, he subsequently learnt, Ilgen was summoned, in spite of the promise given to Lövenörn.

Ilgen having come, after an hour and a half with him and Borcke, brought to consultation by a private stair, Frederick William came out and called Rottembourg to conference in a tent. There he repeated everything in Ilgen's presence, and when he came to speak about breaking off the Russian negotiation, to Rottembourg's extreme surprise Ilgen intervened with insistence on the ratification of that treaty being sent to Petersburg, to prevent a Russian attack.

¹ He asserted this, he says, with the double object of getting rid of Borcke and of seeing the king more frequently.

This with so much vivacity, that Rottembourg supposed him ordered so to talk.

In the end Frederick William desired him to put his arguments in writing. All this, Rottembourg went on, left him assured of intention only to amuse. Ilgen had stated positively that his master would conclude with Seckendorf on condition that the treaty should not be ratified until accommodation with the house of Sulzbach was agreed, for which he would allow a term of six months. Rottembourg prayed him to make his own reflections to the king on the danger of the compact.

This Ilgen claimed to have done. Back at Berlin on 8 October he gave Rottembourg a full account of his representations and of their ill success. He reported the king to say that he would try the experiment; would side with the emperor in return for the Berg concession or, in the contrary case, stand neutral; that a prince, who had 100,000 men on foot and 25 million crowns in his treasury wherewith to move them, must always be courted; that it did not suit him to make his daughter's marriage depend upon political interests; and that the king of England had delayed too long and should be made to desire the marriage himself with ardour and without conditions.

Such, Rottembourg concluded, was the situation, though in the term of six months Ilgen expected many variations. "*Vous jugez bien par tous les comptes que j'ai l'honneur de vous rendre que l'on ne peut répondre de rien dans un pays, où la déraison et le caprice possèdent tout.*" The queen prayed him not to precipitate anything, hoping to bring about a change, but it was to be feared that in such hopes she flattered herself.¹

Du Bourgay preferred to lay stress on the favourable points of the story. "If we may rely upon promises and conceive any hopes from the joy that appeared in the king of Prussia's countenance upon what Count Rottembourg said to him concerning the family alliance, the negotiation with Vienna is in all probability broke off." He noted particularly the promise to send Wallenrodt back to England. Having, however, been so often deceived by appearances, he prayed for suspension of judgment for eight or ten days.²

On 10 October Seckendorf was still uncertain of the issue. He recounted Ilgen's previous opposition,—his submission of a draft clearly intended to embarrass the negotiation or even put an end to it, his claim to have seen the written promise of George I in regard to the marriage, and his assertion that it would be handed in within

¹ The above from a copy of Rottembourg's dispatch of 8 October, R.O. Foreign Ministers 47.

² Du Bourgay on the same date, R.O. Prussia 21.

a week and Prince Frederick come to Berlin at once to claim his bride,—and on the other hand how the king had reiterated his resolve to stand by the emperor, were he contented about Berg, and how he had been so irritated by Rottembourg's revelation of the offers of George I being made solely out of regard to France that he had openly declared that, if so little account were made of him in England, he would have nothing more to do with the allies of Hanover, and thereon had summoned Ilgen to Wusterhausen. That minister, Seckendorf went on, entirely won over by the queen and others, had then raised all conceivable objections to the treaty, and had so represented the unwisdom of refusing the splendid offers of France and England that the king had been quite led away. Himself, however, had been able to procure a decision that an answer must be given to his proposals, and the king had appointed him and Borcke, always well intentioned, to discuss them with Ilgen and Cnyphausen and arrive at a final decision. Although Ilgen had declared at Wusterhausen that he would rather break his neck on his way back to Berlin than disappoint the queen in the matter of the marriages, yet he had admitted that, if his master could have his way about Berg, all else ought to yield to so important an advantage. He (Seckendorf) was greatly perplexed what course to pursue in circumstances so delicate; were he importunate, he might put the king off, while failure to press for signature might ruin the whole business. He could not expect concession when the queen was working day and night to get the negotiation broken off entirely, and so at the coming conference, if he could not carry the treaty without alteration, he would do his best at least to obtain the king's promise to conclude it, if the emperor would meet his wishes.¹

Du Bourgay now wrote: "Count Rottembourg had no sooner left Wusterhausen but our enemys found means to efface the good impressions he had made." He expected Seckendorf to carry the day and deemed it useless for Rottembourg and himself to present a memorial, which they had prepared. He was avoiding the Prussian ministers, he said, in order not to compromise his Majesty's honour on any pretence whatever. He believed that the two parties wished to trick each other, for it was not likely that the emperor would hand over to the king of Prussia a catholic country cutting off access to the Netherlands. And he was certain that the king would throw the treaty over in half the time allowed.²

¹ Seckendorf to Charles VI, 10 October, Förster, Urkundenbuch, ii. 149.

² Du Bourgay, 12 October, R.O. Prussia 21. Isaac Leheup wrote from Ratisbon on 24 October (R.O. Germany, States, 175): "Baron Coter, who comes from Berlin now, says that what hath most inclined the king to listen to Gen: Seckendorf's insinuations is that he beleiveth him honest, and is continually saying, 'que tous ceux qui sont autour de luy sont payés pour le vendre, mais que Mons. Seckendorff est un véritablement honnête homme, qui luy a toujours dit la vérité; et qu'il

The treaty was signed early on the morning of 12 October. It was purely defensive. There were provisions against the Prussian troops engaged for succour being employed elsewhere than in the empire or in the Austrian Netherlands, for mutual confidence on Russian and Polish affairs, and for communication of the Russian treaties, liberty being given to the king of Prussia to accede to the Austrian. Others concerned Prussian rights in the empire, the investiture of Stettin, and arrears owing by Spain from the last war. Under the mutual guarantees of the second article Frederick William renewed undertaking in regard to the imperial succession-ordinance of 1713, the Pragmatic Sanction, so far as concerned the emperor's hereditary kingdoms and lands. By the fifth the emperor accepted the "Interims-Vergleich" of 1624 as basis for agreement with the house of Sulzbach and undertook at once to endeavour to persuade that house to such agreement; that was to say, in default of male issue to the present Palatine electoral line the Juliers succession to fall to the Sulzbach counts and that of Berg, with the lordship of Ravenstein, to the kings of Prussia, as under the compact of 1670; they to enjoy the same absolutely and without hindrance, and the treaty not to be ratified until this cession of Berg was actually agreed to the king of Prussia's satisfaction; if that were not accomplished within six months the whole treaty to be absolutely null and void ("verfällt in totum").

Also was stipulated mutual right to conclude with other powers treaties not in derogation of the present one. From this clause was omitted a provision included in the draft, namely, that were the king of England attacked in his possessions within or without the empire, whether in the name of the Pretender or otherwise, the king of Prussia should be free to send him the succours stipulated under the defensive treaty of Hanover, the emperor not wishing to detach him from that alliance, but on the other hand, should the king of England attempt any hostility against the allies of Vienna, then, since he would be the first aggressor, the king of Prussia no longer to consider himself bound by the said treaty but to succour the emperor in the countries specified and assist him further to the best of his power.¹

étoit Major-Général dans la tranchée à quelque siège dans la dernière guerre,' where that king himself was present."

"Coter," or "Gother" (as elsewhere), was a minister of Saxe-Gotha. Du Bourgay was privately informed that he had come to Berlin to negotiate a marriage of the hereditary prince of Saxe-Gotha to the princess Wilhelmine, and had had private interviews with Seckendorf on his way. He went to Wusterhausen, but was there given to understand, Du Bourgay learnt, that the proposal could not be entertained, the prince being a Lutheran, but that he might have her next sister, Frederica, or one of the Schwedt princesses (Du Bourgay, 10 and 21 September, *l.c.*).

¹ The text, *Preussens Staatsverträge*, pp. 314-322, Förster, *Urkundenbuch* ii. 159-166. As a "Traité apocryphe" Dumont, VIII. ii. 139, Rousset, iii. 187. On Seckendorf's negotiation from the end of June, Droysen, pp. 415-425.

CHAPTER XXIX

AUSTRIA AND SPAIN, AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1726

SAINT-SAPHORIN wrote on 14 August 1726 :

Votre Excellence pourra aisément juger, par tout ce que je viens de luy dire, combien cette cour, si disposée à parler hautainement et à se flater, est maintenant dans des entousiasmes de vanité et d'insolence. Il est difficile à ceux qui ne sont pas sur les lieux de pouvoir se figurer jusques où cela va.

An instance was Sinzendorf's reply to the inquiry of Tarouca ("toujours le plus galant homme du monde"), whether there were any answer to Townshend's letter to him : " nous n'avons rien à vous dire sur une pareille lettre." And ministers were still more satisfied a fortnight since, when news had come from their spies at Paris (" je veux parler des Lorrains ") of Louis XV's illness, for by his death all their agreements with Spain would be fulfilled without fear of opposition. His recovery had greatly disappointed them, and they still hoped that smallpox or some other disease would carry him off.

Then, after a discussion of Austrian and Spanish intrigues in France Italy and elsewhere : " Leur acharnement contre sa Majesté et contre ses ministres et plus grand qu'on ne le sçauroit croire, et ils semblent ne songer à présent qu'à luy faire de tous côtés tout le mal qui sera dans leur pouvoir," seeing that it was only the British government whose behaviour towards them had been really firm. Yet it might be that, if Louis XV lived, the court of Vienna would find itself involved in difficulties from which it could not escape. Only France must act in concert with England with the greatest vigilance to spoil the emperor's plans by forming a protestant party in the empire to oppose him, and that would be difficult without a distribution of money and subsidies.¹

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 14 August, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58. In addition to his forebodings there was an intercepted letter from Sinzendorf to Palm, of 3 August, exulting on the exchange of ratifications with Sweden and the near conclusion of a treaty with Russia. " 'Tis certain," the translation ran, " that our party grows considerably stronger and that France has no inclination or desire for a war " (R.O. Confidential 1).

On this same 14 August Fonseca at Paris announced by order that the emperor was ready to sign a formal agreement with France renouncing all hostilities and to persuade Spain to join therein ; the three powers to treat as a common enemy any who should pretend to disturb the public peace. Asked whether the offer extended to the allies of France, he stated that his master was prepared to sign the act with the king of England both as king and as elector, but that in reference to Prussia or the Dutch republic he had no instructions. The answer given, Walpole goes on, was that the said allies must be consulted, Morville saying that personally, in view of the treaties of Utrecht and Baden, confirmed by the Quadruple Alliance, he failed to see the necessity of the proposition. France nourished no hostility towards Spain, their quarrel was domestic, did not require the interposition of any other power, and was not at all likely to result in war. The emperor knew best what reason there was to apprehend disturbance in Europe, and whenever he should open his mind plainly and fully about means to prevent it, in a way satisfactory not only to France but to her allies, he would meet with a corresponding disposition. Shortly Morville told Walpole further that what he had said to Fonseca as from himself he was ordered to repeat in the king's name.¹

In England the "ensnaring proposall" was interpreted to mean that the hands of the allies were to be tied about the Ostend Company "while the Emperor carryed on all his projects and designs without fear of constraint or opposition."² Another dispatch allowed Morville's answer to have been most proper, but attributed Fonseca's proposal to observation of French weakness.

To tell your Ex^{ty} freely and in confidence his Majesty's reflection upon this matter, it is, that the French ministers acting with so little vigour does us a great deal of mischief, it flatters the Imperialists with an opinion, or at least gives them opportunity of endeavouring to propagate one, that whatever countenance France may show there is nothing they dread so much as a war and that they would avoid it at any rate. This is what they chiefly build upon.³

No such aspersion appeared in the answers to Saint-Saphorin. To him Townshend upheld the conduct of France as even more efficacious than before and expected the court of Vienna to realise the fact from the firm answers given to Fonseca. On the general situation he held that the measures agreed upon with France and the approaching accession of Sweden—on the favourable prospects in

¹ H. Walpole, 16 and 20 August, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² Townshend to W. Finch, 12 August (o.s.), R.O. Holland 291.

³ The same to H. Walpole, 11 August (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

which country he was eloquent—would checkmate the Russian treaty and restrain the king of Prussia. He could not believe that the protestant princes would desert their own cause, and still had hopes of Bavaria from what France was doing at Munich. The king, he said, agreed fully on the necessity of attaching all protestant princes to his interest but was trying first to augment his forces by the aid of the more powerful. Successful, he need not fear invasion of his hereditary dominions, and the lesser princes of the empire would reflect and respond. Considering the Dutch accession, the hope that Sweden would accede soon after the meeting of the riksdag, and the force of 80,000 men to be provided under the Danish convention in negotiation to act in the empire or wherever else required, he was quite easy in his mind. Spain was bankrupt, unless the galleons got home and the private effects on them were seized. The minister of Genoa had been told that the republic had not been invited to join the alliance of Hanover only because of its situation, and so it was hoped that the Genoese would not ill-advisedly be led away. His Majesty's decision to have a proper squadron wintering at Gibraltar would impress the Italian coast towns. And there was news that bankers at Paris and Amsterdam had refused to be concerned with the remittance of four million florins to Vienna, and that the magistrates of Amsterdam had forbidden the merchants to furnish any money abroad without permission.¹ Were the intentions of the Austrian court good, it would be glad to see that it could get out of its difficulties at little cost, only just remedy of grievances being demanded. It knew very well that the balance of Europe, as well as his Majesty's interests, required that the succession should fall to the eldest archduchess, provided that she were married to a suitable prince, as him of Lorraine.² Nothing but its infamous conduct could turn the king from that principle, and the

¹ This on advices (not very sure, said Townshend) from Louis Renard, the British agent at Amsterdam, not greatly trusted. The bankers he named were Samuel Bernard of Paris and André Pels of Amsterdam (Renard, 30 August, R.O. Holland 579).

² Prince Francis of Lorraine, who eventually did marry Maria Theresa and was elected emperor in 1745, is already mentioned by Saint-Saphorin as her intended husband in 1722 (17 July, R.O. Germany, Empire, 47), while in the following year he had a good deal to say about proposed election of the prince as King of the Romans and arrangements for his establishment at Vienna. "Il s'en faut beaucoup qu'à l'âge de 15 ans il soit aussi formé que son Altesse Royale Monseigneur le Prince Frédéric l'étoit à celui de 11, lors que j'ay eu l'honneur de le voir . . . cependant l'Empereur le goûte infiniment" (3 and 22 November and 23 August 1723, *ibid.* 50). And further in January 1725, with much else on the subject: "Il y a un bruit que le prince de Lorraine ira à Sieune pour achever ses études, ou pour les commencer; car il sçait encore proprement rien. Le duc son père a fort pressé l'Empereur de déclarer le mariage. Il y a apparence que cela se seroit fait, sans les circonstances de la mort du roy d'Espagne, et sans l'idée qu'ils se sont formée, qu'ils pourroient leurrer le P. des Asturies en luy faisant espérer leur riche héritière" (17 January 1725, *ibid.* 54).

strongest guarantee of his support was proper treatment of him. For the animosity displayed towards himself Townshend disclaimed all concern; he was serving his master, he said, and could assure the Austrian ministers that if they would redress complaints he would rather resign office than be for a moment an obstacle to reconciliation.¹

Fleury now broached a proposal of his own, suspension of the Ostend Company's operations for a time, during which negotiation might be set on foot "to accommodate that affair and all other matters that occasion the present jealousys and uneasiness." Walpole in objection cited Königsegg's declaration, through De la Paz, that his master would never agree to negotiate on the subject without a preliminary agreement that his charter to the company should subsist. He thought that any proposition of the kind would but exhibit weakness, besides disobliging the Dutch, "who in two solemn resolutions had declared that they would enter into no negotiation about that affair, without a previous abolition of that charter." Whereon Fleury said that he had no intention of moving in the matter without his Majesty's approval. Nevertheless Walpole thought that there might be some good in the idea, under proper restrictions.²

The British government protested forcibly. Seeing, Newcastle argued, that destruction of the Ostend Company had been the chief inducement to the Dutch to accede to the treaty of Hanover, that they were "upon the point of taking some vigorous resolution for the support of their pretensions in the matter," and that it was one "in which England is most chiefly concerned," to entertain the proposal would very much alarm both nations. Were the idea mooted, then also Fonseca's neutrality scheme must be brought forward, and under that the Spaniards would be able to get their treasure safely home and they and the imperialists be able to prosecute their nefarious designs. Hosier's last advices showed "that we have succeeded beyond expectation"; without any breach with the Spanish authorities the galleons were effectually stopped and now the money could only come over in small boats, which it should be possible to intercept.³

¹ Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 25 August (o.s.), *ibid.* 58.

² H. Walpole, 10 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 8 September (o.s.), *ibid.* In a very private letter, thinking the suggestion not in accord with Fleury's "spirit and resolution," he desired to know whether it might not have been inspired by D'Huxelles, "who appears now and then to be making more difficultys than one could wish" and to desire that France should undertake "as little of the load of our present engagements as possible." If Walpole thought so, without being "in the least disagreeable" to Fleury he might "arm him against any insinuations of that sort." Complete confidence in Fleury was once more expressed: "whatever is purely his, and arises from himself solely, the king is sure is well meant and designed for the interest and advantage of the two crowns."

Now was proposed from England a particular plan for sowing distrust between the allies of Vienna. A dispatch to Walpole, written in French for communication to the ministers, or no, as he thought fit, premised the pitiable condition of Spain, which might make it not impossible to detach the queen from the emperor, and hints let fall by Patiño and Castelar on means to that end. While their suggestion of seizing Leghorn, Walpole was told, was not approved, as a violence upon the Grand Duke and a measure likely only to give the emperor excuse to move into Tuscany the numerous forces which he had quartered in the neighbourhood, their other idea, of disturbing the queen of Spain's mind about the prospects of her sons in Italy, commended itself. It was proposed that Stanhope should embody in a memorial of innocent appearance representations calculated to excite reflection. First, namely, a recapitulation of the objects of the Quadruple Alliance : maintenance of the balance of Europe, prevention of war in Italy, confirmation of the rights of the queen of Spain's sons in that country, and preclusion of the emperor from seizing Tuscany and Parma, as he had already laid hands on Mantua and other territories. Secondly, recital of measures of precaution ; establishment of the infant's right of succession to those duchies and occupation of the strong places by neutral garrisons, a measure formerly thought so important by the Spanish sovereigns that they had several times besought Great Britain and France to consent to such occupation by their own troops. Thirdly, observation of the omission of those precautions from the treaty of Vienna, this to the regret of the two crowns, who had hoped that something of the kind might be contained in secret articles but during a year and a half had waited in vain for enlightenment, and who, in view of their rights under treaties with Spain and of their obligation in the public interest to see that Tuscany and Parma did not fall into the emperor's hands, flattered themselves on being informed that the necessary stipulations had been made, in which case they would be ready to uphold them in order to maintain the peace of Europe and the liberties of Italy.

Such a memorial properly turned, the dispatch went on, could not offend, engaged the two crowns to nothing, and left them at liberty to push or drop the affair at desire, while it must cause the queen of Spain much disquietude ; for on the one hand she had thrown herself so entirely into the hands of the emperor that she could not answer the request satisfactorily, and on the other might be led to apprehend such measures on the part of the two crowns as would frustrate not only an Austrian occupation but also the prospects of her sons ; which fear would be not a little augmented by his Majesty's decision to let his squadron winter at Gibraltar.

In a covering dispatch Walpole was desired not to be too pressing with this proposal, should he think fit to communicate it at all, "lest it should give them a jealousy that our view is to be still widening the breach between France and Spain and to hurry matters on to a war, according to the notion which the Imperialists are everywhere endeavouring to give of us." Should it prove agreeable, the king was strongly persuaded of the inducement to the queen of Spain, the king of Sardinia, the princes of Italy and the Pope to unite in measures against extension of the emperor's dreaded tyranny. Nothing could disquiet the court of Vienna more; "it would beat the Imperialists quite out of play." If Walpole found the French ministers amenable he should join with them in drafting the memorial and endeavour to obtain orders for Stanhope, as before, to speak in the name of the king of France as well as in that of his Majesty.¹

Stanhope at the same time was ordered to put in execution whatever Walpole might write to him on the subject, and told that he might expect authorisation to speak also in the name of France. Also that, in accordance with French desire, he must inculcate on all Spaniards the advantages of reconciliation with France and the danger of being governed from Vienna, although the king expected little therefrom while the queen of Spain was so carried away by hopes of advantage to her family.²

The proposal did not commend itself at Paris. Fleury doubted whether the memorial would have any weight with the king and queen of Spain, infatuated as they were with the prospect of one son becoming emperor and the other, should Louis XV have no male issue, king of France, and feared that its communication to Charles VI would give him a pretext for seizing Tuscany and Parma. Nor did he expect the condition of the Spanish people to concern the sovereigns. He agreed, however, to taking the opinion of Stanhope on the matter. Walpole observed him to seem "extreamly piqued against their Catholick Majesties."³

Meanwhile Richelieu's conduct at Vienna had brought into consideration the propriety of his recall. Early in August Saint-Saphorin had stigmatised it as every day more embarrassing to him and more dangerous for affairs. "J'ay de plus en plus lieu de me défier de luy." He was continually in conference with the nuncio and other enemies, including a Florentine abbé, Pellegrini, intriguer by profession and an emissary of Spain. While he stayed he would

¹ Newcastle and Townshend to H Walpole, 11 August (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² Townshend, writing for Newcastle, same date, R.O. Spain 97.

³ H. Walpole, 26 August, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

be constantly on the look out for opportunity for uniting France with Austria and Spain. "Il n'aura de plus jamais de fermeté ni de dignité dans sa conduite, et préférera le plaisir d'être bien vu icy à tous les intérêts de la couronne qu'il sert. . . . Je le répète, à quoy s'en tenir avec luy ?" ¹

Fleury, when Horatio Walpole suggested Richelieu's removal on the pretext of refusal of proper satisfaction for a certain attack upon his servants,² approved, saying that "no orders nor advice whatsoever would make him act a prudent or a reasonable part"; although particularly instructed, when he went to Vienna, not to negotiate but only to observe and report, he had "too much ambition and vivacity" so to limit himself. Shortly he stated definitely that Richelieu's recall was resolved upon, unless ample satisfaction for the affront were given within fifteen days.³ Newcastle termed the proposed action "a most signal instance of the sincerity of the French court, which cannot fail of having a very good effect when it comes to be publicly known."⁴

At the end of August strongest assurances from Richelieu gave Saint-Saphorin opportunity to set forth what was alleged against him; he claimed to have made a great impression and to have parted from him in mutual good understanding.⁵ The general's satisfaction, however, was short-lived. Under date 9 September he devoted forty-six pages of manuscript to a detailed relation of confidential conferences and other circumstances which made him believe that Richelieu was immersed in negotiations most contrary to his Majesty's interest. He did not doubt for a moment that his assurances had been intended to deceive, and if, as he said, he was desiring to leave Vienna, it was only to work at Paris in order to return with power to conclude a treaty, "car c'est là sa plus grande fureur."⁶ But then again, three days later, Saint-Saphorin was disposed to think that Richelieu's behaviour might have been due to levity, and that when the unfortunate affair of Fleury's cardinalate was disposed of he might conduct himself better.⁷

Horatio Walpole was earnest in endeavour to absolve the French court from connivance with Richelieu's vagaries. He was of opinion that Saint-Saphorin had "carried his jealousies too far about the duke of Richelieu, as if there was a concert between this and the

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 3 and 14 August, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

² Full reports of this by Saint-Saphorin in July and August, *ibid.* and France 184.

³ H. Walpole, 30 August and 3 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747. But on 16 September (R.O. France 184) he apprehended that the imperial court would give the satisfaction, so that Richelieu would stay on.

⁴ To Stanhope, 27 August (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

⁵ Saint-Saphorin, 31 August, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

⁶ The same, 9 September, *ibid.* 59.

⁷ Postscript to one of his great essays of 12 September.

Imperial court relating to the Ostend Company. . . . Whatever that minister may have done at Vienna, that is not right, is certainly to be attributed to his own vain and uncertain conduct, without any orders or connivance from home.”¹ Newcastle answered that it could be wished that some method could be found to remove Richelieu from Vienna, on account of his indiscreet behaviour, but the king was “so far from suspecting that he has any orders from his court for what he does, that he is firmly persuaded he does not even dare to give them information of those proceedings of his, and that they have no other account of them but from our hands.”² Townshend recommended Saint-Saphorin to continue to manage his colleague, not showing coldness but treating him “en bon ami et avec toute l’honnêteté et politesse possible.”³

In a private letter of 12 September Saint-Saphorin reverted to the animosity of the Austrian ministers against Townshend and the two Walpoles; Palm, he said, was employed to do all he could to discredit them with his Majesty. In a long ciphered passage he gave warning against trusting France too far, noting the possibility of agreements with the emperor not in violation of the treaty of Hanover. He described his own painful situation, how he and his whole family were ill and Vienna a prison to him, for no-one from court dared visit him and foreign ministers only with great precaution. Besides Tarouca Di Breglio and Berckentin he had none in whom he could confide, and the last-named was on the point of leaving for some months.

Townshend absolutely refused credit to Saint-Saphorin’s insinuations against the court of France; he asserted relations to be free and cordial and confidence to be increased every day.

Ainsi S.M. est résolue d’aller son grand chemin toujours avec droiture et avec fermeté, et de ne s’en écarter par le moindre pas qui pourra donner de l’ombrage à ses alliés, comme s’il récherchoit le cour Imp^{le} à leurs dépens, et S.M. vous ordonne positivement de ne point entamer aucune négociation, ni de prêter l’oreille à aucunes insinuations, qui tendent à entraîner des ménagements particuliers. Vous voyés bien tout le danger d’une telle con-

¹ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 28 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747. To Tilson he wrote (23 September, holograph, R.Q. France 184): “I doe indeed own that the spirit of peace and meekness, and the vast care of avoyding menaces, that runs thro’ all M^r de Morville’s dispatches to all the French ministers, joyned wth the vanity and ambition of the D. of Richelieu to negotiate, to be busy and to make himself considerable, may have had an ill effect and enabled the Imperiall ministers to turn this balsamick temper to their advantage in their negotiations wth other princes; but I have so many proofs of the sincerity of their intentions, and especially of his that governs all, that I dare say that the D. of Richelieu has had no encouragement for this conduct from hence; besides, M^r Rottenburgh’s letters to that minister may convince St. Saphorin of the true intentions of this court.”

² Newcastle in reply, 22 September (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, same date, R.O. Germany, Empire, 59.

duite, et comme vous pouvés être fort bien rassuré sur la fidélité de la cour de France à notre égard, vous serés moins tenté à écouter ou à vous soucier des discours insidieux qu'on lâche de côté et d'autre à Vienne pour inspirer de la jalousie et pour nous susciter l'envie de tâter le terrain et de commencer à négocier.

The king was persuaded that the court of Vienna was neither upright nor sincere ; Starhemberg and Strickland talked, but no proposition was forthcoming to satisfy his complaints, nothing said about the Ostend Company or the commercial treaty with Spain ; on the contrary, expressions on these subjects of " la dernière roideur." The " tas de traittés " gave little concern ; want of money from Spain or revelation of the true designs would make them of short duration. Saint-Saphorin knew the secret stipulations about the marriages, and they might one day be published. He must act towards Bavaria and Cologne as he proposed, cultivating friendship and showing no disquiet. The little princes of the empire were not worth the expense of gaining ; " le Roy a mieux aimé de s'appliquer au gros de l'affaire." The duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel had declined the offers made, and he of Saxe-Gotha and other princes of his calibre made too burthensome conditions ; guarantees of possessions and of claims upon their neighbours. With Holland Denmark and Sweden on their side Great Britain and France had nothing to fear from the emperor and his allies and need not trouble for such little acquisitions. The treaty of Hanover was too manifestly founded on the right of every prince of the empire to make defensive alliances to be in danger of denunciation at Ratisbon. Should the emperor venture to propose that, which he hardly would, the experience of the last session of parliament showed how the British nation would be fired.

For what was said against himself Townshend again disclaimed concern, so long as he did his duty towards his Majesty. He con-doled with Saint-Saphorin's personal sufferings but could only hold out hope of his being relieved in a year's time, perhaps, when matters might be calmer ; in existing circumstances his stay at Vienna was indispensable.¹

Of conditions at Madrid Stanhope continued to write as previously. Excluded from court, he apologised for lack of information, " no one Grandee or other person about their Cat^k Ma^{ties} having dared to come to my house, or even to be seen to speak with me, ever since Ripperda's disgrace." Nevertheless in September he ventured to San Ildefonso, partly, he tells us, to confer privately with De la Paz, " with whom I have of late lived in the greatest confidence and friendship," arriving, to his misfortune, just when

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 12 September, Townshend in reply, 22 September (o.s.), *ibid.*

news had been received of the treaty between Austria and Russia. "They now are not only under no sort of apprehensions, but on the contrary imagine themselves with their allies able to give the law to the rest of Europe." He saw no hope of success for any propositions, however reasonable, "if in the least contrary to the good pleasure of the Emperor." He found Königsegg, "who grows every day more and more the idole or rather governor of their Cat^k Maj^s," asserting that the Russian fleet was to put to sea, that war in the north was looked on as begun, "that the king of Prussia will be frightened by the Czarina from the Hanoverian alliance, and that his Ma^{ty} will in a few months loose his dominions in Germany and the Pretender be settled upon the throne of Great Britain." The king and queen had publicly declined to notice him, whereon he saw "all the courtiers immediately afterwards falling from me, as if I had the plague, not one of them ever since daring to be seen to speak to me, and even Grimaldo himself not venturing to receive a visit from me." The Jacobites swarmed at court and held the most insolent language imaginable, Liria, for instance, saying publicly "that in less than a month it would be a crime here to mention his Ma^{ty} as king of England." He saw plainly that "all mild tentatives . . . towards diminishing the servile and blind attachment of their Cat^k Maj^s to the Emperor would in the present circumstances be absolutely fruitless and looked upon as the effect of fear."

In consequence of this Stanhope absented himself from court and confined himself to conferences with De la Paz. But him also he found subjugated by present conditions.¹ He was told that the dispatch of squadrons to the coasts of Spain and to the West Indies was looked upon "as the highest indignity that could be offered and little less than a declaration of warr." In reply to which he had argued the provocation given and in particular rebutted the opinion of De la Paz that parliament could not possibly be brought to approve, much less to support, a war with Spain. With so little encouragement he saw no use in making proposals, being "fully perswaded that this court is at present too much elevated and even intoxicated

¹ "One principal motif for my coming hither was to conferr with the marquis de la Paz, who had desired it of me in hopes, as he alledged, that some method might be thought upon between us for reconciling matters. But I found he had entirely changed his sentiments and looking at present upon affairs as past redress, for that, as he said, his Cath^k Ma^{ty} was so immovably attached to the Emperor that he would pawn and sell to the last pistole rather than depart from the least engagement entered into with the court of Vienna. He confessed to me in the greatest confidence his disapprobation of those measures and wished he could contribute towards a change of them, but had not courage, I found, from his fear of the queen, to make any attempt tending that way, which indeed is not only his case but that of all the other ministers, namely the M. de Grimaldo, Sig^r Patino, and the Marq^s de Castelar."

with their fancied irresistible power, upon their new additional strength from the Czarina's accession, to be worked upon by any but the most violent remedies." He hoped in a short time to see "a soberer way of thinking," particularly as Königsegg was wanting yet more money.¹

Although persuaded that hope of separating France from England was almost abandoned, and noticing as much anger against Fleury now as formerly against Bourbon, Stanhope yet learnt from Montgon² that some proposition for reconciliation had lately been made. And in fact another letter from Bermudez had been received at Paris towards the end of August, in which the confessor expressed astonishment at being misunderstood and expectation that Philip V would be irritated rather than softened by the last from Fleury, owing to what he said about alliance with protestant powers. He asserted that such alliance must clearly be offensive.³

Showing Walpole the letter, Fleury bade him be at no pains about the answer that it would receive and shortly sent him a draft of it, an elaborate epistle which recapitulated all that had passed since Bourbon's fall, rebutted the charge against himself of want of zeal for the catholic religion, and justified the alliance of France with protestant powers not only on general grounds but by Spain's own example. It concluded with the following definite proposals. (1) The king of France to write to his uncle requesting restoration of friendship and assuring him that any offence complained of was contrary to his own intention and will. (2) An ambassador to be sent to Madrid to explain all this more fully. (3) The two crowns to resume their former good relations. (4) The reconciliation to make no change in their respective engagements with other powers, but each to concur in regard to their allies in preventing or putting an end to jealousies which might divide them. (5) The two crowns to engage reciprocally not to commence hostilities, and if unfortunately one of their allies should do so to employ their good offices to stop them.

To the latter part of the fourth proposal and to all the fifth Walpole strongly objected, and Fleury readily agreed to expunge them; "assuring me that he meant nothing more by those articles, than being apprehensive that the first hostilities would be committed by attacking the Ostend East India ships, or the Spanish galleons,

¹ Stanhope, 22 July to 18 September, R.O. Spain 94, 95.

² Who "with all his sanctity is not allways what he would appear to be," and whose favour at court appeared suspicious; yet there was "no sort of reason to suspect his entire attachment to the bishop of Fréjus nor his professions of acting with the greatest confidence openness and sincerity towards me."

³ The text, Baudrillart, iii. 261, note. Fleury agreed with Walpole in attributing the letter to Königsegg's dictation.

he hoped that France being reconciled to Spain might after such a blow was struck have an opportunity to fling in their good offices for bringing matters to an accommodation and to prevent a war." It had been better, said Walpole, had an end been put to the correspondence with Bermudez, but French desire for reconciliation with Spain was so strong that he could not "prevent the one without giving jealousy of being thought to be against the other." Yet, whatever their "blind zeal" for reunion, "I flatter myself the Bishop will never go any length that he apprehends may give the least offense to his Majesty, or without consulting me upon it."¹

Besides what was shown him, Walpole had knowledge of a private postscript to Bermudez, all in Fleury's own hand, "full of more reproaches, in decent but strong terms," about the king of Spain's behaviour and hinting artfully at the danger of deception by the court of Vienna, as proved by a secret which he could impart, if he would.²

Newcastle regretted that Fleury should yet be trying to influence the Spanish court by writing, when action similar to that of the king, who by the mere sending of his fleet to the coasts of Spain had roused such consternation there, might have been so effectual. However, he bade Walpole thank Fleury for his complaisance in altering his letter as desired.³

It was discovered at this time from intercepted letters that Palm was giving positive assurances of a plot, to which Stanhope was said to be privy, to shut up Philip and his queen in a convent and place the prince of Asturias on the throne. Newcastle supposed the intention to be to excite the Spanish court and remove from Philip's mind any idea of abdicating again. Stanhope was told that the accusation against himself was the strongest proof of the value of his services: the king would "to the utmost support and maintain the dignity of your character and highly resent the affront," were his recall demanded. Letters to Pozobueno and to the chevalier d'Eon were cited to show that the Spaniards were conscious of their miserable condition; remittances to Vienna, they stated, were entirely suspended.⁴

Horatio Walpole boiled over with indignation at the "ridiculous

¹ H. Walpole, 27 August and 2 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747, with a copy of Fleury's draft.

² The same, 3 September. The postscript letter, Baudrillart iii. 263-4. The secret hinted at, Fleury disclosed to Walpole very privately, was "that he had undoubted proofs of the Emperor's having assured the duke of Lorraine that he would give his daughters to no other princes but those of his family."

³ Newcastle to him, 27 August (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ Newcastle to Stanhope, 26 August (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97. D'Eon was a Spanish agent in London, specially employed, it appears from a notice in the *Lettres historiques* (lxix. 672), in connexion with the South Sea Company's affairs.

and detestable invention," the "base and ridiculous forgery." He expected Fleury's exposure of "the villainous proceedings of the Imperialists to compass their ends" to make the best impression at Madrid.

It is at the the same time an instance not to be paralleled of the Bishop's integrity courage and zeal for the union of the two crowns, as well as of his cordial affection towards his Majesty and his administration, and, in all events, should the king of Spain receive it, it must convince him, and also the Imperial court, if he communicates it to Count Konegsegg, how vain and fruitless all attempts will be to separate France from England.¹

Fleury was now a cardinal. On 9 September had come news from Richelieu of the emperor's consent to anticipate the ordinary nomination, while another courier brought the intelligence to Fonseca and pursued his journey to Spain to obtain the consent of that crown, Fonseca telling Morville that an express had gone to Cardinal Cienfuegos at Rome to press the Pope "to make all possible expedition" in the matter.² News of the nomination as "seul Cardinal" came ten days later³ and hearty congratulations from England followed.⁴

His cardinalate obtained, this inducement to Fleury to be well with the Austrian and Spanish courts lapsed. Horatio Walpole continued to be absolutely sure of him. About his correspondence with Bermudez, when Walpole hinted "how unprofitable and consequently unnecessary" it was, Fleury agreed, but pleaded that in view of the strong disposition of the nation to be reconciled with Spain he could not help himself, though he would "do nothing but in concert and participation" with Walpole. The latter admitted that, so long as Spanish confessors and nuncios wrote on the subject of reconciliation, they must be answered. He referred in this especially to a letter of 26 August from Aldobrandini at Madrid to

¹ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 18 September, private, and similarly to Stanhope, 15 September B.M. Add. MS. 32747. Stanhope learnt through the Genoese envoy that the queen's confessor was "assured of my having caused the paper so much talked of to be put in the prince of Asturias's pocket, and that I was more dangerous than the Devil himself" (30 September, R.O. Spain 95).

² H. Walpole to Newcastle, 10 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747. From the *Lettres historiques* (lxx. 188) we learn that Louis XV wrote to the cardinal de Polignac with his own hand to forward the matter, saying that of Polignac's services none would be more agreeable, and that the duc de Mortemart had been sent to Madrid to solicit the king of Spain's support. Also that an extraordinary promotion was wanted, in order that Fleury might be able to preside at an assembly of the clergy to be held towards the end of September.

³ The same, 20 September, enclosing Fleury's and Morville's notes of announcement (originals). The former gave the date of the appointment as 10 September, the latter as at a consistory on the 11th.

⁴ E.g. from George I and Townshend, 15 September (o.s.), R.O. France 184, copies of the former also, with Fleury's autograph reply of 5 October, Royal Letters 7.

Massei at Paris, written by direction of the Spanish sovereigns and "containing a proposition to be made to France and enjoining an answer to it." He had been shown, he said, both the letter and the reply that was to be sent, and in the latter could find nothing improper, "allowing for the unalterable desire of this court to be reconciled with Spain."¹

Fleury's private postscript to Bermudez had roused the curiosity of Philip V, as was intended, and he had charged the confessor to desire explanation. Fleury's reply thereto was his letter to Philip V of 16 September, which contributed to the fall of Bermudez, as we shall see. He stigmatised the allegations against Stanhope as an odious forgery of the imperialists, designed to keep the king of Spain in their alliance in spite of his people's discontent at such large sums being sent to Vienna and to force the recall of an ambassador who was troublesome to Königsegg; and he affirmed that the emperor had assured the elector of Bavaria in writing that Don Carlos and Don Felipe should never marry his daughters, and the duke of Lorraine that the two elder should marry none other but his two sons.²

Newcastle was enthusiastic about both the letter for Philip V and the answer to Aldobrandini prescribed. The king, he said, commanded warmest thanks to Fleury, holding that the former letter must open the eyes of the Spanish sovereigns to the fact that they were lavishing the wealth of their country on a power that was playing them a double game. A week later he could not express the king's satisfaction at the "wise and vigorous answer given to Fonseca upon mature deliberation," which would convince the Austrian court of French persuasion of the necessity and justice of suppressing the Ostend Company, as also at Fleury's avoiding a direct answer about the action in the West Indies, referring Fonseca to the answer to Aldobrandini. "His Majesty doubts not but the court of France will soon see the good effect of their vigorous proceedings." It was plain from Saint-Saphorin's letter that nothing else would bring the courts of Vienna and Madrid to reason, the latter depending entirely on the former. It appeared already that the prohibition of import of English woollen goods into Sicily had been withdrawn, doubtless an effect of fear of the British squadron appointed to winter at

¹ H. Walpole, 18 September, private, B.M. Add. MS. 32747. Aldobrandini's letter, communicated to Walpole by Massei's auditor (Walpole says that he had not time to take a copy himself) with his holograph letter of 20 September, R.O. France 184. The "proposition" was whether France would give help in case of an attack on the Spanish coasts by the English fleet. See Baudrillart, iii. 269.

² Baudrillart, iii. 264-5. Walpole sent Stanhope on 15 September a full summary of the letter (B.M. Add. MS. 32747, f. 332). Translation, Coxo, *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain*, iii. 382-4.

Gibraltar. This one instance showed what could be done "even in the great point of the Ostend Company."¹

This second dispatch referred to what Walpole had written about further answers of Fleury to Fonseca, who had continued to "torment" him about the Ostend Company. After long arguments in the end, said Walpole, "the Cardinal told him plainly that as long as that patent subsisted it would be an insurmountable difficulty to a negociation, especially since the late declaration made by the marquis de la Paz in the Emperor's name to the English and Dutch ambassadors at Madrid with regard to the Ostend Company." To Fonseca's inquiry, whether that was the only matter in dispute, Fleury had replied that he could not say until he knew what were the secret articles between the emperor and Spain. And when Fonseca asked about an undertaking by Great Britain not to enter on naval hostilities anywhere, and particularly in the Indies, he said that unforeseen accidents might occur against which no guarantee could be given, but he did not think that the English designed to be the aggressors. Fonseca desiring an answer in form, Fleury declared that he must consult Walpole first.

Accordingly Walpole conferred with the French ministers, including Marshal Tallard, lately appointed to the Council. About the Ostend Company it was agreed to confirm Fleury's statement, with the proviso that if the emperor had any new overtures to propose they should be heard. On other matters it was resolved to refer to the answer sent to Aldobrandini. Walpole affirmed all the French ministers to be imbued with Fleury's spirit and did not doubt continuance of their resolution.²

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 16 and 22 September (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² H. Walpole, 27 September, *ibid.*

CHAPTER XXX

ISSUES OF THE BLOCKADE OF THE SPANISH GALLEONS

THE angry protests by De la Paz against the coming of Sir John Jennings with his squadron gave the king, Newcastle wrote,

an opportunity of returning such an answer . . . as will not only justify to all the world the prudent measures that his Majesty has taken but show the court of Spain and all others, who may be concerned in this extraordinary proceeding, that his Ma^{ty} is both ready and able to defend the just rights of his subjects, as well as his own dignity and honour.

He desired Stanhope to set forth in a formal memorial the king's astonishment at the violent and improper tone adopted, calling attention therein to Jennings's assurances that his intentions were perfectly friendly and that he was driven to Santander by contrary winds and want of water; expressing the king's surprise that the reasons which made his naval armaments necessary were not perceived, and reciting as those reasons the various offensive acts of Spain. "It would have given just cause of complaint to his people had not care been taken of the security of the kingdom and of their rights and property, which appear to be so much exposed."¹

From the memorial which Stanhope accordingly drew up and presented on 25 September 1726 one of the counts of offence prescribed, "the repeated demand for Gibraltar," was by Horatio Walpole's advice omitted, "as what might give occasion to a disagreeable discussion of what may have formerly past between the three crowns on that head." He recommended reference only to Ripperda's disclosure of intent to recover the place by force.² What

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 27 August (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Spain 97, and similarly on the same date to Horatio Walpole, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² H. Walpole to Stanhope, 15 September 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 32747. Congratulating him on having obtained French approval of the memorial in all points but this, Newcastle explained that it had been inserted "to shew the nation here, who are so fond of retaining that place, that even the demand of it is what the King thought could not be passed over, and the manner in which it was made and the threats that accompanied it made it still more to be resented (16 September (o.s.), *ibid.*).

was recited were the engagements undertaken by Spain with certain powers of Europe, so strongly complained of; the Spanish naval and military preparations, and in particular the movement of troops to those parts of the coast most convenient for an enterprise against his Majesty's dominions; the public boasting of the Pretender's adherents, and especially of those so greatly favoured at Madrid, of succour expected from Spain; the intrigues with Russia and the suspicious voyage of the three ships; Ripperda's acknowledgment of an offensive treaty with Austria, one article of which stipulated the recovery of Gibraltar by force; the great sums of money furnished to the imperial court under no treaty published; and the notorious infractions of the West Indian guardacostas, so often complained of without effect. In conclusion was recalled the refusal to make any reparation either for the insult of the seizure of Ripperda in Stanhope's house or for the deportation of Colonel Dunbar from San Sebastian.¹

Receiving no reply, on 29 September Stanhope repaired to Segovia and had an interview with De la Paz next day. He was persuaded as the result that the answer would be very haughty and his departure be demanded. De la Paz even insinuated that Ripperda's retreat had been concerted with Stanhope, "which is what he had never before given me the least hint of." But the ambassador's great news was of the "disgrace and entire dismissal from their employments" of Grimaldo and Bermudez. This, he said, had happened on the day after the arrival of Fleury's letter to the king under cover to the confessor "without any reason being as yet given or guessed at for it. As for Grimaldo it is publicly said it was for his being sold to England and acting in concert with me in every thing."²

Later, of his own perception and from what he could learn from Montgon, Stanhope was persuaded that it was knowledge obtained by the queen of Fleury's letter of 16 September (a letter to be delivered to the king when he was alone and under seal of confession, or else to be returned) that had brought the "coup de grâce" on Bermudez

¹ Copy with Stanhope's dispatch of 4 October, R.O. Spain 95. Dunbar, in consequence of his activity, before noticed, in investigating Spanish naval and military preparations and Jacobite doings, had been seized and deported to Salamanca. See his letters of July 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 32746 and R.O. Spain 94, and on his deportation H. Walpole, 9 August, with a copy of his report, R.O. France 184.

² Stanhope, 30 September, R.O. Spain 95. A circular which he enclosed for want of time to write more, "very exact for such particulars as are yet made publick relating to the late changes at this court," stated that Grimaldo and Bermudez had been dismissed on the night of 29 September, the former being allowed to keep his salary of 2,000 pistoles a year, the latter merely informed that the king had no further occasion for his services. Both had left for Madrid the next day. De la Paz had taken over the whole direction of foreign affairs, and Patiño all that of finance, retaining his control of the marine and Indies.

and that Grimaldo had shared his fate "as being in the same faction." The suddenness of the blow, he said, appeared from what Monteleon had told the Portuguese envoy ("as to me, he dares not so much as come within sight of the place where I am"), that but two days previously Bermudez had appeared and thought himself to be in greater favour and confidence than ever.¹

Certainly Elizabeth had long sought to be rid of the leaders of such opposition to her Austrian policy as could be ventured. Bermudez was specially obnoxious to her from the advantage that he derived from the secrecy of his office. Whether, however, it was her discovery of Fleury's letter that achieved her end—the ordinary story—may be doubted. It was on this 29 September that first news of Hosier's doings reached Madrid. Nothing could have wounded Philip more grievously nor more readily excite his anger. As he would never give up his demand for restoration of Gibraltar, so now his wrath flamed out at this new insult to his dignity and his dominions. It is reasonable to suppose that this was the determining cause of the fall of Bermudez and Grimaldo.

The information was that Hosier had appeared before Puerto Bello with four of the line and eight frigates on Trinity Sunday and had demanded release of the South Sea ship and of an English packet-boat, which had been accorded. The President of Panama, inquiring why he stayed, was answered that he could not leave without further orders. Frigates detached to cruise along the coast had stopped "balandras" carrying to the Chagre goods taken from the galleons for transport to Panama, and from one of them letters had been taken and read. English sailors had landed freely in the town, insulting the authorities, and when leave had been asked to fetch necessary provisions from Cartagena it had been granted only on condition that the boats sent for them should carry neither cargoes nor money. In fine, said the deponents, all Hosier's doings indicated war.²

Hosier's own report, his second, had been received in England on 17 September. Leaving Tiburon Bay on 5 June, and finding on

¹ The same, 7 and 4 October. On 30 September he had told H. Walpole that while every one was surprised, none were more so than the persons concerned. Grimaldo, when the order to retire to Madrid was handed to him, was "actually putting his papers in the bag in order to carry them to the king (it being his dispatch day)," while Bermudez was at work on papers which he had been bid prepare after confessing Philip in the morning (R.O. France 184, copy).

² Copies (enclosed by Stanhope on 4 October) of a letter from squadron-captain Don Antonio Serrano, of 8 August, from Havana, and of an affidavit sworn at Trinidad de Cuba by Don Diego Ramos, 28 July (Spanish, with French translations). The former reported information from Puerto Bello of 16 July and that the treasure had been landed at "Cruzes," within seven leagues of Panama. The latter had been on board one of the "balandras" stopped but had subsequently escaped to his home in Cuba.

his arrival at Cartagena that the galleons had left for Puerto Bello, he had refrained from sending in his letters, from fear that the *Royal George*, which was with the galleons, might be debarred from further sales or that money received might be seized. On reaching Puerto Bello he was informed that on warning of his coming the treasure on board the galleons had been taken out of them and sent back to Panama. Precise particulars, he learnt, had been received from Spain about his squadron's strength, even his captain's names being given. The effect of his coming was to stop the annual fair. Informed that the South Sea ship had contracted for sale of its cargo, he thought proper to stay action until the money was received and the ship gone. Meanwhile he collected information about the Spaniards' strength. He found a new fort of 14 guns in course of construction and the galleons and men-of-war unrigging; the former eleven of from 36 to 30 guns, the latter one of 70 guns, one of 60 and two of 30. Two ships at Cartagena, he learnt, the one a guardacosta of 50 guns, the other a Dutch prize of 40, fitting out as a man-of-war, were expected to join, two others cruising off Caracas could be brought up in eight or ten days, two from Spain were expected daily, and four more of 60 guns apiece could be got from Havana in two months' time. Other credible information was that the treasure sent away could be carried in small vessels to Havana by a passage to leeward of the Mosquito Cays, or shipped unseen from a small port, Nombre de Dios, eastward of Puerto Bello. He therefore sent out cruisers to watch those outlets, with orders, should a superior force appear, to make the best of their way back, when "we can ply up to them before they can be able to do anything."

Having made his dispositions Hosier imparted his orders to the "General" of the galleons, Don Francisco Cornejo, and to the President of Panama, Don Manuele de Alderete.¹ Cornejo replied that the fair had been suspended and the treasure sent back to Panama because of notice from Europe of apprehensions of war; the merchants could not be compelled to go on without an order from the king of Spain. Alderete knew nothing about the treaties of Vienna beyond what had been published and asserted express orders to depart in no way from the engagements in force between Spain and England. As soon as the goods on board the galleons had been sold, he said, and the money for them received, proper arrangements would be made for their return to Spain, though there might be delay in consequence of the removal of the treasure. He expressed entire confidence in maintaining friendly relations.²

¹ Elsewhere called President of Peru.

² Hosier from the "Bastimentos" near Puerto Bello, 28 June (o.s.), R.O. S. P. Dom. Naval 69, the Spanish letters (bad translations), of date 8 July, therewith.

Reply to Stanhope's memorial was delayed no longer. It was couched in terms of highest indignation. The British government was accused of maintaining the ill will shown for some time past, of substituting words and protestations only for sincere and friendly explanation of the reasons for the dispatch of the two squadrons, and of taking refuge in new and specious complaints without foundation and entirely contrary to the king of Spain's candour and good faith. Armaments were denied, as also the king's responsibility for the vague and absurd reports of encouragement to the Pretender. The alarm at the three Russian vessels, engaged in ordinary trade, was equally foolish. Ripperda's assertion of an offensive alliance to recover Gibraltar was false; the emperor had already tried to disabuse the king of England's mind of it; he need only be reminded of his promise to restore the place, claim to which neither king nor nation would ever renounce. The demand for explanation of the subsidies to the emperor was strange, seeing that the king of Spain had never even inquired the motives of the notorious expenditure of British money in France, Prussia, Sweden, Holland and elsewhere. Most unjust of all were the complaints against the guardacostas. All that they had done was their duty against the smuggling practised by all nations in the West Indies, so solemnly forbidden by treaties, and it was not known that the king of England had ever done anything to stop the practice. Ripperda's arrest had been premeditated and was entirely justifiable and conformable to the rights of nations; no violation or insult could be inferred in view of the reasons set forth to the courts of Europe and particularly to that of London; the king of Spain would neither speak nor think more of the matter. In view of Hosier's operations, just known, it seemed unworthy of a prince who gave such assurances of friendship to enter complaints without proof. In view of what must be regarded as acts of war begun and continued the king of Spain must take the measures most suitable to the honour and dignity of his crown and the safety of his dominions, unless the king of England were disposed to make, and ordered without delay, the promptest satisfaction and reparation.¹

From De la Paz Stanhope gathered that this document was a manifesto "not intended for his Majesty only, but for the nation in general and for the rest of Europe." The evident intention he took to be to disprove Spanish aggression, this being, perhaps, the reasons for his not being desired to leave Segovia; "the whole stress was to be lay'd upon the pretended hostilities committed by Admiral Hosier, as what would equally answer that purpose, and at

¹ De la Paz to Stanhope, 30 September, Spanish copy and French translation with Stanhope's of 4 October.

the same time keep up the appearance of this court's acting upon the defensive only." To the same reason he attributed the lack of answer to his demand for the admission of his Majesty's ships to Spanish ports, De la Paz asserting that his master would not explain himself on that head. Of Dunbar's deportation no notice was taken because, he was informed, assurance had already been given that that had been done without the king of Spain's authority. Upon the whole he concluded a rupture with England to be resolved upon and only deferred till answer was received to the demand for reparation for Hosier's doings, the king "imagining that a refusal (which he can't but expect from the haughtiness and indecency with which he makes his demands) will furnish him with a plausible pretext. . . . For what other interpretation could be given to the opprobrious language towards his Ma^{ty}'s ministers, and even indecent reflection upon the King himself in the last article?" The same was evident from the refusal of satisfaction or accommodation about Ripperda, the peremptory insistence on the restoration of Gibraltar, and the "tacit denial" of entry of British men-of-war to Spanish ports.

Nor did Stanhope see any grounds for hope of the king being brought to "a juster way of thinking," at least for some time, considering the queen's violent temper and present views and her absolute dominion over him, "most signal proof" of which was given by her obliging him to dismiss from his service "the only two persons for whom he was known to have a real affection." Bermudez' successor was to be "one Clark, a Scotch Jesuit and the most violent Jacobite upon earth,"¹ and now there was no approach to the king but through the queen, Königsegg ("first minister"), Clark, or "an Irish physician of the same inveterate principles,"² of special influence on account of the king's anxiety about his health. "Consequently no room seems left to expect anything from this court that is not directly opposite to his Majesties interests and destructive to his government."

Apprehension of attack by Jennings Stanhope noticed to be wearing off but about the galleons increasing every day, though hope appeared to be entertained that their voyage home might be forced. Expecting that on the return of his courier with an answer hostilities might be begun, he asked what conduct in that case he should pursue; "nothing but direct force" should make him leave without orders. He had notified the consuls, he said, to warn

¹ Rector of the Scots Jesuit College at Madrid. He was not personally known to the sovereigns, says Stanhope (7 October), but had been confessor to Count and Countess Königsegg since their arrival in Spain, sufficient recommendation. Later (30 October) he said that Clark had formerly been confessor to the Pretender.

² Dr. Higgins.

British merchants privately to secure their most valuable effects, from past experience.¹

In England Hosier's report gave lively satisfaction. The only faults found were that he need not have sent in his letters to the Spanish authorities, when he found the treasure gone and the galleons being unrigged, and that he should have furnished copies of them and of the answers. On the whole, he was told, he had acted so prudently that further proceedings would be left to his good judgment. There were flying reports about the money being sent over when he could no longer keep the sea, but the possibility of that had little credit. About the flota from Vera Cruz, Newcastle went on, there were various accounts. Possibly fear might have induced the Spaniards to keep that also back. Should Hosier fall in with it he must treat it as the galleons, though they must always be his chief care. The king would have him keep his squadron out the whole winter, whether before Puerto Bello or elsewhere that it might be necessary to go to refit: "omit nothing that can possibly be done to prevent the bringing home of this treasure, on which those that wish us ill have so much dependence." It was intended shortly to reinforce him, so that he might be able to meet any force likely to be brought against him. In conclusion Newcastle noticed immense satisfaction among the West India merchants and great increase of the trade.²

Stanhope also had been congratulated on the unlikelihood of the treasure reaching Spain that season, and instructed, if complaint were made, to point out that Hosier had committed no hostilities but not to conceal his Majesty's satisfaction that his subjects were saved the risk of confiscation of their property. If fault were found with Hosier's letters to the authorities—it did not appear clearly whether he had acquainted them with the real object of his mission—Stanhope might cite, besides the general reasons for the naval preparations lately advanced, Grimaldo's letter of 13 July 1725 and other demands and threats about Gibraltar as making it absolutely necessary to prevent the return of the galleons, in order to disable the emperor and the king of Spain from carrying out those threats. If no complaint were made, he must say nothing. In another dispatch, after exposition afresh of the cheerful aspect of affairs generally and especially in Sweden, Newcastle ridiculed Spanish hopes that parliament and the nation would not support his Majesty in his "wise and prudent measures" in defence of their rights. Although what Stanhope had said on the subject was "exceedingly right," he might further have called attention to the undertaking

¹ Stanhope, 4 October, cited.

² Newcastle to Hosier, 29 September (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 19332, R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 69 (draft) and 80.

of parliament to support the king even in the case of an attack upon his German dominions. "After this any expectation of opposition from the parliament to whatever his Ma^{ty} should think fit to propose to them must be very idle and vain and mislead those who would build upon so weak a foundation." ¹

In further illustration of British views may be cited Townshend's comments to William Finch.

I can tell you in general that their reasonings are so poor that they may be easily answered, and that tho' the complaints begin in a pretty high strain, and are very hard upon the King's ministers, yet the conclusion is not of a piece with the warmth of the first part of their representation. They neither threaten a rupture, nor a seizure of our merchants' effects, but desire that his Ma^{ty} would give them some reparation, and if not, they must take their measures accordingly. This is a different stile from what we found before the treaty of Hanover was signed and before they thought we were able to make any stand against their vast projects concerted with the court of Vienna. Then we were threatened with seizing all our merchants' effects and the annulling of all our treatys of commerce, if we did not deliver up Gibraltar immediately; and his Ma^{ty} was bid to go over and summon the parliament on purpose to do it. But thank God the language is abated, and by the firmness we and our allies shall shew it must abate more and more, notwithstanding the unbounded influence the Imperial minister has still at Madrid, where the king's confessor and the marq^s de Grimaldo are turned out, as people who have compassion on the miserys of the Spanish nation, where the want of money grows greater every day, and the difficultys w^{ch} attend such a disorder in their finances must increase in proportion. ²

At Paris the case was different. Outcry by the merchants, who, says Walpole, "have certainly a greater interest in them (the galleons) than any other nation and some of them are already become bankrupts," was renewed. He claimed, nevertheless, to have made his previous arguments good. Newcastle in reply recalled Fleury's former approval of the expedition and adduced Stanhope's last dispatches as evidence of the malignant temper of the court of Spain. ³

Pozobueno presented the answer to Stanhope's memorial, with the incriminating letters from Havana, in London on 15 October 1726. He refused copies, on the ground that Stanhope's account would soon be received and that he would not risk possible inaccuracy in translations from the Spanish. It was the more strongly desired, Newcastle wrote, to have copies, since it seemed from what Pozobueno read in English that the accusations could readily be answered; Hosier appeared to have committed no act of hostility; nothing

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 16 and 22 September (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

² Townshend to Finch, 4 October (o.s.), R.O. Holland 291.

³ H. Walpole, 28 September, Newcastle to him, 22 September (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

taken from the Spaniards, only cargoes of ships passing to and fro examined, "which was the true end and design of his going into those seas." No answer would be made till Stanhope's courier came, "but I have in the mean time been collecting the several facts that have happened since the concluding the treatys of Vienna, which will not only amply justify what has been done but would have left his Ma^{ty} inexcusable to his own people and to his allys, if these necessary precautions had not been taken." The king was very impatient to learn French sentiments on this "extraordinary application" from Spain, and did not doubt continuance of French firmness. This and the disgrace of Grimaldo and Bermudez seemed to him to be "the last effort of the court of Spain to see if they can terrify us into a compliance, and therefore a little resolution at this time will probably put an end to this whole affair." Spain could not furnish further subsidies to the emperor, and concession would have had consequences in Sweden and Denmark and with the king of Sardinia, "who are upon the point, as we hope, of joining with us, and even prevent the king of Prussia, if he has any thoughts of returning to us, from doing it." His Majesty reflected with great satisfaction that the mission of Jennings to the Spanish coast was advised by France "as well as that the instructions to Admiral Hosier were in the warmest manner approved of by the Cardinal, when first communicated to him by M^r Robinson." The fall of Grimaldo and Bermudez was held to be due to their advocacy of reconciliation with France without, as the king of Spain insisted, separation of France from England.¹

At the same time that the Spanish answer had passed Paris had been received there a letter from Aldobrandini to Massei of the same date (30 September) and corresponding import. The nuncio cited the proceedings of Jennings and Hosier as proof of English resolve to enter on hostilities, stated that reconciliation with France could only be effected on the terms proposed by Spain, and expressed the hope that the court of France would explain its intentions, in order that the king of Spain might know what to depend upon. Walpole argued the letter to have been manifestly inspired by the queen and Königsegg, and justified the blockade of the galleons by the Spanish conduct. Afterwards, at a conference with Fleury alone, he asserted "in the plainest terms that matters were now come to a crisis" and asked shortly, would Great Britain and France submit to the emperor ("Spain was no more") or stand to their engagements? Whereat Fleury had appeared to be "a good deal embarrassed and disconcerted. . . . His courage is not always equal to his intentions."

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 6 October (o.s.), *ibid.* 32748.

Walpole deferred further report until he should be better informed of the resolution of the French court.¹

This better information he conveyed in a very long private dispatch of 15 October. On the arrival of those from Stanhope (of the 4th) he had thought better, he said, in spite of the anxiety with which they must be awaited in England, to ascertain French opinion on their contents before sending them on. As soon, therefore, as they were deciphered and perused he had waited on Fleury and D'Huxelles and read to them the more material parts, laying special stress on what was said about the "absolute and uncontrollable power" of the queen and Königsegg. The duke of Orleans coming in, he had seized the opportunity to discourse to him on the news from Spain and on affairs in general, receiving the immediate reply "that France must stand by their allies." Next morning, the 13th, he had interviewed Fleury alone. The cardinal said that although he had the king's confidence and was responsible he must consult on this matter with the other ministers, though no final conclusion, he intimated, would be adopted but in concert with Walpole. Perceiving a good deal of concern about Hosier's doings, and particularly about his stopping the vessel out of Puerto Bello and opening the letters, Walpole argued that the admiral had done nothing but what the conduct of the emperor and Spain abundantly and most clearly justified, took occasion to allude to Fleury's "steadiness and vigour," so well proved, and insisted that no other way of acting could preserve the peace of Europe. The same evening he prepared and sent to Fleury disquisitions on relations with Austria and Spain and on the treaties of Vienna,² the latter designed to show their infractions of others already in force. He had the satisfaction of saying that the two Pecquets, when they had read this, were for supporting the union of the two crowns with vigour; and they hinted the most suitable terms for a reply to De la Paz.

Leaving Fleury time to digest these papers Walpole called upon D'Huxelles to convey the congratulations ordered upon his admission to the Council. Attributing that to the marshal's integrity sincerity and other valuable qualities, he received answer "in his plain way that his intentions were good, that he must be allowed to speak his mind frankly, and to blame as well as approve both French and English ministers," if it seemed necessary. He owned to apprehension on the part of the merchants that their goods might be seized, if the galleons came home, and admitted that hostilities entered on

¹ H. Walpole, 9 and 11 October, *ibid.* 32747.

² Considérations sur l'état présent des affaires par rapport à l'Empereur et à l'Espagne, and "Remarques sur les Traitez de Vienne," the latter chiefly concerned with the treaty of commerce (enclosures Nos. 1 and 2).

by Spain would be a *casus fœderis*. He said that Fonseca had been with him on the news and had represented France to be entirely governed by England, "so insolent a thing, that it had put him quite in a passion"; he had defied Fonseca to show that he had ever been influenced by anything but his own sincere opinion. Says Walpole: "Your Grace may be sure I was not wanting to aggravate the impudence of such a behaviour in Fonseca."

The immediate question was what answers should be made to Aldobrandini and De la Paz. After long discussions in the Council Fleury showed Walpole a draft of the former for his opinion.¹ It disclaimed knowledge of the alleged English hostilities in the West Indies and suggested either exaggeration in the reports received or justifying circumstances. It represented that French English and Dutch subjects had a very considerable interest in the effects on board the galleons, which it was reported that the king of Spain would confiscate, and that while, of course, the king of France could not credit this, the merchants were very much disturbed and the only means to calm them was for the king of Spain to propose some expedient in the matter, the king of France being ready to do all he could to help to reassure his subjects. This, said Fleury, engaged them to nothing; the galleons would remain in safety in West Indian ports, time would be gained, and in his answer the king of Spain must give either explanation or light for other resolutions. But Walpole objected strongly to "the great inconvenience and danger" of the expedient proposed, to wit, as of old, a declaration by the king of Spain upon his royal word and honour that the effects should be properly distributed among their owners; for then, he argued, a "most fatal dilemma" would arise; either the king of Spain's word must not be trusted, which would "have a most odd appearance in the world" after France had made the proposal, or embezzlement of the money in spite of it must be risked, a thing which was certainly to be expected, seeing how easily the queen and Königsegg could overrule the king. Fleury argued to the contrary, and Walpole believed him to be influenced especially by the merchants' representations of damage to the state and to themselves from shortage of money for circulation, "since any misfortune of that nature would reflect upon his administration." He perceived him not now to approve the stoppage of the galleons so much as formerly.

In the end Fleury requested Walpole to set on paper his views on the answer to be made to Aldobrandini. This Walpole did, altering his draft, after another interview, in a form which gave, he

¹ Enclosure No. 3.

says, entire satisfaction.¹ Having hurried to express his acknowledgments and to beg pardon, if his zeal for the union had betrayed him into too great warmth of expression, he received the promise that, as the answer was agreeable to him, it should be laid before the Council the next day. Since, however, no other person had seen it, Fleury begged that no notice should be taken of it to Broglie until that ambassador was informed through the proper channel.

The paper followed the former draft so far as the proposal of an expedient, which was now expunged. In its place were recited the refusal to declare that the treaty of Vienna was not offensive, the insistence on maintaining the Ostend Company, an insuperable obstacle in the way of the accommodation proposed, and the insult to Colonel Dunbar, and it was stated that these doings could only be regarded as veritable acts of hostility and that the king of France, being indissolubly allied with the king of England and the States-General, must take them as hostilities against himself and conclude that the emperor and the king of Spain intended war. At the end came the usual assertion of willingness to negotiate for the removal of everything opposed to a good understanding.

This settled, the next thing was to agree on what should be said to De la Paz. All the French ministers, says Walpole, resented the opprobrious terms used about the English ministry, "indecent with respect to his Majesty," but considering them inspired by the "malicious inventions of the Imperial court" advised their being treated with contempt. And similarly, about Hosier's "pretended hostilities" they thought it improper to acknowledge the truth of the facts alleged by entering into justification of them, refusing satisfaction absolutely; they preferred to avoid a precise answer and to enumerate the violations of treaties before as well as after Hosier's sailing. Thus, they held, it would be shown that not Great Britain, as the Spaniards seemed to wish to be enabled to declare, but Spain was the aggressor. This, said Walpole, was what the two Pecquets had hinted, and D'Huxelles had talked much to the same purpose. Fleury and all the ministers, he went on, seemed to think war inevitable, noting the favour shown to Patiño, "who is the only capable and useful man that they have in Spain for that purpose," and were resolved to be prepared. Walpole himself thought that Königsegg might perhaps be startled by the answer sent and the imperial court think twice before suffering Spain to make war, especially as the power to do that must depend on the return of the galleons.

Continuing next day Walpole related that just as his courier

¹ Enclosures Nos. 4 and 5.

was leaving he had again been summoned to a conference and told that the answer to Aldobrandini must wait for settlement of the other, and he was handed two papers, the one an excuse to the nuncio for not replying to him at present more fully, the other a draft of French sentiments in regard to the answer to be made to De la Paz, enabling the French court to "speak in more ample and explicit terms to Spain." Walpole thinking the former paper "so dry and insignificant" that it was better to say nothing at all at present "unless they would express themselves with more vigour and spirit," Fleury dictated to Morville a substitute, much in the style of that previously agreed upon but intimating that a definite reply must await consultation with England.¹ From the other paper² Walpole observed omission of some of the points of complaint against Spain, particularly Ripperda's declaration of an offensive alliance with the emperor to maintain the Ostend Company and to recover Gibraltar by force. He was answered that it was only a sketch "to be amplified by other facts . . . and to be put in the strongest and clearest light" to prove that the emperor and Spain were the aggressors, "for too much could not be said on that head." He was the less careful in criticising the paper, he said, because no doubt the draft would come back to him altered as his Majesty desired.

Commenting on the whole, he observed that Fleury was "so made" as not to venture a sole decision, and that the alterations would give him opportunity to insist on joint demand for satisfaction. Broglie, he thought, might be spoken to accordingly, while he himself would work upon the cardinal. "I am persuaded that their intentions at bottom are good, tho' their minds are weak"; they would not separate from England. He noted that not a word was said about the galleons in the paper sent. While Fleury thought that some mention of them ought to be made, the manner of doing it Walpole thought "too nice and delicate" for himself to decide. He was certain that the French ministers wanted some expedient to enable the galleons to return, citing again D'Huxelles' hint and his own reply. But as a summary of French opinion: "the sentiments of this court seem to be that you should shew as fully as possible that his Majesty and his allies have done all they could to avoid coming to a rupture, and that if after all it is impossible to avoid it, that the Emperor and Spain have been the occasion of it."³

In a letter to Delafaye Walpole desired that nothing of what had passed between Fleury and himself should be mentioned to Broglie but discourse with him be confined to the last two documents.

¹ Enclosure No. 6.

² Enclosure No. 7.

³ H. Walpole, 15 and 16 October, private, B.M. Add. MS. 32748, the various documents, seven in number, enclosed.

No. 6, "all dictated this morning in our conference by the Cardinall upon what I sayd in room of a most sorry paper by Morville," he thought good enough for the present, but would prepare Fleury next day "for more vigour upon the definitive answer." Of the other: "I hope care will be taken to mend with you the pitifull terms in M^r Morville's paper marked No. 7." In general, he remarked, "things are indeed brought to a crisis in all respects."¹

Answering these dispatches Newcastle expressed his Majesty's satisfaction at the "unanimous resolution" of the French court to keep to engagements, and sent heads for a memorial in accordance with French ideas to be delivered by Stanhope, authorising adjustment by Walpole of any change not very essential. He drew attention to the moderate language used as proof of his Majesty's desire to avoid a rupture, and to the deference to French views in abstention from retort to the imputations made. The charges were neither denied nor owned, on the ground of no advice concerning them from Hosier; only the necessity shown "of sending a squadron into those parts, to put an end to the continued hostilities committed by the Spaniards upon the trade and properties of his Majesty's subjects there."

Since it was proved, Newcastle went on, that the court of Spain had in the instances mentioned been "notoriously and egregiously the aggressors," the king was obliged to demand the assistance of his allies, pursuant to their engagements, should the king of Spain either refuse satisfaction or, "in revenge for the defensive measures the King has taken with the approbation of the court of France, think fit to come to a rupture with his Majesty." So that Walpole must insist strongly on a declaration that such assistance would be given. That, "so far from being subject to any inconvenience, will, in all probability, shew Spain, blinded as it is, the dangers they may expose themselves to and be the most effectual way to prevent the beginning of disturbances of Europe." Walpole knew that his Majesty had all along contributed what he could to dispose the king of Spain to come to a reconciliation with France "and into a juster and righter way of thinking with regard to the general affairs of Europe," and had entirely approved the steps taken by France towards that end, but he now saw with concern result in the dismissal of the two persons at Madrid known to be the best intentioned. Also had been shown the present entire dependence of Spain upon the emperor. The French must see that unless vigour and spirit

¹ H. Walpole to Delafaye, 16 October, holograph, R.O. France 184. Other similar letters, of 18 and 22 October, dealt with the matter further, especially with regard to the Ostend Company. Walpole assumed that no answer would be given to Pozobueno until agreement with France and Holland had been reached, for on it "all future measures and reasonings will in a great measure depend."

were shown the latter would be able to impose whatever conditions he pleased, "and sure it is not the interest of France that things should be brought to that pass." In any case his Majesty could not but reflect with pleasure that the prudent measures of the two crowns had prevented execution of anything so far.¹

So much, Newcastle wrote further in a private letter, was sent for communication to the French ministers. Here he expressed thorough approval of Walpole's conduct, "for notwithstanding some little disagreeable circumstances which happened in the transacting this affair, his Majesty thinks the French ministers are right at bottom"; assurances given by Broglie were a proof. Yet he could not help being impatient to know their final decision, considering the very great consequence of the affair. After which was set out the folly of devising an expedient allowing the return of the galleons to Spain and the recall of Hosier;

that one step of sending those ships thither having, in the King's opinion, been of more service to the common cause, and has put a greater stop to the ambitious designs of the court of Vienna, than all that the two crowns have been able to do besides, and should we now recede from it, and that squadron be recalled home, it would certainly, as your Ex^{ty} very well observed, be giving up the whole and putting it into the Emp^r's power to impose whatever he pleases upon us.

The dismissal of Grimaldo and Bermudez and the appointment of Clark gave proof of the "inveteracy and animosity" of the courts of Vienna and Madrid and their undoubted schemes against the two crowns. Seeing that the emperor had procured his alliances only by the expectation of large subsidies, and Spain having no money, would it not be madness to suffer the galleons to bring home supplies, chiefly at the expense of his Majesty's subjects and of those of his allies, amongst whom the French merchants were most deeply concerned? For undoubtedly all the treasure would be converted to the use named. Besides, the stoppage of the galleons had met with such universal approval in England that even should the French insist on Hosier's recall no minister durst advise what parliament and the nation would so highly resent, "out of a persuasion that this measure is the most effectual means of preventing a war." British merchants were convinced that their property was safe in the West Indies, but not in Spain, and further, what the French ministers must never be told, "the continuance of Admiral Hosier's squadron in those seas has been of so great an advantage to our trade there,

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 14 October (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748. Enclosed: "Heads proposed to serve for an instruction to M^r. Stanhope in drawing up an answer to the marq^e. de la Paz's letter to him of the 30th Sep^r 1726 (n.s.)."

that never in so short a space of time have such quantities of silver been brought hither from America, so that the least mention of sending for that squadron back would create the greatest uneasiness and dissatisfaction among his Majesty's trading subjects."

The king, Newcastle went on, was much pleased with the conduct of D'Huxelles and hoped that Fleury would be cured of his uneasiness when he considered that the merchants' effects could only be secured by the course taken, and that, whatever might be French sympathy with a Bourbon prince, the king of Spain's interest was "quite out of the question," it being the emperor who was to enjoy the money from the West Indies and a rupture only avoidable by convincing him that he would not be supported in that way. Apart from other arguments, the stress laid on the affair by Spain proved the importance of it. Strong talk had been employed with Broglie, and he seemed to agree; but how far he would venture to put his sentiments on paper, or what weight they would have, could not be said. It had even been proposed to go further and to say that Hosier's further conduct would depend on that of Spain, but that the king would not have inserted out of deference to French views.¹

A third dispatch, of similar tenour, went to Stanhope. Undoubtedly, it was said, the intention of De la Paz in his "extraordinary paper" was to raise such indignation as to move his Majesty's government to some act of violence, which might justify the Spanish court "in the rupture they may be desirous to begin." But the memorial to be delivered, when concerted with France, would disappoint that expectation.

You will observe by it that his Majesty continues to act with such moderation as must put the court where you are entirely in the wrong, and whenever an open rupture shall begin it must in the eyes of all Europe lye at their door, since they are fully proved to have for a long time past been the aggressors. . . . But when they shall find the becoming dignity and resolution on the King's part, which will appear in your answer, though drawn in a decent manner and in such a style as is fit to be used between great princes and their ministers, and that the court of France are ready to stand by his Majesty and support their engagements, this fondness of an open rupture will most probably cease, nor can it be imagined that even Count Königsegg himself will advise them to it.

Of Aldobrandini's letter, insinuating that since the king of England had begun hostilities the French were no longer bound by their alliance but might be reconciled to Spain, and of the answer to it ordered, which, indefinite as it was, sufficiently showed resolution to support engagements, no doubt Stanhope was informed,

¹ The same, private, same date.

as also of the unanimity of the French ministers for maintaining the union with Great Britain. The reply to De la Paz would doubtless be couched in terms as strong as could possibly be desired. So that when Stanhope received the "paper of heads" he must put it into the form of a memorial and follow the methods which he should learn to have been agreed at Paris. Should the court of Spain, "for whose proceedings, as it is now constituted, there is no answering by the rules of justice and prudence," contrary to expectation "take such rash measures, as that a rupture should be declared," he must quit Spain forthwith without taking audience of leave, "endeavouring to put them as much in the wrong as possible by insisting upon their obliging you in the most formal manner to leave the kingdom." If the consuls were ordered to depart, as had been the French when the infanta was sent back, they must be directed to comply.¹

In his next dispatch Walpole reported "general rumour" that Hosier's doings had rendered war inevitable, and universal wish for peace; uneasiness and alarm being propagated by the imperialists and Jacobites and malicious reports spread, for instance, that the French effects would be detained, but the South Sea Company's ship come home richly laden. The impression of all which upon ministers, he said, was considerable, but not so great as to make them think of abandoning his Majesty. Massei and his auditor di rota, "who are both avowed enemys, but especially the last, to the Imperiall court," had assured him that nothing would be done but in close concert with England "and that the whole conversation of the French ministers turned upon being inseparably united to us," while Fonseca, whom they had seen several times, "could not conceal his great concern and confusion on this account." And Gedda had heard the same from the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's former minister Dumont, now an inmate of Fonseca's house and maintained by him, namely, that that minister, "who some time ago thought the Emperor's measures so well concerted as to carry all before them, appeared now most extremely uneasy and disconsolate." Fleury at a further interview, when Walpole had "tenderly" expressed surprise at the decision to postpone a definite answer to Aldobrandini, had explained that he had not wished to counter the other ministers' opinion on a point which was not essential. He promised that the reply dictated by himself should be delivered to Massei "in the very terms it was drawn in my presence," and declared that the maintenance of strict union with England "should be the foundation of all his actions." Yet,

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, same date, R.O. Spain 97.

says Walpole, he could not conceal his concern about the galleons, the merchants having put forward that the king of Spain's money would be brought over in single ships safely and their own kept in the West Indies as security.¹

When he next wrote Walpole had seen the actual letter delivered to Massei for transmission, agreeing word for word with the copy sent to England. Besides which, he said, Massei undertook to let Aldobrandini know that he was certain of the impossibility of detaching France from England. Fleury, however, had put into his hands a paper, a "Mémoire sur les Gallions," which might be imputed either to the importunity of merchants who would have it believed that the present shortage of money was due to the stoppage of the galleons, or else to Fleury's earnest desire, if the blockade were to be continued, to put the justification of it in the strongest light, showing the world that the emperor and the king of Spain were the aggressors. That, Walpole told him, would not be difficult, nor must the two be separated in responsibility for the injuries inflicted; moreover, it were better to stop commerce for a time than to let the treasure be turned to the use justly apprehended. D'Huxelles and Pecquet had "plainly declared their sentiments for preventing the return of the galleons," the latter saying in confidence that the merchants' complaints were "ill founded both in reason and fact" and the bankruptcies due to other causes, and attributing Fleury's uneasiness principally to representations by Le Peletier des Forts, who, not being able to restore credit, laid the blame on want of the money expected. And when Walpole explained to D'Huxelles, on the latter "in his free manner" terming the issue of Hosier's instructions without previous concert "unfriendly behaviour," the reasons of haste which had necessitated it, "the marshal then assured me that since this point had been taken it ought to be supported," saying further that by news received by the merchants there would soon be in the West Indies eighteen Spanish men-of-war to convey the flota from Havana and that the money from the galleons was expected home in separate ships.²

Stanhope's information on this head, obtained from the contractor himself, was of orders to provision for four months six or seven men-of-war, and he counted up two already in the West Indies, the two which had sailed from Santander some six weeks since but had been forced back by bad weather,³ a frigate at Cadiz, and two 60-gun ships bought at Genoa, one of them already in Cadiz Bay. In answer he was informed of reinforcements for Hosier

¹ H. Walpole, 18 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

² The same, 22 October, enclosing a copy of the "Mémoire."

³ The *San Felipe* and *San Carlos*.

ordered, six large men-of-war "sheathing with all possible expedition" and to sail in a few days, and of instructions to that admiral to take up a station to prevent the design in view.¹ Walpole had previously been desired to give assurance at Paris of serious work and of sufficient provision to reinforce both Hosier and Hopson, although the former was thought strong enough already to oppose any Spanish force now in the West Indies. Certainly the Spaniards had magnified that much; Hosier reported but twelve of their ships altogether, dispersed in different ports and most of them so long out that they could not be very fit for service; one said to have been burnt, another disabled. From Cadiz only two large ships and two of from 20 to 30 guns were reported to have sailed, while the two that had left Santander had been forced back by stress of weather into a port of Finisterre, where they would probably remain. Hosier, on the other hand, had ten men-of-war with him, seven of them of 50 guns or more, "as good ships, and in as good condition, as any in his Majesty's navy." However, four of those returned from Spain with Jennings were to be sent to reinforce him and he was to be ordered to "a port of Cuba adjoining Havana," leaving only one or two ships before Puerto Bello. And in case he should not catch the flota, as expected, Hopson was instructed to keep to sea as long as possible and to look out with the greatest diligence for any ships coming from America, and he would be so reinforced as to be able to execute his commands against any force convoying the flota home. His Majesty hoped that these precautions would seem sufficient to the court of France for any contingency.

Although, however, Newcastle went on, the stoppage of the treasure-fleets was the service thought to require principal attention, yet the king could not but take notice of Stanhope's report of Königsegg urging the king of Spain to come to a rupture on the strength of Hosier's doings, his object evidently being to make that king the principal in the dispute, the emperor an assisting party under the treaty of Vienna, for which assistance the Austrians "would not fail to insist upon most exorbitant supplies and subsidies from Spain; whereas should the King and his allies take proper measures for preventing the notorious infractions that the Emperor is daily making, contrary to all treaties, upon our trade and commerce, Spain might in that case not espouse the cause of Vienna with so much warmth." And so he went on to urge measures being taken at once against the Ostend Company, as elsewhere cited.²

There was talk of other ways of bringing home the treasure

¹ Stanhope, 21 October, Newcastle in reply, 3 November (o.s.), R.O. Spain 95, 97.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 27 October (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

removed from the galleons. By one Dutch report it was to be carried across the continent from Arica and Potosi to Buenos Ayres, a five months' transport, and thence to be brought on ships appointed at different places to evade the English, two men-of-war and the two fine Ostend ships newly built at Hamburg being sent to Buenos Ayres to act as a guard.¹ Another supposition, retailed by Stanhope on the strength of conversations with one Join, a French abbé, was that the four ships which had sailed in May under command of Admiral Antonio Castañeta had gone to bring the treasure from Panama by way of Cape Horn. It was the fact, says Stanhope, that Ripperda had dispatched those ships after several consultations with the said Join, who had rounded the Cape several times and said that the voyage was very secure, more than 200 ships from St. Malo having made it safely during the last war. In further support of the story Stanhope adduced the strong apparent assurance of the court of getting the money home in spite of Hosier, the little concern shown for Castañeta's safety by those in the secret, although nothing had been heard of him since he sailed, and the facts that he had taken with him two of Join's officers and that orders to remove the treasure to Panama had been received ten days before Hosier's appearance off Puerto Bello. He suggested sending ships to catch Castañeta between the Straits of Magellan and Concepcion in Chile, where he must touch for provisions, and that Join himself should sail with the expedition, as a man believed to know those coasts better than any one else in Europe.²

Fleury, when Walpole imparted to him this surmised enterprise, thought it very possible, but would have nothing said to other French ministers about it.³ Experts in London, however, condemned the project as impracticable. Not on account of difficulty in rounding Cape Horn, but in getting the treasure carried from Panama to Lima, Spanish vessels, owing to contrary winds and currents, commonly taking six to eight or even ten months on the

¹ Letter of 15 October, R.O. Holland 579.

² Stanhope, 30 October, R.O. Spain 95. An interesting further suggestion of Join was to colonise the island of San Fernando, which could be done, he pointed out, by the same expedition without further expense. He explained that the island was uninhabited, "though extremely fertile with the best harbour in the world and defensible with four or five hundred men against any force whatsoever"; very well situated for trade and with no other landing place but in the harbour; and showed a patent for making the settlement granted him by Louis XIV, just before his death, as proof that the enterprise, the island being unoccupied, involved no breach of treaties. He supplied full details of the requirements (enclosed with Stanhope's dispatch).

The island meant may, perhaps, be identified with Juan Fernandez, Robinson Crusoe's island. Points in the description agree with that of "L'Isle de Jean Fernando" in Bruzen de la Martinière's *Grand Dictionnaire Géographique et Critique*, ed. 1737, vol. vii.

³ H. Walpole, 7 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32748. For obvious reasons he said nothing of the project for a settlement in the South Seas.

passage. The French vessels referred to, they said, never went north of Peru, and it was more likely that the bullion would have been sent to Vera Cruz, thence to be brought by Castañeta to Havana and sent home either with the flota or on fast single ships.¹ What, moreover, weighed with ministers, said Newcastle, was that Castañeta's ships were reported to be full of soldiers cannon and ammunition, "very improper and unnecessary for so long a voyage, in which he could not apprehend any opposition," but very fit for the design of fortifying Havana. All things considered, and Hopson being posted so as to stop the South Seas route, the king thought the safest method would be to look out for the treasure "in the ordinary course through the Gulph of Florida," and so had ordered the six men-of-war mentioned to sail directly for Matanzas Bay (near Havana), Hosier to meet them there.²

Fleury showed Walpole on the map the best place for Hosier to lie to intercept both flota and galleons, which agreed with that selected. He asked whether Hosier would be ordered actually to attack, if they came in his way, "which would be lookt upon as an open hostility," and, when Walpole supposed that, desired that he should first declare his reasons and prescribe stay of the ships in the West Indies. After which Walpole wrote of memorials presented by certain merchants pretending that the British squadron was sent to the West Indies not only to stop the galleons but also to found a settlement there. He thought, therefore, on account of French and Dutch jealousy, that no encouragement ought to be given to Join's project nor he be employed.³

Stanhope continued to write of unbending resolution at Madrid. He was told that Philip V, having fully declared his sentiments and intentions concerning Hosier's action, and persisting in them, that affair must stand as it did until the king of England's answer was received. He deemed the stoppage of the galleons as great an act of hostility as could be committed, and must have full satisfaction for it. Subsidies, not being at war, he thought himself at liberty to give to whom he pleased. He would "infallibly make good all his engagements for subsidies to the Emperor and the rest of his allies, though neither the galleons nor the flota should get to Spain, being determined to sell even his shirt for that purpose if it was necessary." And so Stanhope remained persuaded that on receiving his Majesty's answer "this court will proceed to violent measures, tho' I should not be very much surprised should it prove otherwise, considering

¹ Opinion of Woodes Rogers and Jonathan Dennis, the original with Newcastle's dispatch (below), a copy R.O. Spain 95.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 10 November (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748, and further to Stanhope on the 14th, R.O. Spain 97.

³ H. Walpole, 12 and 15 November, *ibid.*

the inconsistency with which they have acted in every thing of late." He knew himself of ancient crown rents in Valencia sold for two million ducats, about 350,000 pistoles. On the other hand Patiño, "with whom I have a very intimate secret correspondence, is most certainly in his heart against a war," giving strongest assurances of endeavour to dissuade the king from his present measures, though he dared not yet oppose the queen. For the rest, in this dispatch, Stanhope recounted Patiño's efforts to create a navy¹ and the continued insolence of the Jacobites.²

¹ He had ordered several ships to be built in Spain, had sent to buy others at Genoa and Venice, and had lately signed a contract with Join, which Stanhope had seen, for three 50-gun ships at St. Malo to carry troops to Chile, the owners being allowed to embark each 250 tons of merchandise on their own accounts. Also commissaries had been sent out to register in classes all sea-faring men, as was done in France.

² Stanhope, 30 October, cited. Ormonde, he said, never stirred from court, Wharton was leaving for Rome, Father Clark meddled little as yet in politics but probably would soon, he being a known partisan of Austria and enemy of France.

CHAPTER XXXI

RUPTURE WITH SPAIN

By the second week of November 1726 Horatio Walpole had at last settled with the French ministers the heads for Stanhope's memorial and the final answer to be sent by Massei to Aldobrandini. With the copies he enclosed an autograph letter from Morville of the most satisfactory character, observing that Hosier's proceedings "being particularly specified, that measure is now as much adopted by France to be supported jointly with his Majesty, as if it had been originally concerted with this court." Too much could not be said to Broglie on this occasion, "and the trouble would be too long, were I to tell your Grace the share and merit which the Cardinal has had in this affair."¹

Acknowledgment from England was enthusiastic; Newcastle had never had so much reason to congratulate. The attitude of the French court was "kind and affectionate," its resolution admirable, its sincerity never doubted. "The obliging manner in which they have shewn it upon this occasion has exceeded all expectation, and Mo^r de Morville's letter to the Pope's Nuncio is justly thought here the most perfect of its kind that ever was written, comprehending every thing that a faithfull and zealous ally could say in so right and so just a cause." Excellent effect was expected. Spain must alter her measures or be convinced of the impossibility of their success, for what force could resist Great Britain France and Holland, united as they were now? The alterations in the "heads" were entirely agreeable and the paper made "still stronger and clearer." Broglie had been warmly thanked, and so must also be Fleury; indeed, Walpole might request a special audience of the king to give strongest assurances.²

¹ H. Walpole, 7 and 11 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32748. Enclosed: particulars of "some small alterations and additions" made to the paper sent from England, the "heads" as finally adjusted and sent to Stanhope, and Morville's letters to himself and to Massei, the latter a copy. Baudrillart has this, and notes the answers from Aldobrandini abandoning hope of peace (iii. 271, notes).

² Newcastle in reply, 7 November (o.s.), *ibid.* Walpole, however, wrote (to Delafaye, 22 November), "Mo^r de Morville's letter to the nuncio, which meets with so great applause, was not his own performance."

Again, when informing Stanhope of Pozobueno having at last presented copies of the letter of De la Paz of 30 September and of the papers in connexion, Newcastle took occasion to paint the situation in brightest colours. He noted addition of twelve men-of-war to the Dutch navy, progress with Denmark, and good hopes of securing the king of Sardinia, which "would contribute more than any thing to give uneasiness to the court of Vienna." From the last advices he took that court to be by no means sanguine about its treaty with Prussia, indeed, "must have more skill and money than I believe they are masters of at present, if they can hope to satisfy two powers, whose interest is opposite, with the hopes and expectations of the same thing." The elector of Bavaria was likely to insist on payment of his subsidies before he raised his promised troops. "Our affairs go exceedingly well in Sweden, and M^r Poyntz writes in the most sanguine manner upon every thing that we can hope for from thence."¹

Stanhope, the agreed "heads" for his memorial received, embodied them in a letter to De la Paz of date 25 November. Premising the surprise of George I that advantage should have been taken of reports from the West Indies to refuse the anticipated clear and satisfactory answer to his plain exposition of the reasons for his naval armaments, he went on to say that his Majesty, while ardently desiring restoration of good intelligence, felt himself obliged to make clearly known the king of Spain's behaviour since his close union with the emperor. From the moment of that union he had constantly awaited opportunity to break with the king of England, to attack his dominions, and to attempt to put the Pretender in his place; witness the threatening language of Ripperda, the honours showered on him in approval of his conduct, Grimaldo's peremptory demand for the restoration of Gibraltar, the reception of a person of distinction sent from Rome with credentials from the Pretender, his frequent conferences with Spanish ministers and formation with them of projects of invasion, the dispatch of troops to the coasts of Galicia and Biscay and of men-of-war to the West Indies, and the three Russian ships which could incontestably be proved to have been fitted out by the Pretender's adherents and sent to Spain to serve as transports. Which hostile preparations had only been defeated by the vigorous resolutions of parliament and equipment of fleets for defence. Ripperda's avowal of an offensive alliance with the emperor could not be disclaimed, for he had made it when first minister to the king of Spain and in his full confidence; and the

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 24 November (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97. A yet higher note of exultation was struck by Townshend in a dispatch to Poyntz, when sending him the Spanish papers (8 November (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 45).

man who had negotiated the treaties of Vienna must know their contents.

Next the establishment of the Ostend Company was stated to be an illegal and offensive act, which Great Britain and Holland had the right to resist by force. That, it was said (and passages from Pozobueno's memorial of 5 April 1724 were quoted in support), had been the Spanish view at the time of the congress of Cambray, indeed, request had then been made from Madrid for joint action to destroy the company. That England and Holland had not resorted to force was due to their desire for moderation and trial of all other means. Now the support given to the emperor in the matter by Spain justified them in calling on their allies for assistance.

Other acts of offence specified were the refusal to allow Jennings's ships to enter Spanish ports, in spite of his assurances, the arrest of Ripperda in Stanhope's house, the deportation of consul Dunbar, in order that he might not report on the preparations for war in the northern provinces, the order to the Dutch squadron to leave Cadiz within twenty-four hours, and the prohibition of entry to all British and Dutch war-ships. The allegation that the king of England had distributed money in France, Holland, Sweden and Prussia was styled unjust and atrocious, and inability was expressed to conceive why so unworthy a calumny should be promulgated in answer to his representations about the Spanish subsidies publicly furnished to Vienna.

Lastly it was asserted that no word had been received from Hosier on any of the subjects of which complaint was made, so that nothing could be replied about them, but the king of England was surprised at such complaints in view of the open pillage and hostilities practised by the Spaniards in the West Indies for several years past. They remained without redress, although the damages were serious and would have justified most vigorous reprisal. Evidently, as Hosier was sent to protect trade, his conduct must depend reciprocally upon the Spanish.

From this sincere impartial detail, Stanhope concluded, it would be known how great had been the king of England's moderation and love of peace, which had restrained him from the violent measures which he had incontestable right to adopt. All his armaments were for defence. Were the king of Spain disposed to give satisfaction and reparation, he would always be ready to re-establish friendly relations.¹

Philip V was in no mind for giving in; on the contrary, he himself was turning to action. Stanhope had already sent word of

¹ Stanhope to De la Paz, 25 November 1726, R.O. Spain 95.

an army assembling in Andalusia ; six battalions of guards, all the Swiss and Irish regiments but one, and the choicest of other foreign troops ; altogether some 12,000 to 14,000 foot and 2,000 horse under command of Lieut.-General Montemar, reputed the best officer in Spain. The object, he was given to understand, was to protect workmen employed on the construction of two forts or batteries on the Spanish side of Gibraltar Bay, but he suspected the real intention to be a sudden assault on the fortress, or possibly an enterprise against Great Britain from Cadiz, in view of the armaments at that port and cheerful confidence on the part of the Jacobites. Letters just received from De la Paz he took " to carry an undoubted proof of the king of Spain's persevering in his resolution of breaking with his Ma^{ty} " ; one of them recalled the want of answer yet to the writer's letter of 30 September and stated that, if a positive reply were not given speedily to a second memorial which Pozobueno would present in London, the king of Spain must infer tacit approval of all that Hosier had done and manifest intention to pursue the notorious infractions of treaties and hostilities begun. Stanhope's reply had been that he was daily expecting a messenger with the answer awaited, and should it not arrive within two or three days would send one of his servants to London with De la Paz' letter specially. As he would have to render some account of the military movements he asked for some explanation of the reasons for them. That, De la Paz replied, should be given on receipt of an immediate answer about Hosier, so clear as to remove all suspicions. Stanhope thought all this of so much import as to necessitate the mission of his secretary, Blair, to England, instructed to inform Horatio Walpole on his way. He insisted on the necessity of bringing the court of France to act with greater vigour and hoped that the enclosed letter from Montgon might assist Walpole by exposing the impression made upon the king of Spain by the reports of ill-intentioned people in France. To disabuse him he saw no means but for the French government to make a clear and positive declaration of intention to support his Majesty, particularly in the matter of Hosier, its attitude in regard to which had encouraged the " haughty menaces " of Spain. In apology for his scanty information about the Andalusian troops : " no one even of my most intimate friends dare to come near me and that from the precise orders given them by this court to that purpose." ¹

Montgon's letter dealt with the mischievous correspondence of Sir Toby Burke and Colabar and a Count D'Hudicourt, calling himself a favourite of ex-king Stanislaus. Another letter of the

¹ Stanhope, 21 November, *ibid.* The letters from De la Paz (enclosed) were of date the 18th and 20th ; his own reply of the 19th.

kind, shown by Fleury to Walpole as certainly dictated by the Spanish sovereigns, was from the duchess of Saint-Pierre. It recapitulated the bad treatment of Spain by France since the death of Louis XIV, panegyricised the king and queen, and so on. Fleury's reply, also shown to Walpole, recalled his efforts for reconciliation and their bad reception, intimated anew the willingness of Louis XV to make up the quarrel, without the intervention of any mediator, showed how Burke and the rest deceived the court of Spain, and reiterated the king's decision to stand fast by his allies. Fleury told Walpole further that he had forbidden Le Blanc (implicated) to see Burke or D'Hudicourt or La Grange or a Swiss named Roguin, ordered by Morville to return to his own country.¹ Newcastle signified George I to be greatly pleased with the confidence shown and with Fleury's "vigour and prudence with relation to Mo^r Le Blanc and to S^r Toby Birk and his confederates,"² while Stanhope was informed that no design of the Spaniards, whatever it might be, could give uneasiness; the only result would be further to convince the world of the just reasons for his Majesty's measures. Gibraltar was thoroughly well provided for defence and the garrison could be strengthened, if necessary. Walpole's letters would have set Stanhope's mind perfectly at ease, and though so tardy in arrival have made by their contents amends for the delay. A new instance of French "spirit and resolution" and steadfastness to the alliance was the French East India Company's refusal of an offer by Philip V to transfer to them the South Sea Company's "Asiento" privilege. In fact, the French court was "as forward as the King can be in every thing that is right." The Dutch were showing increasing vigour, and the court of Vienna, by the latest advices, seemed "backward at present and reluctant to come to extremities." Should Spain take any rash step she would have cause to repent.³

The violence of Stanhope's letter of 25 November could but throw fuel on the fire. De la Paz, says he, portrayed the anger of Philip V and "gave me plainly to understand that he thought a rupture absolutely certain." Afterwards, however, observing dissatisfaction after long conferences with Königsegg, Stanhope imagined the count either not to have encouraged the warlike disposition (which was true) or else to have demanded more money than could

¹ H. Walpole, 26 and 29 November, 3 and 7 December, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

² Newcastle in reply, 30 November (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Newcastle to Stanhope, 1 December (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97. Philip's offer, Fleury acquainted Walpole, had come in a letter from the French company's agent at Madrid. Le Peletier des Forts, says Walpole, had called together some of the principal directors and advised them to reject the proposal "as a snare to create a misunderstanding between England and France, to which they unanimously agreed" (3 December, cited).

be furnished. So at another conference with De la Paz he insinuated that Spain was not only not obliged to support the emperor further but had strongest grounds for resentment, continuing with assurance of the good intentions of George I and his allies and of their readiness to revive ancient friendship on reasonable terms, with all regard possible to the king of Spain's honour and support to his pretensions and those of his family, so far as was consistent with the peace of Europe and the faith of treaties.

De la Paz, Stanhope goes on, listened attentively and promised to acquaint the king with what he had said. But fearing want of faith in his report he got Montgon to inform the queen's confessor of the conversation and was given to understand that this had had a very good effect, Guerra admitting that the sovereigns were not satisfied with the emperor's conduct. Soon, however, after the arrival of couriers from London and Vienna, Stanhope saw a change again; their Majesties more irritated against Great Britain and France than ever. He was sure now that the expedition against Gibraltar would be pressed with all possible vigour and that an expedition in favour of the Pretender was "on the anvil," citing in evidence long conferences accorded to Ormonde and General Seissan and confidences by Castelar to Sartine. He pointed out how easily troops carried across the bay of Gibraltar on galleys might succeed against a single wall insufficiently defended. He had warning of what was on foot from two "undoubted hands who had it in the greatest confidence from their intimate friend the General himself, the Conde de las Torres, who commands the expedition." Thirty battalions and sixty squadrons were ordered already, whereas to protect workmen engaged in erecting forts on the Spanish shore six to eight battalions would have been sufficient. He could get no explanation from the court in spite of daily request "in the most formal and earnest manner," and had certain knowledge of plans for the attack being hurried on with all expedition.¹ He had sent Colonel Dunbar specially to warn Colonel Kane and believed expectation to be that in face of the five men-of-war at Cadiz and the two others coming from Biscay, Admiral Hopson would not be able to divide his squadron, in order both to watch for the flota and to protect Gibraltar. In fine, Stanhope believed war to be inevitable, though thinking it not likely to last more than six months on account of dissension certain to arise with Austria from the impossibility of finding the subsidies promised.²

¹ Directed by "Mons^r de Verbom chief engenieer and author of the plan for the attack upon the sea side of the town," who had orders to set out for Malaga with De las Torres on 15 December.

² Stanhope, 9 December, R.O. Spain 95. In his last supposition he was wrong, the third million florins of the three due for the year being paid through Genoese

Receipt of this dispatch caused application at Paris for support, care being taken to emphasise Stanhope's endeavours, by giving strongest assurances of interest taken in the personal welfare of the king and his family, to divert the court of Spain from its "pernicious measures." It seemed nevertheless, said Newcastle, "that the Imperialists, rather than lose an ally so intirely devoted to them, have given into all their views." He set forth the measures taken to make Gibraltar safe and to reinforce Hopson, disclaimed all apprehension of an attack on England, in view of the preparations made, but at the same time expressed the king's conviction that France would make good the repeated assurances given of help in case of an attack upon Gibraltar; were the season too late for moving troops towards the Spanish frontier, then by a declaration either through Stanhope or through the nuncio that such an attempt against his Majesty would be looked upon by the French as made against themselves, obliging them to make good their engagements by offensive action.¹

Robinson, when Stanhope's dispatch passed through his hands, had taken a copy of it for use with the French ministers. He found Morville sure that Gibraltar was in no danger and lamenting a war; desirous of waiting to see how the Spaniards would proceed, but of opinion that no time should be lost in concerting a general plan of campaign. Fleury's discourse had been

very short; he spoke, I must own it, with much concern that things were come to this extremity, but that concern was more on account of the time and circumstances, as he said himself, before the parliament was assembled or any of the several negotiations now on foot were finished, than from any slackness or fear; for he charged me to assure your Grace in the most solemn manner that he was setting seriously to work to put every thing in the best posture, and that this very afternoon all the necessary orders were to be given for this purpose."²

bankers before the end of December (Syveton, p. 236). Concerned with this matter was the following report from Robinson, of 17 January 1727 (B.M. Add. MS. 32749). "In discoursing in general upon the necessity of keeping the galleons and flota in the Indies," he had taken occasion to express surprise at the fact, confirmed by the Sardinian minister at Paris, that Spain "in its present low condition" should have been able lately to supply the emperor with three millions of French money, although disadvantage in the exchange amounted to 25 per cent. Morville had disclaimed knowledge of this, unless it referred to transactions of the Genoese "in hopes to be employd as factors to transport the merchandises of Sicily and Naples with Spain," from which traffic, the imperialists flattered themselves, the English French and Dutch would be entirely excluded. Morville said that he had taken action in the matter with the Genoese minister, Sabas, more than three months since, warning him of what would happen to Genoese trade in case of war, and he wanted his colleague in London to be similarly threatened.

¹ Newcastle to Robinson, 15 December (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748, and similarly again, with further arguments, on the 20th.

² Robinson, 20 and 24 December, *ibid.* In the *Lettres historiques* (lxx. 665) we find as news from Paris in this month: "on se prépare tout de bon à la guerre";

Success in an attack upon Gibraltar Robinson found generally ridiculed. The marquis de Brancas and other officers, who had been at the siege of 1704, gave "the Spanish army over, as lost or ruined, if they sitt down before that place"; Morville could only suppose that the emperor had incited the enterprise with that very object, to prevent himself from being forced into an unequal war; Marshal Berwick looked on a siege as "too great a chimaera for any thing else to be designed by it, but a cover for the intended invasion of his Majesty's dominions." Fleury, owing to "a general received notion" that "so foolish and mad an enterprise" could not be undertaken without the connivance of France, "added and repeated it two or three times, you may be sure of us, you may be sure of us."¹

All this time Pozobueno in London had been protesting. On 18 November he had reminded ministers that it was more than a month since, in accordance with precise orders received, he had demanded for his master complete reparation and satisfaction for Hosier's acts of aggression. On 2 December he handed in again the papers on the subject, desiring communication of them to George I immediately and demanding a reply "prompte claire et positive" within a few days under pain of adoption of suitable measures. When he was still answered that his Majesty deemed it sufficient to work through Stanhope, he took a final step in delivering on 1 January 1727 a paper in which, "*pour éviter toute ultérieure équivoque*," Stanhope's letter of 25 November was answered point by point. At the same time he asked for his passports, which were given him at once.

The memorial began by recapitulating the letters that had passed between Stanhope and De la Paz and declaring that the king of Spain, desiring nothing more than peace and the quiet of his dominions and of all Europe, would accept the king of England's corresponding protestations with the fullest satisfaction, were it possible to reconcile his friendly expressions with the insults and hostilities committed in full time of peace. The document continued as follows.

For what Ripperda might have said at Vienna in the heat of conversation, and which ill-intentioned people might have magnified, the king of Spain could not be responsible.

What had been said and written to Stanhope about good correspondence and friendship with England depending absolutely upon the restoration of Gibraltar, as positively promised, Pozobueno had orders to confirm. Apart from that promise, the cession of the place had been annulled by violation of its conditions, namely, by extension

Le Blanc working with the duke of Maine about the artillery, orders given to remount the cavalry, 100 guns sent to Strasburg, etc.

¹ The same, 30 and 31 December.

of the fortifications beyond the prescribed limits, by the admission of Jews and Moors in the same manner as Spaniards and men of other nations, contrary to the express terms of the treaty and to the prejudice of the holy catholic religion ; not to mention the frauds and continual smuggling.

Although Ripperda had been honoured on his return to Madrid for what he had done, his vain and strange talk and ideas had brought his disgrace and imprisonment.

It was well known that the king of Spain had never admitted Wharton to his court and had refused to know anything of his credentials or schemes ; anything that the duke might have said to Ripperda was of no consequence.

Nor did the king know anything more of the Russian ships than that they were ordinary traders.

The equipment of men-of-war and the marching of troops to the coasts of Cantabria and Galicia had been necessitated by the news of the British naval preparations ; the king of Spain could not have his coasts exposed and the shipyards of Santander burnt again.

The truth of Ripperda's disclosure to Stanhope and Van der Meer of an offensive alliance with Austria had been formally denied by the imperial ministers at Vienna and London. If the king of Spain had not at once dismissed Ripperda and declared the falsity of his declaration, it was for reasons which he did not think fit to make public.

As to the Ostend Company (a matter discussed at length) there was nothing strange in the king of Spain changing his attitude when making peace with the emperor ; such things were usual in treaties.

Refusal to admit to Spanish harbours Jennings's squadron, fresh from its own ports, notoriously equipped for war, and carrying troops for known purposes, on the frivolous pretext of wanting food and water, had been proper. A frank declaration of the purpose of its coming ought to have been made before it appeared on the Spanish coasts.

As to the arrest of Ripperda in Stanhope's house, he had been declared a criminal and could not enjoy immunity.

Consuls could not be admitted to any port without a cedula, and there had never been any right to send a British consul or any other to a port of Guipuzcoa.

Exclusion of the British and Dutch men-of-war from Cadiz was completely justified by what was said about Jennings.

Stanhope's heat at what De la Paz had said to him about British money distributed in Holland Sweden and Prussia was not justified. It was nothing new or unworthy for a prince or state to give or

receive money for services rendered, and De la Paz could have had no intention to blame or complain, but only to counter Stanhope's demand for information about the subsidies paid to the emperor.

When Stanhope had denied knowledge of Hosier's having done anything that could give the slightest cause of complaint, he had apparently forgotten having previously informed De la Paz of orders to communicate that admiral's operations. If ships of Great Britain and other nations had been seized by the guardacostas it was as smugglers; of this the places where they were caught was sufficient proof. Lawful commerce had been accorded full liberty, and more to British ships than to others. The king of Spain regarded and would continue to regard the stay of the British squadron in those waters as a continuation of voluntary hostilities. The document concluded:

Le Roy mon maître se trouve justifié devant Dieu et les hommes pour repousser ces injures et hostilités avec toute la force, que la bonté et providence divine luy a mis en main, et en droit de requérir ses alliés sur les secours, auxquels ils se sont engagés. Sa Majesté . . . proteste et assure de n'avoir jamais fait, ni cherché de faire, aucun tort à la nation Angloise, et que tous les dessins qu'on luy suppose contre sa Majesté Britannique et ses domaines sont inventez et sans sa connoissance. Mais sa Majesté déclare aussi en même tems que dans l'état violent où les choses sont enfin réduites par le ministère d'Angleterre, Elle ne peut ni ne veut plus écouter aucune plainte, instance, ni accommodement pendant que sa Majesté Britannique sera avec les armes à la main dans les domaines de sa Majesté, comm' Elle l'est effectivement avec une esquadre sur les côtes et mers d'Espagne, et une autre dans celles des Indes, et que l'on continue dans les susdits domaines les hostilités, comme on le menace par le séjour ultérieur de l'esquadre Anglois dans les mers de l'Amérique, particulièrement lorsqu'il est notoire, que pour renforcer la même esquadre on aprête quatre autres vaisseaux de guerre en Angleterre, et deux autres pour celle qui est dans les mers et sur les côtes d'Espagne." ¹

At the same time that Pozobueno was ordered to present this memorial Philip and Elizabeth took a definite step in support of James III by sending an ambassador, the duke of Liria, to Russia, principally instructed to concert a naval descent upon the British coasts. As, however, Liria did not leave till March 1727, and as he paid long visits on his way to James Edward at Bologna and to the courts of Vienna Dresden and Berlin, he arrived at Petersburg only in February 1728.²

The cue in England was to take the straightforward Spanish

¹ Original of the above, R.O. Foreign Ministers 57. Printed by Rousset, iii. 368, and elsewhere. Copies were supplied to all British ministers abroad and others.

² His entertaining diary in the *Documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, vol. 93; see the *Quarterly Review* for January 1892.

statement to justify what had been done. Thus Townshend to Finch at the Hague: "You will easily observe that all we accused the court of Spain of is in effect acknowledged, tho' there are some glosses and turns to alleviate and retort the charges, which might be answered with great ease."¹ And Newcastle to Stanhope: although the memorial was "in the conclusion as it were a declaration of war," for the rest it was as his Majesty could have wished, seeing that hardly any point of Stanhope's was denied; "every body will be convinced by it of the justice of his Majesty's measures, at the same time that it appears they cannot defend their own." He was sure that the action had been instigated from Vienna and took "other circumstances and advices" to confirm the planning of an expedition against England; in fact, he said, the king was persuaded that this was the chief intention of the Spanish preparations. Since it was infinitely necessary to have the earliest and best information about this he left it to Stanhope to stay on for that purpose at Madrid, or not, as he should think proper. He suggested the employment of "a Spaniard or some other foreigner to travel along the Spanish coast and remain in some town in Galicia," advising the British embassy at Paris of motions and preparations there and of what ships lay in Biscayan ports. And he emphatically exonerated Stanhope from any blame for the offensive conduct of the court of Spain, promising him on his return to England, as a mark of the king's approval, a seat in parliament, so that he might expose there the late transactions as an eye-witness of them.²

As a fact, so far from what was alleged against Charles VI, he was always endeavouring to dissuade Philip V from entering on hostilities. Königsegg, acting on instructions of 20 October, had remonstrated both against the attack upon Gibraltar and the final action through Pozobueno.³ Hence, probably, the temporary dissatisfaction with him that Stanhope had observed.

The permission given to Stanhope to stay on at Madrid, and the civil treatment accorded to Pozobueno, were advanced at Paris as proof that George I, in spite of everything, was resolved to behave towards Spain with "as much temper and moderation as is consistent with his honour and dignity and with the safety of his own dominions and those of his allies." Newcastle expected this to convince "that tho' his Majesty is solidly providing against the ill effect of the union between the Emperor and Spain, yet he is not insisting upon trifles or punctilios, or exasperating his Catholick Majesty wherever he can avoid it." He agreed in suspecting the

¹ 23 December 1726 (o.s.), R.O. Holland 292.

² 22 December (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

³ Syveton, p. 240.

threatened attack on Gibraltar to be but a feint for an expedition against England from Cadiz, and while disclaiming all apprehension took occasion to assert confidence in help from France against any attack, whether Austrian or Spanish. He sent for communication the instructions given to Sir Charles Wager, named for command off the Spanish coasts, and again made note of the precautions taken for protection of the private property on board the flota or galleons.¹

Robinson, on submitting this to Fleury, received the usual assurance that nothing that was proper should be wanting on the part of France. But at further interviews he found the cardinal unwilling to make formal declaration, as desired, that an attack on Gibraltar would oblige offensive action on the part of France, he pleaded that such might be taken but as gasconade and that action was required, not words. Robinson opposing the effect in encouraging the allies, in the end Fleury said that there was no need for the declaration, for but a week since he had written to the king of Spain in the sense of it, namely (quoting the opening words of the letter), that the enterprise against Gibraltar was regarded as a declaration of war, precluding all hope of peaceful accommodation. He said further that in his own hand he had furnished Fénelon in Holland with strongest assurances of the firmness of France, without reserve of consideration for Spain, that he would write to George I promising to make common cause about Gibraltar, and that he would move Massei to let Aldobrandini know the same. From several of his expressions Robinson gathered that he was greatly piqued against Philip V : "he cannot speak of him with patience, or in any other terms but of *un opiniâtré et d'un fou*."

Yet, in Robinson's opinion, "the article of Spain is a sore place which the Cardinal does not love should be touched," not indeed, it seemed, from any remains of affection for that power,—rather, he strongly approved his Majesty's measures—but from apprehension of the burden of a war. Seeing that he had written to Fénelon "to hasten the Dutch to form immediately a general plan for the operations of an early and vigorous campaign, and probably has wrote with the more warmth to remove all their suspicions," perhaps, Robinson suggested, use could be made of his evident pique to direct the plan desired against Spain, as his Majesty and the States-General wished.

For the rest Robinson reported great alarm at news to hand that Admiral Castañeta had reached Havana and was expected home with the flota about Christmas time, and that the South Sea Company's ship, the *Prince Frederick*, reported to have five millions of

¹ To Robinson, same date, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

treasure on board, had been seized on the pretext of her endeavouring to sail without permission. He recounted Fleury to be in great fear about the treasure on the flota, to regret that there had not been time to order Hosier to Matanzas Bay to intercept it, and to believe that the king of Spain would certainly seize the effects "and lavish them away upon the Emperor."¹

Meanwhile, on 26 December (o.s.), had been received in London Stanhope's detailed reasons for thinking an immediate attack upon Gibraltar "absolutely certain" and an expedition against England from Cadiz "morally so, thô not altogether so immediate, . . . as certain as anything can be, of which there is not an absolute demonstration." For the siege he reported 47 battalions of infantry² and 42 squadrons of cavalry and dragoons on the march, with near 100 pieces of siege artillery, and all the generals,³ Count de las Torres in chief command, gone from Madrid and ordered to be at their posts about Gibraltar by the first of January. Evidence for the expedition from Cadiz he adduced from the activities of Ormonde, looked on "as the chief author and promoter of the intended siege" against the opinion of all the generals and officers to be employed in it, from open talk of the Scotch Jesuits, from the intention of the duke of Liria to visit Bologna (where James Edward was now holding his court)⁴ and Vienna on his way to Russia, evidently to concert a plan, from the armaments at Cadiz,⁵ and chiefly from the actual readiness of 300,000 rations of sea-provision there and of 2,000,000 more wanted for February; this learnt at great pains and in the strictest confidence from the contractor himself, Du Plessis,⁶ whom, further, Patiño had told that he would have twenty men-of-war ready at Cadiz for any expedition by the end of February. For this he could only account by expectation of the arrival of the flota, long

¹ Robinson, 4 and 8 January 1727, *ibid.*

² The list (enclosed) included 29 Spanish battalions, 4 Irish, 4 Italian and 10 Walloon.

³ Six lieutenant-generals, ten major-generals, "and a proportionable number of brigadiers."

⁴ We read in the *Lettres historiques* (lxxi. 129) of the brilliance of the court at Bologna, of secret dispatches and unknown persons constantly arriving and departing, of continual conferences, and of the Chevalier's "air de gayeté et de satisfaction extraordinaire."

⁵ Five men-of-war already there; one of 80 guns expected shortly from Genoa; the *San Carlos*, 70, and *San Felipe*, 80, ordered thither (these being the ships that had sailed for the West Indies but had been forced back, the one into Corunna, the other into Vigo); two building at Santander, to be completed in about a month; others pretended to have been bought at and to be coming from Ostend and other places. The *San Carlos*, we learn from news-letters, was commanded by an Irishman, Mark Forest, or Forester, who later, on his arrival at Cadiz, was thrown into prison on the accusation of having struck his colours to Admiral Hopson on meeting him off Cape St. Vincent (*cf.* p. 635).

⁶ "Whose veracity may be entirely depended upon, althô he is the most intimate friend Sr Patiño hath in the world."

since ordered to risk the voyage from Havana to the Canaries, where the squadron from Cadiz would join it and enable it to force its way home in spite of Hopson. He repeated that he could not see why the king should prosecute a siege of Gibraltar, "so directly contrary to the opinion of everybody about him," unless to cover some enterprise of greater importance, which must be an invasion of England. All explanations were denied him; on the ground of Pozobueno's declaration that no complaints could be answered, while British fleets remained in the West Indies and on the coasts of Spain, De la Paz refused "either by word or writing to treat with me upon any matter or business of what nature soever." He would have left Madrid forthwith, but that he thought he might possibly be of service in gaining information about schemes in favour of the Pretender.

For all that, Stanhope went on, the king's situation was "certainly as difficult and as disagreeable a one as can be imagin'd," he being plainly reduced by the queen to servile obedience to the emperor "contrary to the dictates of his own judgment inclination and interests" and in spite of tormenting doubt of Austrian sincerity. And yet he was "more bent and resolute upon immediately beginning a warr than the Emperor himself." This Stanhope could only account for by supposing him to be tired of the frequent remittances of money to Vienna and the daily importunity for more, and to wish to try the emperor's good faith by testing his readiness to send aid; if he found himself deceived, he would have an honourable pretext for rejoining his former friends. Alternatively, the courts of Madrid and Vienna might be counting on the safe return of the *flota* early in February, and so would venture an invasion of England as a stroke against the Hanover alliance.¹

In view of these advices it was thought proper, as on former occasions, to call upon the Dutch for the military aid to which they were engaged by treaties. William Finch was informed that "a bold and desperate push with a strong body of forces upon this country" appearing to be "absolutely resolved on," with the object of obtaining for the king of Spain, whether by success or failure, release from his embarrassing engagements with the emperor; and there being left in the kingdom only eleven regiments of foot and three of the Guards, a great part of them quartered in Scotland and not to be removed thence save at too great hazard; while parliament, although to be relied upon to vote a sufficient force for all purposes, could not meet before the end of January, so that the troops could not be ready before the spring; therefore the king

¹ Stanhope, 21 December 1726, R.O. Spain 95.

would have five or six thousand Dutch held ready to come over. It was argued that the emperor could attempt nothing against Holland for some months, having nothing ready, and stated that like application was being made to the king of Denmark for 6,000 men, and to the dukes of Wolfenbüttel and Würtemberg and others. Promise was made that the Dutch troops should be so quartered in England that in case of sudden emergency they could be sent back at once, and in any case as soon as the country was sufficiently provided or the Spanish designs abandoned. Finch was instructed, if the "friends" thought well, to ask for the help publicly, but if they saw insuperable difficulties to open the affair to no-one else. And in addition, for five or six men-of-war to join the Channel squadron. For otherwise, although the king had fifty ships manned, a sufficient force could not be spared for the Baltic again to defend Sweden against Russia and to protect the transport of her 12,000 men, with the result that her accession to the treaty of Hanover would be valueless. It was added that Saint-Saphorin's latest advices that the emperor's chief aim was against Hanover rendered the king's Hanoverians and Hessians of most service there.¹

A week later French attention was called to a road that the Spaniards were constructing from their head-quarters at Algeciras to Cadiz, "for the more easy march of their troops to this last place, where, according to all our advices, they are to embark in order to their expedition hither." And while Newcastle doubted the return of the flota, latest advices from Havana reporting everything there in the greatest confusion, he directed attention to ships fitting out, it was supposed for the Pretender, at St. Malo, and arms being collected on that coast, and desired Fleury's attention to be called to the matter. "There was certainly," he said, "and that very lately a design of this nature."²

For Swedish consumption, on the other hand, a very different situation was pictured. No anxiety, Poyntz was assured, was entertained about Gibraltar, in view of the strength of the garrison and the reinforcements going out, and there was little expectation of seeing Castañeta or the flota for many months. "As for the descent, it is so chimerical, that if the strongest bigotry did not rule the councils one would think it would never enter into a reasonable man's thoughts."³

¹ Townshend to Finch, 30 December (o.s.), R.O. Holland 292.

² Newcastle to Robinson, 5 January (o.s.) 1727, B.M. Add. MS. 32749. In his next dispatch, of the 10th, he objected to the Clare and other Irish regiments in the French service being quartered "on the French coast towards England."

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 6 January (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 46.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE DANISH NEGOTIATION

DURING the summer of 1726 the British and French governments continued to debate between themselves the conditions of the convention to be proposed to Denmark for the supply of troops. A new draft sent from London under date 19 June assumed the certainty now of a Russian invasion of North Germany, and declared the principal object of the proposed convention to be to succour Denmark actually and effectively. The arrangements already agreed were recorded, and it was asserted that French troops had full right under the constitutions of the empire, as well as by strongest treaty obligations, to enter Germany in case of trouble raised by Russia or any other power. In comment Newcastle laid emphasis on the convention, as now drawn, not being "confin'd singly to the security of the king of Denmark, or to oppose the attempts that may be made from Muscovy, but equally to all such as may come from any quarter"; especially, "by this way of turning it, the king of Prussia will more easily see both what he is to hope and to fear, according to his future behaviour." ¹

Horatio Walpole found the French ministers disposed to accept the amendments, save (principally) that they desired so to turn the reasons for stationing a French army on the Rhine or Moselle as not to give umbrage to the princes of Germany, and to be free to employ the 12,000 Danes to be taken into French pay wherever required. Frederick IV, he reported, while willing to furnish 24,000 men, would limit their service to Lower Saxony, required the half of them to be hired by France on the terms arranged with Great Britain and Holland in 1701, and considered the number asked for his reserve corps too great. This, and Wedderkop's account of an interview with Morville, Walpole termed "as favorable in general as could be expected." But naturally he was asked, what Danish engagements with England were, and what the rate of pay referred to? And he found the limitation of service of the hired

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 8 June (o.s.) 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 32746, arguing the case in full.

troops to be held unreasonable. Newcastle replied that the only recent engagement with Denmark was the guarantee of Sleswick, that the last treaty of alliance was of 1667, and that although a new one had been earnestly sought from Copenhagen for two years past the proposals had been declined, his Majesty being resolved to do nothing but in concert with France whether in the north or south. He sent a copy of the convention of 1701 for troops and was glad to think that the court of France was disposed to spend money, seeing that Bavaria and Cologne had been lost for want of it.¹ Shortly Walpole reported agreement to have the convention put into form in England for French consideration and subsequent dispatch to Copenhagen. He surmised rumour of abandonment of the Russian projects of invasion to have produced a disposition not to hurry, and himself saw some advantage in the method proposed, since the convention would thus embody his Majesty's views.²

This advice reached London just when minds there were so sadly exercised about Fleury's advances at Vienna. He, Newcastle wrote, should be shown the necessity of taking some vigorous measure, and none better than immediate conclusion of the convention, to draft which in England would be advantageous. "His Majesty is on his part determined to give them no pretence not to conclude with Denmark. . . . The King will now have a fair handle to give such a turn to it, as may put them upon giving a proof of their sincerity."³ Walpole was able to return assurance of strongest resolution on the part of the French ministers to finish the convention "with all possible expedition," a proper person having been found to go to Copenhagen as ambassador, as also to stand to their engagements whether against Spain, in spite of the strong desire for reconciliation with that power, or against the emperor.⁴

In the new draft sent from England on 12 July deference was paid to the French objection to send troops into Germany, excepting on lawful requisition under the treaties of Westphalia. Reference to their passing the Rhine was omitted, the requirement running that the king of France should have always ready a body of 30,000 men to serve wherever his guarantee of Sleswick and the safety of the allies should demand. An additional clause provided for succour by the army in North Germany to the king of Prussia, should a Russian or other force enter his dominions in spite of anticipated refusal of permission on his part.

The French did not like this general engagement for their army.

¹ H. Walpole, 25 June to 2 July, enclosing a translation of the royal rescript to Wedderkop; Newcastle in reply, 24 June (o.s.); *ibid.*

² H. Walpole, 6 July, *ibid.*

³ Newcastle to him, 29 June and 1 July (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ H. Walpole, 13 July, *ibid.*

They proposed to state in one article (the ninth) that the king of France, although bound to no fixed succour to Denmark, was willing, in order further to assure the success of the combined force, to send across the Rhine not fewer than 30,000 men to make diversions on requisition by the kings of England and Denmark (as princes of the empire) to fulfil his guarantees of the treaties of Westphalia, and by the next to stipulate requisition by the diet also, and efforts to obtain the concurrence of other German princes. The Prussian clause they accepted. For the rest the amended document laid obligation on the king of Denmark to keep as near as possible to the frontier of Holstein 24,000 regular troops fully equipped and ready to march wherever necessary to oppose entry of the Russians into Germany (other 10,000 men to be held in reserve); on the king of England to have his 12,000 Hessians and his Hanoverians ready to join the Danish army as soon as the Russians began their march; and on the king of France to take half of the 24,000 Danes into his pay, on a reduced scale were such 12,000 employed for the king of Denmark's service only, and to furnish a subsidy quarterly for four years.

There were, besides, four secret articles. The first forbade the king of Denmark to hire out troops to any other power without consent of the king of France and required him not to support but rather to oppose any contrary project. The second allowed him full pay for his troops, should they be required to serve elsewhere than for his own protection. The fourth provided for communication of the convention to the king and republic of Poland to animate them against allowing the passage of Russian troops. The third brought in a novelty: concert in advance on means for amicably satisfying the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and getting him to accept a reasonable indemnity for his loss of Sleswick.

Summoned to discuss the French amendments on 22 July Walpole, amongst other criticisms, wanted the place of assembly of the army of the north to be wherever most convenient, and omission of specification of the Hessians for his master's contingent. But his strong objections were to the third secret article and to the conditions of the French troops entering Germany.

Without taking notice of its not being proper to make the treaties of Westphalia the basis of this treaty, when the chief aim of our adversaries was to destroy the treaty of Hanover, notwithstanding Sleswick was the pretext, yet I could not but observe that the requisition to be made by his Majesty and the king of Denmark in the 9th article with regard to the thirty thousand French troops, and the application to be made by the 10th article at the diet of Ratisbonne for the concurrence of the other princes of Lower Saxony, put such a restraint upon the use to be made of those troops, and gave the Emperor such

an opportunity and advantage in caballing among the princes of the Empire against us, that I thought it was better to leave that article of the thirty thousand men entirely out, than to insert it under such restrictions.

The Holstein article he attributed to the frequently expressed persuasion of the French that only by finding satisfaction for the duke could Sweden be brought over, Morville having expatiated much on the great effect which the concession would have in the coming Swedish riksdag. He argued the incongruity of stipulating an equivalent for Sleswick, when nothing was said about the king of Denmark being maintained in possession of the duchy. In fine, he advanced the English plan as "plain, simple and inoffensive, and to which I did not perceive they had made the least objection." Fleury he stated to have heard his arguments with great attention and without interruption and to have concluded the conference by asking Morville for the draft to criticise. He had only to add that in subsequent private conference with the bishop he had earnestly represented "the uneasiness and speculations" likely to be roused in England after the delays and difficulties already encountered, and with regard to the French army on the Rhine had desired only some expression "to shew the just apprehension of the treaties of Westphalia as well as that of Hanover being violated by the invasion of the Muscovites, and consequently the reason of France agreeing to have a body of troops at hand to support their guaranties, and to succour their allies."

That Morville's objections proceeded from any desire to defeat or delay the convention Walpole did not believe, ascribing them rather to those groundless fears of alarming the princes of the empire which so oppressed him and D'Huxelles. He was inclined to credit them with an honest conviction that those princes might more readily be gained by basing the convention on the treaties of Westphalia rather than on securing Sleswick to Denmark and preventing disturbance in the north.¹

In England strong objection was taken to the Holstein article as "of very fatal consequence" both to the value of the guarantees of Sleswick given to the king of Denmark and at Stockholm, where

¹ H. Walpole, 24 July, *ibid.* Enclosed was a copy of the French draft with his detailed observations, as sent to Morville with a "*Déduction abrégée des faits concernant les garanties du duché de Sleswick.*" This recalled the fact that the Danes had first occupied the duchy when at war with Sweden in conjunction with Russia and cited the guarantees given by George I in 1715 as elector and in 1719 as king and the formal guarantees of 1720 (see on these matters Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 71, 386, 396-7). It was observed that the late tsar could not ask for restoration of the duchy and that mention of an equivalent had been made only in the electoral convention of 1715, and then in the lightest and most ambiguous manner as to be settled at a congress (that of Brunswick) which had never met.

the friends would be discouraged and the Holstein party fortified. The conduct of the duke and his adherents was asserted to afford no reason for consideration of his claims or change of policy towards him. On the other matter, Newcastle insisted, support of the engagements of Hanover was a chief end of the convention and application to Ratisbon an impossible and very dangerous doctrine, for which no precedent could be found in four large folio volumes of treaties between France and princes of the empire consulted. He foreboded confirmation of the king of Prussia's fears, on observation of the difficulties raised about assisting any prince of the empire, and augmentation of Austrian pride and vanity, an argument which would especially tell with France. He adverted again to the great concern of George I that the convention should go on so slowly, and hoped that the French court would see the necessity of reference to Sleswick in a manner agreeable to the king of Denmark.¹

Most of Walpole's objections were met. The preamble to an amended draft handed him on 31 July based the convention on the real ground for believing that the Russians or their adherents might soon concert means of attacking Denmark in order to recover for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp Sleswick, of which the kings of England and France were guarantors, with other projects contrary to the peace of Lower Germany; for which reason the parties interested must take precautions against such or anything else antagonistic to the treaty of Hanover, a treaty specially confirming those of Westphalia, and put themselves in a condition to execute their guarantees faithfully. In the eighth clause the nationality of the troops to be provided by the king of England was no longer specified.² The ninth and tenth were thrown into one and the conditions of requisition dropped. On the other hand the secret Holstein article was but slightly altered by bringing in a reference to the promise of 1715 to refer the duke's satisfaction to the congress of Brunswick.³

This the British government termed nonsense, and to the whole

¹ Newcastle in reply, 18 July (o.s.), *ibid.* 32747.

² On this point Walpole was informed later: "As to what your Ex^{ty} mentions of the King promising the 12,000 men in the convention *en qualité d'Electeur*, that is a distinction that should at all times and upon all occasions be avoided as much as possible, for the very reason that the Imperialists and the Muscovites, on their part, take all opportunity of making it. All honest men in the parliam^t will easily see that England is not to be at the expence, since no provision is made or asked for it here, nor even as yet for the 12,000 Hessians, the not mentioning of whom in the draught of the convention has been with this view, that the landgrave should not immediately call upon us for subsidies, which he would certainly have done had it stipulated that these 12,000 Hessians should be part of his Ma^{ty}'s quota to be furnisht in pursuance of that convention" (Delafaye to him, 11 August (o.s.), R.O. France 184).

³ Copy delivered to and forwarded by H. Walpole on 31 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

article former objections were repeated. It was deemed necessary to admit it, but only as recast in the following form, designed to render it innocuous.

Comme ce n'est pas assés de prévoir les cas où la guerre pourroit survenir, et qu'il est nécessaire en même tems de détruire d'avance, s'il est possible, jusqu'aux moindres apparences qui pourroient la rallumer, l'on seroit convenu par le présent traité de concerter amiablement sur les moyens de trouver un dédommagement convenable au duc de Holsteyn pour la perte qu'il a faite du Sleswick, si la conduite de la Czarine et du dit duc n'avoit été depuis quelque temps, et ne continuoit d'être encore actuellement telle envers les trois couronnes, qu'elles ne peuvent avec bienséance se mêler présentement de ce qui regarde le duc de Holsteyn ; cependant on est convenu que si ces dites puissances changent de conduite envers les parties contractantes de ce traité, le Roy T.C., Sa M. Brit^{que} et S. M. Danoise concerteront alors entre eux amiablement et sans delai sur les moyens de trouver un dédommagement raisonnable pour le duc de Holsteyn à l'égard du Sleswick, et l'on conviendra ensuite des mesures pour faire accepter par le dit duc le dédommagement dont on sera convenu.

In this form, Newcastle argued, the article would meet French views about its facilitating the work in Sweden, while making compensation to the duke depend upon his future conduct would dispose him and the tsaritsa to better ways ; and the substitution of the word " dédommagement " for " indemnité " would render acceptance on the part of Denmark easier, because the latter word seemed to imply wrongful dispossession. There was nothing to which the king of Denmark should object, nothing about his finding an equivalent or satisfaction ; yet, should he be determined not to admit it, it were better not to lose the other important provisions of the convention by insisting on it.¹ Townshend, for his part, boasted of its emptiness. The intention, he said, was to rebut the charges of pitilessness towards the duke everywhere levelled against Great Britain and France.² It was not at all probable that he and the tsaritsa, who had just acceded to the treaty of Vienna, would change their conduct, and if they did the contracting powers would still have to deliberate on what could be done and afterwards to concert measures for procuring acceptance of their decision. On the whole treaty Glenorchy was desired to emphasise the good fortune of Denmark in acquiring full and ample provision for her defence, whereas the existing guarantees of Sleswick carried no such undertaking, and also the support of France. As an argument to be held in reserve an offer previously made of ten or twelve men-of-war in addition to the

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 26 July (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Especially the king of Prussia and the Swedes " pressing that some regard should be had for that prince."

troops stipulated was repeated.¹ A consequential amendment was omission from the preamble of reference to the British and French guarantees of Sleswick, on the ground of incongruity.

French views were set out in instructions prepared for the chevalier Pierre Blouet de Camilly,² named to go as ambassador to Copenhagen as the result, it was stated, of reiterated instances by the kings of Denmark and England. Count Brancas, he was informed, had been sent to Sweden in consequence of the tsaritsa's evident intention of making war on behalf of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and he and Poyntz were believed to have so far succeeded that the Swedes would oppose rather than assist her. It was hardly yet time to enter into particulars about an indemnity for the duke ; more pressing to extend the precautions of which the measures taken with Sweden were a part. The spirit of the convention was declared to be, in chief, assurance to the king of Denmark of present succour and of considerable solace ("soulagement") in the future, were he attacked in consequence of his possession of Sleswick. The Holstein article was declared, even such as it was, to have been obtained only with the greatest difficulty, the king of England refusing absolutely to enter into any specific undertakings. His ministers could not deny the justice, still less the necessity of indemnifying the duke, for not only had that been agreed to verbally at the time of the pacification of the north but previously it had been promised to refer his claims immediately to a congress. It was all but certain that the king of England had agreed with the king of Denmark to contribute half the indemnity, and it could not be doubted that here was the real reason for his recalcitrance on various unfounded pretexts. To discover the truth of this Camilly must treat the compact as well known and indubitable. No doubt the Danish ministers would raise great difficulties about the article, and probably Glenorchy, though formally instructed otherwise, would support them underhand. But Camilly must hold out no hope that the king of France would recede from it ; he must argue the continual alarms and trouble caused, the impossibility of a British squadron coming to the Baltic every year, the uncertainty of a continued good disposition on the part of the Swedes, and so on. He must insist

¹ Townshend to Glenorchy, 22 August (o.s.), R.O. Denmark 49, and to Söhlenthal, 26 August (o.s.), *ibid.* and Foreign Entry Book 245. Söhlenthal was reminded that it had never been ventured to present the guarantee of Sleswick to parliament, and so it could hardly be brought into force, whereas, embodied in the present convention, it could be presented boldly.

² A Knight of Malta, says H. Walpole (16 July) and formerly captain of a man-of-war. There had been no French ambassador at Copenhagen since the recall of Count de Chamilly in 1702, chiefly in consequence of difficulties about the Danish royal title. In order that Camilly might get away more quickly and avoid such difficulties on his arrival he was given characters both as ambassador and as plenipotentiary, to treat in the latter and to sign finally in the former.

that the true solution was to conciliate the duke and remove his sense of unjust oppression. The article must neither be abandoned nor postponed for consideration after the treaty was signed.

On other points of the convention Camilly was instructed as follows. Should the Danish ministers presume on the king of France's readiness to furnish succour, they must be reminded that his guarantee of Sleswick bound him no further than to the exertion of good offices and that anything more was purely gratuitous. This reflection, however, true as it was, should be advanced only in case of necessity. The king of France had his own reasons for befriending Denmark against the northern powers who would trouble her, and if, having a choice of means thereto, he preferred to specify succour, he ought not to be met with objections. The subsidy and payment of troops offered were not obliged by any particular engagement but accorded as distinguished marks of amity and as an indication of what the king of Denmark might expect, if he responded suitably.

Next were explained the reasons for the reduced scale of pay. The present case, it was pointed out, was quite different from that of 1701. Now the primary question was the defence of Denmark, in which the king of France was interested only indirectly. And if there were no war the money would be wasted. So that it was sufficient for him to hire the Danish troops at half the former cost. Doubtless there would be disappointment, but he would not pay more, would rather increase the subsidy in amount or period, but that Camilly must not let out to ministers "*aussi avantageux en matière de négociation que sont ceux du Nord en général, et en particulier ceux du Danemark.*"

The article about Prussia was designated as relative to the late conduct of that king, expected to allow the Russian troops to pass, and as inserted only because the convention had to be communicated to him. That the second separate article in no way engaged the Danes to the alliance of Hanover, Camilly could easily show; in fact, it was not the king's intention to invite them to accede to that treaty. One reason for this, to be known to Camilly only, was that he did not wish to exchange his simple and indeterminate guarantee of Sleswick for one stipulating succour.

Other matters dealt with were commercial relations, with special reference to the Sound tolls; conditions at the Danish court, for instance, the discord between the king and the crown prince; the affair of East Friesland, in which Camilly was ordered to support the Dutch; and the manner of his audience. At that he was to omit the usual practice of presenting credentials because the king of Denmark would not receive letters without the royal title, a "*grâce*

nouvelle " which the king of France would only grant in return for particular considerations, such as the signing of a treaty. His credentials as ambassador, which allowed the title, he was not to present till the convention was signed or assured. But he was to explain this to the ministers without concealment and offer to show an unsigned copy of the credentials, if necessary.¹

It remained to settle the difficult ninth article, which now, as altered in England, specified the obligations of service for the Hanoverian reserve corps as well as for the French army, in order, it was explained, to render them identical. Each was to be employed, the wording ran, "à renforcer l'armée combinée, s'il en est besoin, ou à faire les diversions nécessaires pour la seureté des alliés dans l'Empire, ou dans le Nord." This obligation the French absolutely refused, but in the end, when Walpole pleaded for some phrase of the same effect in aspect and which might particularly impress the king of Prussia, Fleury proposed the service to be "partout où le besoin sera."² When, however, Broglie submitted the new draft in London, it was found that the words objected to were simply omitted. In disregard of this (Morville subsequently pleaded oversight) Fleury's phrasing, somewhat modified, was adopted in a copy of the convention sent off to Glenorchy. The French acquiesced, save for insertion of the words "et où l'on conviendra" after "où le besoin sera," and that addition was assented to, ostensibly, in England, Newcastle expressing the hope that the draft was now finally settled.³ Shortly, however, Glenorchy was instructed that omission of the new words was desired, though he must leave objection to them to the Danish ministers and not support it, if Camilly insisted on their retention.⁴

After Camilly had left Paris Walpole learnt that in the copy of the convention given him the phrasing of the ninth article was still not as agreed, but he believed that the English wording, with the addition of "où l'on conviendra," would be adopted, if insisted on.⁵ When, however, cognisance was had in the usual way of dispatches coming to Broglie it was found that, while on the whole he had communicated their contents "very fairly," he had "left out industriously" a passage showing that the court of France did not intend to march

¹ Instructions to Camilly, 18 August, *Recueil des instructions*, xiii. 111-126, B.M. Add. MS. 15092. In the affair of East Friesland, the contest between that prince and his burghers of Emden, Danish troops had marched to support the prince. Townshend's protest, 5 July (o.s.), and Glenorchy's reply, 30 July, R.O. Denmark 49. See on the affair Itterssum, 9 July, R.O. Holland 284, a "species facti" of the end of 1724, Prussia 105, and much else in the correspondence with the Hague, Vienna and Berlin.

² H. Walpole, 13 August, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

³ Newcastle to him, 22 August (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ Townshend to Glenorchy, 30 August (o.s.), R.O. Denmark 49.

⁵ H. Walpole, 3 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

its 30,000 men to the aid of its allies in the north or in any part of Lower Saxony. This "plain declaration of their sentiments," said Newcastle, obliged the king not only to insist on having the amendments to the ninth article, last sent, accepted, but also on assurance that, in case the force stipulated under the convention should prove insufficient, no difficulty would be made about sending the French aid either to the north or for such operations as should be deemed proper, namely, "*partout où le besoin sera*," as in the draft sent to Glenorchy. That had been judged conformable to French opinion and accompanied by instructions to admit of no alteration, and it was hoped that Fleury would procure orders for Camilly in accordance. The addition of the words "*et où l'on conviendra*" his Majesty, while not approving, did not absolutely refuse. Walpole must remind Fleury of the former uneasiness of some of the French ministers about French troops marching into the empire and their consequent preference for diversions towards Flanders or on the Upper Rhine, and must show from the difficulty made about the ninth article that those fears still persisted; and so lay before him his Majesty's thoughts, namely,

that nothing will bring the Emperor to reason and prevent the ill consequences of the late alliance between him and the Czarina, and also hinder the other princes in Germany from taking part against us, but the seeing that France is in earnest to joyn with his Majesty in support of the treaty of Hanover, and that not only by furnishing their quota in the manner proposed in the convention but also, in case that should not be sufficient, by marching into the Empire. . . . Whereas the making diversions only would be of little or no use, nor would the Emperor value either the loss of a town or two in Flanders, or the ransacking of Swabia or any part of the Empire contiguous to France, in which he may have little or no concern.

The action advised would be of great significance to him and spoil his plans. For even should the king of Prussia continue to act as of late, how could he stand against the great army that would be gathered, not to mention the naval force in the Baltic? Yet, Newcastle concluded, for all this said, not the least suspicion of Fleury's integrity existed.¹

Fleury, when Walpole attacked him on the subject, professed extreme surprise that Camilly's copy of the convention should have been worded as it was. He gave the strongest assurances that so long as he had any credit France would support his Majesty in defence of his electoral and all other interests, and undertook to declare to Fonseca at the first opportunity that any attempt by the emperor against Hanover would entail a rupture. He invited Walpole to attend a meeting appointed for the next morning with

¹ Newcastle in reply, 2 September (o.s.), *ibid.*

Morville and D'Huxelles to consider the foreign dispatches before the Council met, promising to support his views about the ninth article "in a naturall and proper manner" without the other ministers knowing of their previous agreement. As the result, on Fleury's counsel and "explication that the treaty of Hanover was to be the basis of all our measures and councils," the article was "finally agreed and settled" as follows.

Et quoique leurs Majestez Très-Chrétienne et Britannique ne soient obligées à aucun secours fixe envers le roi de Danemarck, cependant comme Elles veulent éloigner des états de ce prince toute invasion, dont la suite seroit sans doute d'allumer le feu de la guerre, en violation du traité d'Hanovre aussi bien que des traitéz de Westphalie, qui les obligeroient d'aller au soutien de leurs garanties et au soutien de leurs alliez qui seroient en souffrance ou en danger d'être attaquez ; à cette fin sa dite M.T.C. s'engage de tenir toujours prêt un corps au moins de 30^m hommes, lequel corps sera destiné, dès qu'Elle en sera requise, à être porté partout où le besoin sera, et dont on conviendra, ou à faire des diversions ou autres opérations nécessaires pour l'avantage commun et pour le sûreté des alliez dans l'Empire, ou dans le Nord, et en même tems sa dite Majesté Britannique s'engage de tenir aussi en état un autre corps de troupes, qui ne pourra être moindre de 12^m hommes, pour être destiné de la même manière à être porté partout où le besoin sera, et dont on conviendra, ou à faire des diversions ou autres opérations nécessaires pour la sûreté de ses alliez dans l'Empire, ou dans le Nord, selon que le cas l'exigera.¹

Arrived at Copenhagen on 23 September Camilly found the Danes in no hurry to conclude. The alarms of the summer were past, and six months lay open to them for bargaining.² In the first place an audience was denied him until he should present his credentials allowing Frederick IV the title of "Majesty," a thing forbidden him by his instructions, as we have seen. It appeared that Wedderkop had given private information that no difficulty would be made about the matter, and Frederick stood obstinately on his dignity. Had he known what Camilly's orders were, Glenorchy was told, he would never have assented to his coming but would have had the negotiation conducted at Paris.

There, says Horatio Walpole, the Danish demand was denounced as "a thing never heard of before between two crowns." Hope was expressed to him that every effort would be made with Söhlenthal in London and by Glenorchy to remove this "unprecedented restriction" and all further hindrance to a negotiation "which at the present juncture requires the most expeditious dispatch and con-

¹ H. Walpole, 20 September, holograph, *ibid.* He lauded Fleury's behaviour highly, "altho indeed it is no more than what is usuall in all his actions where the common cause is concerned."

² Cf. Holm, pp. 161-2.

clusion." The title, Camilly was informed again, would be accorded only for some particular consideration, such as conclusion of a treaty.¹ In England also the demand was held to be quite unnecessary and clearly a device to find out whether the title, "so long and earnestly sought for," were to be granted or no. The king of France, Glenorchy was told, fully intended to allow it, but would not have it extorted. Unless the Danes would "lay aside all chicane and come roundly to the main points of this important business" his Majesty might have to think of other measures; Camilly would be recalled "and then the whole business, which is so much in favour of Denmark, will intirely drop."

The arrangement come to after a whole month's wrangle was that Camilly should negotiate through Glenorchy. Thereon he was received by the king without ceremony as a private person,² and Glenorchy handed in the draft convention. The compromise was approved both at London and Paris; on the English side Camilly's "temper and moderation" in agreeing were praised and Glenorchy was urged to do his utmost, not as a mediator but acting in concert with his colleague, to hear objections and devise expedients, for the situation in Europe required it.³

Before this arrangement was effected it was learnt through the Hanoverian envoy, General Bothmer, that the Danes objected to the Holstein article and asserted that they could only make up the number of troops required by withdrawals from Norway. On this point Townshend argued that Norway would be sufficiently secured by the British fleet and that the convention, it was hoped, would be followed by a good understanding with Sweden, with great resulting benefit to Denmark. The Holstein article, as last drafted, he upheld, descanting on its reasonableness and advantage: "not only the Czarina and the D. of Holstein, but great numbers in Sweden would be very glad to see the court of Denmark act so unreasonable a part as to refuse to come into this article."⁴ Newcastle wrote to Paris that his Majesty would not depart from any point of it, as settled with France, and that Glenorchy was instructed to represent in strongest terms the ill consequences of refusing a convention, one of whose chief objects was the king of Denmark's own security.⁵

Regarding the difference in the ninth article between the French

¹ Instructions to Camilly, 28 September, B.M. Add. MS. 15092.

² As Camilly himself put it: "comme un étranger et un homme de condition qui voyage." In that character he was agreeably received (*ibid.*).

³ Dispatches from and to Glenorchy, 24 September to 29 October, R.O. Denmark 49; H. Walpole, 15 and 25 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

⁴ Townshend to Glenorchy, 4 October (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁵ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 6 October (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

and English drafts Glenorchy found that Camilly professed to be instructed to present his own separately and let the Danish ministers choose between the two. Camilly admitted, however, that this was only suggested as an expedient and believed that he might alter in accordance with Glenorchy's form; whence the latter judged his orders to be to try to get his copy passed, but not to insist on it. When he received the form as finally agreed with France he found Camilly to have been in possession of it for some time past but to have wished to get his own presented.¹ He was instructed: "Now France and we are perfectly of one mind as to the whole of the convention your Lord^p has nothing to do but to consult with that minister and to push the negociation as well as you can with the utmost vigour and unanimity." And again: "The convention is to be your Lord^p's fixed rule, and all your endeavours must be bent, in conjunction with M^r. de Camilly, to bring that to bear."² Then, on finding nothing in Glenorchy's dispatch of 19 October beyond news of the safe return of the Baltic fleet, Townshend administered a sharp rebuke. He supposed him to be amusing himself in the country or otherwise neglectful. "The King does expect both an earnest and assiduous application to his business under your management and a constant and most exact account of the progress you make in it"; if he failed it would be the worse for him.³

This was hasty, for Glenorchy, when he wrote, had not received his important instructions of 30 September (o.s.). When they came he at once communicated their purport to the ministers and advised them to admit Camilly to a conference. He found them apparently persuaded of the necessity of the convention but dissatisfied with the amount of the subsidy offered—Camilly had set down 200,000 rix dollars annually as the sum—and wanting the Holstein article postponed. They intimated that that, with increased subsidies and a guarantee of British naval help, would make the rest easy. Glenorchy offered insertion of a stipulation for the naval help if they would accept the article, which was necessary and of advantage to Denmark. About the subsidies he desired the ministers to speak to Camilly, so engaging them to meet that minister and hoping by degrees to get the difficulty of treating with him removed.⁴

Townshend in reply insisted peremptorily on retention of the Holstein article and argued an annual subsidy of 200,000 rix dollars for four years to be no small sum, "considering the Danes may happen to have it for doing nothing" but keeping troops ready to

¹ Glenorchy, 5 and 8 October, R.O. Denmark 49. The English form had, in fact, been sent to Camilly under date 17 September (B.M. Add. MS. 15092, f. 47).

² Townshend to him, 11 and 18 October (o.s.), *ibid*.

³ The same, 25 October (o.s.), private.

⁴ Glenorchy, 22 and 26 October, *ibid*.

defend themselves. He pointed out that the French guarantee of Sleswick obliged neither subsidy nor military aid, and that the much cheaper terms on which the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel had been engaged precluded pressure upon France for more. France promised to hold 30,000 men ready to help Denmark, and the presence of a British squadron would save the Danes great expense in case of war. Glenorchy should let the king know that were the convention not speedily finished it could not be laid before parliament at the opening of the session, and so the benefits of the British engagements would be lost to him for a whole year.¹

Nevertheless it was suggested to Paris that increase of the subsidies would carry the Holstein article. Walpole, after interviewing Fleury on the subject, was able to report that if the Danes would readily pass the rest "this court will not differ from them on account of a little more or less money to be given for their troops," though the cardinal would not have this known at Copenhagen yet.²

By this time express orders to Camilly not to continue the expedient of treating through Glenorchy, and the latter's strong representations, had procured his admission to the conferences. At one held on 2 November the Danish ministers presented their demands in writing, "so wide," says Glenorchy, "from what I had offer'd them, that it looks as if they were not in earnest." Principal among them was one for an annual subsidy of 600,000 rix dollars for six years. When Camilly refused even to report this, the ministers told him that his surprise at the demand was not greater than their own at the smallness of the sum he offered.³ To Glenorchy they explained that these were first demands, from which they were prepared to recede, adding that they knew it to be the French habit to offer very little at first and go on by degrees. "Il faudra tâcher de se rapprocher réciproquement," said grand chancellor Holsteinborg. They asked for the naval succour twenty British men-of-war for so long as the troubles lasted. Glenorchy told them that he could promise ten, if they agreed to the Holstein article. He observed them to be greatly pressed for money, and no argument so strong with them as a French subsidy.⁴

¹ Townshend to Glenorchy, 28 October (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 27 October (o.s.), Walpole in reply, 12 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

³ Camilly, 9 November, B.M. Add. MS. 15092.

⁴ Glenorchy, 2 November, R.O. Denmark 49. On the Holstein article: "they told me they knew it was to their advantage to have that prince contented, provided it be not at their expence, but that by engaging themselves in this article they give him a handle of demanding a satisfaction. To which I answer'd that if ever he comes to be in condition to demand it he'll easily find a pretence for it without having recourse to this article, which is not to take place till he changes his conduct and becomes their friend."

What the demands were is sufficiently shown by the comments on them which Newcastle sent to Paris, as follows.

The number of Danish troops could not be reduced from 24,000 to 20,000, because it was agreed already that the reserve force should consist of 6,000 instead of 10,000.

The term "Basse Saxe" could not be accepted in substitution for "Basse Allemagne," his Majesty having German dominions not in Lower Saxony, and France being likewise concerned; while the limitation would remove the greatest inducement to the Dutch to join.

The demand at the end of the second article for contribution by France to the cost of bringing troops from Norway was thought exorbitant. On the other hand, although the change in raising the subsidy from 200,000 to 600,000 rix dollars, and its term from four years to six, was very great, yet the king of Denmark must be at considerable expense in getting his troops ready and there would be good effect upon the king of Prussia, so that perhaps the court of France might be persuaded to raise its offer, if not to so great extent. Like considerations applied to other changes relating to French payments.

Dispensing, however, with the oath of fidelity for the troops in French pay, as in the sixth article, was altogether unreasonable, for so, while bearing the expense of them, France would have little control over or advantage from them.

Nor could the addition to the seventh article, as to continuance of the subsidies after the troubles were over, be allowed.

The change proposed in the ninth concerned his Majesty. But he was no more engaged to fixed succour for his guarantee of Sleswick, as the Danes wanted to recite, than was the king of France. The French ministers must be reassured that he was under no obligation under this head beyond what they were informed of. Yet he did not think the alteration of sufficient importance for him to insist on its being set aside.

In regard to bringing in mention of the last treaty of peace of the north as well as those of Hanover and Westphalia, he was indifferent.

The omission from the end of the first separate article of engagement to oppose what might be contrary to the interests of Great Britain and France was bad for the king of Denmark, but might pass.

But in the second, payment of the Danish troops in the French service on the footing of 1701 was very exorbitant, "since it is well known that that was the dearest bargain that ever was made."

Lastly, there was nothing in the Holstein article that could be

interpreted to the prejudice of Denmark ; insistence on it must be "positive and peremptory." ¹

Townshend pronounced the Danish pretensions "unreasonable in almost every particular." He set forth the pains of his Majesty during two years to impress the French court with sentiments favourable to Denmark, and his sense that the proposals made were so honourable and advantageous that he had expected them to be received with joy and gratitude. The principal object of the convention, he insisted, was the defence of Denmark, and the present exorbitant demands would irritate the French to the last degree.² Indeed, from Paris they were termed impossible ; the subsidy claim, in particular, "hors de tout propos." ³

At the next conference several points, it was agreed, could be adjusted ; on others Camilly declared that he must await orders. In the fifth and in the Holstein article he and Glenorchy refused the slightest change, although the Danish ministers argued that unless the subsidy were increased and more troops taken into French pay, in case of war, the king would only impose upon his allies by undertaking engagements which he could not perform. They promised acceptance of the Holstein article, were compensation for the duke specified or Denmark definitely exempted from share in the expense. They explained their objection to the term "Basse Allemagne" to be that in the Danish meaning it included Holland.⁴ Glenorchy judged that if the French would offer 400,000 rix dollars subsidy and take into full pay, in case of war, 10,000 Danes, the convention might be accepted. "I think I know their strength pretty well and indeed I do not think they will be able to do much service on the conditions in the project" ; the fleet, he knew, had been kept in harbour in the spring for nearly a fortnight for the want of about £1,500. Holsteinborg seemed "extremely desirous of concluding on any tolerable terms," and spoke with some approval of a suggestion by Camilly that the three crowns should undertake to share the cost of compensation to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp equally. Glenorchy found him "particularly shock'd" at the word "dédommagement" and learnt of the king saying that "when the guaranty of Sleswick was at first stipulated he was told by some people that the king of Great Britain would be the first to propose an equivalent for the duke, which if he had imagined, he would never have consented to the peace at that time." ⁵

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 7 November (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

² Townshend to Glenorchy and to Söhlenthal, 8 November (o.s.), R.O. Denmark 49.

³ Instructions to Camilly, 21 November, B.M. Add. MS. 15092.

⁴ In another place Glenorchy states that they held the term to include all the circle of Westphalia, Upper Saxony, Pomerania, Brandenburg, "and several other countries, even Holland" (22 February 1727).

⁵ Glenorchy, 5 to 23 November 1726, R.O. Denmark 49.

Townshend rebutted emphatically this "malicious insinuation," this "vile and groundless" suggestion. He denied the word "dédommagement" to imply that the duke had been deprived of Sleswick unjustly. In deliberate oblivion of the facts he declared: "As it is certain that the D. of Holstein was the aggressor in the breach of the treaty of Travendahl, so it must be acknowledged he has no right to demand any satisfaction for the losses he sustained in a war begun by him unjustly, and in violation of his engagements." The word, he said, could only be interpreted to mean that without admitting any right to such satisfaction it would be a good thing to make up losses to and so reconcile a neighbour, and the Danish court need not be afraid of the two crowns explaining it otherwise, to their own prejudice.¹

Newcastle now ventured opinion that all difficulties were over excepting about the subsidies and the Holstein article. Citing, as Townshend had done, credible news of an intended Russo-Austrian invasion of Germany in the spring, and designating the convention "the only means we shall have in our hands to oppose these designs," he delicately suggested to Paris either abandonment of that article or its modification by omission of the words "dédommagement raisonnable," as in the draft now sent.² At the same time Walpole was informed by Morville of orders going to Camilly to offer a yearly subsidy of 300,000 rix dollars, for one year certain, if he thought that this complaisance would content the Danes, and further, if he found them sincerely disposed to conclude on these terms, to assent also to a small alteration in the Holstein article devised, but only if he and Glenorchy should discover by proper means whether these offers would suffice; for, says Walpole, "it is impossible for France to go to any greater lengths in their behalf, and yet should Denmark be at all apprised of a disposition to yield in any thing they may become more opinionated in their objections and even heighten their demands." Next day, on receipt of Newcastle's former dispatch, finding it impossible to get the Holstein article entirely laid aside, he submitted a modified form, which, says he, Fleury "entirely approved," adding to it only the words "pour le bien de la paix," and to which Morville and D'Huxelles, seen subsequently, assented. He again warned Newcastle against letting the Danes have any intimation of what was in the wind, and reported Fleury to say that in the last resort the subsidy might be increased to 350,000 rix dollars.

As now turned the Holstein article ran as follows:

Quoique la conduite de la Czarine et du duc de Holstein ait été depuis quelque tems et continue d'être encore actuellement telle envers les trois

¹ Townshend to Glenorchy, 25 November (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 22 and 24 November (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

couronnes, qu'elles ne peuvent avec bienséance se mêler présentement de ce qui regarde le duc de Holstein, cependant on est convenu que si les dites puissances changent de conduite envers les parties contractantes de ce traité leurs Majestez Britannique Très Chrétienne et Danoise examineront alors entre Elles ce qu'on pourroit faire en faveur du duc de Holstein, pour le bien de la paix, et après en être convenu on conviendra aussi des mesures qu'il faudra prendre pour le faire accepter au duc de Holstein, en sorte qu'au moien de ce dont on sera ainsi convenu il donne en faveur du roi de Danemarc les renonciations les plus authentiques à toutes ses prétensions contre le roi de Danemarc, pour raison du duché de Sleswick.¹

Robinson wrote home on this : " You will find that this courier brings you the affair with Denmark as good as finished, and M^r Walpole has done it all in a day by forming a new article in the room of the other." Newcastle thought it almost needless to say that the alteration would be accepted. " The chief point is to have this affair, which has been so long depending, finished out of hand." With his next dispatch Walpole enclosed a letter from Morville stating that the subsidy of 300,000 rix dollars was agreed to and again desiring secrecy.²

Glenorchy was now advising that compromise on the amount of subsidy might be effected if the French would take a larger number of troops into their pay. He expected but slow progress, from the necessity of taking the king in a good humour ; ministers had already " ventured farther with him in this affair than I ever knew them do." It was certain, he affirmed, that unless France undertook a greater share of the burthen the Danes would not be able to perform their engagements, for the subsidies would but suffice to pay off arrears of debt and put the troops in condition for service, leaving nothing for their pay. " Having been so long here that I am perfectly well acquainted with the disposition of this court and their ability, I can very certainly assure your Lordship that they are ready to come into any measures that they can perform, and that they are not in a condition of doing what is required of them in the convention. . . . France will no where find an occasion of bringing 30^m men into Germany at a cheaper rate." Were that court rightly informed of the condition of Denmark it would concede the demands. The

¹ H. Walpole, 6 and 7 December, *ibid.* The amended Holstein article was sent to Camilly under date 5 December, to be communicated to Glenorchy but the Danes only to be given a hint of the change. At the same time it was signified that the amount of the subsidy might be raised to 300,000 rix dollars and, as a further concession, that it might be paid for the first year whether war broke out, and so the Danish troops passed into the pay of France, or no (B.M. Add. MS. 15092).

² Robinson to Delafaye, 7 December, R.O. France 184 ; Newcastle to H. Walpole, 1 December (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

grand chancellor had expressed "with what concern he sees so fair an opportunity like to be lost by their being under an impossibility of performance."¹

In England it was held that the French offers ought to satisfy the Danes, and their recalcitrance was bitterly impugned. After the diplomatic rupture with Spain the warning was sent: "Tho' the fire begins so farr off as Gibraltar, yet the train is so laid that the flame would soon reach to the north" and the affair of Sleswick plunge those parts in trouble, unless the Danes protected themselves by concluding the convention.² Soon Robinson at Paris, in answer to his strong representations, was informed that on advice from Camilly that the offer would be accepted, and from anxiety to preserve the peace of the north, it had been resolved to make the annual subsidy 350,000 rix dollars for four years, in case of war, and for two in any case, and further, to take into full pay 9,000 Danes at once and 12,000 on the outbreak of war, when the service of France or the case of the Hanover alliance should require it. Great merit was made of these concessions, says Robinson, in view of the other French expenses.³

In fact, these concessions were embodied in a new draft (in this the old ninth article became the tenth) sent to Camilly under date 9 January. He was informed of expectation that the modification of the Holstein article would remove all difficulty about it, and authorised to sign, not conclusively, but *sub spe rati*.⁴

By these orders Newcastle believed the chief difficulties to be entirely removed and that the convention ought to be signed immediately.⁵ Townshend too believed all the points about which Camilly had written to his court to be "in a manner complied with," so that there could be no question but that the Danes would finish the matter out of hand. Glenorchy must sign when Camilly did, and "in the same manner he agrees to do it." With this dispatch was sent the draft of a separate article obliging George I to furnish for the

¹ Glenorchy, 7 and 10 December, R.O. Denmark 49. And in a letter to H. Walpole of 10 December: "They must keep up in all thirty thousand men, of which France takes but six thousand into their service, so that they must pay twenty-four thousand without including the garrisons and troops for the defence of the country; which they are not in any condition of doing." Ships also must be equipped and money laid out on tents and other necessities, even the officers being unprovided and most of them, even in the cavalry, without horses. He discredited Wedderkop as one who did not know the true state of his country or had reasons for misrepresenting it, citing a remark of his that Denmark would join whichever side offered most, "which I am very certain is not the king's intention and much less his ministers."

² Townshend to Glenorchy, 13 and 23 December (o.s.), R.O. Denmark 49.

³ Robinson, 8 and 9 January 1727, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

⁴ Instructions to Camilly, 9 January, *ibid.* 15092.

⁵ Newcastle to Robinson 5 January (o.s.), *ibid.* 32749, and similarly elsewhere

defence of Denmark, in case of an attack by sea when so many of her troops were abroad, a squadron of ten or twelve men-of-war. For his further security, said Townshend, Frederick IV must himself provide by joining with the squadron as many of his own ships as should seem necessary.¹

For all this expectation the convention was not to be signed yet. During January Camilly could report no progress, and when his new orders came the concessions did not satisfy the Danes. The king, Glenorchy was informed, would like to be quit of the Holstein article altogether, but if it were retained must, in common prudence, see that his interests should suffer no harm in the future. Says the envoy : "The K. of Denmark has taken it so strongly into his head that the two crowns intend to overreach him in it, that the ministers are obliged to be very cautious on that subject." In fact, he had said to the prince royal : "*plutôt que de me laisser tromper par la France et l'Angleterre sur la garantie du Slesvic je risqueray cheveux gris et tout ce que j'ay.*"²

¹ Townshend to Glenorchy, 3 January (o.s.), R.O. Denmark 50.

² Glenorchy, 25 January and 4 February, *ibid.*

CHAPTER XXXIII

PORTUGAL. POLAND. TURKEY

TOWARDS the end of March 1726 General Dormer returned to the subject of a commercial treaty between Portugal and Austria. He noticed Mendonça to be "more than ordinary cautious" in the matter, only insinuating "such a treaty as a thing at a great distance," by which the emperor could never obtain such favours as were enjoyed by England, and on the subject of the Trieste trade disclaimed apprehension, knowing "the ill success those ships had met with here," but he deduced from the conversations inclination for the treaty. He noted depreciation by Galvão's secretary, just arrived, of the power of England to suppress the Ostend Company, while Burnett wrote privately of new influences at the councils, ill disposed to England, and that a treaty of commerce with Spain was said to have been concluded before Dom José Da Cunha Brochado, one of these new influences, had left Madrid.¹

Principal negotiation, however, between Austria and Portugal was being conducted at Vienna by Count Tarouca, at last arrived there, recommended by Townshend to Saint-Saphorin as "un de mes anciens amis, . . . fort honnête homme," but likely in his difficult circumstances to simulate coldness.² Saint-Saphorin also claimed intimacy with him from old days in Holland, and was satisfied with a first casual interview. He thought the count's aim to be to open the eyes of the court of Vienna and correct its outlook, and recognised the obligation on him to be circumspect.³ Through Itterssum it was learnt that his cautious offers of the king of Portugal's mediation had met with "une grande fermeté ou

¹ Dormer and Burnett, 23 March 1726, R.O. Portugal 33.

² 1 March (o.s.), R.O. Germany, Empire, 57. Tarouca had left the Hague on 16 January, but travelled slowly, reaching Vienna early in March. Another Portuguese visitor to Vienna was prince Manoel, who had left after a long conference with Prince Eugene on 12 February (*Lettres historiques*, lxi. 290).

³ Saint-Saphorin, 9 March, *ibid.*

ferté, on peut être indolence, je ne sais comment le nommer.”¹ A letter from Tarouca himself, relating his first efforts, comprised a lengthy exposition of the Austrian attitude.² A month later Saint-Saphorin advised that, when opening the subject of alliance between Austria and Portugal, the count had declared himself authorised to conclude only if nothing were stipulated which could engage his master against the king of England. What, however, the Austrian court wanted, Saint-Saphorin commented, was to put a stop to British trade with Portugal; without that the alliance was looked upon as useless. Tarouca had given assurance that nothing need be feared either on that head or in regard to mediation, for his master was beginning “rentrer en lui-même,” and also showed great anxiety for reconciliation with France. To that Richelieu was well disposed, and had written on the subject to his court, but as, in present circumstances, he and Tarouca could not meet officially, a person friendly to both was required to intervene. Were that person himself, Saint-Saphorin thought that he could find expedients to end the difficulty to the satisfaction of both crowns. Tarouca, being provided with unlimited powers, undertook to finish the affair on any expedient sufficiently plausible.³ Newcastle on this desired Horatio Walpole to try to obtain authority for Richelieu to treat with Tarouca, if only to restrain the king of Portugal and at the same time render the court of Vienna jealous of him. To this Walpole was able to notify consent.⁴

When Tarouca's declaration at Vienna was known at Madrid, Ripperda, Dormer understood, had written to the court of Portugal “insisting that in the new engagements with Spain there was no such limitation” and threatening to break off the marriages, whence great perplexity at Lisbon, ministers knowing the neglected state of the army and the frontier defences. Consequently, the later news of Ripperda “being retired from business” had been received with pleasure, in the hope that his successor would be more peaceable and less pressing.⁵ At the end of June, again, Dormer could report Mendonça talking of the transference of the Ostend Company to Trieste, of the improbability of an attack on Gibraltar, seeing that the emperor was only bound to interfere in that matter by good offices, and of the likelihood of

¹ Itterssum, 2 April, R.O. Holland 284.

² 7 April, R.O. Germany, Empire, 225, original. What he wrote about the Ostend Company is noticed elsewhere.

³ Saint-Saphorin, 4 May, Germany, Empire, 58.

⁴ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 7 May (o.s.), and the reply, 28 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

⁵ Dormer, 23 May, R.O. Portugal 33.

Don Carlos's marriage proving to be "a meer chimera" of Ripperda's and the new ministry in Spain indisposed to enter into the emperor's schemes, while accounts from Madrid had it that "the inconveniences of the Vienna treaty are perceived there more and more every day." Yet it was true, he said, that it was the coast defences that were being strengthened, guns properly mounted and the forts now in good repair.¹

Townshend now sent Tarouca a personal letter of thanks, remarking to Saint-Saphorin that the cold answers to "ce bon et galant homme" might be regarded as a refusal of Portuguese mediation, and desiring facilitation of intercourse between him and Richelieu. Saint-Saphorin notified the count to be marvelously pleased with the letter and hoping to put its expressions of confidence in the king of Portugal to good use; although his coming had been requested ministers had now no confidence in him, and the aversion was mutual. Soon Tarouca informed Saint-Saphorin that his stroke had succeeded; his master now thought only of mediation and was doing all he could to evade alliance with Austria. Townshend, advised of this, desired further ardent and sincere compliments to be made to the count, "notre grand ami."²

For the rest Dormer's principal subject of report this summer was of interviews stealthily sought by the king's brother, Dom Francisco, cured now, said the envoy, of his youthful wildness, an expert in naval matters, and known for attachment to England. A meeting arranged, as though accidental, on board H.M.S. *Colchester* was followed by a secret interview by night at the prince's palace, when Dom Francisco asked for a private audience, of which Galvão should be kept in ignorance, for a servant of his in London, Pedro José Supico de Moraes. At a subsequent interview, after the fall of Ripperda, the prince discoursed on "amity with Great Britain as the only true interest of his country," and drew attention to the fitting out of ships and to the repairing of the river forts, while the Spanish frontier was quite neglected. He had made representations to the king, he said, but had met with reproach "for being too much an Englishman." He was convinced that the influential marquis D'Abrantes was entirely in the Spanish interest, and believed Mendonça to be "too great a courtier long to resist the king's inclinations. Upon the whole he declared it his opinion that nothing could prevent this court siding with Spain in case of warr but the appearance of a British fleet here."

¹ The same, 29 June.

² Townshend, 21 June (o.s.), Saint-Saphorin, 25 July and 14 August, Townshend 25 August (o.s.), R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

Were that of sufficient strength, and especially if there were bomb-vessels, the people would be so alarmed that the king must give in. After which he disclosed the business with which Supico would be charged to be a proposal for his marriage to an English princess. Dormer naturally declined to discuss a matter of that nature and made the prince so understand, while taking care, he said, not to disoblige him.¹

Supico was not allowed his audience on the ground that he had no credentials. In answer to Dormer's second dispatch Newcastle gave him permission to continue his interviews with Dom Francisco without going "too deep with him," lest the king's and his ministers' jealousy should be aroused; they knew something of the prince's designs, for Galvão had inquired about request for an audience by an emissary of his, and the fact could not be denied. To what he had said about the king his brother little heed need be given; the measures which it was suggested that monarch would take in case of war were too contrary to his interest to be credited. The absurdity of the marriage proposal need not be exposed to one so well acquainted as was Dormer "with our laws and constitution, and with his Majesty's zeal for the protestant religion and goodness to his people."²

At further conferences Dom Francisco, exacting "most solemn assurances that what he should communicate should be laid *entirely before his Majesty* with the utmost secrecy," proceeded to "open clearly and fully what he intended by his former proposall." He vouched for the marriage-negotiations with Spain being conducted by personal autograph letters between the two kings, knew that Mendonça "was as great a stranger as himself to those transactions," but believed D'Abrantes to have been consulted. He spoke of the king's joy at the change of government in France as what "could not fail of making an entire change in the affairs of Europe," of more ships being fitted out, and of the difficulty with which he himself, in conjunction with Cardinal Da Cunha and Mendonça, had hitherto prevented accession to the treaty of Vienna, D'Abrantes having strongly advised alliance with a power that would engage with Great Britain in a war which could not last long and would procure for Portugal a better peace, the present one being most pernicious. Hence his own desire to see a British fleet at Lisbon; it might enter Cascaes roads without any infringement of treaties. He expected, he said, to be petitioned by the nobility and people to desire the king to call a general council of state, "where the true interests of their country might be fully debated"; the result

¹ Dormer, 21 April, 9 May, 15 June, private, R.O. Portugal 33.

² Newcastle in reply, 10 May and 21 June (o.s.), private, *ibid.* 32.

would certainly be for "adhering to their most ancient and best alliance, that of Great Britain."¹

Newcastle replied that Dormer was sufficiently well apprised of the king's views both in regard to Dom Francisco and to the measures that the court of Lisbon might take. Whatever D'Abrantes might wish, it was not likely that the Portuguese would fall out with their oldest and best friends, especially at a time when they were suffering such losses in Africa at the hands of the Dutch. Dormer, however, must neglect no opportunity of sending all the information he could about designs of the king and his ministers and about the inclination of the nobility and people generally, but, as formerly said, must not go too far with the prince.²

Returning in August to the confidences of Dom Francisco Dormer said that he had had no more private conferences with him and thought that what he had communicated was "in a great measure the effect of a too violent temper." Other advices, he said, agreed about D'Abrantes' principles but not about his power.

The secretary of state is now looked upon to have greatly the ascendant, and whilst the power is lodged there I cannot so readily give in to such apprehensions. Besides, I have very lately had the satisfaction to find it the opinion of some men of great credit and reputation here that his Portuguese Majesty will take no measures without consulting the King our master.³

One subject of correspondence, and cause of irritation, was the conveyance of a Jew, Da Costa, to England on a British man-of-war to escape the clutches of the Inquisition, a proceeding against which Galvão protested strongly, asserting him to be a fugitive debtor. While justifying the action, in view of Galvão's threat of prohibition of the visits of English packet-boats to Lisbon Newcastle forbade its repetition.⁴

¹ Dormer, 2 July, *ibid.* 33.

² Newcastle to him, 19 July (o.s.), private, *ibid.* 32.

³ Dormer, 17 August, *ibid.* 33.

⁴ Again Newcastle censured Galvão as "always disposed to give the worst turn to every thing and to create, if it were in his power, a difference between our court and his." And on 15 November (o.s.), when Galvão had returned to the subject: "He is very difficult to please and always ready to put the worst construction upon every thing and to do all the mischief he can; and as you know a good correspondence and friendship with his court is of great importance to us, it were to be wished we had a better intentioned minister here from Portugal."

Galvão's complaints, R.O. Foreign Ministers 39, Foreign Entry Book 252; Dormer's account of the affair, 28 July, Portugal 33; directions to the Admiralty against allowing his Majesty's ships to convey such debtors, 23 August (o.s.), S.P. Dom. Entry Book 221, Admiralty i. 4105. A further memorial by Galvão and order for inquiry, 13 and 22 February (o.s.) 1727, *ibid.*

By the account in the *Lettres historiques* (lxx. 308) fifteen Jews interned with their families in the prisons of the Inquisition had escaped with the inquisitor in charge of them, bringing to London cash and bullion to the value of £600,000,

On the arrival of Sir John Jennings at Lisbon consul Burnett reported the court to be disturbed, viewing a rupture between Great Britain and Spain with great apprehension.¹ Dormer sent word of a long conference of the Spanish ambassador with Mendonça and of a council held next day; he could not learn that anything of importance was discussed.² Newcastle transmitted the king's pleasure at the kind reception given to Jennings, called to notice the different treatment accorded to the admiral in Spain, and expected the papers sent (the Spanish correspondence) to satisfy the Portuguese ministers of the necessity of the squadron coming. Referring to the published account of Hosier's doings he observed that they rendered it almost impossible for the galleons to reach Spain that year.³

In November Burnett was

assured by a tolerable good hand that the reason of the marquess D'Abrantes' departure for the court of Madrid is on account of the confidence the king put in his abilities, that he will have address enough to engage the queen of Spain to let the marriages go on, without obliging Portugal to enter into the league offensive and defensive, which the court of Spain insists upon as having been from the beginning the basis upon which the marriages were proposed to Mons^r Guedes, the Portuguese envoy at Madrid, by the marquess Grimaldi.

Delay in the matter he imputed to desire entertained at Vienna to mediate between Spain and Portugal before the marriages were solemnised instead of afterwards. Although, he said, "the Portuguese envoy is extremely carest of late at the Escorial, and this court is very warmly prest to accede to the treaty of Vienna," it seemed that no resolution would be taken till after Christmas.⁴ Dormer, when that date was near, supposed the court to be waiting "until they can see further into the affairs of Europe," being divided between desire to maintain the alliance with Great Britain and dread of a rupture with Spain.⁵ Previously he had noted renewed remonstrance from Madrid against the welcome given to Sir John Jennings and the admission of his ships to ports of Portugal, enabling him, with Gibraltar on the other side, to blockade Cadiz.⁶

With France Portuguese relations, so far from being improved, had been embittered by Fleury's promotion to the cardinalate, more than half thereof belonging to John da Costa, formerly commissary-general for the Portuguese army, who had given £2,000 for distribution among poor Jews in London.

¹ Burnett, 30 August, R.O. Portugal 33.

² Dormer, 7 September, *ibid.*

³ Newcastle to him, 20 September (o.s.), *ibid.* 32 and Foreign Entry Book 115.

⁴ Burnett, 7 and 15 November, R.O. Portugal 33.

⁵ Dormer, 23 December, *ibid.*

⁶ The same, 16 November.

seeing that John V had nominated for a hat in vain the nuncio at Lisbon, Monsignor Bichi. There was even prospect of a rupture also with Rome.¹ And further offence was given by a formal visit paid by Mendonça to the Spanish ambassador, the marquis de Capeceletro, a ceremonial concession denied to De Livry or to any other foreign minister since his time. To soften relations with France, says Dormer, "seems at present to be little the intention of this court."²

At the other end of Europe this same De Livry had at last appeared as French ambassador at Warsaw on 3 August 1726. His instructions, drawn up under date 30 April and therefore already antiquated, stated as the reasons for his mission the precarious health of Augustus II, the publicity of his endeavours to secure the succession for his son, Austrian intrigues in Poland, the Courland adventure of Maurice of Saxony, and the affair of Thorn. In regard to the marriage of Louis XV he was desired to employ all his art to be well with all parties, especially at first. French aspiration to succession to the throne of Poland he was to deny, for suspicion on this head among the Poles would probably carry the king's views. On the Thorn affair were recalled the efforts of the protestants to obtain redress, the dilemma of the king in avoiding offence to either protestants or catholics, and the violence of Finch's language, which had brought the demand for his recall. French policy had been to take no sensational step; arguments from the catholic side showed that the protestant complaints were not entirely well founded. So far from doing anything to irritate the Poles, endeavour had been to mollify the courts of London and Berlin. In fact, representations to the king of Prussia had had effect; he had turned to moderation and offered to leave everything to French mediation. De Livry must do something to meet his master's engagements, but on no account behave as though he were the minister of a protestant prince. He must

¹ Dormer wrote: "The separate promotion of the Cardinal Fleury, and the behaviour of Cardinal Polignac in the Consistory, are highly displeasing here." And on 31 March 1727: "Fresh remonstrances of the cardinals against the promotion of Mons^r Bichi has put the king of Portugal in very ill humour. As much money has been expended to gain that point as might have put his army into good order." Also on the subject Burnett, 1 to 15 November, *ibid.*, *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 360-1, 474-6, lxxi. 243-4. Rupture of relations with Rome actually resulted.

² Dormer, 3 November. His inquiry as to proper conduct in the matter by himself was answered that since he had not the rank of ambassador his status was not affected; he need not require Mendonça's formal visit (Newcastle to him, 15 November (o.s.), *l.c.*). With Saint-Saphorin's dispatches (R.O. Germany, Empire, 59) is to be found a full exposition of all that had passed at Lisbon with De Livry, with a dissertation on Portuguese relations with France and Spain and the good work done by Tarouca at Vienna.

disclaim interference, and only offer good offices for the restoration of peace. It should be easy for him to persuade Finch and Schwerin to like conduct. Louis XV was disposed exactly to fulfil his engagements under the treaty of Oliva, but only by mediation and good offices. He was the only prince in Europe on whom the Poles could depend for settlement of the affair.

About the treaties of Vienna and Hanover, the latter regarded by the emperor and Spain as offensive, it was stated to be more important to prevent accessions to the one than to obtain them for the other. The emperor had worked to persuade the tsaritsa that she could never obtain settlement of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's claims by alliance with France, and the result had been the suspension of Campredon's negotiation. To prevent her alliance with Austria the principal thing was to gain Sweden. But there no success had been obtained so far, and it was much to be feared that engagements between Russia and Austria would be shared by Poland. Against this De Livry must work hard, the more so since the king of Prussia, unless assured of the safety of his open eastern frontier, would not be able to fulfil his contracts properly. While the Poles themselves probably only wanted quiet, it must be shown them that their king, in encouraging engagements with Austria, must have private interests in view, since such engagements must be based on the treaty of Vienna and so opposed to the interests of Saxony. Ministers might be reminded of the claims of the electoral prince of Saxony to the Austrian succession, but remembering that they were not to be trusted, De Livry should only advocate alliance with France and dissuade from steps that might be an obstacle thereto. For the succession in Poland the candidate preferred by France was Stanislaus Leszczynski, but in accordance with the memorial presented by that prince his interests must not be advocated prematurely, but his supporters only told that their counsel was desired, and every caution used in intercourse with them, lest their opponents should suspect.

Next De Livry was instructed how to act, when the time came, towards healing dissension between Prussia and Poland and so rendering Prussian efforts efficacious. As to Russia, while it was not believed that Catherine I could ever ally herself with the emperor, he must not open himself to Dolgoruky till he saw how the land lay. He must try to attend the diet at Grodno, although constitutionally forbidden. Lastly he was warned of the engaging but dangerous character of Augustus II, with whom, however, now that his son was acting as first minister, he would

have little to do. How the change affected Count Flemming, previously the favourite, was not known.¹

Pending De Livry's arrival negotiations at Warsaw had stood still. In May General Schwerin had been summoned to Berlin to head his regiment at a great review. Prince Sergius Dolgoruky had previously left, and soon prince Basil also was recalled, on the ground, says Finch, that "since he did nothing here, he might be more usefully employed elsewhere."² He was replaced in July by Michael Bestuzhev, who neglected to visit Finch because, as he explained, he had observed the same conduct, with his court's approval, towards the ministers of George I at Stockholm, though he would lose no opportunity of meeting him in society and making his acquaintance.³ Nor did the coming of De Livry, restricted as his orders were, in appearance make much difference. During August Finch still had little of which to write beyond the stirring events in Courland in connexion with count Maurice of Saxony's election, a dangerous dispute with court-marshal Chomentowski about a cook, count Wratislaw's assumption of the character of ambassador to match De Livry's, and strong warning given by the latter to the Saxon and Polish ministers, on news of the Austro-Russian treaty, "that if in consequence of this step the peace of the north shall be disturbed, it would concern them more nearly than any other power."⁴ Early in September there was a general exodus for the diet at Grodno. Finch followed on 1 October, having had particular orders to attend, if other ministers went, in order to maintain his character.⁵ Assurance was given at Paris that he would not be recalled on the groundless prettexts advanced, for that would prejudice George I in the eyes of the protestants, who placed such trust in Finch, not to mention the wrong to him. Once the king was assured of justice being done to the much injured protestants, then "so good a work should not be obstructed" by Finch's continuance at Warsaw, but some expedient be found.⁶

The refusal to receive Finch had not debarred negotiation by Augustus II through his ministers in London and Paris, Jacques

¹ *Recueil des instructions*, iv. 301-323.

² "His departure was much more sudden than that of his cousin, yet it was also with more civility . . . I believe no foreign minister's stay here would be long, if it depended on the hope he had of doing anything." Later (3 August) Finch heard that Dolgoruky was under arrest for his conduct at Warsaw.

³ Finch, 11 May to 7 August, R.O. Poland 32, 33.

⁴ Finch, 7 to 24 August, R.O. Poland 33. On the last subject: "The Saxons agree entirely with him in his principles and conclusions, but the Polish ministers seem to be perswaded that the partys already formed in Muscovy will prevent the Czarina's undertaking anything abruptly."

⁵ Townshend to him, 19 July (o.s.), *ibid.* 32.

⁶ Townshend to H. Walpole, 1 August (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

Le Coq and Count Hoym. Towards the end of June Horatio Walpole had reported strongest assurances by the latter that his master would not join the allies of Vienna and would be glad to exercise his good offices towards accommodation ; to which Fleury had returned a civil answer in general terms.¹ Subsequently, however, Finch was warned not to conclude from the frequent arrival at Warsaw of couriers from Le Coq that anything was transacting ; "as your court does not care to accede to the treaty of Hanover, so neither do I find they are much inclined to go into that of Vienna ; their aim, if they have a steady one, seems to be to amuse both sides without concluding any thing."² What Le Coq had said Townshend stated to Paris, when repudiating as purposeful fiction a story of Hoym's that he had been repulsed "in a rough and peremptory manner," to have been that his master was willing to enter, not yet into the treaty of Hanover, but into one for securing the rights and privileges of the Germanic Body. To which the reply had been that negotiation to that end, in conjunction with France, would be agreeable, if the king of Poland were in earnest and would define his proposals. Whereat Le Coq had seemed very pleased and, although an imperialist, he was too honest a man to misrepresent what had been said.³

Le Coq's own version of his doings was contained in three dispatches of 22 July, of which cognisance was had in London before they left. Also were known in like manner, later, the resolutions taken on the said reports at Warsaw, dispatched to Le Coq on 14 September ; the principal matter a long discussion on the subject of the treaty of Hanover and explanation of the reasons which prevented the king of Poland from acceding to it.⁴ Sending the papers to Horatio Walpole for communication in strict confidence to Fleury Newcastle directed him to observe that while it was pretended to De Livry that Augustus desired to enter into closest measures with France, yet Le Coq had negotiated for a separate treaty with the king of England ; that Townshend had insisted upon accession to the treaty of Hanover or engagement with all the parties to that alliance ; and that the king of Poland was "still averse to come into measures with France, with whose conduct towards him he is by no means satisfied and on whose friendship he thinks he can have no dependance." It seemed evident that Le Coq

¹ H. Walpole, 25 June, *ibid.* 32746.

² Townshend to Finch, 19 July (o.s.), R.O. Poland 32.

³ Townshend to H. Walpole, 1 August (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

⁴ All these papers, intercepted, R.O. Confidential 1. How they were procured Newcastle told Walpole, he would guess. He must not let out how easy it was to obtain such information but might pretend, perhaps, that the papers had come from Finch at Warsaw or had "fallen into our hands some way in Holland."

was to make what bargain he could and that the king of Poland would not, at present at least, "take party with the Emperor, but stay and see what terms he can have from us, and if the affairs of the two crowns succeed as well as there is all the reason in the world to expect, I believe there will be no doubt but we may have Poland, and all other powers that stand out to see on which side they can make their best advantage."

Since writing so far, Newcastle resumed, he was informed of another conference of Le Coq with Townshend, when the Polish envoy had repeated his assurances that his master would not accede to the treaty of Vienna, and had offered again a separate alliance with the king of England as also a prince of the empire, with other arguments against the inclusion of France. In reply to which Townshend had insisted that the king would do nothing without France; that the two courts communicated everything mutually and faithfully; that France could not be looked on as a power foreign to the empire, being a guarantor of the treaty of Westphalia; and that if the king of Poland wanted the separate alliance, let him propose it through De Livry; the king would hear of nothing such unless "advised and proposed by the French themselves."¹

At the end of November Le Coq renewed proposals, in Newcastle's words for a defensive alliance "for preserving the libertys of the Germanick Body and regulating the disputes about religion." Newcastle sent to Paris a copy of an intercepted letter from him—"he has in general stated what past with great truth and exactness"—for communication with proper excisions, as of what was said about the king of Poland being prevented from acceding to the treaty of Hanover from jealousy of France, and with emphasis on Townshend's firmness in refusing any agreement without French participation. He observed that although France had formerly thought a treaty with the king of Poland impracticable, yet it appeared more and more that nothing frightened the king of Prussia so much as negotiation with the republic, or with the king as elector of Saxony. Remarking on the great influence of Augustus in the empire Newcastle proceeded to advise opening a negotiation, even if with little prospect of success. "The behaviour of the Saxon minister at Ratisbon is as good as can be wished; and if we could gain Poland on any reasonable terms it would certainly be a very great means of disconcerting the schemes of the Emperor and the Czarina in the north." But his Majesty would neither on this consideration, nor on any other, take any step concerning

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 22 September (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

common interests "but what shall be perfectly agreeable to the sentiments of the court of France."¹

Walpole found Fleury of opinion that the proposed negotiation might be of some use, "hinting at the same time that it was very natural for France," as a guarantor of the treaties of Westphalia, "to become a party to a treaty of that kind." He proposed to render a full account of this and other matters on his return to England.² Whereon Newcastle wrote that his Majesty was "very well pleased that the cardinal does not dislike the setting on foot a negotiation with the king of Poland," but waited to hear Walpole's personal report.³ Nothing more appears to have been done. A note by Townshend on the intercepted letter, made after the death of George I, states that Le Coq had never spoken on the subject since; he inferred that the king of Poland had had no real intention of concluding a treaty.

At Grodno Finch learnt of "a general exclamation upon my arrival, and they proposed to declare infamous every body who had any commerce with me," though readiness was expressed to negotiate with George I through any other minister. The diet he found occupied almost solely with the Courland question, the deputies, in their determination to have the duchy made a Polish palatinate, refusing any other business. Russia, he observed, represented specially by Yaguzhinsky, would strongly oppose the incorporation.

On 19 October he had to recount a private interview with Maurice of Saxony, arrived at Grodno secretly, "on horseback in the open fields." The prince complained strongly of the king of Poland's conduct and "desired to know whether his Ma^{ty} would not accept of the protection of the dutchy, the nobility being resolved to suffer the last extremitys sooner than the Polish incorporation" and preferring the support of George I to that of the tsaritsa or the king of Prussia. He proposed two Baltic ports as security for £80,000 and 25,000 arms, for which he would engage to have on foot 10,000 regular troops and 15,000 militia, the latter as good as the army of the republic.⁴ For answer to this Townshend referred to that already given to the prince's confidant, the marquis de Visconti, namely, that it was hoped that he would not take

¹ The same, 24 November (o.s.), *ibid.* 32748. Le Coq's letter, of date 29 November, R.O. Confidential 1.

² H. Walpole in reply, 10 December, *ibid.*

³ Newcastle to Robinson, 5 December (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ Finch 12 to 19 October, R.O. Poland 33, with much further discourse of the prince about his prospects. With these dispatches a record of the proceedings of the diet from day to day, for which see also *Lettres historiques*, vols. lxx. and lxxi., *Political State of Great Britain*, 1726, *Historical Register*, x. 289 f.

it amiss if George I did not do more for him, when the king of Poland himself did not favour his pretensions.¹ On 26 October Finch wrote that the animosity of the Poles against the prince's candidature was so great, that sooner than allow it they would set up a confederation.²

Staying on at Grodno till the end of November, when the king returned to Warsaw, Finch continued to send a detailed account of the proceedings of the diet up to their conclusion a fortnight earlier, reporting on one occasion a proposal for alliance with Austria to have raised "a general noise and cry in the house." He heard neither of any attention given to the protestant grievances nor of further oppressive methods proposed.³ Back in Warsaw he had little to transmit but news from Courland, wild stories of what was doing in the west, and medical details of the king's dangerous illness, from which he unexpectedly recovered. On 27 April 1727 Augustus left for Dresden, leaving, Finch had said, full powers to the senate to act in his absence without him, since he preferred "the appearance of their acting by his approbation during his absence to letting the world see that they do it without consulting him, and contrary to his opinion." On the king's departure the diplomatic party at Warsaw broke up. Count Schwerin and Yaguzhinsky anticipated it; Rumpf went away soon afterwards; Wratislaw and De Livry did not "think of Dresden till the latter end of May." Finch himself took boat on the Vistula to Dantzic and returned to Dresden by way of Berlin, arriving on 2 June. He stayed there till November and then returned to England.⁴

At Constantinople the menace of war had at last induced the French government to enter on a definite change of policy. Instructions to Andrezel of September 1726, according to a draft shown to Horatio Walpole, communicated to him the heads of the Austro-Russian treaty, depicted, purposely, the prospects of the allies of Hanover in the brightest colours, and informed him that, while orders to him to drop mediation between Turkey and Russia had been awaiting developments, there was now "no room left for any management." He must therefore (in Walpole's words) with "utmost prudence and address" inform the grand vizier of the said heads, and in doing so "pass slightly over what

¹ Townshend to him, 1 November (o.s.), *ibid.* Visconti's letter of 31 August, from Brussels, and the reply of 7 October (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Entry Book 248; another copy of the latter here.

² Finch, 26 October, *ibid.*

³ 29 October to 29 November, *ibid.* A full discussion of the results of the diet and of the Courland affair on 16 November.

⁴ Dispatches of 1727, *ibid.* 34.

regards the duke of Holstein and the north, and expose that part which immediately concerns the Turks in so strong a light as may, without appearing to exhort him to war, make the greatest impression upon him and provoke him to express his discontent and uneasiness in such a manner to the ministers of the Emperor and the Czarina as may extremely alarm the courts of Vienna and Petersburg." Any open incitement to war, however, must be carefully avoided, in view of the use that the emperor might make of such in Christendom. Imparting this information to Walpole Morville supposed that Stanyan would be instructed similarly and quite expected success from the policy enjoined.¹

In consonance with this was an instruction to secretary Magnan at Petersburg that the conclusion of the treaty between Austria and Russia rendered it absolutely necessary for him to inform Andrezel accurately of Russian resolutions. "Je me remets à votre exactitude de ne rien laisser ignorer à M. d'Andrezel des circonstances, qui pourraient intéresser les Turcs, afin qu'il en puisse faire usage à propos conformément aux intentions de S.M." ²

Andrezel on receipt of his instructions repaired to the grand vizier and on the latter's inquiry for news from Christendom—always, says Stanyan, his first question—discoursed as ordered. The grand vizier professed little apprehension about the Russian treaty, and likened the opposing sides in Europe to wrestlers feinting without closing. Nor, when Andrezel set out the situation in writing and pressed for a declaration of policy, could he extract more than expression of satisfaction that a defensive alliance was formed against the emperor, with the reminder that the Turks were fully occupied in Persia.³

For the rest, Andrezel still failed to obtain a definite answer and Stanyan occupied himself in dissuading the Turks from withdrawing reinforcements for Persia from their Hungarian frontier, lest that might enable the emperor also to remove troops thence for employment elsewhere. He records approaches made to him on the part of that old opponent of Austrian domination, the Transylvanian prince Rákóczy. In March 1727 he had to report Andrezel's death of dropsy and his temporary replacement in charge of affairs by De Fontenu, the French consul at Smyrna.⁴

¹ H. Walpole, 10 September 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² 14 September, *Sbornik* lxiv. 406–7.

³ Stanyan, 7 November and 7 December (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Turkey 25.

⁴ The same, 24 January and 17 March (o.s.) 1727.

CHAPTER XXXIV

WORK IN THE EMPIRE

To advance the interests of the allies of Hanover in Germany it was decided in the early summer of 1726 to send French and English ministers to Ratisbon. On methods and aims, however, the two governments differed. The British, in accordance with Saint-Saphorin's continual advocacy of attaching all German princes, small and great, desired the orders to the French envoy to be "very general, it being the chief view to engage as many princes of the empire as possible," and would have money spent in all quarters, on the ground that by such "good husbandry" heavy expenditure would be avoided later. Fleury, on the other hand, Walpole advised, was for forming only a league of neutrality in support of the treaties of Westphalia; the princes not to be invited to take part in anything foreign to the empire. Distribution of money among them, he said, all the ministers took to be "an endless and unprofitable work, since they would all grow more and more craving, and perhaps employ the very money, we should give them, against us."¹

The ministers appointed were the chevalier de Chavigny and Isaac Leheup, the latter member of parliament for Bodmin and a brother-in-law of Horatio Walpole.² He was directed to govern his conduct at Ratisbon by the advice of the Hanoverian minister there, Baron Munchausen; to stay at Paris on his way in order to acquaint himself thoroughly with French intentions; on arriving at his post to assure "all and singular the members of the dyett" of the king of England's anxiety to promote the true interests of the empire and to maintain peace, to which ends he was ready to concert ways and means with the protestant, and even with such catholic princes as should be disposed thereto, with the particular object of preventing war "on account of disputes that have no manner of relation to the Empire"; to join with the French minister in

¹ Correspondence of Newcastle and H. Walpole, 23 May (o.s.) to 13 July 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

² So Villars terms him (*Mémoires*, v. 66). A letter from him to H. Walpole of 23 December 1726 opens "Dear Brother" and concludes, "Pray assure my sister of my respects." Presumably their wives were sisters.

insistence that the objects of the alliance of Hanover were purely pacific ; “ to gain the good opinion of all people without distinction of religion or principles, as far as you possibly can ” ; thoroughly to acquaint himself with the grievances of the protestants and on all occasions to support with good offices their just demands ; and to learn all that he could of the “ several tempers inclinations and designs ” of the different princes and states.¹ He reached Paris on 29 July but was kept a month there, waiting for Chavigny, and only got to Ratisbon on 5 September, by which time certain of the princes to whom he carried creditive letters had been engaged by Austria. Chief among the others were the dukes of Würtemberg and Saxe-Gotha, the two landgraves, and the margrave of Baden-Durlach.

Eberhard Louis, duke of Würtemberg, was one whose accession to the treaty of Hanover Saint-Saphorin reckoned second only in gravity to that of Bavaria, he having as many troops as that elector and having always been able to dispose of the circle of Swabia.² Like his fellows he wanted money, but more than that satisfaction of his claims to Montbéliard (Mömpelgard), sequestered by the crown of France, and security for the protestants in that country.³ Saint-Saphorin, to whom he complained, advised that restitution should be made as a condition of his accession, the estates in the meantime to be administered with gentleness, the protestants not molested, and the revenues kept in sequestration pending the restitution.⁴ In June Horatio Walpole could report the French government “ seriously at work ” on a project of conciliation, and before long that it was “ in a manner settled ” and would be carried to Stuttgart by Chavigny, there being a certain difficulty about negotiation at Paris.⁵

¹ Instructions, dated 8 July (o.s.), R.O. Germany, States, 175, King's Letters 19.
² 25 July, cited.

³ The lands in question were the town and county of Montbéliard, or Mömpelgard, and four adjacent lordships. This fraction of the empire, intruding between Franche-Comté and Alsace, was particularly coveted by Louis XIV. Three times he seized it and as often, by the treaties of Nimeguen Ryswick and Baden, restored or undertook to restore it. After his death it was held in sequestration, pending submission of the duke of Würtemberg-Mömpelgard. When Leopold Eberhard, last of that line, died in 1723 the heritage reverted to the head of his house, Eberhard Louis. But the question was complicated by the claims of Leopold Eberhard's bastard children, some of whom Louis XV recognised as legitimate. See among other authorities a copy of a long memorial dealing with the whole question from 1614-1734, R.O. Germany, States, 177. It was prepared for the use of the ministers of Charles Alexander, duke of Würtemberg, sent to Vienna to negotiate with the French ministers employed there on preliminaries of peace, presumably in 1735.

⁴ Saint-Saphorin, 4 June, enclosing a copy of the duke's letter of 23 May, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58.

⁵ H. Walpole, 25 June and 8 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32746. The difficulty noticed was that the duke had two ministers at Paris, to both of whom the business must be communicated. One of them, Montigny, a Frenchman, had assured Morville “ that his master will certainly accede to the treaty of Hanover, but desired it might be kept as a great secret, and particularly from his colleague Mr. Fech, who has the air

Two months afterwards Walpole advised that two projects would be presented to the duke, the one fully satisfying his Montbéliard pretensions, the other for alliance with France. Failing success in persuading him to accede to the treaty of Hanover Chavigny would try to engage him nevertheless not only not to oppose in the diet but to give every assistance both there and elsewhere.¹

Before Leheup left Paris Fleury, in view of Saint-Saphorin's warning that the emperor, if he succeeded with the elector of Bavaria, would endeavour to obtain a declaration by the diet that the treaty of Hanover was contrary to the laws and constitutions of the empire, renewed a proposal, long, says Walpole, growing strong in his mind, that Leheup and Munchausen—in conjunction with Metternich, the Prussian minister, if possible,—should put forward an act declaring just the opposite. He had desired Morville, he said, to have such an act prepared for Chavigny's use. Afterwards D'Huxelles, in an impassioned discourse to Walpole, blamed the British government for slackness in persuading the protestant princes of the advantages of the treaty of Hanover, called attention to the emperor's successes, his unaccustomed condescension to gain his ends, his treaties with Sweden Russia and the catholic princes, pressed that the protestant, and some of the catholic too, should be brought to unite in defence of their liberties under British and French guarantees, and even suggested that in a time of such difficulty and danger they might elect a King of the Romans, the mere raising of which question might bring over the elector of Bavaria. All this, says Walpole, he spoke with the greatest zeal for the union of the two crowns, "wherein he is publicly known to be very sincere and hearty."²

Newcastle remarked on this that the king had nothing more at heart than union of the protestant princes and only wished that France were disposed to follow her former maxims in regard to them. He retorted the treaties made or pending with the five leading protestant powers, Prussia, Holland, Sweden, Denmark and Hesse-Cassel,—the last so ill relished by France that the king had been obliged to conclude it alone,—and the approaches to the dukes of Wolfenbüttel and Würtemberg, the latter, again, only holding back for want of performance of the promises long since made him about Montbéliard. Others, he now agreed, were of too small account, and their demands would be so great that application to them, before the greater were secured, would be to no purpose. Particular

of the man of business in transacting the duke of Wirtemberg's pretensions here, but is, as I have reason to suspect, in the interest of the Imperial court."

¹ The same, 14 September, *ibid.* 32747.

² The same, 26 and 30 August.

instructions for the ministers at Ratisbon could be considered when reports were had from them ; certainly they would be right in promoting agreement among the protestants and some catholics to stand neutral, apart from matters concerning the constitution and liberties of the empire. The clear intention of the treaty of Hanover to maintain those made censure of it impossible. But the protestants, intimidated by the emperor's oppression everywhere, ought to be encouraged, and for that nothing could have had greater effect than an occupation of Rheinfels, affording easy means to communicate with and succour them ; but here again scruples about French troops entering the empire had stood in the way. These reflections, however, Newcastle concluded, were not at all intended to censure the conduct of France, they were but reasonings inspired by D'Huxelles' discourse. An election of a King of the Romans might be insinuated to the elector of Bavaria with good effect.¹

Moreover, Newcastle stated George I to approve Fleury's idea of a declaration at Ratisbon and to be pleased that Chavigny should have such orders.² Nevertheless, when Broglie submitted a draft, the British government dissented, on the ground of the improbability of attempt by the emperor to have the treaty of Hanover censured in form, seeing that the princes could hardly be brought to condemn what upheld their liberties. All that seemed necessary, Newcastle thought, was to provide Chavigny and Leheup with an answer to the *Analyse* which might be made use of with the various ministers privately, "and thereby this whole affair put in a truer and better light than it could be by any formal justification before the diet." Such an answer, prepared "by one abroad" and "thought here to be an exceeding good one," he enclosed, desiring Walpole to cut out such parts as might offend the French and then to communicate it for transmission to Chavigny. If approved, "Mr. Samson³ or some other proper hand may fit it for the press, in case it should be thought convenient to publish it." At the same time Newcastle sent a draft memorial, suitable for presentation to the diet or in any case instructive for Chavigny and Leheup. Adverting to the accusation of slackness in gaining the lesser princes of the

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 26 August (o.s.), *ibid.*

² The same, 22 August (o.s.).

³ Lord Cadogan, envoy at the Hague in 1719, wrote of Sansom as "a very dangerous intriguing fellow" lately gone to England, "mightily trusted by Lord Townshend and Horace Walpole" and since corresponding with the latter and "his agent for dispersing false news and scandal in this country. He is likewise principal pamphlet-writer to Beretti Landi, and is sent by him, as I am assured, into England to procure materials and assistance for a libel to be published here" (1 August 1719, R.O. Holland 267). This, of course, was written at the time when Townshend and the Walpoles were out of favour.

empire, and their votes in the diet,¹ he referred to his previous dispatch as showing "how irreproachable his Majesty is upon that head" and reiterated the change of opinion in London in regard to them. "The vast expence that it would be to go seriously to work to gain those princes makes it very unadvisable to think of any such thing at present, but all our efforts should be used in getting more considerable powers into our interest."²

It was known from former experience that objection would be made to Leheup appearing at Ratisbon as a foreign minister. He therefore, arrived, decided to go about at first as a private person only, a looker-on. Even so the catholic leaders objected to his presence as a contravention of the emperor's election-contract. He found the two deputies of greatest weight to be those of Wolfenbüttel and Sweden. The former he reported very well disposed to his Majesty, having refused to be employed about the duke's treaty with the emperor. He had a large family and had been offered, but had declined, a pension. The other had 1,000 crowns income from the emperor, but was willing to have more; "the difficulty with him will be how to tie him down." Besides which Leheup wrote of advances for accommodation between George I and Charles VI by the Bohemian minister, Count Sinzendorf.³

His decision as to procedure was approved. Townshend informed him of identical memorials preparing for him and for Chavigny, not for formal presentation, on account of ceremonial difficulties, but for private distribution of copies among the deputies. He desired him, in spite of the treaties made with the emperor by Bavaria and Cologne, to be well with those ministers, and in general to make himself as agreeable as was possible to all, showing them that the chief object of the treaty of Hanover was to preserve their rights.⁴ Newcastle expressed to Paris the king's satisfaction at French agreement about the manner of using the memorial. He desired Walpole to get the French court also to dispense with unnecessary forms, for instance, to allow the deputies "the title which the Emperor himself does, while claiming a superiority over their masters. It can surely be no dishonour to the two crowns to go as great lengths as he in this respect, besides, the more regard is paid to the other German princes the more it raises them and enclines them to withstand any unjust authority that the Emperor

¹ Repeated in one of Morville's dispatches to Broglie, of 5 September, of which private cognisance was taken in the usual way, R.O. Confidential 1.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, with the draft memorial mentioned, 2 September (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

³ Leheup's dispatches of September, R.O. Germany, States, 175. This was Franz Wenzel Sinzendorf, a son-in-law of the imperial chancellor.

⁴ Townshend to Leheup, 22 September (o.s.), *ibid.*

may pretend over them." ¹ The French were found complaisant; Chavigny, Walpole was informed, was given the character of minister only expressly to avoid "the least difficulty or punctilio" in matters of ceremony and was ordered "to give the hand on what titles" were expected and to be as easy in his intercourse as possible, in order to avoid the obstacles which the imperialists would certainly raise. He anticipated, therefore, that on Chavigny's arrival at Ratisbon "all supposed doubts and difficulties on that head" would be removed. ²

Further orders to Leheup empowered him to spend up to £800 a year in gaining deputies, if he thought the expenditure of real use, under Munchausen's advice. For concert of measures for a better reception he was directed to await Chavigny's arrival, and in the meantime to show himself indifferent to hostility exhibited, dissembling resentment and obtaining what information he could. He must let Sinzendorf, in reference to his overtures, know that the king could treat of accommodation with the emperor only in concert with France, and that Ratisbon was no fit place for such negotiation. On inquiry from Leheup, whether he should present himself in a definite character, Townshend ordered him to go on as at present, with the reminder that he was purposely given the character of minister only in order to obviate the inconvenience of any other title. ³

At this time was published Samson's pamphlet which has been noticed, *Remarques sur l'Analyse du Traité de Hanovre*, "redressed" to suit French sentiment. It had been printed in utmost secrecy by a bookseller at the Hague, Charles Le Vier. Copies were directed to be sent to all the chief French and English ministers abroad, to Count Törring at Munich, and to booksellers in certain principal cities. ⁴ The pamphlet was lauded on the allies' side as at once moderate in tone and unanswerable in argument; Saint-Saphorin, for instance, expected good effect in clearing up matters which the Austrian court had done its best to confuse. Horatio Walpole noticed that Morville had struck out all the quotations but one and suggested their restoration in an appendix. ⁵

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, same date, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² H. Walpole, 15 October, *ibid.* 32748.

³ Townshend to Leheup, 4 and 11 October (o.s.), R.O. Germany, States, 175. Leheup had learnt that it was resolved that all foreign ministers must be legitimated, or leave. He wrote on 7 October (*ibid.*): "I hope I am not to legitimate myself, as that every body is to take place of me, which they will do, if as the Dutch minister has done I am received as resident."

⁴ To Ratisbon 156 copies, to Frankfort 100, to Leipzig, Hamburg, Vienna, Berlin and Brussels, 50 each; the whole number printed being 2,000.

⁵ H. Walpole and Robinson, 9 October, Le Vier to Samson, 15 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32747 and R.O. France 184; Townshend to Finch, 14 October (o.s.), R.O. Holland 291; Finch, 7 November, *ibid.* 292; Saint-Saphorin, 3 December, R.O. Germany, Empire, 59. The pamphlet, Rousset, ii. 338.

Le Vier's bill, sent by William Finch on 16 May 1727 (R.O. Holland 293),

Chavigny came to Ratisbon early in October. Ostensibly holding only the character of minister, for the reasons stated, he was provided with full powers to hold in reserve, if wanted. His instructions, of date 23 September, throw a valuable light on the constitution methods and proclivities of the Germanic diet. It was shown how during the wars Louis XIV had lost his influence in Germany, while that of the emperor had continually increased. Chavigny must work to restore confidence in France, whose care for peace and for the liberties of the empire had been shown clearly of late years, notably by the Triple Alliance and the treaty of Hanover, but that by insinuation, not by open advocacy. Instances were given of the way in which the diet wasted its time on protracted discussions on unimportant questions and for months together did nothing. Then were discussed the interminable mutual complaints of protestants and catholics. It was shown how strongly, since the elector of Hanover had obtained the crown of England, he and the king of Prussia had exerted themselves to obtain for the protestants reparation of wrongs, threatening to form a party opposed to the emperor in support of the rights conferred by the treaties of Westphalia. The reprisals instituted by the latter king, and their consequences, were sketched, and the failure noted to settle the disputes as yet. Whether the emperor viewed the dissensions with chagrin or with pleasure, it was said, was doubtful. On the one hand he might profit by them to extend his authority, on the other the protestant princes might revolt against it. But they were not at one; long continued efforts by the kings of Prussia and England to reconcile Lutheran and Calvinist had failed. There were two classes of them; the "zélés," of whom only the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel and the margrave of Brandenburg-Ansbach supported the two kings, and the "politiques," they headed by the elector of Saxony, still Director of the Evangelic Body and whose personal change of religion disposed him rather to compose the quarrels of the protestants than to uphold their rights. And he had his own reasons for keeping well with the emperor, among them his ambition that his son should succeed him as king of Poland. Prussia and Hanover had made different attempts to replace him in the Directorium by the next in rank, the king of Prussia, but some of the protestants feared the elector's desertion of their cause, should he be displaced, others saw Prussia and Hanover

showed 23 copies sent to British ministers abroad at a charge for postage of 37 florins 10 sols (the price per copy being 12 sols), 48 to ministers in England, and 500 to booksellers in the principal towns in Holland, with Cleves and Wesel. Of a German translation 500 copies were sent in February 1727 to the principal cities in Germany and to London, costing 359 florins 16 sols, the half of which was for French account. The total British payment was 559 florins.

likely to be tyrants and to seek to raise war in the empire for their own ends. The emperor governed the deliberations of the diet by two principal means ; first by the devotion of the elector of Mentz, a Schönborn, its director-general by virtue of his office of chancellor of the empire, secondly by the influence that he could exert on individual deputies, protestant as well as catholic. Some of them had possessions in his hereditary dominions, some were retained by gratitude for or expectation of benefits. Also much use was made of rescripts and mandates and of the authority of the imperial chamber of Wetzlar and the Aulic Council. All of which pursuit of private interests and disregard of the encroachments of imperial power the king of France watched with sorrow. His guarantees of the treaties of Westphalia remained in force and were specially recorded in the treaty of Hanover. It would be a great thing if Chavigny could prevail on members of the diet to support him. But he must not show the hand of France, for fear of reviving jealousies ; must speak only in the language of treaties. In conclusion were set out the histories of the Alsatian fiefs, of the duke of Würtemberg's claim to Montbéliard, of the fourth article of the treaty of Ryswick, of the Pragmatic Sanction, and of the Ostend Company, with a discussion of the nature and aims of the treaty of Hanover. In supplementary instructions Chavigny was directed how to comport himself with different ministers : to act in close concert with Leheup and Munchausen, without, however, showing too great partiality for the protestants ; to show all regard to the Prussian, in spite of that king's variations ; to manage those of Bavaria and Cologne ; and to distrust the Palatine as entirely devoted to the emperor.¹

It was decided on Chavigny's arrival that he and Leheup should present their credentials, and the latter also the letter from George I entrusted to him. Chavigny, however, was required to produce his full powers, and in view of this the like were prepared for Leheup. They empowered him to treat of and conclude "such articles, matters and things as may tend to the publick good" either with the deputies at the diet or with those princes to whom he was accredited. Also he was informed that his salary would be increased by £3 a day, in order that he might make a better figure. He, for his part, was

more and more convinced every day that nothing will be attempted here in prejudice of the Hanover alliance, but perswaded att the same time that no insinuations to ministers here can have a just effect upon their masters, considering that the court of Vienna, either by the pensions or other expectations, keepeth most of the ministers in dependance. . . . I fear the princes have

¹ *Recueil des instructions*, xviii. 115-177.

almost forgott that they have a right to their liberties and immunities, and are so much affraid of the power of the house of Austria that rather than be exposed to the resentment of it they choose to enjoy what is really their own only *durante placito*.¹

New instructions to Chavigny, as summarised by Horatio Walpole to Leheup in a dispatch of 3 November, dealt with the question of presenting formal memorials to the diet. Hope was expressed that the *Remarques sur l'Analyse*, when published, would remove the false ideas about the treaty of Hanover inculcated by the Austrian court. The idea of presenting formal memorials, it was said, had been discountenanced in England as not in accordance with precedent and because the imperialists might be able to prevent their reception. But of the one sent, communicated from England and only altered at Paris to suit the position of the king of France as guarantor of the treaties of Westphalia, Chavigny might make use in conversation with the deputies and, as it was too usual with them to alter or misrepresent what they heard, might give them copies. He should inform himself, as best he could, of views about the Ostend Company, the accession of Holland to the treaty of Hanover, and the proceedings of Hosier in the West Indies, because future instructions to him must be based on his reports on those matters. Especially must he discover whether there was disposition to take the emperor's part about the company, although that question had not the least relation to the interests or privileges of the empire.

The memorial formerly sent Walpole told Leheup that he might use, taking care, however, "to retrench out of that paper everything that gives it, as it now stands, the air of a memorial and particularly whatever may be offensive or afford the least handle of a complaint to the Imperialists"; in fact he must model it as nearly as possible on the paper sent to Chavigny, which was particularly proper for his Majesty, *mutatis mutandis* and saving the reference to the treaties of Westphalia. This until he should hear further from England.²

Leheup, discussing the outlook at some length, expected every day an imperial rescript requiring the States to declare that they would assist him in case of a rupture, and that the same stratagem would be employed as had obtained the empire's acceptance of the treaty of Vienna. He did not doubt that in case of an attack upon

¹ Leheup, 12 October to 4 November, Townshend to him, 1 November (o.s.), R.O. Germany, States, 175. The full powers, of date 31 October (o.s.), also in King's Letters 19. Particulars of the doings, *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 541-4, 658-661.

² H. Walpole to Leheup, 3 November, copy enclosed with his dispatch to Newcastle of the 8th, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

the Ostend Company the Netherlands would be claimed as part of the empire, citing arguments for and against this assertion. In another dispatch he discussed "what could be undertaken here to draw the Empire into a war, and the methods of preventing it." Munchausen and Chavigny and himself, he said, and the well-intentioned minister of Hesse, all expected the principal argument to be that an attack on the trade of Ostend was an attack on the circle of Burgundy, and on this question

the Emperor is so sure of a majority, whenever he proposes it, that nothing can hinder the Empire from declaring war but a *Votum Commune* of the Evangelic Body; and even that, I fear, will be hard to obtain. I shall send your Lordship annexed a copy of an argument Monsieur Munchausen has found for establishing the *Jus eundi* in *partes* politicis,¹ tho' I fear the goodness of the argument will avail but little.²

Townshend replied :

The advice you have had, as if the Emperor might find means to engage the Empire in his quarrel upon the business of Ostend, because that town may be reckoned a part of the circle of Burgundy, is very surprizing, and a very far fetcht reason for the dyet's having the complaisance to enter into the private disputes of the Emperor, in which he has involved himself.

The Netherlands could hardly after so long a time be "re-annexed" to the empire to serve the emperor's private views, but while the king hardly thought that the diet would be so persuaded, watch must be kept. As to the prohibition of English manufactures reported, reprisals could be made on the Hanse-Towns: German linens were not wanted in England. But Leheup must not talk on these matters in a threatening manner, only inspire apprehensions. "I cannot conceive that so wise a body as the diet will grow so mad on a sudden as to involve themselves in an unnecessary quarrel, that may prove extremely detrimental to them, for the sake of the Emperor and his interests, wholly foreign to the Empire."³

Chavigny presented his credentials to prince Fürstenberg, the

¹ Apparently the word "rebus" is omitted. Strictly, the "*jus eundi* in *partes*," the vote by party instead of by majority, was limited to questions of religion.

² Leheup, 25 November and 3 December, R.O. Germany, States, 175. With his next dispatch he enclosed a paper, "*Syllabus aliquot Actorum publicorum Circulum Burgundicum pertinentium*," a series of 17th-century documents cited from Londorp.

³ Townshend to Leheup, 2 December (o.s.), *ibid.* The observation about manufactures referred to a prohibition to import English textiles into the emperor's dominions, in the interest of the Ostend Company. With his dispatch of 25 November Leheup sent a number of samples of these, preserved. Similar exclusion of English woollen stuffs from Sicily had been reported in June by William Chamberlayne, consul at Messina (with Saint-Saphorin's of 25 July, R.O. Germany, Empire, 58).

first imperial commissary, on 27 November. They were accepted in due form, and similar credentials, as minister, were prepared for Leheup, in spite, said Townshend, of there being no precedent for this.¹ Chavigny wrote: "Je suis enfin en pleine activité et en pleine fonction, malgré tous les efforts que les Impériaux ont fait non seulement pour me les interdire, mais pour m'exclure de tout commerce." He saw no reason now to expect direct attack on the treaty of Hanover, and surmised means more legitimate or more specious than attempt to make the empire a party to the quarrel. He recommended direct work with the German princes individually, and commission to Leheup, whose ability intelligence and complaisance he praised warmly, to visit them. Like Saint-Saphorin, he was all for strong measures. "Il ne faut pas s'y méprendre, le salut de l'Europe comme celui des allies dépend aujourd'hui de la vigueur de leur résolution; soyés persuadé qu'à mesure qu'elle se fera sentir, la cour de Vienne connoitra à son tour tout le danger de la situation."²

Emissaries were already going from Vienna to work in the southern German circles. Chief among them was Count Wurmbrand, vice-president of the Aulic Council; others of whom Leheup heard were Counts Schlick and Kinsky. On Wurmbrand's mission (Leheup reported him necessitous and easily purchaseable) Saint-Saphorin had a great deal to say. He supposed the intention to be to re-establish in the emperor's interest the old Association of the Four Circles, formed after the peace of Ryswick, under headship of the discontented prince Louis of Baden, for self-defence against both French aggression and imperial despotism. He showed how its restoration would serve to secure the frontier of the Upper Rhine and free the emperor's forces for service elsewhere, and at the same time ensure him support at Ratisbon. But for blind passion to pursue the plans concerted with Spain and consequent embarrassments, he commented, a passion exhibited in caressing the violently jealous court of Bavaria and in aggrandising the prince it hated the most in the world, the king of Prussia, the court of Vienna would never have wished to revive the Association. Intent only on the present it was sacrificing the future. He expected, however, the plan to succeed only if the "chers gallions" came home, for money was essential, and he thought that Great Britain and France ought to institute counter-measures by using threats or promising support.³

¹ Townshend to Leheup, 6 December (o.s.), *ibid.* Copies of the credentials here and R.O. King's Letters 19.

² Chavigny, 7 December, autograph, R.O. Germany, States, 177.

³ Saint-Saphorin, 31 December 1726, 66 pages, R.O. Germany, Empire, 60. In addition he set forth to Leheup at equal length, for his information and that of Chavigny, "tous les cas qui peuvent être agités à Ratisbonne."

Leheup, however, thought Saint-Saphorin "a little mistaken as to the designed Association, for the Imperialists are to demand that the circles should prepare the number of troops which they are engaged to maintain by the Association concluded at Hailbron about the year 1713."¹ Later he understood that "the treaty of Franckfort concluded at the time of the Emperor's coronation is what Count Wurmbbrand and the other ministers sent into the circles are to enforce, which the Emperor insists to be a perpetual treaty."²

The necessity of countering the Austrian propaganda was patent to minds in England. Townshend in a dispatch prefaced by a long account of all that had happened and was happening in regard to Spain—on the expected expedition against England, "we are in no pains of such a wild enterprize"—descanted on the necessity of combination among the protestant princes in defence of their religion and sent a paper of thoughts on the subject, for communication, after consultation with Munchausen, to Chavigny, who, it was hoped, if he approved, might suggest to his court the propriety of similar instructions to himself. These "thoughts" set forth the absolute necessity of keeping the empire neutral and of combating the unfounded argument that the Ostend affair concerned a member of it. Of the German princes those of Franconia and Swabia were stated to seem well disposed, and in particular the bishop of Würzburg, the margrave of Baden-Durlach and the duke of Würtemberg, the last-named manageable by concessions in regard to Montbéliard and through "*une certaine personne chérie*."³ "*Ces deux cercles gagnés on aura assés gagné*." In that of the Upper Rhine much could be done with the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt; he might be made to understand that he could never inherit the county of Hanau-Lichtenberg in Alsace without the consent and help of the king of France, its feudal sovereign, and as intermediary might be employed the Alsatian chevalier Planta, in the landgrave's service, already employed in the affair and very well known at Paris.⁴

These four princes were also specified by Dalwigk, writing from Cassel with most earnest entreaty that his name should in no way be divulged. He named, besides, the duke of Saxe-Gotha and the margrave of Brandenburg-Ansbach, the latter amenable to the influence of his guardian, the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt. He urged strongly commencement of a negotiation at Ratisbon for the

¹ To Townshend, 7 January 1727, R.O. Germany, States, 176.

² The same, 30 January.

³ Countess Grävenitz. The margrave and the duke were also specially recommended by Saint-Saphorin in his dispatch just cited.

⁴ Townshend to Leheup, 26 December 1726 (o.s.), R.O. Germany, States, 175

neutrality of the empire and set forth the arguments that should be used.¹

The duke of Würtemberg had sent his minister, Baron Schutz, to Ratisbon to conduct negotiations with Chavigny. Leheup had believed that by Chavigny's instructions he would be satisfied about Montbéliard, but that he would not accede to the treaty of Hanover without subsidies, of which nothing was said in them.² Schutz, indeed, intimated that his master would do whatever the king of England wanted, were his Montbéliard claims allowed, and yet after an interview with Chavigny Leheup found him greatly angered, saying that it was absurd to bring him to Ratisbon at that time of the year for nothing, it being plain that the court of France had no intention of redeeming the promises made by Dubois and Bourbon. And in any case he wanted subsidies. Chavigny, for his part, averred that the main reason for the duke's insistence was the desire of Countess Grävenitz, in bad odour with the imperial court, to be able to retire to one of the Montbéliard lordships, in case of necessity.³

Of Schutz himself Leheup noted how his least steps drew everyone's attention, in consequence of his known credit with his master and the important situation of the duke's dominions.

Tho M^r Chavigny seeth him but by night, and meets him without servants, and M^r Munchausen and I preach up the complaints of the protestants of the dutchy of Montbelliard, we cannot quiet the Concommissary, who complaineth of designs that he hath advice from Vienna are hatching here, and that Baron Schutz hath another treaty besides that of Montbelliard to negotiate.

Leheup wished that the negotiation were ended, in order that measures might be taken to prevent the duke "from being involved in the Association, for which end the ministers are setting out from Vienna."⁴

When, however, Robinson broached the subject at Paris he received short answer from Morville that the duke's demands were "too unreasonable to be comply'd with" and the difficulties about Montbéliard insuperable. Would he lower his conditions and make them practicable he would find France "very ready to finish with him."⁵ This was answered by expression of the regret of George I at hearing of the failure to win over so important a prince,

¹ Dalwigk, 30 December, copy, *ibid.* 177.

² Leheup, 18 November, *ibid.* 175.

³ The same, 23 and 25 December.

⁴ The same, 3 January 1727, *ibid.* 176.

⁵ Robinson, 9 January, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

and Robinson was ordered to press again for settlement of the Mont-béliard question in accordance with the duke's desires. The chief difficulty remaining, said Newcastle, seemed to be toleration of the protestant religion there.¹ However, Robinson could only forward a letter received from Morville, from which, he said, it would be seen that the French thought that they had done all they could to meet the duke. Religion was not the only point, and now all remained with him.²

Another prince of whom Leheup had a good deal to write was the duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, who in September 1726 and again at the end of the year appealed anew to George I for payment of the arrears due to him. In the latter case his minister, Frederick Thom, put in a claim for nearly 140,000 rix dollars under his treaty of 1694.³ In November Leheup learnt from his deputy at Ratisbon that if he had been offered subsidies for 3,000 or 4,000 men he would never have paid his court to Vienna.⁴ In December Saint-Saphorin reported Dehn gone from Vienna with a fine present and the title of count and intending to pass Ratisbon in order to inspire the protestant deputies there with ideas conformable to the Austrian system.⁵ Arrived at Ratisbon, says Leheup, Dehn held himself aloof from every one, even from his old friend Munchausen. Leheup could hardly believe that he was going on to see the elector of Mentz at Bamberg merely to obtain remission of the fees for his new dignity ; he suspected some secret and evil negotiation on foot.

Other deputies whom Leheup thought amenable were those of Würzburg and Mentz, the former seeming to desire that a French emissary should visit his court, the latter greatly dissatisfied with his meagre salary of 5,000 florins. On the other hand Count Königsfeld, from Bavaria, he set down as absolutely in the emperor's interest, and Metternich, the Prussian, as little to be trusted, " his whole estate being in Bohemia and his heir a papist." For himself he

¹ Newcastle in reply, 5 January (o.s.), *ibid.* 32749.

² Robinson, 29 January, *ibid.*, with a copy of Morville's letter of the 26th.

³ 18 September and 20 December 1726, R.O. Royal Letters 15, the latter also Foreign Ministers 15.

⁴ Leheup, 14 November, R.O. Germany, States, 175. The deputy, whose name is deciphered as " Braw," insisted, he says, that the object of the allies of Hanover was not to maintain the treaties of Westphalia, as alleged, but to destroy the Ostend Company, and at the same time was of opinion that the emperor would do nothing in the diet, in spite of his influence there. He pointed out how the emperor was always holding out to the German princes at least distant prospects, while George I cared nothing for them. Leheup found him well disposed, and though he refused a pension promised his son 1,000 florins a year " in consideration of his father's affection to his Mat^r's service and to help him to finish his studys." Later (6 December) he noted enmity between him and Dehn and his desire to be openly employed by George I, when he would be able to disclose several things. Leheup, however, thought him more useful " behind the curtain."

⁵ Saint-Saphorin, 11 December, R.O. Germany, Empire, 59.

reported very favourable reception by prince Fürstenberg, when he presented his credential letter ; he "treated me with the greatest civility, hoping that now he should often see me." ¹

It was agreed now that all that could be done with the lesser princes of the empire was to keep them neutral. The question was, whether to counter the imperial propaganda by inducing them to form a neutrality association among themselves, or to obtain a formal resolution for neutrality of the empire from the diet. Saint-Saphorin was for the latter course ; he advised that with the French troops ready to act such a demand would disconcert the emperor's schemes completely.² Schutz recommended the mission of some one into the circles of Swabia and Franconia and the Upper Rhine, not a Frenchman, for France was not trusted.³ From Paris Broglie was instructed that in view of the favourable disposition of several princes, whose ministers at Ratisbon had spoken very suitably, there seemed nothing better to be done than to propose formally an absolute neutrality of the empire. But no orders, he was told, would be sent to Chavigny until it was known what part Leheup would be instructed to take. The proposed step might strike a powerful blow at Austrian despotism in the empire, and Broglie should talk on the subject and request authorisation for Leheup.⁴ Robinson wrote that while Morville was thinking of sending some one without a character to Nuremberg for the meeting of the Franconian diet, to expose the emperor's aims in their true light and dissuade the circles from taking up a cause in which they had no interest, and while he desired some person "perfectly verst" in the affairs of the empire to be sent from England also, yet at the same time he thought the best thing to be for the French and British ministers at Ratisbon to propose a general neutrality. He believed the elector of Cologne, the dukes of Würtemberg and Wolfenbüttel, and the bishop of Würzburg to be extremely well inclined thereto. The answer signified the entire approval of George I and his agreement that the necessary orders ought to be sent to Chavigny and Leheup.⁵ And though Chavigny doubted the wisdom of making the attempt without good promise of success, Morville, Robinson wrote again, thought

¹ Leheup, further dispatches to 3 January 1727, *ibid.* States, 175-6.

² 31 December 1726, cited.

³ Leheup, 3 January 1727, cited. He enclosed long Latin dissertations, "Quaestio an obligatur Imperium Romano-Germanicum ut bello se immisceat quod commercii in India Orientali causâ forsan exoriturum sit," and "Consilii argumenta ad dissuadendum Imperii Statibus ne partes Caesaris suscipiant in bello futuro," and in French a paper of "Raisons fondamentales" against the empire joining in war on the allies of Hanover.

⁴ Morville to Broglie, 16 January, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5, copy.

⁵ Robinson, 17 January, and the reply, 12 January (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

him wrong, because although the emperor's influence with the diet might prevent adoption of neutrality as an act of the empire, yet the proposal would serve to divide the princes and defeat him that way.¹ As for Austrian views, Leheup reported Schutz to have been told by prince Fürstenberg, when he had spoken about the situation of affairs in Swabia and Franconia and had mentioned a neutrality, that the emperor "would look on all those who would pass for neutral as enemies." ²

¹ Robinson, 30 January, *ibid.*

² Leheup, 20 January, R.O. Germany, States, 176.

CHAPTER XXXV

WAR PLANS

AFTER the refusal of the Dutch to take part in open assault upon the Ostend Company it remained to discover in what action against Austria and Spain they would join. Their first care was soon found to be provision for their own security. They were themselves augmenting their army and voting large sums for repair of the frontier fortresses as well as for subsidies to the elector of Cologne, with whom, says Finch, ministers were instructed to do all they could to keep well, as absolutely necessary in present circumstances. Fénelon and Finch were asked what succour France and Great Britain could furnish in case of need, and what security George I could give that troops of his from Germany would be able to march towards Holland unhindered, the deputies explaining that their questions did not arise from doubt that the "properest measures" had already been taken, but were put only "to sett matters a-going" and give opportunity for inquiry in return, what the States-General projected.¹

Finch had already heard complaints from Slingelandt and Fagel that Hoornbeek had no plan formed.² He had suggested some sketch to be sent from England, with references to the Ostend Company in the style prescribed for Stanhope's memorial. Answer had been that his Majesty was quite willing to furnish such a plan, but would have the Dutch ministers privately acquainted first with the state of the negotiations with France for strengthening the alliance and opposing the dangerous designs of the enemy. Calling attention to the negotiations with Sweden and Denmark, and to British and French armaments, Townshend showed that with such forces, "if upon our vindicating our right to suppress the Ostend East India Company the Emperor should be so unadvised

¹ Finch, 22 and 26 November 1726, R.O. Holland 292.

² "The truth of it is he is somewhat timorous and consults with but few, so that the only means to draw from him what may serve as a foundation for measures to be taken will be to produce and communicate in secrecy something of that kind, tho' it be never so short, provided it bears the title of a plan."

as to come to a rupture," the Netherlands could be conquered from him very quickly and placed under administration at first of the two sea-powers, afterwards of some prince who would be dependent on them, for instance, the elector of Bavaria; whom, indeed, and his brother of Cologne an intimation to such effect might detach from the side of Austria.¹ But the king would not have a word of this mentioned yet to any one but the three "friends," not even to France. Let them consider the matter, make suggestions, and join in the negotiations, particularly those with Sweden and Denmark.²

Having represented this, Finch had reported Hoornbeek to acknowledge matter supplied, on which to reason, and to have undertaken to spare no pains to procure a vigorous resolution; whereon Townshend notified that the result would be awaited, in the hope that the full exposition of his Majesty's views given would soon bring information of how the States would act in prosecution of the interests of the alliance.³

In private talk with Slिंगelandt and Fagel, later, Finch found them to doubt whether Sweden and Denmark could supply the troops required, while allowing that with such supply nothing need be feared from Russia. They very much approved the plan of depriving the emperor of the Netherlands, their government to remain in the hands of the maritime powers; but while admitting the value of the king of Sardinia's alliance, to which also Townshend had referred, doubted the possibility of gaining him. Finch commented on the whole: "As people here begin to have more vigorous intentions they will every day be more and more charmed with the timely and vigorous measures his Majesty has taken, without which their slowness might have cost them dear."⁴

It was replied that the troops for succour would be the 12,000 hired Hessians, who would be ready by the beginning of March to move on the first requisition and whose march could not be

¹ Fleury, approached on this subject, expressed himself willing to have placed the Netherlands under the rule of Maximilian of Bavaria, but neither considered the present elector suitable for the post nor knew of another prince who could pretend to it (H. Walpole, 29 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32748).

² Townshend to Finch, 1 November (o.s.), *ibid.* He left it to him to judge of the propriety of communication to Visscher of Haarlem and Halewyn of Dordrecht.

³ Finch, 15 November, Townshend to him, 8 November (o.s.), *ibid.* With the latter dispatch was enclosed a translation of part of a letter from Palm to the archduchess Elizabeth at Brussels, of 18 November, asserting a plot to deliver up certain Barrier fortresses to the French. Says Townshend: "that fellow, ever since he has been here, has never ceased spreading some notorious lye or other," witness the stories of a scheme to seize Ostend and of the plot to dethrone Philip V, and now this "vile and false invention."

⁴ Finch, 26 November, cited.

obstructed, if proper measures were concerted. Again Townshend descanted on the promising prospects of obtaining Swedish and Danish aid and on the sufficiency of forces, if the Dutch would play their part, to ruin the emperor's schemes in Lower Germany. He advised their sending the Danes financial help, so as to induce them to increase their forces and so secure the eastern frontiers of Holland. He stated the Danish convention to carry no guarantee of Sleswick; it was "only a treaty formed to repel any power that shall pretend to invade it by force during the term of four years." Save by Swedish and Danish aid he did not see how the Dutch could have a force sufficient for defence against the emperor. Whereas, if they joined heartily in helping the negotiations forward, they would be perfectly safe. The essential thing was to form a concert against the spring and before the meeting of parliament.¹

Thus urged, the Dutch council of state, as directed by the States-General, submitted to Fénelon and Finch a so-called "Préavis," a cautious exposition of views on measures to be adopted in the present crisis, put forward "non pas comme une résolution ni comme un plan, qui seroit arrêté par L.H.P., mais comme des considérations sur les conjonctures présentes," and stipulating as a first condition the complete security of the republic. It premised that the charter of the Ostend Company, one of the principal sources of the present difficulties, violated the 8th article of the British treaty with Spain of 23 May 1667 as well as the Dutch treaty of Münster² and was perhaps not less prejudicial to British than to Dutch commerce; also that the alliance of Vienna, and what else had happened since the charter was granted, interested the republic no more than its allies, the principal parties to the treaty of Hanover. Wherefore it had been thought more suitable, in view of the little weight that the republic in present circumstances could bring to bear and for other reasons, that France and Great Britain should draw up a plan for common measures, or at least communicate their ideas on the subject. Since, however, Fénelon and Finch had pressed to be informed as soon as possible of the sentiments of the republic on affairs in general and on the Ostend Company in particular, and as the States-General approved, the council of state made no difficulty about expressing those sentiments.

In the first place the republic would have serious efforts renewed at Vienna, and perhaps at Madrid also, to obtain revocation of

¹ Townshend to him, 22 November (o.s.), R.O. Holland 292.

² Fagel having previously objected to the case against the Ostend Company, as stated in Stanhope's memorial, being founded on the treaty of Münster only, Finch had drawn his attention to words bringing in, by implication, the British treaty of 1667 also, on which "I could not but observe that the Greffier seem'd very much pleas'd with those expressions, which seem'd to join us."

the company's charter and redress of other infractions of treaties, disabusing the emperor at the same time of his apparent belief that the republic could not act with vigour. Secondly, a blockade of Ostend, or destruction of the company's ships at sea, though little trouble, would hardly suffice to procure revocation of the charter and would probably be answered by reprisals. Thirdly, joint action with its allies was imposed upon the republic by the Triple Alliance of 4 January 1717 as well as by its accession to the treaty of Hanover, and it could not recede from those engagements but at the cost of being thrown wholly on the emperor's mercy and of total ruin of its trade, so that the council saw no way but to assert the rights of the republic and Great Britain with vigour and joint forces; in coming to which conclusion they were encouraged by the declaration of the king of France that he would fulfil his engagements as a faithful ally.¹

It was necessary, the document went on, as soon as the special measures for the security of the republic had been concerted to its entire satisfaction, to agree upon what should be done about closing the port of Ostend and taking or destroying the company's ships; how liberty of navigation could be preserved against privateering and other forms of retaliation; and how the emperor and Spain could be forced to yield. On the last question it was observed that it was of no use to begin a war for the objects in view merely by precautions for defence. Given that the allies could act with superior forces by land and sea—the safety of the republic always presupposed—action might take place in the Netherlands, on the Rhine, in Italy, against Spain, or in more than one place at the same time. But unless the allies dealt with Ostend as some years since with a neighbouring port,² not nearly so harmful to Holland, action in the Netherlands would be regarded by the emperor with complacency; he might expect to see conquests there become an apple of discord among the allies and also to recover his losses at a peace, with or without abolition of the Ostend Company's charter. Measures on the Rhine would damage not the emperor, but the empire; the most that could be done there would be to keep in awe certain German princes inclined to side with him, a matter, indeed, meriting particular attention. On the other hand, were the war carried into Italy, a certain powerful prince (the king of Sardinia) might be tempted by expectation of advantages to help the allies; the emperor would be attacked not only on his

¹ A resolution of the States-General of 27 November (translation with Finch's dispatch of 6 December) recorded the promise of Great Britain and France to provide the succour stipulated, 24,000 men in all.

² Maardyk.

tenderest but on his weakest side, in view of disaffection among his subjects there and the jealousy of Italian princes, and Spain might be shown that her treasure could be employed more profitably in recovering her old possessions there than in subsidising Austria. Besides this action, Spain should be attacked directly both in Europe and in America and thereby her true interests be brought home to her. Provided always, as before, that due regard should be had to the weakness of the republic and nothing be done until its safety was completely secured.¹

This was termed in England "a vigorous and wise advice" and the proposal to prosecute a war with chief vigour in Italy Spain and the West Indies "certainly most judicious." France, said Townshend, must attack Spain by land, England and Holland by sea, and the "friends" must be consulted on the best way of annoying her in the West Indies, whither the king was now sending six men-of-war to reinforce Hosier. He observed, however, that nothing was said about the Dutch eastern frontier, and the king would know both what scheme was most desired for protecting it, when the Danish convention and the Swedish accession were concluded, and what was thought about putting Rheinfels into the hands of the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. That would secure Lower Germany, and then the emperor could never attempt a war; for experience showed attacks on the Rhine and the Moselle to be impracticable and in case of a rupture he must certainly lose the Netherlands and probably his possessions in Italy also. And whereas, Townshend went on, a squadron must be sent to the Baltic next year, for without such protection neither would Denmark send troops into Lower Germany nor Sweden accede to the treaty of Hanover, and in view of the many calls for ships elsewhere, therefore the king expected naval help from Holland and was very glad to hear of the proposed increase of the Dutch fleet to eighteen of the line.²

The Rheinfels proposal was pressed again at Paris also. Terming the Dutch document "in the main very wise and well digested," Townshend endorsed the objections to action on the Upper Rhine and so expressed the hope that Fleury would now have more regard to Rheinfels and closer union with the landgrave. For so the king's dominions in Germany, were they attacked, could be succoured by French troops, and since the Dutch, "by their situation of considerable influence in those parts," had resolved to act with greater spirit, that measure would certainly put the

¹ From the French translation sent by Finch on 4 December, *ibid.*

² Townshend to Finch, 29 November (o.s.), *ibid.*

elector Palatine in fear for Juliers and Berg and "strike a terror into the king of Prussia and the elector of Cologne." In fact, in confidence, unless the landgrave were thus made secure of succour by France, in case of need, it did not appear how he could spare his 12,000 men to protect the Dutch, while in the contrary case "I am persuaded that not a prince in Lower Germany would venture to stirr a step in the defense of his Imp^l Ma^{ty}." ¹

When, however, Robinson opened the subject once more to Fleury, the cardinal, says he, began by adverting to the clamours against himself as being led by Walpole and a slave to England, but affirmed that he would not be deterred by such from doing what he thought right. Yet on some points he must yield, and one was that of Rheinfels. His reasons: that to transfer a property from one prince to another without other pretext than convenience "might revolt several German princes against us" and strengthen the emperor's cause, his dignity being attacked, since the prince of Rheinfels held by his mandate; that it might "give great offense to the king of Sardinia, whose son had married to a princess of that family"; and that his own personal credit was concerned against substituting a protestant for a catholic prince. He agreed, however, with the force of the British arguments and thought that something might be done by negotiating with the prince for surrender of the place; and he asked that a faithful account of his "delicacy and scruples" might be rendered. Robinson, descanting, hoped that his objection might be less to doing the thing than to the manner of doing it, and thought that negotiation might justify and lead to further action. ²

Newcastle supposed Fleury to misunderstand the Rheinfels proposition and that he might change, were it rightly explained to him; the place was not to be seized but in case of a rupture, and then not by the two crowns but by the landgrave, who had good claim to it. If, however, Fleury did not like the scheme, some alternative of his own, answering the same end, would be equally agreeable to his Majesty. The proper place for posting the French army would in great measure depend upon the motions of the enemy. But wherever posted "their passing the Rhine and marching into any part of Germany upon occasion must be understood, or else they will be of little significancy to our alliance." So plain a point his Majesty was firmly persuaded could not meet "with the least dispute or difficulty." ³

¹ Townshend (in Newcastle's absence from town) to H. Walpole, 26 November (o.s.), from a corrected copy sent to Finch, *ibid*.

² Robinson, 18 December, private, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

³ Newcastle, in reply, 13 and 20 December (o.s.), *ibid*.

To this Robinson was able to reply that Fleury seemed well disposed to the measure of seizing Rheinfels as an act of war authorised by necessity and by the emperor's hostility, though still disquieted about the effect on the king of Sardinia. He hoped, therefore, that the difficulty was surmounted. "A war is looked upon here as most certain, and the proper preparations are making for it."¹

Despite rebuff about the Rheinfels plan in France, it was not allowed to drop. Endeavour was made to bring old landgrave Charles to force the issue by direct action. A new attempt on his fidelity to the allies of Hanover had been made in November, when Count Metsch had paid a second visit to his court, but his terms had not been accorded and renewed assurances from him had been received in London.² In an elaborate epistle of the new year Townshend recalled to Diemar the dangers threatening from imperial activities in Germany. It was certain, he represented, that the secret treaty between Austria and Spain included an article for restoring the Pretender, that at the same time that the king of Spain was preparing for this the emperor was making his arrangements for an invasion of Hanover, and that evidently the two attacks were to be made in concert. Should these plans be carried out the landgrave would agree that the protestant religion and all the liberties of the Germanic Body would be in the greatest danger. In so perilous a situation, then, in whom could his Majesty confide, to whom open his mind more freely, than to so zealous and hereditary a champion of the protestant religion as the landgrave? He had no design of disquieting the repose of the empire, on the contrary, his greatest care had been always to conserve it. He would not light the fires of war, but since the designs of Austria and Spain were so manifest it would be inexcusable if he did not take suitable measures for protection. It was most fortunate that France was still so faithful and powerful an ally, not less well intentioned than formerly to support the protestants of the empire; she promised to have 30,000 men always ready at home and, by the convention with Denmark about to be signed, 20,000 or 30,000 more in Lower Germany. If these forces were united with those of the landgrave nothing need be feared. But they had no ready passage of the Rhine, and this was of the last importance. Should the emperor attack, nothing would be more advantageous and necessary than to have the fortress of Rheinfels in the hands of the landgrave; if he would seize it, in the case mentioned, his

¹ Robinson, 30 December, secret, *ibid.*

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 30 November (o.s.), *ibid.*, with an extract from a letter from Baron Dalwigk.

Majesty would guarantee his rights to keep it and the country appertaining, and also the succession to Hanau. The enterprise was not difficult, but very important. Once the place was in the landgrave's hands he could be very well supported by the French. But it was very necessary to be secret; the blow must be struck suddenly, when the imperialists made it necessary.¹ What followed on this may be left for relation to a later chapter.

In Holland, at a conference held on 10 December, it was agreed to confine discussion to the subject of the 12,000 Hessians, other questions being postponed until the second augmentation of troops had passed the States of Holland and thereby, in Finch's words, "the timorous spirits of some here are a little encourag'd by the preparations they make for their own defence." Fénelon, however, he recounted, had found himself obliged by his instructions to declare as follows. That what he had said at the conference on 22 November was approved and confirmed. That his master had no more desire for war than had the Dutch; he only wished to see the republic in a position to sustain rights guaranteed, to support which he himself had set a sufficient force on foot, in case war should result from refusal by the court of Vienna to do justice about the Ostend Company. That nothing would stiffen that court more than to suppose that it could bring about a rupture through Spain, itself acting as an auxiliary. That measures to procure revocation of the company's charter must be prepared before coming to hostilities. That therefore the king of France would have the winter spent in providing for the march of troops and necessary movements, either to awe the court of Vienna or to wage war successfully, if obliged. His succour was fully stipulated in the treaty, and although he preferred to keep his 12,000 men in the field he did not absolutely refuse their employment to garrison the frontier towns. Finch then spoke about the Hessians being ready by the beginning of March, the time fixed for the Dutch troops to be ready also. The deputies, he learnt from Fagel, deduced from what Fénelon said inclination on the part of France to consider the Dutch the principals in the quarrel and themselves but seconds. He wished that Horatio Walpole could have come to the Hague on his way to England (as had been intended),² since he would have been able to clear away a great many doubts. He stated the deputies to be well pleased that the Hessians would

¹ Townshend to Diemar, 4 January (o.s.) 1727, R.O. Foreign Entry Book 248.

² Fleury had thought it necessary for Walpole, returning to England for his parliamentary duties, to stay on at Paris pending news of the result of Stanhope's memorial, "by which in all likelihood we should be able to frame a judgement with regard to peace and war" and to consider means accordingly. So no time was left for a visit to the Hague (H. Walpole, 29 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32748).

be so many as 12,000, they having supposed that the landgrave could furnish but 8,000, and to agree that the manner of their coming would have to be concerted.¹

Before a second augmentation of the Dutch army could pass the States of Holland factious disputes of Amsterdam with Haarlem and Dordrecht had to be disposed of. At last, on 17 December, resolutions were adopted to raise the strength to 50,000 effectives and to expend a million florins on repair of fortifications and on storing magazines. A further resolution to equip twelve more men-of-war Finch expected shortly. But in regard to a plan of campaign it was observed to him that no provision appeared to be made for paying the Hessian troops, when on the march; that the French could not possibly master Rheinfels before May, whereas the early spring was the time of most hazard and communications ought to be secured by then; and that Hanoverian troops had better be employed, since there was no danger of an attack on Hanover so early. Finch objecting, Slingelandt told him that what was required was some assurance to people of consequence, who had doubts of the troops required being ready in time.²

To meet these objections Townshend sent a copy of the Hessian convention. He stated that the first instalment of £75,000 was paid already, that the second, of £50,000, though not due till February, was to be paid that week, and that payment of the troops when taken into service was sufficiently stipulated. He indulged in a panegyric of them and of the landgrave, "an honest, strong and faithful ally and a zealous patron of the protestant cause." He observed that France had a considerable force posted between the Rhine and the Moselle to help him; that the Hanoverian contingent was ordered to be raised to 20,000 men, fully equipped and to be ready by the spring in case of war; that the emperor was not strong enough to attack Holland Hanover and Hesse-Cassel at the same time; and that Hanoverian troops would be as much obstructed as those of the landgrave in reaching Holland, on account of probable opposition by the elector of Cologne,³ the duke of Wolfenbüttel, and perhaps the king of Prussia. His Majesty was anxious to have the Hessians ready by 25 March, "which is early eno' for any operations and sooner than the Dutch

¹ Finch, 10 and 13 December, R.O. Holland 292, with a translation of the deputies' report of 11 December.

² Finch, 17 December, *ibid.*, enclosing a document containing the objections, which he calls a "Suite du Préavis." Dayrolle had sent particulars of the increase of the army on 26 November; by the first augmentation 9,474 men, by the second 10,262; giving a total of 4,570 cavalry, 2,400 dragoons, and 46,914 foot (*ibid.* 288).

³ "As you know, likewise Bishop of Münster Paterborne and Hildesheim."

will be ready themselves." There were troops in plenty ; what was wanted was a good plan.¹

Other expression of British views was made by Townshend in answer to a long dissertation by Itterssum on Dutch sentiments. Principally he expressed his Majesty's regret that there should be in Holland so much distrust of France, whereas it was certain that the French government was acting in all sincerity in spite of Spanish temptation. The Dutch "préavis" he lauded as a very good beginning for getting rid of the timidity exhibited. The letter included a discussion of plans for attack and defence and of the whole situation.

Itterssum replied that Fénelon's expressions at the last conference had tended to increase distrust of France rather than to diminish it, and since then his singular manner of expressing himself, as though he feared to say too much, had done further harm. On this Townshend represented that nothing could be worse than these jealousies among the allies ; "il faut que chacun qui aime le bien public y porte du remède autant qu'il dépend de luy." He expressed pleasure that Itterssum was on terms of familiarity with Fénelon ; he might influence him and suggest his expressing himself better. And he should also warn his friends not to entertain suspicion on too light grounds. France was sincere, and too much must not be hung upon doubtful expressions of a French minister resulting from excess of precaution. To which Itterssum replied that he had used Townshend's letters with good effect and that Fénelon had received hints given cordially and in good part ; suspicion of France was beginning to disappear.²

After Walpole's return to London a dispatch to Broglie there conveyed the instructions sent to Fénelon about the "préavis." It was observed that the Dutch appeared inclined for action not in the Netherlands but against the emperor in Italy and against the king of Spain directly, in order to detach him from the emperor. In case, however, of their consenting to an attack upon Ostend, it should be left to them to formulate the plan in detail. The king of France had no interest in gains in the Low Countries and would be pleased to see an extension of Dutch power there, but prudence demanded that all proper preparations should be made. What was said about the risk of invading the empire was approved exactly, but about war in Italy it remained to see what the king of England would do to second the king of Sardinia with troops, and the Dutch to encourage him. On the

¹ Townshend to Finch, 13 December (o.s.), *ibid.* 292.

² Townshend 2 and 6 December (o.s.), Itterssum to him, 13 and 31 December, *ibid.* 284.

other hand objection was entertained to pressing war on Spain. On the whole matter Broglie should impart to the British ministers the instructions that were being sent to Fénelon, who was ordered, however, not to act upon them unless Finch were authorised to join in explanations in the same spirit.¹

The answer made opened with expression of his Majesty's sense of obligation to the king of France for not permitting Fénelon to act on his instructions sent him until Finch had received orders in conformity. It was explained that his Majesty regarded the "préavis" as a very important expression of Dutch opinion on the present state of affairs, the measures, which ought to be concerted, appearing to be insinuated with much judgment and solidity. Familiar with the habitual timidity of the Dutch, he feared that although most of what Morville proposed was very well founded, yet, if represented to them in the manner expressed, they might apprehend, although without the slightest foundation, that France was not disposed to concur in the vigorous measures suggested. He entirely agreed that the Dutch ought to explain themselves more clearly, but would have omitted what was said about France being ready to defend the Netherlands frontiers, supposing Austrian reprisals there; the precaution seemed hardly necessary, the emperor having very few troops in Flanders, and the Dutch a numerous army and so many strong places. A strong French force would lie idle there at useless expense; in case of necessity the army which his Majesty had always wanted France to have on the Moselle would serve for the purpose, as well as lying ready for an incursion into Lower Germany or for the reserve under the convention with Denmark. The second and third points were entirely approved, with reservation of the need of knowing with greater certainty whether the Dutch were ready to join in the measures for engaging the king of Sardinia; and further, his Majesty would omit mention of troops to be supplied by himself, thinking it more suitable for him to take his part in an Italian war by means of fleets or other succour. In regard to Spain opinion was expressed that the measures proposed should be adopted in their entirety.²

Robinson, however, was writing of disinclination in France to have Spain "undo itself," of opinion that "the Emperor should be made the principal in the war and the whole strength of the

¹ Morville to Broglie, 15 December, copy, R.O. France 184. Remarks annexed, presumably from the English side, agreed to the second article, suggested but verbal change in the third, and in the first changed only the order of what was said.

² Newcastle to Broglie, fair draft dated only December 1726 and apparently unfinished, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5.

allies turned upon him in the most sensible part, by which is meant Italy. That immediate application should be made to him for revoking his *Octroi*, which he will certainly refuse, and thereby give occasion for our entering into action.”¹

Fénelon having received his instructions, he and Finch at a conference on 23 December gave answer to the propositions of the “*préavis*” and pressed for a plan. Finch was assured that most of the deputies assented to what was said, but did not like Fénelon’s tone in regard to Spain; indeed, he said, Slingelandt had observed that the French seemed pretty plainly resolved to favour Spain. He noted jealousy of Prussia increasing on reports of magazines being erected in Cleves, and resolutions to bring nearer some three regiments of dragoons in garrison at Namur Tournai and Ypres.²

Townshend in reply argued that the best way to engage France thoroughly against Spain was for the Dutch to join in a plan for opening the war there and not about the Ostend Company. Not the least doubt was entertained but that France would co-operate loyally. They need not fear the king of Prussia, “for undoubtedly he has more fears and terrors than they can have, and is in the utmost uneasiness at the situation he is now in, being neither loved nor respected nor trusted on any side.”³

Newcastle for his part, writing to Paris, called attention to the coldness of Fénelon’s answer to the deputies having been taken to evince disinclination on the part of France to act against Spain offensively. The Dutch, he remarked, were “but too apt, even without grounds, to suspect France,” for which reason endeavour had been made to render the answer prescribed to Fénelon more palatable. However, since Finch had joined with him in making it, Robinson, when communicating the present dispatch, might take occasion to observe how readily the king’s ministers supported French measures, and might express the hope that, to reassure the Dutch, France would take such measures against Spain as would make them thoroughly easy. His Majesty entirely agreed with them that the only way to detach Spain from the emperor was to show the court of Madrid how small was the advantage it derived from his alliance and how great its dangers. Further, when a dispatch communicated by Broglie referred to a bad impression created in Holland by observation that George I

¹ Robinson to Delafaye, 25 December, R.O. France 184.

² Finch, 24 December, R.O. Holland 292. The reports about Cleves were discredited by Du Bourgay, and shortly were formally rebutted at the Hague by Meinerzhagen (Finch, 27 December).

³ Townshend to him, 20 December (o.s.), *ibid.*

had not increased his Hanoverian or English forces, and by report that the meeting of parliament was postponed from fear of the issue there, Newcastle asserted "such idle stories" to be purposely set about by Palm and repeated by other emissaries of Austria. By March the Hanoverian force would be raised to 20,000, "as good as any prince in Europe has," and at least as many would be sent from England as would "make them and the Hessians three bodys of 12,000 each, which is our two contingents and our corps de réserve"; but there must be delay till parliament met, because no funds were assigned for the purpose; nothing was more certain than the concurrence of parliament and of the whole nation, the session being postponed only in order to obtain first the accession of Sweden and the convention with Denmark. "You may acquaint the Cardinal and Mo^r de Morville that we are sure every thing will go well here, and we doubt not but they on their part will do all that can be expected, or in reason desired of them."¹

Still, however, as is apparent in the memoirs of Marshal Villars, it was the feeling in France that hostilities might and even should be entered upon with Austria, but not with Spain. Robinson, after further discussion with Fleury on the subject, reported:

He commended M^r Finch's observation to one of the deputies, that it was the principal efforts only that France did not think adviseable to turn against Spain, for the Cardinal said that that passage in the answer proceeded from no ill placed affection to his Catholick Majesty, who, by his conduct, deserved no more affectionate treatment, nor should have any better from hence, than from any other power he should injure; but that they were of opinion here that the best way to disunite the two courts of Madrid and Vienna was by turning the whole weight of the war upon the latter, and by that means shew the king of Spain how useless an ally the Emperor will prove to him.

He did not conceal his feeling that the principal burden of war with Spain would have to be borne by France, unfairly, and that all that the Dutch wanted was to remove danger as far as possible from themselves. To which Robinson rejoined that the British aim also was to disunite Spain from Austria, "but they were for going a shorter and surer way, which was to reduce his Catholic Majesty to such extremities, and no further, as might make him see his own true interests, and therefore his Majesty approved what had been hinted by the Dutch, that the Spaniards themselves might, if they would put it in our power, find their own advantage by our carrying on the war in Italy." This Fleury approved,

¹ Newcastle to Robinson, 20 and 22 December (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

he says, but showed much concern at " what he said were the most injurious and ill grounded suspicions in the Dutch, to imagine him capable of foregoing his engagements and word." He hoped that such suspicions were not entertained in England, any more than in Spain, and went on to inform Robinson of his last communications with Madrid, as elsewhere cited.¹

¹ Robinson, 8 January 1727, *ibid.*

CHAPTER XXXVI

PROGRESS IN SWEDEN

THE Swedish riksdag opened for preliminary work on 1 September (o.s.) 1726.¹ Count Horn was elected marshal by a majority over Baron Strömfelt of more than three to two. Poyntz was jubilant : " the election is an earnest of a good secret committee, and as we are sure of the clergy burghers and peasants all must go well." He expected most members of a neutral party, who had acted with the Holsteiners but were " incorrupt," to be " converted when they see the proofs of the danger." Although every one had " more or less affection for the duke of Holstein, which nothing but his own ill conduct could have cooled," the weakness of the Russian party was exposed and all that was to be feared now was delay. True, that Horn's election would cut him off for the time from intercourse with foreign ministers, " but this loss may be supplied, and we must be content to part with him on so good an occasion." ²

Golovin was correspondingly disgusted. He set down Horn's victory to the over-weight of officers and small gentry bought ; not one reputable person, he averred, had voted for him ; had a certain sum of money arrived from Russia a month sooner the result might have been different. Defeated with the nobles, he said, he was working among the burghers, who promised to influence the other two estates. His expenses he estimated not to exceed 5,000 ducats.³

¹ Particulars of the proceedings, Malmström II. chap. ix, and in the journals sent home by Poyntz. A full account of the ceremonial opening by Frederick I, *Lettres historiques*, lxx. 509.

² Poyntz, 7 September (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Sweden 44. A fortnight later he described how at least two-thirds of the nobles voting for Horn had come up from the country strongly prejudiced against him and had been converted on the eve of the election. Countess Horn had been in tears of despair, and the Holsteiners sure of carrying Strömfelt. A great number of ballots for him had been found torn up, and several for Horn written in pencil, " so that many changed on the spot without our knowing why," unless owing to the eloquence of " some of our young speakers. . . . Another surprizing circumstance is that Count Horn, whose Lady is of the Royal Family and who is himself of the old nobility, was carried by the new, whom he has constantly depressed."

³ Solov'ev, XIX. chap. i. He records a resolution of the Russian Supreme Privy Council, of 6 August (o.s.), to send to Sweden a note of exchange for 20,000 roubles for use among the smaller gentry and others, with promise of notable presents besides in return for support.

In his next dispatch Poyntz told of Horn carrying all before him—speaking with “great modesty and good temper” and loudly acclaimed,—and the elections for the secret committee, “on which the whole summ of affairs, particularly foreign, entirely depends,” gone “entirely in our favour.” Of the fifty nobles chosen “there are not five Holsteiners, of the twenty-five priests not above three, and in the burghers we have a clear majority”; the peasants not being represented. “Count Horn has now the game in his own hands, we shall see how he will act, he has excluded all the royalists he can, which I fear may create disunion. Our accession cannot come on the stage for some weeks, but I shall lose no time in pressing it. Baron Sparre is not on the secret committee, but appears satisfied and may be as useful out of it.”¹

Heartiest congratulations were returned from England. Poyntz was desired to find means to let Horn know how greatly pleased his Majesty was at his election, having “the highest opinion of his probity abilitys and zeal for the true interest of Sweden, which has so near a connexion with that of these kingdoms.” Without pressing him unduly, Poyntz must work to get the accession through as soon as possible, for it would be “of peculiar use here” if completed in time, even though parliament would not meet till after Christmas.² Newcastle, writing in like vein to Paris, observed that the strength of Horn’s party was greatly owing to the support of the king of Sweden and his friends, “who are kept in the right way of thinking by the honest accounts sent from hence by General Diemar,” and so made a fresh appeal for French financial aid to that unfortunate.³

Attendance at the riksdag appears to have been by no means full. Most of the 2,200 heads of noble families, who had the right to sit, says Poyntz, saved the trouble and expense of coming by sending proxies, often blank, to friends. The other three orders were represented by delegates, and here again, to save the expense of maintaining them, it was the custom for several “consistories towns and parishes” to combine in single representation. And as the number of these delegates was uncertain, so yet more were their principles and inclinations, though in each order the greater part obeyed a few leaders implicitly. The peasants were “mere louts, of a lower class than the meanest and poorest of your Lordship’s tenants.”

In particular Poyntz wrote of the leaders of a neutral party,

¹ Poyntz, 14 September (o.s.), private, R.O. Sweden 44. Sparre had come from England for the riksdag. Recreditive letter for him from George I, with expression of wish for his return, 13 August (o.s.), R.O. Royal Letters 56.

² Townshend to Poyntz, 20 September (o.s.), *ibid.*; the full text, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 234–5.

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 22 September (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

members of the secret committee : " three noblemen of the oldest familys, of great parts and credit, and of unblemished reputation, who, tho' far from leaning towards the Russians, seem inclined to putt themselves in opposition to Count Horn." These were Count Karl Emil Lewenhaupt, Count Ture Bielke, " a very fair man," having large pretensions in Courland and, Poyntz believed, in Livonia, and supposed to have hoped to be elected marshal, and Baron Conrad Ribbing, " an excellent writer and speaker, much addicted to republican principles and, as I am told, an inveterate enemy of the house of Holstein. He is stern rigid and unpopular, particularly among the officers of the army. But very ambitious and jealous of C. Horn, as his rival." ¹

With so strong a majority on the secret committee Poyntz forecast it as Horn's fault if things did not go well. " I think him sincere, but with all these advantages, which I may say without vanity are in a good measure owing to us, he redoubles his management for the Holsteiners," allowing " open access " to himself to Golovin Freitag and Reichel, but desiring Poyntz and Brancas not to visit him. " However it is my opinion he will in the end act steddily and well." In regard to the accession, while expecting success, Poyntz saw great difficulties ahead about the Ostend affair and despaired of obtaining troops, although Brancas' orders on that head were more positive than ever. He asked for particulars of how it was intended to employ them. In reference to a pamphlet lately published, written at his instigation and balancing the advantages of siding with Russia or with the allies of Hanover, he wrote : " lett what will come of our accession thus much I may venture to say, that we have raised such a spirit ag^t Muscovy and consequently the court of Vienna as no one can lay, and all measures of union between Sweden and them may from this time be pronounced impracticable." ²

¹ This neutral party, says Malmström (II. i.) objected to either Horn or Ström-felt being marshal, to the one as a senator, to the other as a Livonian, and wanted to put Bielke forward for the post. Horatio Walpole learnt through Gedda, on Horn's own authority, that of eight or nine members of the secret committee opposed to him only Bielke and Ribbing were of consequence; the former " a very honest gentleman and of great reputation for his integrity, so that the only means to get him is by great address and civilitys," the latter " a person of no great weight or credit " but very able and worth gaining, which might easily be done through his self interest (22 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32748).

² Poyntz, 21 and 22 September (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 44. To Tilson he wrote : " The whole play of our antagonists here at present is to spin out affairs." The secret committee had " a cartload of papers to devour before they can work their way to their accession." However, as three months was the legal term of the session the riksdag must be over before Christmas, unless a new law were made prolonging it. Jackson reckoned that there was work to occupy the riksdag until April (28 September (o.s.), *ibid.* 41).

The pamphlet noticed—Poyntz enclosed a French translation—was the work

Before this Horatio Walpole had written that in view of advice of £50,000 to be remitted to Golovin Brancas was empowered to spend £8,000 beyond the £40,000 already in his hands. Also that it was agreed, in case of necessity, to abate the quota of 12,000 men "annexed to the granting of subsidies, and upon the last extremity, rather than loose or hazard the accession, to recede from the whole." But he had to confess French expectation of the accession to be "by no means favourable," ministers distrusting Horn and fearing that, whatever his motives, he would "continue to act the same unequal and irresolute part, by dayly doing and undoing and changing his mind every moment"; witness his permission to Count Tessin to return for the riksdag in spite of his assurances to the contrary. They feared the effect of apprehension of fresh Russian ravages and other dangers, but nevertheless were strongly for obtaining the accession, if possible. One suggestion of Fleury, against which Walpole retails his arguments, was, in case of failure, a treaty of neutrality, perhaps with subsidies attaching. Morville, on the other hand, and the elder Pecquet dissented; no subsidies without accession. On the whole Walpole believed that the only orders to Stockholm would be to send the earliest advice of what seemed to be the disposition of the riksdag and what could be done against the emperor and the tsaritsa, should the accession fail.¹

Newcastle expressed the king's pleasure that Brancas was to have more money for use with the riksdag, in view of the expected Russian outlay, if only £8,000. "It will be necessary for us to keep touch with, if not to exceed, what is given by the opposite party." He regretted, however, that Brancas' reports should make Fleury so despondent of the issue. All accounts made Horn really to be sincere and ready, if properly supported, to put out his whole strength to obtain the accession, and Poyntz was sanguine and in high spirits. And so the king thought it undesirable to order ministers at Stockholm at present, as proposed by Broglie, to ventilate the idea of a defensive alliance between Great Britain France and Sweden as an alternative to the accession. Nothing, in his opinion, should be omitted to procure that, now that there were great hopes of success, nor anything done "that might make even our own ministers think that the two crowns would be satisfied without it." Should the suggestion get air, there would be an end of Otto Klinkowström, elsewhere noticed (pp. 258, 578). It is printed in the French by Rousset, iii. 246; the reply, iv. 196. Poyntz had written previously: "Mr Klinkostroom behaves well and is writing a piece in our favour . . . has writ an admirable piece in our favour." And after the publication: it had raised a great storm; Golovin and Reichel had protested and Cederhielm wanted it burnt by the common hangman; but all they had got was a severe rebuke from the secret committee (10 and 31 August and 5 October (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 44).

¹ H. Walpole, 14 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

of the accession; Horn, so much suspected by France, and "certainly so timorous and dilatory," would welcome the chance of thus getting out of his difficulties, and the Holstein party would oppose a defensive alliance just as much, although Cederhielm, to hinder the accession, had proposed it in the senate. The "friends" had defeated him there, and "should we be making the same proposals ourselves, or thinking of doing it, it would not fail of having the worst consequence among them." Wherefore the king thought that nothing should be said of an alliance until the accession was past all hope; he believed it might be had at any time. After another roseate presentment of the general situation Newcastle concluded by terming a hint from Walpole about putting money into Horn's hand "an exceeding good one," promising to have it suggested to Poyntz in a proper manner.¹

On the question of the troops some trouble between London and Paris had survened. Baron Sparre, it appears, had got wind of the disposition to recede from the demand, and had so reported home. Morville expressed to Walpole "a good deal of concern" at the divulcation of a matter, which it had been hoped would have been kept secret from all the Swedish ministers. A dispatch to Brancas, of which Walpole saw the draft, ordered him, should Horn open the subject, to declare with Poyntz that Sparre had been entirely mistaken, that there could be no subsidy without some advantage which might plainly distinguish, in favour of France and Great Britain, the accession of Sweden to the treaty of Hanover from that of the emperor to the treaty of Stockholm, and that otherwise, as he could easily show, Swedish service to the two crowns would be no more than observance of neutrality. This would leave Brancas free to consent to a reduction of the force, if he found that absolutely necessary. Walpole himself undertook to write to Poyntz to like effect and to assert to Gedda in the strongest terms, should he mention the subject, that Sparre must have misunderstood, "it being a point that the two crowns can never give up."²

Townshend at the same time was writing that the French seemed "fonder of having a body of troops from Sweden than we thought at first they would be," and so Poyntz must try to obtain the 12,000 men, using as an argument the reputation which would accrue to Sweden from their employment to preserve the peace of the north.³

¹ Newcastle in reply, 16 September (o.s.), *ibid.* The hint, given by "some gentlemen of the north," was that Horn, while having "the character of a very incorruptible, tho' of a cunning man," yet "loved money and has formerly found his account in the disposal of places." Walpole thereon had suggested entrusting some part of the bribery money to him for his private disposal, a thing which would bind without offending him.

² H. Walpole, 2 October, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 20 September (o.s.), cited.

Newcastle made out that Sparre and Diemar had acted too forwardly on a mere hint dropped, a hint prompted by what Horn and others had written about inability to supply the 12,000 men, whence his Majesty had been of opinion that the demand should not be insisted on. There had been no idea that the concession would be unpalatable to the French, they having proposed a grant of money before without condition of the kind. Orders now going to Poyntz to suit those to Brancas would, it was hoped, set everything right and the troops be obtained with the accession.¹ These orders were to the effect that, the French being found to be "more earnest than ever" in the matter and "displeased that we have been so yielding," Poyntz must "make use of the most warm and pressing instances which France makes here as an argument for your renewing that demand, which we really take to be very advantageous for Sweden."²

In October Poyntz set out what might "reasonably be expected" from the deliberations of the riksdag, "without our flattering our selves with false hopes." On the credit side he reckoned majorities increased among the nobles and yet more, in proportion, among the clergy, the burghers brought to heel,³ the peasants with no voice on foreign affairs nor much consulted on others,⁴ and in the secret committee at least 70 out of the 100 in favour of accession. He described how that committee was hearing read "two vast volumes" of extracts from the senate's protocols on foreign affairs, and dispatches from ministers abroad, and on the whole understood the king's and Horn's conduct to be "generally applauded" and that of their opponents censured. "Some days ago a member of the secret committee, an intimate friend of Count Horn, sent to me by his order to tell me I might now securely write to England that every thing would go to his Ma^{ty}'s wishes." On the other side Poyntz expected the real difficulties to begin when the principle of accession was approved. Although Horn certainly meant well, and would then be less shackled, "still that excess of caution and love of popularity, which is rooted in his nature, will dispose him to drive as hard a bargain as possible and to throw the whole weight of the treaty on our shoulders." Delays might be anticipated till the spring, when "many fine arguments" would be used to show the necessity of another British squadron coming.

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 29 September (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

² Townshend to Poyntz, 30 September (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 44, with various arguments to be set forth.

³ After "some danger of being misled by the burgomaster of Gotteburg, a young man of parts named Nericius; but they were soon set right, and he has since received orders from his town to vote for our alliance" (cf. Malmström, ii. 4).

⁴ "Their secretary, who usually governs them, and is some man of letters chosen by the Speakers of the three other orders, is entirely in our interests."

"In short Count Horn has had such success in drawing on our courts from one compliance to another, that I much fear he will stretch the cord till it breaks." The only remedy appeared to be to make "a resolute stand, once for all," letting the Swedes see that their alliance was desired "for their advantage as much, and for their security more than for our own," and giving them to understand that, provided that they abstained from engagements with the tsaritsa and the emperor, his Majesty would make his own punctually good, advance his own subsidies at shortest notice, and do his best to persuade France, though not obliged by treaty, to do the same. But purchase the alliance with annual subsidies and squadrons, while the Swedes did nothing, no. In view of the shortness of time for making their own naval preparations, and that amid the winter frosts, it seemed probable that the Swedes would want a British squadron next spring in any case.

However, Poyntz went on, whatever there might be in these conjectures, they must "keep fair with Count Horn, who is impatient of reproach and does not easily forgive. The accession is after all more necessary to him than us, and when in a civil manner we make a stand he must, I think, come up to our terms." He undertook to do his utmost with Brancas to obtain the troops, representing that the hopes of desisting from the demand, given to Baron Sparre, were conditional on the accession being carried before the riksdag met, in order that parliament might be persuaded to grant the subsidies. He announced having drawn again for £5,000, "which, except Dolgorucki ¹ brings more than was expected, will be the last." In spite of what he had set down, as the worst that could happen, the friends were "in very good heart." ²

Concerned at these prognostications, at "delays which, if not prevented, will turn both to their and our confusion," Townshend declared as follows. About the Ostend Company everything had been conceded that was possible; to go further would be to give up old rights. The troops must be found, and be held ready to embark for any destination required, only then entering into the pay of the allies; "his Ma^{ty} does not think it reasonable to promise to maintain these twelve thousand men for the use of Sweden, if attacked, when at the same time he will be obliged to send the succours stipulated by treaty." The resolution of the riksdag ought to be known before the opening of parliament; "delay would be almost as bad for us, as losing our point"; the subsidies could not possibly be voted until the instrument of accession was received. To procure the accession Poyntz must "leave no stone unturned," for therein the king was

¹ The Russian ambassador expected, see below.

² Poyntz, 8 October (o.s.), private, *ibid.*

"more concerned now than ever in point of credit both at home and abroad." A squadron would probably be sent next summer in case of need, but no stipulation for its coming could be made. Its dispatch would be empowered by the Danish convention as well as by the existing treaty with Sweden, so that the Swedes might be sure of it "both ways."¹

One means of influencing the Swedes Poyntz saw in quieting alarm on the part of the merchants at the peace between Holland and Algiers. An article of import chiefly needed, he said, was salt, and that was brought principally from Setuval (St. Ubes). It was feared that the corsairs, freed and wanting something to do, might extend their depredations northward of the Straits. He believed "that some specious and present advantage of this kind would go farther towards making the accession popular and eagerly demanded than all the solid and lasting, but less obvious interests, which would be secured to them by our alliance. At least it would fix Stockholm and all the trading towns to our interest, which would be a great point gain'd."² Townshend replied: "We know not what to say to the Swedish merchants concerning their fears of the Algerines." The Dutch demand to have them forced to peace as a condition of accession had been refused, "and much less can we purchase the alliance of Sweden upon such terms as may endanger the peace of this nation with the Algerines." Later, however, he found that articles in the existing defensive alliance with Sweden obliged his Majesty to protect Swedish ships in the southern "seas or streights," and so he hoped that apprehensions would be removed, although the Swedes would not undertake a guarantee of possessions outside Europe.³

For procuring the Swedish troops one argument enjoined was the danger threatening Sweden from the "shameful conduct" of the king of Prussia, this on advice from Poyntz of the tale of Swedish complaints against Prussia growing, "the governour of Pomerania (Count Meyerfeldt) is inexhaustible on this subject." Hitherto, said Poyntz, himself and Brancas had only with great difficulty staved off appeal to Great Britain and France for redress, on the ground of

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 14 and 28 October (o.s.), *ibid.*; the latter dispatch, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 236-7. A letter of like import went to Sparre, with congratulation on the "considerable figure" he made in the riksdag, all patriots owning that he distinguished himself on all occasions where the public service was concerned (1 November (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Entry Book 256).

² Poyntz, 19 and 23 October (o.s.), R.O. Sweden, 44, 45, the latter dispatch very private.

³ Townshend in reply, 8 and 15 November (o.s.), *ibid.* 45. The Portuguese were affected in the same way and had to fit out men-of-war to protect their merchant fleets, after the Dutch squadron had sailed for home (see Dormer and Burnett, 7 and 20 December, R.O. Portugal 33).

furnishing pretext to that king to obstruct their negotiation. He indited a long comment on all parties having "an equal contempt for the unsteadiness of his conduct."¹ Townshend pointed out in reply that the equivalent to Frederick William for Berg and Ravenstein, if such had to be found, would be Swedish Pomerania, so that it was to the Swedish interest, as well as to that of the two crowns, to get the 12,000 men sent over thither. Although his Majesty would not have the grievances brought into the treaty, if a memorial were presented after that was signed, and at the same time the Swedish forces in Pomerania were augmented, "a good use might be made of it towards awing the king of Prussia and keeping him within bounds."² To Finch at the Hague he wrote as follows.

You did well to explain how practicable you thought it was to have 12^m Swedes. It is a matter that will meet with difficulty in Sweden, but the King is not without hopes that it may be carryed, especially if the States would joyn their instances to those of the two crowns and would contribute something by way of subsidy to Sweden as an encouragement. A body of Swedish troops of that strength in Pomerania would be of excellent use for the service of the allys. Not that his Ma^{ty} apprehends so much the Muscovite designs singly and alone with respect to Sleswick, for his Ma^{ty} has been very well assured for these two years past and upwards that all those armaments in Muscovy, and all that noise of restoring the duke of Holstein to the territory he had lost, was only a cover to deceive the world and to blind Sweden in particular, upon which kingdome the first and chief aim was levelled. Those troops with that fleet were to have come to the mouth of the river of Stockholm under the pretence of demanding the use of the Swedish ports for their fleet, as necessary for carrying on their designs against Denmark, and when they were there to have landed their forces and in conjunction with the Holstein faction to have driven the present king of Sweden from the throne. If this grand project had succeeded, no doubt the same force would have gone on afterwards and retaken Sleswick and plunged the north with the rest of Europe into a most dangerous warr. But by the measures his Majesty took privately last year and by what the King did with his fleet this summer in the Baltick, and by other measures taken by his Ma^{ty} and France to support the true patriots in Sweden and lessen the prevalency of the Holstein and Russ party there, the face of affairs is now much changed, and Sweden will not become that easy prey to the cabals of the Czarina and the duke of Holstein, as was once expected. It is the Emperor therefore and his new allys whom the King has reason to apprehend, who have by a secret article with the Czarina engaged in favour of that duke, if good offices don't succeed in the space of a year, to restore him by force. We therefore may again hear of much talk of the recovery of Sleswyck. But the King is perswaded that that is not the real view of the Imperial court, but it was the lure to tempt the Czarina and her son in law with to accede to the treaty of Vienna; and it is the most specious pretence the Emperor can make

¹ 23 October (o.s.), cited.

² Townshend in reply, 15 November (o.s.), *ibid.*

use of to bring an army of Muscovites into the Empire to support him in his true design, which is, to make himself master in Lower Germany and to wreak his revenge on the King and the States, whose dominions lye open and exposed that way. Wherefore his Ma^{ty}'s view has been to gather a strength in those parts sufficient to oppose all the pernicious projects of the court of Vienna for annoying him and the republick; and that might at the same time be some check upon the king of Prussia, and some others of the Emperor's allys. To this purpose the body of 12^m Swedes in Pomerania, with the other forces designed to form an army on that side, will not only be of most excellent use but are absolutely necessary.¹

A month before this a heavy blow had been struck upon the Russian party in Sweden by the arrest of old Count Vellingk, the most bitter opponent of the allies of Hanover. The immediate charge against him was endeavour in the year 1722 to relieve the king's financial straits by raising a loan at Berlin on the security of the customs of Wolgast, state property. Vellingk in his defence admitted the fact of the negotiation, but stated that the proposal of a mortgage, first on lands in Hesse and then on the customs of Wolgast, had come from the king of Prussia and had been unhesitatingly rejected. He attributed the whole accusation to Diemar's personal enmity against himself as the supposed chief author of his expulsion from Sweden.

Diemar was indeed the incriminator, though it was the British government who employed him. In anticipation of the meeting of the riksdag he had, with the king of Sweden's consent, supplied original documents concerning the transaction, supplementing previous information.² When the time was ripe the papers were placed in the hands of the secret committee. On the evening of 18 October (o.s.) the committee, Horn absenting himself on the plea of indisposition, sent a deputation to the king to inform him that Vellingk was found guilty of criminal correspondence and to ask authority to place him under arrest and seize his papers. That given, Major Wrangel, of the Guards, carried out the execution.³

Poyntz took the "bold stroke" for proof of "a strong and clear majority in the secret committee" and saw the accession made "absolutely necessary to Count Horn, who must sink without it."

¹ To William Finch, 22 November (o.s.), R.O. Holland 292.

² "Having now received from General Diemar the acquittances and other pieces, together with his Relation or Species Facti, I send them to you by this messenger to compleat what you have had from me before. You will take the same care of these papers as you was to have of the former, the General putting his whole confidence in your friendship and your management" (Townshend to Poyntz, 12 August (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 43. Diemar's "Eclaircissements sur la dangereuse négociation d'argent à Berlin" therewith, putting the affair in the worst light for Vellingk and exonerating the king).

³ Jackson, 19 October (o.s.), *ibid.* 41; cf. Malmström i. 489, ii. 7. For the proceedings and sentence (April 1727) see the dispatches and Malmström further.

He stated Cederhielm to be implicated, and so terrified that he had sent a box of papers to Golovin's house for safety.¹ In England the news gave unbounded satisfaction. Townshend wrote :

You can't well imagine the joy which the news of Count Wellingk's arrest gave us. This great blow given to the Holstein and Muscovite faction in seizing the person of their mighty oracle and chief director, with all his papers, must break their spirits and confound their schemes ; and we look upon it as a sure earnest that the accession cannot fail to follow soon, since those who ventured to strike such a bold stroke must never think more of being on tolerable terms with the Russ or Holsteiners, but go on and secure to themselves the allies of Hanover in order to support themselves against that party, and be enabled entirely to quell and subdue them. I shall be curious to know the springs and secret management of this arrest, which I look upon to be a masterly stroke of Count Horn's, and which must engage him more firmly to go hand in hand with us.²

Renewing instances with Horn, Poyntz now obtained the appointment of a special commission to examine and report upon the whole question of the accession.³ Yet he could not venture to forecast proximate conclusion. Says he : "Chancellour Duben has ownd to me frankly that he has not the least hopes of seeing our conferences resumed and the accession signed, as long as the diet continues sitting ; but he hopes they will separate by Christmas and that when the secret committee (who he assures me are every day more favourably disposed) shall have approved and regulated the manner of proceeding the rest will not take up much time." To his observation that the riksdag might resume after Christmas and continue sitting till February or March, Poyntz could only get answer that Horn and his party desired the accession even "more than we can do, being interested in it, but that the committee must go its own pace and be led to it by such gradations as may make it their own act and deed." Although he expected the Vellingk prosecution to result in complete rout of the Holstein party and expulsion of some of its leaders from the senate, whereon all direct opposition to the accession would fall, yet he had to apprehend "two or three incidents" which might "throw great obstacles in the way." First the emperor ("who has thought it worth his while to purchase the Electors so dear") might "in conjunction with Muscovy and Spain offer them subsidies vastly superior to ours" ;⁴ secondly,

¹ Poyntz, 23 October (o.s.), cited. For the proceedings against Cederhielm, Malmström ii. 13, 14, 30-35.

² Townshend in reply, 8 November (o.s.), and further on the 15th, R.O. Sweden 45.

³ Cf. Malmström, ii. 9.

⁴ "This would not so certainly gain their inclinations, as it would stagger and perplex their counsels, and would probably end in raising their demands on us and consequently protract the negotiation to the term mentioned in my express of the 8th October."

rupture with Spain would furnish the neutral party with an argument against Sweden being involved in the quarrel; and thirdly, the negotiation with Denmark might give umbrage. On this subject, he said, nothing had been remarked to himself or Brancas yet, and he had not exercised his power to communicate the secret Holstein article.

After which Poyntz reverted to a former topic, disapproved in England, a supply of corn thence to relieve the scarcity in Sweden. To Horn's representations that Livonia was now so ill cultivated that none could be obtained thence, that the want would disable the Swedes from furnishing magazines for their army, and that as soon as the merchants of Dantzic and Königsberg learnt of the famine they would double the price, he had objected, he said, the impracticability of importation of British corn against the heavy customs preferences in favour of the Swedish merchants, and had insisted that it was safest to effect the accession and make sure of the subsidies by granting the troops asked for. To which Horn had countered that refusal would damage the prospects of accession, but consent bring great credit to the king of England and profit to the merchants. Allowing the scheme to be "crude and absurd" Poyntz went on to advance reasons in favour of it. Rye, he said, was most wanted; a barrel (upwards of four English bushels) cost about 8/5 at Dantzic and 8/10 in London, allowing for the bounty, while it sold at Stockholm for near 15/-. He had himself engaged a small quantity at Dantzic to import, but 40,000 to 50,000 "tuns" were wanted. "But to expect that our government should turn corn-factors for them, while the accession is not perfected, will, I fear, be thought very unreasonable."¹

The Russian ambassador so long expected, Prince Vasily Lukich Dolgoruky, appeared at last at Stockholm on 18 November. He showed no hurry to enter upon business, was leisurely with his visits, and did not have his audience till 10 December. Count Freytag endeavoured to bring him into relations with Poyntz, but he, as in such previous cases, felt himself obliged to decline, unless visits were also exchanged with his Hanoverian colleague, Colonel Bassewitz. He described Dolgoruky as a "well bred, personable man, and resembles a little my Lord Stair."² Freytag in a letter intercepted depicted him as an able and prudent gentleman, who would do nothing with warmth or precipitation and might make proselytes by his liberality. In reference to which information Townshend suggested that Poyntz might "find means to cultivate

¹ Poyntz, 17 November (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 45.

² Poyntz and Jackson, 9 to 30 November (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 45, 41. Particulars, Solov'ev, XIX. chap. i.

his acquaintance and draw advantages from it, without doing any prejudice to Sweden, or our affairs here.”¹

In December Poyntz reported the secret committee “hard at work about the alliance” but was “in great pain for the event,” many of the friendly nobles, tired of the delays and expense, having gone into the country, and those that remained being divided “about lessening the number of representatives and excluding those in foreign service.”

Our greatest hopes are in the secret committee itself, but even there some change to our disadvantage is observed in the burghers, and the whole committee have so long been taught to look upon the accession as a most hazardous step, that the least specious offer from Dolgorucki and Freitag, or the least appearance of an immediate rupture with Spain, would easily throw them back into the utmost irresolution; if the last discovery of the committee proves important, this may put some new life into the diet, otherwise I foresee no good issue of their tedious deliberation.

Horn, meanwhile, preached patience and to “forbear closing with Denmark,” Poyntz countering that the sum of the negotiation at Copenhagen, like that with the landgrave, was only for troops. Searching for the treaty made by Prussia with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp in 1713 he had the good fortune to find a memorial presented by Golovkin at Berlin expressly declaring the Danish pretension to Sleswick and Holstein to be just and well founded and threatening the king of Prussia with a rupture, should he offer to procure restitution or indemnity for the duke. This memorial, he advised, should not be forgotten but “rubbd about their noses till they smell the stink of it.”²

The question of prolonging the session of the riksdag beyond its legal term of three months was now being debated with great violence. The Holstein party, headed by Colonel Stobæus, moved its dissolution and the calling of a new assembly in January.³ The object, we are told, was to displace Horn from his office of marshal, and the rudeness of Stobæus towards him had roused general tumult. Some, says Poyntz, laid hand on their swords, there were cries for throwing the colonel out, and the sitting “had all the aspect of a Polish diet.” Stobæus, “pale with fear, then red

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 13 December (o.s.), *ibid.* 45. Freytag's letter was of 27 November, to Count Schönborn. But Jackson remarked Dolgoruky to be sparing of his money, and Freytag doubted his being empowered to offer the subsidies foreshadowed by Cederhielm, and certainly not in time of peace.

² Poyntz, 30 November (o.s.), *ibid.* He sent an extract from Golovkin's memorial of 12 December 1713, noting it to have been printed in the *English Monthly Mercury* of that date.

³ Cf. Malmström, ii. 9, 10.

and trembling with rage," had been forced to ask pardon, and prolongation had been carried. Once more Poyntz hoped that all would go well, the friends having gained "new life and union" and Horn, lately thinking of throwing up the game and retiring, being imbued with new spirit. Although the accession could not be completed before parliament met, he hoped that by that time news of resolution to accede would be to hand, unless some unforeseen accident should upset everything.¹

At the end of the year Townshend was still pressing for conclusion. "Time wears away apace, and our parliament will be meeting now in a short time; and you know how inconvenient it will be in several respects to have our session open without the accession being finished." He was of opinion that expectation of a rupture with Spain ought to forward the affair, rather than hinder it, for under the existing defensive treaty Sweden could be called upon simply to furnish succour, whereas accession would bring a subsidy of 100,000 crowns a year and payment for the troops supplied. And when notifying, as to other envoys, the circumstances attending Pozobueno's withdrawal, he urged that Sweden ought to join with the other protestant powers in defence of their religion. He renewed assurance of the coming of another squadron, if required, to be commanded, if not by Sir Charles Wager, employed elsewhere, by an officer as able.²

Dolgoruky now made formal declaration that new engagements with the king of England might result in war and certainly would forfeit all confidence between the tsaritsa and the king of Sweden. This, says Poyntz, he accompanied with "scandalous and senseless invectives" against his Majesty, "which betrayed the most impotent rage, joyned with the most profound and barbarous ignorance." Language used to Sparre, he stated, had been even worse.³

To counter this Poyntz and Brancas presented, as requested by the "friends," memorials demanding a final answer on the subject of the accession; this with the object of having them referred to the chancery, "who will come in with a strong report to second and enforce that of the committee." At the same time, on the advice of a very sincere friend and in agreement with Brancas, Poyntz ventured to broach suppression of the specific demand for 12,000 men, and in lieu thereof increase, so far as could be borne, of the succour to be stipulated, with application of part of the subsidy to keeping the troops for that succour ready for action. He argued that if their number were raised from 5,000 to 10,000 the Swedes

¹ Poyntz and Jackson, 7 December (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 45, 41.

² Townshend to Poyntz, 13 to 23 December (o.s.), *ibid.* 45.

³ Poyntz, 13 December (o.s.), very private, *ibid.*

would have to maintain them at their own expense during the whole term of the treaty, whereas, as at present proposed, the 12,000 men would be paid for by Great Britain and France, and kept on foot only for the term of the subsidy. Also he noted that the words "forces ultérieures" in the treaty would always supply a handle for a new convention for troops. Further, in view of his present hopes, he asked what term he might name for payment of the first £50,000, in money or corn, thinking the sooner after the treaty was signed the better, "in order to reconcile the whole nation to the alliance by some immediate and palpable advantage."¹

There was nothing to do but to give Poyntz praise for the importance clearness and exactness of his reports and to say, "we must be contented with things in the pace they can be made to go. . . . Any thing that is done towards raising new levies in Pomerania, and strengthening the garrison of Stralsund, will be very acceptable." First payment of the subsidies, he was told, must wait for approval of the treaty by parliament. He need not have the least scruple about leaving Happe out of the conferences, the king of Prussia having so continually obstructed the success of the treaty of Hanover. In fact, news that Happe was not taking part in them would gratify.²

Commissioners having been appointed to confer with Dolgoruky, he met them on 12 January (o.s.) 1727. As the result, says Poyntz, "The arrogance emptiness and impertinence of this conference has given great offence, and, as I am assured, has very much helped forward the accession, which no one now seems to doubt of"; nothing offered, only the same invective against his Majesty as before. Soon he could report opinion by the chancery "that they saw no reason to alter their resolution in favour of the accession." And he learnt in great secrecy that a report, advising it, was being engrossed and would be presented the next Friday.³

Before the riksdag adjourned for the Christmas holidays the

¹ Poyntz and Jackson, 20 and 21 December (o.s.), *ll.cc.*, with copies of the two memorials.

² Townshend to him, 6 January (o.s.), 1727, *ibid.* 46.

³ Poyntz, 11 to 25 January (o.s.), *ibid.* A few days afterwards he sent a copy of the protocol of the conference obtained, after fruitless efforts elsewhere, from Golovin's secretary. He understood Dolgoruky's speech to have been drafted at Petersburg and corrected in consultation with Freytag Cederhielm and Höpken. "It does no honour to any of them, and has been of more use to us than anything that has passed in the whole course of this negotiation." On 8 February (o.s.) he sent a copy of a memorial of Dolgoruky to the king and wrote to Tilson: "You will find by my dispatch and what Du Commun is to bring that *Acheronta movebo* is the word here. The father of lyes himself never begot such lusty ones as those that have been let loose upon us for some days past. I take them all as omens of despair on the other side and the accessⁿ being at the door." A memorial of the same date by Freytag, *Lettres historiques*, lxi. 380.

weakness of the Holstein party had been exposed by a vote of more than two to one against allowing Vellingk bail, although, says Poyntz, they had polled their whole strength, while fifty of the other side were already gone into the country.¹ Dolgoruky confessed the weakness to his court. The riksdag, he wrote, was like a fair, every one trafficking and telling what moneys others had received, while for themselves protesting innocence, since punishment for the offence was capital. The festivities that he celebrated for the tsaritsa's name-day had had but small effect. The commissioners appointed to negotiate with him, all of the opposite party, inquired why so powerful a fleet equipped, why 40,000 men brought to Petersburg and provisions for them prepared in haste, why nothing but threats? Hanoverian partisans, such as De la Gardie and Von Kochen, were ready to go to the stake for the king of England; the former had an English pension of £4,000 a year. The two best disposed of the secret committee, Bielke and Lewenhaupt, Horn had taken off into the country to win them over; the one was promised an estate in Bremen worth 30,000 roubles, the other a field-marshal's baton. The English party prevailed, because the Russian had no leaders of capacity and energy; the former disregarded no means of influencing the secret committee, and the neutralists were overcome by fear of consequences. He himself was authorised to promise subsidies only in return for Swedish support in the affair of Sleswick, but if he put that condition forward he might spoil his whole business, for the court party would cry out that he was trying to bring Sweden into war. He could approach no one; his promise of immediate subsidies was not listened to.²

Reporting the proceedings at the opening of parliament Townshend expressed the wish that the friends in Sweden had enabled more positive language to be used in the King's Speech about the accession, but nevertheless, he said, the addresses in reply would show that the country was entirely in favour of the king's measures. A week later he wrote of a motion to have Poyntz's memorial of 4 June 1726 laid before the Commons, with the object of inquiry into the reasons for sending so large a squadron to the Baltic, at such great expense, when the Swedes, according to Poyntz, had not asked for it. Although the motion had been rejected the friends would see "to what streights we are driven for want of their accession"; had it been carried, there must have been laid before the House "all the private instances that have been made to us from Sweden."³

¹ Poyntz, 20 December (o.s.) 1726, cited.

² Dolgoruky in December 1726 and January 1727, Solov'ev XIX. chap. i.

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 17 and 24 January (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 46.

Poyntz reported in answer great effect produced by the King's Speech and the Addresses and shortly afterwards signature of the sub-committee's report by all its twelve members excepting burgo-master Stobæus and the bishop of Gothenburg (Erik Benzelius), "whom Count Horn, according to his usual policy, hoped to gain by placing them in the deputation." Also he was able to send a particular account of what had passed at a twelve-hour sitting of the secret committee, in spite of the secrecy to which members were sworn. From this, he said, would be seen the reasons for rejecting the article proposed in favour of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, as also the necessity for concealing the secret article of the Danish convention.¹

¹ Poyntz, 8 and 11 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

CHAPTER XXXVII

DEFEAT AT TURIN

IN July 1726, when John Hedges was at last about to set out for Turin, Newcastle intimated to Paris that his Majesty, rather than lose the king of Sardinia, might be inclined to go so far as to renew to him the guarantee of 1704 of an equivalent for the territory of Vigevano. But this, Horatio Walpole was told, only if absolutely necessary, and to be mentioned as a thought of his own to Fleury alone. Fleury, however, was found to be for delay in the matter, thinking Victor Amadeus "determined to wait to see the scene open more fully, with regard to peace, or war, before he would take any party," and in case of war more likely to side with Great Britain and France than with the emperor.¹

On news of the treaty between Austria and Russia Newcastle brought up the suggestion again, though still only as an offer to be made in the last resort, and if possible not at all. A week later, however, observing that engagement of the king of Sardinia would, in view of the emperor's particular ambition to secure and extend his dominions in Italy, be the greatest blow to him that was possible, and that it seemed that the king would insist on advantages, whether war broke out or no, he desired Walpole, although knowing from his own instructions and from those given to Hedges that his Majesty had already gone further than was at first thought necessary, to consult the French ministers whether the engagements in regard to an equivalent for the Vigevanasco ought not to be renewed in any circumstances. True, that the king of Sardinia had renounced those his pretensions under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, but since the emperor was breaking those terms every day and promising to the powers of Europe anything to gain them, surely it was proper for Great Britain and France to renew an engagement, to which the emperor had formerly been a party and which would probably secure the king named immediately. Were Fleury willing to send Cambis instructions in this sense, Hedges could proceed to Turin at once.²

¹ Newcastle, 27 June (o.s.) 1726, H. Walpole in reply, 13 July, B.M. Add. MS. 32746.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 18 and 26 August (o.s.), *ibid.* 32747.

That envoy, arrived at Fontainebleau in the first week of September, reported his instructions entirely approved and orders about to go to Cambis conformable in every particular. The French ministers, however, he said, expected Victor Amadeus to put off making terms until there was certainty of war, from which alone he looked to secure sufficient advantages. Against that Walpole had argued that representation of the consequences of his not engaging himself with the allies of Hanover must have great weight with him, namely, that in case of a pacific solution, if not so engaged, his interests would hardly be considered, while if he sided with the emperor he would get nothing, since any gain to him must be at the emperor's expense. Also that his accession to the treaty of Hanover would be of greater value to him than a separate treaty, because he would have "the guaranty of the Dutch for an equivalent to the Vigevenasc, to which they were still obliged by the treaty of Utrecht, they having never acceded to the Quadruple Alliance." The value of these arguments had been admitted and Hedges desired to employ them to the best advantage. Also the French ministers thought it "too cold a beginning" merely to propose general advantages, as less than what the king of Sardinia had already been led to hope for, endeavours, that was to say, to get Sicily for him in case of war. And they desired particularly to insist on his having a guarantee of the reversion of the crown of Spain, should the succession to Philip V fail.¹

Newcastle expressed pleasure at learning that the only objection made to Hedges' instructions was that they were not "warm and strong enough" about the advantages for the king of Sardinia to be proposed. When they were drawn, he said,

great caution was used not to lay in his way any temptation to hurry on matters towards a rupture in hopes to find his particular account in it, but the activity and progress of the Imperialists in strengthening their party have convinced the King that such precautions must now be overlookt, and that more vigorous and effectual measures are become necessary to be taken on our part for gaining new alliances.

It was for this reason that it had been proposed to offer an equivalent for the Vigevanasco, even should there be no war, and it seemed from Hedges' report that the French ministers would probably agree to this; but whether so or no, he and Walpole must settle with the court of France without waiting for further instructions, and might meet the wishes of that court in regard to promise of

¹ Hedges, 10 September, R.O. Savoy and Sardinia 32, cf. H. Walpole, 10 and 14 September, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

all possible endeavour to recover Sicily for the king of Sardinia in case of war. His Majesty did not doubt Hedges' ability to press the arguments put forward by Walpole, and he must hasten his departure for Turin, for delay might have a bad effect in making the king of Sardinia believe that the two courts were not in earnest, or at variance.¹

Yet Hedges still stayed at Paris during October, waiting for the letter instructing Cambis to act in concert with him, according to his orders. The real cause of the delay, we may suppose, was that Fleury had entered on trial of Victor Amadeus through a secret agent of his own, without the knowledge either of Morville or of Cambis. The man employed was Anfossy, of Avignon, before noticed, whom Fleury had known when in Provence. A letter of introduction and recommendation, which he carried, stated that there had been no time to give him further orders than to execute such as he should receive from the king of Sardinia; that more precise instructions would be sent him on receipt of his first report; and that Louis XV, the only other person who knew of his mission, was greatly interested in it. For the rest the letter gave account of the present condition of France, the firm character of Louis XV, and the recent overtures to Spain and by Austria, with brief notice of the position with other powers. It concluded with assurance of desire to enter into close relations, the king of Sardinia's counsels and help being greatly valued, and of absolute secrecy to be observed in regard to any proposals that might be made.²

Arrived at Chambéry Anfossy had several private interviews with the king but had to report that he was more ready to give advice than help and could not be prevailed upon to undertake engagements. Nor did subsequent correspondence of Fleury with Victor Amadeus produce anything substantive.

On 4 October Hedges sent copies of paragraphs added to an extract from his instructions to be left with Morville, one regarding an equivalent for the Vigevanasco, in case of a congress, the other gains in case of war, retention, namely, as fiefs of the empire of

¹ Newcastle to Hedges, 8 September (o.s.), R.O. Savoy and Sardinia 32.

² See the *Recueil des instructions*, xiv. 349, 357. The letter and instructions of date 2 August. Anfossy was desired to leave Avignon at once on the pretext of employment offered him at Paris, and at Lyons to turn off to Chambéry, pretending to be a merchant and carefully avoiding recognition. Arrived, he was to inform the Intendant of Savoy that he would be glad to propose to the king a project for trade in his dominions. Admitted, he was to explain his mission without concealment and to present the letter: to listen, but not discuss, excusing himself on the ground of insufficient instructions; and if the king explained his requirements to intimate that they were exorbitant and only promise to report. On all questions foreign to his mission he was to talk freely.

conquests that the king of Sardinia might make in Italy, or Sicily in substitution.¹ Walpole on the same date wrote of doubt by the younger Pecquet whether either proposal would have effect; the former, because the king of Sardinia would always apprehend relegation of his interests to the background, were the emperor disposed to give way on matters of greater moment, the latter, because an attempt to conquer Sicily might fail and would in any case weaken attack upon the emperor in Italy. As his own private idea Pecquet put forward promise, in case of war, of utmost endeavours to secure to the king of Sardinia such conquests as he should make in Italy, as fiefs of the empire, but should those endeavours fail to guarantee him Sicily as an equivalent. Walpole thought it much the same thing whether Sicily were obtained for him either way.²

Next Walpole and Hedges reported what the instructions proposed for Cambis were. They allowed the king of Sardinia a separate treaty instead of accession to the treaty of Hanover, should he so prefer, assurance being given that nothing in regard to Italy or the Austrian succession should be agreed to without his immediate knowledge and consent. In case of war he was not to be discouraged from attempting conquest of the Milanese, but rather assured of powerful assistance both for defence and for attack, with a guarantee of what conquests he should make, to be held as fiefs of the empire; should this prove impracticable, then Sicily at least to be given him in compensation, an exchange the easier, because the emperor had always set such high value on the Milanese. Engagements, however, for the case of settlement of differences without a war Morville thought should be "weighd with all possible caution, since the making good too sanguine promises would be a more difficult task in this case"; the utmost promised should be exercise of good offices for obtaining an equivalent. He was content to leave the matter to the "prudence and management" of Cambis and Hedges, but deprecated delay in making the offers, the negotiation having already been drawn out for so extended a period. They should refrain from more, with further fruitless prolongation as a consequence, and put these proposals, from which alone success could be hoped, "fairly and openly" forward.

These offers, Walpole and Hedges commented, the French court thought the least that could be made, in view of the great value of the king of Sardinia's alliance. Morville, they said,

¹ Hedges, 4 October, R.O. Savoy and Sardinia 32.

² H. Walpole, same date, B.M. Add. MS. 32747.

thought him "so disoblighd by the Emperor, and so angry with him, as to be disposed to listen to any favourable propositions from the two crowns, and therefore so good an opportunity should not be let slip." For later his demands might grow with the necessity of gaining him.¹

Hedges had scruples about the difference in these proposals from his own instructions, although, he wrote, "Mr Walpole is of opinion, as well as the ministers here, that nothing less can have any influence on his Sardinian Majesty."² He was reassured, reminded again of the changes in the situation, informed that his Majesty entered entirely into French views, and earnestly desired, since the only way to deprive the Austrian and Spanish courts of the power of putting their designs in execution was to strengthen the two crowns by new alliances and to act with spirit and resolution, to spare no pains to bring his negotiation to as speedy a conclusion as possible.³ Arrived at Turin on 7 November he was most cordially received by Cambis, but was surprised to learn that already for some twelve months that ambassador had been making offer, in general terms, of powerful aid from France, in case of war, for conquests in the Milanese, to be retained by the king of Sardinia at the peace. "These propositions the king was always pleased with, but still found some pretext never absolutely to accept of," waiting, it might be supposed, for like offers from England and to see what other powers might come in. The proposals, Hedges observed, were not in accordance with his own instructions, nor, did he think, would the idea of exchange of Milanese conquests for Sicily have been put forward, had the French propositions for keeping those conquests absolutely been known. Cambis even expected the offer of Sicily in eventual exchange for them to be "a great draw back" in the king's eyes. For the rest he reported Victor Amadeus as at present "in a very good humour and much more inclin'd to come into engagements with us, than he has ever yet been." Count Harrach had as yet made no propositions on the part of the emperor, "but on the contrary has so dissatisfied the whole court here by his behaviour that they have but little correspondence with him."⁴

Answering this, Horatio Walpole disclaimed knowledge of authorisation to Cambis to make such offers; he conjectured private orders, through Morville, from the duke of Bourbon, without the Council's knowledge, for nothing had been said on the subject at

¹ Walpole and Hedges jointly, 15 October, R.O. Savoy and Sardinia 32.

² Hedges to Delafaye, 16 October, R.O. France 184.

³ Newcastle to Hedges, 14 October (o.s.), R.O. Savoy and Sardinia 32.

⁴ Hedges, 9 November, *ibid.* Harrach had appeared at Turin on 2 June (*Lettres historiques*, lix. 645).

the conferences for settling instructions to Hedges. He could not, therefore, tell what answer would be made to dispatches from Cambis just received, but supposed that his must be the greater embarrassment.

No wonder that he is extremely desirous to have his offer supported and made good by his Majesty's concurrence, without the least abatement, and indeed I must own that the case is nice with regard to your conduct, as well as the French ambassador's in this affair. . . . He cannot pretend to recede from what he has so long since offered, and your proposing less may be very disagreeable to the king of Sardinia, and make him lay his not having a prospect of what he has so much at heart entirely at his Majesty's door.

To meet the difficulty Walpole suggested assertion that while the king of England's offers had been limited to Sicily, in case of a rupture, he had no objection to extension of the king of Sardinia's dominions on the side of the Milanese, saving that, as a prince of the empire, he could not enter into a treaty for the alienation of a fief thereof. Hence the authorisation to Hedges to promise aid for conquests there to be held by the king of Sardinia as fiefs of the empire, or, if contrary to expectation that should prove impracticable, to procure for him Sicily as an equivalent, "without which he shall not be obliged to quit the said conquests." All of which might be so represented "as to shew that what his Majesty now offers, far from being derogatory or a drawback, is an explanation of the most effectual means to secure, as far as is practicable, what has been offered by M^r Cambis, in general terms only, before the sentiments of England were known."¹

Hedges' first audience passed off extremely well, he says. In reply to his speech Victor Amadeus expressed the greatest esteem for his Majesty and the British nation, which had so powerfully assisted him in the wars, but asserted the necessity of utmost circumspection in the present crisis and preferred, as usual, to put questions rather than give information.²

The ministers appointed to treat on the king's part were the marquises di Santommaso³ and del Borgo. The latter at a first interview with Hedges disclaimed engagements with the emperor, and in answer to his discourse on the difficulty of making offers, when desires were so closely concealed, pointed out how the exposed condition of Piedmont on the side of Italy prevented his master from any venture there, unless he were assured of most effectual

¹ H. Walpole to Hedges, 18 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

² Hedges, 15 November, R.O. Savoy and Sardinia 32.

³ In the dispatches, "St. Thomas." He had formerly represented Victor Amadeus at Vienna, but having displeased the emperor had been replaced there in January 1720 by Di Breglio (Carutti, iii. 558-9).

measures for his safety. Possession of Sicily, he said, "would weaken them in Piedmont by the troops it would drain them of." Fearing that the suggestion of Sicily as an eventual equivalent for conquests in the Milanese might be taken as a prior decision that such conquests could not be retained, with the result of so jealous a prince either breaking the negotiation off or prolonging it indefinitely, Hedges agreed with Cambis to defer the suggestion till views should have been sounded.¹

When it came to conferences the Sardinian ministers would let out nothing. At the first, on 17 November, Cambis and Hedges were compelled at last to set on paper the following memorandum of what might be offered.

In case of a war a superior strength by sea and by land, the troops of his Sardinian Majesty comprised; and in case of success the conquests he shall make shall remain to him as fiefs of the empire, being such beforehand. In case his retaining those conquests should be attended with insurmountable difficulties, peace shall not be made unless an equivalent be found for him *à sa convenance*. In case of peace, if this should be accommodated by a negotiation without entering into a war, nothing shall be done but in concert with his Sardinian Majesty, and his interests shall be taken care of in such manner as shall be agreed on with the two kings his allies in the treaty which is now proposed to be made. And this treaty shall be either by accession to the treaty of Hanover or by a particular one.

After explanation of the reasons for formulating proposals thus Hedges observed the best effect to have been obtained by the assurance of doing nothing but in concert with the king of Sardinia, and particularly in regard to Italy. Against his standing neutral had been argued the little show that he would make in Europe and his exclusion from any voice in the settlement. Hedges thought to have left the ministers not ill satisfied. The king, he said, was reported ill, but yet at private interviews had been found "very gay, and in good humour," and again inquisitive about affairs in England.²

At the next conference "three hours perpetual dispute" failed to move the Sardinian ministers to specify requirements; they had the king's order to the contrary, they said. However, at last they were persuaded to put down something of their views on paper, in French and in a manner which Cambis and Hedges found it hard to understand, as follows.

¹ Hedges, 15 and 16 November, *l.c.* Carutti says (p. 570) that Victor Amadeus gave good words enough but was determined to keep himself free for eventualities on the death of Charles VI. Also (pp. 573-4) that in 1726 he suggested to Di Breglio exchange of Sardinia for Tuscany, having previously asked for the fiefs of the Langhe and the marquisate of Finale. He laughed at the offer of Sicily.

² Hedges, 22 November, *ibid.*

(1) The king already had all the securities and guarantees for his dominions, that he could want, under the Quadruple Alliance. (2) All his frontiers were open, there having been no time to put them in a state of defence. (3) In case of peace, in view of the risks to which the treaty offered would expose him he wanted to know what real advantages he might expect, independently of events. (4) Seeing that conquests in Italy, in the case of war, might be at the expense of various states, he would have specified to whom those conquests should belong. (5) Could they not be retained at the peace, he would know what was meant by an equivalent. (6) And the same, should there not be war but a congress called, as to security for solid advantages whether in respect to the imperial succession, or otherwise, so that war would be continued rather than these advantages not obtained for him. (7) The security to be put into his hands. When all this was agreed, then he would come to terms about prosecution of war.

Entirely dissatisfied with this Cambis and Hedges obtained, with difficulty, another interview with Santommaso, when they spoke with much warmth of the inadequacy of the answer to their proposals and expressed conviction that it was only desired to gain time and that the emperor had given expectation of the Vigevanasco or other advantage. Santommaso "answered with great temper and coolness that he was sorry the paper deliver'd was so little agreeable to us," owned it to be "ill-writ and full of useless repetitions," but held the meaning to be clear and requested Cambis and Hedges to put that meaning into their own words. The king, he said, was "resolved to have an answer as to the securities demanded for performance of the treaty, having lately experienc'd how little treaties had been regarded for some time past." He gave solemn assurance on his honour both as a man and as a minister that nothing had been done with Harrach. After this, at a third conference, the ministers gave up the first two articles as "useless and unnecessary" and promised on the king's behalf,

that if he engaged with us he would not do it *by halves* and expected to make terms accordingly, and wou'd have such securities for himself as not to be expos'd, in all humane probability, to the misfortunes he had lately so severely felt. M^r de St. Thomas often repeated to us, pray obtain an answer and all will go well.

Expressing his great mortification at his failure so far Hedges asked that if it were possible to found a treaty on the demands made a sketch of it should be sent for the guidance of himself and Cambis. He addedth at Santommaso had asked "with a particular emphasis" what was to be the fate of Mantua, Parma, Tuscany,

if the emperor died without heirs male? "He said we ought to think at least to say something about it, and told me it was not so hard to guess what he meant." Hedges thought that perhaps this lure might be the most effectual of any, "but at the present they seem to be determin'd not only to see their way before them clearly, but to feel it palpably besides."¹

Hedges now received instructions which disposed of the main difficulty in his way. There had been reason, Newcastle told him, to suspect the lengths to which the French had gone from what had been said to Robinson and from the "constant discourses" of the marquis D'Aix. The king had supposed the offer of Sicily, easily to be conquered by a British naval force, to be sufficient, and had desired to put off the king of Sardinia from thoughts of acquisitions in the Milanese. But now, since the French had gone so far and with the special object of showing complete accord with Cambis, Hedges might make the same offers. Descanting as before on the importance of the king of Sardinia's alliance on account of the menace to the emperor's possessions in Italy, and on the conduct of the imperial court, "who stick at no promises, no stipulations whatsoever, however impossible or contradictory, to gain but the name of an accession or an alliance," Newcastle prescribed to Hedges the argument employed successfully with D'Aix, the danger, namely, of hesitation;

that however lavish the two crowns may now be in their offers to him, yet if before he has made his bargain the affairs of Europe should take such a turn, that his assistance should become less usefull, he cannot but think that the advantages proposed to him by either side would lessen in proportion.

He concluded, as in other quarters, with a panegyric on the promising aspect of affairs. Ten days later he conveyed to Hedges the king's complete approval of his conduct, empowering him to drop the offer of Sicily or any other point in his instructions that might impede his negotiation and to go as far in his offers as had Cambis, in order to show accord with him.²

The former dispatch received, Hedges reported Cambis much satisfied and touched, but the Sardinian ministers keeping close to their point, to have an answer to the paper delivered by them.

¹ Hedges, 5 December, *ibid.* Next day he lamented to Delafaye his lack of instructions from England, "tho I never in my life wanted more either the pleasure or directions I should have received from your letters." He expected his last to get him "the name of St Saphorin Junr at the Club." Apparently the main intention was to wait and see whether peace or war.

² Newcastle to Hedges, 14 and 24 November (o.s.), *ibid.* Similarly on 17 November (o.s.), he stated to H Walpole his Majesty's desire to agree with the French court "in everything as far as possible" and its proof in the removal of the difficulty with the king of Sardinia (B.M. Add. MS. 32748).

They explained the king's difficulties and the necessity of caution imposed upon him, but "what this real advantage is, that he desires, we cou'd never prevail on them to say. Their only answer being that our respective courts must know their interest as well as themselves, and were better judges of what they wou'd give them, than they cou'd be."¹

Hedges' report of the second conference received, a private dispatch to Robinson set forth the views of George I on what advantages Victor Amadeus might be given to expect, first in case of war, secondly should a rupture be avoided. Belief was expressed in the possibility of satisfying him, unless he were determined to wait for a clear perception of how things might turn. For the case of war, his Majesty was now prepared to expunge all mention of an equivalent for conquests in the Milanese, and to make the guarantee absolute; that ought to be sufficient. But nothing as to acquisitions elsewhere in Italy, as hinted; princes who had given no provocation to the allies stood on a very different footing from so offending a prince as the emperor.² For the case of a peaceful settlement it appeared proper to repeat what had been said in general about the advantages the king of Sardinia would derive from joining the alliance of Hanover and to promise that no agreement should be come to without his participation and consent; with reminder that as the two crowns could not guess what present advantages he wanted, he must explain himself.³

French views were not in accord. Morville urged the utmost caution in dealing with so artful a prince, and that it was not well to specify acquisitions in the Milanese but to give him "a guaranty in general of all conquests"; for since he could not make them without the subsidies and troops of the allies he could be kept within bounds and told, when necessary, that war could not be continued for his sake only. Morville offered to have words inserted in the treaty to protect the Genoese and others, who had not "offended the two crowns." Robinson noted a strong suspicion that the king of Sardinia had his eye on some possession of Genoa, the acquisition of which by him would be prejudicial to France as well as to that republic, but not at all to the emperor. Fleury he found to approve the general guarantee in case of war,

¹ Hedges, 14 December, *ibid.* He continued with a long ciphered passage of comment and an account of Austrian threats and war-preparations in the Milanese, and concluded with a discussion of increased import duties on woollen manufactures.

² Newcastle observed, however, that what San Tommaso had "flung out" about Tuscany and Parma and Mantua might possibly be made use of at a later time to give Spain warning of what might happen.

³ Newcastle to Robinson, 13 December (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

suggesting for the contrary event an arrangement by which the emperor should cede to the king of Sardinia the marquisate of Finale, very tempting to him by its situation ; he to redeem a Genoese mortgage on it of 400,000 florins. The cardinal thought also that the two crowns might promise their good offices in regard to the Vigevanasco.¹

Saint-Saphorin was now writing that late expressions of certainty of gaining the king of Sardinia were entirely dropped at Vienna, that news of his conclusion with Great Britain and France was expected every day, and that Di Breglio had hopes thereof from his advices.² Nevertheless Hedges continued to have nothing more to say than that negotiations were at a standstill, pending receipt of a reply to the king of Sardinia's propositions, and about his own difficulties. The ministers gave him frequent assurance of the king's readiness to come into the alliance of Hanover, were he protected against the emperor's resentment and certain of advantage, though they would never explain what such might be. With "most solemn protestations" they promised "that upon our receiving an answer to their memorial they will enter into the negotiation, with the sincerest intentions to bring it to a happy conclusion." Meantime the king was recruiting some hundreds of Swiss and augmenting the strength of his regiments, so that by the New Year he would have available a force of more than 20,000 men ; was preparing fortifications on the side of the Milanese and storing magazines with all manner of necessaries for war. At audiences obtained he always turned from the point to put questions about what was happening elsewhere, the Spanish move against Gibraltar, the position in Holland, the progress of the Swedish and Danish negotiations ; "'tis always his constant custom to enquire of me of things he has been well informed of beforehand, that he may judge whether I am apprized of them at all, or, if I am, if I answer them directly or not." When Cambis' orders did come Hedges doubted whether they would be of service, for both had used all possible arguments with all possible warmth.³

¹ Robinson, 30 December, *ibid.* ; the interview with Fleury, as usual, in a secret dispatch.

² Saint-Saphorin, 31 December, R.O. Germany, Empire, 60.

³ Hedges, 2 December 1726 to 11 January 1727, R.O. Savoy and Sardinia 32. In a letter of 20 December to Delafaye : "It was extremely strange to me at first, to find myself drop'd at once from the Alps into the midst of a court and city where I knew not one soul, and what is worse can not find yet any one man on whom I can depend for any account of what my predecessor did here as to matters of ceremony or any thing else. The matters of ceremony are here things of the greatest moment. You know how little I was used to them and how much I detest them. I had not besides the least instructions as to that matter, which the French ambassador here and Mr de Harrach have each a volume of. The court here is exceedingly apt to make difficultys about the least ceremony, and if

After the breach with Spain Newcastle opined that the practical certainty of war now rendered debate on advantages to be assured to the king of Sardinia, in case of preservation of peace, of less import, and pressed for conclusion with him, without further loss of time, on the basis of "strongest assurances of preserving to him any conquests he shall make in the Milanese."¹ Fleury, however, was found to be of opinion that he would wait for hostilities to open, and should be dealt with very warily; made to believe that they were as good as begun and "the two crowns preparing to carry on the war with united counsels and force." Once, he said, "the king of Sardinia is persuaded that things are at the last extremity, he may then speak out," and he asked Robinson to write to Hedges to that effect. Robinson, accordingly, informed Hedges that for the case of war the French government was willing to drop mention of an equivalent and to give a general guarantee, not of conquests in the Milanese specifically, but of all, and for the case of peace agreed with his Majesty's views but did not seem to wish to hurry. He described war with Spain to be looked upon in France and England as actually begun and dilated on perfect confidence continuing between the two crowns. "I can assure you that this court is taking all the proper and necessary measures for the operations of a campaign."²

After this Morville read to Robinson a dispatch going to Cambis, of the following tenour.

Reply to his letters of 5 December had been delayed by the necessity of knowing the king of England's sentiments, and now the situation was much altered by the Austrian action in spurring the king of Spain on to a war, as the result of which Gibraltar was to be attacked and a rupture was unavoidable. The king of Sardinia, therefore, might be expected to concentrate his attention on the advantages that he might draw from a war. But neither his inclination nor prospects of profit would lead him to wish it carried on principally against Spain, nor would France and England suffer the real instigators of it to go unpunished. Italy was the most sensible part of the emperor's dominions, and for the king of Sardinia the most convenient to attack; if he would join in such on the Milanese his allies would direct their main

they get the least advantage they quote that for an example to the next successor of the man they have gained the advantage over, and this may possibly happen to me, having not the least instruction or direction to go by. All I can do is to consult M. de Cambis, who is good at it, and takes all the care he can of me." He goes on about the Knights of the Annunciation requiring the first visit, etc.

¹ Newcastle to Hedges, 20 and 22 December (o.s.) 1726, *ibid.*, and to Robinson on the former date, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

² Robinson to Newcastle, 8 January 1727, private, and to Hedges, 6 January, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

force thither and assure to him all conquests that should be made there, France and England having nothing to wish for "but to oppress the Emperor."¹ After which was expressed the concern of the two crowns at the king of Sardinia being so close and reserved, "and how impossible it is for them to think for him." Cambis must continue to press the ministers to open their minds, and to that end must request the draft of a treaty; in case of failure leaving them alone and seeing what effect the accompanying document would have.

This contained answers, point by point, to the Sardinian propositions of 1 December. The first two, it was said, had been admitted by the ministers themselves to be superfluous. On the third article: war seemed certain, but if the king of Sardinia wanted explanations on advantages that he might expect in case of peace, he must himself set forth to what he looked. On the fourth: he knew that conquests could not be specified at present. No Italian prince or state had yet acceded to the treaty of Vienna, and it was doubtful whether any of them thought of doing so, or would think, when they saw the king of Sardinia placed in a position to make them repent. He must have his advantages, but they could not be defined until a plan of operations was concerted. Sufficient for him to know that the kings of France and England had no Italian acquisitions in view and could only desire his aggrandisement. Fifthly, on the question of an equivalent nothing further could be said; the two kings would guarantee conquests made by him absolutely. For the matter of the sixth article sufficed the sacred word of princes. War would be carried on until the king of Sardinia's demands were satisfied under a treaty of peace. The question of the emperor's succession was too vast to allow of judgment with certainty, what was the king's aim. He should explain himself on this and other points in the draft of a treaty, sure that what could be promised, and what not, would be stated with complete franchise.

This paper Robinson held to be "more essential than the dispatch." In that, he noted, the conquests to be guaranteed were specified to be such as should be made in the Milanese, but in the other the answer to the fifth article of the other paper gave an absolute guarantee of any. Morville, he said, intended the Milanese, but until the king of Sardinia's particular views were discovered

¹ "In short, my Lord," says Robinson, "the whole letter turns upon three points: the first to show that a war is inevitable; the second to convince the king of Sardinia that tho' the war is begun by Spain, yet the Emperor, who is represented to be the author of it, is likely and ought to be the greatest sufferer; and thirdly to spur and animate his Sardinian Majesty to lay hold of this occasion to increase his dominions and particularly to turn his views upon the Milanese."

preferred to use general terms. He did not expect much success, thinking Victor Amadeus certain to procrastinate until a war was actually begun, but it seemed to him "proper to keep the negotiation on foot, till the necessity of affairs, or the king of Sardinia's own humour, should sooner or later, as they certainly would, determine him to join with the two crowns."¹

Another conference, on 26 January 1727, proved equally barren of result, and next day Hedges went to court, to be entertained only with conversation on general affairs and on the coming siege of Gibraltar. Santommaso afterwards informed him that the reply was being considered. Harrach he observed to be very easy and doing nothing, unless through an under-secretary of the king, for he neither saw any of the ministers on business nor had any private audiences.² In his next dispatch he had no doubt that the procrastination was intentional and noted the king's respect for the German troops, and the better treatment of Di Breglio at Vienna, as reported by Richelieu.³ It was replied that clearly nothing was to be gained by being "over earnest and pressing," that perhaps news of war actually begun before Gibraltar might hasten things on, and that his Majesty saw matters proceeding as he had "all along had but too much reason to expect."⁴

At last, on 15 February, the answer of Victor Amadeus was delivered. He coolly asked for territorial gain at the expense not of Austria, but of France, and for a deposit in cash, repayable when he should have acquired the Milanese. After stating that he had sufficient guarantee of his existing possessions under the Quadruple Alliance treaty the document went on :

Il s'agit à présent de prendre un engagement qui pourroit produire une guerre. En ce cas il est juste, attendu la situation des états du roy, . . . de stipuler les avantages qui, quoy que jamais égaux aux risques inévitables que l'on coureroit, donnent une raison solide et stable à l'engagement qu'on propose.

La France ne manque pas des moyens. Il y a l'Entre-deux-Guiers, qui resta à la maison de Savoye par l'échange qui fut fait entre le roy dauphin de Viennois et Amesis, Comte de Savoye, sur lequel la France n'a exercé la souveraineté que pendant la dernière guerre, et qui est dû au roy notre maître.⁵ Il y a la vallée de Barcelonette. L'on sçait les provinces qui

¹ Robinson, 9 January, *ibid.*

² Hedges, 1 February, R.O. Savoy and Sardinia, 32.

³ The same, 8 February.

⁴ Newcastle to him, 6 and 16 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁵ The reference is to the treaty of 1355 by which Amadeus VI of Savoy ceded to the king and dauphin of France his holdings in the Viennois west of the Guiers and north of the Isère, receiving in exchange the province of Faucigny and other valuable consideration. See Jean de Cordey, *Les Comtes de Savoie* . . . (1329-1391), chap. vi.

furent cédées pour l'échange du marquisat de Saluces. Il y a Monaco, dont une partie de cette petite souveraineté relève de la maison de Savoye. Enfin les moyens ne manquent pas à la France pour contenter un prince dans sa frontière, qui connoît également ses avantages et les risques qu'il peut courir dans cette alliance, ayant par l'expérience des guerres passées, qu'il a soutenues, et de plusieurs traités solennels qu'il a faits, connu les vicissitudes qui luy sont arrivées et qui sont si notoires.

Les conquêtes dans l'état de Milan dépendent des moyens que les deux puissances doivent fournir. C'est par cette raison que la prudence enseigne d'un côté à demander un dépôt, pour être rendu après la libre possession de l'état de Milan par la paix. Et comme c'est cette conquête qui fait le principal but du traité à faire ; et ne pouvant pas douter de la véritable intention des deux roys ; notre maître est persuadé qu'ils y entreront d'autant plus aisément, qu'ils l'ont toujours fait assurer de le mettre dans une supériorité de force contre la puissance si formidable des Allemands aujourd'hui connue par les dits roys.

Ainsi cela dépendant des dits roys ils doivent le regarder sans répugnance, d'autant plus qu'ils sont toujours en état de retirer ce dépôt, et que de leur côté ils ont tous les états du roy notre maître de là les monts sans fortifications et entièrement ouverts, qui leur servent d'une garantie bien considérable. Il n'en est pas de même de notre côté ; car c'est le plus foible qui doit plutôt demander des sûretés au plus fort. Cela est si vray que les exemples donnent bien clairement à connoître que les premiers sont ceux qui en ont toujours eu le besoin.¹

It was with difficulty, said Hedges in comment on the above, that Cambis, on hearing demands for restoration of lands by France, had kept his temper. No arguments had prevailed to alter "the fixt resolution the king has taken to all appearance of either not joyning at all with us or at least so late as only to share the prey, in case of success, without running the risk with us necessary to get it in our power. . . . All the answer we cou'd obtain was that if we did not mind our old treatys, neither should we our new ones." He and Cambis had resolved, pending receipt of orders, to put the best face on the matter, if only that Harrach might not perceive dissatisfaction on their part at want of success. To Tilson he wrote : "I take it for granted the paper is design'd as the strongest sarcasm on the French, and our Quadruple Alliance, which they never mention but with a most confirm'd resentment, and always with professions that there is no more faith in treaties, since Sicily yeilded to them by that of Utrecht was taken from them by this and by force, destitute as they say of all reason and regard to their master."²

At Paris, says Marshal Villars, the Sardinian proposals appeared

¹ Dated "a Turin ce 13^{me}. Fevrier 1727 N.S."

² Hedges, 15 February.

to the Council "si odieuses et indignes" that it was resolved to make no answer.¹ Robinson found Fleury "under very great concern, thinking nothing can be done without the king of Sardinia, the want of whose alliance will make necessary for France so great an army in Dauphiny as must very much drain their forces to be employed upon their other frontiers." Ministers were "extreamly offended at the unkind returns and injurious treatment" experienced, Morville declaring that "to demand of this crown possessions acquired and established by treatys and indisputably belonging to France was not a method for a duke of Savoy to negotiate with his Most Christian Majesty; it was what France had never been used to, nor would she be used to it." The king of Sardinia was "the person in the world" to give security for engagements. Either he was tempted by offers from the emperor, or wished to put off decision until war was actually begun. The proper course was to wait for the accession of Sweden, conclusion of the convention with Denmark, and the return of the king of Prussia (as seemed probable) to his former engagements; then the king of Sardinia would have no choice upon what part to play. Cambis, therefore, says Robinson, was ordered to watch closely Count Harrach at Turin, as Richelieu similarly Di Breglio at Vienna, but for the rest only to present, if he thought well, a "short dry letter" now being sent.²

British opinion concurred. The negotiations, Walpole was advised, should be kept open, even if with little prospect of good issue. From a letter from the king of Sardinia to the marquis D'Aix, knowledge of which was had in the usual way, it was pretty plain that his backwardness was really due to belief that "we are determined at all events to patch up with the emperor and not come to a rupture with him." But it was only in case of rupture that his help would be needed. Offers which could then be made would probably bring him in. Hedges at the same time was informed of the king's surprise at "the exorbitant and unaccountable demands," and, for his own consolation, that his conduct was not judged by his want of success, "which is in no man's power," but approved in every particular. The negotiation must be kept on foot, "for should it be intirely at an end, the Emperor by that means might in a great measure be freed from any apprehensions of being attackt in Italy," and so withdraw troops thence. The king of Sardinia would probably want to go on with it, "in order to make his market the better at Vienna." Hedges should express pleasure at knowing at last the sentiments entertained,

¹ *Mémoires*, v. 47, 23 February 1727.

² Robinson, 26 February and 1 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

surprise at the terms asked, and hope for further explanations, while representing that the king of Sardinia's assistance would be of the greatest use, should there be war.¹

In receipt of Newcastle's report of the successes in parliament Hedges could not flatter himself on more impression being made than previously by the King's Speech. Since the answer given, he said, "they have kept a dead silence with us." Although carnival time had given frequent opportunity of conversation with the king he had talked only on indifferent subjects, "or if he ever did border on any thing concerning publick affairs it was to shew his suspicion that all these preparations for war were not quite in earnest, and that the storm would soon blow over and end in an accommodation some way or other."² He found consolation in writing to Delafaye :

Now that we are sure of not having him with us, woud it be amiss to think a little what we have lost, and if we think of it calmly surely not so much as may be imagind. For considering the immense subsidys he would have demanded to have been constantly paid two months before hand at Turin, as they were all the last war, and the superiority of troops they woud have requird, they having assur'd us that they lookt on one of ten thousand men as not sufficient, they having seen armies beat with twenty thousand superiority ; the money requisite for maintaining an army of 40 thousand French, for so many he would have insisted on, and he to command absolutely ; the inconvenience of sending armies over the Alps and the misfortunes and diseases the French have ever met with in Italy ; and all this for whom, for a prince who on the first occasion, where one farthing of his interest is concern'd, would laugh at us for thinking of gratitude after our having sav'd him last war. Has he not quite forgot it, chicaning for every trifle in trade, bearing us an incurable grudge for having taken Sicily from him ? All we shoud get would be to mortify the Emperor, which the same forces and money employ'd elsewhere woud do sufficiently tho perhaps not so effectually. In the meantime here is an end of my mushroom negotiation.³

Horatio Walpole, for his part, reported assent at Paris to making show of carrying on the negotiation, Morville saying that he had instructed Cambis "above all things" to avoid giving Harrach the least suspicion of its being at a stand, "or as if we were at all disapointed or disconcerted on that account," while Fleury still attributed the king of Sardinia's attitude not to disposition on his part to join the emperor but to expectation that the allies would not make war, and so that he would get nothing. When

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole and to Hedges, 23 February (o.s.), *ibid.* and R.O. Savoy and Sardinia 32.

² Hedges, 22 February and 1 March, *ibid.*

³ 8 March, *ibid.*

Maffei, confessing himself uninstructed, expressed fear of Harrach being successful,

I smiled (says Walpole), and told M^r Maffei, with the freedom that is usual between us two, that his master was a prince of the greatest dexterity imaginable, having the address to manage our ministers and the Emperor's so well, as to make them both think it necessary to appear publicly pleased and satisfied at his court, while neither of them had any content or satisfaction in their negotiation there.¹

This was the end. Cambis and Hedges continued to make show of keeping the negotiation up, as ordered, and the Sardinian ministers to maintain reserve, until at the end of May the signature of preliminaries of peace removed the menace of European war.

¹ H. Walpole, 12 and 14 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

PRUSSIA WAVERING

HIS work at Berlin accomplished, Seckendorf hurried home to Meuselwitz to rest, and thence recounted to Vienna all that had passed; the difficulties encountered, his unexpected success, and Frederick William's fervent assurances of holding firm.¹ Very soon, however, aware of strenuous effort at Berlin to overthrow the treaty, he was pressing the necessity of carrying the Berg contract into effect as soon as possible. He claimed to know that the French and English courts were doing all that they could to dissuade the elector Palatine from concurrence. In answer he received promise that negotiation with him should be opened at once. Frederick William gave assurance, by letter, that from his allies of Hanover he had nothing but amusement to expect; he was to pull the chestnuts out of the fire and they, in case of success, to have all the profit, or in the contrary event to slip out of the noose.²

Du Bourgay was soon in possession of a version of the treaty, in the main correct. He understood it in no way to engage the empire, and that in allowing six months for ratification and in other points Seckendorf had exceeded his instructions, so that trouble was likely at Vienna. And so on the whole: "our very enemies begin to doubt whether this treaty will ever be ratify'd"; determined action by England and France should oblige the king of Prussia to stand to his Hanover engagements.³ With these views

¹ Letter to Prince Eugene and full report to Charles VI, 14 October 1726, with the treaty and comments on certain of its articles, Förster, *Friedrich Wilhelm I*, Urkundenbuch ii. 151-170.

² Seckendorf correspondence, 17 October to 9 November, *ibid.* 170-182. Among other things he asked for a pension of 1,000 ducats for Grumbkow in return for his untiring efforts and the risk he was running; for a gold chain and medal to win Gundling, who, Grumbkow let him know, was doing more harm than anyone; and especially, as more acceptable than anything else, for 24 giants for the king and 12 big men, of lesser stature, for generals and officers. The pension was granted, and Gundling had a medal set with diamonds, as of greater distinction than the ordinary gold chain. Twenty giants were sent towards the end of November, when Seckendorf wrote of the pleasure given, but that 24 had been expected; a larger number had come in from other countries, and if the emperor were unwilling to do more he was prepared to spend for them 2,000 or 3,000 gulden of his own.

³ Du Bourgay, 19 October, R.O. Prussia 21.

the British ministers agreed. Horatio Walpole, though but "sadly edified," wrote : "That king is an unaccountable creature, neither interest nor reason will prevayl upon him to doe right ; he will repent it, but we must look upon him wth this view, that as he will doe no good wth us, there is the samê reason to believe he will doe no harm against us." ¹ Newcastle drew conclusion that Frederick William's strange behaviour for some time past had not been occasioned by the marriage-question but was undoubtedly the result of his ascribing to weakness and irresolution the "gentle measures and soft manner" pursued by the French government with Spain. When he saw strong action in that direction he might be expected to change "and become as uncertain and useless an ally to the Emperor as he has proved to us." He seemed "already a little sick" of his treaty, and "if the two crowns shew a right spirit on this occasion, he will certainly regret what he has done before the time for the ratification is expired." ² Of Townshend's pronouncements the following is an example.

The Emperor engages to procure the king of Prussia Bergues and Ravenstein, and there is a very extraordinary article which requires that the treaty shall not be ratified in less than six months, in the compass of which term one may very reasonably suppose his Prussian Ma^{ty} will have changed his mind ten times, since by the whole tenour of his conduct he seems resolved to adhere steddily to that single principle of being useful to no ally whatsoever ; and we may the more justly conclude that his Prussian Ma^{ty} will pay as little regard to this treaty as he has to all former engagements, it being impossible to imagine that the Emperor will ever perform what he has stipulated with regard to Bergues and Ravenstein. I dare say this proceeding of the king of Prussia will have no effect where you are, and I can assure you it is intirely disregarded here. ³

In his next dispatches Du Bourgay reported dislike of the treaty growing every day, partly from knowledge of its provisions, partly, in his view, from lessened fear of Russia in consequence of the action of the Baltic fleet. He hoped to make good use of Townshend's "solid and affectionate reasonings upon the true interest of the two families, if this court continue in the dispositions they seem to be in at present of re-establishing matters upon the former foot." ⁴ Soon afterwards Horatio Walpole wrote :

M^r de Morville tells me that by his accounts the king of Prussia begins to be extremely embarrassed and uneasy about the treaty he has concluded with the Emperor ; that his Prussian Majesty has ordered it to be declared in all places, that he has not thereby in the least renounced the treaty of Hanover,

¹ To Delafaye, 22 October, holograph, R.O. France 184.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 14 and 20 October (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

³ Townshend to Poyntz, 14 October (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 44.

⁴ Du Bourgay, 2 November, R.O. Prussia 21.

or done any thing contrary to it ; that M^r Grumbkow and that party are very solicitous to have Seekendorf return to keep the king of Prussia steady to his engagements, and in the mean time they divert him from going to Berlin for fear of the reproaches of Count Rottemberg.”¹

As a first step Rottembourg and Du Bourgay made separate but identical demand for communication of the late treaties (with Russia and Austria), as required by that of Hanover.² About the one the answer was that the king of Prussia had been obliged to make terms with the tsaritsa, because his applications for protection on that side had remained unregarded. The Austrian was stated to be a mere punctation, not ratified nor to be ratified for five months yet ; the emperor's offers had been so advantageous that the king could not but make trial of his sincerity ; if he did not make his engagements good nothing could be said to have been done, and if he did, nothing derogatory to the treaty of Hanover ; in fact, the treaty was nothing more than a renewal of old engagements between the emperor, the king of Prussia, and the house of Sulzbach. When Du Bourgay insisted on communication of the written texts, secret articles and all, Ilgen replied that although this would contravene engagements, yet he would lay before the king fairly all that had been said. Rottembourg, Du Bourgay went on, was ordered in general, while insisting peremptorily on the demand made and admitting no expedient to the contrary, “to avoid all reproaches and hard expostulations . . . and by his behaviour affect to show that the court of France is more concerned for what hath happen'd out of regard to the K. of Prussia than from the least apprehension that it will be of any prejudice to the two crowns.” A proposal to communicate the Austrian treaty, on the condition of its being kept secret, he had refused.³

Having reported to the king Ilgen read to Bourgay a second paper, promising a copy of the Russian treaty and declaring that, although nothing could properly be said to be concluded with the emperor, and therefore article 4 of the treaty of Hanover did not apply, nevertheless from his desire for perfect friendship and confidence the king let it be known that an article expressly stipulated that he should not be bound to depart from his engagements of Hanover ; he would faithfully adhere to them even after he should be in possession of Berg and Ravenstein on extinction of the Palatine electoral line, and of Juliers on the failure of that of

¹ H. Walpole, 19 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

² Expecting thereby, says Du Bourgay, to confute their enemies by setting “in the clearest light the great harmony and friendship subsisting between the two crowns.”

³ Du Bourgay, 5 and 12 November, R.O. Prussia 21.

Sulzbach. And further, that his guarantee of the emperor's succession extended only to rights in Germany, not in Bohemia, Hungary, Italy or the Netherlands, nor was he "concerned in any differences about trade and traffick." Having made this ample communication he hoped for like confidence in regard to what was being transacted with Poland, Saxony, Denmark and Savoy. In answer Du Bourgay still insisted on communication in writing, since otherwise "the King my master could not concert measures or dispose matters against the meeting of parliament." Ilgen in the end asked him to await the king of Prussia's confirmation of what he said on his coming to Berlin, to which Du Bourgay agreed. All that he had done, he said, was concerted with Rottembourg, who had seen Ilgen a few hours before to the same purpose.¹

Frederick William came to Berlin unexpectedly the next evening (16 November), ostensibly to notify personally to the queen the death of her mother,² really, Rottembourg wrote, to confer with his ministers on fresh and dangerous disputes with the king of Poland.³ He stayed but a day, leaving orders for Seckendorf, just returned, to follow him to Potsdam. Ilgen handed over a copy of the Russian treaty and a formal declaration concerning the Austrian in the terms stated.⁴

Seckendorf's report of all this was to the effect that the king was nearly driven mad by sinister insinuations, heaped up, that the emperor had neither the will nor the power to content him and aimed only at making him an object of hatred to his allies of Hanover. Rottembourg and Du Bourgay were never so peremptory in their

¹ The same, 16 November.

² Rottembourg ascribed the depth of mourning ordered for the "duchess of Ahlden" not so much to grief as to desire to annoy George I. He noted Frederick William's interest in his wife's heritage from the deceased, said to amount to more than a million crowns.

³ Edward Finch wrote on this subject from Warsaw: "The Imperial and Prussian ministers have ever since I have been in Poland cultivated together a strict friendship. The Poles have got it into their heads not only not to fear the king of Prussia but even to despise him, and I have heard from them almost every day these fourteen months that if his Ma^{ty} did not meddle in the affair of Thorn they would laugh at everything the king of Prussia had done, and in effect, since the diet, the K. of Poland has writ him as imperious a letter as I ever read. . . . The Saxon minister seems to have one fixed opinion, which is, that his Prussian Majesty never meant any thing else by any engagement he entered into than to drive a private bargain, and that the Emperor has little reason to count upon him" (10 December, R.O. Poland 33). Du Bourgay (12 November) noted great uneasiness caused by report of the doings of Le Coq, before noticed.

⁴ Rottembourg and Du Bourgay, 19 and 21 November, R.O. Foreign Ministers 47 (copy) and Prussia 21; with the latter a German copy and a French translation of the Russian treaty with its secret articles. Rottembourg relates how Ilgen, after his comments on the ignominious part he played, the prejudice to his family, and the confidence which the king reposed in Borcke, "*m'embrassa avec la dernière tendresse, et l'abondance de ses larmes et de ses sanglots l'empêchèrent de me répondre, et je le quittai dans cet état, saisi moi-même d'une vraie pitié.*"

speech ; they had insisted on a written answer to their memorials and the king had felt himself obliged to consent. At his own interview with the Prussian ministers they had pressed him urgently to help the king out of his embarrassments. He had himself advised the demand about the treaties with other powers.¹

On that point Horatio Walpole was desired to concert with the French ministers what answer should be made. This would not be difficult, Newcastle wrote, since the negotiations in question were intended to strengthen the Hanover alliance, but the king of Prussia's treaty to destroy it. "It may also with great truth be observed, that no negotiation relating to our alliance was ever carried on by the two crowns without his participation, till such time as his Prussian Maty's conduct and behaviour plainly showed how little dependance they could have upon him." Walpole replied that no orders on the subject were sent to Rottembourg yet, but that Morville "in general thought that the two crowns should in their answer show a great deal of indifference with regard to the king of Prussia's behaviour." ² This was to British taste ; "coolness and indifference," Newcastle wrote once more, "having always, in the King's opinion, who knows that prince perfectly well, been the only method of dealing with him, and the most likely way to reclaim him." ³

Meanwhile in England Broglie had inquired whether, should Frederick William "abandon his new engagements with the Emperor and behave in the manner required by his Majesty on occasion of the last concession which the King, at the desire of the French court, made with relation to the marriage," his conduct could be so far "overlook't and forgiven" that the assurance could be renewed in the same terms. Consent to this was signified to him, provided that the said engagements were absolutely renounced." ⁴

On 24 November Frederick William came to town again, entertained Rottembourg and Du Bourgay to dinner twice, and accorded the former a private audience. Getting wind of this the imperialists, says Du Bourgay, had "resolved to prepossess the king that the count would enter into very hard and reproachfull expostulations," for which reason Rottembourg had discoursed only on the insecurity of the emperor's promises, on the powerful arrangements of France for assisting her allies, and on the strength of the Hanover confederacy. Whereby the king had been so moved, that after enjoining strictest secrecy he had declared himself to be not so much in the

¹ Seckendorf, 18 November, *l.c.* pp. 184-9.

² Newcastle, 24 November (o.s.), and the reply, 10 December, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

³ To Robinson, 13 December (o.s.), in reply to his full report of a special interview with Morville on the subject (7 December, *ibid.*).

⁴ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 2 November (o.s.), *ibid.*

emperor's interest as Rottembourg might imagine, unable to say more, and desirous of continuing his friendship and confidence. Of himself, Du Bourgay went on, the king had asked what "national troops" his Majesty could raise, in what time, who would command them, and what would be done with the 15,000 seamen for next year? Du Bourgay showed how in a very short time any force required could be set on foot, with plenty of efficient commanders of reputation gained in Flanders Spain and at home. As to the seamen, all the world knew what 10,000 had done that year, and 5,000 more would have a proportionable influence on the affairs of Europe.

I was the more particular, and dwelt the longer on this subject, being firmly of opinion from the knowledge I have of the temper of this court that whoever is first ready, in case things come to hostilities, will be sure of them, . . . not being affected by speculative truths but resolved to side with the strongest, who in their opinion will be he that first takes the field. I am told from a very sure hand that his Prussian Ma^{ty} stay'd alone in his closet an hour and a half after C. Rotemburg's audience, his head leaning all the time upon his hand and full of the deepest thought, and afterwards he sent for his chief ministers, with whom he conferr'd a long time.

When on 3 December Frederick William went back to Potsdam, Du Bourgay was able to report him in a very good humour and flattered himself on seeing less and less confidence reposed in the emperor.¹ And confirmatory of this was information from Otto Klinckowström, before mentioned, now Swedish envoy at Berlin,²

¹ Du Bourgay, 26 November to 5 December, R.O. Prussia 21.

² Klinckowström, once employed as Swedish agent at Paris, had been expelled thence in 1722 on account, says Schaub, of his activities "*tant vers le Prince Cellamare que vers les Jacobites*" (29 March 1722, B.M. Add. MS. 22522). In 1725 his appointment as Swedish envoy to Spain was successfully opposed by the British government for the same reasons, but in the following year he obtained the post at Berlin, according to Poyntz through the influence of Stanislaus Leszczynski and his daughter, the queen of France (Poyntz, 14 October (o.s.) 1725, 16 February and 30 March (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Sweden 39, 42; Townshend, 5 November 1725, R.O. Regencies 8; H. Walpole, 15 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32744). In May 1726 we find him betraying his Jacobite friends to the British ministers at Paris (Robinson, enclosing his information, 13 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32746). Returned to Sweden, he was employed by Poyntz to write the pamphlet previously noticed (pp. 540-1). He went to Berlin early in September, and before long Poyntz wrote of his service in discovering Holstein intrigues through Colonel Tessin, the duke's minister there. "I make not the least doubt but he will continue to render admirable service as long as we pay him." Poyntz had already found him £200 ("half of this or more is gone to Breslau to buy his wife off from following him to Berlin"), on his plea that he had lost part of his appointments by staying on at Stockholm to write "that paper which has done us incredible service"; and he was prepared in this one instance to go as far as £500. "I never writ to him nor shall trust him with any thing, but keeping his own secret. He signs Daubigny" (Poyntz, very private, 23 October (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 45).

Townshend approved the above and arranged for a secret correspondence between himself as "Joshua Wymer," merchant of London, and Klinckowström as

which, poor stuff as it was, may have impressed. It was retailed by Poyntz as follows.

The prince of Anhalt having proposed his own nephew (son to the mark-grave Philip) for the princess royal, the king of Prussia was much shocked, and began to suspect that the whole intrigue of that prince, Bork, Grumkow and the rest of the imperial faction was only an artifice to ensnare him into that match and to facilitate it by embroiling him with his Mat^y. That Gen^l Lottum having had the courage to tell the king publicly in the *Tabak's-Collegium*, in Bork's presence, that the treatys he had lately been made to sign had reduced him from being considered as the bulwark of the protestant cause to be lookd on with horror by all that body, and having gaind an entire victory over Bork in the argument, *il n'y avoit point de mauvaise mine que ce prince ne fit à Bork*; in short, that these incidents seconded by General Schuylenburg's strong and judicious representations gave room to expect another change in our favour.¹

Seckendorf, for his part, reported Ilgen to seem steady for alliance with France and England, but the king still most earnest in assurances, provided that the Berg article of his treaty were fulfilled, anxious for composition of the religious differences, of which so much was made in England, much disturbed by reports that Ostend would be attacked in May and the Dutch cut off communication with Brabant, which province might be lost before help could arrive, and apprehensive of monopolisation of European trade by England through her sea-power. He himself stood in fear for the results of the conferences accorded to Rottembourg and deplored the poor state of the defences in the Netherlands. To Sinzendorf he wrote, as deciphered in French :

Il n'est que trop sûr que la France et l'Angleterre ont fait des nouvelles propositions. Je les crains autant plus, puisque je n'en peux rien découvrir. Si je dois juger par le discours qu'un des plus confidants du roy de Prusse m'a tenu, il se pourra agir de la succession entière de Juiliers et

"D'Aubigny," through a Hamburg merchant, Samuel Free. He remarked : "I see he is a very active intriguing man, and will be able to give us very good accounts from Berlin, for I must own to you that those we have at present from thence are but very poor ones" (to Poyntz, 15 November (o.s.), *ibid.*). Particulars of the arrangement are given in a letter from Townshend to "D'Aubigny" of the same date (R.O. Foreign Ministers 47). Wich at Hamburg, also, was employed as an intermediary. There resulted a long series of letters conveying to Townshend all kinds of secret intelligence and gossip, together with (from September) copies of letters to Klinckowström from France from Sir Toby Burke under the name of "Rinoncourt" (*ibid.*).

In January 1727 we find "D'Aubigny" wanting to be transferred to Petersburg or Vienna, and in April expressing intention to ask for recall, since he had been left pitilessly without payment for six months.

¹ Poyntz, 17 November (o.s.) 1726, private, R.O. Sweden 45. The visits of Count Schulenburg to London, in July, and now to Berlin, primed with arguments in favour of the allies of Hanover, have been noticed (p. 412).

Bergue à l'exclusion de la maison de Soultzbach. Tout ce qu'on peut assurer est, que le roy est fort inquiet, pensif et incertain.¹

Expectation that Frederick William would throw over his treaty with the emperor continued up to Christmas. Du Bourgay knew of orders sent to Meinertzhagen to deny that it contained anything inimical to the Dutch or that magazines, as was reported, were being furnished in Cleves. And he was assured by the queen, returned from Wusterhausen, that she had so well disposed her husband that the result would soon be seen.² "D'Aubigny" had a number of pleasant stories to tell. "Il y a plus d'apparence que jamais que cette cour ne fait à présent qu'amuser le C^{te} Seckendorf." Spies reported the emperor's troops in miserable condition and French war-preparations vigorous. The king had been informed that Borcke, Grumbkow, Dönhoff, Katsch and Daschau³ had divided 50,000 crowns of Austrian money and expected as much more, and he was suspicious. At the "Tabachie" Count Lottum and General Dockum had been allowed to contend with Seckendorf that the emperor had always been the king's greatest enemy, and that to expect him to contribute to Prussian aggrandisement was a chimaera.

¹ Seckendorf, 30 November and 3 December, *l.c.* pp. 191 foll. He left Berlin in January and then sent to Prince Eugene a very full and particular report of his experiences; of the king's constant, if perhaps simulated, declarations of devotion to emperor and empire, of the anxieties that racked him, of his present tenderness towards and respect for the feelings of the queen (ascribed to his hope of getting possession of her mother's inheritance), and all the rest. He noted Frederick William's great ambition to make a parade in the world, and his unsatiable greed of money and landed extension. If nothing came of the Sulzbach compact he would almost certainly change over; could he be contented on that head, he might be willing to enter on a war and accept in compensation Bremen and Verden, or Stralsund, or other gain (22 January 1727, *ibid.* Nachträge, pp. 335-347).

Marshal Villars reflects in his memoirs at this time (v. 38): "On voyoit tous jours de grandes variétés sur la conduite du roi de Prusse, ce prince étant continuellement agité par les sentimens très opposés de ses ministres; Ilgen et Knipausen étant pour la France, Grumbko et Bourck pour l'empereur; le comte de Rottembourg le tourmentant et le général Sekendorf de son côté, au point que sa tête en étoit complètement ébranlée. Il est certain qu'en beaucoup de choses ce prince montrait une cervelle dérangée; mais il avoit 70,000 h. sur pied, plus de 50 millions d'argent comptant, la plus grande économie; il se trouvoit ainsi plus puissant que tous les autres electeurs ensemble et par cette raison pouvoit emporter la balance pour la paix ou pour la guerre. . . . Les extravagans ne sont quelque fois pas les ennemis les moins à craindre." Droysen (IV. ii. 425-6) cites the Polish envoy Suhm on 10 December: "il est assez rare de voir la manière dont négocient ici les deux parties; l'un et l'autre travaillent avec le même empressement à engager le plus avant qu'il est possible dans les liaisons les plus étroites une cour, qui les voudroit ménager tous deux et qui sans qu'il luy en coûtât aucun réel engagement voudroit profiter de l'ardeur avec la quelle l'un et l'autre la ménage."

² Du Bourgay, 21 and 24 December, R.O. Prussia 21. Seckendorf wrote of a twelve-days' stay of the queen with the king at Wusterhausen and of daily threats coaxing and promises by the "weibliche Partei" to wean him from his patriotic frankly German sentiments (24 December, Förster, Urkundenbuch ii. 204).

³ Presumably Col. Derschau (p. 409 n.).

A lady had been told by the queen that the Austrian treaty would never be ratified. To combat all which Seckendorf had produced a letter from Prince Eugene telling him that in the spring he would be at the head of 150 squadrons and 40 battalions.¹

Nevertheless Morville was warning Robinson that "there was no depending a week upon the advices from Berlin" and that the king's conduct towards Rottembourg had changed again,² and soon Du Bourgay wrote :

Mr Ilgen told me two days ago that the K. of Prussia had ordered him to declare to me (out of pique at some things that had lately passed with the regency of Hanover)³ that if his Ma^{ty} sent a squadron in the Baltick next year he would look upon it as an insult to his coasts and would revenge himself elsewhere, meaning, I suppose, on the King's German dominions. Mo^r Ilgen showed all the concern imaginable to be obliged to deliver me this message and begged I would represent it as a flight of his master's ill humour, which he hoped would not hold long. . . . I must further acquaint your Lordship, as Count Rottembourg does his court by this post and in much stronger terms, that we are under daily fears that his Prussian Ma^{ty}'s reason will totally sink under the violence of his passion.⁴

After which more about the continual changefulness, preparations for war, officers sent in disguise to gain intelligence in Austria Holland and France,⁵ the propriety (on the queen's advice) of gaining surgeon Holzendorf, always about the king and of great influence, the violence of the king's resentment against Hanoverian proceedings, and so on. Although the queen, "by her indefatigable pains and constant agreeable good humour, recovers him now and then," on the least provocation a new outburst. Misgiving on the backwardness of the emperor's preparations appeared to influence him more than the protestant cause, not regarded so much as ought to be expected. At dinner on several occasions Rottembourg and himself (Du Bourgay) had exposed to him the situation of affairs, but he would not open his mind. He seemed inclined to put himself at the head of a body of troops in Cleves and wait to see which side to join. There had been "loose and general proposals" from Petersburg about setting up Charles, eldest son of the margrave Albert, in Courland, but the court was so taken up with affairs in

¹ "D'Aubigny" (Klinckowström), 25 December, R.O. Foreign Ministers 47. Eugene's letter, of 18 December, Förster, p. 201.

² Robinson, 24 December, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

³ Affairs of the salt trade (particulars in "D'Aubigny's" letters).

⁴ Du Bourgay, 31 December, R.O. Prussia 21.

⁵ William Finch sent word of the same, on the authority of Muyden, the Dutch chargé d'affaires at Berlin, and again about the furnishing of Prussian magazines in Cleves, whither De Lynden was being sent to observe (14 and 24 January 1727, R.O. Holland 293).

the Rhine country that little attention was now paid to anything from Russia.¹

In the meantime it had been thought well, in connexion with the happenings in Spain, to remind Frederick William of his liabilities. In a letter to him George I observed that although it had been agreed not to require service of his troops engaged under the treaties of Charlottenburg and Hanover at a distance from his dominions, money might be demanded in proportion. Of his friendship and affection, however, for his son-in-law he would not be a chargeable ally, unless in case of pressing necessity, and he hoped to put Gibraltar in so good a state of defence as to defeat the evil designs of the Spaniards. At the same time, having reason to believe that the king of Spain was animated to a rupture and had firm hope of a diversion in his favour elsewhere, he did not doubt that in case of an attempt against his dominions in Germany the succour stipulated would promptly be forthcoming. And he hoped, at the least, for most positive assurances that during a war Frederick William would take no action against his allies either directly or indirectly in any way or on any pretext. His own engagements stood unchangeable, and there was no risk that he would not face in order to observe them faithfully. Any attack upon himself must involve Prussia. Recounting the forces at his disposal in North Germany and the help promised by France, George stated that he by no means desired to implicate Frederick William in a war, but only to preserve the peace of Lower Germany ; yet, in case of a war, Frederick William might expect most solid advantages by placing himself on his side, without running the risks to which he might be exposed by lending his ear to captious and illusory promises from elsewhere. He was sure that the king's proved zeal for their holy religion, and his pride in exactly observing treaties, would not allow him to hesitate a moment in according what was asked.² When presenting this letter Du Bourgay was instructed to lay stress on its "tenderness" and to point out that nothing more was requested of Frederick William than what "his own interests would put him under the necessity of doing."³

The letter and Townshend's covering dispatch went first to Paris for approval. Sending them, Newcastle attributed the action taken to a hint from Morville to Broglie that the king of Prussia might be brought to declare neutrality in the matter of the Ostend Company. The whole letter was founded, he said, on Ilgen's scheme of engaging

¹ Du Bourgay, 7 to 18 January 1727, R.O. Prussia 22.

² George I to Frederick William I, 20 December (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Royal Letters 46, King's Letters 52.

³ Townshend to Du Bourgay, same date, R.O. Prussia 21.

his master as little as possible on any side, and would probably restrain him from taking an adverse part, when he saw that all was required of him was to fulfil his engagements in case of an attack upon Hanover and not to do anything in opposition to his Majesty's allies. But no step would be taken without the approval of the court of France. As to sounding the disposition of the elector Palatine, in view of what Finch had written about hints from his minister at the Hague, any particular engagement with him must be deferred until the effect of the present letter was seen.¹

Robinson reported Fleury to approve the letter very strongly, desiring only Rottembourg to be consulted on the propriety of delivering it and promising orders to that envoy to support its representations. With the elector Palatine he thought that little could be done in view of failure of attempt made with his minister at Paris; he believed him to be too much delivered over to the emperor, and that money paid to him or to the elector of Cologne would only be turned against the allies in the repair of fortifications.² It was replied that the orders to Rottembourg were "extremely liked" and that his Majesty, if nothing further could be got, would content himself with the king of Prussia's promise to allow no troops of any power to pass through his dominions to disturb his neighbours, "thus tying himself down to a perfect neutrality."³

On receipt of the documents Du Bourgay agreed with Rottembourg to defer decision about presenting the letter until the count should have sounded the king's present disposition. Accorded an audience, Rottembourg stated positively that if any attempt were made against the king of England's German dominions the king of France would not only assist him with all his forces but would not lay down arms until just satisfaction for damages had been procured. Frederick William asserted his intention of observing an exact neutrality, but would not determine on anything definite until after the term for ratification of his treaty with Austria was expired (12 April). If disappointed about Berg and Ravenstein, he would prove so useful a friend that his sincerity could not be doubted.⁴ Aware that the elector Palatine had absolutely refused compliance and had sent to Paris to know French views on the matter, Rottembourg asked what assurance the king had that that elector would not join the allies of Hanover and secure the possessions in question, rather than lose them by adherence to the emperor?

¹ Newcastle to Robinson, same date, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

² Robinson, 8 January 1727, private, *ibid.*

³ Newcastle in reply, 5 January (o.s.), *ibid.* 32749.

⁴ "The Emperor should not prevail upon him to grant any longer term than the 12th of April for the execution of his promises, or accept of any equivalent for Bergue and Ravestein, but that he would have those countries, or none at all."

As the result of his interview Rottembourg advised delivery of the royal letter, but thought it better to await the news, instantly expected, of the accession of Sweden to the treaty of Hanover. He believed that Frederick William's present favourable disposition was likely to increase daily and that he would give the assurances desired. But he must not be pressed too closely; the dignity of the two crowns must be preserved.¹

For all that Frederick William might be led to say by Rottembourg, what he had specially at heart now were the measures being taken by George I to assemble an army, including Danes and Swedes, in northern Germany. On the one hand he apprehended assault upon himself, on the other he stood always loyal to the constitutions of the empire. He would never suffer, he repeatedly declared, foreign troops to cross its frontiers. Seckendorf had word from Grumbkow of orders to himself to prepare a camp for 30,000 men for defence against invasion. At the same time, he said, the king desired to know specifically, would the emperor hold to his engagements, what advantages he might expect, if he declared war against England and France, and what preparations for war were being made at Vienna? Seckendorf really feared to lose him, unless he were thoroughly reassured.²

The court of Vienna could not carry out its undertakings. Count Stephen Kinsky, now sent on a mission to the elector Palatine and his son-in-law of Sulzbach, failed to persuade.³ Orders went to Seckendorf to repair to Berlin again, to explain to the king open-heartedly how matters stood, and to find out with his usual discretion and dexterity what could be done. He was authorised to suggest, in case of war, an equivalent for Berg in Bremen and Verden or in some Dutch province; or again (but this to be put forward in closest secrecy and as a proposition coming from Petersburg) the acquisition of Courland by the marriage of a Brandenburg prince to the duchess. Also he might inform the king of the negotiation about the Ostend Company opened through the nuncio at Paris and of the emperor's willingness to accept

¹ Du Bourgay, 23 January, R.O. Prussia 22.

² Seckendorf to Eugene, 19 January, Förster, *Nachträge*, pp. 326-9. In his letters to Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau of this time Frederick William had much about Hanoverian preparations and particularly about the security of Wesel. He must have 52 battalions and 102 squadrons on the Elbe before the Hanoverians were ready. His situation was "sehr chabereux"; he must keep his troops together. The imperialists were very indefinite about Berg. If he took part with them, he risked losing all his lands. Advantages must be sufficient to make up damages. Yet he would hinder by force of arms all that might disturb the empire. God willing, he would be "fix und fertig" by the first of May (*Briefe*, January and February).

³ Particulars of his mission, Rosenlehner, chap. iv.

mediation in that dispute, although the openings gave no very satisfactory prospect.¹

Back at Berlin on 3 February Seckendorf had interviews with Ilgen and others (the prince of Anhalt-Dessau advised the advance of an imperial force into Silesia or Bohemia, to show real intention to act in conjunction with the troops of Prussia), and on the 6th went for a prolonged stay at Potsdam. He gave out, says Du Bourgay, that the emperor was resolved on war forthwith and would have his armies ready to move by 1 March.² Of what he did we have in print his full and particular report to Charles VI.

Points were that Frederick William asserted complete confidence in his suzerain, but had better certainty in regard to Juliers and Berg from the other side. He would not accept an equivalent, for conscientious reasons. He remained entirely German and patriotic, hoped earnestly that the emperor would not begin a war in the empire, but were he compelled to counter the armies of the allies of Hanover would set himself with his whole force against them, his sole object being to uphold the peace of the empire, particularly in his own neighbourhood. He had full assurance from London and Paris of his right to Juliers and Berg and of intention to maintain it, so that Seckendorf saw no expedient but for the emperor to obtain the stipulated cession. But the matter of a few weeks was no great thing, and if the cession could not be obtained at once, the king was content to wait. He would do nothing by violence, and would remain the emperor's most faithful servant so far as he could without bringing the allies of Hanover upon his neck. Ilgen had argued against undertaking risks with yet no certainty of obtaining Berg. In the end Frederick William had declared his intention to inquire of George I by special messenger whether he intended to employ his own and foreign troops to damage the empire, or would withdraw them elsewhere. If he declared favourably, it was hoped that the emperor would respond. But if no positive answer, or, by the polite English custom, no answer at all, then the Prussian army should be ready in four weeks to help the emperor and defend the empire.³

To Eugene Seckendorf declared the issue to depend on the answer from England. Were it delayed, or ambiguous, then the king

¹ Charles VI to Seckendorf, 22 January 1727, and Sinzendorf, 23 January, *ibid.* pp. 330-2, 347-8. The whole aim of the Austrian court was contained in a post-script by Sinzendorf: "Il s'agit de gagner le roy-de-Prusse et de s'en assurer, tâchez de prendre la balle au bon et formez un projet définitif avec lui."

² Du Bourgay, 8 February, R.O. Prussia 22.

³ Seckendorf to Charles VI, 12 February, Förster, *Nachträge*, pp. 357 foll. Frederick William confirmed what was last said in a letter to Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau of the same date (*Briefe*, pp. 357-8). Cf. Droysen, IV. ii. 431-2.

would devote to the emperor's cause all his might money and possessions and content himself with his guarantee of Berg, for against the opinion of his whole house he only wanted an excuse for vengeance on the Hanoverian "coujons." On the other hand, in case of a favourable reply from England, he would demand a similar declaration from the emperor, and in case of refusal would rejoin the allies of Hanover. To consent to the neutrality declaration proposed would not be a bad thing, Seckendorf suggested, for then the whole of the emperor's forces would be freed for employment elsewhere than in Germany.¹

Among other things Seckendorf reported Borcke to be now in permanent residence at Potsdam and apparently a regular minister of state. This was known in England, and the possibility of buying him was under consideration. His Majesty, Newcastle instructed Robinson, desired that orders might be sent to Rottembourg to employ his skill and dexterity in this very advisable transaction, whether by promising an annual pension or a sum of money. The affair being exceedingly private, "an offer of a very nice and secret nature," the king did not intend to let Du Bourgay have anything to do with it. He would bear his share of the expense.²

However, the French ministers neither trusted Borcke nor would have Rottembourg meddle with the affair, seeing that he had little commerce with him and might compromise himself with Ilgen. It was replied that all thoughts of the matter were given up.³

Frederick William's letter to George I bore date 8 February. He proposed that George should give his royal word that he had no intention of attacking the emperor's dominions in Germany, and particularly in Silesia or Bohemia, on receipt of which declaration he would himself endeavour to procure a corresponding pledge on the part of the emperor in regard to Hanover.⁴ He personally entrusted the letter for carriage to London to Captain Polentz, of

¹ Seckendorf to Eugene, 15 February, *ibid.* pp. 375-6.

² Newcastle to Robinson, 10 February (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32749. There are some letters of the same time on the subject addressed to Rottembourg and to the Hanoverian ministers, Busch and Hattorf. From one of these it appears that Hattorf had suggested the employment of Rottembourg. It is endorsed: "All these letters were laid aside, and only a short one wrote the 7th Feb. to Mr Hattorf, authorizing Mr Bousch to offer to the person in question 6, 7 or 8,000 crowns per ann., a year's pension to be advanced immediately." Du Bourgay, as we shall see, brought up the subject again, as of his own thought, in May, when Townshend answered him that nothing could be better for his Majesty's service; "lose no time in striking so essential a stroke, if possible," but with great caution and secrecy, to avoid offending Ilgen or Cnyphausen (15 May (o.s.), R.O. Prussia 22).

³ Robinson, 4 March, Newcastle in reply, 27 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ R.O. Royal Letters 46 (original), King's Letters 52 (copy). Printed by Rousset, iv. 239.

his grenadier guards. To ensure secrecy it was given out that Polentz was bound for Mannheim, and provision of horses for foreign couriers was forbidden for four or five days.¹

Du Bourgay and Rottembourg were carefully kept in ignorance of what was passing. A change of clerks and secretaries, the former tells us, deprived them of their customary source of information. They heard general talk of magnificent offers brought by Seckendorf, and were disturbed by the hurried summons of Ilgen, "who never comes to Potsdam but on extraordinary occasions," to assist at the conferences. "Our jealousy was not only grounded on surmises, but likewise on facts; . . . was there a powerfull army within one day's march of the capital, orders could not have been given and executed with greater diligence and expedition." In these circumstances, expecting news of the Swedish accession at any moment and in receipt of the good news of the government success at the opening of parliament, they agreed that Du Bourgay should present the letter from George I. Accordingly he repaired to Potsdam on 14 February. At his audience next day, says he, "a new scene, and entirely different from what is represented at Berlin, was opened to me." The king began by warmly denouncing the false reports of his intentions, extending even to an alleged design to divide Hanover up among the powers, informed Du Bourgay of the letter sent to London by express, and disclaimed any concern with war beyond the Rhine. He would engage himself, he said further, in the strongest manner not to allow the passage of Muscovite or imperial troops through his dominions. Du Bourgay in answer descanted on the prosperous state of his master's affairs generally and advised that, if the king should wish to depart from a strict neutrality, "he would only find his security and advantage in joining with us."²

Polentz had agreeable welcome in London; his coming was taken to indicate a change in his master's politics and there was expectation of a good result. In one dispatch we find: "His Pⁿ Mat^y is in such a disposition at present, that I hope in a very little time to send you word that he is intirely come back to his old friends"; in another that he seemed "heartily desirous to be settled in that kind of situation he has all along aimed at, of being neutral," that a declaration such as he proposed would in no way disadvantage the allies, and that the Dutch would be relieved of all fear of his attacking them, he being resolved not to send troops beyond the Rhine and knowing that he could do nothing against the States without coming into collision with Great Britain and France. Nor

¹ Seckendorf in his report of 12 February, cited.

² Du Bourgay, 15 February, R.O. Prussia 22.

without his concurrence could the elector of Cologne "make any motion to hurt or alarm the republick." ¹

These impressions, however, were of brief duration. But four days later Townshend informed Leheup at Ratisbon: "We are very well assured that this proposal is made at the desire of the Imperial court." ² At Paris, when the letter was communicated there, an Austrian snare was scented, "a new artifice for the Imperial court to sow jealousies between England and France," ³ and Marshal Villars commented: "Belle matière à manifester pour répandre dans l'Empire, que s'il est exposé à la guerre c'est par la volonté du roi de France et d'Angleterre!" ⁴ From the Hague Slingelandt argued at great length on the emperor wanting security for his own dominions, in order that he might turn his whole force against France and Holland, the king of Prussia intending to help him, ⁵ while Finch heard complaints of "not the least mention made of the republick" and of Frederick William's apparent wish "to be in surety near home, in hopes to be the better able to hurt them." Nothing that he could say availed to allay suspicion; an affair at Venlo and new reports about magazines at Cleves suggested actual preparation for attack; a prince, it was said, who had treated his allies in the way experienced, "must speak clearer and plainer before he can expect to be listened to" and Seckendorf's hand was discerned in the artful letter. ⁶ These views entertained, the answer with which Polentz left England on 28 February (o.s.) indulged, indeed, in lengthy asseveration of desire for peace and of rectitude of intention, but beyond that said only that in this matter, as in all others, George I must consult his French and Dutch allies. ⁷ For Dutch benefit Townshend stated its "very civil expressions" to be intended to give Frederick William hope of soon hearing something tending towards peace, a hint given at the desire of France, in order that if the late proposals to Vienna were approved in Holland they

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 16 February (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97; Townshend to Finch, next day, R.O. Holland 293.

² 21 February (o.s.), R.O. Germany, States, 176.

³ "Mr. Pecquet the younger talked to me in the same manner, only adding, as he generally does with more freedom, that this proposal from the Emperor through the canal of the king of Prussia is only an artifice to put his Majesty under the necessity either of occasioning a belief in England, as if the King's sole concern was for his German dominions, if he accepted the offer, or, if he did not accept it, of irritating all the princes of Germany, as if his Majesty's refusal might kindle a war in their country; one or other of which, he said, would be the turn given by the Imperial court to the part his Majesty should take" (Robinson, 4 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32749).

⁴ *Mémoires*, v. 48.

⁵ To Townshend, 4 and 7 March, R.O. Holland 297.

⁶ Finch, same dates, *ibid.* 293.

⁷ George I to Frederick William I, 27 February (o.s.), R.O. Royal Letters 46, King's Letters 52, Prussia 22; Rousset, iv. 241.

might be communicated to him in accordance with the assurances given. The "friends" might be quite sure of his Majesty doing nothing but in concert with them. Finch was able to reply that the answer sent to Berlin had given the greatest satisfaction.¹

To prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau Frederick William stated that the mission of Polentz had the emperor's consent.² In this he must have misunderstood what Seckendorf, made privy to the proposals, may have said. For they roused indignation at Vienna also; were stigmatised as encumbering, dangerous, and of such advantage to the king of England that it was even thought that he and his allies had prompted them. Immunity for Hanover Charles VI stated to mean concentration of attack upon his indefensible Netherlands. As to Berg, he said, everything possible had been tried with the elector Palatine, to his great regret in vain, but new expedients were being devised and all that was possible would be done to keep the king of Prussia in his patriotic disposition. Seckendorf must exert himself to the utmost to that end.³

Pending reply from England at Berlin all was in suspense. Du Bourgay, after his audience, was left again in unhappy ignorance of what was doing. Save for war preparations "carrying on with the greatest dispatch" all that he had to report was hearsay, at one time that the king, to quiet the queen, had promised her observance of exact neutrality, at another that he was "still in the humour of carrying it fair to the court of Vienna. Whilst the Muscovite minister was at Potsdam such things were said at the publick table as are not fitting for me to repeat." In a third dispatch he took a letter from Ilgen to Rottembourg to show plainly "how they are intimidated by the great preparations of the two crowns, tho' at the same time they would have it understood that he who bids fairest will have their friendship," and in a fourth had strongest assurance that the king would never allow Russian troops to pass his dominions.⁴ Seckendorf, behind the scenes at Potsdam, was equally in doubt about the outcome. On report from Polentz of his excellent reception in London and of the statement of George I that he did not reject the Prussian proposal but must wait to consult his allies, Frederick William, while expressing disbelief that France and Holland would consent to have Hanover secured and all the weight of the emperor's forces freed for action elsewhere, yet, in answer to Seckendorf's intimation of corresponding objection on

¹ Townshend to Finch, 28 February (o.s.), Finch in reply, 18 March, R.O. Holland 293.

² *Briefe*, p. 357.

³ Charles VI, to Seckendorf, 22 February, Förster, *Nachträge*, p. 379.

⁴ Du Bourgay, 22 February to 11 March, R.O. Prussia 22.

his master's part, hoped that in any case Hanover would not be attacked. He would await, he said, his answer, could not prescribe measures to the emperor, earnestly hoped that the quiet of the empire would not be disturbed, and renewed his assurances; were the answer not satisfactory, he would adopt with the emperor measures of force without compunction. Like asseveration followed receipt of the next report from Polentz, in which Broglie was stated not to imagine that France and Holland would ever fall in with a proposal so advantageous to the emperor. Seckendorf's advice to his court was acceptance with severe restrictions. He was of opinion that the letter had been communicated to himself with the particular view that, since an answer from his court would be received first and, as Ilgen expected, be in the negative, the allies of Hanover might be freed from the onus of rejection. The impossibility of proposing an equivalent for Berg he stated again; the king would infallibly suspect treachery and without the article would not ratify the treaty.¹

"D'Aubigny" indulged in his usual practice of writing what should please. According to him Frederick William "*étoit entièrement revenu de sa coqueterie envers l'Empereur*," had sedulously avoided meeting Seckendorf for some days, and harped continually on the want of power of the court of Vienna "*soutenir la gageure*"; while Borceke and Grumbkow had completely changed their tone, the former, to avoid the king's railing, having kept to his house for a week on the plea of illness and wanting to get back to his government at Stettin. Putting everything together the writer was confident that the king would not depart from his engagements with France and England.² In some confirmation of this was report, published, that Mardefeld had notified at Petersburg that in the interests of peace the king of Prussia would neither allow Russian troops to pass his dominions, nor give military help on any pretext, in order that he might be in a better position to reconcile the powers at difference with one another.³

Of the long discussions which followed receipt of the answer from George I on 22 March Seckendorf gives full report. The outcome was victory for Ilgen's moderative counsels; Frederick William decided to write to his father-in-law again, pressing his proposals. Seckendorf vented his spleen as follows:

Je peux bien assurer à Votre Excellence, que sans le maudit Ilgen nous aurions vu les troupes de Prusse sur le bord de l'Elbe, mais cette homme

¹ Seckendorf to Charles VI, 12 March, and to Eugene, 18 and 22 March, Förster, *Nachträge*, pp. 387-9, 402-5.

² Letter of 18 March enclosed by Poyntz on the 22nd (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 46.

³ *Lettres historiques*, lxxi. 391.

connaît si bien l'humeur du maître, qu'après que la première chaleur est passée on le peut faire trembler de peur, en lui représentant dangereusement les suites, qui pourront arriver, et poltron lui même de son naturel il fait envisager les choses plus dangereusement, qu'elles ne sont pas.

At the same time Frederick William, desiring, he said, to show his great inclination to live in constant devotion to and friendship with the emperor, consented in writing to prolong the term of ratification of his treaty by three months.¹

Given a copy of Frederick William's second letter Du Bourgay put to Ilgen the pertinent question, was there any truth in the report that the proposed neutrality excluded Mecklenburg and Sleswick and that enemy forces would be allowed to pass into those countries? He was answered that the king of Prussia could not be expected to do anything which might disoblige the tsaritsa, that the neutrality covered only the emperor's and the king of England's dominions in Germany, and that the Mecklenburg and Sleswick questions were foreign to the treaty of Hanover and preceding treaties. About the troops he would neither affirm nor deny. It was plain, Du Bourgay deduced, that the concern shown for the quietude of Germany was insincere and that disturbance in Sleswick was to be apprehended; but his Majesty's army could protect that country and Hanover also. On these considerations he had asked leave to go to Potsdam and was now setting out. Preparations for war continued strenuously.²

At his audience, on 3 April, Du Bourgay presented a memorial, concerted with Rottembourg, explaining the reasons for the late expulsion of Palm from London. Finding disposition to listen he discoursed, and had the "good fortune to destroy several notions our adversaries had infused." The king gave strongest assurances of intention to protect Hanover from any harm, but wished that he had a definite answer to his letter sent by Polentz and that the king of England would enter into a concert of neutrality as elector, saying that a great many German princes would accede to it and so be formed a kind of third moderating league between the allies of Vienna and of Hanover. By what he said about the Spanish marriages Du Bourgay claimed to have made deep impression, but on affairs of the north could obtain only loose and general answers. It would be seen, he concluded, how strongly imperial counsels prevailed and how care was had rather for the safety of the emperor's dominions than for the peace of Lower Germany; also the desire

¹ Seckendorf, 26 and 27 March, with the document comprising this and other undertakings, Förster, *Nachträge*, pp. 406-421. Frederick William's letter to George I, of 25 March, *ll.cc.*

² Du Bourgay, 1 April, R.O. Prussia 22.

to sow dissension between his Majesty and his allies. Nothing, however, was decided on; Ilgen could not say what turn the treaty of Wusterhausen might take, several points remaining unsettled with the elector Palatine.¹ Seckendorf also reported the revelations about Austrian compacts with Spain to have deeply impressed the king and did not anticipate the slightest chance of France and Holland agreeing to his neutrality proposal. Answer was sent him that the principal thing of which to assure the king was that there was no intention of marrying Maria Theresa to any one yet.²

When news of the Swedish accession to the treaty of Hanover came to Berlin "D'Aubigny" reported consternation at court, where belief in the possibility of it had always been rejected. "Mons^r Ilgen, qui est le véritable thermomètre de cette cour, m'a fait compliment à cette occasion avec une contenance si embarrassée, qu'il ne falloit pas être grand phisiognomist pour voir que son maître n'étoit nullement aise de l'évènement."³

The second letter to George I met with scant welcome. From Du Bourgay's reports Newcastle gathered the king to be "now in a worse way than ever," deducing the greater necessity to put it out of his power to do mischief. His Majesty, he said, would not reply until French sentiments were known; his present intent was to write in the same manner as before. Were the French ministers still of opinion that the preliminaries of peace, now under discussion, should be communicated at Berlin, Du Bourgay should have orders accordingly.⁴ Then, on receipt of that envoy's advices of 1 April, Newcastle declared that the king of Prussia's exclusion of Mecklenburg and Sleswick from his scheme of neutrality showed plainly that it was "calculated merely to serve the ends of the court of Vienna"; but a week later, on report from Richelieu of protestations made to him that the emperor had no part in a plan, which seemed to contravene Austrian plans, he was disposed to credit this and so to believe that Frederick William's conduct was not so bad as had been supposed.⁵

On 12 April Du Bourgay reported Rottembourg and himself continually importuned to set some negotiation going. He saw the Prussians "still tampering with the court of Vienna, who on their side do what they can to amuse and deceive them by promises of one kind or other." Yet the Russian army could not move until the emperor had advanced a whole year's pay, while from Silesia:

¹ The same, 5 April.

² Seckendorf's full report of 4 April, and Charles VI to him on 16 April, Förster, *Die Höfe und Cabinette Europa's* I., Urkundenbuch, pp. 69-78, 87, 88.

³ 9 April, R.O. Foreign Ministers 47, with more on the subject on 19 April.

⁴ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 28 March (o.s.), B.M. Add. MSS. 52749.

⁵ The same, 6 and 13 April (o.s.), *ibid.* 32750.

report continued to be that the corn collected there for magazines was in course of distribution to the poor, on account of the prevailing famine. He notified the arrival of a Dutch ambassador, Baron Keppel, with instructions exactly conformable to his own and Rottembourg's and expected to meet with most gracious reception.¹

Keppel had his audience on 12 April. He made formal report of the accession of the States-General to the treaty of Hanover and desired to know, in view of report of Prussian negotiation with the emperor, who, as was well known, bore no goodwill towards the United Provinces or the protestant religion, in spite of treaty obligations, whether the plan of neutrality propounded embraced certain Dutch lands bordering on those of the king of Prussia. Among other matters he brought forward the troubles in East Friesland, where, he said, the emperor was favouring the prince in opposition to the Dutch. Only general answers were then given, but afterwards Keppel was told that the king was ready to conclude with the States-General a treaty of neutrality for their neighbouring possessions. Previously, at an audience accorded to Rottembourg, he had likened his treaty with Austria to a sheet of white paper, denied abandonment of the alliance of Hanover, but claimed freedom to seek his own advantage. A week later Du Bourgay reported removal of the limit of time for execution of the emperor's engagements about Berg. This he attributed to the ascendancy of Borceke, who now had the chief say in all state affairs ("M^r. Ilgen's province is now to receive and execute orders only") and who had advised, about the accession of Sweden to the treaty of Hanover, that the king's proper course, "according to the old maxim of his house, was to join with those who opposed the measures of that crown."²

Under date 25 April (o.s.) was sent the final answer of George I to Frederick William's neutrality proposals. Difficulties with his allies, he said, to whom he had duly communicated them, were not resolved. A simple neutrality denuded of all stipulations on the basis of the interests of the allies of Hanover would not sufficiently

¹ Du Bourgay, 12 April, R.O. Prussia 22.

² Du Bourgay, 15 to 26 April, R.O. Prussia 22. Marshal Villars set down about the orders to Rottembourg (*Mémoires*, v. 58):

"Dans le Conseil d'Etat du 9 Avril on lut les lettres de Rottembourg, qui préparoient à l'attaque des états d'Hanovre. Les ordres du roi de Prusse à ses troupes, ceux qu'il donnoit à son ministre à Petersbourg de se déclarer contre l'Angleterre et la France, ceux qu'avoient les généraux et secrétaires d'état de cacher tous les mouvements, les envois de courriers à Vienne, ne permettoient pas de douter de l'union et des desseins de l'empereur et du roi de Prusse. Sur quoi on manda à Rottembourg de porter ses plaintes au roi de Prusse, et de déclarer qu'il se retireroit incessamment. Toutes ces mesures, si éloignées des dispositions où la cour de Vienne vouloit nous persuader qu'elle étoit pour la paix, nous portoient à nous préparer à tout."

accomplish the object in view, to ensure peace on unshakeable foundations.¹

At this point may be noticed a means found of working upon Frederick William through a regular correspondent of his at Madrid, one De Buy,² of Van der Meer's household. The king, Stanhope tells us, wrote him personal letters, usually countersigned by Ilgen, inquiring about Spanish revenues and forces, secret engagements with the emperor, whether the king of Spain persisted in his resolution to support the Pretender, connexion of the enterprise against Gibraltar with an intended imperial attack on Hanover, and so on. De Buy submitted the letters to Van der Meer, who confided them to Stanhope and with him concerted answers setting forth "in the best manner imaginable" the weakness and poverty of Spain, "and that the engagements and views of the courts of Vienna and Madrid are to make the Infant Don Carlos King of the Romans, and by the destruction of the protestants render him more absolute in the Empire than ever Charles the fifth was, &^a." ³

Grumbkow also corresponded with De Buy, and opportunity had appeared to offer to discredit him with his royal master. He had begun, Itterssum informed Townshend, with such trifles as the exchange of portraits of the princes of Spain and Prussia, had desisted from writing after Frederick William's defection from the alliance of Hanover, and had recommenced with a letter which De Buy had communicated to Van der Meer on 20 November. The latter and Stanhope had drawn up an answer, which they had sent to Itterssum under flying seal, with request to communicate it to Fagel and Hoornbeek and to send it on, or no, as they judged proper. Decision had been in the negative, on the grounds that there was nothing in the letter which Frederick William did not know and that to transmit it might do more harm than good.⁴

A subsequent letter from Grumbkow, of date 10 December, told De Buy that what he had written about the possible consequences of the king of Prussia's accession to the treaty of Vienna might greatly displease; the accession was purely imaginary, there being only a defensive treaty, not yet ratified, which had nothing in common with that of Vienna, and was not contrary to that of Hanover; better for him to confine his accounts to what was passing in Spain and not to meddle with negotiations with countries so far distant.⁵ On the other hand Frederick William wrote on

¹ George I to Frederick William I, 25 April (o.s.), *ll.cc.*

² So by his signature. Stanhope calls him "de Buis," and says he was a gentleman.

³ Stanhope, 30 January 1727, R.O. Spain 95.

⁴ Itterssum to Townshend, 14 February, R.O. Holland 296.

⁵ Copy, furnished to Stanhope by De Buy, R.O. Prussia 105.

14 December desiring that for his own and for his family's interest De Buy should continue to impart the truth of affairs sincerely, and sent him a special cipher to enable him to write with greater security. Van der Meer, who sent this information in a dispatch of 30 January 1727, went on to say that he had communicated everything to Stanhope, who approved and agreed that it was his duty to report in confidence, that for the future De Buy would conduct no correspondence of importance with Grumbkow, but write to Ilgen directly, and that a long ciphered letter was now going, conformable to Fagel's ideas, and certain to disgust the king of Prussia with his treaty with the emperor.¹

Stanhope was answered: "Nothing could be better judged than the use which you and the Dutch ambassador have made of the king of Prussia's writing to Mo^r de Buïs," and special recognition of their services should be made both to that gentleman and to Van der Meer. Since Grumbkow was his Majesty's "most determined enemy" at Berlin it would be "of great use to have his behaviour, even to his own master, sett in a true light," and De Buy should be persuaded, by a sum of money if necessary, to send to the king of Prussia Grumbkow's letter, for it might achieve his ruin.²

De Buy, however, scented danger. He advanced the fear that by the action desired he might raise suspicion in the king of Prussia's mind and so render his correspondence useless to the king of England. Since receipt of the former's order to write without concealment he had done so, he said, under flying seal to Ilgen by every post. If he sent Grumbkow's letter now, he might be suspected of treachery. And as the king would certainly one day reveal the matter to Grumbkow the latter would become a sworn enemy and use the influence that he enjoyed to persuade the king that he was being tricked. He suggested substituting a copy of Grumbkow's letter for the original, now in Fagel's hands, and simply posting the latter to the king of Prussia. Or, as an afterthought, arranging that the letter, which he had never answered, should appear to have been intercepted in the post.³

Apparently, however, Du Buy's scruples were overcome. In a letter to the king of Prussia, of date 8 March,⁴ he stated that Grumbkow's letter, wrongly addressed and so delayed, had reached him but two days previously; had it been received earlier it would have caused him much disquietude, but since the king's later letters

¹ Translation of Van der Meer to Fagel, 30 January, with Itterssum's of 14 February, cited.

² Newcastle to Stanhope, 6 February (o.s.), *ibid.* 97.

³ De Buy to Stanhope, 7 March, holograph, R.O. Spain 235.

⁴ *Ibid.*

had ordered him to write freely on affairs as they were he was freed from all the apprehension, which otherwise Grumbkow's letter might have caused. In a later letter to Stanhope he stated the king of Prussia to have thanked him very graciously and to have prayed him to continue his infinitely interesting information.¹

¹ 31 March, *ibid.*, holograph.

CHAPTER XXXIX

PEACE WORK

IN January 1727, for all the general trumpeting of war, peace was in the air. The Paris correspondent of the *Lettres historiques* wrote: "On ne voit tous les jours que couriers et l'on n'entend parler que de propositions d'accommodement, d'espérances de paix, d'augmentation de troupes, de préparatifs de guerre, et de la tenue d'un congrès; ce qui prouve qu'il n'y a encore rien de déterminé." His colleague at Vienna knew of 10,000 of the king of Poland's and 8,000 of the duke of Wolfenbüttel's men ready to march for the emperor's service, of assurance by the tsaritsa of performance of her treaty engagements, and of measures taken to raise the emperor's own forces to a strength of 188,000, but at the same time of embarrassment at Vienna greater than ever, of sentiment there altogether pacific, and of resolution to act only on the defensive. He believed Count Wurmbrand to be going on from Mentz to Cassel to persuade the landgrave and his son, the king of Sweden, to undertake mediation.¹ Leheup at Ratisbon saw at the same time active recruiting for the imperial Bavarian and Palatine forces—"the city rings with the noise of drums"—and yet general talk of a peaceful issue. Count Kinsky he reported going to Mannheim and thence by common report to Paris, where every thing was supposed to be adjusted. "The Imperialists have so well concerted these reports that from Mannheim Mentz and Wurtzburg wee had written letters by the same post, that confirmed the accession of the court of France to the treaty of Vienna." He had never seen "more pains taken to confirm a fact, than is taken in propagating the belief of this."²

In point of fact desire for accommodation was real at Vienna. The emperor stood to lose by war; his widespread dominions could not be defended everywhere; ruin of his Ostend Company in the event of war was certain. Remittances from Spain depended on the return of the treasure-fleets; Spanish arms were being turned against Gibraltar uselessly. He had tried to dissuade Philip V from that enterprise, as has been noticed, though

¹ *Lettres historiques*, lxxi, 175, 160-165.

² Leheup, 13 and 20 January 1727, R.O. Germany, States, 176.

not (if we may believe Saint-Saphorin) from disapproval of the object, but because it was premature. That minister had written in October of Sinzendorf's fury at the blockade of the galleons,¹ of the blame laid on him, of frustration of all the late treaties now that money was not forthcoming, and of weakening of resolution about the Ostend Company, to which the firm attitude of the French government contributed.² In November he transmitted further testimony to Austrian embarrassment, after the arrival of couriers from Madrid and Turin. The former, he was assured, brought a formal summons to fulfil engagements by compelling withdrawal of the British fleet from the West Indies and satisfaction for offences. Although he heard nothing talked of but war—"on est seulement embarrassé où commencer"—yet, so far as he could learn of the answer sent, the Spaniards were exhorted to be patient and promise was made in that case of measures to be taken which should compel the withdrawal of the fleet. The messenger from Turin he understood to have brought news of the accession of the king of Sardinia to the treaty of Hanover.³ Whatever the truth of this, the advices gave mortal disquietude. Efforts were being made at Hamburg and Genoa to obtain advances of money on promise of repayment when the galleons arrived, and new evidences of embarrassment were seen daily.⁴

Towards the end of October had come a letter from Pentenriedter congratulating Fleury on his promotion to the cardinalate and so turned as to express the hope that it would contribute to the general quiet. Walpole sent a copy of the answer, which he would only have had somewhat more vigorous and spirited; but then, he said, Fleury could not help being mild and civil.⁵ Three days later he sent word of a proposal by Fonseca, which that minister had

¹ "Les mouvemens de Sinzendorff ont été un mélange de fureur et de désespoir; tantôt en serrant le poing et grinçant les dents il donnoit de grands coups sur le table, et tantôt en levant les yeux au ciel il marquoit la plus profonde componction de coeur sur ce qu'on retenoit en Amérique ces chers gallions, le tendre objet de leur convoitise et le fondement de tous leurs vastes et dangereux projets."

Shortly after this, it may be noted, Sinzendorf had an attack of apoplexy. His duties, according to the *Lettres historiques* (lxx. 656), were taken over on 26 November by Pentenriedter.

² Saint-Saphorin, 26 October 1726, R.O. Germany 59. Other disquisitions by him of this date were on the affairs of Portugal, the Austrian succession, Ripperda's revelations, and Richelieu's vagaries. He enclosed copies of dispatches to H. Walpole of 19 October on the last subject and on imperial policy and how it should be met.

³ "Je n'ai garde de les en désabuser." He supposed the report to be the result of a hasty conclusion by Count Harrach, "jeune homme qui peut avoir pris des terreurs paniques."

⁴ Saint-Saphorin, 9 to 23 November, *ibid.*

⁵ H. Walpole, 29 October 1726, with a copy of Fleury's letter, of date the 27th B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

told a friend to be such as would discover whether Fleury was sincere in his desire for peace, or no. It was an offer, Fleury told Walpole, contained in a letter from Sinzendorf full of compliment, to limit, in view of the emperor's desire to prevent a rupture, the number of the Ostend ships, their ports of call, and the character of the merchandise they carried. "The Cardinal immediately told him that he could not give the least attention to a proposal of that nature," made the previous year by San Felipe and rejected by the States-General. On Fonseca's expression of surprise at the contradiction to his reported desire for peace he had asserted the reality of that desire, but that the Ostend Company's charter was an insurmountable obstacle and that France would stand by her engagements to her allies. In fact, says Walpole, "Fonseca being returned from the Cardinal's exprest himself with the greatest inveteracy and rage against him, in having absolutely rejected the said proposition, saying that the Cardinal after all his professions was no more for peace than the rest." Fleury had declared, however, that while the charter could not be suffered to subsist, yet it was not desired to demand "an absolute revocation of it, in a manner that might be offensive to his Imperial Majesty," but rather to leave it to him to save his honour by withdrawing it, or perhaps by transferring the company to Trieste; he was sure that any reasonable expedient to obviate extremities would be accepted. And he had warned Fonseca that it would be of no use for him to speak on the matter to the other ministers, or to Walpole, since all were of one mind about it.

Massei also, Walpole went on, had been approached by his colleague at Vienna, Grimaldi, "who never wrote to him before on this subject," to the same effect, with assertion that it was preferred to negotiate through Fonseca than with Richelieu, because the latter was entirely governed by Saint-Saphorin. But Massei, bringing the proposal before Fleury after Fonseca's failure and at his request, had received answer in identical terms. In spite of this, Fonseca had tried again, whereon Fleury, by his account to Walpole, retorted on the emperor's actions, inimical to peace, on his aspiration to be absolute in Germany, master of all Italy and governor of the north, and on his inadmissible claim for equality of his envoys with the ambassadors of crowned heads. On the subject of the galleons he excused the English action on the ground that it was intended in Spain, if they got home, to melt down all the bullion into coin and to pay the merchants in species of a denomination which would reduce the value of their property to little or nothing. "In short, My Lord, M^r Fonseca obtained nothing by this new attempt, besides provoking the Cardinal

to speak in stronger and more extensive terms than ever he did before with regard to the conduct of the Imperial Court." Walpole reflected that nothing would have influence at Vienna but "certain apprehensions of a war." He found Fonseca to have spoken also to D'Huxelles and Morville, with equal want of success, they told him.¹

Extreme pleasure at Fleury's firmness was expressed from England, seeing, said Newcastle, that to admit any concession in the matter of the Ostend Company would be to depart from the right enjoyed under treaties to ban it absolutely. Soon he could send a copy of a letter from Hamel Bruyninx at Vienna to his colleague in London, confirming "the good effect the spirit lately shewn by the court of France" had had at Vienna.²

After perusal of Saint-Saphorin's dispatches communicated Fleury reaffirmed in a letter to Walpole his old belief that the king, or rather the queen of Spain would embark on an European war without knowing how to get out of it. "Nous voici au 5^{me} acte, c'est à dire au dénouement, et un mois encore de plus éclaircira bien des choses." He disagreed with Saint-Saphorin about the emperor's lack of motive for making war; were he not embarrassed about the means he would have taken up his part long ago, and of the means he must be deprived by putting in force the measures in hand.³ Richelieu on the other hand, as reported by Broglie in London, bore out the desire at Vienna for peace, attributing to Sinzendorf, the principal author of all, dread now of the consequences of his transactions with Ripperda and sincere inclination to bring matters to an accommodation, also desired by the imperial court in general. This Newcastle found hard to reconcile with the duke's account of Prince Eugene's declarations, rendered to Saint-Saphorin; "we must await to see which of these two advices is most to be credited." As evidence of Spanish determination on a rupture he cited the interdict on importation of foreign silk and woollen manufactures, directly contrary to treaties, and Pozobueno's strong letter just received.⁴

¹ The same, to 7 November.

² Newcastle to Walpole, 31 October and 7 November (o.s.), *ibid.* He stated Bruyninx, long at the imperial court and habituated to the old system of alliance with Austria, to be intimate with the ministers, "in much confidence with Prince Eugene and always reckoned in their way of thinking."

³ Fleury to H. Walpole, 26 November, B.M. Add. MS. 32748, copy.

⁴ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 21 November (o.s.), *ibid.* There were two Spanish edicts, the one as above, the other in precaution against introduction of the plague from the Levant. The latter related to vessels which had entered Marseilles or Dutch ports with cargoes from Alexandria, and notified that if the king of Spain had proof of their admittance French British and Dutch trade to his ports would be absolutely forbidden. Says Stanhope: "from the drawing up of that letter one would be apt to think that it (the plague) had acceded to the treaty

In December Saint-Saphorin estimated the whole force, which the emperor could put into the field, at 125,000 men; 92,000 foot, 20,100 cuirassiers, 10,500 dragoons and 2,400 hussars.¹ But only the last, he said, were fully mounted; for the rest of the cavalry horses were from a quarter to a half below requirements. And but few of the troops could really be moved, even were there money for that purpose and to fit them for action. The three infantry regiments in Breisach and Freiburg must stay there, and in case of war be reinforced by a fourth. In Hungary and Transylvania at least twelve of infantry and six of cavalry must be left; Lombardy and Mantua must be secured against the king of Sardinia, who could put 30,000 men into the field; and the forces in Naples and Sicily could not be reduced from fear of a British attack; indeed, to keep those discontented peoples in subjection they must rather be reinforced. The peace establishment in the Netherlands demanded 3,000 men. As to finance, the bank might advance seven or eight million florins, but that was the limit; at best the emperor could get, on loan, money for a single campaign. Anything more, whether for war or to satisfy his treaty engagements, must come from Spain. Military men talked loudly of ravaging Hanover, but the further strengthening of regiments in Hungary appeared to be merely to impress and to get Spanish money, for not a sol was yet expended and supplies were being sought in all parts.²

Now came further proposals from Vienna. On 18 December Fleury imparted to Robinson advice from Richelieu "that the Emperor was seriously disposed to propose a congress and the suspension of the trade of the Ostend Company for two, or three years, during which that affair may be settled among the powers concerned." That, the cardinal observed, would ruin the company. When Robinson recalled all that had passed, the Dutch demand for absolute revocation of the charter and the late declaration to

of Hanover and could be brought hither from no country that was not in the possession of some of the parties to that alliance." Against the other edict, he said, the Council of Castile had strongly protested, everybody looking on it as a kind of declaration of war, while from England the prohibition was termed "a fresh instance of the unjustifiable conduct of Spain towards his Majesty and his allies." Replies to it, said Newcastle, and to the plague ordinance, notified by Pozobueno in a style "agreeable to that used by his court," must await consultation with France and Holland (Stanhope, 4 and 11 November, Newcastle to him, 24 November (o.s.), R.O. Spain 95, 97. A printed copy of the edict, with a French translation, with Stanhope's next dispatch).

¹ In Naples and Sicily 22,514, in Lombardy 14,514, in Flanders 16,871, in the empire (including Austria, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) 20,785, in Hungary 41,469, in Transylvania 8,871; 46 regiments of infantry, 21 of cuirassiers, 11 of dragoons and 4 of hussars.

² Saint-Saphorin, 3 to 18 December, R.O. Germany, Empire, 59.

Fonseca that it presented an unsurmountable difficulty ; when he pointed out how negotiation would but give the emperor breathing-time, while the allies of Hanover exhausted themselves by " constant and great expenses " ; Fleury answered that, were a congress agreed on, fixed times might be appointed for it to begin and end. But he foresaw one difficulty, the certainty that the emperor would demand recall of the British squadron from the West Indies, whereby the Spanish treasure would be enabled to come home, which neither Great Britain nor France could permit, he said, " it being impossible to have a sufficient security that an ill use may not be made of those treasures." An effect, however, which Robinson observed, was that he seemed to see less necessity for haste in carrying out the measures planned. Morville asserted that Richelieu's dispatches contained no great matter, " only that Prince Eugene was more violent than ever and intent upon war, which he would take the execution of upon himself, and answer for the event." ¹

It was replied from England that his Majesty could say little on the subject, accounts being so uncertain. Robinson must thank Fleury for his promise to act in concert and for his firmness in regard to the West Indian blockade. The king was strongly for pressing on the preparations for war. He had sent orders to augment his Hanoverian forces to 20,000, 8,000 beyond the number required under the Danish convention, and these troops, with 4,000 English which he would always have ready to send into Germany, would complete the number under that convention both for his contingent and reserve, leaving the 12,000 Hessians free for succour to the Dutch. Robinson might give the French ministers assurance of this, in any manner most to their satisfaction. ²

At the end of the year Robinson advised that what Richelieu had written about a congress seemed only to refer to the purposely spread report of Count Kinsky going to Paris with a proposition. ³ The subject, Marshal Villars records, was discussed in the Council on 1 January 1727, when it was resolved to await developments. The effect, says he, was " comme l'on dit, mettre l'Angleterre et la Hollande au pied de la mur." ⁴

There was not long to wait. Richelieu had taken upon himself to meet and listen to propositions from the nuncio Grimaldi, independently of Saint-Saphorin and in the presence only of the Dutch envoy, Hamel Bruyninx. The British minister knew

¹ Robinson, 18 December 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

² Newcastle to him, 13 December (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ 30 December, secret, *ibid.*

⁴ *Mémoires*, v. 40, 41.

only, through his friend Di Breglio,¹ that the conference had been held. He indulged in renewed invective against the Austrian ministers and against Richelieu,² expected Kinsky's going to Paris, or no, to depend on the issue of the negotiation, and remarked on the humiliation for the emperor, if he went, after the previous refusal to send an ambassador and the rebuffs administered to Fonseca. Yet, he said again, success would achieve the emperor's aim of separating France from England and enable him to resume the offensive. He did not expect France to be thus trapped and insisted once again that firm measures would reduce the court of Vienna to complete submission.³

Intimation of what was forward came to England first from Robinson, informed, in close secrecy, by Massei's auditor. Grimaldi, he learnt, had written to request Massei to propose, as from himself, the emperor being loth to expose himself to a refusal through Fonseca again, suspension of the Ostend Company's activities for a time, during which might be discussed and decided, by arbitration or otherwise, whether the company's charter was contrary to the treaties of Westphalia or no, the emperor promising to revoke it in the former event and agreeing to stop the sailing of vessels from Ostend during the suspension, on condition that those out were permitted to return in safety. Should the proposal be favourably received Fonseca was to make it in form, but on the further condition that before the suspension were granted, or even discussed, the British squadron should be withdrawn from Puerto Bello and the galleons released. Massei, said the auditor, was sorry to be charged with so disagreeable and unpromising a commission, seeing no difference from what had been so often proposed and as often rejected, and knowing that France would do nothing separately from her allies and had declared, as well as they, that nothing less than absolute revocation of the company's charter would suffice. He claimed to have found Fleury (in Robinson's words) "prepared against this stale and repeated artifice," seeing through the drift of the conditions and resolved to answer as formerly. Robinson took care not to show the least concern, he says, and, discussing the proposals, supposed them to be what had lately been hinted at by Richelieu and talked of as intended for submission by Kinsky.

¹ Whom he supposed to have been let into the secret in order that his master, the king of Sardinia, might be led to believe that accommodation between France and Austria was in prospect.

² "Le Roy n'a pas un plus grand ennemi, ni l'Espagne un plus grand ami, que luy, il s'est mis en tête de faire réussir les mariages. Il nous fait tout le mal qu'il peut, et en France et icy . . . Nous vivons ensemble extérieurement aussi bien que le passé, mais, quoique très babillard, il se cache de moy avec le plus grand soin."

³ Saint-Saphorin, 4 January 1727, R.O. Germany, Empire, 60.

He called to mind what he had written about Fleury's disquietude at report that the Spanish treasure was on its way home. Three days later he reported Boreel, the Dutch ambassador, to have been told that although France "had no other concern but that of an ally in the affair of Ostend," yet no proposals for accommodation would be entertained "till the States had the fullest satisfaction that they could desire."¹

First-hand knowledge of French views was had in London from a dispatch to Broglie, of which private cognisance was taken. Writing on what he termed the incomprehensible news from Spain Morville empowered the ambassador to give assurance that the king of France was ready to stand to his engagements, as might be seen from the last definitive answer sent to Madrid, and to communicate in strict confidence certain reflections on a plan to be formed on that basis. Evidently the court of Vienna had no desire to sustain a war as a principal, but thought only to engage Spain therein with the object of diverting attention from the affair of Ostend and having the blockade of the galleons regarded as the sole cause of war, and consequently the English as the sole authors of it. That aim, it might be believed, would be fulfilled if the allies of Hanover turned all their efforts against Spain, leaving to the emperor the part of an auxiliary only, who might do no more than remit a portion of the subsidies contracted for. He need have no fear of Spain, once ruined by the war, abandoning him; his separate power would not be impaired; nay, the reduction to absolute impotence of a crown always reckoned amongst his natural enemies would magnify it. On these incontestable principles the best advice to be given to the king of England was to confine his action against Spain to rendering Gibraltar impregnable and keeping such close watch as to prohibit any enterprise on behalf of the Pretender, a thing deemed as impracticable as the capture of the fortress, were it well provisioned and defended.

This stated, and noting that the court of Vienna could not ignore the siege of Gibraltar, prompted by itself, Morville went on to the proposals made to Richelieu. They confirmed opinion, he said, that the emperor had no wish to draw upon himself "*le fort de la guerre*," and if he could contrive separate accommodation with the king of France and his allies would care little about leaving Spain in the lurch. The British ministers, therefore, should consider whether they would not join with the king of France and the States-General in negotiation about the Ostend affair, accompanying this mark of goodwill by formal demand for explanation on the part which the emperor would take in the consequences of

¹ Robinson, 8 and 11 January, B.M. Add. MS. 32748.

the attack on Gibraltar, and letting him know that it would be useless, and even a mark of bad faith, to appear to desire conciliation in the matter of Ostend while at the same time sharing directly or indirectly in that attack. One of two things would follow : either the court of Vienna, by admitting part therein, would bring upon itself the reproaches which it had sought to register against France and Great Britain, or, by lending itself to what was proposed, give proof of endeavour to engage Spain in that affair alone. The winter months that must pass before measures of war could be put into execution could be usefully employed in working on the plan suggested, while, as Broglie knew, the great preparations that were expeditiously being carried on enabled such measures to be set in force at any moment.

These observations, Morville concluded, answered most points of the plan which Broglie had transmitted and which comprised many ideas which might be very good, accordingly as conjunctures rendered their execution feasible. It was natural for allies so closely united to exchange views before the time for hostilities arrived, and it was desired extremely that British reflections on the whole matter should be communicated with a view to concerted action.¹

What the Austrian proposals actually were was learnt by Finch at the Hague from a dispatch from Bruyninx, of date 31 December 1726.

(1) A reasonable time to be named for deciding whether the Ostend Company's charter violated treaties, and in particular that of Münster, or no.

(2) Meanwhile its trade to the East Indies to be entirely suspended, save for the return of the ships now out.

(3) Should no decision be reached within the term fixed the same to be extended by common consent, or rights on either side to be resumed.

(4) Were the trade condemned, the emperor would make no difficulty about prohibiting it permanently, in accordance with treaties. The court of Vienna, it was further stated, would have been ready to give all satisfaction that could reasonably be demanded, and even to submit the affair to impartial arbitration and abide by the decision, had not its former proposals so often been rejected.²

Supplementing this information Finch stated Fénelon and himself to have been informed at a conference that Richelieu had declined to forward the proposals to his court unless they were

¹ Morville to Broglie, 9 January, intercepted, R.O. Confidential 1, endorsed as sent to Robinson on 10 January (o.s.).

² Paper sent by Finch on 14 January 1727, R.O. Holland 293. Rousset, in his account of the conference, iii. 386, takes evidently from Bruyninx' report.

delivered to him in the presence and with the knowledge of Bruyninx, who stated further that he had taken them down himself from Grimaldi's dictation, after which they had been put into Richelieu's hands for communication in the first place to Paris, and afterwards to his Majesty and the States-General. The deputies, said Finch, "seem'd to have no mind to give a direct answer in form to what has come to them in so particular a way" and had made known their sentiments in conversation as follows. The proposals were not acceptable without elucidation. Examination of the legality of the charter was useless, arguments having already been exhausted and exacerbation rather than accord being likely to result. All the company's ships but two were already in the Indian seas or on the voyage thither, and those two would have sailed before the proposals were agreed to, so that there would be no suspension of the trade but safe-conduct of it, enabling the ships to return more richly laden. To prolong the term would be but to prolong uncertainty. The emperor had never shown any disposition to submit the dispute to arbitration, which, moreover, would compromise a right sufficiently established.¹

The British verdict was equally uncompromising. Sending Finch a copy of Robinson's dispatch Townshend described the proposals as "a captious offer, no way satisfactory or explicate, and contrary to the notions we have gone upon with respect to the Ostend trade, which, as we have all along understood, ought to be entirely abolished." Undoubtedly the States would unhesitatingly reject this "poor artifice to create jealousies among the allies." It being known that Grimaldi had insisted on Saint-Saphorin's exclusion from the conferences, and since such treatment ought not to be passed over, it was hoped that Bruyninx might have orders always to act in concert with his British colleague and to attend no conferences, especially on matters of joint interest, at which the latter was not present.²

Like answer was returned to Broglie, when he communicated the proposals. His Majesty, said Newcastle, had hardly expected to be desired to examine the foundation of rights so clearly established. And not only were the proposals unreasonable, the manner of presenting them was most peculiar; his Majesty's minister excluded from the conferences to show resentment against a man, who had made himself disliked only because of his diligence and success in discovering designs. The king was astonished that Richelieu should have acted as he had, after the orders sent him, and the fact that the Dutch minister was made a party heightened

¹ Finch, 17 January, *ibid.* Rousset, p. 387.

² Townshend to him, 6 January (o.s.), *ibid.*

the insult. The court of Vienna knew, indeed, that he was devoted to its interests. After which Newcastle proceeded to argue at great length on Morville's suggestion of bringing Gibraltar into the negotiation and on the proper and certainly successful means of forcing the emperor and Spain to reason. Robinson at the same time, furnished with a copy of the above, was desired to intimate to Fleury how highly dissatisfied his Majesty was with Richelieu's conduct, both in acting separately from Saint-Saphorin and "in making it his constant endeavour to prevent, as far as he can, the success of our negotiations that are depending in all the courts of Europe."¹

On 29 January Robinson advised that Morville disclaimed all idea of meeting Grimaldi's propositions; the answer given was that France must consult her allies and that opinion on the insufficiency of the proposals had already been expressed. On Richelieu's conduct, however, while admitting him "highly to blame," Morville distinguished the point, whether he ought to have refused to hear Grimaldi or to have reported to Saint-Saphorin. It was best, he thought, to receive the proposals, and thereby, while rejecting them as insufficient, to show the world that the allies of Hanover were not intractable.² Later it was mildly hinted that some blame attached to Saint-Saphorin for not paying due regard to Richelieu's dignity but treating him in the same manner as Du Bourg: "exercising as hard an empire over the one, as he had done over the other." Fleury promised to renew in the most positive manner the orders sent, in the hope that Saint-Saphorin might be easier with him. Robinson did not see his way to ask for the duke's recall.³

Another count against Saint-Saphorin was a story of his of specific offers made by Austria to France. Says Robinson:

The Cardinal received with much offense the accounts of the Nuncio's having insinuated as if the Emperor was disposed to deliver Luxemburg to the French, and to procure to them the same advantages in commerce to the West Indies, as were granted to the English by the peace of Utrecht. The Cardinal assured me, in the most solemn manner, that nothing like it had been hinted to him either directly or indirectly, and I think it was for the first time in my life that ever I saw him shew any degree of passion, or anger, which he could not contain when M^r de S. Saphorin assures that he has those advices from a good hand.⁴

¹ Newcastle to Broglie, 10 January (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Ministers 5, rough drafts, and to Robinson, same date, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

² Robinson, 29 January, *ibid.*

³ The same, 19 and 20 February, with much more to the same effect.

⁴ The same, 4 February, Saint-Saphorin's advice was of date 18 January. Later (10 February) he remarked that although the French held Thionville and Saarlouis it was on that frontier that they were most vulnerable, so long as the emperor had Luxemburg.

The resolutions of the States-General on the Austrian proposals were sent by Finch on 14 February. There was endless verbiage on the praiseworthiness of and gratitude for Grimaldi's efforts to make peace, the equal desire for it in Holland, and the great respect for the imperial court there entertained. Bruyninx' conduct was approved and he was desired to see Grimaldi, whether at Richelieu's house or elsewhere, and render him thanks. The conclusion, however, was that the proposals were unacceptable, at least without wide explanation; the question of trade to the Indies was one on which the good or ill fortune of the republic depended; and the allies of the States-General were of the same sentiments.¹

This did not please in England. Exception was taken to the commendation of Bruyninx and to the new orders given him to see Grimaldi, again without Saint-Saphorin; and hope was expressed that he would be instructed for the future not to enter into such conferences separately. Finch, however, was ordered not to raise noise about the matter but to "insinuate to our three friends that it would have been a mark of union and of a strict concert to have taken notice of that particular behaviour at Vienna, since that court makes use of such incidents to deceive people, and to spread reports as if France and Holland were inclined to act without England, who must follow their resolutions."²

Saint-Saphorin had continued to insist that the emperor could not make war unless the Spanish galleons got home; money advanced by the Genoese on assignments from Spain sufficed but to remount the cavalry, and the proposed augmentation of the army stayed.³ He advised, in case of war, that frigates should close the port of Genoa, for the Genoese were serving the emperor better than if they had acceded to the treaty of Vienna. As to present feeling the court certainly regretted having carried things so far, for either war must be entered on for the sake of Spain or confession made of gross deception, of only money and other advantages sought. It looked as though, while still endeavouring to get as much money as possible, the Austrians would abandon Spain, if otherwise war could not be avoided. Sinzendorf, when told by Tarouca of the Spanish preparations to attack Gibraltar, had exclaimed in perturbation "il n'y a pas moyen de retenir l'impétuosité de cette femme extravagante, qui dérange tout par son opiniâtreté." He had had violent altercation with Prince Eugene

¹ R.O. Holland 293.

² Tilson to Finch, 7 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Particulars of this second augmentation of each regiment by about one-half, *Lettres historiques*, lxxi. 165, cited (p. 597).

and Vice-chancellor Schönborn, who would carry matters to extremities, for he foresaw the dangerous consequences of war and feared it mortally. Old Count Starhemberg stood aloof and raised difficulties, fulfilment of which should prove his prescience, while Pentenriedter made court to all. One doing much to embroil matters was Count Windischgrätz, in great favour with the emperor but hated and despised by every one else; he had frequent audiences, submitted projects and conducted private negotiations, inspiring belief that he could do more than any one to divide the allies of Hanover. Yet Saint-Saphorin was convinced that the only two in the emperor's true secret were Sinzendorf and the marquis de Rialp.¹

When the French answer reached Vienna Saint-Saphorin perceived it to give, or to be feigned to give, great joy. He was cognisant of further long conferences of Richelieu with Sinzendorf, Grimaldi, and the newly arrived Spanish ambassador, the duke of Bournonville; "ils se firent réciproquement des grandes amitiés." Richelieu he once more asserted to be given over to Austria and Spain completely, and friends to be alarmed to the last point. Possibly the French court might be playing to put the emperor to sleep, but the harm done in the empire and elsewhere was inconceivable. There was as little readiness for war now, as when he had written on 3 December, and no "homme sensé" at Vienna who did not realise its dangers. Augmentation of the army was, indeed, resolved on, and preparations were being urged forward, but they could not be completed that summer. The cavalry was fairly good, but the infantry in entire want of training and discipline. The empire would not take part in a war that did not concern it. It was not known how the king of Sardinia would act, and the Milanese was badly defended. The elector of Bavaria could not be relied on, the Russian help, so greatly hoped for, might fail, and

¹ Saint-Saphorin, 31 December 1726 and 4 January 1727, R.O. Germany, Empire, 60. Syveton (p. 242), no doubt on good authority, makes it principally Eugene and Starhemberg who advocated accommodation with the allies of Hanover, saving only the emperor's honour, but with Saint-Saphorin it was Eugene who fulminated war, Sinzendorf who, repentant of his authorship of the unhappy treaties of Vienna and of his advocacy of close alliance with Spain as the sure way to make his master the arbiter and dictator of Europe, was the strongest for peace, "celuy de tous qui craint le plus la guerre." And so also Richelieu, as cited. Certainly Eugene, in his letters to Seckendorf, was emphatic on the readiness of Austria for war, but that may have been only for the purpose of impressing Frederick William of Prussia.

Charles VI himself Saint-Saphorin sets down as sensible to all that was said about his glory and interest and desirous of a reputation for firmness, but yet always undecided on a final resolution, even when no dangerous consequences threatened, and always listening to the last speaker ("Relation Générale" of 10 February 1727, *ibid.*).

as a probable consequence the Prussian also. The clients of Prince Eugene were boasting that at the head of an imperial army he would carry all before him, but others remembered how after the British desertion in 1712 he had failed to stand against France alone. What Saint-Saphorin expected was for the present year plenty of negotiation and illusory propositions, intended to sow distrust among the allies of Hanover, while preparations went on, by the help of money from Spain, for war in the next in quite a different fashion. He advised pushing on the war with Spain energetically by land and sea, and so forcing the emperor either to take part in an alien and hopeless quarrel or else to discover to Spain his nakedness and want of faith, with the consequence of a breach.¹

On 31 January George Woodward arrived at Vienna as secretary of legation and with the news of the rupture with Spain.² Continuing now his unfinished "*Relation Générale*," cited, Saint-Saphorin could only set down the present "*détours et subterfuges*" of the court as a new and decided proof of obliquity. Why were overtures not made directly, he asked, instead of through so suspicious a channel as the nuncio? He was not surprised at the great care taken to keep the affair secret from himself, having so often been tried without success, but the result was that his Majesty's minister was treated as no longer of significance. And he was losing, he said, his two chief confidants, Tarouca and Di Breglio. Having been led to suspect the former, ministers made him now few confidences, while for the latter matters were so turning at his court that little hope remained of making use of him. There would soon be new propositions. Richelieu after the arrival of a courier from Paris on 28 January had had long conferences with Sinzendorf, and on the evening of 2 February Bruyninx had met Grimaldi at Richelieu's house again. The affair was kept just as private from Kalkoen (passing on his way as Dutch ambassador to the sultan) as from himself. The very same afternoon Bruyninx had endeavoured to excuse his former conduct on the plea that he had found himself at Richelieu's house by accident, when Grimaldi came in, but he had said no word of going there in the evening again. Saint-Saphorin knew well that France and Holland would hold firm, but the mischief was that it was being given out in the empire that George I was being deserted by his allies. In a secret letter he wrote that he had learnt most of the particulars of

¹ The same, 25 January, and in the earlier part (written before date) of his great "*Relation Générale*," just cited.

² Credentials dated 1 November (o.s.) 1726, R.O. Royal Letters 10, King's Letters 3. Says Saint-Saphorin of him: "*Plût à Dieu qu'un homme aussi doux qu'il le paroît estre, et qui a une si grande envie de bien faire, eût été envoyé icy déjà depuis 3 ou 4 ans.*"

Grimaldi's negotiation from the ambassador of Venice, who by his submissive conduct had earned the confidence of the ministers, of the nuncio, and of Richelieu, but yet was a Venetian and so could wish for nothing better than to see the emperor's affairs embarrassed.¹

It was replied, and repeated, that Saint-Saphorin might make himself quite easy ; the French court was absolutely to be depended upon ; Richelieu had transgressed his instructions and was ordered for the future to communicate everything.²

The next news from Robinson was of Massei, "as he has informed me himself," expecting new and very satisfactory proposals and seeming by his way of talking assured that the emperor would revoke the Ostend Company's charter. A week later he sent information to be used with the "greatest management" for the safety of the person who gave it (the auditor). This was that a courier, leaving Vienna on 5 February, had arrived at Paris late at night on the 13th with letters for Fonseca and Massei and from the duke of Bournonville for Madrid. Massei was empowered to propose, and had proposed, suspension of the Ostend Company's activities

¹ Together with this "Relation Générale" Saint-Saphorin sent on 10 February other long disquisitions on Richelieu's conduct and again on the affairs of Portugal, with several letters, one of which, a private one to Townshend, contained piteous supplications for relief from his painful position. "Mon séjour à Vienne," he wrote, "si ruineux a ma santé, et en tous tems si désagréable pour moy, va être entièrement inutile au service de Sa Ma^{té}. . . . Au nom de Dieu, My Lord, ayés la bonté pour moy d'employer vos puissans offices pour me tirer d'icy. . . . A la vérité je suis dans une situation du monde la plus embarrassante, et la plus triste, accablé d'infirmités, et de telle manière que je n'ay pu expédier Smith qu'en y travaillant per intervalles, et toujours anéanti par une attaque de nerfs, la plus violente que j'ay jamais eue ; entourré de tous côtés de gens qui me tendent tous les pièges possibles, quasi plus accablé encore par les inquiétudes d'une famille éplorée, qui voyant la pitiable état de ma santé, et combien le travail et les traverses achèvent de la ruiner totalement, me persécute a fin que je sorte d'un endroit qu'elle voit qui m'est si destructif."

Bruyninx Saint-Saphorin described as loyal to his masters, "mais comme il a un esprit très borné, et qu'il a été proprement élevé à cette cour, il n'a jamais pu revenir des préventions qu'il a conçues en sa faveur." Moreover he had obtained for his son-in-law expectative appointment as imperial resident at Augsburg. Woodward gives an account of the Dutch envoy's interview with Saint-Saphorin and Kalkoen, which he attended. "The poor old man has naturally a trembling upon him, and I fancy 'twas stronger than ordinary, for surely he was thoroughly roasted." And previously (3 December 1726) : "Pas un mauvais homme, mais à qui on ne peut rien confier, et qui, ayant été élève dans l'amour pour cette cour et dans la haine pour la France, n'a pas encore pu se résoudre à quitter ses anciens principes."

² Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 3, 14 and 21 February (o.s.), *ibid.* "Je vous prie instamment de ne vous inquiéter point au sujet des manoeuvres du duc de Richelieu, car la France agit entièrement à la satisfaction du Roy. . . . J'ay à vous prier encore très instamment de passer par dessus tout ce qui est arrivé de désagréable et de vous remettre avec ce duc, du moins en apparence et pour le dehors, dans une amitié et une confiance telle qui conviendrait à des ministres dont les maîtres vivent dans l'union la plus parfaite."

for two years and the calling of a congress, as before, but first preliminaries to be agreed at Paris and afterwards signed at Vienna, where only ministers of all the four powers interested were residing. Fonseca to have an interview on Monday, after which he would send a courier to Madrid to obtain the king of Spain's consent; and Aldobrandini to inform Massei of the result. To which Fleury's answer had been that he would at once communicate the proposal to the allies of France, "without whom nothing could be said or done," and that the king of Spain's reply must also be awaited. On Fonseca's hint, that suspension of the company for three years might be allowed, the cardinal had said that not less than ten would suffice, even supposing that anything less could be accepted than complete revocation of the charter.¹

The proposals, having been considered in the Council on 15 February,² were communicated to Robinson as "extracts of letters of the 2nd instant from the Nuntio at Vienna to the French Nuntio." He reported them as follows.

(1) The operations of the Ostend Company to be suspended for two years.

(2) During that time the emperor's right to establish and maintain the company to be examined at a congress.

(3) The place for such congress to be Basle, Nancy, or (preferably) Aix-la-Chapelle.

(4) Before the congress preliminary agreement to be signed for

(a) the safe return of the Ostend ships on voyage,

(b) the same of the Spanish treasure-ships in the West Indies,

(c) recall of the British squadrons from the American and Spanish coasts; no ships of France or Holland to be sent in their place.

(5) France and Spain to mediate between Great Britain and Holland and the emperor.

(6) The emperor and France similarly between Great Britain and Spain.

(7) As a necessary preliminary to their joint mediation France to be reconciled with Spain, for which purpose the emperor proffered his good offices.

(8) The emperor to inform himself of the king of Spain's intentions as to raising the siege of Gibraltar.

¹ Robinson, 8 and 16 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

² Villars' *Mémoires*, v. 46. He advised acceptance of five years' suspension, to give time for rehabilitation of French finances, but foresaw that the English would not consent. The Dutch, he learnt, wanted 20 years, while Fonseca averred that even to ask for six or seven would mean a declared rupture.

This, says Robinson, "upon a single perusal is the best account that I can give of this proposal." Fonseca, he goes on, having had audiences of Fleury and Morville, was told only that the sentiments of the allies must be awaited. When, much concerned, he had asked for private opinions of the ministers, which he might forward to Spain, they gave them to the effect that the proposals were inadmissible and, as regarded the mediation, could hardly be serious. Yet they told Robinson that, in his words, "it was their opinion, that however trifling loose and exceptionable this proposal might be, yet the formal answer to be given to it should not be such as might shew an absolute and determined unwillingness to come to any accomodation at all," for such an answer the emperor could publish in the empire and demand the assistance of princes as much threatened as he was himself. "To obviate this and other pretexts, M. de Morville said, it was now time for the allys to speak for themselves, and concert some *Ultimatum* with one another, to be demanded of the Emperor as what they would have and would be contented with nothing less." Robinson thought him "grown sanguine enough to resume his former way of thinking, that the engagements between Spain and the Emperor can subsist no longer."¹ Forwarding the proposals to Stanhope at Madrid he stated that Fleury had doubted whether to leave him to inform the marquis de la Roche, or himself to hand them "in a careless unaffected manner" to Montgon, now at Paris, who would be sure to forward them by the next post.²

Montgon had been expected at Paris in the previous September, when Horatio Walpole had promised to be "very curious and watchfull" of his doings while under no apprehension from them, being fully persuaded of French sincerity.³ He actually appeared on 30 January 1727. Besides his principal mission from the sovereigns of Spain,—a secret intrigue concerning the succession to the throne of France, into which we need not enter⁴—he had at the last moment been charged with proposals for reconciliation. He carried a memorial on the subject, which he was to present to Fleury under seal of confession, while a letter to himself set out the readiness of Philip V to forget the past and renew friendship with France, provided that no support were given to England in the war and that Louis XV consented at last to alliance with the

¹ Robinson, 19 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

² The same, 23 February.

³ H. Walpole, 17 September 1726, *ibid* 32747.

⁴ See fully Baudrillart, iii. 276-312, Coxe, *Horatio Lord Walpole*, pp. 143-6, both taking from Montgon's Memoirs; also Armstrong, pp. 211-4, who notes the incentive of the dangerous illness of Louis XV towards the end of 1726.

emperor. That the latter was willing, it was said, was positively known. Both these papers were at least drafted by queen Elizabeth in her own hand.¹

Fleury kept the secret of Montgon's mission to himself, telling other members of the Council that the abbé spoke in none but general terms.² Morville assured Robinson that he had no commission or instructions, but that his advices seemed to confirm those already received of the king of Spain's "violent suspicions and jealousies of the Imperial court."³ On this Robinson had much to say in a later dispatch, from which the following may be quoted.

I am apt to believe that here they, as well as from the eagerness of their hopes as from the many tokens of their Catholick Majesties being displeased at the behaviour of the Emperor, doe certainly flatter themselves that things may take a new and sudden turn at Madrid, where it was not long ago no less than treason not to extol and adore the Emperor's ambassador, but now the queen herself can suffer and even encourage those about her to rally and ridicule that minister.⁴

It suited Fleury to meet Elizabeth's overtures amicably, although he must have distrusted her envoy. He replied on 11 February with explanations similar to those advanced before and with strong promises to restore relations to the footing on which they had stood in the time of Louis XIV.⁵

At about the same time with this letter came to Madrid Bournonville's report of the last Austrian proposals. Thereon Philip V promised to raise the siege of Gibraltar, given the guarantees of Charles VI and Louis XV that the English would cease from all hostilities on their side, and provided that nothing in the treaty of Vienna were changed.⁶ Elizabeth sent to Fleury at the same time a letter couched in the most friendly terms, and Philip added to it a postscript in his own hand.⁷ The answer, however, set

¹ See Syveton, p. 245, Baudrillart (with the story of Montgon's interviews with Fleury), iii, 313-8; the letter to Montgon, of date 6 January, in full, p. 566. It may be true that the overtures were prompted by knowledge of what was passing at Vienna, confided, perhaps, by Fleury, but the imperial rescript on the subject of 21 December, cited by Syveton, cannot have reached Madrid before Montgon left (8 January).

² Villars, *Mémoires*, v. 44.

³ Robinson, 4 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32749. On the 26th, in spite of most confident reports of Montgon having brought letters for the king Fleury and Mme. de Ventadour, he was still "assured from the best hands" that the abbé had not brought one (R.O. France 185).

⁴ The same, 11 February, cf. Armstrong, p. 215.

⁵ Baudrillart, iii. 318, the letter, with its interesting sketch of the character of Louis XV, partly quoted.

⁶ De la Paz to Aldobrandini, 25 February, cited by Baudrillart, iii. 320.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 321, the letter in full, pp. 567-570. Syveton writes (p. 345): "Elisabeth Farnèse se souciait peu d'interrompre brusquement une guerre qu'elle

out the reasons for rejection of the Austrian proposals and the ill consequences of the attack upon Gibraltar.¹

On the same date Horatio Walpole wrote of private word from Massei's auditor of letters from Aldobrandini received on 6 March. Included was that from De la Paz to Aldobrandini noticed. This, when Walpole saw Fleury the next day, the cardinal showed him, and after joint perusal desired him "in the first place to assure his Majesty and his ministers that what is therein asserted, as if the last propositions from Vienna had been previously adjusted between him and the Nuntio here, as a proper means for coming to a general pacification, was without the least foundation of truth." It was evident, Walpole commented, that the affair had been set out by the Austrians to Madrid in a manner to dispel jealousy or mistrust, but Massei was writing thither and to Vienna to undeceive, and on the arrival of Fonseca's courier with the actual propositions a different feeling might be roused. Massei was letting Aldobrandini know that Fleury, so far from having been the author of them, "had thought them by no means reasonable or satisfactory," while Fonseca had advised Königsegg to like effect, and his home government that there was no hope of France doing anything but in concert with her allies.²

avait cherchée et dont elle se promettait la réalisation de ses plus chères espérances. Si elle eût agi avec franchise, elle eût décliné tout arrangement. Mais elle craignait par-dessus tout de déplaire à la cour de Vienne, et elle n'osa pas. Elle jugea que le mieux était d'accepter la négociation et de la faire échouer. Son docile époux déclara donc à Koenigsegg qu'il était prêt à prendre part aux pourparlers."

¹ Fleury to the queen of Spain, 10 March. *ibid.* pp. 322-3.

² H. Walpole, 10 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32749, a copy of the letter from De la Paz enclosed.

CHAPTER XL

RUPTURE WITH EMPEROR AND EMPIRE

DISCREDITING alike the sincerity and the utility of these peace proposals, seeing Spain actually preparing to attack Gibraltar and convinced of Austrian complicity therein, and believing all that Saint-Saphorin affirmed and Ripperda had disclosed, the British government deemed it necessary, in view of the approaching session of parliament, to rouse the nation to a sense of danger impending. Just when parliament was about to meet on 10 January (o.s.) 1727 was published to order, from the forcible pen of Benjamin Hoadly, bishop of Salisbury, *An Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain with Relation to the Present State of Europe*, a virulent indictment of the proceedings and intentions of the allies of Vienna. Other pamphlets followed,¹ the principal documents of the correspondence with Spain, ending with Pozobueno's final memorial, were also put in print, and passages in the King's Speech ran as follows :

I acquainted you last year with the treaties of peace and commerce concluded between the Emperor and the king of Spain ; as that sudden and unaccountable conjunction gave at the first appearance just grounds of jealousy and apprehension to the neighbouring powers of Europe, the subsequent proceedings and transactions in those two courts, and the secret and offensive alliances concluded between them about the same time, have laid the foundations of a most exorbitant and formidable power and are so directly levelled against the most valuable and darling interests and privileges of this nation, that we must determine either tamely to submit to the peremptory and unjust demands of the king of Spain, in giving up Gibraltar, and patiently to acquiesce in the Emperor's usurped and extended exercise of trade and commerce, or

¹ Such as *The Evident Approach to a War and Something of the Necessity of it, in order to establish Peace and preserve Trade*, with a plan of Gibraltar, the second edition published on 2 February (o.s.) ; *The Evident Advantages to Great Britain and its Allies from the approaching War, especially in matters of Trade*, with plans of Puerto Bello and Havana, also published in February ; *Great Britain's speediest Sinking Fund is a powerful Maritime War, rightly manag'd, and especially in the West Indies* ; and *The True Interest of the Hanover Treaty consider'd, and how far France, and the rest of the Allies, may be depended upon*. The last, dedicated to Horatio Walpole, praised the accuracy and exhaustiveness of that "excellent performance," the *Enquiry*.

must resolve to be in a condition to do ourselves justice and to defend our undoubted rights against these reciprocal engagements entered into in defiance and violation of all national faith and the most solemn treaties.

I have likewise received information from different parts, on which I can entirely depend, that the placing the Pretender upon the throne of this kingdom is one of the articles of the secret engagements ; and if time shall evince that the giving up the trade of this nation to one power, and Gibraltar and Port Mahon to another, is made the price and reward of imposing upon this kingdom a Popish Pretender, what an indignation must this raise in the breast of every Protestant Briton !

Nor were these fatal combinations confined to those parts of the world alone, but they extended themselves into Russia ; and had not the designs of that court against some of their neighbours been prevented by the seasonable arrival of Our fleet in those seas, a way had been opened for the invading these kingdoms and giving a powerful assistance to any attempt to be made from other quarters.

After which were brought to notice the augmentation of the French and Dutch forces, the accession of the States-General to the treaty of Hanover, the proximate accession of Sweden and the advanced state of the negotiation with Denmark, the breach with Spain, Pozobueno's memorial, " little short of a declaration of war," the demand for the recall of the West Indian squadron, and the preparations for attack upon Gibraltar. And then :

The certain and undoubted intelligence I have that it is now resolved to attempt an invasion upon these kingdoms in favour of the Pretender by an embarkation from the coasts of Spain gives Me reason to believe that, tho' the siege of Gibraltar may probably be undertaken, the publick avow'd and immense preparations made for that purpose are chiefly calculated to amuse the world and to disguise the intended invasion, which, I am surely informed, has been for some time agreed to be the first step and beginning of the long pre-meditated rupture. . . . If preserving a due balance of power in Europe, if defending the possessions of the crown of Great Britain, of infinite advantage and security to our trade and commerce, if supporting that trade and commerce against dangerous and unlawful encroachments, and if the present establishment, the religion liberties and properties of a protestant people, are any longer considerations worthy of the care and attention of a British parliament, I need say no more to incite My loyal and faithful houses of parliament to exert themselves in the defence of all that is dear and valuable to them.¹

As the result of all this Newcastle was able to report the Lords' address " passed with the greatest unanimity imaginable," the few who usually opposed " intirely concurring," and an amendment in

¹ *London Gazette*, and elsewhere, as, with long abstracts of the publications, in the *Political State of Great Britain*, vol. xxxiii. It is definitely stated there that the *Enquiry* was published to prepare men's minds in anticipation of the opening of parliament and that it was founded on Horatio Walpole's speech in the Commons of 17 February (o.s.) 1726.

the Commons rejected by 251 votes to 81. And when the debates on the army came on he could write of majorities almost unprecedented; "nothing was ever more popular than what his Ma^{ty}. is doing"; despite the menace of war stocks were rising and confidence the universal note.¹ Addresses from all parts of the country confirmed this optimism. Well might Marshal Villars set down in his Memoirs:

L'on ne pouvoit douter que les Anglois ne fussent déterminés à la guerre, suivant un premier principe de profiter de la division de la France et de l'Espagne pour se rendre maîtres du commerce général du monde, faisant céder tout autre intérêt, même ceux de leur roi en Allemagne, à ce premier objet.

The *Enquiry* met with enthusiastic praise from the friends of the government and bitter ridicule from its opponents. Newcastle wrote: "It has given great satisfaction to every body here and has had a very good effect." Robinson had promised from Morville and D'Huxelles to have it translated.² Du Bourgay set "two of the ablest pens at Berlin" to translate "that excellent piece of work" into French and German.³ On the other side the *Craftsman* chose to treat the pamphlet as a satire, a "servile imitation" of Cervantes, Rabelais or Swift, "better intitled *Don Quixote in Politics*, the reflections of *Pantagruel* on the present state of affairs, or *Gulliver* turned *Statesman*, . . . a collection of the most palpable *falsehoods*, *absurdities* and *contradictions*" published "in a grave and serious manner, with the same solemn grimace and repeated professions of *truth* and *simplicity*." ⁴

At the courts impugned indignation was intense. Catherine I declared in form through her ministers at Paris and the Hague that

¹ Newcastle to Robinson, 17 January (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32749, to Stanhope, 17 and 26 January (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97, and elsewhere. Particulars of the proceedings in the *Parliamentary History*, etc.

² Says he: "I liked it extremely in reading, the more so that with two hours reading any body may grow as wise as I have been endeavouring to be in two years. But it is no small commendation of our masters, that they can let all the world into the true mystery of their conduct." He recommended printing it piece-meal in the *Amsterdam Gazette*; "the paper is a Gospel, or at least the only one to be found in this country, and the few who trouble their heads for politicks dip for it there." And later, when he saw the work "creeping out piece by piece" therein, he was confident that "it will and must have a wonderful effect everywhere" (30 January, 5 and 11 February, R.O. France 185).

³ Du Bourgay, 8 February, R.O. Prussia 22. Also may be cited secretary Poley from the Hague, when sending copies of the French translation, *Recherche des Motifs*, etc. "We, on this side of the water, imagined so able a piece as the *Enquiry* into the Reasons of &c. would immediately have jumped into a French dress in England, which fits very well upon it. The piece is in great credit here; I see the scribblers have been nibbling at it, but their attacks will be to as little purpose, I know, as the viper's on the file or the Spaniards on Gibraltar" (to Tilson, 18 February, R.O. Holland 293).

⁴ *The Craftsman*, No. 14, 20 January (o.s.) 1727. The next number descanted on the dangers to which war would expose trade with Spain, export of woollen manufactures to the north, and the general prosperity of the community.

she had never taken engagements with the Pretender and that assertion thereof by the English ministers was pure calumny.¹ Palm, sending a copy of the pamphlet to Vienna, stated the work to be published by government and a collection of all the false accusations against the emperor the king of Spain and the tsaritsa that could be devised.² Charles VI, for his part, saw his "höchste Würde und Ehre verletzt," condemned the entirely groundless imputations as inventions designed to provoke a war, and stated his intention of bringing the matter before the diet with the view of exacting from the king of England just and adequate reparation. Sinzendorf, sending to Berlin for Frederick William I to see a copy of the memorial which Palm was to present in answer, said that it was to be distributed to all ministers abroad for publication as soon as that was done. Seckendorf, he said, would understand how sore was their master's personal wound. Were not the electors and states of the empire bound by their homage to resent the insult to their head? He must dispose the king of Prussia, if possible, to give his vote accordingly, as was his duty.³ Also, to prove the falsity of the accusations made, the private "Foedus Amicitiae" of 30 April 1725, really public property for some time past,⁴ was now put into print and published. Not, however, the most secret treaty of November 1725, for that would have confessed the marriage-contracts. The effect was to confirm belief in some such further compact.

Frederick William did not see his way to comply. Recognising the insult, he failed to perceive how satisfaction was to be had. To give his vote in the diet for impeachment would seriously embarrass him, he intimated; the protestant body could not permit Hanover and Cassel to be completely despoiled. They might easily be brought to reason, but could not be handed over to the mercy of the catholics. He would await the king of England's answer to his letter.⁵ Then again, when news came of the expulsion of Palm from England, Frederick William expressed to Seckendorf the hope that the emperor would not immediately attack Hanover but first bring the affair before the diet. For otherwise he himself and all protestant princes might suppose that the orders sent to Palm, to present and publish his memorial, intentionally purposed his

¹ Copy of prince Kurakin's declaration with Robinson's dispatch of 8 February, R.O. France 185; that of Golovkin, Dayrolle, 21 February, R.O. Holland 295.

² To Sinzendorf, 31 January, Förster, *Die Höfe und Cabinette Europa's*, i. Urkundenbuch, p. 47.

³ Charles VI and Sinzendorf to Seckendorf at Berlin, 22 and 25 February, Förster, *Friedrich Wilhelm I*, Nachträge, pp. 380-1.

⁴ Wich had sent a copy from Hamburg on 17 January, saying that it was well known (R.O. Hamburg 44).

⁵ Seckendorf to Eugene, 8 and 12 March, *ibid.* pp. 383-5.

dismissal. He would be the first to support constitutional action by the diet against Hanover, but prayed for careful circumspection in so important an affair. Seckendorf doubted his holding to his resolution to support the emperor at Ratisbon, seeing that Ilgen would certainly oppose; wont to change his mind several times in a day, he was not to be depended on, and it would be good if the Russian troops came on, for he was afraid of them.¹

Palm presented the memorial mentioned on 13 March and at the same time, as ordered, published in print both it and an accompanying letter from Sinzendorf. In that, as translated into English, "the unwarrantable inferences and pretences," the manifest falsehoods of the King's Speech and the *Enquiry*, were stigmatised as having "no purpose but to excite the nation to a rupture and open war with the Emperor and with Spain and to make the parliament approve the precipitate and burthensome measures which the government has taken for private ends, but too well known." Publication both of this letter and of the memorial were ordered, in order that "the whole nation may be acquainted with it, whilst answers are preparing to certain pamphlets publish'd before the opening of parliament. . . . I have the Emperor's express orders to write this to you in his name, that you may be able to destroy the falsehoods and calumnies which have been charged on the high contracting partys of the treaty of Vienna, who have no other view but of making peace between themselves without hurting any one else."

This breach of diplomatic privilege brought about a step which the violence of the language used might have justified alone. Palm was ordered to quit the kingdom without delay. Indignation at his action was universal; when, on request, a copy of his memorial was laid before parliament members of the opposition in the Commons were as loud in condemnation of it as were the supporters of the government. A joint address of the two Houses in that sense was agreed on 26 March.²

¹ The same to Sinzendorf and to Eugene, 29 March and 1 April, Förster, *Die Höfe und Cabinette Europa's*, i. Urkundenbuch, pp. 67-69.

² The documents, *Political State of Great Britain*, xxxiii. 299 ff., 343 ff., and elsewhere. Broglie had reported on 20 March: "L'aigreur qu'a causé icy la lettre du C^{te} Sinzendorf et le mémoire de l'Emp^r présenté par le Sr de Palm est si grande, qu'il y a lieu de croire que si le roy d'Ang^{te} avoit voulu mettre devant la Chambre des Communes ces deux pièces, elle les auroit fait brûler par la main du bourreau, du moins, plusieurs de ses membres disent publiquement que ce seroit leur sentiment, mais S.M. B^e, plus sage et plus modéré, n'a voulu rien faire jusqu'à ce qu'elle sceut celuy de Sa Maj^{te} sur cette affaire, et a fait dire à ses Chambres qu'aussitôt qu'elle l'auroit receu elle ne manqueroit pas de leur faire savoir ses intentions. Jusques à ce temps les membres ne pourront rien agiter par ce que selon l'usage il faut une communication préalable de la part de ce prince, et je crois que le party qu'il a pris est le plus convenable pour pouvoir parvenir à une conciliation générale" (R.O. Confidential 1, intercepted).

Reprisal at Vienna followed quickly. On 3 April, pending receipt of Palm's official report, Saint-Saphorin and Woodward received notice not to appear at court nor to visit the ministers. Palm's dispatch came in on the 5th, and on the night of the 8th, says Woodward, the Court Marshal's secretary came to acquaint Saint-Saphorin "in a very rude manner" ¹ . . . that he and all his family should quit Vienna within twice 24 hours and within three weeks his territories and the empire, and not stop anywhere, which they repeated several times, as also the secretary; M^r St. Saphorin asked if they meant his secretary; no, they said, the King's secretary who is here and had notice to prepare himself. Then addressing themselves to me in French, You, Sir, must be gone." A decree presented Saint-Saphorin refused to receive, as improper, and it was left on his table.

Actually, by official negligence or adherence to form, the notices to leave were addressed to Saint-Saphorin and Charles Harrison, who had quitted Vienna eight months before but without an audience of leave or recredentials.² Woodward had been presented to Sinzendorf but had not been formally received at court. He had been in doubt whether he would be included in the notice and, if not, whether he should stay on by himself or no. It was agreed that he ought not to stay, without being legitimated, and also was rejected Richelieu's suggestion that he should stop on plea of illness at some place near Vienna, whence he might soon be allowed to return.³ Moreover Saint-Saphorin wanted his association in propaganda that he proposed to undertake on his way home at Ratisbon and Munich and with the duke of Würtemberg.⁴ They set out early on 10 April, were "splendidly entertained" at Ratisbon by Chavigny and Munchausen,⁵ at Munich were "very well received and treated with great civility," at Ulm had a long conference with the Würtemberg deputies to the Swabian diet, and then found refuge in

¹ Elsewhere, "comme une bête féroce." Saint-Saphorin and Woodward attributed this behaviour to the affair being directed by Vice-chancellor Schönborn, the arch-enemy of England.

² Letters of recall for him were sent by Woodward, but Saint-Saphorin had not thought it necessary to present them, as he was quite forgotten, he said (10 February).

³ Richelieu, says Woodward, would willingly have kept him at Vienna, "but the nicety of the Emperor's honour would not suffer it; tho' I was not regularly acknowledg'd as the King's secretary, having been only presented to Count Sinzendorf, without giving a copy of my commission, which I was to have sent him; but those scandalous papers being publisht the same day" Saint-Saphorin had agreed that he ought not to legitimate himself further and in default thereof must not stay.

⁴ "Veu qu'il me paroît assés appliqué, qu'il pense et médite, et qu'il ne manque point de génie naturel, il peut devenir un homme utile au service de sa Majesté."

⁵ "We are in rapture with Mons^r Chavigny, and are sure, if he had been there, instead of the duke of Richelieu, we should have turned the Emperor and his ministers topsy-turvy."

Saint-Saphorin's native Switzerland, whence he indited valuable essays on affairs of the empire.¹ In July he and Woodward travelled together to Basle, thence by boat to Holland, and finally to London.²

The action taken against the ministers of George I at Vienna was followed by the like at Ratisbon.

In February renewed instructions had issued to Leheup to endeavour to obtain from the diet a declaration of neutrality in disputes, "which the Emperor has occasioned and which do not in the least concern the members of the Empire." The French court, he was told, agreed on this as the best measure to be taken in the present juncture, and also that the princes of Franconia and Swabia, in particular, should be dissuaded from entering into any association for the support of the emperor in a cause which regarded him "only as archduke of Austria and not as the head of the Empire." As Chavigny, according to information, was ordered to employ his best skill in these two directions, Leheup, if he found that to be the case, must join forces with him, consulting Munchausen. He had credentials already to the duke of Würtemberg, the margrave of Baden-Durlach and the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, and now were being sent him others to the bishop of Würzburg, "who is as we apprehend a prelate of good weight in the circle of Franconia, and has much of the spirit of a true patriot and lover of the welfare of his country." It might be well for Leheup to visit him personally, to show the purely defensive aim of the treaty of Hanover and that "the King never had the least design to disturb the peace of the Empire," assuring him of his Majesty's esteem and friendship. And similarly with the other princes named, and with others to whom Leheup might think well to be accredited. "The Empire has nothing to do with the present dispute, since the Emperor is likely to begin the warr in aid of Spain, who attacks Gibraltar, which certainly can never be thought a course for the Empire to espouse."³

Leheup and Munchausen discountenanced application for a

¹ A full account of his negotiation at Munich and the relations of the elector of Bavaria with the circles of the Upper and Lower Rhine, Swabia, Franconia and Bavaria; a disquisition on the affairs of the empire in general; "Projet de représentation à la cour de France en faveur du duc de Wirtemberg"; "Relation sur les affaires de Mecklenbourg"; "Relation sur les finances et sur les forces de l'Empereur," with lists.

² Dispatches of Saint-Saphorin and Woodward, 5 April f. 1727, R.O. Germany, Empire, 60, 61.

³ Townshend to Leheup, 26 January (o.s.), R.O. Germany, States, 176. The credentials for the bishop of Würzburg, of even date, F.O. King's Letters 20. They eulogised the bishop's zeal for the public good, which made George I communicate to him his care for the matters which concerned their mutual convenience and the welfare of all Germany in these "gravissimis temporum momentis."

declaration of neutrality by the diet on the ground, says the former, of "reason to think that nothing would be more acceptable to the Emp^r's ministers here, who would immediately get that neutrality condemned by a majority, of which they are assured, and would interpret that offer as a declaration of war." Apart from Austrian pensions, he declared, with the catholic members worked "a more powerful motive than gold itself, the hopes of destroying the Reformed religion in Germany," while most of the protestants seemed "to look out where most money is to be got" and avarice appeared to have "quenched all sparkes" of zeal in them. On the other hand to make such proposals at different courts, the most exposed, and so form an association, he considered very necessary. Retailing much about reported doings of Wurmbrand and the others in the circles he advised that, to counter their work, the right thing would be for Great Britain and France "to make a declaration of their good intentions and offer a neutrality." Next, when advice of the proceedings at the opening of the British parliament was had, he wrote :

The ministers herewere surprised to hear our parliament could come to any resolution in a day, and having formed an idea of that assembly from the dyet were taught that there was a party there, which by it's artifices might delay and frustrate any proposition, but now they think all is over and have no hope from that quarter, particularly since I made those who spoke to me of the Address observe the promise of defending all his Majesty's dominions from any attempts whatsoever.

Also Leheup related how he had used the near prospect of the Swedish accession to encourage the minister of Würzburg "and such as are not over forward to accept of the proposals which are made to the circles, from whence we cannot yett hear any thing certain, except that the dyets are put off," and could recount a satisfactory conversation with the Bavarian deputy, Count Königsfeld.¹ He enclosed an extract from a letter to that minister from

¹ "The Bavarian minister, who hath conceived a great hatred against Count Sinzendorf, and I believe disappointed of the title of privy counsellor at Vienna, which he hoped to obtain, speaks now loudly against the measures formerly taken att his court and hath assured me that his master would avoid assembling the dyet of the circle and would not enter into any further engagements with the court of Vienna. I took great pains to convince him of the marriages, which he at last owned must be the reasons of the vast subsidies paid by the court of Spain, but he did not think that the heir of the Austrian dominions would be Emperor, and I brought him at last to allow that, if the Emperor lived, it might happen, by circumstances he might make use of, that he might get his son-in-law declared King of the Romans. He then assured me that their court had been hurried into the treaty of Vienna by the minister of Cologne, and that his Electoral Highness was so far from agreeing with his brother that he had sent a minister to Manheim on purpose to dissuade the Palatine court from hearkening to Count Kinsky's proposals, which Count Plettenberg was gone to that place to second."

Törring, sent for communication to Chavigny, imparting information that the mission of Count Sinzendorf (deputy for Bohemia) to Munich had had little success, and that the elector would continue to temporise and take no step which could justly be regarded as inimical to the allies of Hanover, confiding entirely in the assurances given by the king of France that he would not under any pretext whatever disturb the peace established between himself and the empire.¹

This intelligence tended to support what Saint-Saphorin had written six weeks before about conversations of his with the ministers of Cologne and Bavaria, Barons Plettenberg and Mörmann, before they had left Vienna. With the former, he said, he had been very cautious, since he was entirely sold to the emperor, but with Mörmann much more open; he thought to have indoctrinated him with principles very different from those he had held some months before. Both seemed deeply scandalised by the emperor's treaty with Prussia.²

Indeed, Charles Albert of Bavaria was not at all disposed to sacrifice to his treaty with the emperor the superior benefits for which he was in separate negotiation with France. Further report from Leheup of Sinzendorf's doings at Munich ended with an assurance given by Königsfeld that in consequence of a letter, which he had written to Törring for the elector's benefit, that prince was now "fully persuaded that no step should be made in the Empire that might give any pretence whatever to the Hanover allies to undertake any thing against the Empire in general or any particular state of it." Afterwards he reported Sinzendorf to have left Munich with answer that the elector would convoke the diet of the circle but was not in a position to undertake new engagements.³

Nor was the elector Palatine now, in consequence of the Berg proposal, as well disposed towards Austria as formerly. He, however, had not much to expect from France; when his minister at Paris inquired whether, in case of war, his master would be allowed neutrality he received the sharp answer, says Robinson, that the elector must take the consequences of his blind devotion to the emperor. Questions put by the said minister to himself Robinson answered in like manner, shortly and plainly.⁴ Later, when he showed inquisitiveness about the engagements taken about Juliers and Berg under the treaty of Hanover—Robinson surmised that the elector might have had wind of the secret article through Seckendorf and Kinsky—Morville, says Robinson again, "treated the matter as a pure

¹ Leheup, 30 January to 13 February, *ibid.*

² Saint-Saphorin, 31 December 1726, cited.

³ Leheup, 23 February and 2 March, *l.c.*

⁴ Robinson, 4 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32749. "But what this gentleman says, or does, is not to be minded, for he has neither credit here, nor at home."

illusion . . . and once for all assured him that England and France had given the king of Prussia no such guaranty."¹ Newcastle went further, desiring "such an answer agreeable to truth" to be given as would confirm the elector in his apparently good disposition, namely, that neither was any guarantee "nor any stipulation entered into in this respect, that can any way tend to deprive the Palatine house of its just rights." Had that been so, it should be pointed out, the king of Prussia would have held to the allies, whereas the emperor's promise of Berg had persuaded him to change sides.²

About the duke of Würtemberg, lastly, Leheup wrote that Schutz, now in the neighbourhood of Ratisbon on his way to Munich, had sent an express desiring to meet Chavigny in order "to conclude the treaty he had begun, the duke his master continuing in the same dispositions as formerly"; Chavigny's answer having been that he hoped to see him, preferably at Ratisbon, after receipt of new instructions expected. Four days later, however, he had to say that the court of France would make no alteration in the treaty proposed, being resolved to give neither subsidies nor security for the protestants, but that nevertheless the terms offered would probably be accepted, if nothing more could be got, the duke "being very fond of recovering that ancient patrimony" (Montbéliard).³

It had now been decided not to demand of the diet a resolution of neutrality—Leheup deprecated again any proposal which might be canvassed and slurred in the dyet here, where the partizans of the house of Austria will ever prevail,"—but to make a formal declaration of the "righteous intentions" of Great Britain and France. Broglie submitted in England a copy of such a declaration, for delivery by Chavigny. The step, Leheup was informed, was thought both proper and urgent, and he also must present a declaration of like import, drawn up in consultation with Chavigny and modelled as best to suit his Majesty, reference to the guarantee of the treaties of Westphalia being, of course, omitted.⁴ The declaration was to the same effect as that formerly proposed, excepting for the unfortunate addition of a paragraph relating to reports of French intrigue in Turkey, in which was used the word "calomnie." It ran as follows. The king of France judged right to make a precise and solemn declaration, in order that none should be in ignorance and the alarms of preparations for war be dissipated. The treaties he had made were proper for any prince who would provide for the security of his dominions, when it appeared to be threatened, and he

¹ The same, 4 March.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 27 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Leheup, 23 and 27 February, R.O. Germany, States, 176.

⁴ Townshend to him, 21 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

declared now, as before, that they were purely defensive and directed only to maintain the peace of Europe. True that in these treaties he had made himself a guarantor of Dutch rights under the fifth and sixth articles of their treaty of Münster, but it was notorious that the guarantee did not affect the Germanic Body directly or indirectly. He was persuaded, therefore, that the princes and states of the empire would take no part in a quarrel absolutely strange to them. Infringement of German territory was far from his thoughts, on the contrary, whatever case arose, he would employ his utmost care and attention to preserve the said territory intact and also the rights, privileges and quiet of the members of the Germanic Body; an assurance which he desired should be accepted as his royal and inviolable word. Further, being informed of report that his ambassador at the Porte was strongly pressing the Turks to resolutions contrary to the repose of the empire, he declared formally that this was a calumny; his ambassador had taken no such step either directly or indirectly. He would faithfully observe the treaties of Westphalia, of which he was a guarantor, and would always be ready to give the most precise assurances to any who might desire them whether for their personal interest or for the common interest of the whole Germanic Body.¹

Chavigny delivered this declaration to the minister of the elector of Mentz, head of the diet as arch-chancellor of the empire, on 27 February. As was usual, that minister alleged the necessity of referring the matter to his court. Then he told Chavigny that the elector being at Bamberg, and having none of his ministers with him to consult on so important a case, they must be written to at Mentz. Pressing him, Chavigny forced him to acknowledge "dictation" of the declaration to the diet to have been inhibited by the imperial commissaries, pending orders. Shortly Leheup reported in answer to Chavigny's declaration, to be dictated to the diet at the same time, to run to the following effect.

The Emperor being head of the Empire he cannot be attacked but that, as a human body, all the members will feel the effects of it; that therefore the Empire should put itself in a posture of defence; that the [phrase] Teutonic Germanic body is derogatory to the grandeur of the Empire as confining its bounds to Germany alone, whereas the Low Countries are part of the circle of Burgundy, Luxemburg a bulwark of the Empire, and Milan and Mantua part of the same Empire; and that the Helvetic body is the only one that is distinguished always under that metaphor.

Moreover Leheup, on Richelieu's authority, reported Prince Eugene

¹ Printed by Rousset, iii. 334; in English, *Political State of Great Britain*, xx. 294.

to be furiously angry at the word "calumny," "which he said the Emperor could never bear."¹

A few days later was published an imperial "Decretum Commissionis," directing Prince Fürstenberg to recall to the deputies the constant endeavours of the emperor since his accession to preserve the peace of Europe, and the hostile armaments now on foot. Chavigny's declaration, it was stated, brought in new artifices, designed to separate the head from the members of the empire. The unheard of attacks and libels of the King's Speech were dwelt upon, as also at great length the emperor's efforts to come to agreement about the Ostend Company. Lastly was noticed the inciting the Turks to war. All of which was recommended to the serious attention of the diet.²

Ever since the libels of the King's Speech and the attendant pamphlets Leheup had been anticipating action against himself. He heard much talk about "an arbitrary and illegal power exercised by the Emperor in removing ministers from the diet" and had desired instructions should this power, "often exercised," be put in force in his own case.³ Townshend had then opined that the emperor "never would be so rash as to proceed to so outrageous a violence" and that in view of his pacific professions Leheup need not expect "any such extraordinary compliment."⁴ However, the blow was now to fall. Just when the imperial decree noticed was published Leheup, in accordance with instructions at last received, drew up and presented to the minister of Mentz a declaration on behalf of George I similar, save for the necessary differences, to Chavigny's.⁵ As he also used the word "calumny," obligatory in his opinion to show complete agreement with Chavigny, Munchausen feared that the declaration would not be dictated, and the minister of Mentz at once called attention to the censure of the term in the decree, while the imperial commissaries, when the document was communicated to them, immediately, says Leheup, "took fire at the word calumny, and ordered him to return it, or at least to propose to the Electoral College the returning of it to me, which was accordingly proposed, tho' in civil terms."

¹ Leheup, 7 and 11 March, R.O. Germany, States, 176.

² German print and French translation, 11 large pages, with Leheup's dispatch of 19 March. Also Dumont, VIII. ii. 142, Rousset, iii. 340, and (extracts) *Lettres historiques*, lxxi. 422-5. Leheup had not "temper enough" to read the document with patience.

³ Leheup, 10 February, *l.c.* He enclosed a Latin document entitled "Resolutio questionis, num Cæsari competat jus legatum Principis, cui cum Imperio amicitia intercedit, sine consensu Ordinum Imperii proscribendi."

⁴ Townshend in reply, 21 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁵ Rousset, iii. 337.

What happened was that in the debate in that College on 21 March only Munchausen (Metternich of Brandenburg absenting himself purposely) advised leaving the thorny affair as it stood, and it was resolved to request Leheup in the most obliging manner, in order to avoid embarrassment and show all respect to his Britannic Majesty, to take his declaration back, "*pour apaiser le Collège Electoral et toute la Diète*" and because the face of affairs, since the imperial decree was issued, was so changed that disagreeable consequences might be feared. The College of Princes, however, on report of this conclusion to them, resolved to leave the affair in suspense and in the state it was, without either dictating the memorial or returning it. The Electoral College agreeing, the declaration was left in the hands of the minister of Mentz.

Justifying his conduct Leheup said that when he presented his declaration he had not read the imperial decree, "but since I have read it, the terms made use of there are such as in my poor opinion would highly justify his Majesty in any terms he should make use of." Another reason in his mind was insinuation that he heard that his Majesty was not acting jointly with France but "intended to reserve to himself the liberty of acting offensively in Lower Germany." He had explained to people that his instructions to present the declaration, delayed by contrary winds, had been issued long before the decree was thought of, and he noted that the emperor, by resenting the word "*calumny*," had put the cap on his own head. The whole affair being referred to Vienna he expected soon an order to depart, news of Palm's dismissal from London, in consequence of the orders to him to publish his memorial, being expected by every post. As he did not know where to go he would wait for instructions in some imperial town.¹

The answer to these dispatches was that Leheup's conduct was thoroughly approved, that he would hear from Horatio Walpole how Chavigny and he must act, that he was perfectly right to insist on the word "*calumny*," and that he must on no account whatever take back his memorial. It was hoped that on reflection this extraordinary ferment would subside.² Horatio Walpole wrote

¹ Leheup, 19 and 24 March, *l.c.* The minister of Mentz, says he, "tho' a professed pensionary of the Imperial court said that he would not expose his master, betraying the power reposed in him, to the resentment his Majesty might shew, who was a powerful king, as well as an elector of the Empire, and had dominions adjoining to his master's, as well as France." The deputy of Saxony took "great notice how the *Jus Foederum* is impeached by the decree, and most of the ministers here (who are not absolutely abandoned to the Imperial court) complain secretly of its contents. . . . When old Count Metternich was asked his opinion of it he answered, '*Je suppose que je n'ay pas vécu assez long tems pour en voir des pareils.*' . . . All the ministers here are now afraid to speak to me."

² Townshend, 21 and 24 March (o.s.), *ibid.*

from Paris to like effect ; it was not thought there, he said, that Leheup would be expelled ; if he were, in reprisal for the dismissal of Palm, it would only make the emperor's action more " notorious and blamable in the eyes of all Europe." ¹

At the same time were sent to Leheup credentials to the diets of the circles of Franconia, Swabia, Bavaria and the Upper Rhine, which, however, he was not to use, nor to leave Ratisbon in accordance with them, without consulting Chavigny and Munchausen.² Already he had learnt that the bishop of Würzburg did not consider a visit to his court opportune. On 27 March he wrote : " I frequent the assembly's as usual, tho' few dare talk with me, and I oblige Mo^r Jodoci ³ by it not to come to any, since he thinks I ought not to be suffered here." And then that the three Colleges had resolved unanimously to return him his declaration through the secretary of the minister of Mentz. " As I thought it would be derogatory to his Majesty's honour to receive it in such a manner, I have taken the opportunity of going with Lord Granstown ⁴ to Augsburg," and would stay there, " upon the footing of a frolick," pending further orders.⁵

Newcastle's dispatches to Paris were full of indignation at what had occurred. The imperial decree he denounced as " more injurious, if possible," than Palm's publication, but he intimated that no step would be taken without French concurrence. It must be considered, he went on, what should be done in case the emperor should proceed to endeavour to put his Majesty under the ban of the empire, he being " very sensible that in the Electoral Colledge he has no chance for any vote but the king of Prussia's, and how precarious that dependance is the late conduct of that prince has sufficiently shewn." When action was concerted and Chavigny instructed Walpole should inform Leheup, in order that he might act in concert. Indiscussing with the French ministers on the " resentment and animosity " displayed by the imperialists he should " take occasion to observe that the whole bent and study of the court of Vienna is to be revenged upon the King, by falling upon his dominions in Germany, and therefore his Majesty hopes that France will be equally carefull to disappoint them in any such design." And when it was known that

¹ H. Walpole, 31 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

² Townshend in the former dispatch. The credentials, also of date 21 March (o.s.), R.O. King's Letters 20.

³ Deputy for Austria, who had taken a leading part in the proceedings in the College of Princes.

⁴ Presumably Lord Cranstown, on tour.

⁵ Leheup, 27 to 31 March, *l.c.* The resolution adopted, he says, was opposed only by the ministers of Denmark Cassel and Hanover. " The minister of Saxony hath behaved himself in this affair with the utmost sedulity and falsehood." He expected expulsion " *ex plenitudine potestatis* " of the emperor. From Augsburg he sent Munchausen's full report of the proceedings.

Leheup had gone to Augsburg Newcastle could not "sufficiently express the King's satisfaction with the orders sent to Mr Chavigny" and desired instructions to him to act with Munchausen "in the same concert and confidence" as hitherto with Leheup, so as to continue to show perfect union.¹

Prussian action at Ratisbon was indeed suspicious. On 23 February Leheup had sent Count Metternich's written opinion on the question whether the constitutions of the empire could be set in force against a member of it who attacked the emperor in the Netherlands, as by assistance to the Dutch to destroy the Ostend Company, namely, that on his conscience such member ought to be prepared to incur the ban of the empire, to be put in force in arms, as formerly in the case of Bavaria. Then on 10 April he sent word of orders to Metternich not to concern himself with the disputes about the declaration, and if resolve should be taken to expel him not to oppose, but to leave the courts of London and Vienna "to make up their disputes themselves." Du Bourgay also wrote from Berlin of request by Seckendorf that Metternich should support the emperor in the diet. On this copies of the various documents in the case were sent to him, with assertion that the "strange unjustifiable treatment" of Leheup by the emperor's sole decree was a clear violation of the rights of the diet and of the constitutions of the empire, that Leheup was properly accredited to the diet and consequently under its protection, and that it was hoped that the members would instruct their ministers at Ratisbon to exhibit just resentment.²

Ilgel, when complaint of the conduct of the Prussian ministers at Ratisbon and Vienna came also from Paris, gave answer to Rottembourg that on specification of cases in which those ministers, or any other in foreign countries, had failed in their conduct towards France, means would be provided for explanation. In defence of Metternich, in the present case, he contended that the emperor pretended to the right to act as he had done and claimed that his predecessors had so acted against ministers of France and other powers with full liberty and without hindrance from the princes or electors of the empire. The diet had not been consulted, but the resolution taken at Vienna and the orders sent thence. The Prussian minister could not have opposed with any effect, had he so desired,

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 21 March to 2 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32749-50. With these dispatches are six pages of arguments supplied by Morville to Chavigny. Cf. "Some considerations with respect to what has passed at Ratisbon on account of the declarations given in by Mr Chavigny and Mr Leheup," a draft given to General Sutton on his going to Cassel in April (R.O. Germany, States, 122).

² Du Bourgay, 22 April, Townshend in reply, 21 April (o.s.), R.O. Prussia 22.

for the majority in the diet were wholly on the emperor's side. Moreover the sentence was carried out so rapidly that nothing was known at Berlin of the affair beforehand. So that for these and other reasons Metternich was not to be blamed.¹

On 3 April Munchausen was expecting more violent measures at next day's assembly, in consequence of the news of Palm's expulsion and of the return of the Spanish flota now received. It looked, he said, as though the imperial commissaries were emboldened enough to act without instructions from Vienna, indeed, orders had been sent to the magistrates of Augsburg to expel Leheup.² He now determined to return to Ratisbon, "resolved to abide the utmost malice of my adversary's and show them how little I value their threats, since I am just informed that severall of the ministers repent themselves of their rashness."³ Arrived, he refused admittance to the secretary who came to return his declaration, giving his reasons in writing. Everybody, he says, was surprised at his return, report saying that a decree for his removal was signed at Vienna, but "I affect not to think of it." He would follow the example of Saint-Saphorin and remain until forced to go.

The order to leave Ratisbon within forty-eight hours and the empire in two weeks came to him on 13 April. He resolved to comply, with protest to the diet, and first repaired to Cannstat, where he hoped to find protection with the duke of Würtemberg. Finding there neither the duke nor Schutz he went on to Strasburg and on 16 May, invited by Horatio Walpole, presented himself in Paris.⁴

It remains to notice the progress of the negotiation with the duke of Würtemberg. Baron Kirchner, Leheup wrote on 24 March, had acquainted Schutz that a commission was appointed by the emperor to redress the duke's grievances and comply with whatever he seemed to desire, and Wurmbrand was to go to him at once to obtain a positive answer to the proposals made; while at the same time the emperor was moving troops towards Swabia "and would have a direct answer whether the duke would do his duty as Velt-Marshall to the Emperor and Empire." Also that Wurmbrand's mission resulted from dissatisfaction of the imperial court with Kirchner's efforts. On knowledge of this Leheup had pressed Schutz to conclude his treaty with France, "but he told me he had positive orders not to conclude without a subsidy," for without that they could not

¹ Du Bourgay, 20 May, *ibid.*

² Munchausen, 3 April, R.O. Germany, States, 176.

³ Leheup, 7 April, *ibid.* With this dispatch he sent "a second part of Mr. Du Mont, in which an unlimited absolute power over the other States of the Empire is by implication vested in the Emperor"; namely, the pamphlet "Réponse aux Remarques sur l'Analyse du Traité de Hanover."

⁴ The same, 10 April f., with various documents.

advance one step, and mentioned the sum of 150,000 German crowns. He gave assurance that the duke would enter into no new measure until a final answer from France was had.¹

Horatio Walpole, however, wrote that when, in view of the emperor's efforts to attach the duke of Würtemberg, he had again urged his cause, neither Fleury nor Morville would give the least hope of granting him a subsidy, holding that he ought to be satisfied with compliance with his demands in Franche-Comté and that in any case neither he nor any other prince would take a side until they saw what came of the preliminaries for peace sent to Vienna. Newcastle observed on this that the duke seemed as well disposed as any prince and that "in all these cases it ought to be a general consideration, that if those whose alliance we desire are not in a capacity to defend themselves and assist us, they can be of no use unless they are enabled to do it."²

Leheup wrote next that Chavigny had set out to meet Count Grävenitz near by but seemed

afraid since his last dispatches to agree to the project that Baron Shutz and he drew up in the conference I brought them to last Monday night, because it differs in some terms from Mr. de Morville's, which, being peculiar to the law, neither he nor I understand, and which M^r Munchausen thinks are of no consequence, but his orders are indeed very positive, tho' he and I think that prince by his situation to be of much more importance than even the D. of Bavaria of whom France seems so fond. . . . The least subsidy, or promise of advantage, made to the duke of Würtemberg, which I own I think not proper to be inserted in the treaty, tho' insisted on by Mr. Schutz, would immediately induce that prince to sign, and if required to act.³

Walpole, however, had to write again that Fleury would do nothing for the duke of Würtemberg in the way of subsidies, believing that the princes of the empire would not engage themselves to the emperor, and still advised encouraging them to form an association "for observing an exact neutrality, and to oppose those who should disturb the peace of the Empire," without engaging them "in any measures that may give the Imperial court just offence"; then allies of Hanover to arrange to come to their assistance in case of any attempt against them on account thereof.⁴ This course Leheup also advocated in a long dispatch from Strasburg, at the same time concluding from an interview had with Grävenitz on his way "that the duke would soon be obliged to enter into the Emperor's measures

¹ The same, 24 March.

² H. Walpole, 31 March, Newcastle in reply, 28 March (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

³ Leheup, 27 and 31 March, *l.c.*

⁴ H. Walpole, 14 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

since he could no longer defer declaring to which side he inclined.”¹ Fleury nevertheless stood firm. Rebutting assertions of Saint-Saphorin he declared it to be not only useless but dangerous to give subsidies to the duke of Würtemberg ; all other princes would ask the same and then, terrified by the power of the emperor, turn against the donors. If they understood their true interest they would embrace the project of a neutrality association. But for that was wanted a prince of authority and credit, who could rouse the others to throw off the emperor’s yoke, and unfortunately there was none such. The four princes of the Palatine house had made treaties with him and had their hands tied for a year and a half. The rest were very little worth and all were ruined. Whatever Saint-Saphorin said, no reliance could be placed upon them.²

¹ Leheup, 20 April, R.O. Germany, States, 176.

² Fleury to H. Walpole, 23 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

CHAPTER XLI

HOSTILITIES WITH SPAIN. PORTUGAL

REAR-ADMIRAL HOPSON maintained his watch off the Spanish coast, until, at the end of October 1726, forced to put in to Gibraltar for provisions and refit. There he stayed till urgent instructions sent him to sea again. These stated that the evident disposition of the court of Spain to come to an open rupture compelled measures to stop the treasure from America, so that now he must not only keep watch for the flota and galleons but also "stop and examine all Spanish ships whatsoever coming from the West Indies," strictly observing, if any of the treasure were found on them, the instructions with regard thereto given to Hosier, of which he had a copy. To perform this service, "which must now be the principal object of your attention and vigilance," he must keep the sea on his present station as long as was possible without evident danger to his Majesty's ships, unless intelligence received should show some other to be more suitable. If he had not small vessels enough for scouting purposes he should hire such proper English ones as could be found, using great caution against discovery of the reason for their employment. Although Hosier advised that the galleons were not likely to reach Spain that year, on the other hand the flota had reached Havana and might be already on the way thence, though its convoy was reported not to be strong.¹

For his stay at Gibraltar, when the fact was known, Hopson was severely censured. Newcastle declared himself unable to conceal the king's surprise that he should have construed his instructions to imply that on any want of water or other need he might repair thither and await orders. Were he obliged by stress of weather or for want of water or provisions or by other unavoidable necessity to put into a port, he must supply himself with all possible haste, return to his station, and remain there until further commands received.²

¹ Instructions to Hopson, 25 October (o.s.), 1726, R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 78 and (drafts) 69.

² Newcastle to him, 30 November (o.s.), *ibid.* General Dormer was desired to use dispatch in sending these orders on (R.O. Portugal 33).

Hopson was already at sea again, having passed the Straits on 5 December. The first thing he had to report was the dismantling of his flagship, the *Stirling Castle*, by a storm and the necessity of sending her to Lisbon to refit. On 29 December he fell in, as previously noticed (p. 471 note), with the Spaniard *San Carlos*, the Irishman named Forester in command, one of the two ships that had sailed from Santander in September but had been forced back by bad weather. Her consort, the *San Felipe*, Hopson believed to have proceeded on her voyage to Havana. In default of instructions to the contrary he used all civility. Early in the new year, after suffering greatly from storms, shortage of all kinds of stores, and scurvy, he was compelled to return to Gibraltar again, arriving on 13 January 1727.¹ Here he received notice of Vice-admiral Sir Charles Wager coming with a reinforcement and to take command. A copy of Wager's instructions was sent him in advance with orders to act in accordance with them.²

These instructions premised the memorial presented by Pozoubo, almost a declaration of war, his notification of departure "in the manner usually practised by the ministers of princes who begin a rupture," the preparations to besiege Gibraltar, the reason to suspect a design upon England in favour of the Pretender, and the necessity "of hindering, if possible, the bringing home of the Spanish treasure from the West Indies, as what would be an effectual means of preventing and disappointing the pernicious and dangerous views and projects of the court of Spain and their confederates against Us and Our allys." Wager was ordered to repair to Spithead and take under his command the 70-gun ships *Kent*, *Royal Oak*, *Berwick* and *Lenox*, the *Portland* and *Tiger*, 50, and the *Cruiser* and *Hawk* sloops, lying there or at Portsmouth, and as soon as they were ready and the land forces for Gibraltar embarked³ to make the best of his way to join Hopson off Cape St. Vincent, taking him and his squadron under his command and carrying or sending on the troops for Gibraltar forthwith. If he found it necessary, and not inconvenient, to send a reinforcement to Hosier in the West Indies he might detach the *Berwick* and *Lenox* for that service, directing their captains to seek the vice-admiral at Matanzas Bay in Cuba, and in case they should meet with the flota or galleons or any ship coming from the West Indies with treasure on board to act in such manner as would best answer his Majesty's intentions,

¹ Hopson's dispatches, 6 December 1726 to 10 January 1727 (o.s.), R.O. P. Dom. Naval 79, Admiralty 1, 378.

² Newcastle to Hopson, 23 December (o.s.), *ll.cc.*

³ These were three regiments of foot and 120 men of Col. Fielding's "Regiment of Invalids" (Admiralty Orders of 20 and 22 December (o.s.), R.O. Admiralty 2, 1).

as set out in the instructions to Hosier Jennings and Hopson of which copies were attached. Wager himself, cruising between Cadiz and Cape St. Vincent or on such other station as he should think proper to intercept the treasure-ships, should they escape Hosier, must obtain and send all possible information about military preparations in Spanish ports, and if he found intention of attempt upon his Majesty's dominions or other act of hostility must undertake such motions and operations as should be proper. He must send to Gibraltar most of the soldiers on Hopson's ships, or all if necessary, and if that could not be done otherwise must lay up one or more of his ships at Gibraltar and supply the want of men from them, using his ships also, if necessary, for defence of the fortress. Should Hosier by any chance come over in pursuit of the treasure-ships he must take his squadron under his command. Further, so far as the above services permitted, he was to afford protection to British trade and navigation and, if war were declared Gibraltar attacked, or any other act of hostility committed to do all he could to distress and annoy the enemy by destroying his ships, as opportunity offered. He must correspond with General Dormer at Lisbon, with consul Cayley at Cadiz, and with others from whom he might expect to obtain intelligence and assistance and send home full and particular accounts. But even were war declared, seeing that much of the cargoes on the treasure-ships was the property of British or allied subjects, he must observe most particularly the orders for safe-keeping of them.¹

Stanhope now was confirming Spanish intention to attack Gibraltar and cited the arrest of Colonel Dunbar at Malaga as evidence of hostilities opened.² On the other hand he was advised by Monteleon that distrust of Austria was growing, and was "fully persuaded that Spain attacks Gibraltar chiefly to try the sincerity of the Emperor." He could point with satisfaction to strained relations with Portugal and to adverse reports from Gibraltar coming in, how De las Torres had several times reconnoitred the fortifications and seen difficulties much greater than represented and how the preparations lagged and arrival of the artillery was delayed by excessive rains. In spite of reports of troops assembling

¹ Instructions to Sir Charles Wager, Knt., Vice-admiral of the Red, 22 December 1726 (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 69, 78.

² Dunbar had been sent to carry to Gibraltar dispatches for Admiral Hopson and Colonel Kane. On reaching Malaga he had kept quiet for some days in the house of consul Nicholas Hollway, until he could obtain a passage. Unfortunately the ship on which he at last embarked was becalmed a short distance out and the governor sent out boats with soldiers, who removed him forcibly. He was carried into the common prison and neither Hollway's efforts nor Stanhope's protests could obtain his release. Particulars in Hollway's letters to Stanhope, R.O. Spain 95. The dispatches got safely to Gibraltar.

n Guipuzcoa and of sea-provisions being stored at Santander he believed expeditions from the Biscay ports or from Cadiz to be suspended "till the Emperor should have more fully explained himself" and an answer from Vienna to his own memorial of 25 November have been received.¹ At the end of January he sent by courier a full answer to Newcastle's dispatch of 22 December 1726 (o.s.). He would stay on, he said, as desired, though doubting whether it would be allowed. He had arranged for sending a man into Galicia. On the siege of Gibraltar: "the immovable obstinacy, with which his Cat^k Majesty persists in the pushing that enterprise, is what astonishes every body." It was publicly known that at a council of war at San Roque all the general officers had agreed that an assault on the land-side was impracticable, and from the sea, now that the British squadron had arrived, almost as hopeless. Nevertheless orders had been sent to begin as soon as the artillery was ready, and any day might be received news of the opening of the trenches or of a naval combat. "What still renders this obstinacy of the king of Spain more incomprehensible is the knowledge that every body here has of his being actually highly jealous of and dissatisfied with the court of Vienna." Suspicion had been caused by the dispatches thence received at the beginning of December, as reported, and there was no answer yet either about Stanhope's memorial or about the movements against Gibraltar. 'Insomuch that at present nothing is more publickly talked of at court than the insincerity of the Emperor, and the king himself was heard to say but a few days since, 'Je m'apperois que Mon^r le Conigseck ment quelques fois, ce que je n'ai jamais trouvé en Mon^r Stanhope.' " Of late De la Paz had never been to see Königsegg once, though formerly with him every day. Stanhope mentioned these things because they made a great noise, not that any judgment could be formed upon them. He supposed himself that "in case the Emperor answers to the liking of this court he warr will be general, and if otherwise it will nevertheless be begun by Spain purely out of a point of honour, to give his Cat^k Ma^{ty} a plausible and justifiable pretence to abandon the Emperor and unite himself again to his old friends." He still believed the enterprise against England to be suspended, if not entirely laid

¹ Stanhope, 30 December 1726 to 20 January 1727, *ibid.* With the last dispatch he sent a list of "all the Spanish men of warr now in Europe," at Cadiz the *San Carlos*, 70, *Infanta*, 64, *Conquistador*, 60, *Giral*, 56 (this ship arrived from Havana), and five frigates; coming from Genoa the *San Antonio* and *Principe*, 60, and the *Genova* frigate; at Los Pasages the *Santa Rosa*, 56; at Santander the *S. Xavier* and another, each of 52, one of these, however, said to have been lost at sea with nearly all its crew. According to the *Lettres historiques* (lxxi. 215) this was the *S. Xavier*, carrying sailors to Santander.

aside, in consequence first of the distrust of the emperor and secondly of the sending of Sir Charles Wager.¹

It was replied that Stanhope's account of jealousies between the courts of Madrid and Vienna gave great satisfaction to his Majesty, "who, notwithstanding the provocations and injuries which he and his subjects have received from the king of Spain would still be glad to see that prince forsake the pernicious measure in which he is engaged, and return to his old allies and best friends." Montgon, returned to Paris, had talked there in the same way "Count Konigsegg we hear is personally offended with the two brothers Patinos, and the queen of Spain even suffers people now to speak against Konigsegg. It is said the court of Vienna dissuaded the siege of Gibraltar, but that is directly contrary to the intelligence your Ex^{cy} has had of that matter." The court of France was "very forward in their military preparations and press mightily Mr Walpole's return to Paris." Letters from Sweden gave great hopes of that accession "and I believe our convention with Denmark will forthwith be finished."²

Contrary winds detained Sir Charles Wager at Spithead until the end of January, but on 1 February (o.s.) he wrote from near Cape St. Vincent to say that he had been joined by the *Stirling Castle* and *Solebay* bombvessel from Lisbon, and not having met with Hopson was going on to Gibraltar. There he found Hopson and his squadron the next day and landed about 1,000 soldiers and ten 24-pound cannon, raising the strength of the garrison to some 2,500. The Spaniards, more than 13,000 regular troops he found encamped "in the bottom of the Bay two or three miles from the tower and the water side, and are building a battery by the sea side, where they had one in the former siege." "Boats and other imbarcations" were continually passing. Hostilities not having been begun he had not thought proper to interrupt their work. On 12 February (o.s.) he sent an account of the opening of the siege. A battery having been erected within cannon-shot of the town Col. Clayton, commanding the garrison, after exchanging letters with De las Torres and giving notice by a warning shot had opened fire and driven the Spaniards off. In the night 2,000 of them had entrenched themselves "in the sand behind the Rock" and fired on the ships, the *Portland* being hit twice but not hurt. He (Wager) had sent ships round the hill and got some shot in. This constituting a state of war he had sent warning to Hosier by the *Berwick* and *Lenox*.³

¹ The same, 30 January, R.O. Spain 95.

² Newcastle to Stanhope, 6 February (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97.

³ Wager's dispatches, R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 79, Admiralty 1, 378

Clayton's account of the opening of hostilities ran as follows.

I arrived here on the 2nd instant when we found the Conde de las Torres encamped near this place with about fifteen thousand men and had raised two batterys, one in an island at Algeziras the other side of the Bay, the other at Thessé, very near gunshot of this place but pointing at the sea. The 9th at night he began another battery, the embrazures pointing directly to the works on the King's and Prince's lines and the landport, upon which discovery early the tenth in the morning I writ to him and about 12 a clock I received his answer, copys of which I do my self the honour to send your Grace. After I had communicated the contents to S^r Charles Wager and called a council of war of all the commanding officers of the corps here it was unanimously agreed I should begin hostilitys according to his M^{ty}'s orders; whereupon about four a clock in the afternoon I fired a cannon with shot pointed over their battery as a signal I expected they would leave off working; I waited an hour that might give the Conde notice, but they continuing the work I ordered all the cannon that could bear upon the battery to fire and so continue to do. Last night they regularly opened their trenches at the Devil's Tower pointing towards the King's and Prince's lines; I gave them all the obstruction by firing great and small shot I was capable of, I believe to the loss of some men, thò the numbers I do not yet know. This morning they fired from a battery of ten guns called Thessé against the Portland man-of-war, which was nearest of his Maj^{ty}'s ships, but without dammage. All this day our cannon and mortars have been playing upon their trenches and batterys from his Majesty's ships, as well as the garrison.

Sir Charles Wager assists me in a multitude of wants which the ordnance here had not, ten twenty four pounders on the Old Mole, planks for batterys, carpenters to lay them, and many other things too numerous to trouble your Grace with. Since the day I arrived here I have had three hundred men at work p^r diem to finish fortifications begun, and I beg leave to acquaint your Grace things are not in that order that I expected, thò Col. Kane has been indefatigable; want of money has been the only cause, However I shall do everything that lies in my power for the defence to the last extremity, which I beg your Grace to assure his Majesty of.

The two regiments from Ireland are not arrived, it would be no small joy to us to see them, being a good addition to the present numbers, which is only 2,230 private men, corporals included. The loss of men during a siege, the tract of ground I have to guard, the distance I am at from relief must press me to beg your Grace to send me a farther reinforcement.¹

Stanhope's present news was of the artillery for the siege still greatly retarded, and of a fourth part of the army lost by sickness and desertion. He believed answers received from Vienna to

¹ Col. Jasper Clayton, 12 February (o.s.), with Townshend's of 3 March (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293. Full particulars of the siege will be found in the *Political State of Great Britain*, vol. xxxiii., the *Historical Register*, vol. xii., and the *Lettres historiques*, vol. lxxi. A journal of it from 14 February to 16 March (o.s.) by Edward Burgo, junior, supercargo of the ship *Christian* of Leith, *Scottish Historical Review*, xvi. 325. There are many other accounts.

be "not so clear and decisive as was expected," to the effect, namely, that while the emperor was making all preparations for war in the spring he was at the same time engaged in negotiation with France.¹ On 11 March, as soon as he could after the news of the opening of the siege of Gibraltar was received, he left Madrid, his next dispatch, of 23 March, being dated from Bayonne.

By this time the flota had got home. Advices of 10 and 12 March from Spain stated that on the arrival of several Spanish men-of-war at Havana early in January Admiral Castañeta had ordered the ships to be laden with all expedition and had sailed on the 25th with ten men-of-war and twelve merchantmen. Two of the former and a "register-ship" having been detached for the Leeward ("Barlovento") Islands, on arrival at the Bermudas a violent storm had separated a further portion of the fleet under Don Antonio Serrano. Castañeta's squadron had made Cadiz, and another ship Santander, on 5 March, and the next day Don Rodrigo Torres with five men-of-war and a large merchant-ship, and later four other merchantmen, had come into Corunna.² By a later advice the ships arrived there were six men-of-war and fourteen merchantmen, and the commander Rear-admiral Don Joachim de las Torres, the specie on board the men-of-war being registered as eighteen million pieces of eight.³

So little was this event expected in England that as late as 28 February Wager was informed: "I herewith send you a copy of a letter from the Havana, communicated to us by the court of France as coming from a good hand, by which you will find the flota had then no orders to leave that place, so that in all probability whatever reinforcements are sent thither will arrive before the departure of the flota from thence." Orders to send the *Berwick* and *Lenox* to the West Indies were repeated, the Spaniards boasting of the strength of Castañeta's squadron, and Hosier's being weak, and besides them the two 50-gun ships (the *Portland* and *Tiger*) "which are ready sheathed and were designed for that purpose": to call at Jamaica and proceed thence to join Hosier at Matanzas Bay.⁴

Even after the flota was safe in Spanish ports Wager was directed to look out sharply for it and for the galleons, as well as taking

¹ Stanhope, 24 February, R.O. Spain 95.

² R.O. Spain 95. A printed list of the flota's lading, sent by Stanhope from Bayonne, showed 74,200 gold pistoles, besides 51 marks' weight in ingots and 1,436 worked, and in silver 12,474,000 "piastres effectives," 3,700 marks' weight in pigs and 17,230 worked. Of other commodities—herbs, spices, dyes, precious stones, porcelain, leather, etc.—the principal item was 162,100 "baynilles" (vanilla).

³ Burnett from Lisbon, 21 March, R.O. Portugal 34.

⁴ Newcastle to Wager, 17 February (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 78.

care for the safety of Gibraltar. Should they escape Hosier, he was told, "we have only you to trust to for intercepting them."¹ After the news was received orders went to him by H.M.S. *Prince Frederick* nevertheless to send to the West Indies the *Portland* and *Tiger*, two ships of 60 guns being fitted to reinforce him with all speed; his chief care now to be to prevent any Spanish naval expedition against Gibraltar or Great Britain, it not being probable that the galleons would come over. "Now treat the Spaniards every where as enemies, and endeavour to annoy them in whatever way you can."²

Wager had left Gibraltar on 27 February with his heavier ships, seven in number, to cruise off Cape Spartel, leaving the rest to help in the defence of the fortress. Previously he had explained that he would take that station because the Spanish ships in the late war used to make for Cadiz from the Canaries along the Barbary coast, thus escaping the usual look-out off Capes S. Vincent and S. Maria. He picked up a prize or two and later on captured the *Nostra Señora del Rosario*, a new man-of-war of 46 guns, bound for Cadiz from Santander and commanded by an old infirm Irishman, Balthazar Sherlock, for many years in the French and Spanish services, having with him a young Englishman named Robert Clark, once of his Majesty's navy as lieutenant or ensign. He had word of a Spanish fleet collecting at Cadiz and found himself, after sending away the *Berwick* and *Lenox*, weak.³ He had news of Castañeta's arrival at Cadiz from consul Cayley on 24 March. He had cruised, he explained, in the proper station to intercept him, as shown by his capture of the *Rosario*, sent that way for safety. "But long nights and thick blowing weather doe very often disappoint the best endeavours in such cases." He could only rate himself very unfortunate and Castañeta very lucky.⁴

On news of the opening of hostilities orders had issued on the

¹ The same, 28 February (o.s.).

² The same, 21 March (o.s.), and again 4 April (o.s.).

³ He wrote to Delafaye when leaving Gibraltar: "I have magnify'd a little my squadron to Mr Poyntz, it will look the better there, and I wish it were so good as I tell him, especially if the flota should have eleven sail of men of warr with them; but if I can not have more, I must be content; the landing all the soldiers that were in Adm^l Hopson's squadron as part of their compliment, which were above 400, have weeken'd those ships very much. I have now but six ships above 50 guns, and I carry but one of them of 50 to sea with me, which will generally be absent from the squadron, and to those six ships we are two flags and a broad penant, which looks a little Danish. When the Torbay comes we shall have one more."

⁴ Wager, 17 February to 13 March (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 79, Admiralty 1, 378. He learnt in June from the Spanish lieutenant, who brought him news of the signature of the preliminaries of peace, that Castañeta had not come by the Barbary coast, as expected; "the town of Cadiz was the first land they saw, when they came from the West Indies" (to Delafaye, 17 June (o.s.), *ibid.*).

one side to Hosier and to the captains of all ships in home and colonial ports on sight of any Spanish men-of-war privateers or merchant ships "to use their utmost endeavours to come up with them and to take, sink, burn or otherwise destroy them,"¹ and on the other for seizure of all British ships in Spanish ports. Most of them, we are told, escaped on warning from Stanhope.² One seized at Corunna was the packet-boat *Boscawen*, as were also all effects in consul Parker's house there.³ Later Cayley at Cadiz and all the British merchants there were reported to have taken refuge on 10 April, after notice to depart, on board French vessels in the harbour.⁴

Orders for the *Torbay* (80), Captain Haddock, and the *Poole* fireship to convoy to Gibraltar stores and provisions and two regiments from Ireland had issued as far back as 12 January (o.s.).⁵ But accidents and unreadiness of the troops delayed their arrival there till April. Before they sailed, and after news of the opening of the siege, the *Prince Frederick* and *Yarmouth* also were ordered thither, convoying a battalion of the guards and Clayton's own regiment of foot, and carrying the non-resident governor, the earl of Portmore, and officers going as volunteers.⁶ This reinforcement joined Wager on 30 April and was at Gibraltar on 2 May.

Back at Gibraltar on 7 April Wager found the *Torbay* and its convoy arrived the previous day. The siege he reported to be going on in desultory fashion, with little damage done on either side.⁷ Advised from Cadiz that the Spanish ships were not likely to come out he stayed on, "as well to encourage our garrison, as to discourage the enemy." His Spanish prisoners, a nuisance in many ways, he was able to exchange, excepting Sherlock and Clark, for a lieutenant and 36 men of the *Winchester* captured by their boat running aground. He wrote also of courtesies exchanged with the Spaniards and of an Irish officer, Colonel Lacy (who confessed to no expectation of the siege succeeding), twice dining on board his ship, and similar hospitality shown to Captain Hardy by De las Torres; this in connexion with the exchange of prisoners. Lord Carpenter, he said, had "very unwillingly" sent 500 men from Port Mahon and he thought that, in view of the strong reinforce-

¹ 4 March (o.s.), R.O. Admiralty 2, 51.

² *Lettres historiques*, lxxi. 466.

³ Burnett from Lisbon, 29 March, R.O. Portugal 34.

⁴ Dormer, 5 May, *ibid.*

⁵ R.O. Admiralty 2, 51.

⁶ 16 and 20 March (o.s.), *ibid.*, and Newcastle to Wager, 7 March (o.s.), S.P. Dom. Naval 78. The troops numbered about 1,600. The largest of the eight transports for them was but of 360 tons, the smallest of 150. Among the volunteer officers were Lords Mark Kerr, James Cavendish, Henry Beauclerk, and Charles Hay.

⁷ Wager, 29 March (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 79, Admiralty 1, 378.

ments arrived or on their way, they might be sent back. He had landed the *Rosario's* lower guns, very good 18-pounders, which gave the garrison now some fifty pieces against the Spaniards' thirty at the most. Although the latter threw a good many shells, 70 or 80 a night, "they seldom do any hurt. Men find means to avoid them by custom." Not more than ten had been killed since the siege began, while the enemy had lost very heavily.¹

By 24 April Wager, now flying his flag on the *Torbay*, was again on the watch off Cadiz, still leaving his smaller ships at Gibraltar "to cruize on the back of the Hill and off Cabarita Point to intercept Spanish embarkations and secure our merchant ships against half gallys &c^a, and one of them will generally be going to Tetuan or Tangier."² The *Colchester* and *Swallow*, on Lord Carpenter's appeal, he had ordered to Port Mahon to protect that place and to clean, and the *Tiger* and *Portland* to the West Indies, as instructed.³

There Hosier, in spite of shortage of stores and provisions and of sickness among his crews, had stayed on his station off Puerto Bello until November 1726. In August he reported the seizure of three sloops and a ship bound for Vera Cruz with cocoa. On one of the former he found letters which informed him, with other intelligence, of the arrival of the flota at Havana. He made these seizures, he says, because the Peruvian merchants would only pay for goods delivered in the river Chagre, where only small vessels could go. He had sent home the *Royal George*, "who is very rich," under escort.⁴ As northerly winds would prevent his staying where he was after October he proposed then to "ply up" to Brete I, near Cartagena. He had many sick, but the only fresh food that he could get for his men was turtle, and that at an extravagant price.⁵

He did not have it all his own way. A report from Count Clavijo, dated Cartagena, 7 August, ran :

Je me trouve dans ce port à raccommoder mon navire qui a été maltraité en combattant avec un vaisseau Anglois, qui fit une grande défense, néanmoins

¹ The same, 9 and 10 April (o.s.).

² In another dispatch : "There are more services for the small ships than they can perform. Cruizing on the Spanish imbarcations is a necessary work, but the sloops sail so ill, and are besides so weak, that they can't be ventured alone ; one ship will always be wanted to go to Tetuan or Tangier, from whence, besides provisions, they have fascines brought over by transports employ'd in that service ; and the two garrisons of Gibraltar and Port Mahon are always wanting a ship to go to Lisbon for money for the soldiers, from whence they send so little at a time that one ship doth not seem sufficient for that service."

³ The same, 23 and 25 April (o.s.).

⁴ There was news in October that the *Royal George* had arrived at Jamaica safely on 2 September (*Lettres historiques*, lxx. 576).

⁵ Hosier, 26 and 29 July (o.s.) 1726, R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 80, and to secretary Burchett, Admiralty 1, In-Letters 230.

je le pris et le conduisis à ce port avec sa cargaison. Le combat fut si fort que les embouchures des canons touchoient l'un autre. La cargaison importera avec l'argent et effets cent mille pièces de huit.¹

In reprisal for the stoppage of trade to the Chagre the Spanish authorities placed the English factory under guard and seized the South Sea Company's sloop *Don Carlos*. Another vessel taken was the turtle-fisher *Abigail*. Hosier's letter of protest to Cornejo on these proceedings is a good example of his style.

The inclosed is an oath made by a turtler of the pirace committed by one of your perriaguas sent by you to Carthagena. The next is to acquaint you of breaking your word of honour, althô you have given it under your hand, by sending tradeing vessels out of your harbour, which is contrary to your promise; besides you have set centries over our factors and made prisoners of them. You well know it was in my power to have starved you in the place, however I doubt not but matters will change in a little time, and made sensible you are the aggressor. I always told you our factors, in case you would keep the vessels in harbour, I would deliver these up to you, provided you let ours come out first, and as you have been pleased to say that I protected the vessels tradeing here, you well know to the contrary, for it was you that sent for most of them yourselves, for your own advantage of trade, and fetching the goods in a publick manner by your own boats. I am further to tell you, if you dont directly release the vessells, and take the centries off our factory, you are to answer to the consequences that may attend it. Whenever I made any complaint to you and the President about piracies committed on the subjects of the King my master by the subjects of the King your mas^r, your answer [was] it was out of your command, but by all your behaviour I find its by your connivance and shall beleive it so till I see your better proceedings.²

At a council of war held on 14 October it was decided, in view of the expected northerly winds and the little sea-room, to remove to Brete I, and also to give up the captured vessels, considering that the season was too late for trade and that they were not in a condition to put to sea. Negotiations resulted in an agreement that all ships seized on either side at Puerto Bello or Cartagena should be released, that the embargo on the factory should be removed, and traffic to the Chagre permitted, but that none of the goods or treasure on board the galleons should be sent to Europe,

¹ French translation sent to England by Stanhope on 6 January 1727, R.O. Spain 95. The British ship was reported to be the *Diamond*, captured by a Spanish man-of-war, 54 guns, Captain de las Torres, after a fight of six or seven hours (*Lettres historiques*, lxx. 582). She had been sent with the *Winchelsea* to Jamaica for repair after damage by lightning. But Hosier had her back with him, perhaps by exchange, in February 1727 (p. 647, note).

² Hosier, 23 September (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 69.

pending further orders. Alderete and Cornejo further undertook to write to the viceroy of Peru and other authorities to obtain release of British vessels seized in ports not under their own jurisdiction.¹ The exchange having been effected Hosier could depart. In a dispatch to Newcastle of 22 October (o.s.) he drew a melancholy picture of his situation. He wished he had had orders to destroy the galleons at once, when he could have done it easily, but now he had buried 360 men and had 900 sick; the *Dunkirk* and *Nottingham* useless from this cause. The Spaniards had at least 1,200 dead, "but they can be recruited, and we cannot"; they had now the stronger force. He would have to press men from the trading sloops in order to take the *Dunkirk* to Jamaica, and doubted ability to man her even there. Nevertheless he would not leave the coast without further commands. "Lett there be force never so great, I'll loose my selfe and all, but the money shall not go off the coast." ²

The South Sea Company's sloops referred to were employed to collect merchandise for its two "annual" ships, permitted to trade to Puerto Bello and Vera Cruz by treaty. Besides the *Don Carlos* at the former port the *Elizabeth* and *Lavinia* had been seized at Cartagena. Both were released, in accordance with the agreement made, but treasure on board the *Elizabeth* and *Lavinia*, amounting to 90,000 pieces of eight, was removed and kept at Cartagena under seal. Protesting against this to the governor, Don Luis de Aponte, Hosier wrote: "I am to observe to you that the Assiento contract is (if a publick warr was proclaimed) they are to have one year and halfs time to recover and send away there effects, at present there is none proclaimed." The answer was that the seizure was justified by the embargo placed upon the galleons; that the ship had been freed; and that the money was sealed up in a chest, of which the keys were in the hands of the factors and would so remain until orders concerning it were received from Spain.³

By Christmas 1726 Hosier was back at Jamaica, having been forced to repair thither by want of provisions and the great mortality among his crews. From Port Royal he reported the *Dunkirk* and *Nottingham* left at Blewfields with only 28 and 22 men respectively to work them; he had buried, he said, 640 of his best and had put 900 sick on shore. Nevertheless he proposed to return to his station in a week's time with five of his ships, if he could get 300

¹ Documents (copies or translations), 3 to 17 October (o.s.), *ibid.* 80.

² *Ibid.*

³ Hosier, 11 January (o.s.) 1727, and the reply, 24 January, with documents in connexion, *ibid.*

men.¹ Accordingly he was back at Cartagena on 14 January 1727, to find the galleons there with no money, the goods having been sent for sale to Panama. He still reported bad gales, want of water, sickness, and the necessity of careening his ships soon or finding them unserviceable. He sent in his protest, above mentioned, to the governor, remarking in his dispatch, "The Spaniards are a sett of gentry of noe honour, as will appear, the best way is to use them in the like manner." He had word of two guardacostas on the coast under Count de Clavijo and hoped to catch them.² Early in February he received the orders to remove to Matanzas Bay and was informed of the reinforcement ordered to join him there; this, it was said, on word of six or seven Spanish men-of-war preparing to sail to force the passage of the flota home. There was no object, he was told, in his remaining to watch Puerto Bello, and since single ships attempting to bring the treasure removed from the galleons must make first for Havana, posted at Matanzas Bay hard by he would be able to stop both them and the flota. He should leave, however, some ships to lie off Puerto Bello or to cruise in the Windward Passage between Cuba and Hispaniola (Haiti) or elsewhere that he might think most convenient. On the other hand, if he had sure word of the flota having left Havana he must stay where he was and send for the ships from Matanzas Bay to join him.³

On receipt of these orders Hosier returned to Jamaica, leaving an advice-boat to watch the movements of the galleons and other suspected ships.⁴ Arrived at Port Royal and deeming the Windward Passage practicable for the treasure ships, while alternatively

¹ Hosier, 14 December (o.s.) 1726, R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 80, Admiralty 1, 230, received 22 February (o.s.) 1727. In the *Political State of Great Britain* (xxxiii. 332), after an account of a terrible hurricane at Jamaica, when some fifty vessels were sunk, we read: "This misfortune was, in a great measure, alleviated by the effect it produced, for Rear-admiral Hosier being some time after obliged to come to Jamaica to careen his ships, to take care of the sickly men on board his squadron, and to recruit those he had lost by diseases while he lay at the Bastimentos, near Porto Bello, he found in Jamaica such great numbers of seamen, who belong'd to the ships lately lost and were glad of getting employment, and on the other hand his sick men were so well look'd after, that in a few weeks the said squadron was better mann'd than when they first arrived there from England."

² The same, 17 January (o.s.) 1727, received 17 April (o.s.).

³ Instructions to Hosier, 18 November (o.s.) 1726, B.M. Add. MS. 19332, original, copies, with other information, R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 69, 80.

⁴ Hosier, 29 January (o.s.) 1727, *ll.cc.*, received 17 April (o.s.). With this dispatch is a list of the Spanish ships in the West Indies: at Havana, under Admiral Castañeta, two of 60 guns, three of 50 (two of them launched there in the previous year), and a French ship of 34, and under Commodore de Torres "of the Barlivoento fleet" one of 50 and one of 30 ("the convoy from the coast of Curacos to Vera Cruz and back to the coast") and a brigantine of 12; at Cartagena Admiral Cornejo's two ships of 70 and 60 guns, Count Clavijo's of 60, a Dutch built ship of 50, a frigat of 26, and an "aviso" of 12.

they might slip into Havana unseen by himself on a station twenty leagues away, he appointed five ships under his second in command, Captain Edward St. Lo, to watch the Passage, and set to work to man and provision the rest as best he could.¹ Arrived in Matanzas Bay on 19 March with the *Bredah*, *Ripon*, *Leopard* and *Greyhound* he failed to find the reinforcement promised, and at Havana learnt from the South Sea Company's factors there of the sailing of the flota two months before. On the ground of requiring a month or six weeks to get back to the main, so that if he stayed on the galleons also might escape him—not wanting for intelligence “as our traders daily give them,”—he decided to sail for Cape S. Antonio (the western extremity of Cuba), “well knowing they must make the said cape before they can attempt getting into the gulph.”² There he remained on useless watch two months.

Stanhope, arrived at Bayonne, explained why he had stayed at Madrid so long and how he had not dared to write, lest violence should be done upon his courier. From like apprehensions, he said, Van der Meer had burnt dispatches arriving for him after he had left. He described how the South Sea Company's agent, Francis Stratford, who had travelled with him as far as Pamplona, had been arrested there, in spite of solemn assurances by De la Paz, on an order from Patiño sent after him by express and on the “frivolous pretence” of his not having sent in an account of the company's affairs.³ Newcastle had previously desired him, on his arrival at Paris, to give Fleury the most circumstantial account he could of Ripperda's revelations, with proofs of their truth, such as the letters to him from the Pretender, “of which you know we have the originals,” and the schemes of Liria and Wharton, “it being of great consequence that the court of France should be truly informed of the disposition of that of Spain and particularly of the engagements entered into in favour of the Pretender,” which the imperialists, as Stanhope would see from the memorial lately delivered by Palm, denied “with the greatest

¹ The same, 15 February (o.s.) 1727, received with the others on 17 April (o.s.). St. Lo's ships were to be the *Superbe*, *Nottingham*, *Dunkirk* and *Diamond*, when they could be manned, and the *Dragon*, if and when arrived and ready; she had parted company on the voyage from Cartagena and had not yet been heard of.

² The same, 10 March (o.s.), received 13 May (o.s.). With this dispatch is another list of the Spanish force at Cartagena: the *Catalan*, 66 guns, captain Don Francisco Cornejo, the *Sanganetia* (? *San Gennadio*), 64, Don Francisco Chavis, the *Potencia*, 50, Conde de Clavijo, the *San Francisco*, 44, Don Vicente de las Torres, a “pingue” (pink) of 26 guns, a “patache” of 20, and ten galleons. A South Sea Company's ship, the *Queen of Spain*, 14 guns, was reported taken, and the *San Pedro* galleon, 36, accidentally burnt.

A contemporary map, B.M. Add. MS. 38133 *, shows the regular return route for the galleons to have been by the north coast of Cuba.

³ Stanhope, 23 March, R.O. Spain 95.

assurance." After that he was to come on to England, where he might be certain of a most gracious reception.¹

With Portugal all this time amicable relations were maintained, in spite of incidents such as the escape of certain Jews, "under prosecution on account of the tobacco-contract," from Lisbon on board a British man-of-war.² John V, besides opening his ports to the British admirals, in spite of Spanish remonstrance, allowed supply of materials for repairs to their ships from his own stores, and purchase of powder for Gibraltar. He offered also his mediation, Mendonça intimating to Dormer that his master could not see without concern war between powers to one of whom he was "from long time engaged by inviolable treaties" and with the other "was entering into a strict friendship by the concerted double marriages." For which reason "he must be extremely desirous of seeing a speedy amicable adjustment, wishing his good offices might be thought usefull to conduce towards it."³ When, however, Galvão made formal offer of Portuguese mediation the answer ran as follows. The king of England's interests could never be in better hands, and for that reason it was thought proper to explain the circumstances which seemed to threaten Europe with a war, in order that the king of Portugal might judge what he could do. All that his Majesty and his allies sought was to conserve rights and privileges enjoyed for a great number of years and confirmed by solemn treaties, and while late proposals from Vienna and Madrid were so uncertain and captious that they could not but lead to new disputes, the counter-proposals were clear and positive and not to be rejected, were the emperor and the king of Spain really desirous of peace. The answer must be awaited and his Majesty consult his allies upon it. Should a congress be arranged and a mediator wanted the king of Portugal would be preferred as such to any other.⁴

Dormer on the other hand was warned that, as he knew, "there is no great reason to depend upon Mo^r Galvao's inclination to

¹ Newcastle to him, 4 March (o.s.), *ibid.* 97.

² Dormer, on inquiry consequent upon instances made to him, was assured by Captain Bowler of the vessel in question, the *Argyle*, that the men were not on board, but when Galvão protested in London the truth was discovered. Newcastle thereon regretted the bad effect of such incidents when it was desired to avoid every "handle of complaint" and notified the issue of strict orders to captains of ships to prevent such for the future. And again: "it is very improper, especially in the present juncture, to give offence to the king of Portugal by a proceeding that he takes most heinously, and which cannot be supported by any law or any treaty in being" (21 February and 4 April (o.s.), R.O. Portugal 32, with Galvão's protest and the answer).

³ Dormer, 23 March, *ibid.* 34.

⁴ Rough draft of a letter to Galvão, 4 April (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Ministers 39.

improve and cultivate a good understanding between the two courts, by representing matters at home in the fairest light." So that he must return only "a general *thô* very gracious answer," saying that what more was to be signified would be delivered in writing, and handing in a copy of the preliminaries sent to Vienna in great confidence for the king's private information, with arguments, such as would occur to him, to keep the king "in the disposition he seems to be and in the resolution of preserving an exact neutrality."¹ Accordingly Dormer expressed, as from himself, "most earnest wishes that the differences with Spain might be composed by the interposition of his Portuguese Majesty," than whom "Great Britain could never desire a more equitable mediator."²

Of relations of Portugal with Spain Stanhope had written at the end of January 1727: "for several months past great coolness and dissatisfactions have visibly appeared between the two courts." He adduced as reasons the Portuguese refusal to accede to the treaty of Vienna, difficulties raised about the marriages, and "what has at last brought matters to a direct breach," the refusal of Capecelatro's demand for exclusion of British ships from Portuguese harbours. In anger at this he heard it almost openly said at Madrid that the marriages were not likely to take place, and lately, "as the ultimatum," of assent offered to Portugal standing neutral in the war, on the condition of an underhand supply of money.³ Dormer for his part had written previously, in regard to Portuguese pretensions founded on the treaty of Utrecht: "it is remarked here that during the whole transaction of the marriages neither this nor any other point between the two crowns has the appearance of any forwardness of being adjusted," while by common report the marriages were broken off.⁴ Stanhope was assured in answer of his Majesty's extreme pleasure at the state of affairs between Spain and Portugal, his report being confirmed by advices received at Paris; the Portuguese understood their interests too well to quarrel with the maritime powers, and he must give the strongest assurances of protection to their minister at Madrid. Dormer was told that Spanish delays in the matter of the marriages were due to endeavours "to engage the Portuguese in their quarrel further than is consistent with their interest or inclination, of which the crown of Portugal now cannot but be sensible, and may probably be induced to free its self from any such

¹ Newcastle to Dormer, same date, R.O. Portugal 32.

² Dormer, 14 May, *ibid.* 34.

³ Stanhope, 30 January 1727, R.O. Spain 95.

⁴ Dormer, 4 January, R.O. Portugal 34.

engagements"; he must avail himself of all proper opportunities to that end and prevent the Portuguese from being "forced or aw'd" into compliance with Spanish demands, giving assurance of his Majesty doing everything to keep them "free and independent." ¹

In fact, April was well advanced before D'Abrantes at Madrid and De los Balbases at Lisbon made their formal entry as ambassadors. Even then it was whispered, says Dormer, that the latter would "speak upon no business until this court declares they will enter into the league with Spain. If so, I am of opinion he will be long silent. . . . For my own part I cannot yet perceive that I fare worse for his coming." ² His prognostication of delay was right. Only at the end of September were contracts signed for the marriages of the prince of Asturias (afterwards King Ferdinand of Spain) to Maria Barbara of Portugal, and of the prince of Brazil (afterwards King Joseph of Portugal) to the Spanish infanta, Maria Anna Victoria. The marriages themselves were solemnised on 19 January 1729.

¹ Newcastle to Stanhope, 6 February (o.s.), R.O. Spain 97, and to Dormer, 17 January (o.s.), Portugal 32.

² Dormer, 5 May, *ibid.* 34.

CHAPTER XLII

THE ALLIES' TERMS

WHEN Broglie communicated the Austrian proposals in London he was begged, indeed, to transmit to the French government his Majesty's sense of the sincere and cordial manner of their action, but it was pointed out that the terms were such as to give Austria and Spain what they wanted, permission for the galleons to return, while discussion of the just pretensions of the allies of Hanover was postponed and their heavy expenditure must be continued. He was handed in substitution a project of preliminaries, which, it was said, his Majesty hoped would be well received at Paris and which the court of Vienna, if really disposed to peace, would probably accept, while in the contrary case the sincere desire of the allies to prevent a rupture would be clearly shown.¹ These counter-proposals were :

1. Suspension of the Ostend Company's and of all other trade from the Austrian Netherlands to the East Indies during a term long enough to have the effect of a veritable abolition of the company's charter, the actual naming of which was avoided out of consideration for the emperor's dignity.
2. The emperor and the king of Spain to agree to re-establish all privileges of trade to Spain and the West Indies on the footing anterior to the treaty of Vienna ; the emperor's subjects to enjoy no greater privileges than the French English or Dutch.
3. All other rights and possessions whatsoever to stand on the footing established by the treaties of Utrecht Baden and the Quadruple Alliance.
4. In order to prevent an outbreak in the north, and consequently a conflagration of all Europe, agreement to be made that neither the emperor nor the king of Spain nor any of the allies of Hanover would take forcible action there or help in any way to create troubles in Lower Germany or in

¹ To Broglie, 15 February (o.s.) 1727, unsigned draft, R.O. Foreign Ministers 5.

the north, to prejudice of the treaties of pacification there.

5. All this agreed, and hostilities ceased, the galleons and the Ostend Company's ships to be allowed to return home.
6. (To be added in case of acceptance of the other articles) :
None of the parties to incommode one another on account of provisions of the treaties of Vienna and Hanover.

Commenting on the above Newcastle suggested that the term of suspension might be such as the Dutch should consider sufficient to attain the end in view. The fourth article he stated to have been brought in because the close connexion of affairs of the north with those of the south would inevitably produce a war, unless something were settled to prevent it, while the last, to be added if approved in France, might offer the greatest inducement to the court of Vienna to agree ; there was no guarantee of the emperor's succession, only an undertaking not to raise disturbance on account of the stipulations of the treaty of Vienna. Again Newcastle expressed the satisfaction of George I at the just and agreeable sentiments of the French ministers. "This artifice of the Imperial court has turned upon themselves, and instead of making the impression they expected upon his Most Christian Majesty has only served to furnish the French court with an opportunity of giving his Majesty the clearest demonstration imaginable of their sincerity and good intention." Were the proposals approved, they might be sent to Fénelon and Finch for consultation with the "friends" and decision on how to proceed with the States-General, "without whom no further step can be taken in this matter." Also Newcastle dilated on the effect which knowledge of separate Austrian proposals might have at Madrid in making evident desire on the part of the court of Vienna to evade its treaty engagements.¹

Finch in Holland was instructed to discuss the articles fully with the "friends" and report exactly. He also was informed that the last of them was drawn "with a particular view to please the Emperor," who would be "the easier upon other heads, if he finds his favorite point not opposed." There was no "guaranty on that subject, which it is not our business to be involved in, but rather to have our hands at liberty."²

Save for verbal alterations the document was returned from Paris approved, the term of suspension suggested being a reasonable time, say seven years. This was accepted in England, though

¹ Newcastle to Robinson, 16 February (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32749, enclosing a copy of the counter-proposals (printed by Rousset, iii. 388), and similarly to Stanhope, same date, R.O. Spain 97.

² Townshend to W. Finch, 14 February (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293.

only as an irreducible minimum; the alterations, particularly in the fourth article, "drawn in a shorter and stronger way," were termed improvements; and the paper was immediately sent on to the Hague. Newcastle wrote:

The King has great hopes, considering the prosperous condition of the affairs of the allies, that the Emperor will accept these proposals; if he should not, we shall at least reap this advantage from having made them, that we shall know of a certainty what we have to trust to and not be amused any longer with insidious and fruitless negociations, which have no other tendency than to divide the allies and to gain time for the Emperor to put himself into a condition to execute his schemes.

On this account it was thought that the proposals should be presented at Vienna as an ultimatum, and that the transaction should by no means be allowed to delay the military preparations, or efforts to obtain accessions.¹

When Fénelon had communicated the proposals from Vienna formally, with extracts from the instructions on the matter to himself and Broglie, Finch had been able to report the deputies not a little pleased with the assurances of sincere intention "to act in all respects for the common interests of the alliance," removing the suspicion of France which so long had been "a clogg on all affairs."² No resolution, he wrote later, would be taken until knowledge of his Majesty's sentiments was had. The "friends" made many excuses for what had passed at Vienna and gave "all assurances that they will not, nor can not, do otherwise than go hand in hand with his Majesty"; yet there were several men of consequence in the government "so apprehensive of a rupture, that they are ready to grasp at anything that looks like an accommodation. . . . It is not that there is a man in the Republick that desires to act separately from England, but there are some who think *qu'en faisant un pas en avant, on pourroit entraîner sa Majesté à faire le même.*"³ Previously Finch had said that on first suggestions of a suspension of the Ostend

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 27 February (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

² In his memorial of 24 February (Finch sent a copy) Fénelon absolutely denied the supposition that his government had favoured suspension for two years only, and denounced the proposal for double mediation as a trap. It was all along agreed, he said, that the term must be such as would entail veritable destruction of the Ostend Company. But seeing that the offers were but overtures it had been thought well to pursue discussion, the time being come to test the sincerity of the court of Vienna and discover its real intentions. With this object it was necessary to deliberate on the proposals, in order to present a concerted answer. There was no feebleness on the part of the allies of Holland; the proposals came from Vienna; all that they wanted was decision whether war or peace.

Yet more than a fortnight later Itterssum was writing of an imperial rescript shown about by Königsegg, which attributed the proposal for a two-year suspension to France and asserted the emperor to be in accord with Louis XV on all points except Gibraltar (14 March, R.O. Holland 296).

³ Finch, 25 and 28 February, R.O. Holland 293.

trade for a time Slingelandt had pronounced that no shorter term than three or fourscore years could be accepted in lieu of revocation of the charter.¹

Townshend answered that it would be seen from the counter-proposals "that tho' a suspension in name is offered to be consented to, yet it is to have the real effect of an abolition of the Ostende trade; and will therefore I hope answer Mons^r Slingelandt's notion, being offered to make the Emperor more easy in his nicety about the point of honour." And on the other head: "Those people in Holland do us great injustice, who entertain an opinion that we are not ready to treat and agree. None of these disputes are of our seeking, neither have they been widened or any agreement protracted by our fault." Then, when sending the proposals as amended at Paris, he observed that the king had at first thought a seven-year term of suspension too short, but inquiry having been made of "some persons here skilful in that trade" he was now inclined to think the term sufficient "to ruin the Comp^a entirely," seeing that its factories established in the Indies at great cost would be destroyed and after such losses and suppression no one would venture their money again, even though the emperor should re-establish the company; and especially if the allies, as his Majesty thought they ought, should enter into a guarantee among themselves to oppose such re-establishment. Were the terms accepted the public peace would be secured, while their refusal "would betray such a spirit of insincerity as must rouse great indignation every where, and even in France, to see such reasonable proposals rejected." Fénelon being already instructed, Finch must join with him in pushing on a matter of so great importance and report immediately, for the intention was to send instructions to the ministers at Vienna to sign at once.²

As first drawn Finch had been able to report the counter-proposals "intirely liked and approved of by our three friends," who owned them to accord with their previous views and remarked, as he read the articles, "*ça est juste*," or "*justement comme ils avoient pensé*," or "*bien imaginé*."³ Now he and Fénelon, at a formal conference with the deputies, met with objection at first to a term of seven years only, but in the end succeeded in obtaining admission

¹ The same, 21 February.

² Townshend to Finch, 17 to 26 February (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Finch, 4 March, *ibid.* In the resolution adopted by the States-General on the subject, which he enclosed, it was stated that although only that observance of treaties was desired, which entailed abolition of the Ostend Company, yet from love of peace a suspension of 25 years would be accepted, in the hope that at the ensuing congress the emperor would make no difficulty about agreeing to total cessation of the trade.

of its sufficiency, given a guarantee by the allies for mutual support against re-establishment of the company. On Finch showing that this was his government's own proposal they were satisfied, he said, and promised to lose no time in delivering an answer.¹ A week later he could report acceptance with only one amendment of any importance; the term of seven years to be proposed only as an irreducible minimum, and one of ten preferred. "In truth, my Lord, since the propositions were made and the answer to them approved by his Majesty and the French court, no people ever shew'd so great an inclination and impatience to make up matters. They talk indeed of what they will do in case the offers made by the allies are rejected, but at present they think of nothing else but coming to an agreement." ²

Walpole, a week earlier, had learnt from the Dutch ambassador, Boreel, that his government insisted on a 25-year suspension, and on the other hand believed that the French would assent to five years, rather than break off the negotiation.³ Afterwards Boreel informed him of orders received to settle on the basis of 25 years and subsistence of all former treaties in their full force and extent. Knowing that at the date of these orders the counter-proposals agreed by Great Britain and France could not have been received in Holland, Walpole answered only that he had not yet full instructions. After which he repaired to Versailles, argued that the Dutch would certainly not accept less than seven years, and suggested that should they show the least reluctance in regard to what was now proposed it might be proper to offer them "renewal of our guaranty relating to the Ostend trade in terms so strong as should declare our understanding the suspension of that trade to be the same as the entire abolition of it," with further guarantee of measures to prevent its re-establishment, should that be attempted. This he thought the French ministers to approve.⁴

Shortly demand for a seven-year suspension was agreed. Townshend instructed Saint-Saphorin that he would receive from Walpole preliminary proposals drafted in France in accordance with his Majesty's views and approved by him as well as by France and Holland. He must execute Walpole's orders, conjointly with the ministers of the contracting powers, without delay, but must not himself sign, as he was not a British subject.⁵ For this purpose

¹ The same, 13 March.

² The same, 21 March.

³ H. Walpole, 14 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

⁴ The same, 17 March, with arguments at length.

⁵ Townshend to Saint-Saphorin, 10 March (o.s.), R.O. Germany, Empire, 60. "Vous savez que comme vous n'êtes pas Anglois, il est impossible que vous signiez quelque instrument public comme un ministre dûement autorisé, sans faire brèche à nos loix."

full powers were sent to George Woodward, "to sign preliminary articles or any other instruments whatsoever which We shall think fit to agree upon, for quieting the growing disturbances," subject to the direction and approval of Saint-Saphorin and the instructions from Walpole.¹ Informing the latter of this Newcastle said that should it happen that Saint-Saphorin and Woodward were expelled from Vienna in consequence of the Palm affair, then it was desired that Richelieu and Bruyninx might signify his Majesty's consent to the preliminaries, "but upon this express condition, that they shall not recede from any of the points as they are now settled," especially in regard to diminution of the seven-year term, and that a "speedy and categorical" answer should be given without the least abatement.²

Brogie at the same time reported an interview at which Newcastle had said that, in spite of the justification for refusal of negotiation and engagement in war with the utmost vigour, afforded by Palm's injurious memorial and by the attack upon Gibraltar, yet his Majesty, from regard to the king of France and for his own word, would always hold to the preliminary articles sent, provided no change in them on any pretext, a condition reiterated several times emphatically. He notified consent to Richelieu and Bruyninx signing a treaty on those terms in the king's name, were his own ministers expelled from Vienna, it being hoped that in case of refusal the king of France would move troops to his frontiers to act as soon as the season allowed and repel force by force.³ Later it was proposed that Morville Walpole and Boreel should deliver the preliminaries to Fonseca at a conference, and a duplicate be handed to Massei. Boreel, being so ill with the gout that he could not leave his bed, authorised Walpole to act in his name. Fonseca, however, politely declining, it was decided to send the proposals to Vienna through the channel of Massei, with instructive letters to Saint-Saphorin Woodward and Richelieu. It was agreed to put forward a ten-year suspension as the first demand, and to insist that the terms were presented as an ultimatum.⁴

Prospects, however, favoured war rather than peace. Saint-

¹ Full powers and instructions of date 28 February (o.s.), *ibid.* and King's Letters 3. "As you cannot yet be sufficiently acquainted with these great and important matters, you will in all things take the advice of Mons^r de St. Saphorin, who is a consummate master in the management of these affairs."

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 9 March (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32749. And similarly Townshend to him next day, enclosing the orders to be sent on to Saint-Saphorin and Woodward and the latter's full powers, should they stay on at Vienna. R.O. France 185.

³ Brogie to Morville, 20 March, intercepted, R.O. Confidential 1.

⁴ H. Walpole, 25 and 26 March, with copies of the various documents, B.M. Add. MS. 32749 and R.O. France 185.

Saphorin was reporting continued movements of troops and importunity for Spanish money.¹ From various quarters came word of 30,000 Austrians marching for the Netherlands, and the expulsion of Palm from London portended reprisal. French minds were seriously disturbed. Marshal Villars saw England at war with Spain, the Swedish accession likely to be no more than an act of neutrality, the Danes, "suivant leur génie naturel en négociation," making every day fresh difficulties, the Sardinian alliance hopeless, the Prussian neutrality offers not accepted, the help of 40,000 Russians offered to the emperor.² And at this moment came the news of the return of the Spanish flota.

That, indeed, Townshend boasted, gave little concern in England; in fact, stocks had risen, the merchants feeling secure about their property as not distinguishable from that of the Spaniards and knowing besides that violence would ruin Spanish trade to the West Indies, by destruction of credit. The worst to be expected, he thought, was an increase of the "indulto," now 5 per cent. and in the war 20 per cent.³ At Paris, on the other hand, feeling was very different. Walpole had never seen Fleury so "down and uneasy" as at the news, apprehending seizure of the considerable French effects. An "artful account" from Cadiz, he wrote, set forth how Hosier's expedition had saved ships of the South Sea Company and

given the English and Dutch interlopers opportunities to make vast advantages by their fraudulent commerce, and by furnishing provisions at excessive rates, for piastres, to the Spanish colonies, while the French and other nations were entirely deprived of any benefit from the West Indies by the galleons being detained so long by force there, which was the chief reason of the scarcity of money, and the want of publick credit here. This, together with the uneasiness of the French merchants least their effects brought by the flota should be confiscated, and Count Konegsegg's letter to M. Fonseca, making the sequestration or restitution of them depend upon the behaviour of France at this juncture, created altogether a greater damp upon the Cardinal's mind than I ever saw, and certainly by the encouragement of some in Council, who lay hold of all incidents to our disadvantage, occasioned M. de Morville's dispatch of the 24th instant to Count Broglio, in which I apprehend the affair of the galleons, as well as what relates to M. Palm, is mentioned in a way that cannot be extremely pleasing to his Majesty.

In spite of arguments on the necessity of keeping back the galleons and on the little relief to the miserable condition of Spain the flota could bring, yet the cardinal seemed already to see the former arrived,

¹ 5 March, R.O. Germany, Empire, 60. Private people at Genoa, he said again, were being tried by the Spanish court for advances and ought to be intimidated.

² *Mémoires*, v. 50-54.

³ To Du Bourgay, 21 March (o.s.), R.O. Prussia 22.

doubting Hosier's power to stop them. On the subject of Morville's dispatch Walpole had discoursed to Fleury "in so full, strong but amicable a manner that he was desirous to have it altered," and when informed that it was already gone had expressed his surprise, seeing that he had instructed Morville to show it first to Walpole. On the whole the cardinal had given "strongest assurances and protestations of his steadiness, of his resolution to declare war on Spain, and of his acting vigourously and in concert with the allies, in case the propositions now sent to Vienna be not accepted."¹

Brogie having communicated in the greatest confidence the dispatch in question Newcastle indited a budget of arguments to be used by Walpole in reply. The chief thing, he said, was to combat the assertion that Hosier's expedition had been contrary to French advice, for although it had been sent without previous concert the French court had approved of it throughout. "If they are so alarmed at the Spaniards having got home 8 millions of pieces of eight (for at last it comes to be no more by Mr. Stanhope's account, and it may be much less, as you will find by the inclosed advices), what would they have been if the whole 30 millions that the galleons and flota were to have brought, had arrived in Spain last summer, which was singly prevented by the wise and prudent precautions that were taken by his Majesty?" How much better to have stopped more than two-thirds, than to have let the whole come through!

Then on receiving Walpole's letter Newcastle wrote that his Majesty did not doubt of Fleury's sincerity, but feared weakness on his part. The letter from Cadiz gave a very false account. One South Sea Company's ship had come safely home, but another, the *Prince Frederick*, very richly laden, was detained at Vera Cruz. And although merchants had been less exposed to attack by the guardacostas, they had suffered very considerably by the stoppage of trade with Spain and on the whole much more than the French, whose property on the galleons was safe. Certainly much more damage would be done to them, were the treaty of Vienna to take effect.²

Already Walpole was able to reassure. He related how his expression of concern that the preliminaries sent to Vienna had not been accompanied by a statement that the allies expected "a clear and explicit answer in a short time," having suspended hostilities against Spain only in expectation of such, had elicited confidence from Fleury that he had taken a more effectual method, namely, by charging Montgon to write fully to the queen of Spain:

¹ H. Walpole, 21 and 26 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 18 and 21 March (o.s.), *ibid.*, a copy of Morville's dispatch to Brogie, dated 23 March, therewith.

confessor on "the resolution of France for declaring war against Spain in case there was no accommodation of matters soon."¹ Also the cardinal had recounted the firm stand that he had taken at the last meeting of the Council "without the least opposition or contradiction, while the marshal D'Huxelles hung down his head" and the duke of Orleans supported. "By what the Cardinal let fall I find he himself is preparing proper matter for a declaration of war against Spain, in case the preliminaries should not be agreed to." Morville confirmed that he "had opened his mind in the strongest manner." And so, Walpole concluded, "I am really of opinion that notwithstanding the Cardinal may be for a time affected by some incidents, yet he is certainly steady in the main, and that he is determined to give the allies of France no reason to complain and will make fidelity to his engagements the chief view and principle of all his counsels and actions."

In a very private letter of the same date Walpole recounted an interview with Montgon, who had talked freely on the disastrous consequences of the alliance with Austria to Spain, the court of Vienna only wanting money, and had said that Philip and Elizabeth, having allowed him to come to Paris on private business, had retained him as a private correspondent through the queen's confessor without the knowledge of Königsegg. Walpole priming him with an account of the preliminaries, of the prosperous state of affairs in England, and so on, he had agreed to write the substance of their conversation and next day showed Walpole his letter and left a copy with him for private communication only.²

At about the same time Fleury himself was writing to queen Elizabeth that Louis XV had no desire to declare war on, still less to injure Spain; that letters sent to London to moderate the fire of that court should render it more ready to accept the way of accommodation entered on; and that from Holland was expected full consent to the preliminaries proposed, provided a suspension of the Ostend trade for not less than seven years. "Je prends la liberté de conjurer à genoux Vos Majestés de faciliter cet expédient."³ From Rome it was reported that Cardinal Polignae had been ordered to say there that the king of France would not depart from his engagements but would support them against all, even against Spain, should she attack England or other of his allies, a declaration believed to have caused much perturbation, and exhortation to the king of Spain not to trouble Europe.⁴

¹ "I must own I was extremely pleased to hear this for reasons which your Grace may easily guess."

² H. Walpole, 31 March, *ibid.* The copy of Montgon's letter enclosed.

³ 24 March, Baudrillart, iii. 325.

⁴ *Lettres historiques*, lxxi. 364.

A few days later Walpole was able to reassure further. Although, he wrote, "I never knew any step during my whole ministry here, that ever gave me so much uneasiness," although first agitation about the flota and the aversion of the Council from going to war with Spain had occasioned the "extraordinary dispatch" to Broglie, yet Fleury had "no thoughts of abandoning his allies and present measures," had indeed "upon recollection resumed the vigour and resolution that his real sentiments and station require." Massei, "who is naturally of a very calm and mild temper," had taken occasion to declare to him "in plain and strong terms . . . that the manner in which the preliminaries had been delivered to him and Mr. Fonseca without fixing a time for an answer, and without letting Spain and the Emperor understand that France would, upon refusal or trifling delays in accepting them, take vigorous measures in conjunction with their allies, was not the way for their having the effect, that might be expected from them." This, said Massei's auditor, had made great impression, and Fleury had promised orders to Richelieu to speak in a proper manner, so that his Majesty might at present "depend upon it, that the Cardinal's resolution is as firm as can be desired." Walpole had sent him a "proper translation" of Newcastle's dispatch, with a letter "conceived in such terms, that the communication of your Grace's reasonings might rather be taken in the confidence of a friend, than the expostulations of a minister."¹

Next day, Stanhope being now at Paris, he and Walpole went together to Versailles to press the necessity of a French declaration of war on Spain, should the proposals to Vienna be rejected. For then, they represented, either the emperor must declare war with France, when he would be looked upon in Europe as the aggressor and neither the princes of the empire nor the tsaritsa be obliged to support him, or else, if he refrained, the king of Spain would believe himself abandoned and make peace with the allies. They found neither Fleury nor Morville to object, and later, after a joint audience of the king, heard Fleury declare that he "would sooner dye," or "quit his employment at court," than not support the engagements taken. He promised that orders to fix a time for an answer should be sent to Richelieu at once, and they left with him a draft of what they thought proper to be said, while Morville recounted emphatic representations to Fonseca on the necessity of a speedy reply and of acceptance. Further they informed Fleury that his Majesty would never consent to refer the question of Gibraltar to a congress; any right and title on the part of Spain could not by any means be

¹ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 4 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32749, with a copy of his letter to Fleury of the same date.

admitted after the sense of the parliament had been so fully declared upon that head." ¹

At Vienna, naturally, the news of the flota's return was received with greatest joy. But lately Saint-Saphorin had been painting the situation in the darkest colours, dwelling in page after page of one of his huge essays on the desperate straits from want of money men and war material, abandonment of hope of bringing the empire into a war, and altogether unimaginable embarrassment.² Now Woodward reported ministers "much flushed" by the news, "hoping to be partakers" of treasure valued at 17 million piastres, and new orders for marching troops. Yet, he said, although they talked "very big," their spirits were very low.³

In Holland, Finch advised, the news had roused a good deal of alarm, but at the same time "a greater inclination to act with vigour than I have perceived for a good while. . . . Some of the chief men think seriously of putting themselves in a better condition" and an augmentation of the army was expected. Townshend intimated that his Majesty did not wish to come to an immediate declaration of war, but if the preliminaries were not accepted must insist on the republic taking part. The French ministers in that case, he said, were showing "all the readiness in the world to concur with his Majesty in declaring warr against Spain," and the same was expected from the States-General.

Afterwards, on news of the Swedish accession, Finch could write: "people here talk with a great deal more spirit and vigour than they have hitherto done, and express great satisfaction on his Majesty's conduct and on that of the court of France." Certainly proper action would be taken, were the preliminaries not accepted. Although a direct and categorical answer was not expected at once, but rather amusement and delay until the Ostend ships were safely home, yet "our friends and the chief people here are intirely for vigorous measures." ⁴

Contributory to this confidence were late instructions to Fénelon ⁵ to assure the Dutch that the preliminaries had in view

¹ H. Walpole and Stanhope jointly, 5 and 8 April, *ibid.*

² Saint-Saphorin, 22 March, R.O. Germany, Empire, 60.

³ To Tilson, 2 April, *ibid.*

⁴ Finch, 25 March to 8 April, Townshend to him, 14 and 21 March (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293.

⁵ Louis XV to Fénelon, 25 March, R.O. France 185, copy. Dayrolle wrote on 4 April (R.O. Holland 295): "A letter from the French king to the States-General, which came some days ago, giving all possible assurances, . . . came very seasonably to revive the minds of the people here, very much affected by the reports spread about lately of the French retrograding. The publick seems again to be in a pretty good humour." And Itterssum on 8 April (*ibid.* 296): the king of France's gracious letter and the news of his declaration in London, that if the

their solid advantage, that suspension of the Ostend trade for seven years was thought to be sufficient for their security, for it would ruin the company, that promptitude in effecting a settlement had been necessary, in view of the attack upon Gibraltar, the return of the flota, and Palm's affair, that the deputies' remarks seemed entirely reasonable, as would be seen from the copy of the preliminaries enclosed, and that if the British ministers had to leave Vienna Richelieu would act in such spirit as to leave no doubt that the proposals were an unequivocal ultimatum and that delay would be regarded as a pretext for not concluding and a demonstration that peace was not desired. As to the two points on which particular explanation had been demanded, Louis XV would not only guarantee execution of the preliminary articles, when signed, but even advantages to the republic to be negotiated at a congress. He declared also that all the troops necessary to guard the Dutch frontiers would be ready when required.¹

Newcastle replied to Walpole that all that he and Stanhope had done was approved and that Broglie had communicated a new dispatch "of very different tenour," so that his Majesty was now "perfectly satisfied." Advices from Vienna confirmed Stanhope's report of "diffidence" between Austria and Spain; vigorous measures would probably "increase the disunion between them, if there be any," and convince Philip V "of the rashness and impracticability of the wild projects which at the instigation of the court of Vienna he has entered into." To the hint of mediation by Portugal "you may be assured a proper answer will be returned, and especial care taken to shew that his Majesty will hearken to no proposals of any kind without the participation and concurrence of his allies." While, however, in view of late assurances, it was not supposed that the French would make any difficulty about joining in a declaration of war with Spain, should the proposals be rejected, they must do more; must think seriously of an effectual diversion, in order that the Spaniards might "neither be able to assist the Emperor nor to push their designs against us." The dispatch concluded with a discussion of proper points for an attack on Spain, preference being given to such as would render impracticable a descent on England and so allow British troops to be sent abroad. Then, on Stanhope's return to London, Newcastle expressed the king's satisfaction at his report that the orders suggested for

emperor rejected the propositions he was ready to declare war on Spain conjointly with England, had produced "un calme et une confiance" not seen since the opening of the accession question.

¹ A statement of the Swiss and national troops to be detailed for this service was enclosed.

Richelieu were to be sent, namely, to "insist on the Emperor's declaring at least his approbation of our preliminaries, if he should make any difficulty of signing them in form, till he should have heard from Spain."¹

Thence the news was not satisfactory. After Stanhope's departure it came chiefly through the Dutch embassy, but though Van der Meer wrote much and frequently, his severance from the absent court left him little to retail but rumour and town talk. Monteleon, he says in one place, dared not set foot in his house, and at court "*nostre amy est plus mal que jamais.*"² He had informed De la Paz of the Austrian proposals for accommodation, telling him that if the emperor intended to gain time and to amuse he was greatly deceived, that the allies of Hanover, while making counter-proposals and earnestly desiring peace, were preparing with all energy for war, and that the king of Prussia was gravely discontented with the emperor's failure to carry out his undertakings about Berg. He noted haughtiness increased on the arrival of the flota; renewed demands by Königsegg for money, which he was not likely to get until the emperor had answered inquiries categorically; the king and queen yet further downcast on the news of the duke of Parma's death and his brother's succession;³ and a reported decision to place the private effects on board the flota under sequestration until peace was made; in any case none of the money to be sent to Vienna.

At another interview De la Paz endeavoured to persuade Van der Meer that affairs would accommodate themselves without a general war, since the propositions made by the emperor could not but be accepted by France and Holland. On the other hand, he said, should those two powers follow blindly "*le torrent des passions du ministère d'Angleterre,*" reject the propositions and refuse a congress, then war was inevitable, since the emperor had declared that in that case he would support the king of Spain with all his forces. Van der Meer answered that the interest of his nation was

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 2 and 6 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

² Apparently this was Stalpart. Another reference to the man (29 April) runs: "*Nostre amy est extrêmement dérouteré, et je remarque que Vicenti s'en défie.*" An unsigned letter of 5 May says that the writer had received a very commendatory letter from Morville, but would die of hunger unless Walpole would second Stanhope's pleading in his favour. And another of 12 May, endorsed as from Stalpart, that he had received from Fleury 2,000 livres, for which he was probably obliged to Stanhope. But how, he asked, could he live and render service on so miserable a pittance? (These letters, R.O. Spain 235.) After the preliminaries of peace were signed, Van der Meer asked for reward to Stalpart for his "*services essentiels.*"

³ A ciphered information, of date 8 April, had it that the new duke was showing sentiments directly contrary to those of his brother and had declared his intention to marry and take no heed of the succession established in favour of Don Carlos.

to be at one with England and that suspension of the Ostend Company for two years, as proposed, would not be accepted ; although the States-General desired peace and quiet they would employ all their forces to oblige the emperor to revoke his charter and would not compromise rights acquired under so many treaties. This, he said, he had stated in a long memorial, to which as yet he had not received reply. De la Paz seemed to indicate by a smile that he doubted Dutch firmness and said that the nuncios at Vienna and Paris were working ardently to establish quiet, and that his own master was helping.

In fact, Van der Meer went on to say, although the siege of Gibraltar was going so badly he could not credit the talk at court and in town that the king was changing his policy. He described how favourably young Count Sinzendorf,¹ arrived from Vienna on 24 March, had been received, and the pleasure which the letters he brought appeared to have given. He saw persuasion that France would not take up arms. That being so, he asked, why did not France declare the contrary clearly ? There must be something, he thought, underneath the cards, which he himself did not understand. The fact that Catalonia and Navarre were to be almost denuded of troops, to strengthen the army before Gibraltar, he took to show absence of fear of a French invasion.²

Another report of the state of affairs at the end of March was rendered by Stanhope's steward, the man who had brought the dispatches which Van der Meer burnt and for whom that ambassador had the greatest difficulty in obtaining a return passport, keeping him the while under protection in his own house. He recounted how De las Torres at Gibraltar blamed Castelar for his lack of supplies ; how the latter was telling his friends in confidence " that the General is a madman and has not done one right thing," most of the other generals concurring in this opinion ; how Patiño was prosecuting his naval preparations with the greatest diligence ; how the queen was heard to commend French conduct, being persuaded " they would not join themselves to the execution of the desperate measures of Great Britain," this being also the general belief ; and how Königsegg appeared to be entirely out of favour and certainly was paying out nothing for expenses, though some had it that Patiño had found him 200,000 pistoles secretly and that the coolness evident between them was nothing but a feint.³

¹ A son of the chancellor, probably Count Johann Wilhelm. It is stated in the *Lettres historiques* (lxxi. 282-3) that he was sent post-haste to Madrid with dispatches immediately after a council held on 14 February.

² Van der Meer, to Stanhope, 15 and 31 March, R.O. Spain 95, 98.

³ "Account of Mr Stanhope's steward of the occurrences of what passed in Spain when he set out from Madrid on the 17/28 March 1727," R.O. Spain 95.

Of one thing at least there was no doubt, that the siege of Gibraltar was going very badly for the Spaniards ; soldiers, by report, drowned in the flooded trenches, much sickness, two sections of the works constructed useless and the rest too far away. The Dutch consul at Gibraltar wrote on 31 March of continuous firing from the Spanish batteries since the 5th, with little damage done and only six men killed.¹ De Buy, on the other hand, did not expect the siege to be raised ; much, he said, was expected from a mine under the rock and the king would not be disabused until he saw its effect. Verboom was still employed, in spite of his quarrel with De las Torres.²

¹ Report to Van der Meer, *ibid.* 98.

² De Buy to Stanhope, same date, *ibid.* 235. An account of the extraordinary sufferings of the Spanish army before Gibraltar will be found in the *Lettres historiques* for March 1727 (lxxi. 322-3). It is there stated that at a council of war held at San Roque many of the generals, including Verboom, had seen no hope of success, though De las Torres and others, while admitting the difficulty, did not despair. Whereon the decision to open the trenches immediately was taken at Madrid.

CHAPTER XLIII

WAR PLANS, FURTHER

At the end of 1726 William Finch, forwarding long replies to his own and Fénelon's reiterated instances for settlement of a plan, hoped the greatest difficulties to have been now surmounted, although people "were very much avers'd to it at first, and began to find fault with the *préavis*," in which they said that Slingelandt had gone too far. After another conference he reported the deputies not to doubt that the provinces would authorise formation of a plan without delay, Gelderland and Holland already having consented. The truth, he said, was that the "friends" were very well inclined but differed about procedure, whether Hoornbeek should be given full powers or not. Soon he was able to announce all minds perfectly satisfied about his Majesty's contingent, confidence in British assurances that France would fulfil her engagements having mastered the habitual suspicion of that court entertained. He reported the "friends" to be much pleased with what Townshend said about the right of the house of Sulzbach to Juliers and Berg, and also about what was projected with the duke of Wolfenbüttel, whom, however, they feared to be too closely engaged to the court of Vienna.¹

Townshend, when notifying the action taken by Pozobueno and his departure, pressed anew for a concert of a plan. "That," he told Finch, "should be at present your main point of view, that you should never let slip out of your thoughts. For nothing is more necessary for the good of our cause than to make such a concert as shall hinder our being surprized or taken unprovided by the Emperor."² Finch reported the "friends" entirely to agree, being in receipt of advices from Van der Meer about an intended invasion of England but not understanding how ships enough could be obtained for transport of troops or how so hazardous an enterprise could be successful. The pensionary had very readily assented to get five or six ships ready at once to join

¹ Finch, 31 December 1726 to 7 January 1727, R.O. Holland 292-3

² Townshend to him, 23 December 1726 (o.s.), *ibid.* 292.

the British Channel squadron.¹ Yet, for all this, distrust of France remained to counter all that Finch could say. Richelieu's late doings at Vienna were beginning to be known, and at the Hague Königsegg was observed to be courting the goodwill of France, in contradiction to his former behaviour, and Fénelon was holding language deemed suspicious.² Itterssum went so far as to impute to Fénelon designed advertisement of French objection to attack on Spain. In a long conversation, he wrote, the ambassador had argued that such would but bind Philip V more closely to the emperor, embitter his mind, and confirm the queen's domination over him, while any place that he might lose in a war he might reckon to recover at the peace. Since he persisted in this tone, in spite of his knowledge of the bad effect, people were persuaded that he spoke by order of his court, and the assurances from Fleury, which Boreel transmitted, failed to satisfy. So that the British rupture with Spain was regarded as a happy incident.³

Finch was adjured again to reassure all those who appeared to be impressed by Fénelon's "wrong judged discourses." Orders to that ambassador, he was told, would soon change his style; "the Cardinal's heart is certainly true and steady, and we may depend upon him intirely."⁴ At the same time Townshend entered on private expostulation with Slingelandt. The article concerning Spain in Fénelon's memorial, he affirmed, was no more approved in England than in Holland. Of the steadfastness of France there was fresh proof every day, "*c'est plutôt à la mode qu'aux sentimens de sa cour qu'il faut s'en prendre.*" True that some inclination to manage Spain was apprehended, and against such ill-advised tenderness they must stand on guard. If Spain found herself brusquely attacked by the allies of Hanover on all sides, and saw that the emperor could in no way succour her, she would think of detaching herself as quickly as possible from an ally who could not help her, one who exhausted her funds and would continue to crush her by expenses as excessive as they were useless. A plan of campaign had best be settled at the Hague, for their interests in the Austrian Netherlands and the exposed condition of their German frontier touched the Dutch nearly. Finch would give

¹ Finch, 7 January 1727, cited.

² Says Finch in the same dispatch: "The Gentlemen of Amsterdam were last night with the Pensionary on purpose to acquaint him that in a discourse which M. Fénelon had had with them at their *logement* he had said that tho' his master would perform the engagements he was entred into with the allies, yet he would not upon any account whatever declare war against Spain. These discourses embarrass very much and are *mal à propos*, but however I hope things will go well here."

³ Itterssum, 14 January 1727, R.O. Holland 296.

⁴ Townshend to Finch, 3 January (o.s.), *ibid.* 293

all particulars of the measures for their protection that were being taken by his Majesty with Sweden Denmark and elsewhere. About the Netherlands and Savoy the king had explained his views, but the answer had not been encouraging; he was told that there was time enough to arrange. He had strongly approved the "préavis" of the council of state; no change in it was thought of; Finch had orders to support its propositions entirely; there was nothing better to be done than to build a plan on so fine a foundation. With the Swedes and Danes there would be plenty of troops in Lower Germany. Moreover Townshend stated that Finch had orders to speak about succour by 5,000 or 6,000 men and five or six ships to join the Channel squadron, in view of the attack on Gibraltar and apprehension of a Spanish descent on England.

In reply Slingelandt sent from his sick bed in closest confidence a paper conveying his thoughts, and would only say that nothing would be gained, but injury done, by acting otherwise than as advised.¹

Finch had already sent word of six of the eighteen ships for the year's service ordered to be got ready at once—five of them, he was assured, to join the British Channel squadron, the other to convoy the republic's present to the state of Algiers, but that a military force could be sent to England only, he was told, if the Barrier garrisons were replaced by troops of France, and from this he had found Fagel and Hoornbeek not averse. Townshend desired him to forward, so far as he could, the equipment of the other twelve men-of-war, in order that they might join the Baltic expedition or render other service necessary.² Later Hoornbeek suggested that orders for an equal force of Hessians to march towards Holland, at the same time that the Dutch troops were being got ready, were likely to ease minds greatly. Now, however, Stanhope's dispatches, elsewhere cited, were to hand. Townshend sent word that, since by them there seem to be no likelihood of a Spanish invasion, arrangements for sending the 6,000 Dutch need not be pressed, nor would the Hessians be wanted. At the same time he advised of a packet of Scotch letters intercepted, which confirmed the intelligence of secret engagements by the court of Vienna to restore the Pretender.³

¹ Townshend to Slingelandt, 3 and 10 January (o.s.), and the reply (original), 28 January, R.O. Holland 297. Slingelandt's brochure (11 long pages, enclosed) was headed "Pensées de N.N. au sujet de la formation d'un plan de mesures communes pour obtenir les fins du traité de Hanovre."

² Finch, 14 and 17 January, Townshend to him, 10 January (o.s.), *ibid.* 293. On the 24th Finch reported two men-of-war almost ready for sea and all the leading men agreed on holding 6,000 infantry ready for transport at need.

³ Finch, 31 January, Townshend to him, 27 January (o.s.), *ibid.*

On 28 January 1727 Fénelon and Finch met the Dutch deputies again. Fénelon opened by reading a declaration sufficient, in Finch's opinion, to remove all doubts and jealousies about the sincerity of his court. He pointed out that Dutch commercial interests were principally involved and that in view of the situation the States-General should reflect whether they could hope to obtain satisfaction in the matter of the Ostend Company without preparation for war. The king of France had given sufficient proof of his desire for peace, but if the republic saw no safety but in arms all means must be employed to ensure success and no time be lost in concerting what measures would be suitable. It seemed that the States-General on the one hand feared that France would act in a war as an auxiliary only, and on the other were inclined to adopt measures solely for their own defence, leaving the kings of France and England to bear the main burthen. He was therefore authorised to declare that his master would not confine his succour to the 12,000 men stipulated, but had always the intention of employing his whole forces in defence of the republic, if required. But it was not reasonable that the Dutch should leave all action to their allies. It was certain that the emperor proposed to stand on the defensive in Italy and elsewhere, in order to concentrate his attack on one particular point, namely, on the king of England's dominions in Germany. The king of France would have enough to do against Spain, in aid to the king of Sardinia, and in resistance to an imperial army on his weakest frontier (Lorraine and Luxemburg). It was not enough for the republic, when he had undertaken war on their behalf, merely to make their own strong places safe.

And so Fénelon desired clear explanation of what the Dutch would do against the Ostend Company, and what land and sea forces they required for protection against the consequences. Should there be war, it must be waged both by land and sea and by common effort; no party could be a mere auxiliary. Attack on Spain was an affair difficult and costly, would prejudice more than anything the safety of the republic and prolong the struggle with Austria, and so far from separating the courts of Vienna and Madrid would unite them more closely. It was the emperor's power that was to be feared, and especially by the Dutch. If efforts were concentrated against him the Spanish court would see that it had nothing to expect from him. He would be glad to see war opened on some other question than the Ostend Company; indeed, his artifice in pushing Spain on to action had this intention.

To these arguments the Dutch deputies replied in a memorial recapitulating the representations made and the measures set out

for protection of the republic and making the following declarations. That without discussing which of the allies was the more interested against the Ostend commerce, whether Great Britain under the treaty of 1667 not as much as the republic, or France in maintaining the treaty of Münster, the States-General held their right under that treaty to exclude the inhabitants of the Netherlands from trade to the East Indies within the limits of the Dutch East India Company to be notoriously incontestable. That it was proper, after a plan had been concerted and the safety of the republic provided for, again to make representations at Vienna under a time limit, on expiry of which without satisfaction obtained orders should issue to the British and Dutch East India Companies to attack take and destroy the Ostend ships wherever found, in which action they would be protected by the whole force of the allies, for should the emperor institute measures of reprisal a *casus foederis* would exist. That for defence of the republic the 50,000 men of the augmented Dutch army, with the 24,000 French and British promised, were considered sufficient, unless the emperor should bring a superior force into the field; the 12,000 Hessians to be held ready to march at the first requisition upon the frontiers about the Meuse Rhine and Yssel, routes and everything else being arranged beforehand and the whole so disposed as with the Dutch army to form one corps. That in taking these measures care should be had to give no cause of offence to the empire, with the affairs of the Ostend Company in no way concerned, and to inform the diet at Ratisbon to that effect. Lastly, that since the safety of the republic would depend on occupation of part of the emperor's forces elsewhere, a plan of campaign should be formulated and communicated in confidence before anything against the Ostend Company were attempted.¹

Observing want of mention in the above "of the measures they would take in case that, after the Ostend ships should be taken or destroy'd, the Emperor should rest quiet without revenging himself and wait for another opportunity," Fénelon and Finch desired further explanation, and in particular whether the States-General would be content to have some of the Ostend ships destroyed, without taking other measures to compel the emperor to revoke his charter. The deputies answered that they did not know how a resolution to declare war would be taken in the provinces "and reason'd with a good deal of warmth upon the subject." It was agreed, "to make the matter easy," that Fénelon should present another memorial, which he did next morning. After

¹ Cf. Goslinga, p. 105.

further discussion the deputies in the end submitted the following definite proposals, all, says Finch, that could be obtained at present.

1. France by the loan of troops to put the king of Sardinia, persuaded to take part in the war, in a position to act with a superior force in Italy.
2. France to station on the Rhine or the Moselle a force sufficient to oblige the emperor to retain his garrisons in those parts and to contribute to restrain the princes of Germany.
3. The allies to post on the Meuse an army strong enough to hold its passages and bar the road to an imperial army.
4. Provision also to be made for the case of an attack upon the republic from Lower Germany.
5. Should the emperor concentrate his forces on the frontier of France that marched with Lorraine and Luxemburg, the allies to join for protection of France in that sensible part, France putting herself in a position to act with a superior force there also.
6. Supposing all this settled, so that imperial reinforcements could not reach the Netherlands, such enterprise to be determined upon against the Ostend commerce as would put an end to it most quickly, whether by seizing places which the emperor could redeem at a peace by sacrifice of the company, or Ostend itself. For either of which purposes France Great Britain and Holland conjointly to supply such troops as would suffice.
7. In Germany to employ all such means as were possible to dissuade the diet and its members, and in particular the king of Prussia, the elector of Cologne, and the elector Palatine, from joining the emperor in a quarrel which did not concern them.¹

Townshend answered all this in another long letter to Slingelandt. Praising his "*Pensées*"—"tant elles étoient claires fortes et judicieuses"—he said that his Majesty, after perusing Finch's account of the conferences, strongly approved of a good corps d'armée being posted on the Meuse to cut communication between Germany and the Austrian Netherlands, and also what Slingelandt said about the necessity of seizing Ostend. But he would have the plan extended. He did not wish to engage the republic further in the affairs of Germany, but if the frontier on that side were not well defended the Meuse plan would be useless. This not on account of his own German dominions, but because

¹ Finch, 31 January, R.O. Holland 293, the various papers therewith or with his further dispatch of 4 February.

it was there that the republic was most exposed to successful attack. He thought that the proper course was to make Lower Germany safe by posting bodies of allied troops from Pomerania to the Rhine. That would prevent the emperor's attack on that side, would hold in check the electors and princes of the Lower Rhine and of Lower Germany (in particular the bishop of Münster), and would make the king of Prussia think. The armies on the Meuse and in Flanders would then be well protected and free to act. Should there be failure to obtain the Swedes and Danes—although all efforts would be continued to bring the negotiations at Stockholm and Copenhagen to a successful issue, the king was not master of events—then it was difficult to see how the army of Lower Germany could be formed, unless the French would send contingents or the Dutch reconsider their Meuse plan. If they would not, then the Hessians must stay in Germany and the British troops to be sent over go there. After which Townshend showed the great expenses to which George I was put; besides the subsidies, 20,000 Hanoverians to maintain in Germany, 40,000 British in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and sixty men-of-war at sea. Continuing his discussion at great length Townshend held it to be evident, as the French agreed, that on the Upper Rhine little was to be done; the French forces in Alsace would be more useful on the Lower Rhine and in the Netherlands. Without the king of Sardinia nothing could be done against the emperor in Italy; in the present situation he could be attacked only in the Netherlands. The real way to force him to submit was to concentrate attack on Spain and cut off Spanish supplies to him.¹ To Finch Townshend wrote:

I send you herewith my letter to Mons^r Slingelandt, together with a copy of it for your information. You will take care to deliver the letter to him without taking any notice to him, or to any body else, that you have a copy of it. At the same time you will make use of what is writ to Mons^r Slingelandt as an instruction to talk in confidence to the Pensionary, and Mons^r Fagel, and to explain the King's sentiments and thoughts upon the plan you sent over. But you will avoid letting them perceive that you had them from my letter to M^r de Slingelandt. You will let the Pensionary and the Greffier know that you are ordered not to open your self any farther either to M^r de Fenelon, or the deputies of the States, than only to tell them that his Majesty thinks the security of the States ought to be provided for in the first place, and therefore approves very much of what is proposed on that head, but that with regard to the plan itself his Majesty cannot as yet declare his sentiments, because it will be proper in the first place, and even necessary, to know the opinion of France upon that subject; for which purpose his Majesty has commanded M^r Walpole to set out next week for that court.²

¹ Townshend to Slingelandt, 31 January (o.s.), *ibid.* 297.

² To Finch, same date, *ibid.* 293.

Slingelandt's answer was that he had supposed from Finch's silence that Fénelon's utterances were approved in England. In spite of denial thereof he could not but think that Fleury nurtured tenderness towards Spain, or that France desired to escape the burthensome expenses of a war expected to damage the emperor but little. In subsequent correspondence he discussed with Townshend, not entirely with calmness, the measures proper to be taken.¹

On the other side Golovkin, presenting a proclamation by Catherine I re-opening liberty of trade to Archangel, took occasion to ascribe its issue to the tsaritsa's willingness to meet the representations of the Dutch minister at Petersburg. In prospect of a British fleet coming to the Baltic again that summer he requested an immediate and categoric declaration on what measures could be concerted to prevent interruption of trade.²

As regards French views, there was advice from Magnan at Petersburg, of date 7 January, of 20,000 Austrians and 10,000 Prussians to join the Russian force in an attack on Hanover certainly determined on.³ Robinson found Marshals D'Huxelles and Berwick to expect invasion of Mecklenburg by a force of 30,000 Russians, which would oblige the Danes to look after their own safety and remove their troops from the defence of Hanover, whereon an imperial army would march through Germany. "Remember what I say," said Berwick, "the King's dominions will be the first and the most vigorously attack'd."⁴ Marshal Villars records conclusion at a conference with the two others on 12 February, that in view of the uncertainty of English plans and of the issues with Sweden Savoy and Prussia no general resolution could be adopted; only preparations, and especially on the side of the Rhine, pushed on.⁵

On news of the opening of attack upon Gibraltar George I called upon the Dutch to execute their engagements by declaring war with Spain and to send at once their six ships to reinforce the Channel squadron. In reference to Palm's action it was represented that the imperial court evidently sought a rupture, and "as they cannot easily annoy the allys in any part, unless

¹ 18 February to 4 March, *ibid.* 297. The correspondence was confided to Finch, and in a letter to him of 14 February (o.s.) Townshend said: "I was much surprised at the warmth wherewith he treats so friendly an opening of our thoughts to one another, as my letter was, but I hope he will return to calm sentiments, that we may discuss mutually, without prevention, what is best and most advantageous for the alliance in general."

² Dayrolle, 25 February, *ibid.* 295, with the documents.

³ *Sbornik*, lxiv. 483.

⁴ Robinson, 4 February, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

⁵ *Mémoires*, v. 45.

they attack the King's German dominions, H. M^{ty} makes no question but the States will have troops in readiness in that case to come to his assistance." ¹ On this head Finch had just sent warning of the imperial force to march, as above-said, for the Netherlands—by the report of Königsegg's secretary, just returned from Vienna, 15,000 men when reinforced by Bavarians and Palatines—and of Prussian battalions said to be ordered towards Wesel and Upper Guelders. The "friends," he said, did not see what was to be done and were in great uneasiness from fear that the Hessian troops would have to be kept at home. ²

In his next dispatch, answering Townshend, Finch had to note hesitation about declaring war with Spain; the "friends" did not think that the States-General could be persuaded to it, people being in such fear and "entirely wrapt up" in hopes of success of the offers made to Vienna. Slingelandt, he said, advised action without declaration of war, on the example of the Spaniards, and to wait. ³ The burghers of Amsterdam, for their part, sent deputations to the Hague to press for convoys for their trade. They expected, says Renard, the British agent at Amsterdam, "que l'Espagne va sommer l'Empereur et les Moscovites de tomber sur nous," and he believed that their outcry would be so loud as to be heard with more success than on previous occasions. ⁴

Horatio Walpole, returned to Paris, pressed on the French government the necessity of an immediate joint declaration of war with Spain imposed by the opening of the siege of Gibraltar. In discourse with Fleury he descanted on the wickedness of Philip V, the righteousness and moderation of the purely precautionary measures taken by George I, and the culpability of the emperor as prime mover. He advocated measures to separate Spain from Austria and make the emperor "appear to be the aggressor in the eyes of all Europe." A joint declaration of war with Spain would, he urged, put Charles VI in the dilemma either of refusing to take part in it, and so undeceiving Philip, or, by entering upon it, of enabling the allies to turn their main strength against him, "without reducing or distressing Spain any further." Like arguments were used by Newcastle, when the news reached London.

¹ Townshend to Finch, 3 and 4 March (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293, enclosing a copy of Colonel Clayton's report from Gibraltar, cited.

² Finch, 11 March, *ibid.* About the Austrian force one of the informations came from Leheup, who sent from Ratisbon on 11 March "a list of the 8 battalions and 12 squadrons of Imperial troops which are to march to the Upper Rhine and so to Luxemburg, with an account of the several roads they are to take" (R.O. Germany, States, 176). His later dispatches have much about the progress of the march and its rumoured intentions.

³ The same, 18 March.

⁴ Renard, same date, *ibid.* 579.

While his Majesty, he said, would not declare war without the concurrence of France, he hoped that no difficulty would be made about marching troops to the Spanish frontier, "being firmly persuaded that if the allies joyn unanimously in a declaration of war it will in a manner be over as soon as declared" and that on seeing them united in action the emperor would prove reasonable.¹

The French answer on declaration of war with Spain was resolute enough. "Both the Cardinal and M^r de Morville," says Walpole, "without the least hesitation assured me that the French king would make no difficulty of doing it, and therefore, as soon as his Majesty should think fit to declare the war and order the declaration to be communicated here, with a proper requisition on the part of the King to his Most Christian Majesty to do the same thing, I might depend upon their declaring war also against the crown of Spain." He learnt, besides, that there had been no dissentient voice in the Council on the matter, although D'Huxelles had been doing much harm by his behaviour and discourse in public. To Berwick's loyalty he testified. Palm's dismissal he reported the French court to admit to be "a natural consequence" of his action, if unfortunate in its time.²

It was now decided to send to Paris to concert plans of campaign the military expert, Colonel Armstrong. At the same time Brigadier-General Richard Sutton, M.P., passing to Cassel as envoy to the landgrave, had a like commission for the Hague. Finch was directed to acquaint the "friends" with his instructions.

You will endeavour to make them as explicit as you possibly can in delivering their thoughts upon this most important matter. The clearer and the sooner we are informed of their notions in Holland, the better shall we be able to instruct M^r Walpole and Col. Armstrong to talk conformably at Paris and settle this necessary concert without losing our precious time by dangerous delays. They have told us from France that M^r Pestors would be very agreeable there, to concur in forming the Plan.³

The Dutch still showed themselves timid. They were much concerned, Finch and Sutton reported, at the king of Sardinia holding aloof, and in regard to Germany seepctical about distinction between emperor and empire having any effect upon the former's influence at Ratisbon. Admitting the Netherlands to be the weakest point of Austrian defence, and that in the poor condition of the Meuse fortresses, Huy and Liège and Roermond, the passages of that river from Namur to Grave could easily be secured, they

¹ H. Walpole, 10 March, Newcastle to him, 4 and 6 March (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

² H. Walpole, 17 and 21 March, *ibid.*

³ Townshend to Finch, 30 March (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293.

raised many difficulties about subsequent operations against Ostend, to which interests of trade would naturally dispose the allies. They evinced jealousy of large French forces entering the Netherlands, and inquired how many sieges it would be necessary to undertake, on account of provision of artillery and ammunition. The accession of Sweden to the treaty of Hanover, and Glenorchy's report of all difficulties at Copenhagen surmounted, failed to ease their minds in regard to an attack by Prussia. And they hesitated to establish a camp near Nimeguen until war was seen to be unavoidable, because of the elector of Cologne. Yet, said the writers, troops enough had been drawn into that neighbourhood to form a camp of 45,000 men at the first warning. Dispatch of 12,000 English "national troops," instead of the 7,000 promised, and more certainty about Prussian action—two articles strongly pressed—would satisfy entirely.¹

Townshend answered all this point by point, with expression of surprise that the plan carried by Sutton, although formed "chiefly upon their own notions and upon what we had collected to be the views of the States" was not well relished by the "friends." They must know, he said, the king of Sardinia to be "too wary and too cautious to take part or to engage on either side before he sees a war inevitable, being always desirous not to offend any one unnecessarily and to be sure, as the nature of things will admit, of his gain, before he ventures to run the least risk." In regard to Germany it had "appeared to be their opinion, as well as that of France, that great care should be taken not to give the least handle to the Empire to joyn with the Emperor, and to make his quarrels theirs." The French were still of that way of thinking,

being persuaded that tho' many princes in words and outward conduct shew a great partiality to the Emperor at the dyet, yet the elector of Bavaria and others assure that they have no intention to joyn with his Imperial Majesty in effect, but rather are inclined to form a third party, which they pretend will be of use to the allies of Hanover. However, if it shall be thought more expedient not to manage the princes of the Empire, but to have a powerful army on the Rhine to act offensively on that side, his Majesty has no objection to any measures that shall be judged most advantageous to the common cause.

As to the camp at Nimeguen, that had been thought to have been suggested from Holland as a proper measure for watching the king of Prussia and for other objects mentioned, and his Majesty believed that it would serve those objects. The siege of Ostend was

one of the first hints we had from your side of the water, but we are assured that the new works are not of such strength as to discourage such an attempt.

¹ Finch and Sutton jointly, 18 April, *ibid.*

And in case we shall be forced to come to extremities we shall have such a superiority on that side that the Imperialists will not be able to withstand us, and the King does not see in what part the allies can distress the Emperor, unless we resolve to attack the Low Countries. The notion of their being part of the Empire, by their having been formerly a part of the circle of Burgundy, which the court of Vienna is endeavouring to establish at the dyet, may be of dangerous consequence to the Republick.

About the force from England, although strong reasons were hinted why it should not exceed 6,000 or 7,000 men, and more could not justly be demanded, yet 4,000 or 5,000 more would not be grudged, "and you may let our friends know that if they, on their part, act in perfect concert with his Majesty, the king will send twelve thousand men for the use of his allies into Flanders, if matters come to a war." This was followed by notification of the resolution of the House of Commons, carried by 229 votes to 109,

to apply such sums of money as shall be necessary for answering such engagements as have at any time been or shall before, or untill the 25th day of Dec^r 1727, be made by His Majesty in concerting such measures as He, in His great wisdom, thinks will best conduce to the security of the trade and navigation of this Kingdom and to the preserving and restoring the peace of Europe.¹

Finch could not say how greatly his Majesty's assurance of sending the 12,000 men had pleased the "friends," dissipating immediately all their doubts about the points of the plan propounded by Sutton. A fortnight later Townshend sent word of fourteen battalions to be quartered in the neighbourhood of Harwich in readiness to cross as soon as wanted.²

Just before leaving for Cassel Sutton reported interviews with Fagel and others, military friends of his, at which he learnt how much the increased English force was needed. Would not, he further asked, the imperial force marching for Luxemburg and already at Oppenheim be likely to occupy Huy and Liège, and would it not therefore be advisable for the French to post a body of troops about Charlemont, to be on the watch? At the same time the Dutch might secure Roermond, equally indefensible and garrisoned by but sixty men.³

¹ Townshend to him, 11 and 14 April (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Finch, 29 April, Townshend to him, 2 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Sutton, 22 April, R.O. Germany, States, 122.

CHAPTER XLIV

SUCCESS AT STOCKHOLM AND COPENHAGEN. THE BALTIC EXPEDITION OF 1727

PRIOR to the final debates on the question of Sweden acceding to the treaty of Hanover court-chancellor Düben was deputed to try for last concessions from Poyntz and Brancas privately.¹ Says Poyntz thereon : " We should be inconsolable under the repetition of all these old demands and the addition of new ones, if we had not *good reason* to believe that this whole scene is farce and grimace." He pressed again for fixing as early a date as possible for first payment of the subsidies, since nothing would encourage the Swedes more and otherwise there might be some fatal surprise and the whole north be thrown into confusion. The Swedes did not want a squadron at present, only a number of ships to be kept in readiness for dispatch in case of an attack. He hoped to obtain the 12,000 men, or the best part of them, over and above the 5,000 stipulated in the treaty.²

Düben having reported, Poyntz and Brancas were invited to a conference, which occupied two whole days. Debates, says Poyntz, waxed violent for the Holstein article, for augmentation of the subsidies, and for assurance of immediate succour on the first appearance of danger from Russia. These difficulties apparently surmounted " to our great surprise they expected we should desist from the demand of troops." That Brancas had refused absolutely without further orders, and the consequence might be five weeks' delay, but " we think things in so violent a situation here, that they must conclude or reject immediately." ³ A week later, after another conference, the protocols were read in the senate and sent to the secret committee, who ordered their sub-committee to give their opinion by 7.0 a.m. next day, the 23rd (o.s.). The article of the troops, says Poyntz, appeared to be the only difficulty of moment

¹ Cf. Malmström, ii. 15.

² Poyntz, 11 February (o.s.) 1727, R.O. Sweden 46. Enclosed : " Copies de plusieurs projets d'articles reçus de M. le Chevalier Düben le 10^{me} et 11^{me} Février 1726/7."

³ The same, 15 February (o.s.).

left; "without unforeseen accidents the appearances are very favourable for a speedy conclusion." He noted the danger of the news that the siege of Gibraltar was begun and Great Britain actually at war with Spain, but feared nothing except the offer of large Russian and Austrian subsidies. After another week of debate he wrote: "I stand in the Isthmus between 11 hours conference of yesterday and perhaps as many for to-morrow, tired nauseated and worn out," but "to morrows even will bring us to an end of this tiresome work one way or other." The difficulties were about the troops and subsidies, and danger threatened from new offers that Dolgoruky might make. "My only comfort is, we want Sweden less than they want us." In the end the Swedes were left to accept one of three alternatives: (1) 5,000 men, as under the treaty, and no subsidies, (2) subsidies, and 12,000 men more, paid for by Great Britain and France, to be held ready, (3) subsidies, and the succour under the treaty to equal the British and French. A concession under the second head, the troops not to be asked for if Sweden were attacked, was taken *ad referendum*. Says Poyntz: "Our difficultys have been greater than could have been expected, and I hope it will appear on the whole that we shall have obtained a very usefull treaty, without deviating from our instructions in any single point."¹

Another conference was suddenly postponed in order that Dolgoruky might be heard. All, however, that he had to offer was the sum of £150,000 payable by the tsaritsa and the emperor in equal shares in three years' time and other prospective advantages. Consequently next day, 4 March (o.s.), "after a most tedious haggling" Poyntz and Brancas "obtained with the utmost difficulty a body of 10,000 men (3,000 horse, 7,000 foot) to be held ready for our service over and above the 5,000 stipulated by their accession," with reservation of right to recall the force at any time that real and imminent danger to Sweden rendered that necessary. Without this restriction, says Poyntz, he and Brancas could not have obtained the troops "nor consequently have granted the subsidys, so that the whole negotiation must have fallen to the ground." Three days later he could write: "At length by the blessing of God I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship that our tedious negotiation is brought to a happy conclusion."²

The treaty was signed on 14 March (o.s.) 1727. The king and crown of Sweden acceded to the treaty of Hanover with its three separate articles, the secret article about Juliers and Berg not being

¹ The same, 22 February and 1 March (o.s.). The report of the secret committee, 4 March (o.s.), *Lettres historiques*, lxxi. 501.

² The same, 8 and 11 March (o.s.).

included. Other separate articles, agreed with Great Britain and France only, stipulated the following reservations. (1) Existing treaties or conventions, of which there were none contravening the present treaty, not to suffer derogation by it, nor it by them. (2) The king and crown of Sweden having no possessions outside Europe, their guarantees to extend only to possessions of Great Britain and France in Europe. (3) The Swedish succour of 5,000 men not to be called for employment in Italy or Spain, and ships or money to be accepted in substitution. (4) The acts mentioned in article 5 of the treaty to be understood to be none but those accepted and approved by the states of the empire in the manner accustomed. (5) The second and third separate articles acceded to on finding that there was nothing in them contrary to the king of Sweden's obligations to the emperor and the empire as a prince of the empire. (6) The parties not to enter into any engagement with any other power which might be contrary to the present treaty. (7) If in enmity thereto, or under other pretext equally unjust, the parties were attacked or troubled jointly or separately, they to make common cause against the aggressor and to support each other to the utmost of their powers, without excuse of engagement in war elsewhere or any other. There was also a secret article by which Great Britain and France engaged each to pay for three consecutive years the sum of £50,000 a year in half-yearly payments, the first of them to be made immediately after the exchange of ratifications and the second as soon afterwards as could be arranged. In return Sweden undertook to hold ready, besides the succour stipulated in the treaty, a force of 7,000 foot and 3,000 horse to be employed at the expense of Great Britain and France wherever the case of the alliance might render necessary; Sweden reserving the right to recall these troops, or not to send them out of the country, if ever real and imminent danger rendered their retention for defence necessary.¹

Frederick I ratified the treaty three days later, and George I immediately after it was received in England, on 17 April (O.S.). Commenting on the separate articles Poyntz stated that he and Brancas had fought hard to get the restriction of the second waived, but without it would have lost the accession. From the Swedes' last treaty with the emperor they had expressly excepted concernment with the Ostend Company, and so it had to be in this case. As a fact, he observed, the matter was provided for sufficiently under the treaty of 1720. The concession of the third article he held to be reasonable,

¹ R.O. Treaties 535. Printed by Dumont, VIII. ii. 141, and Rousset, iii. 314, with (pp. 298 foll.) the report of the secret committee presented to the king by the four orders and Horn's address on the occasion.

it having already been allowed in the case of Prussia. It was the seventh that had given "more pain than all the rest." Dolgoruky had increased his offers by 300,000 crowns (£50,000) and had made what was practically a declaration of war, if the Swedes acceded. They saw in the rupture with Spain prospect of deprivation of succour in the case of Russian attack. "The whole negotiation had like to have split upon this rock," and so it was hoped that the concession made would be approved. That had not only given universal satisfaction, but inspired them with new life and courage. "The engagements are reciprocal, and it is in effect a new and close alliance against Muscovy. The words *selon la situation de leurs affaires respectives* will keep them from asking impossibilities of us, and the interest of Great Britain will ever require our doing all that is possible towards keeping this nation from falling into the hands of Muscovy." ¹

In a letter to Tilson Poyntz advised that the six commissioners and Count Erik Sparre's widow ought to have handsome presents.

The news was received in England almost with rapture. His Majesty, Townshend wrote, "did not find one word that he desired to be altered," promised payment of the first instalment of the subsidy immediately on ratification, and desired the king of Sweden to be informed that a strong squadron lay ready to sail to his assistance, if required. He pressed, however, that the Swedes should make ready both to defend themselves and to be "as useful to their friends as possible," in particular by sending a good body of troops over into Pomerania, since nothing could more speedily put an end to the king of Prussia's suspicious proceedings.² At Paris Horatio Walpole found it "impossible to express the satisfaction" of ministers at the affair "being beyond all expectation concluded in so good a manner."³ Diemar burst forth: the agreeable news "has inspired me with so much English, that I have ventur'd to write it in this to me most agreeable languish."⁴

After the treaty was signed Dolgoruky Golovin and Freytag absented themselves from court, even on the occasion of the king's birthday, the result of which was an unanimous resolution of the riksdag prohibiting any of its members from visiting them. On the other hand Poyntz observed "a great change in Monsieur Happe and some in Monsieur Reichel since the accession."⁵

¹ Poyntz, 11 March (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 46. See for the negotiations and conclusion Malmström, ii. 15-23.

² Townshend to Poyntz, 28 March (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ H. Walpole, 14 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

⁴ 26 March (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Ministers 63.

⁵ Poyntz and Jackson, 29 March (o.s.) f., R.O. Sweden 46, 49.

The ratifications having been exchanged in London, Poyntz was instructed that Brancas would have 15,000 ducats for distribution and that he might expend for the commissioners and for Countess Sparre £1,000 each and 1,000 ducats among those who had attended the conferences.¹ Also that in recognition of his services he was advanced to be ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary. Poyntz deprecated the promotion, in spite of the emoluments it brought (£10 a day as ambassador and £3 as plenipotentiary), writing to Townshend :

The honour is so much above my thoughts and wishes, as well as above my services I have or ever shall be able to perform, that if it may be done with decency, and without suspicion of ingratitude, I would humbly begg of your L^{dp} to gett it waved. . . . Your L^{dp} knows my circumstances and inclinations, and will judge how much such a sudden and distinguished elevation must expose me to envy and malice, and make my retreat more difficult by setting me still farther off from that privacy to which I was born, and from that retirement to which I am desirous, and may some day be forced to return. . . . What I have already is more than sufficient both for my ambition and my wants." ²

And to Tilson :

"Jure perhorreo

Latè conspicuum tollere verticem.

There is sometimes a pride in excessive modesty, and a vainglory in declining honours ; but I have examined my heart and can find nothing of it." ³

However he was told that he was not to present his new credentials, only to acquaint the king and queen with them, this to avoid punctilios of ceremonial and possible jealousy on the part of Brancas. "I hope you will bear with resignation the putting your credentials into your pocket so as not to be embarrassed with the title and honours, and at the same time receiving the appointments allowed to that station." ⁴

At Copenhagen up to April the issue was still in doubt. At conferences on 8 and 22 February Camilly confronted with his last orders from Paris what were stated to be the final resolutions of Frederick IV, and debates with the Danish ministers, Grand Chancellor Count Holsteinborg, his brother John George Holstein, and Christian Louis Plessen, waxed warm. They accepted the annual subsidy at 350,000 rix dollars, but required its continuance for at least four years in any event, and payment in "banco money" of constant value and quarterly in advance. Says Glenporchy on

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 18 April (o.s.), *ibid.* 46.

² Poyntz "to your L^{dp} alone," 26 April (o.s.), *ibid.* 47.

³ Same date, *ibid.*

⁴ Townshend to him, 16 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

this point : " They demand that the subsidies should be paid beforehand, having great need of money, which M^r Camilly refuses. I believe if he would agree to advance the first quarter, that matter may be adjusted." They stood out against the 12,000 men being hired by France on the footing of 9,000 only, and absolutely refused to allow them to take oath of fidelity to Louis XV or to be employed on any service foreign to the alliance of Hanover or the king of Denmark's own interests. They demanded of Glenorchy much stronger naval succour, such a number of ships to be specified as should inspire the tsaritsa with respect. Glenorchy suggested a general promise of a force sufficient to defend the Danish coasts. They still refused the term " Basse Allemagne," but offered to declare the term " Basse Saxe " to include all the dominions of George I in Germany, as had been suggested. To the first separate article they objected that the words " soit dans l'Empire ou hors de l'Empire " might include Spain and the Indies. But what Camilly calls " le noeud de la difficulté " lay in what regarded the hired troops and in the Holstein article. That the Danes refused

s'éteindra jamais. Le premier ne sauroit voir sans envie qu'un prince qui nuy étoit si fort inférieur en puissance en crédit et en richesses soit parvenu à ce haut degré d'élévation, qui le rend un des plus puissans roys de l'Europe." He would be pleased at a revolution in England. Also there was impression that France was ready to be reconciled with Spain and to break with England (25 February).

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ERRATUM

Page 682, line 5 from bottom. J. G. Holstein, a Mecklenburger, was but distantly related, if at all, to U. A. Holstein, Count Holsteinborg.

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¹ The discussion, says Camilly, " alluma la bile de M^r Plessen, lequel s'étant levé brusquement dit qu'on voyoit bien que la France ne vouloit rien faire et qu'elle n'avoit pas un désir sincère de traiter," innovations which appeared insurmountable having been introduced. The Grand Chancellor, with his " phlegme ordinaire," supported, refusing to speak about the two articles to his master, as that would spoil everything. Camilly countered that he also had his orders, and that it was for them to respond to the king of France's advances.

² Dispatches of Camilly and Glenorchy in February, B.M. Add. MS. 15092 and R.O. Denmark 50, respectively. Another point of offence was what had been said in parliament in England about the Baltic squadron going only to defend Sweden against Russia. Meeting Plessen at a fête Camilly found him " si plein de son sujet, et si fâché qu'on donnât à la Suède une protection de préférence, qu'il m'a paru que cette bagatelle, à laquelle on n'a peut être songé en Angleterre, a déplu infiniment à ces gens cy ; la jalousie qui règne entre les deux nations voisines les ayant rendues pointilleuses à l'excès sur ce qui les regarde." On another subject Camilly set down : " Quoy qu'il paroisse que le roy de Danemarck soit en bonne intelligence avec le roy George, il règne entr'eux une haine personnelle qui ne s'éteindra jamais. Le premier ne sauroit voir sans envie qu'un prince qui luy étoit si fort inférieur en puissance en crédit et en richesses soit parvenu à ce haut degré d'élévation, qui le rend un des plus puissans roys de l'Europe." He would be pleased at a revolution in England. Also there was impression that France was ready to be reconciled with Spain and to break with England (25 February).

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Answer to Glenorchy was that the French, in what concerned them only, appeared to have gone as far as could in reason be required. In view of the advancing season conclusion must be pressed with the utmost earnestness, in order that his Majesty, in forcing his measures, might know what he could depend upon. The term "Basse Allemagne" must be retained, or at least some general expression used to cover all his German dominions. He would not bind himself to send any definite number of ships, and rather than admit the insertion demanded in the Holstein article would dispense with it.¹ Camilly was told that were concessions allowed on other points two insurmountable difficulties, the oath and payment of the hired troops, would still remain; there must be some hidden reason, independent of the treaty, for the little hurry to agree; he must await new orders, in the event of the Danes showing a better disposition, but at present efforts appeared to be useless.²

In the same state matters stayed during March also. Camilly refused to yield either on the matter of the "banco" payments, fifteen per cent. above the value of rix dollars current, or on other points, and the Danes, Glenorchy wrote, were expressing doubt of French sincerity. When offer to drop the Holstein article was made Frederick IV, to his surprise, insisted on its retention, saying that otherwise he would rather give up the whole convention. Glenorchy did not expect to get on unless the insertion in the article were allowed. About the oath of allegiance, he said, he was writing to Horatio Walpole to get acceptance of a promise instead.³

Replies were long and urgent. Glenorchy was ordered to press the benefits to Denmark and to declare his Majesty's sentiments "in clear and strong terms, thô without menaces" or offensive expressions. For the "banco" money, he was told, the king would make up the difference. If, after all, the Danes would not finish, he must conclude that they did not intend to sign and would have "nothing to do with our alliance," in which case they must not expect support in the affair of Sleswick. Again, the king was

Europe this negotiation had been long brought to a conclusion, but it is not to be conceived the difficulties that are raised here on trifles, and the backwardness and coldness in conferences. Tho I told Mons^r Camilly betorehand what he was to expect, knowing their way of doing business, yet he is exceedingly surpris'd at it. If we had not employ'd a third person, who is very well with the Chancelour, to go backwards and forwards between us, we should never have got this length. And they have several times gone off from what they hinted to us they would agree to, for they never declar'd themselves plainly till the last conference, in which they gave me the project of which I sent a copy by Mottrum.

¹ Townshend to Glenorchy, 26 February (o.s.), R.O. Denmark 50.

² Instructions to Camilly, 13 March, B.M. Add. MS. 15092.

³ Glenorchy, 4 and 5 March, R.O. Denmark 50.

"highly dissatisfied with the unreasonable cavils and chicanes of the court of Denmark," yet hoped that the concessions made would obviate further delay. The clause about the ships might be allowed, if insisted on, and also the term "Basse-Saxe," provided a definition showing full comprehension of the king's German dominions.¹ At Paris Horatio Walpole did his best to persuade the French government, cautiously, to give in about the 12,000 men, but found the want of money objected. He reported Fleury and Morville to take for granted that the convention would be signed as soon as Camilly had received his orders to drop the Holstein article.²

On 22 March Camilly reported a stormy interview with Holsteinborg, after a meeting of the Council at which it was determined still to insist about the oath and the "banco" money. He had used strong language and had demanded a definite answer within twenty-four hours, Yes or No, to the draft delivered eight days since. He declared it evident that nothing could be done, and asked for his recall. Afterwards he stayed away again from court and got Glenorchy to inform the king that the concessions he had made were only conditional and he now retracted them. Frederick, however, firmly held his ground and concluded the audience by saying "ce n'est pas notre faute, nous avons fait ce que nous pouvons, et nous ne pouvons pas aller outre."³

Nevertheless conclusion was at hand. The undertaking of George I about the "banco" money, and his assurances about the Baltic squadron, had their effect. On 5 April Von Hagen, secretary of state, handed in the following resolutions on the part of the king of Denmark, signed and sealed. Glenorchy noted everything agreed excepting the military oath, "a niceness the King cannot be got over, and he has commanded his ministers not to speak to him any more about it."

(1) In explanation of the term "Basse-Saxe" the king would admit the words "y compris ce que les trois Hauts Contractants possèdent dans le cercle de Westphalie."

(2) If France would not agree to pay the subsidies at "banco" value, he accepted the king of England's offer to make up the difference, hoping that France would be prevailed upon to pay the moneys at Hamburg quarterly in advance, in order that his troops might be enabled to march on the first movements of the Russians and their adherents.

(3) In the Holstein article he would desist from the words

¹ Townshend in reply, 10 and 14 March (o.s.), *ibid.*

² H. Walpole, 14 and 21 March, B.M. Add. MS. 32749.

³ Camilly, 22 and 25 March, B.M. Add. MS. 15093, Glenorchy, 25 March, R.O. Denmark 50.

"chacun pour sa quote part," or, if there still were difficulty, would abandon the article altogether.

(4) He consented to having that about the British squadron couched in general terms, if undertaking were given to send one strong enough to defend the Danish coasts, on sure information of a Russian attack impending.

(5) He would not allow the oath, but would engage in the strongest manner that his troops should never act directly or indirectly against France but always in conformity with the treaty. If the king of England could persuade the king of France to give way on this point conclusion might follow immediately.¹

This received in England, Glenorchy was informed that his Majesty, so advised unanimously by several of his servants consulted, could not request the king of France to give up the oath of fidelity, as he himself could not in like case. To dispense with it would cause great confusion and ill consequence. "The old and established methods of treatys in these cases must be kept sacred." An oath taken to France would not absolve the troops from their allegiance to their sovereign, and so on. "His Majesty perswades himself that the king of Denmark will not fling away all the advantages of this convention for such an empty nicety." Also, the stipulation about the "banco" money must not be made a part of the convention.²

Nevertheless earnest representations were made at Paris. There was great concern, Walpole was told, at the delays, seeing that Colonel Armstrong's plan of campaign depended on securing all the troops therein mentioned. The absurdity of the demand about the oath, "contrary to the constant practice in all such cases," had been exposed to Söhlenthal and to Glenorchy. Yet conclusion was so pressing, that it was hoped that the court of France would not stand upon formality but accept a declaration in writing answering the same end. And since the king of Denmark seemed to have very much at heart payment of the subsidies quarterly in advance it was hoped that this also would be conceded. Advices from Ratisbon Hanover and Cassel showed how absolutely necessary conclusion was; "it is not certain how soon, or in what manner we shall be attackt. The Imperialists are so elated with their late success at Ratisbon that there is no act of violence which may not be expected from them."³

Before receiving Townshend's dispatch Glenorchy had written that an expedient found by Camilly about the oath had been accepted, that all the articles of the convention had been adjusted, and that

¹ Glenorchy, 5 April, *ibid.*, enclosing the original document.

² Townshend in reply, 4 April (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 6 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

Camilly was to have audience of the king to deliver "the French king's letter with the title of Majesty and take the character of ambassador," so that the treaty would be signed immediately after the holidays. And although next he wrote that Camilly's angry letter had brought him "orders in the strongest terms not to proceed any farther, for that either he should be recalled, as he had desired, or some conjunctures would fall out that might make his court more tractable, with a great many very hard expressions," yet "the matter is now gone so far that he cannot well retract." It was replied that everything was approved and that as soon as news came of the convention being signed the squadron intended for the Baltic, now all but ready, would sail, it being hoped that the king of Denmark would at once march at least 12,000 men towards his frontier on the Elbe, to be ready if required.¹

At last, on 16 April, the convention was signed. It was not an accession to the treaty of Hanover, as is generally stated, but a convention for the establishment of a joint force for the defence of Denmark and Lower Saxony against the attack anticipated. The preamble recited that the kings of Great Britain and France, always attentive to fulfil their engagements and watchful for the repose and security of their friends and allies, and really believing that the Muscovites and their adherents could very well undertake an attack upon the dominions of the king of Denmark, whether to deprive him of the duchy of Sleswick by force or to prepare means of executing other projects contrary to the quiet of the north and of Lower Saxony and the countries interesting the high contracting parties in the circle of Westphalia, and being also anxious to maintain the treaty of Hanover, a treaty specially confirming those of Westphalia, and to put themselves in condition faithfully to execute their guarantees given against any hostility on the part of the tsaritsa or any other power against the duchy of Sleswick, had arrived through their plenipotentiaries at the following agreement with the king of Denmark.

1. With the above objects he to assemble without delay at the most convenient place a force of 24,000 men, to be moved wherever necessary on the first certain advices of Muscovite or any other troops advancing to attack.

2. He also to keep on foot a reserve corps of 6,000 men.

3. To assist him in the expense the king of France to pay him an annual subsidy of 350,000 silver Danish rix dollars current for four years, quarterly in advance at Hamburg.

¹ Glenorchy, 12 and 15 April, Townshend in reply, 18 April (o.s.), *L.c.*

4. To relieve him further the king of France to take into his pay, in case the troops should be called upon to march, 12,000 of them, but so that, since the first object was defence of the king of Denmark's dominions, such pay should be no more than what it would cost that king to maintain 9,000 on campaign.

5. This payment to be monthly, the first month in advance, and to begin from the day of the first review of the troops by the French commissary-general.

6. Although the king of France might contend with justice that his subsidy ought to cease on the day that the above pay began, yet, since this might be before the king of Denmark had received effective succour from the subsidy, he to receive the amount of two years' subsidy in any case, and if thereafter the troops were no longer in French pay the subsidy to continue for four years, the term of the treaty.

7. After specification of what the French commissary-general was to do : " *quoiqu'il ne soit pas possible de statuer d'avance sur le cas non avenu de la guerre, l'on convient cependant en général que les 12^m hommes de troupes à la solde de sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne sur le pied de 9^m hommes seront traités en tout dans une parfaite égalité avec les 12^m hommes entièrement la à solde du roy de Dannemarc.* "

8. The king of France to give two months' notice of desire to discontinue paying the Danish troops.

9. The king of Great Britain to hold ready a force of 12,000 men to join the Danish 24,000 on the first certain advices, as before.

10. In view of the exposure of the Danish coasts to attack, when so considerable a number of troops were away in Lower Saxony, the same king to send, on the first advices of movement of a Muscovite fleet to be feared, a sufficient squadron of good men-of-war.

11. The king of France also to maintain a force of not less than 30,000 men to be carried " *partout où le besoin sera, et dont on conviendra, ou à faire des diversions ou autres opérations nécessaires pour l'avantage commun et pour la seureté de ses alliés dans l'Empire, ou dans le Nord* " ; and similarly the king of England another corps of not less than 12,000 men for the same purposes.

12. Since the Muscovites and troops joined with them might attempt to pass the dominions of the king of Prussia, which the allies presumed that that king would not allow ; then, were he in consequence himself attacked, the contracting parties to march their combined army to his aid and make war on his assailants, until the danger was past and full reparation made.

13. Ratifications to be exchanged at Copenhagen within six weeks.

Separate and secret articles were :

1. Should the king of Denmark carry out his intention of commanding the combined army in person, then the king of France to dispense with the oath of fidelity by the troops taken into his pay and to be content with the king of Denmark's royal word to act conformably to the treaty that day signed ; but if he changed his above said resolution, and it were thought proper to separate the corps for the advantage of the common cause, then the troops in the pay of the king of France to take the oath of fidelity to him in the ordinary way.

2. In view of the extraordinary efforts of the kings of Great Britain and France on the king of Denmark's behalf, he not to dispose of any part of his troops directly or indirectly contrary to their interests, nor during the term of the treaty to give or sell ("ne donnera ni ne vendra") any of them to any power but by agreement with those kings ; and further not only to do nothing himself against their interests but also to oppose anything of the kind, they undertaking reciprocally.

3. Should the king of France desire to use the 12,000 men, whom he paid on the footing of 9,000, for work not concerning the king of Denmark's security but only the interests of the king of France or of the allies of Hanover, no difficulty to be made about giving them for such use by agreement to be concluded within six weeks of the demand.

4. Since the Muscovite forces must pass through Poland, and it could not be doubted that the Poles remembered the disorders committed by them in their country a few years since, the agreements made to be communicated to the king and republic of Poland, and they invited to take on their part efficacious measures to bar the way.¹

Apart from the convention, Glenorchy delivered to the Danish plenipotentiaries a declaration that George I would use his good offices to obtain payment of the subsidies by France in "argent de banque" of Hamburg, and if he failed would charge himself with the difference in value.²

The terms obtained were by no means relished at Paris. Marshal Villars set down under date 27 April :

L'on en fut d'autant plus surpris, que Camilly avoit ordre de ne rien signer sans en recevoir des nouveaux (ordres). Camilly s'étoit assez mal conduit dans cette négociation, et le traité étoit très onéreux, nous engageant à près de deux millions par an de subsides, outre la paie de douze mille hommes, et sous des

¹ R.O. Treaties, 46, 98. Printed by Dumont, VIII. ii. 144, Rousset, iv. 244. Both use the title "Traité d'Alliance."

² R.O. Treaty Papers 108, copy.

conditions embarrassantes ; il falloit même payer d'avance. On reforma cet article et plusieurs d'autres avant de ratifier.

However, he goes on, on re-examination at councils on 7 and 11 May, "comme on était dans une crainte violente sur la paix ou sur la guerre," and in concession to Walpole's solicitations, it was resolved to ratify, if must be.¹

Signature of the convention known in England, orders issued to Admiral Sir John Norris to conduct to Copenhagen the fleet that lay in readiness. He was instructed on arrival to take up with the Danish fleet such station as should be deemed proper thoroughly to protect the coasts of Denmark, in order that the Danish army might advance to the Elbe at once. He was not to "act offensively against any one, We being wholly bent to preserve and establish peace," but were attempt upon Denmark made he must "repel force by force." Also, subject to his principal service, he must give all attention to the safety of British trade and help to such allied subjects as might need it. Private and additional instructions advised him of the "new and particular engagements" for defence of Swedish territories undertaken, so that if informed by Poyntz of intention by any neighbouring power to attack Sweden, and if the Swedes desired it, he must sail to assist them in their defence, it not being apprehended that both Sweden and Denmark would be attacked at the same time.²

Norris was provided also with full powers to treat jointly with Glenorchy on any matters that might arise, and carried a royal letter in which George I called the prompt sending of the fleet in evidence of his sincerity and did not doubt that Frederick IV would be equally exact to his engagements in marching his troops towards the Elbe.³

Poyntz at Stockholm was informed that his Majesty, although there appeared to be no present danger from Russia, had decided to send the squadron from anxiety to please the king of Sweden, Baron Sparre on his return having raised the subject. Norris would proceed to the coasts of Sweden, or not, accordingly as Poyntz advised.⁴ On this question Poyntz had a fencing match with Horn ; the count for, he against Norris coming up to Stockholm. Horn's most important argument was that, apart from the conduct and threats of the Russian and Austrian ministers, the defeated party were stirring up sedition in the provinces by alleging another descent of Russian galleys to be certain ; the object being to get a new riksdag

¹ *Mémoires*, v. 61-64.

² Instructions to Sir John Norris, 24 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 28156, original, copies, 28146 and R.O. King's Letters 8. The private ones printed, *British Diplomatic Instructions*, i. 243.

³ These, of date 27 April (o.s.), R.O. Royal Letters 5, King's Letters 8.

⁴ Townshend to Poyntz, 21 April (o.s.), R.O. Sweden 46.

called, which should settle the succession to the crown on the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and take off the heads of those who had favoured the accession. The first onset of the Russians, he said, was most to be feared, and there were no objections, as last year, to the squadron coming; it would be welcomed. Yet Poyntz noted Horn not to press the matter "so warmly and directly as last year," and spent much ink in depreciating the danger.¹

Answering this Townshend notified that Norris would give every assistance for the transport of Swedish troops into Pomerania, advisable in view of probable designs of the king of Prussia on that province. Enclosing a copy of the orders to Richelieu in respect of the terms offered at Vienna he assured Poyntz that "as the Imperialists have betrayed a great deal of insincerity in their way of acting" Great Britain France and Holland were preparing "to be amused no longer."²

The strength of the fleet shows the estimation in which the Russian naval force was held. With Norris were two rear-admirals, Sir George Walton and Robert Hughes, the latter newly promoted to that rank. Norris flew his flag on the *Cornwall*, 80 guns, others of the line were eleven of 70, two of 60, and one of 50, with two frigates, two fireships, two bombvessels, and the *Portsmouth* hospital ship. The Nore was left on 12 May and anchor cast in Copenhagen roads on Friday the 23rd. There five Danish ships were found without the boom, fitting for sea with moderate diligence. There was little for Norris to do but to visit the king at Fredensborg. On 2 June came the news of the death of Catherine I and on the 11th that of the signature of the preliminaries of peace. The immediate effect was the withdrawal of the Danish ships within the harbour and countermanding of the marching orders to the army, while it became the pre-occupation of the British government to get the fleet home as soon as possible. On 30 May (o.s.) Poyntz was told that the tsaritsa's death would make "all things very quiet in those parts. . . . I wish the Swedes would agree that his Ma^{ty} might recall his ships; it would save a great deal of money, lessen the burthen of our taxes next year, and make the parliament pay the subsidys more chearfully." A month later the same was pressed again, and at the same time Norris was informed that the withdrawal of the Danish ships showed that nothing was feared from the Muscovites now, so that he might return at once, "if the King were not likewise engaged to Sweden." Consent of both kings obtained on 1 August, on the 17th Norris was back at the Nore.³

¹ Poyntz, 19 and 24 April (o.s.), *ibid.* 47.

² Townshend in reply, 12 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

³ Particulars of the above, besides the authorities cited, in Norris' journal, B.M. Add. MS. 28130, and his letters home, R.O. Admiralty 1, 3.

CHAPTER XLV

THE AUSTRIAN COUNTER-PROJECT AND THE REPLY

RICHELIEU'S report of the reception of the allies' ultimatum at Vienna reached Paris on 13 April 1727. Horatio Walpole, to whom it was read next morning, retailed its contents as follows. Richelieu having been furnished by Saint-Saphorin and Woodward, when they had notice to depart, with a joint letter authorising him to treat in the name of George I as well as of Louis XV, he and Bruyninx had met Eugene and Sinzendorf on 4 April. They had found the Austrian ministers unexpectedly complaisant, making no difficulty about accepting a seven-year suspension of the Ostend trade—they would have conceded ten years, but that they were informed that the Dutch would be content with seven—and to the other articles advancing only two objections of importance; to the fifth, that Hosier's recall from the West Indies should be stipulated, and to the fourth (and here Richelieu anticipated the greatest difficulty) that it allowed no room for arranging compensation to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. While letting the ministers know that not the least alteration could be admitted, and while not expecting immediate acceptance, Richelieu hoped eventually to succeed in obtaining orders to Fonseca to sign. Bournonville, the Spanish ambassador, he intimated to be "very pressing with the Imperial court to come to a peace, or to make good their engagements, and hints as if he is not well satisfied with them, altho' they caress him extremely." He noted that the Austrians seemed willing to treat without consulting Spain or other ally.¹

Answer ran :

The only material thing now to be attended to, and which the just diffidence the French ministers have of the Imperial court will, it is to be hoped, incline them to take care of, is that this prospect of a general accommodation should not slacken our military preparations, nor our negotiations with other courts. . . . The accession of Sweden and the conclusion of our convention with Denmark will have put our affairs upon such a foot, that if France will shew

¹ H. Walpole, 14 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

the same firmness and resolution in adhering to our proposals, as they have hitherto done in making them, the Emperor, thô he should be disposed to chicaner with us, must be obliged to submit.¹

The specific Austrian demands received, they were stigmatised by Horatio Walpole as objectionable in almost every part; "calculated to give no satisfaction at all to the allies, and in a particular manner injurious to his Majesty." The governing condition was cessation of all hostilities by sea and land, and consequently suspension of the siege of Gibraltar, but that only from the date of ratification of the present articles by the king of Spain, and the affair to be discussed at a congress. This principle established, Spanish trade to the Indies to be carried on as tranquilly as formerly, the galleons allowed to return home, the British squadron withdrawn by immediate orders, the private effects on board the flota faithfully given up, and, as soon as these conditions were fulfilled, British Dutch or French fleets off the coasts of Spain or towards the emperor's dominions recalled at the time of cessation of hostilities. That to begin from the date of forming the proposed congress and to subsist during its session, limited to six months; its business, agreement on abolition of the Ostend Company's charter or its suspension for a reasonable time, say seven years, the company's ships at sea being allowed to return safely during the time of suspension of hostilities and the bases of negotiation the treaties of Utrecht Baden and the Quadruple Alliance, commerce being re-established on the Utrecht conditions. Other articles appointed Aix-la-Chapelle for the place of assembly, and made provision for regulating proceedings in the interests of simplicity and expedition. By the eleventh, if any of the powers concerned practised hostilities during the sitting of the congress the others to unite in opposition, and by the twelfth the northern powers to be invited to send ministers to terminate differences amicably.²

Walpole's criticisms ran as follows. In the first article there was "not one part that can possibly be agreed to by his Majesty, . . . scarce an expression that was not liable to exception." The next were "conceived in such terms as plainly shew that the Emperor has no design to make a peace, but only to suspend hostilities untill the galleons shall return home." The offer of seven years' suspension of the Ostend Company's charter was much less than the former one of three years, for that was to be immediate, while the longer term was only to be agreed on at a future congress. By putting commerce on the Utrecht footing later treaties, "from which his Majesty cannot depart," were excluded. The twelfth

¹ Newcastle in reply, 10 April (o.s.), *ibid.*

² The twelve articles printed by Rousset, iii, 390.

article by no means sufficed for preserving the peace of the north, apart from the omission, perhaps intentional, to mention Lower Germany.

"Perusal of this extraordinary piece" sent him off at once to see Fleury at Versailles. The cardinal, he says, allowed that "far from being a satisfactory answer it is very captious, and by no means fit to be received," yet failed to show disposition "to come immediately to a vigorous resolution or a declaration of war against Spain, as I told him his Majesty would expect." He preferred to await instructions expected by Fonseca, and in the meantime proposed to draft the proposals in another form, to be used only after consultation with Walpole. He renewed assurances "in stronger terms than I can express," and agreed on the necessity of continuing military operations so as to be ready for action by the middle of May, the soonest that forage could be collected. Yet he was still persuaded that both the emperor and the king of Spain were disposed to peace, and held "that a final project of demands must be framed, and a term fixed for an answer, all which could be done in his opinion by the 20th of May, and that then we should be ready to take our measures accordingly." Privately Walpole wrote :

I am very sensible of the great uneasiness which my dispatch of this day will create in his Majesty, and indeed my agony and concern is inexpressible. The Cardinal still perseveres in the solemn protestations of good faith, of maintaining the union and engagements between the two crowns, and of declaring war as soon as it was necessary and the season for action will permit, but is still for trying a month longer his dexterity in negociation, and notwithstanding the remarkable change, which I told him has been made in the Pretender's family, who has parted with M^r Hay and his wife and made one Graham, now his agent at Vienna, his prime minister, he, the Cardinal, is fully persuaded of the Emperor's as well as of the king of Spain's disposition for peace, and has hinted to me my sending for a full power, since he says M^r Fonseca will certainly have one, but I must own I have no notion of his being sufficiently authorised to sign what can be reasonable or safe for his Majesty to accept, besides that M^r Boreel has told me since my return from Versailles, that M^r Bruyninx does not in his letter to Greffier Fagel give the least hopes of any abatement in the Emperor's counter-project, nor mention one word of full powers and instructions to be sent to M^r Fonseca.

The Cardinal, as a mark of his usual confidence in me, not only read but gave me the inclosed copy of the duke of Richelieu's private letter to him, without seeming to think it a very extraordinary piece, all which is unaccountable, but no use must be made or notice taken of it. I am too full to write any more, but I hope no hasty resolution will be taken in England untill this matter is a little more cleared up.

Back in Paris Walpole could not sleep without writing to

Fleury that he deemed Richelieu's attitude incomprehensible and could not hope to quiet the mind of the king his master unless he might have something to send in writing ; being unable to augur anything good, after all that had passed. Fleury, accordingly, put his sentiments on paper, under date 22 April, as follows.

Je vous supplie, Monsieur, de ne pas vous inquiéter, et encore moins vous décourager. Je dois convaincre le conseil du roi et toute la nation que je n'ai rien négligé pour conserver la paix, et que si nous avons la guerre elle ne devra être imputée qu'à l'Empereur. C'est dans cette vue que j'ai cru ne devoir rien précipiter, et qu'avant de prendre un parti décisif j'ai voulu entretenir M^r de Fonseca. Il reçut hier matin son courier, et m'envoia demander hier au soir un rendez-vous ; je le lui ai donné pour jeudi matin, parceque je suis bien aise auparavant d'avoir réfléchi sur le contre-projet, pour tascher à le convaincre de l'impossibilité de le recevoir, et du peu de bonne foy qui y paroît. Vous serez averti de tout, et je ne ferai rien sans vous le communiquer ; j'ai assuré V. Ex^{ce} que le roi rempliroit ses engagements avec toute la fidélité possible, et je vous réitère les mêmes assurances. Si nous y manquons je vous permets, et vous serez en droit, de publier qu'on ne peut se fier à nous. Quand j'aurai entretenu M^r de Fonseca je vous parlerai plus décidément.

Richelieu's further information was that the counter-proposals had been sent in after the conference with the Austrian ministers on 4 April, in spite of the arguments that he had then used and his insistence on obligation to accept the allies' terms as they stood. Nevertheless he thought the counter-proposals fairly reasonable, anticipating greatest difficulties with the two articles which concerned the kings of Spain and England. From what Bournonville had said he did not think that the former would consent to compromise his claim to Gibraltar by reference of the question to a congress, any more than would the other. So that Fleury would have need of all his cleverness to accommodate the point ; it would be a misfortune if it brought war. Richelieu still believed that the emperor desired peace, and so on.¹

By the detailed report of Saint-Saphorin and Woodward, sent from Passau after their departure from Vienna, what had passed there was as follows. Richelieu had seen difficulties in the allies' conditions, and Saint-Saphorin, while insisting that they were perfectly well drawn and provided for everything, had expected acceptance of them only if the extreme embarrassment of the Austrian court obliged. He had at once prepared a " brochure " on them and had carried it to Richelieu's house next day (3 April). There he found the ambassador engaged with Sinzendorf in another

¹ All the above from H. Walpole's dispatches and enclosures of 21 and 22 April, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

room, and when he was gone was told by Richelieu of notice preparing for him and Woodward to frequent neither the court nor the houses of the ministers. Thereon he had determined to authorise Richelieu by letter to signify his Majesty's assent to the conditions, if accepted as they stood, and after the notices to leave received (in the afternoon) had suggested holding conferences in Richelieu's house, as neutral territory. Next day Bruyninx had reported a negative reply by Sinzendorf and had come with Richelieu to Saint-Saphorin's house to confer. Saint-Saphorin pointed out the Austrian dilemma; either by refusal exposure to dangers which might be fatal and to the odium of all powers hitherto neutral, or by acceptance failure to carry out the magnificent promises made and forfeiture, probably, of share in the treasures of the flota. Expecting ministers, therefore, to avoid a positive answer and to ask for explanations or time of reflection, he had advised demand for an absolute Yes or No, for then, although they would try to prolong negotiation in the hope of dividing the allies, in their extreme embarrassment they might give in. Richelieu and Bruyninx gave positive assurance that they would follow this advice exactly. Yet, in spite of agreement that no conference should be held before Saint-Saphorin's above-mentioned letter was received, they had seen the Austrian ministers again that evening, 4 April, when a conference, at which Bournonville would be present, was arranged for the 8th.

On that day Saint-Saphorin and Woodward had gone to Richelieu's house, by invitation, and heard everything in detail, though not understanding him clearly in spite of all endeavour and questions. They learnt enough to know that difficulties would not arise upon the Ostend affair ("combien de fois n'ai je pas eu l'honneur d'écrire qu'ils seroient ravis de trouver une porte honorable pour se tirer de cet engagement?") but on reference of the question of Gibraltar to a congress and on basing commercial privileges on treaties up to that of 1721.¹

The two ministers were sure that Richelieu had acted in collusion with the Austrians. Saint-Saphorin filled page after page with indictment of his conduct: "ses relations sont toutes faites dans les principes de cette cour; . . . je ne puis, en aucune manière, douter que c'est luy qui a concerté avec le comte de Sinzendorf la notification que l'on nous fit le 3 de ce mois." And Woodward, as one instance: "The duke said that he assured them (the Austrian ministers) all he could, 'twould be useless, but I may

¹ Saint-Saphorin and Woodward from Passau, 16 April, R.O. Germany, Empire, 61.

venture to own it, by what I have seen these few days past, I am convinced that his Ex^{cy} deceives us and has underhand dealings with them.”¹

Condemnation in England of the Austrian counter-project fell in no degree short of Walpole's. About Gibraltar Newcastle wrote him: “You will, in the strongest manner, assure both the Cardinal and the rest of the French ministers that the King cannot consent or agree to take any step from whence the least inference may be drawn as if his Maj^{ty} could on any account be induced to part with it”; this because of “the importance of that place, the opinion of the parliament and nation upon it, and the great expense they are actually now at to maintain and support it.” So that on no account could the affair be suffered to be brought before a congress. Yet, convinced of Fleury's sincerity, his Majesty did not “at present insist upon putting him out of his own way,” relying on his promise that no such time should be lost in negotiation as would enable their enemies “to put their military preparations into such a forwardness, as to fall upon us wherever they shall think proper.” During such negotiation the cardinal ought to inhibit any attack upon his Majesty or his allies by declaring to Fonseca that in case of any reason to apprehend such a design France would at once come to their assistance. In particular, as previously urged, he ought so to dispose the French forces on the Rhine, that they might be ready to march into Germany on short notice. And as the Rheinfels proposal had been rejected, he might explain in what manner those forces were intended to pass the Rhine. Further Walpole should observe that Richelieu's conduct gave great offence and that his Majesty attributed the behaviour of the court of Vienna in great measure to it.²

Nor did the counter-project find favour with the Dutch, though they were disappointed, says Dayrolle, “the name of peace being the only thing which flatters them” and Bruyninx having held out expectation of acceptance of the allies' proposals. Finch wrote: “if this counter-project had been drawn in a more alluring way, I don't know but that from the great inclination people have here to accommodate matters it might have been listened to; but at present I don't perceive there is any one man in the republick of consequence has the least notion of it.” He found the deputies, while refraining from reasoning upon the document, “very much disappointed and dissatisfied with it,” and heard general cry that the court of Vienna had no object but to “amuse and deceive.”

¹ The same, 2 and 9 April, before leaving Vienna, *ibid.* 60, 61.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 15 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

They would wait patiently, however, he said, to hear the opinion of London and Paris.¹

By another dispatch, conveying approval of all that he had done, Walpole was instructed to lay emphasis on his Majesty's forbearance in not declaring war on Spain at once. In view of Fleury's assurances, he was told, Richelieu should be

directed to insist upon an immediate and categorical answer, that no time might be lost to prevent our taking the field as soon as possible, and that our military preparations should be carried on every where with the utmost vigour. For these reasons, as well as the danger that there may possibly be in pressing the Cardinal too hard, or endeavouring to dissuade him from a step which he seems resolved upon, especially considering it is uncertain what part the Dutch will take in this matter, his Ma^{ty} is willing, as I had the honour to acquaint your Ex^{cy} in my letter of Saturday last, that the Cardinal should try this experiment, provided he will give you the satisfaction mentioned in my said letter, that in case any motion be made by the Imperialists, which may give his Maj^{ty} reason to apprehend any design against him or his allies, France will immediately come to his Maj^{ty}'s assistance, and that the necessary dispositions of their troops shall be forthwith made for that purpose.

An imperial force being already in the neighbourhood of Hesse-Cassel, unless the French were in immediate readiness to act whatever design the emperor might have in those parts would undoubtedly be executed before they were in a condition to oppose.

Further Walpole was instructed to represent to Fleury how great was the reliance placed upon him, when after all the provocations from Vienna the king was agreeable to his making one more advance, and at the same time to bring him to explain thoroughly his intentions in case of rejection of the new proposals.

We are sufficiently justified in desiring to know, very particularly, on what we are to depend; your Ex^{cy} will accordingly insist with the Cardinal that he declares to you when and in what manner they will declare war, and how they will come to the King's assistance in case any attempt be made upon him in Germany, for without this express condition his Maj^{ty} can by no means consent that any more time should be spent in a negotiation, where the King thinks there is so little appearance of success.²

Following on Fleury's letter came observations by him on an answer to the Austrian proposals projected, in his own words "une pièce très informe," only drawn up in preparation for his coming interview with Fonseca, and mildly couched, from his persuasion that high words would but serve to alienate and embitter; a paper

¹ Dayrolle, 25 April, R.O. Holland 295; Finch, same date and similarly on 29 April and 2 May, *ibid.* 293.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 18 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

termed by Walpole, in discussion with Morville, "just enough, but turned in such a manner as shewed his intentions to frame a new project. I excepted extremely against that method." Unable to obtain from Morville a satisfactory answer to his arguments on the necessity of insisting on the conditions offered and of immediately declaring war on Spain, he decided to write to Fleury again. To his home government he recommended strong expostulation in Holland, if it were true, as stated by Saint-Saphorin in a dispatch just received,¹ that Bruyninx was ordered not to let the negotiation drop.

The States should be required to joyn immediately with his Majesty in a declaration of war against Spain after his Majesty has been two months attacked, without any assistance from them his most intimate allies. This in my poor opinion is the least that should be done, altho' it should be thought advisable to give any new turn to the preliminaries, tho' nothing can be better than the old ones are, and they will be always justified and supported by their own equity and moderation, and if Holland will declare war against Spain I think it impossible for France to avoid or decline it any longer.

Fleury answered after he had seen Fonseca on 24 April. He had been shown, he said, original dispatches from the court of Vienna manifesting "un si grand désir de la paix, que je ne laisse par de croire qu'elle est en partie sincère, et que l'Empereur ne cherche qu'à sauver son honneur. Il est gêné par le roy d'Espagne, qui paroît inflexible sur Gibraltar." If execution of French undertakings were deferred, it was not with intention of failing in them but only to escape the reproach of not having tried everything to prevent war. Should the answer to be received from Vienna in less than a month not be favourable and precise, they should be carried out to their full extent. Without entering into long explanations he would only set out his plan, namely, to deliver to Fonseca certain observations for him to send to Vienna, after approval of them in England and Holland. Pending acceptance nothing need prevent his British Majesty from declaring war with Spain and calling upon France to do the same, in accordance with engagements. Time would thus be gained to receive the emperor's decisive answer, and immediate action would follow, were it adverse. His government were not posing as mediators, they desired only to show inclination for pacification. Were hostilities against the emperor entered on before he took the part of declaring war, they themselves would be the aggressors.

The letter made impression. After receiving it Walpole advised that George I should fix a date for declaring war on Spain

¹ Of 16 April.

and, in order to engage France to declare it at the same time, should speak to Broglie and write letters to Louis XV and to Fleury setting forth his firm resolution to remain united with France and specifying the reasons for the declaration. Presupposed, however, that it were "absolutely agreed and certain that France will do it the same day." Meanwhile Walpole himself would go on as hitherto, neither giving up anything essentially necessary nor consenting to any propositions being sent to Vienna that did not answer his Majesty's ends. Thus would be prevented "that dangerous method of negotiating," which Fleury would have considered not mediation but conciliation.¹

Still unsatisfied, however, Walpole felt himself compelled to write to Fleury a third time (26 April), to make him

perceive that I still insisted in sticking close to the preliminaries, which were sent to the Imperial court, in order to dispose him to declare his opinion to that purpose at the Council of State, which was to be held the next day, or at least to shew him that there were not the least hopes of his Majesty's departing from them.

He sent the letter to Issy by a special messenger, whom Fleury "called into his closet and bid him tell me for answer, that I should not be uneasy, for he would certainly do (which he repeated twice) what I required." Subsequently he learnt on undoubted authority that after his own long conference with Morville on 24 April Fonseca had visited that minister, who had

talked so warmly and in so high a strain to him upon the subject of the Emperor's counter-project, as being exceptionable and captious in every article and as by no means shewing the least inclination on the part of the Imperial court to come to a general pacification, that he, M. Fonseca, went that very afternoon to Issy and made his complaint to the Cardinal of the manner in which M. de Morville had received him. His Majesty may depend upon the truth of this fact, and to give M. de Morville his due, his conduct ever since the arrival of the counter-project from Vienna, in his discourse with me as well as with some of the foreign ministers, has been such as could be desired.

Two days afterwards Walpole sought out Fleury at Versailles, when, says he,

¹ Walpole's dispatches and enclosures, 25 April, *ibid.* According to Montgon (as cited by Baudrillart, iii. 328) Fleury told Fonseca that his master's spirit of equity would not make him lose sight of what he owed to his glory and to his allies. He was firmly resolved to take the most prompt and efficacious measures to sustain his own and their interests, and Fonseca would see from the preparations for war already made in France England and Holland that they would postpone resolution no longer. If the emperor desired sincerely to prevent war, the moment had come to put that desire into execution.

after some strong but friendly expostulations between us, in which we differed about the way of treating the Imperial court, in order to bring them to reason, and in which he renewed on his part his solemn protestations of standing by his engagements, . . . he at last, to convince me that he had fully pursued his Majesty's intentions with regard to the preliminaries, produced a paper he had drawn, of which the inclosed is a copy, and desired me to read it aloud; which I having done he asked me whether he had not effectually kept up to the substance of our preliminaries, altho' he had in some places given a turn or extension to them, that might be more agreeable to the temper of the Imperial court, and said that, if I approved them, they should be immediately sent by express to Vienna and Madrid, and no longer time allowed for the acceptance of them than what was necessary for their being considered there and for the going and returning of the courier between this place and Vienna, which he imagined might be about the space of a month from this time.

Meanwhile, he said, the paper might be submitted for approval in England and Holland and powers prepared for British and Dutch ministers to sign, should the conditions be accepted.

Walpole had no exception to make to the paper, but insisted on three weeks at most as sufficient for an answer and "in the mean while did not believe his Majesty would forbear declaring war against Spain, and would require France to do the same thing." Fleury did not oppose a British declaration, but wanted delay for France. Walpole differed, said that he would soon know his Majesty's sentiments, and in the meantime had nothing to object against Fleury sending the paper of conditions to Vienna as from himself,

in case he took care to let that court know that these preliminaries must be accepted or refused in three weeks from the day of their being sent from here, and that as France as well as England had suspended their declaration of war against Spain, on account of the siege of Gibraltar, purely for the sake of peace and in expectation that the preliminaries lately offered would have been accepted, so France daily expected, considering the reception which the late offers had met with at Vienna, that England would require France to joyn in a declaration of war against Spain, which his most Christian Majesty must, on such a requisition, be obliged to do.

Fleury undertook to write to Richelieu in a manner to please Walpole entirely and to furnish a copy of the letter, taking care that the same sentiments should be conveyed by a proper channel also to Madrid. In discourse about Richelieu, Walpole goes on: "altho' I cannot flatter myself that the Cardinal, who seems by no means satisfied with him, will give him a reprimand suitable to his behaviour, yet I am persuaded that he will absolutely tie up his hands, and confine him entirely to the present project."

To justify his complaisance Walpole advanced persuasion

of Fleury's sincerity and the consideration that, although desirous of avoiding a rupture with Spain as long as possible, he would be justified in that "even in the eye of France, after he has made this last effort for preserving the peace." The assurances which Broglie would give would bind him to the most vigorous measures, should the terms not be accepted. Walpole suggested again that George I should write to Louis XV and to Fleury, "in a stile full of confidence and affection," requiring France to join in a declaration of war with Spain at a fixed time, say in about three weeks from the coming Wednesday (30 April), the day that the terms offered were to be dispatched to Vienna by Fonseca and to Madrid by Massei, in order that everything might be ready for action if and as soon as they were rejected. Fleury, he said, appeared to expect acceptance of the terms. He had asked Walpole to send for full powers not as ambassador, nor in any other character but that of plenipotentiary, because then Fonseca, only so provided and yet thinking "that he must not condescend to sign after any other minister," would be able to sign first. Morville told Walpole in confidence that Fleury could not possibly have spoken more strongly than he had done in the Council on the previous day, but did not appear to nourish equal hope about the issue.¹

The new proposals, like the former, made suspension of the Ostend Company's charter for seven years the essential condition. For the rest, privileges of commerce to French British and Dutch subjects were to stand as under treaties prior to 1725 and all other rights and possessions on the basis of those of Utrecht Baden and the Quadruple Alliance. The northern powers were to be prayed by their respective allies not to have recourse to measures of force, but on the contrary to enter into all reasonable means for arriving at a settlement; pending the assembly of the congress in view neither party to lend itself directly or indirectly under any pretext to any measure of force which might trouble the actual state of the north or of Lower Germany, but on the contrary to exert itself to put an end to any trouble that might supervene. The above agreed, all hostilities to cease during the seven years' suspension of the charter, the galleons and the Ostend ships at sea being allowed to return home peaceably (any taken to be released), the cargoes of the galleons and the flota dealt with as in times of freedom, Hosier's squadron recalled, British commerce to America pursued as formerly, and the French English and Dutch fleets off the coasts of Spain or towards the emperor's dominions brought home as soon as possible (article 5). During the cessation of hostilities

¹ H. Walpole, 28 April, *ibid.*

solid endeavour to be made towards a general pacification, and should any trouble, after the signature of these preliminaries, arise anywhere between subjects of the contracting powers they to join in repairing damages or prejudice suffered. A congress to assemble as soon as possible at Aix-la-Chapelle or other town to be proposed by the emperor, and there all respective rights and pretensions to be examined and discussed. The Austrian proposals for the conduct of the congress were stated to be approved.¹

The document received in England, Walpole was directed to insist on the fifth article being so understood that English ships and effects taken by way of reprisal must be restored, and particularly the South Sea ship *Prince Frederick*, with its cargo of 4,000,000 piastres value, released from Vera Cruz before Hosier withdrew. He was ordered also to assure Fleury that in view of the reliance placed upon him his Majesty, confident that there would be no further procrastination after the return of the courier, was "very well satisfied with the step he has thought fit to take." He would insist on a declaration of war with Spain only if the terms were refused, the courts of Vienna and Madrid being certified of that and the necessary preparations being made in the meantime. He could not think that any difficulty would be made about this, seeing for how long a time Gibraltar had been under siege and nevertheless a declaration of war deferred, in order that Fleury might make one more attempt at accommodation; so that it would be "extreme hard" if even now the French would not come "to that resolution, which by their treatys they were long ago obliged to." Insinuation was being heard in England that "their best and most powerful ally" was disposed to act rather the part of a mediator and at the last, notwithstanding all the fair promises made, would disappoint.²

To the Dutch the proposals were represented as "a new form of preliminaries, which the Cardinal has drawn up and sent to Vienna as from himself." His Majesty, said Townshend, would have preferred to adhere to the former proposals and demand a clear and positive answer to them, but was so thoroughly convinced of Fleury's sincerity that he believed that the new ones would be final. The course adopted would save much time, and if Richelieu had instructions in the spirit promised a good effect might be seen quickly. The accession of Sweden and the conclusion of the treaty with Denmark would carry much weight. But above all vigorous preparation for war would show the Austrian

¹ Copies with Walpole's last dispatch and R.O. France 185.

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 22 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

court that "there is no room for trifling, and that they must conclude roundly and speedily, or else expect the worst immediately." Finch, therefore, must join with Fénelon in stirring up the Dutch, "for nothing can hurt us so much as a languid way of acting in this juncture," and the more they hastened their equipments the sooner would they have peace.¹

The proposals were not yet in their final form, though alterations made were of little moment. On 2 May Walpole sent "a new modelled project of articles" and with it a copy of a letter to Richelieu; the whole, he said, entirely Fleury's work "and the effect of his integrity good sense and moderation."² He explained how, when Morville on 30 April had brought him the drafts of these two documents, he had excepted against observations on the Austrian counter-project made in the letter to Richelieu as giving that ambassador scope to allow some abatement in the articles, and how Fleury had readily consented to omit them, as his letter enclosed would show. He reported agreement about pressing on preparations for war and impatience for some one to come from Holland to assist Colonel Armstrong; by preference Pestors, "who will be the most agreeable to this court."

By the letter, as amended, Richelieu was informed that the Council could not but consider the Austrian proposals "captieux, peu satisfaisans, et nullement propres à une pacification," and that Walpole and Boreel, yet less content, pressed for breaking off the negotiation, insisting that to prolong it was merely to waste time and to enable the emperor to prepare the better for war. Their arguments, certainly, were solid, but there was good reason to believe that the emperor did not want war, and the allies of Hanover were veritably disposed to peace on reasonable conditions. The terms now sent, based on the former with some amplification and explanation, were the result of orders from the king of France to work on a project which might content all parties. Walpole, in default of instructions, had felt himself unable either to approve or to condemn them, but had consented to their being put forward in the name of the king of France only. He, therefore, would have them so communicated in expectation that, were they accepted by the emperor and the king of Spain, who would receive them through Aldobrandini, they would be accepted also by his allies. Consultation with London and the Hague would have occasioned great delay, and each side have wasted time in preparations for a campaign. Richelieu must demand a precise and positive

¹ Townshend to Finch, 21 April (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293.

² Baudrillart, however (iii. 32), on the authority of Montgon, attributes the letter to Chauvelin, the rising man already designated for Morville's place.

reply, for these were final proposals and peace or war would depend upon the answer. Were the essentials approved modifications of little consequence might be allowed, and powers should be sent to Fonseca to agree on them and sign. Everything must be settled within a month at most. After which Fleury proceeded to discuss the articles seriatim, concluding with instructions to communicate them to Bruyninx, not for him to approve without orders, but in order to show the firm union with Holland.¹

Newcastle found it impossible to express the satisfaction which this letter had given, "the whole turn of it being so strong and manly" and the conduct that France would pursue so clearly set out. Instructions to Broglie communicated, he said, were yet more strongly couched. It was hoped that previous appeal to France to declare war on Spain would be taken as sufficient requisition; if Walpole thought otherwise he should make it in a memorial or in other proper manner, founding the demand on treaty engagements.² At the same time elaborate full powers were drawn for Walpole to negotiate and conclude.³

When the couriers had gone for Vienna and Madrid Walpole had from Massei's auditor a particular account of the nuncio's interview with Fleury on 30 April. The cardinal, he learnt, had communicated the two documents and given a copy of the preliminaries, asking Massei to explain to the court of Madrid the impossibility of accepting the Austrian counter-project, although some extension of the allies' proposals was allowed. The present ones, he thought, "might be agreeable to the Emperor and Spain as being entirely founded upon former treaties," and a door was left open for the king of Spain to bring forward at the proposed congress any other pretensions that he might have. Arguments to be used with Aldobrandini were the sincere desire of the king of France for reconciliation and his success in persuading the king of England to refrain from declaring war in consequence of the attack upon Gibraltar, notwithstanding his strong obligations in the matter; but the present preliminaries were an *ultimum ultimum*, and were they not accepted within a month's time he would execute his engagements. All of which, said the auditor,

¹ Copies of these documents with Walpole's dispatch of 2 May, *l.c.*, and R.O. France 185. The articles printed by Rousset, iii. 394. Robinson commented in one of his familiar letters to Delafaye (3 May, R.O. France 185): "The affair is come out as well and as handsomely as can be, and what is best, master Richelieu's hands are so well tyed, that if his fingers itched twice as much as they do to be negotiating, I cannot see where he will find room to thrust them in, so that if we have no peace that will even be better than one cooked up by him with his Imperial friends."

² Newcastle to H. Walpole, 27 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

³ Dated 24 April (o.s.), R.O. King's Letters 15.

was dictated to and taken down by Massei in the most explicit terms.

Moreover, he had seen Fonseca's dispatch to his court, recommending as strongly as could be acceptance of the preliminaries, under pain of war as the inevitable consequence of refusal, this, however, with a hint that at a congress France might be "sooner detached from England than if a rupture should happen."¹ But later he let Walpole know in great confidence that besides this dispatch Fonseca had written privately to Sinzendorf advising him to hold firm, as he did not doubt being able to bring the court of France to allow some abatement. Besides which, said the auditor, Fonseca had declared to several persons that the preliminaries would not be accepted.²

In Holland, when Fénelon was at last informed of the views of his court, he communicated them to the Dutch deputies, who, says Finch again, exhibited neither satisfaction nor the contrary, but took what he said *ad referendum*. Afterwards Finch found them entirely of the opinion expressed by Townshend and satisfied with Walpole's strong opinion of Fleury's fidelity. "Mr Goslinga, among the rest, told me that I had made him easy" and that more spirit and vigour would now be seen. In fact, that morning it had been decided to send Pestors to Paris to concert a plan of campaign; to add to the four men-of-war cruising in the Channel under command of Vice-admiral Petersen two expected back from Algiers and four that were now ready to sail; and to raise 500,000 florins for the expense of marching troops and forming a camp. All of which points were to be communicated to Fénelon and himself at a conference next day. Then, enclosing a resolution of the States-General of 6 May: "They are intirely of the same sentiments with his Majesty and say, that without the allies act in the present conjuncture with vigour and spirit, the opportunity will be lost without any hopes of regaining it." And again:

they think that we shall now soon see what we are to expect, and all people are inclined to prepare themselves for the worst, but above all things to take care that no time be lost and that whatever is undertaken may be carried on with the utmost vigour, that the affair may be soon brought to a conclusion. The project of the first people here is that in case the court of Vienna does not give a direct and categorical answer we should immediately block up the port of Ostend and take all proper measures to embarrass the Emperor on that side.

¹ H. Walpole, 5 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32750, enclosing a copy of Morville's letter to Massei of 2 May, and noting that by advices from Vienna and elsewhere money had lately been remitted from Madrid to Vienna to the value of seven millions of French money.

² The same, 8 May.

Townshend in answer intimated impatience to hear what resolution would be taken about blockading Ostend, the answer from Vienna not being expected to be satisfactory, and again :

We persuade ourselves that the States will take care to be ready in all respects on their parts, and particularly that, in case the Emperor's answer is not satisfactory, they will without delay declare warr against Spain, as France has promised to do at the same time with his Majesty.¹

With Newcastle's dispatch of 22 April (o.s.) had gone a royal letter to Fleury in the sense desired. Replying, Fleury acknowledged the goodness of George I in thus intimating his approval and reaffirmed that the new proposals were but the former, with additions in no way altering their substance. His master only wished to signify the rectitude of his intentions and his desire for peace, without in the least receding from his engagements. Should the emperor and the king of Spain unfortunately refuse to consider the reasonable conditions offered he would take all the measures necessary for protection of his Majesty's dominions, and as soon as he had resolved to declare war on Spain would do the same. All kinds of reasons obliged him not to hesitate to take this step. His interests and those of George I were the same.² Walpole wrote of this reply when sending it :

It is conceived in terms so clear and so explicit as can leave no room to doubt of the sincerity of his intentions to fulfill the engagements, which France is under towards England, and is accompanied at the same time with expressions so full of zeal cordiality and respect towards the King, and for his interest and service, that I am persuaded it will give his Majesty a more than ordinary satisfaction.³

¹ Finch, 6 to 13 May, Townshend to him, 5 and 9 May (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293.

² George I to Fleury, 22 April (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Ministers 5; Fleury in reply, 9 May, Royal Letters 7.

³ H. Walpole, 10 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32750, enclosing copies of the letter.

CHAPTER XLVI

LAST PLANS OF CAMPAIGN

JOHN ARMSTRONG, the British military expert appointed to confer at Paris, now a brigadier-general, presented himself there on 19 April 1727. A main point of his plan, Newcastle had written, was to form "a considerable army of observation" about Nimeguen, and Walpole should make it his chief endeavour to obtain for that army as large a contingent of French troops as possible, because it was from it that the forces in Lower Germany must be supported "in case the Emp^r should penetrate that way, as well as our army in Flanders, if he should come with a body of troops on that side . . . Italy is now quite out of the question by the part the king of Sardinia has thought fit to take."¹

Walpole and Armstrong met Fleury Berwick and Morville in conference on 21 April. They submitted that every effort should be made to engage the princes of the empire to a strict neutrality, since then there would be no need to consider operations on the Rhine and action could be confined to the Austrian Netherlands. They advised as a first step seizure of the line of the Meuse, "in which enterprize a good body of French troops may concur, as well as to form an army on the side of Nimeguen." Fleury and Berwick they thought to approve this plan in general, holding, however, that a strong force must be kept upon the Upper Rhine to guard against a sudden irruption into Alsace. Yet, computing the French forces between Rhine and Moselle to amount to some 53,200 foot and 17,360 horse, they seemed to agree that 30,000 of them might be moved to act upon the Meuse, "without counting the 12,000 they have in French Flanders." What could be done about reinforcements for the camp about Nimeguen there had not been time to discuss.²

After this, Berwick having asked to see something in writing, Walpole and Armstrong read to him "A Plan for opening the campaign against the Emperor and the King of Spain." This, presupposing the empire to remain neutral, recommended defensive

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 2 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

² H. Walpole and Armstrong, jointly, 21 April, *ibid.*

action only on the Upper Rhine, in Dauphiné, and in Lower Germany, and offensive in the Austrian Netherlands and in the provinces of Biscay and Guipuzcoa ; the French to furnish forces for these purposes and to join with the English and Dutch in forming the Nimeguen army, and all troops to be ready to begin operations by the middle of May at latest. Details of conducting them were set out at length, and it was proposed that, in case of need, for instance if the emperor abandoned all the rest and turned his whole attack on Lower Germany, a strong force should be detached from the Upper Rhine, in order to leave sufficient troops for the offensive in the Netherlands. There, after securing all the passages of the Meuse, attack might be made upon Ostend or other operations undertaken, that might seem proper.

Berwick, said the writers, seemed "in general well satisfied," but they believed that, if the French could be persuaded to an attack on Spain at all, it would be on the side of Roussillon, not of Biscay ; with equal effect, it was thought, in preventing an invasion of England. They observed great impatience for some one to come from Holland to discuss plans.¹

It was at this time that General Sutton, as has been noticed, was on his way to Cassel, where he arrived on 29 April. Fullest assurances had been received from the landgrave in February, and in March another long rescript to Diemar stated that, according to confidential advices from Hanover, the real destination of the imperial troops ordered, as given out, for the Netherlands was Brunswick, there to join the troops of Wolfenbüttel and Münster. The Hanoverian ministers had prayed for communication of anything that might be learnt on the subject at Cassel and to know the landgrave's sentiments on the case of passage being demanded through his dominions. Answer had been made that the information could hardly be believed, for reasons given, but that yet the aspect of affairs did not allow too great assurance of security, and it was necessary to be prepared for all unexpected happenings. In order, therefore, to avoid decisions insufficiently concerted and unsuitable, and not to lose necessary time, the king of England should be informed that while, as he knew, the landgrave's troops were engaged for the service of the crown of England, and so he would take no step not approved by his Majesty, on the other hand he hoped to avoid, should the passage of the imperial troops be demanded, or even forced, without previous requisition, the blame of having done either too much or too little. Diemar, therefore, must request an immediate audience of the king and pray him to communicate his wise

¹ The same, 26 April, enclosing the plan.

sentiments on the matter, and also confer with the ministers, have the affair maturely considered, and obtain, if possible, an answer in writing as to what use the landgrave should make of his troops in unexpected cases, and chiefly, whether they should not be kept at home to defend his frontiers against an entry without requisition.¹

The reply to this expressed his Majesty's gratification and sense of the landgrave's protestant zeal. In regard to the movement of the imperial troops, it was said, although he could not well refuse their passage through his country, were it demanded, he might make conditions that they should only march in small detachments and do no damage. And he must be well on his guard against their seizing Rheinfels. If they wanted to pass into Wolfenbüttel he might say that old accords between the two branches of the house of Brunswick forbade the entry of foreign troops without their mutual assent, and that being so closely united with the king of England he must obtain his permission first. If they attempted to force a passage, that would be a direct violation of the constitutions of the empire, so that he would be justified in offering all possible resistance and his Majesty would support him with all his forces.²

Soon afterwards was received from the landgrave a long Latin letter to George I explaining in detail the question of Hanau and in particular the emperor's refusal to confirm his compact on the subject with the king of Poland, in consequence of his having joined his forces with those of his Majesty. He knew what to expect, he said, from such signs as Wurmbrand not coming to Cassel on his mission to the circles, although he had visited Darmstadt. He denied his convention with George I for troops to be a violation of the laws of the empire, and prayed his wholesome counsel and assistance.³

General Sutton's mission followed. His instructions dwelt in the usual style on the defensive aims of the treaty of Hanover, maintenance of religion and liberties against "the ambitious views of certain powers," and expressed his Majesty's satisfaction at the assurances given by Diemar, "with whose prudence and good conduct We are extremely well satisfied," and particularly at the influence exerted by the landgrave with his son, the king of Sweden, in promoting the Swedish accession. Sutton was to insinuate his Majesty's desire to bring into the alliance of Hanover as many princes and states of the empire as possible, and to obtain in con-

¹ Rescript to Diemar, 8 March (French translation), R.O. Royal Letters 19.

² Townshend to Diemar, 14 March (o.s.), R.O. Foreign Entry Book 248.

³ The landgrave to George I, 31 March, R.O. Royal Letters 19, King's Letters 20.

fidence the landgrave's advice on means to that end. He was to take all opportunities of confidential converse with German ministers in the neighbourhood of Cassel,¹ and to correspond constantly with those of Hanover. He must keep in view accession of the landgrave to the treaty of Hanover, but this with every caution. Should he press for a general guarantee of his dominions and of the successions to Hanau and Rheinfels, it must be pointed out that such was already accorded under his convention and that he might consider himself quite safe, his security being of such importance to Hanover. Should he, however, be willing to accede, the existing guarantees might be extended.

Private instructions, on the other hand, warned Sutton that the landgrave's accession in form to the treaty of Hanover was invited "more to show Our great value and esteem for his Highness, and for his more close alliance to Us, than that We are persuaded his accession will be of such great advantage to our cause"; on the contrary, he might be expected to load the accession with burthensome conditions. Sutton, therefore, must not press him so earnestly as to make him think it would be taken amiss, should he decline. He must have chiefly in view the contents of Townshend's letter of 4 January (O.S.),² "and whenever you talk of Rheinfeldts, or of the succession of Hanaw, you will keep to the word *droits*, or rights, for We are not inclined to engage Ourselves to him the possession of these two pretensions upon Rheinfeldts and Hanaw in all events." But the landgrave must not be allowed to perceive this. On all steps taken Sutton must consult Dalwigh, paying particular regard to and following his advice, whether in regard to work at Cassel or with relation to neighbouring princes. He must keep an eye on imperial endeavours to intimidate or corrupt such as were well disposed to the allies. No doubt, it was said, the landgrave would wish to keep well with the emperor, both as a prince of the empire and as having interests and pretensions which greatly depended on his favour, but Sutton must not show "uneasiness in these matters which regard the constitutions of the Empire," only, should he observe the emperor's interest growing so strong as to endanger the landgrave's good inclinations,

¹ "And in particular with Mons^r Schleinitz, who has some credit with the duke of Wolfenbüttel and would be thought to be well inclined to Us, and is in constant correspondence with Mons^r Morville." This man, a native of Saxe-Gotha, having entered the service of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and had much to do with the marriage of the tsarevich Alexis into that house, had been taken over by Peter the Great and employed by him as his minister at Hanover and afterwards at Paris. In 1724, being in great straits, and again after Peter's death, he had applied, without success, for service with George I, returning to Wolfenbüttel in June 1726.

² Previously cited.

must do his best "to oppose the progress of such councils, and to lessen the influence of the insinuations from Vienna." With these instructions went copies of Townshend's letters of 4 January and 14 March (o.s.), of the landgrave's of 31 March, of the preliminaries sent to Vienna, of the draft treaty with Denmark, of Leheup's late information from Ratisbon, and a "Plan of the Operations of the War."¹

Answer to the landgrave's letter was sent at the end of April. Nothing, said George I, could serve him better to achieve his aims than accession to the purely defensive treaty of Hanover, following the example of the king and crown of Sweden. George would be most prompt himself to confirm the Hanau succession by his "fidejussio," and hoped that his allies would make no difficulty, and certainly, were the landgrave assailed on account of his convention for troops, would exert all his power both as king and as elector to defend him.²

The necessity of support to the landgrave was pressed upon the court of France. Horatio Walpole, Newcastle wrote, would see from letters received by Diemar from Dalwighk, who seemed "to be very well informed of the motions of the Imperialists, and of what is doing in the Empire," that the hopes of forming a neutrality association amongst the princes were not to be depended upon, "so great is the awe and influence of the court of Vienna over them," and that the emperor avowed intention of furnishing magazines at Frankfort, Mentz, Coblenz and Cologne for the service of his troops marching towards the Rhine. "In these circumstances all that can be done at present is to take early care of providing for the security of such princes of the Empire as are inclined to act with any firmness and resolution in opposition to the views of the Imperial court," and especially the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, "who has hitherto shown a great deal of steadiness and vigour, and his Majesty doubts not will continue to act in the same way." So that to counter imperial persuasion with him his Majesty would have the French court "forthwith give him the strongest assurances of assisting him in case of need with a body of their troops," and make in earnest such a disposition of their forces towards the Rhine as to forestall any sudden attack in Lower Germany, before the plan of military operations was settled or the army under the Danish convention ready to take the field. Then the landgrave would see that "sufficient care was taken of his security, and our enemies be

¹ Credentials for and instructions to Sutton, 25 March (o.s.), R.O. Germany, States, 122, King's Letters 20.

² George I to the landgrave, 14 April (o.s.), R.O. Royal Letters 19, King's Letters 20.

discouraged from making any attempt upon his Maj^{ty} in Germany." ¹

Fleury admitted the necessity of prompt measures, undertook to press for the coming of Pesters from Holland, and advised that no time should be lost about getting the Danish and Swedish troops in readiness. "Il y a tout lieu de croire," he wrote, "que l'Empereur en veut au landgrave de Hesse et aux états de Hanovre, et que le roi de Prusse, par la plus grande de toutes ses perfidies, est d'intelligence avec lui sur cela." He promised to have the French subsidy for Sweden sent at once, and to work in the same spirit for that for Denmark. Their own troops, he observed, would be at hand also, but the difficulty was to know where they should act and how pass the Rhine "sans faire déclarer tout l'Empire et sans y avoir aucun prince pour allié." ²

This Walpole admitted, seeing, he commented, that "the princes of the Empire must not be disobliged by us, and the getting possession of Rhinfeldt is looked upon to be imprudent and indeed impracticable." Going on to the subject of a joint declaration of war on Spain, should the proposals now going to Vienna be rejected, doubtless, he thought, the French would be for breaking with the emperor at the same time, in order that main efforts might be directed against him, and it was highly probable that a declaration of war on Spain would oblige him to take up arms, lest Spain should abandon him. But should he forbear, on what pretext could he be attacked, when "the only open and avowed difference" with him was the Ostend trade? Would the Dutch agree to attack the Ostend ships or commit other act of hostility against the emperor immediately, without some previous declaration or demand for satisfaction? And by such, at this advanced season of the year and in present circumstances, would not too much time be lost? The emperor must not be left to act, while themselves differed and were at a loss about proceedings. ³

Newcastle presented the private thoughts of his government very fully.

Thô the Cardinal's letter to your Ex^{cy} gave the King great satisfaction, as expressing all imaginable concern for his Maj^{ty}'s security in Germany, yet I must not conceal from you that the King was sorry to find the Cardinal thought there might be some difficulty in the French army's passing the Rhine, lest it

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 13 April (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750. Dalwigk's letters (copies enclosed) treated of such matters as formation of magazines at various places, 16,000 men to come from Bohemia, the intention of the landgrave to resist, if attacked, a visit by Wurmbrand shortly expected, nominally to treat of the grievances of the protestants, and the ability of the emperor to carry the diet on any question of neutrality.

² Fleury to H. Walpole, Issy, 1 May, *ibid.*

³ H. Walpole, 2 May, *ibid.*

should disoblige the princes of the Empire when, as he said, we have few or none of them on our side.

The first objection his Maj^{ty} thinks can be of no weight, since those princes, thrô whose territorys the French troops in such case may probably pass, are so avowedly and so deeply engaged against the Hanôver allys that little regard ought to be had to them, and their troops are so few, that no opposition is to be feared from them ; and since nothing of this nature is proposed to be done but upon supposition that the Emperor is the aggressor and himself begins to attack the princes of the Empire, contrary to the laws and constitutions of it, it may not possibly be amiss that those among them who have so blindly given in to all the Emperor's views should feel the ill effects of it ; and the Dutch, who were at first very much averse to any proceeding of this kind, are now so exasperated at the late behaviour of those princes that they seem to think that it would be right they should see the dangers to which they expose themselves ; and as to the second point, of our having no allys in those parts to joyn the French troops, or otherwise support them, the Cardinal will surely not be of that opinion, when he reflects upon the forces which his Maj^{ty} has in his German dominions, and those that the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel and the crowns of Denmark and Sweden are engaged to furnish, which are infinitely superiour to what can be brought against them by those that are in alliance with the Emperor.

After which Newcastle recalled how as long ago as May 1726 Fleury had told of orders to prepare a bridge of boats, and how it was then promised positively that 40,000 French should be ready to pass the Rhine to make a diversion where required. Certainly France had sufficient forces on the Upper and Lower Rhine to answer that or any other purpose thought proper, and although objection to the landgrave possessing himself of Rheinfels still persisted, it was thought in England very practicable for the French, with their bridges, to pass the river somewhere in that neighbourhood and march into the country of that allied prince, in time to act in such manner as the motions of the imperial forces should appear to render necessary, while still maintaining in Alsace a body of troops considerable enough to pass the Rhine also thence. As to the subsidies to Sweden and Denmark, it was hoped that the convention with Denmark would be ratified speedily and the subsidies to that king immediately advanced, to enable him to send his troops at once towards the Elbe, since chief dependence must be placed on them, in case the king of Prussia should join in any disturbance in those parts, as Fleury seemed to think possible. Declaration of war with Spain, in case the preliminaries sent to Vienna were not accepted within the term specified, Walpole was already instructed to demand in "the most formal and effectual manner possible." Finch in Holland had orders to like effect, and his letters gave all imaginable reason to expect the States-General to join in a declaration without

difficulty, as soon as the French should have resolved upon it. As to conduct of the war, in view of French disposition to act against Austria rather than against Spain, his Majesty's own sentiments were these. First, the allies to declare war on Spain only and the French to march their troops into Catalonia, on first notice of which the emperor would be obliged to execute his engagements with Spain, and whether he attacked France or Hanover would plainly be the aggressor. Since the occasion of the quarrel was the attack upon Gibraltar the empire could have "no sort of pretence to concern themselves in it," and the allies could fall upon the emperor "when and wherever they shall find it most for their interest. And if, contrary to expectation, the Emperor should forbear to assist Spain, that crown will most certainly abandon him, his Cath^k Maj^{ty}, as your Ex^{cy} knows, being generally thought to desire no better than a fair opportunity of quitting him." In that case all the present troubles would be ended and the aims of the allies, and of France in particular, be effectually answered. To begin with an attack upon the Ostend Company's ships his Majesty did not think to the purpose; too much time would be required to obtain Dutch participation, success in execution was uncertain, and the ships might not come home until the time for attack on them was past. Besides, such action might engage some of the princes of Germany in the dispute, since many of them had been brought by the emperor "to look upon Ostend as part of the circle of Burgundy, and as such belonging to the Emperor." Yet, should France prefer to declare war on Austria at the same time as on Spain, and to begin with attack upon the emperor, his Majesty would readily concur, justified as he was by "the late unprecedented behaviour of the Imperial court . . . and the oppressions they lay upon our trade and commerce." Lastly Newcastle asked for what purpose were the ten or twelve men-of-war fitting out in France designed? He suggested that, as Sir Charles Wager's force was more than sufficient for securing Gibraltar and keeping the Spanish navy in its ports, part of his squadron, and particularly the bomb-vessels, might join the French in a cruise along the coasts of Naples and Sicily, rousing by the squadron's mere appearance alarm at Vienna and influencing also the king of Sardinia, "whose inclination to joyn with us is raised by the likelihood of war." And perhaps a very few French troops put on board galleys might effect what Walpole had formerly hinted, the seizure of Portolongone. There would be no difficulty about saluting colours, because, apart from special orders that would be given, "we do not pretend to any superiority at sea beyond Cape Finister." ¹

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 27 April (o.s.), private, *ibid.*

This dispatch was crossed by a private letter from Walpole all in his own hand. The fault he found was inability to agree on a plan of action. While the French army was already provided with everything necessary to take the field, Armstrong's plan of seizing the line of the Meuse was little relished. Against Spain Berwick had plainly shown the difficulty and expense of attack on the Biscay side and equal effect from a diversion in Catalonia. The difficult matter of passing the Rhine both the marshal and Armstrong were at a loss to decide. Walpole himself had asked, why did not the Hanoverian troops advance towards the landgrave's country, and the Danes towards Hanover; who was to command the army, since the king of Denmark talked of taking the field in person; and what means of communication would it have with the Dutch at Nimeguen? "France has made, or can soon make, a disposition of above 80,000 men to extend from the Maes to the Rhine, and move in concert with the allies on either side as the motions of the enemy shall require." The necessity of considering and concerting all this was the reason for Walpole's suggestion that Berwick and George I should meet. "What I think would be best is that his Maj^{ty} should, if he intends to command himself, hasten to Holland" and desire that Berwick should meet him there. Everything could then be concerted without the delay of sending couriers, and really the Hague seemed to be the best place for deciding operations both by sea and land in the presence of his Majesty and some of his ministers. Any other scheme involved delay confusion and disputes. All this for Newcastle's private eye and to be used as he thought fit.¹

That George I should take command of the army in Flanders was also suggested to Finch in Holland by Goslinga, as "the most advantageous thing for the alliance that could happen." It was replied:

His Ma^{ty} takes very kindly that great mark of confidence, which he told you the best men in the republick would be very desirous of shewing him. You will therefore let Mr Goslinga in confidence know the great pleasure with which his Majesty received that overture, and his readiness to undertake any thing that may contribute to the safety and honour of the States. But as to the command of their army his Ma^{ty} can say nothing till the plan of operations is first settled, and till he sees by the motions of the Imperialists where the chief weight of the war is like to fall, his Ma^{ty} being desirous to command where his presence may be most useful and necessary.²

Marshal Berwick now presented a state of the French forces and also, in Walpole's words, "such a one as he had been able to obtain of those of the Emperour." It showed as follows.

¹ H. Walpole to Newcastle, 9 May, *ibid.*

² Finch, 9 May, Townshend to him, 5 May (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293.

Army of the Rhine: 88 battalions and 124 squadrons, 77,691 men, to be augmented by 5,000 cavalry and 1,200 of the free companies, besides militia for the garrisons and to guard the lines.

Army of Roussillon: 41 battalions and 35 squadrons, 32,974 men, to be augmented by 1,800 cavalry, besides militia for the garrisons and nine battalions of militia or "miquelets" to guard the mountain passes.

Army of Dauphiné: 31 battalions and 18 squadrons, 24,299 men, to be augmented by 200 cavalry, besides militia for the garrisons and, according to the kind of war, free companies or even battalions of mountaineers, "auxquels cependant il ne faudra pas donner le nom de Barbets."

Army of Flanders: 18 battalions and 12 squadrons, 13,884 men, to be augmented by 390 cavalry and militia for the garrisons.

Totals: 178 battalions of infantry, 120,940 men, and 189 squadrons of cavalry, 27,908 men, to be augmented by 7,390; 60,000 militia for the garrisons, 12,000 veterans to guard castles, etc., and 12 free companies, of which 6 dragoons, 1,200 men; approximately in all 230,000.

Guns: 332 siege and 260 field; namely, in Alsace 72 and 60, on the Moselle 80 and 50, in Roussillon 30 and 30, in Guienne 30 and 20, in Dauphiné 40 and 40, in Flanders 80 and 60.

The Austrian statement showed, including intended augmentations: in Naples and Sicily 20,000 infantry and 2,514 cavalry; in Lombardy 16,800 and 2,200; in Flanders 16,100 and 3,300; in Germany 6,000 and 3,000; in Bohemia and Austria 15,000 and 8,568; in Transylvania 9,000 and 4,284; in Hungary 36,000 and 24,048; the total of these widely scattered and largely unavailable forces amounting but to 118,900 foot and 47,914 horse.¹

Another account, however, reckoned the existing imperial forces at 92,000 infantry, 32,424 cavalry, and 2,000 "heidecques," and intended augmentations at 61,536, a total of 187,960.²

The next Paris dispatches discussed the policy to be pursued with the princes and states of the empire. Fleury, Walpole wrote, approved Saint-Saphorin's plan of a declaration to be made by Great Britain and France at the coming Frankfort meeting of the circles, as also his advice not to be at pains or expense in attempting a neutrality convention with them, but only to promise support by men and money to a league that they should form amongst themselves.³ This was approved; Walpole was instructed to desire that since George I, owing to "the violent proceedings of the court of

¹ Sent by H. Walpole and Armstrong on 8 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

² *Lettres historiques*, lxxi. 418, April 1727.

³ H. Walpole, 10 May, *l.c.*

Vienna," had now no minister at Ratisbon, Chavigny or some other should make the declaration in his name. He was supplied with the king's ideas of what should be said and was told : " if the elector of Bavaria and the other princes of the Empire are in the disposition that Mo^r de S^t Saphorin apprehends, they will readily agree to a neutrality, if not, their refusal will justify any measures that shall be thought proper to be taken for the common interest of the allys." Their disposition would be tested, and the difficulty about giving them offence by a French passage of the Rhine removed. For if neutral they could not object to France sending help to her allies, and in the contrary case no scruple could arise about a crossing being forced. Nothing could better persuade them to neutrality than the sight of a French army ready to cross. Should the emperor attack his Majesty or his allies before the declaration at Frankfort were made, it was not doubted but that the French would come to his assistance. Best was as previously set out ; the French to cross the Rhine at Rheinfels and Strasburg, the Hessians to march to meet them, the Hanoverians advance to assist the landgrave, the Danes move to the Elbe, the Swedes stand ready in Pomerania. Regarding measures to put an end to the Ostend trade, since it was just known that Pestors and General Grovestins were ordered to Paris, his Majesty thought it best to leave this question and others regarding Flanders for settlement with them. In what concerned the princes of Germany, circumstances were altered since Armstrong had submitted his plan, and caution about offending them was now unnecessary. Promise of support to a German neutrality league being approved, should not the princes be so apprised ? Or did Fleury prefer to wait for this till their resolution was taken ? If France and Holland were of opinion that war should be declared on the emperor about the Ostend Company, as well as on Spain about Gibraltar, his Majesty would readily concur, agreeing that in the latter case an invasion of Catalonia would serve the purposes in view as well as one of Biscay.¹

Walpole was able to reply that a declaration to be made at Frankfort (he enclosed a copy, terming it not " so full and extensive " as could be wished, since Morville did not think it prudent " to speak yet in a higher stile ") was already dispatched, that certain princes of the empire had been informed as was desired, that Fleury did not object to the plans for crossing the Rhine proposed, and that as Pestors and Grovestins had arrived the previous evening a plan of campaign would soon be concerted.²

¹ Newcastle in reply, 4 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

² H. Walpole, 20 May, *ibid.* It may be noted that Chavigny left Ratisbon for Frankfort on 23 May, his appearance there, it was reported, causing much surprise among the deputies. He was back at Ratisbon on 19 June (*Lettres*

Sutton, arrived at Cassel, had reported apprehensions about Austrian preparations and the march of troops allayed. He was received with honours "much more than either I desired, or deserved," and could not sufficiently commend Dalwigk. He found him to rank Saxe-Gotha first for approach, and naturally, since that duke's country covered the most exposed part of the landgrave's dominions, and he had found a way to open correspondence with Schleinitz, a matter requiring the utmost caution and circumspection. The troops, he was assured, were very complete, excepting as regarded clothing, and he would begin his inspections the following week.¹

Immediately after, however, came alarming word from Dalwigk : 40,000 imperial troops passing and threatening attack, an army of 50,000 to be assembled on the Rhine towards Coblenz, magazines at Langensalzen completely furnished, six Saxon regiments entered already into the emperor's service, and all the remaining forces of Saxony ready to march at a minute's warning.² Sutton, while expecting Townshend to be surprised at the least credit being given "to such an improbability, if not to say an impossibility," reported nevertheless orders issued for arming the militia and the peasants to resist invasion, and pressure on himself to urge readiness of the Danes Swedes and Hanoverians to advance and immediate payment of the subsidies, in view of the great expenses. Soon, however, he could write again of alarms quieted, partly by assurance of military help from Hanover, partly by news of the imperial force, only eight battalions and twelve squadrons, gone on from Mentz to Coblenz and no troops in motion on the side of Silesia and Bohemia. He had reviewed four battalions of foot, "all new clothed, well armed and accoutred, and compleat to a man."³

Dalwigk's advices were sufficient, however, to bring new orders to Walpole to urge again his previous demands : immediate orders for the French troops to be ready to pass the Rhine, instant payments to the king of Denmark, repetition of declaration to Fonseca that France would certainly send help, were Hanover attacked, and a formal undertaking that, should the answer from Vienna be "captious and unsatisfactory," France would declare war on Spain within ten days from its receipt, giving time for a like declaration by Great Britain the same day. The king did not

historiques, lxxi. 635, lxxii. 60). It was at this assembly, on 31 May, that the old association of the five circles, the Upper Rhenish, Electoral Rhenish, Franconian, Swabian and Austrian, was renewed, while there were negotiations for the Westphalian and Bavarian to join (Droysen, IV. ii. 437, Rosenlehner, p. 269).

¹ Sutton, 1 and 5 May, R.O. Germany, States, 122.

² Extract from a letter to Diemar of 8 May with Newcastle's dispatch of 8 May o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

³ Sutton, 12 to 19 May, R.O. Germany, States, 122.

doubt, said Newcastle, that the States-General would do the same.¹

Whatever the Dutch inclination for this, or whatever their qualms about an attack upon Ostend by land, they were willing to take part in a blockade of the port by sea. The deputies, says Finch, "express'd themselves very clearly, that they thought no good was to be expected at present but from vigorous measures"; were the answer from Vienna not satisfactory there would be ten men-of-war ready for the blockade, four already out in the Channel, four ready to sail, and two expected back from Algiers; and they desired to know how many British ships would join, the rendezvous, "and what might be the properest method for executing that design." It was replied that in spite of the many ships employed on various necessary service five of the line were available to join the Dutch wherever it should be deemed proper, Lord Berkeley advising that two of each nation would suffice for the blockade, while the rest cruised in the Channel to stop any Ostend ships returning from entering Nieuport or other haven. This information, Finch answered, gave the highest satisfaction. The blockade of Ostend "was their own thought and is still what they propose to do," though orders for it would be deferred until the result of the conferences at Vienna, of which there was word, was known.²

Previously Townshend had stated that the English troops to be quartered about Harwich would consist of nine regiments of foot, each of 900 men, and four of dragoons, each of nine troops; to which his Majesty designed to add a strong detachment of foot-guards, the earl of Orkney and the duke of Argyll to command.³

The Dutch commissioners, Ernest Pesters and Frederick van Grovestins, arrived in Paris on 19 May. The one, when minister resident at Brussels, had more than once been entrusted with missions to George I, the other, lately promoted major-general, was a soldier of fame and governor of Bergen-op-Zoom. They were instructed, Finch was told, "to conform themselves to what M^r Armstrong and M^r Le Blanc should agree upon, as to a plan of operations."⁴ As a first step they asked for specific information on three points, essential for forming a plan of operations, should the emperor reject the preliminaries.

(1) How best to employ the English and Dutch forces (the latter 8,000 foot and 4,000 horse besides some battalions which might be

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 8 and 11 May (o.s.), *l.c.*

² Finch, 16 and 30 May, Townshend to him, 12 May (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293. On 20 May Finch reported Admiral Sperling's squadron of four ships, now at Plymouth, ordered thence to Portsmouth.

³ Townshend to Finch, 9 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

⁴ Finch, 16 May, cited.

drawn from the Barrier garrisons when the army was formed), and also those of Denmark and Sweden, were the kings of France and England able to dispose of them? Should they not be employed in the Austrian Netherlands to render the port of Ostend useless to the emperor, given in the first place the security of the dominions of the allies in Germany adequately assured, according to treaties?

(2) Would the said forces be ready at the time to be fixed to camp and march wherever the kings of France and England should think proper, so that all might co-operate together in execution of the aims of the alliance, success, especially when the season for campaigning was so far advanced, appearing to depend entirely on this?

(3) Although it was of the last importance to manage the princes and states of the empire, should not, at the time that resolution was taken to act against the emperor in the Netherlands, declarations of intention be obtained from those whose action might be doubted, and in particular from the bishop of Liège, whether or no he would permit passage of the Meuse, and from the king of Prussia; with summons to the latter, under pain of hostilities, to perform his engagements under the treaty of Hanover, or at least to declare that he would not assist the emperor? ¹

Newcastle answered the third question first. His Majesty, he said, thought more advisable the method advised by France, merely to repeat assurance that the allies of Hanover had no design of disturbing the tranquillity of the empire. Inquiry as to intention he considered would have effect only when the allied forces were assembled in such places and manner as might show the princes to whom application was to be made, and particularly the king of Prussia, "that if the answer given be not satisfactory we are in a condition to withstand any attempt they may make upon us, and even to fall upon them if their behaviour should make it necessary." On the first question, next, Newcastle called to mind how the Danish convention had been communicated to the "friends" in Holland, soon after it was first projected, and how, had they been willing to join in it, they would have been entitled to assistance by the Danish troops; indeed, "his Majesty and France did at first go so far as to propose that all the Lower Germany should have been mentioned in that convention for that purpose." But as the whole weight of the business had been thrown upon Great Britain and France, at great expense to them, and as the king of Denmark could not be persuaded to allow the Dutch any immediate advantage from the convention, the terms had been confined to Lower Saxony and Westphalia,

¹ Paper enclosed by Walpole and Armstrong, 21 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

" which however will be very usefull to the common cause, and even to the States themselves in its consequence." For since in case of a rupture the emperor and his allies would most probably make an attempt in the north, were not the Danish troops there to resist the attack forces available elsewhere would be reduced and the emperor and the king of Prussia " more at liberty to carry on their designs even against Holland." If the States wanted Danish troops for the Netherlands, supposing that they could be spared, they might join in the convention and by sharing in the burden become entitled to the aid. As to Sweden, that accession was " yet in its infancy "; a Russian offensive might prevent the Swedes from sending their troops abroad, and the allies of Hanover, instead of expecting assistance from them, would be compelled to protect and defend them. There was this good from the treaty, however, " besides many others," that probably it would prevent the tsaritsa from sending her 30,000 men to help the emperor. Nevertheless proper instance should be made with the Swedes to have their troops in readiness, in case they could be spared from home. " Upon the whole, the States have hitherto been at no expense for the preservation of the peace of the north, and till they are, and till that is sufficiently secured, it is not to be expected that any of the troops designed for that purpose can be employed in any other service."

On the second question ; the English force of 12,000 men, in as good order, if not better, in every respect than any previously sent abroad, was ready to embark as soon as it was agreed where they should go and for what service. The earl of Orkney was to command in chief, the duke of Argyll the infantry, Lord Cobham and the earl of Stair to serve as lieutenant-generals, and the earl of Deloraine and Philip Honywood as major-generals. The 20,000 Hanoverians and the 12,000 Hessians were also ready. His Majesty's fleets were long since in employment where their presence was absolutely necessary, while none of his allies had come to his help in the defence of Gibraltar. Against all this all that the Dutch proposed was to furnish " but one 12,000 men with the chance of what troops can be spared from their garrisons."

Further, Newcastle went on, it was observed that the paper related chiefly to operations in Flanders and made no mention of what France would do there. His Majesty thought " that a general scheme should be formed at the same time, both with relation to the operations in Flanders, the security of the peace of the north, and the preventing the Imperialists from passing the Rhine," and this by adding to Armstrong's plan such disposition of the French forces as had been advised. When the camp at Nimeguen was formed, any operation on that side must proceed thence, and the

best security for Holland appeared to be to have a strong force there, as first proposed.

After which were repeated the arguments for declaring war on Spain first. A blockade of Ostend, it was said, could be undertaken without declaration of war upon the emperor, for the trade thence was in violation of treaty rights. The two things should take place at the same time. If the emperor thought fit to attack in consequence, he would be the aggressor. But it was very necessary to consult with the French and Dutch what should be done in Flanders, in case the emperor came to a rupture.¹

Walpole and Armstrong, meanwhile, to meet desire expressed by Pestors and Grovestins to act in perfect concert at the conferences with the French ministers, had drawn up a "*Projet des opérations que pourroient faire les Alliez.*" This premised the necessity of losing no more time and of deciding in the first place whether to declare war on the emperor or on Spain before beginning to act against those powers. In the case of Spain, it was laid down, there was no difficulty; in view of the attack upon Gibraltar a declaration of war could not be dispensed with and had been deferred only to see the issue of the present negotiations. But whether the emperor should be included therein was not so clear. If he took up arms on behalf of Spain he would evidently be the aggressor, and in the affair of Gibraltar neither the princes of the empire could pretend to have interest, nor any other power allied with him under treaties purely defensive. If he refrained, Spain would see herself abandoned, and "*piquée au vif*" would separate from him. From this point of view war should be declared on Spain and France immediately thereon march troops into Catalonia to show her resolution and to force discovery of the emperor's intentions. On the other hand must be considered whether at this advanced season of the year, and seeing that the emperor's object appeared to be to amuse and delay while strengthening himself, time for the above test could be spared, or whether war should not be declared and a plan of operations formed against him at once, not as emperor, but in virtue of his violation of commercial treaties, in spite of protests.

Secondly, the conduct of the king of Prussia, although a party to the treaty of Hanover, and the great number of his troops could not but disquiet the Dutch, so long as they remained uncertain of what part he would take. He should be summoned, if not to fulfil his engagements, at least to declare whether he intended to help

¹ Newcastle in reply, 15 May (o.s.), *ibid.* Particulars of the British force, four regiments of dragoons, including the "Scots Greys," two battalions of the 2nd foot guards, and eight regiments of infantry, in all 10,000 men, *Political State of Great Britain*, xxxiii. 463.

the emperor to defend the Netherlands or to attack any of the allies of Hanover, within the empire or out of it, on any pretext, with intimation that, unless he gave complete satisfaction on this head without doubt or uncertainty, the allies would find themselves obliged to impede the march of his troops in any suspicious direction. And from other princes of the empire also should be required a prompt and categorical declaration, such as was now set out, whether or no on the strength of treaties made with the emperor, or considering the Austrian Netherlands to be part of the empire, they would engage in war with the allies; the Ostend commerce not concerning the empire in any way. And at the same time a declaration to them that if foreign troops entered the empire it would be for their service. There followed details for the proposed alignment of allied armies from Pomerania to Alsace, a disposition which, it was said, would cause the emperor's schemes to collapse on all sides and probably oblige the king of Prussia at least to observe neutrality. Thus freed from fear of him the Dutch could readily take part in the seizure of the line of the Meuse and other operations in the Netherlands.

In comment on this document Walpole and Armstrong noticed two principal desires of the French constantly appearing, the one to keep "their whole army entire, and as much together as possible," the other to manage the princes of the empire. They remarked on the danger of an attack on Hesse or Hanover before a sufficient force could be got ready to oppose, unless a French force should immediately cross the Rhine, and had consequently, they said, "given such a turn to the declaration to be made to the circles and princes of the Empire, and mentioned at the same time the immediate march of the French troops in such a manner as may without remaining in a dangerous uncertainty make all things secure." And they reported Grovestins to advise that, the proposed disposition of forces made, nothing would be of greater service or effect than a combined invasion of Silesia or Bohemia, "distressing the Emperor in his hereditary country's."¹

Reply to this was made in an addition to Newcastle's dispatch last cited. The king, he said, still maintained his opinion that war should be declared first against Spain singly, and that declarations to the king of Prussia and the other princes of the empire, designed to discover their intentions, should, in order to have full weight,

¹ "This seemed to us a very good thought, but not necessary to mention at first in our scheme, not knowing his Majesty's sentiments upon it, and because it may be more proper to leave that or any other particular undertaking to be considered in the course of our conferences, when we have agreed with the French ministers in the main upon the general rendezvous and disposition of the confederate troops" (H. Walpole and Armstrong, 23 May, *ibid.*).

be deferred until the several forces were actually marched to the posts assigned them. The French objection to invading the empire before the emperor's troops were actually in motion was recognised ; it was the reason for proposing that the 30,000 French to act under the Danish convention should only be posted ready to pass the Rhine at first notice, being concentrated, perhaps, in the bishoprics of Metz Toul and Verdun or thereabouts. As to the idea of invading Silesia and Bohemia, Walpole and Armstrong had done well not to include it in their plan.¹

Walpole and Pestors and their military coadjutors engaged in a seven hours' conference with the French ministers and marshals on 26 May. One plan put forward, marked "French first proposals which seemed to have been concerted between themselves," was for the English French and Dutch "to begin the campaign by besieging and taking Wesel (from the king of Prussia) and so open a way for their communication with the other troops in Lower Germany. The main French army to remain between the Moselle and the Rhine to observe the Emperor's motions." Another (a "second proposal of a French minister, which seemed casual and the result of their discourse at the meeting") suggested an army of 68,000 French to cross the Rhine "below Strasbourg—near Hailbron between the Neckar and the Mein"—and another composed of the 12,000 Hessians, 24,000 Danes, 12,000 English, 20,000 Hanoverians and 20,000 Dutch, in all 88,000, "to advance and post themselves between the Elbe and the Mein, in such manner that the two armies might be able to joyn and act in concert with one another."²

However, there was no need to pursue the discussions, for on 28 May, just after Armstrong had left to report results in London confidentially, came news from Vienna that the allies' peace-terms were accepted.

At Cassel, meanwhile, had appeared on 23 May the baron van Isselmuiden, deputed by the States-General to visit that and other German courts. He having pressed the landgrave to accede to the treaty of Hanover, Sutton was told that although the landgrave had hitherto held off from that, in the hope that the emperor would confirm his treaty with the king of Poland for the succession to some part of Hanau, now it was plain that no justice was to be had at Vienna, "when a protestant prince that had no mind to be a slave was concerned." So that the act of accession would be prepared immediately, without restriction or reservation. It was

¹ Newcastle in reply, 16 May (o.s.), *ibid.*

² Documents forwarded by H. Walpole on 27 May, R.O. France 185. Villars in his *Mémoires* (v. 67-69) attributes the first proposal to Fleury, the second to himself.

replied from England that Sutton was likely to become a "particular favorite" by the good intelligence that he continued to send, that his Majesty would be very glad to have the landgrave's formal accession, that the second article would effectually guarantee all rights, even that to Hanau, but that particular specification of it in any way would only clog the negotiation in France and Holland, without giving better security. At the same time Townshend was able to send word of the signature of the preliminaries of peace at Paris.¹

On 5 June Sutton sent a copy of the act of accession drafted, another, he said, having been given to Isselmuiden before his departure on the previous day for Frankfort. It declared the landgrave's resolution to accede, and his accession, to the treaty of Hanover as purely defensive, in accordance with the invitation given by the envoys.² There followed a letter from Dalwikk to Diemar explaining the reasons and expressing hope that not only the king of England but all the allies would regard the accession as having been made long since, and the landgrave be treated on that footing. For it would be very painful for a house, which thus sacrificed itself for the public cause, if a slight change of conjunctures deprived it of the merit of its services.³

The case was most favourably presented to the French court. The landgrave, Newcastle wrote on instructions received from George I before his departure for Hanover, "has behaved in so handsome and steady a manner towards the two crowns, and has certainly contributed so much to disappoint the Emperor's views in the north, that he undoubtedly deserves all the encouragement that can reasonably be given him. . . . The accession of the landgrave to our treaty will also, in all events, be strengthening that alliance, which his Majesty is always desirous of having the foundation of all our proceedings." He enclosed copies of the acts prepared at Cassel, that for the accession, and others for guarantees of Hanau and Rheinfels, but in ignorance of the king's sentiments desired Walpole to keep the latter secret for the present.⁴ The French, however, were found to be cold in the matter, now that the emperor's acceptance of the preliminaries had changed the face of affairs, and it was not prosecuted.⁵ In July Sutton was summoned home for the service of George II in the coming elections to parliament. He had continued to write of the efficiency of the landgrave's troops, quoting

¹ Sutton, 28 May, Townshend to him, 23 May (o.s.), R.O. Germany, States, 122.

² Sutton, 5 June, *ibid.*

³ 16 June, R.O. France 185, copy.

⁴ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 12 June (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750, the drafts enclosed.

⁵ Cf. Goslinga, p. 132.

in his last dispatch a saying of Rottembourg, passing Cassel on his way home from Berlin, that "he had rather have the three battalions he had seen than any three in the king of Prussia's service." ¹

It remains to notice Sutton's tentatives with Wolfenbüttel. On the pretext of a visit to a friend in the country he arranged to meet Schleinitz, as though accidentally, at a village inn at Nordheim, when they would pretend to be old friends, overjoyed to see each other. He describes Schleinitz as "a grave man of about 67, with both ends of his wig before," and could scarce keep his countenance. He heard fullest assurance of devotion of the duke of Wolfenbüttel to his Majesty, complaint that he had not been admitted to the alliance of Hanover, in spite of his earnest desire, and assertion that he had entered into no engagements with the emperor since the treaty of 1719. Owning that the duke was receiving regularly 200,000 florins a year from the emperor, which money was being used to repair the fortifications of Brunswick, Schleinitz brought up on the other hand the £30,000 owing from England from the last war and withheld on no good pretext, and ceremonial difficulties encountered at Hanover. The effect of paying the money, he said, would soon answer the expense. Sutton replied with assurance of the desire of George I for the duke's friendship, and said that if Schleinitz would arrange a correspondence, demand for the £30,000 would serve as a good foundation to treat upon, "and would cover what remained behind from any suspicions even of his own court, who would not be displeased, if they should know that such an affair was secretly carrying on between us." Schleinitz replied that he had the confidence not only of the duke his master, but also of the prince of Bevern, now at Brunswick; but Sutton must swear inviolably to preserve the secret of the correspondence, which must not pass through the ordinary post, even though it should cost the king of England some thousands of crowns for couriers, and his own name must never be used. He gave a cipher, which, says Sutton, "I hugged very close, and in return he received from me the closest embraces, that ever mortal at his age could boast of." When one or two of his letters were received he would be had "in a cleft stick." ²

The correspondence began and went on, but it is unnecessary to say more of the matter here than that a treaty was concluded by George II with the duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel on 25 November 1727.³ First reply to the present renewed demand for

¹ Sutton, 21 July, R.O. Germany, States, 122.

² Sutton, in another dispatch of 28 May, *ibid.*

³ R.O. Treaties 257, Dumont VIII. ii. 148.

payment of the £30,000 was that the commission for examination of military debts no longer existed, that in the last session of parliament pressure of business had prevented its revival, but that when a new one was appointed full attention and support should be given to the claim.¹

¹ Letters of 30 May (o.s.), R.O. Royal Letters 15, King's Letters 20.

CHAPTER XLVII

PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE SIGNED

UP to the last moment expectation of Austrian acceptance of the allies' ultimatum was but small. Finch reported Bruyninx to believe a direct and satisfactory reply possible only on the subject of the Ostend trade, and stated intimation by the Spanish secretary De Oliver, in a formal memorial, that his master would do nothing to injure the Dutch so long as they remained in good intelligence with him, to have given impression that the allies of Vienna sought only to amuse and to divide their adversaries and strengthened determination for vigorous measures.¹ From Paris Horatio Walpole advised : "I find the sentiments of this court are, that their courier will not be returned untill the latter end of this month, since as a favourable answer is not expected, the Imperiall court will gain as much time as they can, before they make it." ²

Yet three days later news of the arrival of a courier from Vienna, and of Fonseca having been to see Fleury at Versailles, was "all over the town." Massei's auditor let Walpole know that the Austrian minister had just been in to report that the emperor had without difficulty accepted the Ostend article, concluding by saying "not without some warmth, that he did not doubt but that there would be peace, notwithstanding the great agitation and motions of the English in all parts." Next morning at Versailles Walpole found Fleury and Morville so full of expectation of peace that they would scarce give ear to the renewed alarms from Cassel. Fleury handed him a paper which Fonseca had insisted on delivering, with comment that, although the emperor had not come to a final resolution, it showed "the great advances he readily made towards a general pacification." The paper was a copy of the ultimatum with marginal notes. The first article, requiring suspension of the Ostend trade, was marked "Cet article est accordé." But the second and third : "L'ambassadeur d'Espagne souhaiteroit

¹ W. Finch, 23 May 1727, R.O. Holland 293. De Oliver's memorial, of 17 May *Lettres historiques*, lxxi. 597.

² H. Walpole to Delafaye, 21 May, R.O. France 185.

d'attendre les ordres de sa cour, puis qu'on y a dépêché en droiture de Paris. Cependant il formera un article pour voir si l'on pourra se rapprocher, et on s'assemblera Dimanche qui vient à six heures du soir." To the other articles there was no amendment of importance.

Fleury did not doubt that the emperor would give way in the manner desired, but Walpole called to notice that the points of commerce and possessions were not yet decided, since Madrid was to be consulted, and doubted concurrence there. However, Morville coming in and sharing Fleury's confidence, he did not think fit to push the matter then, since at any time might come the emperor's answer in form. He had assurance from the French ministers that they would not yield on the second and third articles, and supposed nothing to be done at present but to go on with the preparations for war and the instruments that would be wanted in case of peace.¹

Sending the paper to Holland Townshend hoped that the "friends" would insist on holding to the second and third articles as they stood. A little time, he said, would show "the true spirit of the court of Vienna," and firmness must be the word.²

On 28 May Horatio Walpole set out his private thoughts as follows.

We expect every moment the return of the courriers from Vienna and Madrid. In the mean time the Cardinal is fully perswaded that the Imperial court is sincere for accepting the preliminaries, but that Spain will not agree to the 2 and 3 art: and the Emperour will not press the king of Spain so far to accept them against his will as to hazard his friendship and separation. I must own that I think the Emperour is not for accepting the preliminaries, but knowing that he can fling the fault upon Spain endeavours to make it beleived as much as possible that he is for peace, by w^{ch} he hopes to stave off the resentments against him, and perhaps flatters himself that France will not be brought to declare against Spain, and consequently that nothing may be done this year but the attack and defense of Gibraltar; but if the preliminaries be not signed by the Emperour and Spain, whether it proceeds from the ill disposition of the one or the other, it is the same thing, they are not in that case accepted, and that is the opinion of our Dutch friends here and we must pursue our measures accordingly for acting, w^{ch} I judge by the Cardinal's discourse will be done by declaring immediatly war against Spain, and by concerting a plan of operations to be prepared to act against the Emperour, who must immediatly upon our declaration of war against Spain declare himselfe too, or run the risk of being abandoned by Spain, w^{ch} in all likelihood, as I have a long time preached, will finish this matter one way or the other.³

Hardly had this letter gone to London by the hands of Armstrong, when the auditor brought report of a courier arrived from Madrid

¹ The same to Newcastle, 28 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

² Townshend to Finch, 19 May (o.s.), R.O. Holland 293.

³ H. Walpole, 28 May, holograph, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

and gone on, after delivering a packet to Massei, to Vienna the night before. Walpole still saw "no great prospect of a reasonable answer from Spain or of any success in our negotiations"; he would know better that evening, he said, but it seemed plain that the emperor and the king of Spain were only amusing to gain time. Fleury and the Dutch delegates alike stated intention to declare war on Spain if the preliminaries were not accepted by the date fixed.¹

The evening came, and with it report from Richelieu. Going to Versailles next day Walpole found Fleury and Morville "full of satisfaction at the preliminaries being accepted without any exceptionable change." He was not himself contented, observing particularly the second article, as it appeared in a copy given him by Boreel, to be unintelligible both in its Latin and with regard to "the occasion and intention of the alterations made in it." After comparison with and correction from the copy received from Richelieu, Morville communicated the duke's report of what had passed at the conferences. It appeared, says Walpole, that the alterations in the second article were solely due to Bournonville, who had insisted either on no treaties being mentioned at all, or else, besides those of Utrecht Baden and the Quadruple Alliance, the triple treaty of Madrid of 1721, as "equally good and made as well as the rest before 1725." He had also pressed very much for something about Gibraltar, particularly because, should the place be taken before the preliminaries were signed, the king of Spain would have to restore it "as a preliminary, without having his pretensions, even in that case, debated and discussed in a congress." When, however, he had failed to produce a copy of the Madrid treaty the imperial ministers had objected that their master could never consent to one being mentioned which he had never seen, to which neither he nor the States-General were parties, and which might contain something prejudicial to his interest. "But if they could find some general words, which might not affect his Imperial Majesty and yet might have the advantages, which Spain pretends to have obtained by virtue of that treaty, they should have no objection to it."² Mention of Gibraltar Richelieu had definitely refused, as certain to break off the negotiation.

After several long debates relating to this article of rights and possessions, and after the rejecting of several clauses proposed by the Spanish ambassador, in which point the Imperialists seemed to appear neither too much for nor against the court of Spain, but grew very uneasy at the protracting of the time,

¹ The same, same date.

² Similarly in Holland Slingelandt and Fagel, informed of Bournonville's wish, objected to mention of "a treaty which nobody knew anything of" (Finch, 3 June, R.O. Holland 293).

Mr Bournonville at last desired the two articles of possessions and commerce to be transposed, and the 2^d to be worded as it now stands, in which I think there can be no other meaning but that in case any alterations have been made, or engagements taken but not executed, by vertue of treaties and conventions concluded since those of Utrecht Baden and the Quadruple Alliance, such alterations and unexecuted engagements shall, pursuant to the tenor of such treaties and conventions, be debated and discussed at the congress, so that I do not see what prejudice the addition in the 2^d article, relating to rights and possessions, can be to his Majesty, since it cannot under any pretext or colour whatsoever bring his Majesty's right and possession of Gibraltar before the congress, no mention about the restitution of that place being made in any treaty between his Majesty and Spain, nor indeed between that crown and France, as I am fully satisfied by the duke of Richelieu's dispatch, as well as by the inquiry that I have made here, and therefore if any verbal assurances may have formerly been given by a minister of France to Spain, with respect to good offices touching Gibraltar, they can be of no consequence at all to affect his Majesty at a congress, since any thing of that nature must have been sufficiently cancelled on the part of France by the declaration given to me by Mr de Morville, with respect to that place, in his most Christian Majesty's name on 16 of August 1725, as well as by what past in a conference which Mr Stanhope and I had lately with the Cardinal on that head, and lastly by my having declared to him on all occasions, and particularly upon his showing me his last project of preliminaries, where mention is made that the rights and pretensions of the contracting parties may be examined and discussed in the congress, when I told him that I supposed he could have no view to have his Majesty's right and possession of Gibraltar questioned there, which he said he never intended, but that it was impossible to avoid putting in some such words, considering the many concerns that must be discussed in that assembly by the various accessions made to the treaties of Vienna and Hanover. This being the state of the case I must own that I could not make any great objection to the 2^d or 3^d articles, as they now stand, and there seems to me in the whole to be no other material alteration.

Walpole had asked, he went on, what hope there was of the preliminaries being signed (supposing that he did not oppose the alterations), seeing that Fonseca had not received full powers to sign for Spain? "They seemed somewhat at a loss and uneasy about this point, but said that Mr. Fonseca's courier was not yet arrived, still insisting that the Imperial court was sincere and even impatient to conclude the matter." At this point Fonseca was announced and Fleury went out to speak to him, returning immediately to say that his courier was come and he believed brought good news. This was confirmed at a further conference in the afternoon, when Fleury, "with the greatest joy and satisfaction in his countenance," announced that Fonseca "was fully authorised and was ready to sign, as soon as we would, in the Emperor's name," and hoped that Walpole would sign with him, for the king of Spain would either

soon authorise some one to sign on his part, or, by refusing, create an irreconcilable breach with the emperor. Indeed, says Walpole, it appeared from Richelieu's report and from what Bruyninx wrote to Pestiers that Bournonville would have signed at Vienna, had there been any one there to sign on the part of his Majesty and had he not been informed that the French court had desired full powers from Madrid for Fonseca. And so he (Walpole) had no hesitation in consenting to sign, seeing that thereby the king of Spain would be isolated, and also in view of a letter from De la Paz to Aldobrandini,¹ transmitted to Massei, which, while showing much ill will towards his Majesty and Fleury, yet gave a turn to the second and third articles fairly concordant with that devised by Bournonville. As to form, the first proposal had been that Fonseca should sign with Walpole at Paris, and the French and Dutch ministers at Vienna with the imperial and Spanish there, but finally it had been agreed that Fonseca should exchange separate instruments with the British French and Dutch ministers at Paris, that copies should be sent to Vienna, and that Richelieu and Bruyninx should sign with Bournonville there, he to dispatch the instruments immediately by an express to Spain. Also that Richelieu, signing in the name of Louis XV, should strongly advocate the interests of George I; that a joint declaration by him and Bournonville should stipulate ratifications by George I and Philip V; and that Walpole should write to Richelieu authorising him to answer in his Majesty's name; "copies and accounts of all these transactions" to be sent to Madrid by express.

Afterwards Walpole, conceiving difficulties in regard to Richelieu acting as above, had proposed to sign

such an instrument alone, as has been interchangeably signed by us all, annexing a proper declaration to it, by which I should promise and undertake, in virtue of my full power, that such an instrument so signed by me shall be obligatory on the part of his Majesty towards the king of Spain, as if it had been signed jointly with a minister of his Catholic Majesty, and shall accordingly be ratified by his Majesty at the time prescribed by the articles, provided that M^r de Bournonville shall on his part sign and deliver a like instrument on the part of the king of Spain.

This, after some debate, had been allowed, and to strengthen the instrument the other signatories had "signed and sealed an authentic declaration in testimony of it." Should Bournonville refuse this, then Richelieu and Bruyninx would not sign the preliminaries with him, for it would be very improper for his Majesty's allies to

¹ Of date 18 May, copy with Walpole's of 3 June. It set out in the latter part the changes in the preliminaries proposed at Madrid.

have come to terms with Spain without him, and he, perhaps, be left to carry on war alone. In that case Walpole advised immediate dispatch of a British plenipotentiary to Vienna, Woodward being out of reach and himself the only other person empowered. Should, however, the king of Spain think proper to employ Fonseca, or send some one (say Pozobueno) to Paris as plenipotentiary, then Walpole would sign and exchange instruments with him.

Everything thus settled, Fonseca signed the preliminaries with Morville Walpole and Boreel separately at an early hour on 31 May. Walpole also signed his declaration and the others witnessed it in form.¹

The first three articles ran, in their rude Latin :

1. Cum sua Caesarea Regio-Catholica Majestas commercium Ostendianum apud nonnullos finitimos aemulationem atque etiam sollicitudinem excitasse animadvertat, publicae Europae tranquillitatis causâ consentit ut privilegium (vulgo Octroy) Societati Ostendanae concessum, omneque ex Belgio Austriaco in Indias commercium, per spatium septem annorum suspendatur.

2. Jura, aut ea, quae vi tractatus Trajectensis, Badensis, Quadruplicis Foederis, atque etiam eorum tractatum et conventionum quae annum 1725 praecesserunt, et Imperatorem ac Status Generales foederati Belgii non tangunt, à quocumque Contractantium possessa fuêre, intacta remanebunt. Si quid verò super iis immutatum vel executioni mandatum non fuisse comperiretur, juxta tenorem eorundem tractatum et conventionum status immutatus, aut executioni non datus, in futuro congressu discutiatur et decidetur.

3. Consequenter cuncta commerciorum privilegia quibus natio Anglica et Gallica, subditique Statuum Generalium foederati Belgii antehàc vigore tractatum càm in Europâ, tùm in Hispaniâ, prout et in Indiis gavisì sunt, ad eum usum et normam revocentur, secundum quam per tractatum anno millesimo septingentesimo vigesimo quinto anteriores cum singulis conventum fuit.

For the rest, other than verbal alteration appeared only in the eighth article, which appointed a congress to meet at Aix-la-Chapelle within four months from the date of signature. The next three, controlling expense and ceremony thereat, were restored from the Austrian counter-project.²

Heartiest congratulation came from England on the prospect of an amicable accommodation, confessedly not expected, "upon terms so just in themselves, and so honourable for the two crowns." The king, said Newcastle, was "sensible how much the resolution and firmness of the Cardinal has contributed to the part the Emperor is now taking." He remarked, however, that in the fifth article

¹ H. Walpole, 30 and 31 May, B.M. Add. MS. 32750, the latter dispatch, reporting the signature, timed "past two in the morning."

² The original counterpart signed by "Marcus Baro Deffonseca" and H. Walpole, R.O. Treaties 152, copies elsewhere. The articles printed by Dumont, VIII. ii. 146, Rousset, iii. 399, iv. 1, *Lettres historiques*, lxxi. 640.

nothing was said of the Spaniards restoring ships or effects seized from British subjects, only of such as belonged to the emperor's subjects. And "the 8th article in the copy you sent us is neither sense nor Latin." He notified orders preparing for the recall of Hosier and Wager as soon as the preliminaries were accepted by Spain. Walpole, however, understood the fifth article to relate to restoration of ships and effects of all parties. The fault in the eighth he admitted, but thought that to suggest change might be dangerous.¹

Later, after Walpole had received renewed assurance that Richelieu and Bruyninx would not sign to the exclusion of George I, and that Fleury would maintain alliance with England and Holland as the rule of all future measures for establishing the peace of Europe,² very complimentary letters passed between the British ministers and Fleury, the latter ascribing the happy result in no way to his own cleverness but to the unanimity preserved among the allies.³ When notifying the death of George I Newcastle desired further particular assurances to be given to Fleury as from himself, with the statement that Broglie's conduct had given so much satisfaction, that his return to London without loss of time would be very agreeable to George II.⁴

In Holland also there was "inexprimable satisfaction," in Dayrolle's phrase. He related how Fagel had gone to compliment Königsegg next day, "who has since been visited by the whole Regency transported with joy, and is like to be as much their favourite afterwards as he has been out of fashion for some time," though yet "the wisest among them are of opinion that nothing must be changed in the present dispositions." And similarly Finch :

Our friends here have great joy and look upon it as a good beginning ; but however are of opinion that it is absolutely necessary to keep up the vigor and spirit which now subsist amongst the allies of the treaty of Hanover, as the best means of settling the peace of Europe and preventing difficulties and chicane which may arise at the congress. The States-General have wrote a circular letter to the several provinces very proper for that purpose, and the whole discourse of this place turns upon union and steadiness.⁵

To Stockholm Townshend wrote : "The conclusion of these articles was received here with equal joy and surprize, for we thought we had much reason to doubt of the sincere intentions of the Imperial court for peace." He desired Poyntz to emphasise the great influence which the accession of Sweden to the treaty of Hanover

¹ Newcastle to H. Walpole 22 May (o.s.), Walpole in reply, 7 June, B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

² H. Walpole, 3 and 7 June, *ibid.*

³ 1 June (o.s.) and 20 June, R.O. France 185, King's Letters 15.

⁴ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 16 June (o.s.) B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

⁵ Dayrolle and Finch, 6 June, R.O. Holland 295, 294.

must have had at Vienna, and to give assurance of gratitude to be shown. No doubt the king of Sweden would name plenipotentiaries for Aix-la-Chapelle. Poyntz himself and Stanhope were appointed to represent Great Britain, and Poyntz must be prepared to leave Stockholm on orders received.¹

In the view of Marshal Villars it was to the state of affairs in Russia that the Austrian surrender was in great measure due. "Il n'étoit pas surprenant que, dans le désordre de la cour de Petersbourg, l'empereur, qui en attendoit de grands secours et pouvoit craindre de les voir manquer, voulût éviter la guerre."² This may well have been the case, though the death of Catherine I on 17 May was not yet known.

Walpole's suggestion of sending a plenipotentiary to Vienna was acted upon immediately by the appointment of James Lord Waldegrave, empowered "to treat upon conclude and sign . . . such preliminary articles, or convention, as shall be thought proper to prepare the way for a general congress and reconciliation of the present differences in Europe." He was instructed, when passing Paris, to confer with Walpole, and at Vienna to confide in Richelieu, in particular as to signing the preliminaries with Bournonville, "which is the principal business you are sent upon."³ To Walpole he carried a dispatch asserting that "making the first step towards the court of Vienna is what his Maj^{ty} would never have thought of doing of his own accord"; it was done "purely out of deference" to Fleury. Yet, it was said, the mission might "have a good effect, and tend to increase the jealousies and resentment that the court of Spain must have against the Emperor, for having attended so little to their interests and signed without them"; there would be "an end of their union, which is what the court of France has much at heart."⁴

There was also a memorandum acquainting Walpole that he

¹ Townshend to Poyntz, 26 May (o.s.) 1727, R.O. Sweden 47. Poyntz, however, though letters of recall to take up his duties at Aix-la-Chapelle were sent him at the end of July, left Stockholm only on the arrival of his successor, Isaac Leheup, in September.

² *Mémoires*, v. 71. The two princes, he observes, who did want war were the kings of Prussia and Sardinia.

³ Full powers, credentials and instructions, 24 and 26 May (o.s.), R.O. King's Letters 3, Foreign Entry Book 80. Private instructions recommended him to confide in the Portuguese ambassador, Tarouca, "for whom We have a great esteem, as being a person of worth and merit and truly zealous to promote the joint interests of the crowns of Great Britain and Portugal. . . . You will find him a person of great understanding and honour, and you will create as strict an intimacy with him as possibly you can, by opening to him freely all you do and asking his advice upon all parts of your conduct, who from his known sagacity and experience will be able to give you very usefull lights both as to the court where you are, and all other affairs now transacting in Europe." But this without exciting any jealousy in Richelieu.

⁴ Newcastle to H. Walpole, 27 May (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

would receive new full powers, to suit those of the Dutch ambassador and to be used should Pozobueno come to Paris to sign and object to those which Walpole already had. Also that Robinson, returning to Paris the next week, would bring with him three ratifications of the preliminary articles, but this only for precaution, "lest the French and Dutch should think it necessary to have ratifications from us," for it seemed needless, and even improper, to exchange them with any power but the emperor.¹

Waldegrave, reaching Paris on 14 June, was not required to proceed to Vienna, for a week later a courier from Richelieu brought the documents required, executed by Bournonville on the 13th.² Furnished in August with new credentials as ambassador to the emperor from George II he still stayed on in Paris, presenting himself at Vienna at last in May 1728.

About the signing at Vienna Walpole wrote that from a letter from Richelieu to himself, enclosed, Townshend would "see that there arose some difficulties in the conferences, and that it seems to be expected that some new instruments should still be executed by all the contracting parties in order to bring all matters to the usual form and regularity of proceedings in cases of this nature." What these difficulties were he recounted from Richelieu's official dispatches, shown him, namely, the style of the preamble to Bournonville's full powers, "conceived in terms by no means suitable to the occasion, and with an apology that was altogether unseasonable and unnecessary," debate whether the language of his declaration should be Spanish Latin or French, and dispute about the place where the new instruments in contemplation should be executed. On the first point Richelieu, seeing that it was a case of accepting the full powers as they were or getting nothing done, had given in, on condition of Bournonville writing to his court to have them altered for the occasion of signing the new instruments. On the second he insisted on French, to match Walpole's declaration, and prevailed.³ On the third, since Philip V was not likely to consent to send a minister to Paris, the most convenient place, before reconciliation, Richelieu proposed Vienna, subject to knowledge whether a British minister would be sent thither.⁴

At Berlin the outcome failed to please; Frederick William's expectations of gain lay in the dissensions of others. For the aid of his powerful army, or even for its neutrality, the allies both of

¹ R.O. France 187, rough draft dated 29 May (o.s.).

² R.O. Treaties 487.

³ But Bournonville "would not recede from the ruban that ties the whole Act, and upon which the seal is fixed, being a red, instead of a blew one."

⁴ H. Walpole to Townshend, 22 June, B.M. Add. MS. 32750, enclosing letters to himself from Morville of 21 June and from Richelieu of 14 June.

Vienna and Hanover had been prepared to pay, but arrangement of their differences spoilt the market. At the time of the first proposals to Vienna, when Rottembourg Du Bourgay and Keppel requested an audience at which to communicate the conditions, he had said that he had them already and appeared to disbelieve their genuineness.¹ Later he wrote to Seckendorf at Dresden that nothing was spoken of but war and that the Hanoverians were ordered to be ready to march. "Ich glaube Krieg und keinen Congress, das seynd Comödie." He supposed the emperor to be the dupe of the French, Richelieu a great villain who led Eugene by the nose. As the Hanoverians were to open the dance, he said, there must be no pity.²

In May Du Bourgay, now advanced to the rank of brigadier-general, was reporting, as accustomed, variously. Rottembourg's request for permission to go to Potsdam had been refused. Seckendorf, who had left for Leipzig on the 2nd, had met at Sarmond, four miles away, the Russian ambassador and the imperial resident. There was news from Saxony that the princes of that house awaited only the arrival of the king of Poland at Leipzig "to concert with him the properest measures to oppose the Emperor's project of procuring Berg to the house of Brandenburg." Prince Eugene had written to the king "desiring him, in the name of the Emperor, not to think any more of his plans of neutrality for this side of Germany, for if matters were not accomodated the Emperor would concert measures with him to attack the dominions of Hanover; part of which should be given to his Prussian Majesty, upon the King our master's being put under the ban of the Empire." On the other hand, by advices from Silesia, there was still no appearance of collection of troops or magazines there, while Mardefeld reported such utter confusion at Petersburg that no one could say when the Russians would march, and Prussian stores were being consumed by the famine. Yet Borceke was pressing for advantage to be taken of the large offers of the emperor, there being none from the other side. He might be induced by proper measures to change his opinion; if necessary, Du Bourgay would write what would infallibly effect that.

¹ Du Bourgay, 19 April, cited. He quoted Frederick William to say, "Thos gentlemen need not take the trouble to communicate to me that paper, for I am thoroughly apprized of the contents of it. I am Thomas, and shall never believe the Emperor will put up with the affront he has received in the person of his minister M^r Palm till I see it." Seckendorf reported him to suspect that the negotiation had been concealed from him, in order that he might be kept amused with words until the time came that his help would no longer be required.

² 8 and 10 May, Förster, *Friedrich Wilhelm I, Nachträge*, pp. 247-8. Similarly "D'Aubigny" had written on 3 May that the imperialists at Berlin maintained that war was inevitable and that the proposed congress would only serve to strengthen the emperor's hands (R.O. Foreign Ministers 47).

His influence was the more surprising, since it was well known that the king "never was governed by any body's opinion and advice before now." Certainly on Ilgen's approaching death he would step into that minister's place, and his relative Mardefeld act under him. He and his party were "extreamly afraid that an accommodation will soon ensue, knowing very well that when the Emperor has no further occasion for this court he will take the same course with them as he did formerly." From new propositions submitted by Seckendorf before he left, of which Rottembourg had obtained an abstract, would be seen how "distant and precarious" the offers were, how "real and present" the services required, and how deluded the king must be.¹ Before long came Edward Finch from Warsaw with word that the general famine prevented the march of Russian troops before the harvest, while Seckendorf, returned, reported the emperor's acceptance of the preliminaries of peace for himself, subject to prior adjustment of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp's claims, unless the court of Petersburg should assent to what was proposed about him.²

On the subject of the preliminaries Rottembourg had audience on 30 May. He adduced from the sixth and eighth articles proof that the allies of Hanover had no private views, but aimed only at reasonable redress of their grievances; wished that the king of Prussia could have concurred in their measures, as more honourable and more to his true interests, for then the affair of Juliers and Berg might have been settled in his favour at the congress; and pointed out that, in case of a rupture, the scene of war must inevitably draw nearer to his dominions. Frederick William answered that he nurtured only feelings of friendship towards France and in case of war on the frontiers of the empire only would do no more than assist the emperor with his obligatory contingent, "but that if the K. of Great Britain came with a lighted torch to kindle a fire in the heart and bowels of the Empire he would oppose him with all the force he had." Rottembourg perceived, as had Du Bourgay and Keppel before, that the king was in great pain about the pacification, pain no doubt aggravated by the news from Petersburg of the death of Catherine I.³ Then, when Seckendorf received from Vienna and communicated the preliminaries accepted, the king had not been able to conceal his surprise and was even heard to reproach Seckendorf with deception. At a council he had asked his ministers severally,

¹ Du Bourgay, 3 to 13 May, R.O. Prussia 22. The proposals were for possession of Berg to be deferred until after extinction of the house of Sulzbach, when Juliers would be handed over as well; the king of Prussia being allowed after a certain time to occupy Düsseldorf and Juliers and the emperor undertaking to grant the investitures. For the previous proposal to buy Borecke, see p. 586.

² The same, 27 May.

³ Notified at Berlin by Golovkin on 30 May.

whether they could not hit on an expedient to prevent the pacification, but all three had replied that it would be labour lost, both sides being desirous of peace. Seeing him greatly discontented with the imperial court Rottembourg Du Bourgay and Keppel agreed to take any proposals made to themselves *ad referendum*, without showing the least mark of discontent at what had passed. Later Du Bourgay wrote: "The ferment and agitation which are here at present about this question make every person about the K. of Prussia wholly incapable of reasoning coolly or hearkening to any proposal whatsoever." Seckendorf had desired of Rottembourg and Keppel assistance in convincing the king "that matters were on the point of being accommodated, for that all his endeavours had failed," and had seemed very uneasy "least this court should embroil things." Meanwhile, inspired by Grumbkow with the hope that Great Britain would reject the terms and France accept them, resulting in a breach between the two powers, the king was showing Rottembourg as great civility now as formerly the reverse.¹

While the issue at Vienna was still in doubt the difficulties in the north were suddenly resolved. There had been news from Magnan at Petersburg of date 26 April that on definite information of the Swedish accession to the treaty of Hanover Catherine I had given orders to equip a powerful fleet for sea. Also that on 20 April she had renewed her proclamation of 21 June 1726 that British merchants should in no way be molested in her dominions in spite of the hostility of George I.² Early in June, after receipt of this news, prince Kurakin had long conversations with Fleury and Horatio Walpole on relations with Russia, disclaiming any support given from Petersburg to the Pretender and protesting against the appearance of a British fleet in the Baltic again. Then, on 7 June,

¹ Du Bourgay, 31 May to 7 June, R.O. Prussia 22. "D'Aubigny" pictured Frederick William as thrown by the news of the emperor's disposition for peace into "des furies dont tout le monde se repent," into "excès bizarres"; declaring to Seckendorf that if the emperor accepted the articles "il flétrit son honneur et se rend méprisable"; and when he knew of the acceptance maintaining "que le roy d'Angleterre ne les recevra jamais, que ce contreprojet rend la possession du Gibraltar douteuse, et que les ministère d'Angleterre ne peut se sauver que par une guerre." He persisted in persuasion that there would be war, while yet caressing Rottembourg whenever they met. He accused England of having obliged him to forsake the alliance of Hanover, and had told Rottembourg that he had nothing to expect from the emperor and Seckendorf; in plain terms, that he had been cheated. Yet, said the letter, it was certain that if he took any side it would be the emperor's, for he consulted only his own passion and envy and hatred of the king of England (9 June, R.O. Foreign Ministers 47). Förster (*Friedrich Wilhelm I*, ii. 94) cites in full Frederick William's letter to Seckendorf of 7 June, giving assurances of fidelity to the emperor but saying that he would wait to see whether there were peace or war, since in the latter case circumstances would be so much altered.

² *Sbornik*, lxiv. 549 f.

as Walpole was stepping into a postchaise for Versailles, Kurakin came to announce the death of Catherine I. Reporting the news hurriedly Walpole suggested sending some one to Petersburg, "not of any great distinction or with any character, but of dexterity and ability enough to gain P. Menzicoff" and others and to get the duke of Holstein-Gottorp removed from the Council. This was disapproved; it was thought that such proceeding might give umbrage in Sweden and that it was inadvisable to attempt anything at Petersburg until the situation was cleared up.¹ That occurred very quickly. Power in Russia passed for the time into the hands of Menshikov, and he and the rest cared nothing for the Holstein cause. In July the duke left Petersburg to hold his petty German court at Kiel, glad of a Swedish pension.

When the news of the Spanish signature of the preliminaries reached London George I was dead. He had embarked at Greenwich on 14 June, and pursuing his journey to Hanover so far as he could by water, but delayed by contrary winds, had landed, by Dayrolle's account, near Utrecht on the night of Wednesday, the 18th, going on next morning for Delden.² Soon after leaving that place he was taken ill, to be carried into his brother's castle at Osnabrück a dying man. Townshend, who had diverted his journey in order to visit his friends at the Hague and reached Osnabrück early on Monday the 23rd, sent out thence the following hurried circular.

"Osnabrug 12/23 June 1727.

"The King our late good and great master departed this life at this place yesterday morning between twelve and one. His late Ma^{ty} was seized in his coach between Delden and Lingen with a fit of an apoplexy on Friday last in the morning, and was brought hither the same night." ³

¹ H. Walpole, 6 and 7 June, Newcastle in reply, 1 June (o.s.), B.M. Add. MS. 32750.

² Dayrolle, 20 June, R.O. Holland 295.

³ In spite of this testimony, it would seem to have been on the night of Saturday, 10/21 June, that George was brought to Osnabrück. The notice in the *London Gazette* naturally follows Townshend's statement, and so does that in the *Historical Register* for June 1727. But in later accounts of the year, as in the *Political State of Great Britain* (xxxiii. 544-6), and in the *Chronological Diary* appended to the *Historical Register*, Saturday is the day given.

The traveller Aubry de la Motraye relates in the third volume of his *Voyages*, published in 1732, that being at the Hague on business with the booksellers he learnt that George was to land at Vartz, a little village at the confluence of Lek and Yssel, two leagues below Utrecht, and consequently repaired thither to present to him the earlier portion of his work, just printed. He states that George actually left his yacht at Schoonhoven, and went on to Vartz by carriage, proceeding on his journey at 7.0 a.m. next morning in good health and spirits. What happened afterwards he had from George's travelling attendant, Chamberlain De Fabrice, on the latter's hurried return to the Hague after the death; among other particulars

that they had spent the *Friday* night at Delden. It may be that the alteration in the English notices was due to the statements of Fabrice, when he returned with La Motraye to England towards the end of July.

Accustomed to travel at top speed, George should not have required more than two days, the Thursday and the Friday, for the 130 miles or so of his land-journey (Delden is about half-way). But Coxe (*Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, i. 265-6) states that he visited the Count de "Twittel" (*i.e.* Wassenauer van Twickel) at his house some twenty miles from Delden, and returned to that place after supper. So that he would appear to have stayed two nights there.

There are several other accounts of the time, as in the *Political State of Great Britain* and in the *Lettres historiques* (lxxi. 704), all discrepant in particulars. La Motraye, for instance, denies the ascription of George's seizure to a melon partaken of at Delden, saying that the only fruit that he ate was a China orange presented by his hostess.

All contemporary accounts agree that George died in the castle at Osnabrück at an early hour on Sunday, 11/22 June. The version adopted by Coxe (*Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, i. 266), and followed by most later writers, that he died in his coach, rests confessedly on late oral tradition.

CHAPTER XLVIII

LAST DEALINGS WITH SPAIN, 1727

BOURNONVILLE's signature of the preliminaries of peace by no means signified his sovereigns' acquiescence in them.¹ So far from evincing desire for conciliation, Philip and Elizabeth had only shown the contrary. In a letter from Fleury to the queen, which accompanied the allies' ultimatum—a letter in which, with fervent expression of devotion to Philip V, he had professed himself entirely discouraged by her last to him and without hope of peace, if all moderation about Gibraltar and about English trade were refused, and to which Louis XV had appended assurances of friendship in his own hand²—the reply had been that from De la Paz to Aldobrandini, of 18 May, which has been noticed, so hard in its terms that Philip felt himself obliged to request Fleury to apply them to England only.³ Afterwards Van der Meer, discoursing on Spanish intentions at considerable length, reported Bournonville's secretary to be returning to Vienna by way of Paris, certainly with no conciliatory dispatches. Although Königsegg was not, he thought, so much in favour as formerly, the courts of Vienna and Madrid were still in accord.⁴

Another proof of Elizabeth's temper had been her action against the two Sicilian canons, Platania and Caraccioli, whose later disclosures to Horatio Walpole have been noticed. They had great influence with Philip V and were using it in favour of France and England; by one report they had exerted themselves to prevent money being sent to Vienna, in spite of the arrival of the *flota*.⁵ On 6 May, as they were leaving Aranjuez for Madrid, they were placed under arrest by the ecclesiastical authorities and ordered to quit the kingdom. By one advice the queen and her confessor, and Königsegg, had contrived their

¹ Cf. Syveton, p. 247, citing Königsegg to Charles VI on 20 June.

² Letter of 2 May 1727, Baudrillart, iii. 333–4.

³ *Ibid.* p. 335.

⁴ 26 May R.O. Spain 98.

⁵ Unsigned letter of 5 May, previously cited (p. 663).

arrest by ecclesiastical procedure, in order that the king should not be concerned,¹ but Van der Meer, in his similar account of the affair, believed that the king must have consented to the arrest and inferred that the court of Madrid was not so well disposed to peace as had lately been supposed.²

The crisis of the siege of Gibraltar set in on 7 May. On that day, Lord Portmore reported,

we had warm work, the enemy beginning at four in the morning to play on our fortifications from their new batteries with 57 pieces of cannon, besides mortars, and we on their works with much the same number. They plyed the head of the Old Mole hard, but did no considerable damage there. Willis's battery, which annoys the enemy most of all, suffered very much both by balls and bombs. This morning the same fire was renewed on both sides and is like to last for some days, which you may easily imagine will put us to an incredible expence of powder, therefore I must beg the favour of you, as I have also of Sir Charles Wager, that if there be any to be had amongst the merchants at Lisbon you will be so good as to get us what you can and send hither by the first safe opportunity.³

Another account came from consul Holroyde. Several new enemy batteries, he wrote, had been completed, somewhat nearer the town and very skilfully placed, with "excellent fine brass cannon," besides mortars. Fire had continued from 7 May with the greatest fury conceivable.

All officers allow that they never saw so continued and great a fire either in Flanders or any part of action wherever they have been, and so far we must do them justice, they have excellent engineers and train officers, as appears by all their dispositions, and are plentifully supplied with all they want. We do our endeavour in returning them all the fire we can, but to tell you the truth they are far too many for us in their artillery work.

Yet to achieve success they must bring their batteries yet nearer and make a lodgement on the counterscarp. Officers were of opinion that even without guns to oppose them the Spaniards could not force their way in by the narrow approach. They had not more than 9,000 or 10,000 men, and the garrison was strong enough to make a great defence. Their health was very good, and Wager within call.⁴

That admiral, cruising off Cadiz, also believed that in spite

¹ Letter of 12 May, as above.

² Same date, *ibid.* 98.

³ Lord Portmore to General Dormer at Lisbon, 8 May, copy, R.O. Portugal 34.

⁴ Consul Holroyde to his colleague Thomas Lempriere at Faro, Gibraltar, 10 May 1727, with Dormer's of 23 May, *ibid.*

of the damage done the garrison, now 5,000 strong, could hold out. Ships, he said, were of little use at Gibraltar.¹

On 14 May, when most of the Spanish ships were seen out in Cadiz Bay, Wager held a council of war on the question of attacking them. This was pronounced impracticable, not only on account of the difficulty but because the same wind which took the British ships in would enable the Spaniards to withdraw behind their defences. That, indeed, on the approach of the British squadron, they were seen to do. Best, it was decided, not to risk disaster, but "to continue masters of the sea."²

On the day before the peace preliminaries were signed at Paris orders issued to the admirals to the following effect. To Hosier that since, as he would have heard, the flota had got home, he had now only to attend to the galleons, a matter of the highest importance. No doubt he would be strong enough, now that he had been joined by two clean 70-gun ships, to meet anything in the West Indies, and two of 60 guns were about to follow. He must send home from time to time such ships as had to be laid up. And since war had actually been begun by Spain he might seize the galleons instead of merely stopping them, and the same with other ships, always, however, observing the precautions enjoined against embezzlement. Wager was informed of the *Kingston* and *Lion* being sent with troops and stores for Gibraltar, thence to proceed to the West Indies. He was directed still to watch the Spanish naval movements closely and prevent a junction of the squadrons. Since, however, Newcastle went on, it was not doubted that the siege of Gibraltar must soon be raised, Lord Portmore was ordered in that event to send home the guards and the four regiments brought from Ireland, and Wager might, at his discretion, spare some of his ships to help in their transport. And he might give Hopson the necessary orders for his return.³

The preliminaries signed, these orders were cancelled. Hosier was directed now at once to acquaint the Spanish governors with the conditions and to act accordingly, sending in particular for the *Prince Frederick* from Vera Cruz and after everything was completed returning with his squadron to England. Wager was instructed that as soon as he had certain information of orders sent for raising

¹ To Dormer, 11 May, *ibid.*

² Wager, 3 May (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 79, Admiralty 1, 378. By the report of consul Lempriere the Spaniards had nine ships of 50 guns and upwards, six frigates, two fireships and six galleys. Madrid advices put the number gone out into the Bay at twelve, ten of from 80 to 36 guns and two frigates (Van der Meer, 12 May, cited).

³ Newcastle to Hosier and to Wager, 19 May (o.s.), R.O., S.P. Dom. Naval 80, 78, the former dispatch also B.M. Add. MS. 19332.

the siege of Gibraltar and cessation of all hostilities, and that those orders were complied with, he should forbear committing any hostilities. He must acquaint the governor of Cadiz and other Spanish officers, whom it might concern, that if they would restore persons ships and effects taken by way of reprisal embargo or otherwise then he would do the like. If more time were required for this than he could stay, he should send his prizes into Gibraltar and leave them there with one or more ships under command of Captain Stewart (of the *Burford*) as commodore. He himself, having repaired on the cessation of hostilities with his whole squadron to Gibraltar, must there settle everything and then return to England with as many of the land forces as he could conveniently carry. The dispatch ended with congratulation on the happy turn of affairs and wishes for a good voyage home.¹

Wager at the end of May had been of opinion that the Spaniards had in view not an expedition against England, but either junction of their Cadiz and Corunna squadrons or the dispatch of some of their ships to the West Indies. He doubted their venturing this, but if he had certain news of it would send after them two 60-gun ships, as ordered, although he could ill spare them. On 16 June he was in Lagos Bay for water and other necessities, having left one ship on the watch off Cape St. Vincent, and had word of the ships at Corunna having sailed. Seven French men-of-war, he learnt, had been there lately, bound for Cadiz. On the 18th he wrote :

I hope to sail in two days and shall go directly off Cadiz, where if the Spaniards think fit to see us we shall give them a fair opportunity. I can have but eight ships and the fireship with me ; if they are joyn'd, they will be about fourteen from 50 guns to 80, besides smaller, with two fire-ships and five or six gallies ; but I hope, if we are attacked by them, we shall behave ourselves as becomes us. If we had more ships, it would be better. If we can beat them with these, in the condition we are in, it will be the more honour to us.

On 23 June he learnt that the Spanish Corunna squadron had returned to port and observed that at Cadiz lying "above the Portalls," as before, and on the same day had first news of the signature of the preliminaries and suspension of hostilities by a dispatch from Van der Meer, transmitted by Castañeta. At a loss how to act "in so nice an affair" without specific instructions, and considering the unlikelihood of meeting any Spanish ships at sea and the fact that the war had begun about Gibraltar, he took for granted that the Spaniards would cease hostilities and determined to issue orders to his captains to that effect and to

¹ The same, 1 June (O.S.).

return to Gibraltar at once. Back there on 28 June he found entire cessation of arms both by land and sea.¹

Really, the attack upon Gibraltar had collapsed of itself. News had come to Lisbon by 6 June that although all the guns of Willis's battery had been dismantled, and most of those in the Queen's and on the Old Mole, repairs had speedily been or were being effected, while on the Spanish side twelve guns in the "Twelve Apostles" battery had melted under the heat of fire and so, in Burnett's phrase, were "disabled from working further miracles."² The next was of the Spanish army reduced to 6,000 men wholly disheartened, and of the 60 brass cannon only 14 left fit for service. Officers, it was said, were representing the enterprise as hopeless without a reinforcement of 30,000 men and a new train of artillery. The British again had 44 guns in action, besides mortars, while their table of casualties up to 24 May showed but 102 dead, 113 wounded, and 205 sick.³

The last orders to the British admirals and to Lord Portmore, in regard to suspension of hostilities, were duly submitted to and approved by the French court and sent on by Horatio Walpole for communication at Madrid by Van der Meer. They went no further.⁴ That ambassador explained in a letter to De la Paz of 5 July that he had been unable to present them because of the difference of Spanish disposition from that of England and France. He must wait fresh instructions, noting with concern that matters must proceed to a much greater length, unless the king of Spain would contribute to remove the difficulties raised about execution of the preliminary articles, which seemed so clear on the points in dispute as to admit of no doubt.⁵

In a dispatch of 12 July (o.s.), approving Wager's conduct in so readily assenting to a cessation of hostilities on the notices received, Newcastle supposed him to be now informed of the "unfair dealing" of Spain in refusing either to withdraw the forces from before Gibraltar and demolish the works, or to restore ships and effects, in spite of the agreement. In view of this, and perhaps

¹ Wager to Newcastle, 15 May to 18 June (o.s.), *ll.cc.*

² Burnett, 6 June, R.O. Portugal 34. The duke of Wharton was present at the siege as aide-de-camp to De las Torres. A news-letter of 16 May recounted how he had insisted on going forward into the trenches wearing his Garter riband and crying out "Vive le Prétendant," etc., and how, wounded in the toes by the explosion of a shell, he had required much brandy to restore him.

³ The same, 19 June.

⁴ The dispatch to Wager is endorsed: "This letter was sent to Mr Van der Meer, the Dutch amb^r at Madrid, to lye ready againste the king of Spain's giving his orders for executing the preliminaries; but was not made use of, another term having afterwards been agreed upon."

⁵ 5 July; translations, R.O. Spain 235 and B.M. Add. MS. 32750, the French, *Lettres historiques*, lxxii. 222-232.

of Spanish treachery—an attempt, for instance, to surprise Gibraltar—he must neither return nor send any ships home until the siege were raised and ships and effects restored, without, however, opening hostilities unless obliged by action of the Spaniards. Should they be so rash his squadron would be reinforced. One ship of 70 guns and two of 50 were ordered to be at Plymouth in readiness to sail.

A week later he was instructed that although the siege of Gibraltar would doubtless be raised there was absolute refusal to deliver up the *Prince Frederick* or other ships or effects seized. That being so, besides preventing junction of the Cadiz and Corunna squadrons, as previously ordered, if the galleons should have been released and be coming home and fall in his way, before the siege were raised or the restorations made, he must use his utmost endeavours to secure them or as many of them as he could, breaking for that purpose the suspension of hostilities but otherwise observing it.¹

Soon afterwards there was advice of the ships at Corunna having put to sea. Wager was then informed that for his better security the *Orford Weymouth* and *Preston* were being sent to reinforce him. On their arrival he must take up a station so as to prevent any attempt upon his Majesty's dominions, though without letting the Spaniards know that such was his object, and not molesting merchant ships or men-of-war, unless the latter should be in sufficient force to execute any design against Great Britain or the West Indies. If asked the reason for his dispositions he must say that they were intended to prevent any sudden outburst of the kind on the Spaniards' part. Should their force have got to sea with the objects apprehended he must follow and do his best to destroy it wherever encountered, and if it made for the West Indies must send his four sheathed ships and any others that were fit to reinforce Hosier.²

That admiral had stayed off Cape S. Antonio till want of water obliged him to return to seek it on the north coast of Cuba. He found some with great difficulty at Bahia Honda—a lagoon to be passed and then the casks rolled a mile through woods—and there a lieutenant and party were captured by the Spaniards. However, having seized several coasting vessels “and men off the shore” he was able to effect exchange at Havana. Back at Matanzas Bay he still found no ships there and his own so foul as to be unfit for cruising. Besides which his flagship, the *Bredah*, had sprung a serious leak, and his men were continually deserting

¹ Newcastle to Wager, 12 and 18 July (o.s.), R.O. S.P. Dom. Naval 78.

² Townshend to Wager, in Newcastle's absence, 5 August (o.s.), *ibid.*

to the Spaniards. So leaving the *Greyhound* on the look-out he sailed to join S^t Lo in the Windward Passage. If, he said, he attempted reprisals on the Spaniards they would retaliate on the ships of the South Sea Company. He had no answer yet from the viceroy of Mexico about the *Prince Frederick*, detained at Vera Cruz, and the strong fortifications of that place made it impossible to fetch her out. He had parted company with the *Ripon* on 13 May off Abico I., in squally weather, but had heard of the arrival of the *Berwick* and *Lenox* at Jamaica, the former in a sinking condition after running ashore. Next he wrote that he had joined his ships in the Windward Passage on 27 May; had heard nothing yet of the *Ripon*; and was now proceeding to Jamaica for provisions and stores; thence to go to Cartagena or return to Havana, according to intelligence received about the galleons.¹

Back at Port Royal on 11 June Hosier reported the *Berwick* capable of repair, but that neither she nor the *Lenox* could be manned for sea through sickness and desertion. "Another great misfortune" was that two lieutenants and 80 men of the latter ship had been sent off in a hired sloop to seek him at Havana. How to get men he could not tell; there was great difficulty also in procuring stores; and all his ships were very foul. The galleons were reported still at Cartagena and their convoy unrigged, but the two guardacostas careened had put to sea. In spite of his difficulties he hoped to sail thither in four days' time with the *Bredah*, *Superbe*, *Dunkirk*, *Nottingham* and *Diamond*, the *Lenox* to follow as soon as practicable but the *Ripon* still not arrived.² Back on his station his force was strengthened by the *Ripon* and *Greyhound*, of his own squadron, and by the *Portland* and *Tiger* from England, but remained without the *Berwick* and *Lenox*, for want of men.³

And so affairs continued for half a year. Philip V consented to ratify the preliminaries (3 August),⁴ but only subject to reference of all points contested to a congress.⁵ Rottembourg, sent to Madrid, could effect nothing. The siege of Gibraltar was not raised; interpretation of points in the preliminaries was disputed; the galleons and the *Prince Frederick* were not released. Wager still kept guard on Cadiz or harboured at Gibraltar; Hosier died on

¹ Hosier, 12 and 29 May (o.s.), S.P. Dom. Naval 80 and Admiralty 1, 230, received respectively 26 June and 15 July (o.s.).

² Hosier, 9 June (o.s.), received 7 September (o.s.), *ibid.* George Stone, supercargo of the *Swallow* sloop, reported as at Cartagena eleven galleons in indifferent condition outside the harbour, and of men-of-war one of 64 guns, two of 60, one of 48, one of 30, and one of 20.

³ The same, 15 July (o.s.), received 25 September (o.s.).

⁴ R.O. Treaties 488.

⁵ *Lettres historiques*, lxxii. 109.

his watch off Cartagena on 5 September, to be replaced in January 1728 by Hopson, now a vice-admiral. Not till compelled by financial straits, a dangerous illness of her husband, and the prospect of frustration of her Italian ambitions, would Elizabeth of Spain give in. Then, on 6 March 1728, the convention of the Prado confirmed the preliminaries with slight modifications and opened the way to the congress of Soissons.

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
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